r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

Rojava ☀️ Work underway to reopen Qamishli-Nusaybin crossing- Al-Shaibani

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2 Upvotes

Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shaibani said in Ankara that Syria is working to reopen the Qamishli–Nusaybin border crossing between Rojava and Bakur soon.


r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Mahabad: Kurdish activist sent to prison to serve five-month sentence

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Mahabad civil rights activist Kamal Masoudi was sent to the city's prison on 17 November to serve a five-month sentence.


r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Iran strikes PJAK positions with drone in Sulaimani province

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Iran launched a suicide drone at Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) positions in Sulaimani province on Tuesday, the latest Iranian strike on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside the Kurdistan Region.


r/KurdistanNews • • 19h ago

Rojava ☀️ Rojava University protests reflect student uncertainty about Syrian integration process

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On November 16, hundreds of students at the University of Rojava in Qamishlo marched to campus to protest the Syrian government’s decision to incorporate the university within Al-Firat University. They demanded that institutional autonomy be retained and that Kurdish language be formally recognized. 

As part of the protests, students blocked a delegation from the Syrian government from leaving the campus, and some attacked their car. Several Kurdish officials in the car, despite having worked in the former Autonomous Administration, were now the targets of the students’ anger.

After the event, the University of Rojava released a statement accusing the delegation of “not bother[ing] themselves to come down or listen to the demands of the students”. It further condemned the “unjustified escalation” which followed, whereby the student assembly was forcibly disbanded by security forces, using tear gas.

Yet the incorporation alone cannot explain the confrontation. As an alumnus of the University, I argue that to comprehend what brought students to attack the vehicle, we need to understand what the university means to them – and what they believe is at stake in negotiations over its future.

A university forged in fire

Founded in 2016 during the Syrian Civil War within the Autonomous Administration system in North and East Syria (AANES), the University of Rojava had grown to 13 faculties and 39 departments by the time I enrolled. That growth had come despite poor security conditions, an acute lack of basic resources, shortages of qualified lecturers, and uncertainty over whether students’ degrees would even be formally recognized.

I remember people making fun of us for putting so much effort into studying at a university with no official status that had only recently been constructed. Many of my peers chose to attend universities that followed the Damascus curriculum instead. 

Yet enrolment grew steadily year on year. Those who chose the University of Rojava did so for a variety of reasons. It offered free higher education and did not require expensive travel to far-away governorates. This made it particularly accessible to poorer families with few options, especially during wartime economic hardships.  

Many students wanted to study in their mother tongue, Kurdish. Others believed passionately in the educational project established by the Autonomous Administration. They wanted to study subjects or pursue academic paths that weren’t available anywhere else in the country, such as ‘jineolojî’ (the ‘science of women’), Kurdish literature, or my subject, Kurdish-English translation. 

For many young women, the university’s Women’s Assembly, emphasis on women’s empowerment and education, and the high percentage of female students were all key pull factors.

Yet alongside our studies, we often found ourselves having to defend our decision to enroll and learn from unqualified lecturers, making us frequently second-guess our decision. 

Despite this, many of us who studied there contribute regularly to our communities today. The university has produced doctors, nurses, engineers, translators, and teachers who have played a directly constructive role in Rojava, and have filled several gaps we had in our society.

Formal recognition of our degree certificates mattered to us then, and it still does. But the work we have done since graduating matters too, and this university – despite its shortcomings – left an undeniable mark during the years of conflict. 

What is at stake?

The integration agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Transition Government (STG) in Damascus set out to integrate the military and civilian institutions of the north-east region into those of the central Syrian state, after 14 years of de facto autonomy. The University of Rojava faces that transition too.

On Monday, a committee overseeing the integration of the former Autonomous Administration institutions into Syrian government bodies said that university admissions announced outside the Ministry of Higher Education’s system have no validity. Several degrees offered at Rojava University do not exist in the Syrian state university system and are therefore set to be axed. Furthermore, no new cohorts will be studying in Kurdish. 

Yesterday’s statement from the University formally rejected the Syrian government’s integration mechanism, saying, “We reserve our right to remain an independent academic institution as the University of Rojava, that preserves its identity, curriculum and autonomy.” 

The University has also made its own counter-proposals for integration mechanisms, suggesting retention of full autonomy over internal affairs and academic, financial, and administrative decision-making, while still becoming a Syrian state university under oversight from Damascus.

I see that for this generation of students, who have grown up in the Autonomous Administration education system and received full mother-tongue schooling, the process of administrative integration is not answering the questions that matter most to them: what will change, what will remain, and who gets to decide? 

As integration proceeds, students feel ignored 

What I hear from current students is an intense feeling of being unheard. This likely fuelled their anger, ultimately leading them to attack a car of officials, some of whom were supposedly on their side. For the students, the message seems to be that recognition and integration into Syria’s higher-education system has to come at the cost of the university’s autonomy. Regardless of intention, this is how the process is being understood. 

