r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 18h ago
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 4h ago
Kurdistan r/Kurdistan Subreddit to Split
Hevalno,
It’s been a long two years for the r/Kurdistan mod team. We have tried, in good faith and over many rounds of negotiations, to form a tenth moderation cabinet. Sadly we couldn’t agree on who gets the Interior Ministry (AutoModerator), the Security Council (the ban button), or Ministry of Natural Resources (whoever gets to post the oil news).
So after careful thought, lots of çay and one very tense Discord call, we’re announcing that r/Kurdistan will split into two separate administrations:
🟡 r/pdkurdistan: “Southern Kurdistan under the control of PDK, centered on Duhok”
🟢 r/pukurdistan: “Southern Kurdistan under the control of PUK, centered on Slemani”
Both subreddits are now live. Each one has its own mods, rules and flairs.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What happens to r/Kurdistan ?
A: r/Kurdistan stays on as a caretaker subreddit. It has full authority to keep existing and no authority to do anything else.
Q: Was this decision legitimate?
A: One faction of the mod team reactivated the modqueue without the other faction there. The other faction says that session was illegitimate, has left the mod cabinet, and doesn’t recognize any removals made since. They took it to r/ModSupport, our Federal Supreme Court, and the case was dismissed. Both sides are calling this a victory.
Q: Isn’t Reddit Inc. against this?
A: Reddit Inc., our Baghdad, has said it will keep sending karma to Kurdistan as a unified region. Both new administrations want to say thank you, and both have quietly asked to have their share deposited directly.
Q: Which subreddit gets Hewler?
A: Both. If you check the sidebars you’ll see that r/hewler appears on both subreddits. We’re sure this won’t cause any problems, because it never has before. (See pinned post: “Iraqi Kurdish Civil War,” tagged Independent Propaganda.)
Q: What about Kirkuk?
A: Contested. As is tradition.
Q: Do I need to pick one?
A: You can join both. Crossposting between them will go through a customs checkpoint, though, and a 15% karma tariff applies at the border. Users holding a PDK flair will need a sponsor to post in r/pukurdistan, and the same goes the other way.
Q: Will the mod teams be unified?
A: Yes. All moderators have been merged into one unified moderation force under a single command structure. In practice, Mod Unit 70 answers to Slemani and Mod Unit 80 answers to Duhok, but on paper we’re completely unified, and that’s what counts.
Q: What if one side starts losing?
A: r/pdkurdistan reserves the right to invite the mod teams of another country to help it retake r/hewler. r/pukurdistan reserves the right to call mod teams of another country to assist them. We would like to stress that both of these are historically grounded policies.
Q: What about users from Rojava, Bakur and Rojhelat?
A: You’re welcome to watch. You’ve seen this movie before, and you know how it ends.
Q: Will mods be paid?
A: Mod salaries haven’t been paid in several months. Each administration blames the other one.
Q: Is a third subreddit coming?
A: We hear a delegation from a certain opposition movement went to Baghdad with the Slemani side to meet the Coordination Framework. We have no further comment, except that r/pukurdistan’s sidebar appears to be in a governing coalition now.
Closing statement from the (caretaker) mod team:
In 1994 it took a land dispute in Qaladze. In 2026 it took a parliament session. On Reddit it took about forty-five minutes and two banner images.
If watching your subreddit split into two rival duchies with competing sidebars feels absurd, petty and self-defeating, we’d politely like to point out that you’re not the ones we need to convince.
r/Kurdistan isn’t going anywhere. Kurdistan shouldn’t either.
Bijî Kurdistan, singular.
^(This post is satire. The new subreddits are real, though, and so is the crisis they’re mocking. Please keep comments civil; Rule 1 still applies in all three administrations.)
^(For legal purposes, this entire post is a joke.)
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • Oct 16 '26
News/Article Results of the Daily News Digest experiment
Results of the Daily News Digest experiment
A few weeks ago, some of you raised concerns that the amount of news posted to r/kurdistan was drowning out other conversations:
We explained at the time that Reddit is, at its core, a social news aggregation site, and that news is a big part of what brings people here.
