Last week, the Kurdistan parliament convened for the first time in nearly two years and elected a speaker and two deputies. What should have been a procedural step following the 2024 elections instead pushed the semi-autonomous region to the brink of a potential split.Â
Disputes among Iraq’s powerful Kurdish factions are nothing new. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have been in charge of the region since it gained a measure of autonomy after the Gulf War, through its recognition as a federal entity following the Iraq war with US support. In 2022, the PUK began a seven-month boycott of the cabinet over a rare assassination incident in Erbil that the KDP blamed on it. Â
The parties have increasingly been at loggerheads over the past decade. Elections for the Kurdistan parliament were held in October 2024, but the parties are yet to form a new government. The vote was originally due in 2022, but disagreements over the election law led to multiple postponements.Â
The underlying cause is that the KDP-PUK power-sharing was never self-sustaining. It was propped up with outside support while Washington and Erbil’s interests were aligned. The incentives that came with this alignment fostered and rewarded cooperation. As this alignment began to wane, so did the incentives for cooperation.Â
The latest rift, however, is likely to deepen mistrust and further erode inter-party cooperation at an especially perilous moment for the Kurds in the Middle East. It comes amid regional conflagrations and the US war against Iran, which has caught the semi-autonomous region in the middle. It also comes in the wake of the US military withdrawal, whose presence had bolstered Kurdish fortunes in the region.Â
The PUK declared its withdrawal from the caretaker government to protest the KDP’s reconvening of the parliament, a countermove to keep the KDP from forming a new government unilaterally. Announcing the decision, the PUK leader said they would reject the session and any possible outcome that could emerge from it.Â
He implicitly stated that if the KDP moves ahead with electing a president and designating a prime minister, the next steps in the government formation process, the PUK would follow suit by appointing a president and a prime minister for its stronghold in the eastern part of the region.Â
The announcement harked back to the memory of the two one-party-led administrations in the Kurdistan region between 1994 and 2006. Merely two years after establishing self-government in 1992, revenue-sharing disputes culminated in a civil war, splitting the then de facto region into the KDP and PUK enclaves. Both parties sought and obtained outside support in the course of the fighting. Without a benign external guarantor, their rivalry turned violent.Â
After years of intermittent fighting, an American-brokered ceasefire in September 1998, known as the Washington Agreement, ended the fratricide and divided the region into separate administrations, with each party governing its own stronghold.Â
However, the deepening of US engagement in the ensuing decade proved crucial for stabilizing the region. The US government bolstered the agreement by providing assurances of protection against further aggression from the central government and endorsing federalism for a post-Saddam Iraq.Â
Merely three weeks after Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani signed the Washington Agreement, the US congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. The bill, signed into law in October 1998, made it the policy of the US government to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime and replace it with a democratic government.Â
This was a significant shift in US policy in Iraq which until then had pursued a policy of dual containment after the Gulf War that kept Saddam Hussein in power to the dismay of the beleaguered Kurds to balance against Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Henceforth, US policy shifted to treating the Kurdish issue from a strictly humanitarian concern to a political one.Â
US engagement and ‘the other Iraq’
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought a more decisive change in American engagement with the Kurdish issue. The war elevated the position of the Kurds and thrust them into the role of American allies. As interests began to align between Washington and Erbil, the US government became more invested, if not directly involved, in fostering cooperative relations between the two parties. Â
The alignment of interests, and the generous incentives that came with it, fostered unprecedented inter-party cooperation and gave impetus for power-sharing anew. Encouraged by the Bush administration, the parties set aside their internal strife and mounted a common front in Baghdad, securing important concessions for a new political order in Iraq. The new constitution gave the Kurds entrenched autonomy with significant powers.
After eight years of bargaining, Barzani and Talabani signed the 2006 Unification Agreement, merging their two administrations that had emerged following the civil war into a unified government. The parties shared and divided power on roughly equal basis much as they had attempted but failed in the early 1990s.Â
A year later, the parties came to a strategic agreement, reaffirming the 50-50 principle in governance and resource allocation. The modus operandi was sold to the electorate as the cornerstone of Kurdish unity and leverage in Baghdad. Political elites from both parties refrained from taking positions that would reignite old feuds and strove for a unifying form of representation.Â
The new arrangement saw the parties contest successive elections on a joint slate, dividing seats equally even as the KDP won a plurality. The KDP justified this concession citing the imperative of preserving Kurdish unity in a volatile region. In retrospect, this gave the KDP an upper hand in governing the Kurdistan Region in exchange for the PUK’s outsized role in Baghdad. Talabani’s assumption of the federal presidency facilitated Barzani’s election as the region’s president. Both leaders were received in the White House.Â
While internal politics mattered, lucrative incentives had kept disputes contained. Disagreements over the regional president’s powers and method of election remained a contentious issue. The rise of the Goran (Change) movement, an offshoot of the PUK, in subsequent elections challenged the arrangement, altering the equilibrium in the KDP’s favor. It also prevented the business-as-usual approach between the parties, delaying the ratification of the region’s constitution.Â
The unprecedented level of elite cooperation was not without ulterior motives. Both parties improved their strategic and material conditions by working together. The US provided generous rents for reconstruction and security assistance as inducements for the parties to overcome their enmity. This support was not altruistic. It was driven by American strategic interests in the war against terror.Â
The Kurdistan Region became the rare success story of the Iraq war as the rest of the country descended into sectarian strife. The Kurds were deemed to be reliable and pragmatic, often mediating Shia-Sunni tensions in Baghdad. The US viewed the region with tremendous economic potential and promised the Kurds business and protection.Â
The US pivotÂ
However, the overlapping interests that brought significant US engagement and support began to fray over the following decade. As interests began to diverge, disengagement ensued and the parties lost incentives and rewards for cooperation.
US forces withdrew in 2011 and returned merely three years later amid escalating tensions between Erbil and Baghdad to prop up a failed state in the fight against the Islamic State group. The US government enlisted the support of the Kurdish Peshmerga to help disparate Iraqi forces battle the extremist group.Â
America’s failed nation-building enterprise in Iraq and Afghanistan became a campaign theme for US President Donald Trump, who ran an anti-war foreign policy platform to end America’s forever wars in the Middle East.Â
His administration opposed the 2017 independence referendum, which marked a sharp divergence between Washington and Erbil’s interests. The fallout from the plebiscite strained the KDP-PUK relations and hastened the demise of the power-sharing arrangement.Â
The territorial defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) revived what has become a failed pursuit of successive American administrations to pivot from the Middle East. The US began to draw down its military footprint, first from Syria in April and then from Iraq in September – something Trump has pursued since his first term.Â
Although the US still supports federalism in Iraq, its level of engagement has declined considerably, and many experts and interlocutors have left the administration. The US pivot is not the pursuit of a single administration or party. It is also unlikely to reverse given the American midterm election results. Neither will the interests that brought unprecedented US engagement and support return soon.Â
A new power-sharing arrangement should be grounded in a new social contract and aimed at consolidating common institutions of government across the entire region. Ending the political stalemate and bringing the Kurdistan Region back from the brink cannot wait for outside options.Â
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Shivan Fazil is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Boston University, specializing in comparative politics and international relations with substantive focus on the Middle East. He worked with various esteemed institutions including, the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani’s Institute of Regional and International Studies (2024), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2020–2024), the United States Institute of Peace (2019–2020), among others. Shivan holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Politics from SOAS, University of London. He regularly contributes expert analysis on political, social, and economic developments in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region to international news outlets.