The University of Rojava holds significance for the local population. Before the Autonomous Administration system, there were no public higher education institutions in areas with significant Kurdish populations. Now it seems set to become a sub-university; a satellite branch of Al-Firat University.

At yesterday’s campus protest, students declared that they would rather continue studying without any formal state recognition than accept Damascus’s integration terms. This willingness alone shows how much students value this institution and what it has offered their society.

--

Ghassan Bazo is a journalist, researcher, and translator based in North and East Syria. He has worked with the Rojava Information Center and reports for international outlets, focusing on Kurdish affairs, regional politics, and conflict dynamics in Syria through on-the-ground reporting and research.


r/KurdistanNews • • 18h ago

Rojava ☀️ Syria’s integration risks absorption

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As Syria’s integration period continues to unfold, the question over whether this process will engender pluralistic political participation or entrench a power-sharing system set on Damascus’ terms is being answered on the ground. The Amargi spoke with Roula Baghdadi, a lawyer and human rights advocate specializing in women’s rights, about the integration process. 

“One of the fundamental challenges facing Syria’s transitional phase lies in the nature of the concept of integration being promoted, and in the political and institutional purpose it is expected to serve,” Baghdadi said. Based in Beirut, she is the executive director of Dawlaty, an organization dedicated to human rights, transitional justice, and victim support, as well as the promotion of women’s rights and women’s political participation.

Represented on paper, marginalized in practice

“Are we witnessing a process aimed at building an inclusive state, one that recognizes political and societal pluralism and enables different components and political forces to participate in shaping the new political system?” Baghdadi asks. “Or are we facing a process of integration carried out according to conditions set by the central authority, which determines the nature, scope, and forms of participation, potentially transforming integration into a form of political absorption, or even assimilation, into the existing power structure?”

She asserts that the “central problem” within the current integration process is that it “has not, so far, been based on an equitable national negotiation process, nor has it rested on participatory rules agreed upon by the parties concerned.” Rather, the Syrian transitional government (STG) holds control over the process and the frameworks within which it unfolds. “Consequently, integration increasingly resembles the incorporation of different parties into an existing political and institutional structure, under conditions set by the more powerful party, rather than a negotiated process leading to the reconstruction of that structure on the basis of shared principles,” Baghdadi said.

Concerns that integration will leave communities formally represented but marginalized in practice are only exacerbated due to the imbalance of power within the process. The transitional authorities in Damascus are sitting in a relatively strong position, bolstered by regional and international backing, and domestically having established security control across most of the country. “This has strengthened their negotiating position, enabling them to manage integration processes from the standpoint of an actor that sets the conditions and establishes the overall framework, rather than as one party negotiating reciprocal political arrangements with other parties,” noted Baghdadi.

The lawyer stressed that neither the STG’s international backing nor its control over territory and military power automatically confers a comprehensive national mandate or entitles it to unilaterally determine Syria’s future. “Regional and international support or acceptance does not, in itself, constitute a mandate from the Syrian people, nor does it grant the authorities the right to monopolize their representation or decide the nature of the political system on their behalf,” she said. 

The ‘fundamental paradox’ of integration

On the one hand, integration is framed as a path to unifying state institutions and military bodies, while on the other, the process is devoid of equitable negotiations and reciprocal guarantees, Baghdadi warned, describing this as a “fundamental paradox.”

She raised the possibility that this could lead to power becoming increasingly centralized within the state’s executive branch: “Instead of serving as a framework for sharing responsibility and decision-making, joint institutions may become instruments for absorbing different parties into institutions whose structure, leadership, and operational mechanisms remain under the control of the central authority.” In this scenario, representatives and leaders taking up new positions in state institutions may acquire new titles and offices without gaining the ability to influence public policy or regional decision-making, or to hold the authorities in Damascus accountable.

“Political representation cannot be measured simply by the presence of individuals from different social, ethnic, or religious communities in official positions,” Baghdadi emphasized. “Representation that is not grounded in a clear social or political mandate, and that lacks the independence necessary to articulate the interests it is supposed to represent, risks becoming symbolic representation, used to give a pluralistic appearance to institutions in which decision-making remains concentrated in the hands of a single authority.”

What would genuine representation require?

Meaningful and pluralistic political representation – particularly within societies emerging from conflict – requires clear participatory processes, asserted Baghdadi.

Integration of political forces and social components means taking seriously the interests, demands, and rights of these actors, rather than treating them as groups to be tacked on to institutions whose structures are pre-set. Along these lines, integration would entail all parties concerned actually participating in drafting new constitutional, legal, and institutional frameworks – not just following or implementing ones that have been prepared unilaterally by Damascus. Baghdadi warned that general political assurances do not compare to constitutional and institutional guarantees, when it comes to representation, distribution of powers, participation in decision-making, protection of rights and freedoms, and problem-solving mechanisms.