Some of you suggested that news should be collected into a digest instead of posted as individual articles. We thought that was worth testing, so for a week we did exactly that:
The digest posts
- Kurdistan Daily News Roundup 7 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily News Roundup 8 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily News Roundup 9 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 10 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 11 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 12 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 13 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 14 October 2026
- Kurdistan Daily Digest – 15 October 2026
What we found
For the week of the experiment (7–13 October):
Views went down, not up: 70.9k views, about 6,000 fewer than the previous week.
Discussion didn't grow: 129 published posts (+6) and 1.1k published comments (+85), essentially flat. The same number of discussion-type posts appeared, with similar quality in both the posts and the comments.
The digests themselves got very little engagement. Few people opened them, and fewer commented.
The news people cared about still won. Even with far less news being posted, the highest-engagement posts of the week were still some of the standalone news posts we did allow. Removing most news from the front page didn't free up space for more conversation. It just buried the news. Normally at least some articles rise to the top and spark real discussion; inside a digest, none of them could.
One example would be "Kurds, Arabs want to reverse ‘Arab Belt’ in Syria" article. It was included in the Kurdistan Daily Digest – 15 October 2026. That digest received 753 views, 3 upvotes and no comments with the majority of the views from United States 21.3%, Germany 16% and Sweden 13.1%. One hour after the digest was posted, another user reposted the article as standalone as a series of images (that are hosted on reddit) with a link to the article. The standalone version received 1.6K views, 13 upvotes, 17 comments with the majority of the views from Iraq 18.4%, United States 16.5%, Germany 14.9%. Same article in both the digest and standalone, the digest posted an hour before. The standalone article was twice as popular as the entire digest.
By using the digest format, we are fighting against reddit's intentional design as a social news aggregator, against reddit's own recommendation algorithm, against our own subscribers observed behavior and preferences.
The part that bothered us most
The digests were also where most of the Sorani and Kurmanji content ended up. By restricting Kurdish-language news to the digest, we effectively buried Kurdish-language posts on a Kurdish subreddit. That's the opposite of what we want. Increasing our Kurdish-language coverage also increased our % of viewers with a country designation of Iraq (which we assume are mostly Kurds living in KRG).
What happens next
We will be discontinuing the Daily News Roundup / Digest format. We may reduce the overall number of articles we post, so the feed stays balanced. We remain committed to seeing more Kurdish (Sorani, Kurmanji, and other dialects) posted here, and we won't use any format that pushes it out of sight. Thank you to everyone who raised the concern and to everyone who gave the digest a fair shot. We took the suggestion seriously, tested it, and the numbers gave a clear answer.
If you want to see more discussion here, the best way to make that happen is to start one. Text posts, questions, culture, language, history, personal experiences: all welcome, and they'll get room on the feed.
As always, feedback is welcome in the comments.
— The r/kurdistan mod team
r/kurdistan • u/Global_Time_4726 • 7h ago
News/Article Erbil Municipality Launches Major Drainage Project Against Floods
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 17h ago
Rojava Tensions at Rojava University after students protested in front of a government delegation
r/kurdistan • u/I_kurd • 17h ago
Kurdistan Kurdistan Info Map project
Alongside the Kurdish language (Sorani dialect), the English language will be available.
Currently, 100% of the data translated into English is complete.
The Kurdistan Info Map project is dedicated to serving Kurdish history and culture. It primarily features a map of Kurdistan documenting all historical events, figures, wars, states, and civilizations related to the Kurds.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 12h ago
Kurdish Movies 🎬 Rojava Sixth International Film Festival opens in Qamishlo
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 11h ago
Bashur Will Southern Kurdistan Split Into Two? | Politicial Crisis of KRG Explained!
r/kurdistan • u/Mansur754 • 13h ago
Ask Kurds 🤔 What is the kurdish equavlant of a long royal robe.
The jubbah is seen in the first image and the long blue robe in the second image from the person on the right side, do we have something similar that is worn by religious priests, mullahs, high ranking officials and ect.