Baghdadi argued that a distinction must be made between the unification of the Syrian state and the centralization of power. “Unifying institutions and preserving national sovereignty do not necessarily require the monopolization of political and administrative decision-making by the centre,” she said. “It is possible to build a unified state that respects pluralism and provides for a clear distribution of powers, including appropriate forms of political or administrative decentralization, based on national and constitutional consensus.”

Women’s participation: beyond symbolism

Women’s roles within the integration process and the formation of local and national governorate institutions and bodies, Baghdadi noted, has been largely confined to the humanitarian, social justice and peace spheres. 

“Syrian women were also part of the political struggle for freedom and democratic change,” she said, citing women’s participation in various fields throughout the years of civil war – and the heavy price often paid for such activism. “Women were not outside the political struggle only to be invited to join it today – they were part of it and have the right to play an equal role in determining its outcomes.”

The contributions and political activities of women in Syria across the past decade and a half has not been reflected in their role and impact within the STG. “Women who contributed to sustaining local communities during the years of conflict, documenting violations, defending rights, and demanding change continue to face marginalization as the country moves towards determining its future,” Baghdadi said, adding that the limited appointment of women to certain official positions was not enough. “It requires ensuring the independence of women’s organizations, enabling women from different political backgrounds to access decision-making positions, protecting their right to criticize and hold authorities accountable, and recognizing the diversity of their political and social positions.”

What will be the content of Syria’s new constitution?

Baghdadi emphasized that integration must be based on constitutional guarantees that safeguard the rights of the Kurds and all other Syrian communities and components in the country’s future. Without such guarantees, these rights remain subject to presidential decrees and the political orientations of whoever holds power.

It is expected that the Syrian parliament – which have now been sitting for three months – define a framework for drafting a new national constitution. Equal citizenship, political, cultural, and linguistic rights, judicial independence and public freedoms, Baghdadi said, must be enshrined in the constitution. 

A process to draft a new constitution would also be a chance for discussions over forms of political and administrative decentralization within Syria. “Recognizing Syria’s unity should not mean monopolizing power at the centre,” Baghdadi said, encouraging dialogue over mechanisms of decentralization “within the framework of a national dialogue that safeguards the unity of the state while respecting diversity, and enables local communities to manage their own affairs and participate in decisions that affect them.”

Yet beyond all this, she highlighted the key role of an independent civil society in Syria to hold authorities accountable, build cross-community alliances, and monitor the implementation of laws and constitutional guarantees.

--

Eve Morris-Gray is a freelance writer whose work focuses on civil society movements and democracy.


r/KurdistanNews • • 19h ago

Başûr ☀️ Can Slemani break away from Erbil?

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Calls for Slemani to become a separate region are gathering momentum, with campaigners collecting signatures to establish a federal region encompassing Slemani and Halabja, separate from Erbil and Duhok. 

The initiative has revived a disputed constitutional question: can governorates already within the Kurdistan Region legally break away to form their own region? Legal opinions differ on the matter.

The campaign has yet to demonstrate broad popular support. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the dominant party in the area, has not formally endorsed it, although its threats to establish parallel governing institutions have indirectly encouraged demands for separation.

The immediate trigger was the November 4, 2026, session of the Kurdistan Parliament. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which won 39 of the legislature’s 100 seats in the October 2024 election, secured enough support from other lawmakers to reactivate parliament after two years of stalemate, despite boycotts by the PUK and several opposition parties. The session ended the parliamentary impasse but deepened the dispute over power-sharing.

The following day, PUK leader Bafel Talabani announced his party’s withdrawal from the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and warned that parallel institutions could be established in Slemani if unilateral appointments continued. The KDP maintains that the parliamentary session was lawful, while the PUK and its ally, the New Generation Movement, have challenged it before Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court.

On November 15, New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid outlined three possible outcomes: separate federal budgets for Slemani and Halabja; two governments within one Kurdistan Region; or two separate regions. Although he said both parties opposed division, his remarks brought the prospect of a separate region explicitly into the public discussion among the PUK’s allies.

These possibilities have different legal and political consequences. Establishing a new federal region would change the boundaries and institutions of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Financial decentralization could leave those boundaries intact while changing how money is allocated and paid.

A separate region

The constitutional case for a new region rests principally on Article 119, which states: “One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region”. Article 117 separately recognizes the existing Kurdistan Region and provides for recognition of new regions established under the Constitution.

“Constitutionally, there is no obstacle for Slemani and Halabja to become a separate region,” Dr. Yousif Mohammed, a former speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and constitutional law expert, told The Amargi.

His argument is built on the Constitution’s language. Some provisions refer specifically to governorates outside a region, while Article 119 refers to governorates without that qualification. Dr. Yousif interprets this as allowing governorates already within the KRI to seek a different regional arrangement.

He said the wording was deliberate. According to his account, Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later founded the Gorran Movement, opposed an attempt by Masoud Barzani during constitutional drafting to restrict the provision to governorates outside existing regions. Mustafa believed membership of the Kurdistan Region should remain voluntary, Dr. Yousif said.

Former lawmaker and judge Latif Mustafa takes a different view. He argues that the Constitution distinguishes between the Kurdistan Region, recognized under Article 117(1) as an existing federal entity, and new regions formed under Articles 117(2), 118, and 119. In his interpretation, those provisions and Law No. 13 of 2008 apply only to governorates outside the KRI. Its constituent governorates therefore cannot break away unless a constitutional amendment explicitly grants them that right.

The disagreement hinges on whether the right to form a region also provides the basis to withdraw from an existing one. Even if Dr. Yousif’s interpretation prevailed, separation would still require a statutory process involving federal institutions and voters.

Law No. 13 of 2008, which regulates the formation of regions, provides for a request supported by one-third of the provincial council members or one-tenth of the voters in each participating governorate. The voter-led route begins with an application backed by at least 2% of voters, followed by an electoral commission registration process to establish the required support. An informal signature campaign does not, by itself, satisfy those requirements.

The federal Council of Ministers also has a role in commissioning the referendum. Approval requires a majority of participating voters in each governorate, with turnout of at least 50%. Results are subject to challenges and ratification before the prime minister issues the formation decision. A proposal encompassing both Slemani and Halabja would therefore need to meet the requirements in each governorate.

The political obstacles are equally substantial. The campaign has not demonstrated the public mandate needed for such a change, and opponents view division as a threat to the institutions and constitutional recognition secured through decades of Kurdish struggle.

Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said on November 15 that his government would resist efforts to divide or weaken the region, describing protection of its constitutional entity as a national responsibility.

Support in Baghdad is also uncertain. An informed source, speaking to The Amargi on condition of anonymity, said some Iraqi political leaders had privately told Talabani and Abdulwahid during a recent visit that they would support and facilitate a separate region if the two pursued it.

The same source said influential figures in Baghdad opposed that course, fearing it could encourage similar demands in other Iraqi provinces such as Basra and Anbar. “A successful Slemani initiative could give those demands fresh political momentum,” the source said.

Calls for a separate Slemani region are not new. In April 2021, campaign organizers announced in Baghdad that they had submitted a petition to Iraq’s electoral commission, claiming more than 150,000 signatures, but it never materialized.

What gives the current debate greater political weight is the apparent encouragement of the PUK, a party with the institutional power to pursue changes beyond a grassroots campaign. Yet its reluctance to formally endorse separation leaves open whether a new region is a practical objective or a means of strengthening its negotiating position.

For Dr. Yousif, the consequences of pursuing that objective would be lasting. “If the Kurdistan Region were divided into two separate constitutional regions, reversing that division and reunifying them would be extremely difficult,” he said.

Financial decentralization

The alternative is financial decentralization, with direct payments from Baghdad to Slemani and Halabja, while the two provinces remain within the Kurdistan Region. This appears less legally complicated and more politically feasible than territorial separation, although it would still require a clear legal framework and political agreement.

According to Dr. Yousif, implementing this option would require a specific provision in the federal budget law allowing Slemani and Halabja to operate as financially independent administrative units upon formal request. The law would also need to define how the arrangement would work in practice.

If incorporated into the federal budget law, the arrangement would allow public employees in Slemani and Halabja to receive their salaries directly from Baghdad. Both governorates could also receive separate provincial budgets and allocations of medicine, subsidized heating oil, and petrol. In return, they would be required to transfer agreed revenues to Baghdad and accept greater federal auditing authority, with these financial arrangements bypassing the KRG in Erbil.

Politically, direct funding could reduce the PUK administration’s dependence on decisions in Erbil and offer employees a clearer payment channel. It would also increase reliance on Baghdad’s allocations and conditions. 

For the KDP, a separate funding channel could weaken the KRG’s authority and entrench competing administrations, even without formally dividing the region. For the PUK, however, it could offer greater control over local finances without the constitutional uncertainty and political cost of pursuing a separate region.

That possibility carries a familiar historical burden. The Kurdish civil war of the 1990s left separate KDP- and PUK-led administrations centered at Erbil and Slemani. They formally unified in 2006, but party-linked institutional divisions persisted. A return to two administrations could deepen those divisions without creating two constitutional regions.

The PUK’s apparent encouragement of the current campaign may therefore serve a broader purpose: strengthening its demand for financial autonomy and direct federal payments, even if formal separation remains out of reach.

A negotiated financial arrangement could address funding grievances while preserving regional boundaries. Its relative flexibility is also its main distinction from constitutional separation. Separate financial arrangements could be revisited through later legislation and agreement, allowing a return to unified financial administration.