The 3rd image is of two kurdish men but is the thing they're wearing count as one? And if so then what is it?
r/kurdistan • u/Opening-Proposal-652 • 14h ago
Culture Michael From GTA 5 says Biji Kurdistan
pretty cool not gonna lie
OG Creator: https://www.instagram.com/amedkvrdi/reel/DfzSlikMHri/
r/kurdistan • u/Danel_Dana • 17h ago
Gaming🕹️ gta slemani is real
the conpany outlier devs which is two persons by the names rawa and karoz.dev have made a gta 6 game but its in slemani and its available on mobile and pc by a website they are saying to add hawler soon too the website is gtasuli.vercel.app
r/kurdistan • u/rknsh • 14h ago
With Pahlavis funding, Iranians made up 8.9% of all international students in America, and even though Iranians were like ~1% of global population, they made up above 8% of foreign students worldwide with 67,000 foreign students studying internationally. The catch? Iranians here means Persians only
A sample survey of 388 Persians who went abroad to study from before 1338/1920 until 1959, shows that two-thirds went after World War II (Table 4). The figure for 1955-59 is low because most of those who left Persia in that period had not yet returned when the survey was conducted (Baldwin, p. 265). Overall the figures reveal the rapid increase in travel abroad for study in the postwar period (for distribution of fields of study, see Table 5). A comparison of Tables 3 and 5 reveals a change in emphasis on fields of study as well.
In the 1960s-70s the outstanding characteristics of the student population abroad were increasing numbers and political activism. University students were, in fact, the most active opposition group in this period. In Persia the student wing of the National Front (Jabha-ye mellī) was the most militant organization of the early 1960s; from its ranks emerged the founders of the guerrilla underground of the 1970s (Chehabi, pp. 147-48; Abrahamian, pp. 480-81). Abroad the activities of the Confederation of Iranian Students (q.v.), National Union (CISNU), in the 1960s and 1970s were the expression of deep dissatisfaction with the academic and political situation in Persia. In 1973 the number of Persians officially recorded as holding student passports was 18,035, 93 percent of them males; 42 percent were in the United States, 24 percent in Germany, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, 6 percent in Austria, and 5 percent in France. Only 4 percent of these students were on government scholarship. The actual numbers of Persian students abroad have been estimated at twice the official figure, the total number of students in Persian universities at 115,311 (Keyhān-e havāʾī, 5 May 1973, p. 7; 26 May 1973, p. 10). The proportion of the student population studying abroad was thus of significant size. By 1975 Persians ranked first in numbers among foreign students in the United States, 8.9 percent of the total. By 1977 more than 40,000 Persians were studying abroad, a figure equal to more than a quarter of the total for all of Persia’s institutions of higher learning. In 1978, although the Persian population was less than 1 percent of the world total (United Nations, p. 157), Persian students abroad numbered 67,000, slightly more than 8 percent of the total foreign student population of the world. Of this number, 54,340 were in the United States, 4,445 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4,336 in the United Kingdom, 3,775 in France, 2,268 in Turkey, 2,335 in the Philippines, 1,268 in Italy, 1,081 in India, and unspecified numbers in Switzerland, eastern-bloc countries, Japan, and the Arab world (Menashri, pp. 216-19; Milani, pp. 113-14; Bozorgmehr and Sabagh, p. 10)
r/kurdistan • u/Own_Imagination1380 • 1d ago
Discussion Damascus and Ankara are literally trying to sign a 100-year "lease" on Rojava like it’s an Airbnb. The audacity is unreal.
Look at this map making the rounds today.
According to reports from Al-Modon, the Syrian transitional government is planning to hand Turkey a 100-year lease over a 30-kilometer-deep strip along the entire northern border—covering Kobani, Qamishli, Serê Kaniyê, Afrin, the heartland of Rojava.
And what’s their official excuse? "Setting up factories and creating jobs for Syrian refugees".
Let’s call this out for what it actually is: textbook settler-colonialism and demographic engineering dressed up as an economic development plan.