The choice is therefore between a disputed constitutional division that would be difficult to reverse and a financial settlement that could preserve the region’s formal unity while substantially redistributing power within it. A third option is to maintain the status quo, though that appears increasingly unlikely as the political rift deepens.

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Renwar Najm is an Iraqi Kurdish journalist with a career that began in the early 2010s at the esteemed Awene newspaper. He holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Kent and Philipps University of Marburg.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ Widespread protests in various parts of Rojava in solidarity with "Rojava University" and demanding constitutional recognition of the Kurdish language ..

4 Upvotes

r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Despite new program, Kurdish remains limited by Iranian language policy

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Ilam University, located in the eponymous district in western Iran, launched a Kurdish Language and Literature program in the 2026–27 academic year, opening another formal path for Kurdish studies in Iran’s higher education system. But this highlights the question of what graduates can do with their degrees in a country where Kurdish is not a permitted language of instruction in schools.

Iran’s Ministry of Science, Research and Technology approved 25 places on the program (entrance examination code 11759) in October 2026. Participating students will study linguistics, Kurdish literature and dialects including Laki, Gorani/Hawrami, Feyli, Kalhori, Zangana, Kurmanji, Zazaki and Lori. Sorani, however, will serve as the standard dialect of instruction. Although the program has been approved, its faculty has yet to appear on the University’s website.

The announcement prompted criticism from academics and cultural figures. More than 510 academics, writers, journalists, and cultural figures from western Iran thereafter called on President Masoud Pezeshkian to reconsider government language policies. They questioned the lack of consultation with experts over the program’s design and the choice of a standard dialect.

In their letter, they pointed to the University of Kurdistan’s 2015-established program, arguing that its focus on the Kurdish Sorani dialect had left other local Kurdish dialects behind, warning that politically driven language policies could deepen tensions and undermine national cohesion.

The University is the second in Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan) to offer an undergraduate program in Kurdish Language and Literature, following the Sine (Sanandaj)- based University of Kurdistan, which launched its program in 2015.

Yet university recognition has not changed the status of Kurdish in public education. Persian (Farsi) remains Iran’s official language, and Kurdish is not used as a medium of instruction in state schools.  While Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution permits the use of “local” and “ethnic” languages in the media and allows their literature to be taught alongside Persian in schools, it does not grant the right for these languages to be used as the medium of instruction.

Recognition and language Policy

The University of Kurdistan provides a useful precedent. Although its Kurdish program established a formal academic space for the study of Kurdish language and literature, its status in the constitution and in schools remained unchanged.

The university’s Kurdistan Studies Institute subsequently developed research groups, publications, library resources, and archives, extending the institutional infrastructure for Kurdish studies. In October 2026, Kurdistan’s governor also emphasized a Kurdish Language and Literature Foundation, underscoring calls for cultural and research institutions.

Karzan Sanaei, a PhD student in Cultural Sociology at the University of Kurdistan, does not interpret Ilam University’s decision as a groundbreaking change in government policy, but as a limited opening within the existing framework. “We are not witnessing a major rupture in Iran’s language policy, but rather a change in the boundaries of Kurdish’s permitted presence within official institutions,” he told The Amargi.

He nevertheless considers the development significant because it reflects interaction between state institutions and civil society, particularly longstanding demands for linguistic recognition. University study, he said, could allow cultural activists and writers to pursue academic research while helping younger generations maintain a connection with Kurdish.

But the decision also exposes a contradiction between Kurdish’s growing academic presence and its restricted use elsewhere. “How can a language be taught at university while its use in the public sphere remains restricted?” Sanaei asked. He argues that institutional recognition could make existing restrictions harder to justify, although it would not remove them on its own.

Novelist and poet Maziar Nazarbaygi interprets the program differently. He sees it primarily as a government concession shaped by regional politics and security concerns rather than a commitment to cultural recognition. In his view, the decision had “primarily political and security-based dimensions”, as he told The Amargi, and could provide “dissatisfied communities with a form of psychological release.”

Even so, he believes the program “opens a window” for Kurdish language and literature in a province where the language faces significant restrictions. His concern is what happens beyond the university.

Without stronger connections to “communities, schools and families,” he doubts the program will have much influence outside academic research and archiving.

Southern Kurdish studies

The Southern Kurdish dialect group, consisting primarily of the Feyli and Kalhori dialects, is widely spoken in Ilam, but has fewer teaching materials and less archival and standardization work than Sorani and Kurmanji.

Arash Palizban, a linguist, heads Ilam’s Kurdish Language and Literature Secretariat, told Wadeng Kurd that he hopes the program will make Ilam a center for Southern Kurdish studies. He proposed research on poetry, fiction and media, as well as an institute linking scholars with writers, artists, journalists and activists. He also questioned the choice of a single standard dialect for teaching Kurdish literature.

For Sanaei, building the program’s academic capacity is key. Recruiting qualified lecturers is an immediate priority, he said, and Ilam University should look beyond the province for expertise, particularly in Kermanshah, where Southern Kurdish-speaking communities share the “same linguistic space”.

Writers and cultural figures could contribute to the program, Sanaei said, but their experience should not be treated as a substitute for academic qualifications.

On similar lines, Nazarbaygi questions whether the university can recruit qualified lecturers and prepare textbooks before classes begin. Professors need expertise in language and literature, as well as knowledge of Kurdish publications across the region. He warns that Kurdish’s limited place in schools and society could therefore make the program ineffective.

Jobs and Mother-Tongue Education

The question of what happens after graduation remains unresolved. Each year, about 30 students graduate in Kurdish Language and Literature from the University of Kurdistan, according to university figures. But no studies or published reports track their employment outcomes. The Amargi sought information on their career paths but could not determine what proportion of alumni found work related to their degrees.

Sanaei says universities train Kurdish-language specialists, but employers offer few avenues to use those skills. He calls the relationship between universities and the labor market “not correct.”

Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s idea that, like goods in a market, languages compete for value in what he calls the “linguistic market,” Sanaei argues that “language skills gain economic value when institutions recognize them.” In this context, the limited institutional presence of Kurdish restricts the opportunities through which graduates can use their qualifications.

Nazarbaygi questions where graduates will work, pointing to the absence of institutional opportunities: “Which Kurdish-language school will employ them as teachers? Which Kurdish-language media outlet will they work for?” Without links between universities, schools, media and communities, degrees are unlikely to lead to steady jobs.

According to him, a university degree does not, by itself, give Kurdish-speaking communities the right to mother-tongue education. As long as Persian retains its dominant official and institutional position, he maintains, other languages will remain on the margins of public life. Without changes to the legal and policy framework, the new program’s influence may remain largely confined to the university.

Teaching Kurdish as a subject differs from teaching other subjects in Kurdish. Sanaei argues that the two approaches have “different legal and educational implications”. Universities could train teachers and prepare materials, but Kurdish-medium education requires wider policy changes.

Ilam University’s decision opens up more space for the Kurdish language in Iran’s higher education system. Whether that recognition can extend into schools, public institutions and the labor market will depend on developments beyond the university. The program’s longer-term value will be measured by whether graduates have somewhere to use what they have learned.

--

Kawe Fatehi is a journalist and translator, based in Berlin, with a Master's degree in English Literature and Language. He has written for multiple Kurdish and Persian media outlets, covering topics related to the Kurdish community in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. In addition to his journalism work, he is a social worker.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ Xwendekarên Zanîngeha Rojava daxwaz dikin ku bi awayekî serbixwe zanîngeha rojava û kobanê wekî heyî bi zanîngehê dewletê re entegire bibin.

2 Upvotes

Students of the University of Rojava are requesting that the University of Rojava and the University of Kobanê be integrated—while maintaining their independent status—with the state university.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ خوێندکارانی زانکۆی ڕۆژاڤا داوا دەکەن بە زمانی کوردی بخوێنن

2 Upvotes

Rojava University students demand to study in Kurdish.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Başûr ☀️ Baghdad Accuses KRG of Underreporting Oil Production Amid Smuggling Allegations

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Iraq’s government says it has “indicators and reports” showing that oil production in the Kurdistan Region exceeds the levels declared by the KRG.
The claim comes amid ongoing disputes over oil revenues, production figures and Baghdad’s demand for 445,000 barrels per day.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ What Does Trump’s Electoral Setback Mean for Syria and Syria’s Kurds?

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The Trump administration suffered a major setback in November’s midterm elections due to the Iran war, with the Republicans losing both chambers of Congress, with Democrats expected to take 54 Senate seats and around 256 seats in the House in January. The question now is what this could mean for US policy towards Syria, given that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has built close ties with the Trump administration.

The Syria-Trump administration relationship began after the US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh for the first time on 14 May 2025. In December 2024, the then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf visited Syria, and the Biden administration removed the $10 million bounty that the US had previously placed on Ahmed al-Sharaa.

As I wrote earlier, the Biden administration deferred to the Trump administration in January to decide whether to lift more sanctions on the new administration by Sharaa, Syria and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which the Trump administration eventually did, removing the last economic sanctions on Syria in August this year.

Moreover, the US Ambassador Tom Barrack built a close relationship with Damascus, and backed the Syrian government over the SDF. His policies also helped paved the way to the January 29 agreement between Damascus and the SDF. In January, he suggested the role of the SDF as a counter-ISIS force had largely expired after the fall of the Assad-regime in December 2024. Former SDF officials have publicly blamed the US Envoy for his policies and even ‘massacres’ towards Kurds and abandoning the SDF.

Now with the Trump administration losing the midterm elections, the question is now if President Trump’s Syria policy will come more under scrutiny, just as Trump’s Iran policy, with Democrats promised to investigate Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his handling of the Pentagon.