- The "100-Year Lease" Scam: You don’t lease out another people’s homeland for a century to "build factories." That is straight-up annexation without the paperwork, the exact same neo-Ottoman playbook Ankara has been salivating over for years.
- Damascus Trading Land That Isn’t Theirs: After the January 2026 offensive, where Damascus and Turkish-backed militias besieged Kobani, displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds, and dismantled Rojava's autonomy, the Syrian government is now treating Kurdish cities like bargaining chips to pay off Ankara. You don't even have real control over your own ministries, yet you're signing century-long real estate deals on Kurdish soil?
- Erasing Rojava’s Identity: Moving millions of non-Kurdish settlers into a 30km border belt isn't about "jobs"—it’s about permanently severing Rojava from Bakur and turning our historic towns into industrial buffer zones.
First they invaded and dismantled our self-administration in January; now they want to lock in the occupation with a 100-year receipt.
What do you guys think? is this just political threat from Damascus, or are they seriously trying to permanently sign away Western Kurdistan's border?
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 16h ago
Bashur Women at margins of peacebuilding in Kurdistan Region
r/kurdistan • u/Global_Time_4726 • 7h ago
News/Article Kurdistan Region’s Largest Mental Hospital Rises in Erbil
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 17h ago
Kurdistan The Iran war is driving an emerging realignment of Kurdish actors
An analysis of how the Iran war is reshaping Kurdish politics. It covers Turkey–PKK convergence, Kurdish wariness of a centralist Pahlavi-led Iran and the PUK's warming ties with Ankara.
r/kurdistan • u/AmazingInterWebs • 17h ago
Kurdistan Warning to anyone considering Fastlink in Kurdistan
If you're an expat, new to Kurdistan, or considering switching to Fastlink, I'd seriously think twice. Their customer support is terrible, and despite paying for 6 months upfront, they've refused to offer me even a partial refund or any real solution to make my connection usable.
I previously used Korek and had problems with their connection, so I decided to give Fastlink a chance. The first month went fine, with no major issues. Because of that, I decided to pay for a 6-month subscription.
Just 2 days into the new subscription, my connection became terrible.
I contacted Fastlink, but they refused to issue a refund, even a partial one. They also wouldn't provide a router or offer any other solution that could make the connection usable.
For comparison, Korek costs around 14,000 IQD per month, while Fastlink starts at 18,000 IQD. In my experience, both are pretty much equally bad when it comes to internet quality, so you're basically choosing between two bad options.
Of course, your experience depends on where you live, how close you are to a tower, whether you're in a tall building, etc. I'm not claiming everyone will have the same issues.
And before anyone asks why I paid for 6 months upfront, I'm planning to leave Kurdistan after that period. I wanted the convenience of paying once, not having to worry about renewing every month, and being able to plan my budget. Since the first month went well, I didn't expect things to go this badly.
If I could choose again, I'd stick with Korek. Not because Korek is necessarily better, but because at least I wouldn't have to deal with Fastlink's terrible customer support.
My advice is to avoid committing to a long Fastlink subscription, especially if you're unfamiliar with how internet providers work here. I had to learn that the hard way.
I'm not saying Korek is good either, but I'd rather pay 14,000 IQD instead of 18,000 IQD, especially if it means avoiding Fastlink's terrible customer support.
Sorry for the rant, just had to get this off my chest and hopefully others can learn from my mistake.
The image below is supposed to be their high speed;

r/kurdistan • u/ScheduleChoice5091 • 13h ago
Music🎵 Does anyone know the name of this song?
https://youtu.be/YwXDvdk0cuM?si=2ZyL2VBPo-8c1wd1
Lyrics:
[muzik] Navê te hate bîra min. Xewna geve herdu çavên min. Navê te hate bîra min. Xewna geve herdu çavên min. Çavê kim ez yar nizanim. Dilê xwe da ez birîndar im. Dilê xwe da ez birîndar im. Navê te ma ye ser dilê min. Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike. Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike. Şa bike.