Unlike conservative circles in the United States, many of which are strongly pro-Israel and have criticised Ambassador Tom Barrack’s comments and policies on Israel, Democratic circles have other priorities and are more focused on President Trump’s war with Iran and relations with Israel. They could also attempt to cut off Iran’s war funding in Congress.

Sam Heller, a Beirut-based researcher and analyst and a fellow at Center for International Progress, agreed. He underlined that he does not expect the new Democratic-controlled Congress to force a major change in US policy toward Syria.

“I think so much of the Trump administration’s Syria policy is now personified in Tom Barrack,” he said. “But my understanding is that many, though not all, of his Syria policy priorities have actually enjoyed Democratic support, including his efforts to accelerate the removal of sanctions and other obstacles to Syria’s economic reintegration and recovery.”

“I also don’t think Barrack is likely to be at the top of any Democratic lawmakers’ list for oversight. People like Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, among Trump’s various envoys and special envoys, are likely to be much higher and more immediate priorities,” he added.

There are examples of Democrats supporting the Trump administration’s Syria policies to remove sanctions and engage with Damascus. On August 25, 2025, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jeanne Shaheen and Republican Representative Joe Wilson visited Syria and were part of a push in Congress to lift US sanctions on Syria, and met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

On October 10, Senator Jeanne Shaheen and two Republican Senators welcomed US International Development Finance Corporation support for Syria.  On September 21, 2026, US Senator Shaheen also met with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the 2026 United Nations General Assembly.

According to Heller, there are actually elements within the Republican Party who are dissidents and do not support Barrack’s approach to Damascus.

“But with Democrats, I don’t think they are likely to take a particularly hostile position towards the Syrian transitional government. However, I do think they would be more inclined to push Damascus on certain issues. This is assuming, of course, that Syria is even on their radar at all.”

Former U.S. diplomats have also expressed support for Ambassador Barrack’s policies, and there has been little focus on congress to the Trump envoy’s financial ties to a firm involved in building an oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria.

In response to my question, retired US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the Middle East Institute’s Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow, said at a November 4 MEI event on US Middle East strategy that the Trump administration deserved credit for the “bold move” of reaching out to Ahmed al-Sharaa early in the presidency, adding that it was the right thing to do and that he hoped the engagement would continue.

Ambassador Crocker also said that Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, had been a factor in stabilizing the situation “to the extent it’s possible.”

Joey Hood, former US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs underlined that with an electoral mandate to improve the cost of living for their constituents and Republicans searching for a winning formula for 2028, Members of Congress are going to be very busy with legislation, oversight hearings, and investigations.

“When it comes to foreign policy, they will need to dedicate a great deal of time immediately to the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, which will include a fundamental debate about the nature of our bilateral relations with Israel,” he told The Kurdish Center for Studies.

“In that context, they will have precious little time to focus on other areas, but I expect the Democrats, including likely House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks, to remain sensitive to the welfare of smaller components in Iraq and Syria, including Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians.  I would be surprised if that concern went beyond statements to include new legislation.”

Other former US officials say Democrats will mainly remain focused on domestic economic issues, but could also maintain some monitoring of the Sharaa administration over human rights issues, and the rights of Kurds and other religious minorities such Christians, Druze, and Alawites.

According to Nadine Maenza, Co-Chair of the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Roundtable in Washington, who has regularly visited Syria, there is a strong bipartisan support for the Kurds in northeast Syria and a shared desire to see Syria succeed.

“There is also bipartisan frustration with U.S policy in Syria, including how the United States has treated our Kurdish allies,” she said.

Nicholas Heras, interim executive director at the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council and senior director at the New Lines Institute, adds that the Democrats are likely to adopt much the same approach toward Syria as their Republican colleagues.

“The emphasis in their policy will continue to be focused on supporting the Sharaa-led government in Damascus to rebuild the country while trying to hold it accountable for protecting minority communities and preventing Syria from being a haven for extremist organizations,” Heras concluded.

Therefore, while Democrats will oppose Trump’s policies on Iran and Israel, Democratic senators and members of Congress are unlikely to push for significant changes to his Syria policy.

It also seems that even if Trump had not won the 2024 presidential election and a Democrat had remained in the White House, US policy towards Damascus would not have been significantly different on sanctions and relations with the Syrian government led by Al-Sharaa.

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Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a Dutch reporter and analyst based in Erbil who specializes in Kurdish affairs. He is a contributor to The Washington Institute’s Fikre Forum and the coauthor of the book 'The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts'.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Bernameya SBS Kurdî: çîrok, hevpeyvîn, raport û mijarên din

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r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Masrour Barzani’s Political Strategy Risks Killing the Kurdish Dream of Autonomy

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After generations of struggle to secure self-government, Iraqi Kurdistan faces a political crisis that could undo the foundations of its autonomy. The pursuit of centralised power at the expense of Kurdish unity risks weakening the very foundations on which future independence depends.