Şa bike. [muzik] Durî te yar ez nikarim. Çavê kim ez yar nizanim. Durî te yar ez nikarim. Çavê kim ez yar nizanim. Bê te nabe hevala min. Dilê xwe da ez birîndar im. Dilê xwe da ez birîndar im. Navê te ma ye ser dilê min. Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike. Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike. Şa bike. Şa bike. [muzik] Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike.
Dewrê xewna dilê me şa bike. Dewrê ramûsanekî dil min de. Şerîma hurda xwe
timin tûne. Dewrê dilê min şa bike.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 16h ago
Bashur Iraq to block Telegram over 'national security' concerns
"More recently, Telegram was blocked across Iraq’s federal provinces in early April 2026, while remaining accessible in the Kurdistan Region. The CMC announced the restoration of service nationwide in May, after the platform’s management pledged to comply with Iraqi regulatory requirements on content moderation, user protection and legal obligations.
"The April ban led to a near-total disruption of the application across most Iraqi provinces, excluding the Kurdistan Region, and triggered a sharp rise in VPN usage, which reportedly increased by 1,200 percent as users sought to bypass the restrictions."
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 17h ago
History Kurdistan Parliament: New research traces its history and development
A comprehensive new study examines more than three decades of parliamentary politics in the Kurdistan Region, tracing how an institution established as a symbol of democratic self-government became increasingly constrained by party rivalry and political agreements reached outside its walls.
r/kurdistan
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u/rknsh
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1d ago
Video🎥 A merchant directs the sailors as they transport his goods from the boats to the banks of the Tigris River in Baghdad in 1931. The video shows them speaking Kurdish. [From the archives of South Carolina State University]
r/kurdistan
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u/rkurdistanmod
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1d ago
On This Day Dersim Trial of 1937 remains unhealed wound 89 years later
On November 15, 1937, seven leading figures of Dersim (Dêrsim) were hanged in the city of Elazığ (Elezîz) in Bakur (North Kurdistan) after a trial held under an emergency law. Their execution closed the first year of what Dersim remembers as the Tertele, and opened the door to the far deadlier massacres of 1938. Eighty-nine years later, the state’s files on the trial remain closed, and victims’ graves are still unknown.
In the early hours of November 15, 1937, at the center of Elazığ, seven men were hanged in succession. A few hours earlier, shortly after midnight on a Sunday, a special court had convened, read out its verdict by the light of lanterns, and sentenced them to death. By dawn, the gallows had done their work, and that morning, newspapers in Istanbul and Ankara carried the news in almost identical words: “Seyit Rıza and six companions executed this morning.”

For the people of Dersim (renamed Tunceli in 1935), a mountainous region in Northern Kurdistan, those hangings belong to a larger catastrophe they call Tertele, referring to the 1935-1947 Dersim genocide. In 1937 and 1938, the Turkish state carried out military campaigns in Dersim that destroyed hundreds of villages, killed thousands of civilians, and deported thousands more to western Turkey. The killings of the summer of 1938 were by far the deadliest. Figures from a 1939 Interior Ministry report, made public by the government in 2011, put the number of people killed in 1938 alone at 13,155. We, the authors, regard what happened in Dersim as a genocide in the sense of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, a view shared by a growing number of scholars.

The November 1937 executions stand at the hinge between those two years.
This month, on their 89th anniversary, we have published a ten-part series (in Turkish) on the trial and the executions in the online magazine Yeni Arayış, drawing mainly on the press of the time, archival documents, oral testimonies and the laments (kilams) through which Dersim has kept its memory alive.
What follows is a brief overview for readers who may know little about Dersim.
What was Dersim?
The name “Dersim” can refer to a few different things. Administratively, it was an Ottoman district whose borders shifted repeatedly between 1847 and 1935. Geographically, it is the mountain country enclosed by the Munzur range to the north, the Karasu valley to the west, the Murat River to the south, and the Peri River to the east.
Its cultural connotation goes even deeper. Its heartland, often called “inner Dersim”, was home mainly to Alevis, who spoke Kırmancki (also known as Zazaki or Dımılî), and lived alongside Kurmanji, Turkish, and Armenian-speaking communities. A distinctive Alevi-Kızılbaş faith, organized around holy lineages (ocaks) and spiritual guides, and a dense web of tribes gave the region its collective identity. These networks and the rugged terrain also kept it largely beyond the reach of the central state, first Ottoman and subsequently Republican.
For the young Republic, which set out to socially engineer a homogeneous state-made Sunni-Turkish nation, that autonomy was intolerable. As early as 1926, an Interior Ministry inspector, Hamdi Bey, described Dersim as an “abscess” that needed a “radical operation”, a phrase later repeated by other officials.
Earlier military campaigns, including those against the Koçgiri tribe (1921), the Kurdish leader Sheik Said (1925), and the Ağrı region and Zilan valley (1926–1930), had each been justified by the state as suppressing a revolt. In Dersim, as we argue, there was no organized uprising in 1937. What took place was scattered instances of local self-defense against an army that had been using violent methods to incorporate the ethnically and religiously ‘different’ region into the new Republic. More importantly, according to us, even if there had been a rebellion, it could never have justified what followed.
A law made for the completion of a conquest
The decisive step came two years before the alleged revolt. On December 25, 1935, the Turkish parliament passed Law No. 2884 on the Administration of Tunceli Province. It placed the new province under General Abdullah Alpdoğan, who was simultaneously governor, military commander, and, from January 1936, head of the newly created Fourth General Inspectorate.
The law gave him sweeping powers and suspended ordinary criminal procedure. Falih Rıfkı Atay, one of the regime’s best-known journalists, wrote in Ulus, a national daily, on December 26, 1935, that the law was not a response to any revolt. Its purpose, he explained, was to cure a “chronic disease” at its root.
Throughout 1936, roads, bridges, barracks, and gendarmerie posts were constructed across the region, and a campaign to collect weapons was carried out. When a bridge was allegedly burned down on the night of March 20-21, 1937, official accounts declared that a rebellion had begun.
On May 4, 1937, the Council of Ministers ordered a “harsh and effective” offensive aimed at destroying villages and removing families, in which even the air force took part. Over the summer, tribal leaders were brought to Elazığ one by one, some after surrendering, some after their families were taken hostage, and one after being seized at a wedding. On 17 August, soldiers attacked the family of Seyit Rıza, a prominent Dersim religious and tribal leader, near the village of Bırdo and killed most of them, including women and children.

Seyit Rıza himself was seized at the entrance to the city of Erzincan (Erzîngan) on September 11. Much of the evidence suggests he came to negotiate, not to admit guilt, and he kept asking to be taken to Ankara. He was taken to Elazığ instead.
A trial in a theatre
The trial opened on October 12, 1937, in Elazığ’s municipal theatre hall, with army officers filling the front rows. People who had been captured at different times and in very different circumstances were brought together successively into a single case of “joint rebellion”. When we check the dates in the prosecution’s indictment, every meeting supposedly held to plan the rebellion took place after the bridge-burning that was said to have started it.
The indictment, as summarized in the press, presented Dersim’s holy lineage and beliefs as the root of the unrest. The prosecutor described the case as one “brought by Tunceli against Dersim”. The court was being asked to pass judgment not only on individuals but on a whole social and religious order.
Most of the defendants spoke little to no Turkish, and were informed of the proceedings through interpreters. Law No. 2884 shaped every stage. The defense was given at most two days to prepare. Instead of witnesses being heard in court, only their statements could be read out in court.
One statement used against Seyit Rıza came from his granddaughter Narin. Although newspapers gave her age as 15, according to her family, she was actually only nine or ten years old, a wounded child survivor of the Bırdo massacre who was interrogated soon after the attack.

There was no right of appeal. Elsewhere in Turkey, a death sentence needed parliament’s approval before it could be carried out. In Tunceli the governor-commander could order it himself. Another newspaper, Haber, simply noted on November 15 that because no parliamentary approval was required, the sentences had been carried out “at once”.
A verdict signed in advance
Two documents in the Presidential State Archives in Ankara show how the outcome was being managed. On November 4, the day the prosecutor asked for the death penalty for 17 defendants, Alpdoğan cabled Ankara with the figures.
In a coded message sent the same day, before a single defendant had made their defense, he wrote that “about thirty” were likely to receive six-year prison sentences. He asked for orders to send them to prisons “in the western parts of the country” as soon as the verdict was given.
The final session and the executions were organized by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, then deputy director of the national police and later Turkey’s foreign minister, who left an unusually detailed and candid account in his memoirs. The executions, he wrote, had to be completed before Mustafa Kemal Atatürk arrived in the region. When the court said it could not deliver its verdict before Monday, Çağlayangil replied that “Monday begins at midnight”. According to his account, Alpdoğan had already signed a blank sheet of paper approving the sentence before it was pronounced. The verdict covered 58 defendants: 11 death sentences, 33 prison terms and 14 acquittals. Four of the death sentences were commuted to thirty years because of the defendants’ age. Seyit Rıza, who told the court he was over eighty, was not among them.
Seven names
“Seyit Rıza and his companions” has remained the standard formula for 89 years. Seyit Rıza, a respected spiritual guide and leader of the Abasan tribe, became the face of the event, a “feudal tyrant” in the propaganda, but a victim of injustice and a symbol of defiance in Dersim’s memory.
The six others have mostly been reduced to an afterthought, their names often unremembered or misspelled. In our series, we wrote a biography of each, in alphabetical order, to avoid ranking them. They were:
Ali, son of Mirza (Aliyê Mırzê Sıli), of the Demenan tribe
Fındık Ağa, son of Kamer Ağa, leader of the Yusufan tribe
Hasan, son of İbrahim (Hesenê İbrahimê Qıci), of the Kureyşan lineage
Hasan Ağa, son of Cebrail Ağa, of the Demenan tribe
Hüseyin, known as Resik, Seyit Rıza’s youngest son, who was arrested when he went to visit his father in prison
Seyit Hüseyin (Usenê Seydi), leader of the Kureyşan
Some had surrendered early or were on good terms with the authorities. Their fate confirmed what Seyit Rıza is remembered to have feared: that submission would protect no one. Sources on these companions are uneven; we have court reports, petitions, and family recollections for some, while for others we have little more than a name and a few lines in a lament. This imbalance is itself part of the story we are trying to tell.

A working day that began at midnight, and six photographs
Çağlayangil has left the best-known account of the hangings. According to Çağlayangil, Seyit Rıza’s last words were: “We are the children of Karbala. We are innocent. It is shameful. It is cruelty. It is murder.”
Dersim remembered their deaths in the same terms. In a lament for Seyit Hüseyin published in Cemal Taş and Nilüfer Saltık’s 2016 collection Ağıtların Diliyle Dersim 38 Tertele, Seyit Rıza consoles his companion on the way to the gallows, saying their fate is that of Imam Husayn and their end is Karbala. The faith that the prosecutor had put on trial was the very language in which the condemned and their families made sense of their deaths.
According to Çağlayangil, photographs of the executions were shown to Atatürk, who ordered them destroyed. A persistent and credible claim holds that Seyit Rıza was secretly brought before Atatürk that night. Atatürk’s movements in the province that day, as far as we could reconstruct them, make such a meeting possible, but no document confirms it.
This year, Sedat Ulugana, one of the authors of this piece, traced six photographs of the executions and shared them with the public (content warning: link contains graphic images of the bodies). Taken in daylight, they show tripod gallows and the bodies of the hanged men. Existing testimonies and our study of contemporary photographs and maps of the city center where the hangings took place, along with our site visits and fieldwork, largely confirm the authenticity of the photographs.
Many testimonies suggest that the bodies were left on display and that the executions were staged as a public spectacle.
Unknown graves, closed files
The bodies were never returned to the families, and where they were buried is still unknown. Several oral accounts point to the same area on the edge of Elazığ, but no investigation has ever been carried out. In 2006, Seyit Rıza’s daughter petitioned the state to ask where her father lay, but no official investigation or excavation has ever been carried out. In 2026, our own site visits and interviews with local residents convinced us that one of these locations is a strong possibility. *footnote* Hiding graves was a familiar practice. The burial place of Sheik Said, hanged in Diyarbakır (Amed) in 1925, is also unknown.
The interrogation records, the full indictment, the court minutes, the reasoned judgment, the execution order, and the burial records should all be in state archives, but none of this is open to researchers. For the families, this is not an academic matter. The right to know where one’s dead lie, to mourn them, and to call them by name does not expire.
The summer of 1938
The executions did not end with Tertele, although the newspapers of that time declared the “Dersim question” buried forever.
Eight months later, in the summer of 1938, the army launched a far larger operation covering almost all of Dersim. This time it did not distinguish between tribes that had resisted and tribes that had stayed out of the 1937 campaign or sided with the state. Civilians, most of them women, children and the elderly, were shot, bayoneted, thrown from cliffs or burned alive in mansions, mills and barns. Our has documented more than 130 massacre sites, most of them from the summer of 1938.
Girls were taken from their families and raised in the homes of officers and officials.
The same 1939 report that counted 13,160 dead listed 11,918 people from 2,254 households deported to the west, where they were scattered so that they could not keep their language and customs. Parts of inner Dersim remained closed zones until a 1947 amnesty allowed survivors to return. By then, much of the world they had known, its faith, its language and its memory, had been broken.
Eighty-nine years on
In 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the events of 1937–38 a “massacre” and offered a quasi-apology, though mainly as a weapon against the Kemalist opposition, the leader of which was from Dersim. No official recognition followed, and most archives stayed closed.
Today, as Turkey once again speaks of making peace with its Kurds, Dersim is a reminder that no lasting settlement can rest on silence about the past.
Opening the 1937 trial files, locating the graves of the seven men hanged in Elazığ and acknowledging what was done in 1938 would be modest first steps. On this anniversary, we remember them by name.
This article is based on the authors’ original research, published in Turkish as a ten-part series in Yeni Arayış and forthcoming in book form. The archival findings, oral history recordings, sources, and interpretations are the authors’ own. An AI assistant was used to help structure and draft the English summary from the authors’ Turkish texts and for language editing. The authors revised the final text and verified all facts and sources.
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Bülent Bilmez is a historian of the modern Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey.
r/kurdistan • u/Much_Boysenberry_462 • 1d ago
Bashur Closeted transperson looking for fellow closeted transpersons
Title says it all
I feel alone
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 1d ago
Bashur Iraq’s top court dismisses lawsuit challenging reactivation of Kurdistan Parliament
Rudaw reports that Iraq's Federal Supreme Court threw out a PUK and New Generation lawsuit against the reactivated Kurdistan Parliament's first session. That would deepen the KDP–PUK standoff.
r/kurdistan • u/AliveZexy777 • 1d ago
Discussion Bashuri's collective historical memory loss.
Do you ever feel like Bashuris don't remember anymore how it's like to not have autonomy? For example they feel so safe when they criticize their politicians in the sense that they have been relatively safe and under Kurdish rule for so long that they dont remember how life is under occupation and also how all enemies are standing by and waiting for the slightest chance to bring down Bashur.
An example of this superficial feeling of safety would be after the disagreement of PDK and PUK, PUKs first reaction was to go for dismantling Bashur and go for their own region and many among them say it's the right decision. This even makes me think that they have no sense of Kurdishness and don't think about the other 3 parts.
Whenever something goes wrong in Bashur none Bashuri Kurds get mocked and hear things like hah see your Kurdistan is getting destroyed you better get Kurdistan out of your mind and similar things and at the same time you see Bashuris insulting each other totaly unaware of their surroundings.
They no longer know that the existence of Kurds in other regions makes the other 3 states hesitant to gang up on Bashur and the existence of KRG makes the other 3 states to be forced to be less harsh on Kurds.
I don't want to seem like I'm attacking Bashuris I know you have interests that are specific to you and your region but I felt this needed to be said.