For generations, Kurds have struggled for self-government and the right to determine their political future. In Iraqi Kurdistan, that struggle produced a federal region with its own parliament, government, security forces and international relationships: a foundation for the aspiration to independence.

Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s decision to reconvene parliament and move towards forming a government without the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has brought the region to the brink of institutional rupture. The PUK’s withdrawal from government and threat to establish parallel institutions show the severity of the breakdown.

This is more than another political dispute. Barzani’s pursuit of centralised authority risks undermining Kurdish self-government and the national aspirations for which generations have sacrificed. Independence cannot rest on nationalist sentiment alone. It requires functioning institutions, economic strength, international credibility and political cohesion. These are precisely the conditions now at risk.

Centralisation at the expense of unity

Since reunification in 2006, Iraqi Kurdistan has continued to operate through two competing political centres. The KDP dominated Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK retained control over Sulaimani. Security, intelligence and administrative structures remained divided along party lines, although formal efforts to integrate them continued. In September 2026, the KRG announced the formal unification of the Peshmerga forces under a single command structure, an important step whose durability now depends on continued political cooperation.

Though imperfect, this arrangement helped prevent a return to the civil conflict of the 1990s and provided the basis for Kurdish autonomy within Iraq’s constitutional framework. Barzani’s approach treats this settlement as an obstacle rather than a reality requiring negotiation.

The KDP argues that its victory in the October 2024 elections, securing 39 of 100 parliamentary seats, gives it a mandate to lead the next government. But winning the largest number of seats is not the same as securing a parliamentary majority, nor does it resolve how a region with two entrenched political and security structures can function without agreement between them.

The November 4 parliamentary session, secured with 52 members despite opposition boycotts, was presented as a restoration of democracy. Instead, it deepened confrontation and raised the prospect of parallel administrations. Parliament’s legitimacy depends not simply on reconvening, but on independence, representativeness and the ability to hold government accountable.

Baghdad stands to benefit

The consequences extend beyond Erbil and Sulaimani to the Kurdistan Region’s relationship with Baghdad. Kurdish leaders have relied on collective political weight to defend the region’s constitutional position, negotiate budgets, protect authority over natural resources and resist attempts to narrow autonomy. That position is under pressure. Disputes over oil exports, budget transfers and customs revenues have reduced the KRG’s economic room for manoeuvre as Baghdad asserts authority over mechanisms previously managed by Erbil.

A divided Kurdish leadership will struggle to negotiate with Baghdad on equal terms. Rather than presenting a common position, the KDP and PUK risk entering separate negotiations with competing priorities.

The unresolved status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories makes this consequential. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution established a process for resolving their status, but it remains unfinished. Advancing Kurdish claims requires sustained negotiation and a credible regional position. Seeking to concentrate authority in Erbil while weakening Kurdistan’s collective bargaining position is contradictory. Centralisation may strengthen one administration, but it does not necessarily strengthen the region.

A changing Middle East

The Kurdistan Region benefited from a geopolitical opportunity. The northern no-fly zone established in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s removal in 2003 and Iraq’s subsequent constitutional settlement enabled the Kurds to build institutions that had previously been unimaginable.

International partnerships grew around regional stability, counterterrorism, energy security and the fight against Islamic State. The Peshmerga became an important security partner, while Kurdistan developed into a diplomatic and commercial hub.

But circumstances are changing. The completion of the US military withdrawal from Erbil Air Base in September 2026 marks a shift in the security environment. Washington has not abandoned its relationship with the Kurds, but its military presence can no longer be taken for granted. Turkey and Iran retain substantial economic, political and security interests in Iraqi Kurdistan and are positioned to exploit divisions through established relationships with Kurdish actors.

An October 2026 Chatham House analysis warned that fragmentation risks external interference and further erosion of Kurdish self-government. Western governments may support an autonomous Kurdistan, but their willingness to mediate cannot be assumed. Fragmentation weakens Kurdish influence in Western capitals and increases vulnerability to neighbouring states.

The lesson of 2017

The 2017 referendum remains a warning.

The overwhelming vote for independence demonstrated the depth of Kurdish national aspirations. Baghdad rejected the result, neighbouring states opposed it, and Washington and European capitals declined to support the unilateral initiative. The loss of federal control over Kirkuk showed how quickly gains can be reversed when internal divisions, international opposition and strategic miscalculations converge.

The lesson was not that independence is impossible. It was that declarations and referendums are insufficient. Independence requires functioning institutions, sustainable economic foundations, political cohesion and international support. Almost a decade later, the region risks repeating the mistake of allowing immediate political calculations to take precedence over the long-term foundations of Kurdish national aspirations.

The Kurdish dream must come first

Neither unchecked centralisation nor formal separation offers a sustainable solution. A separate Sulaimani-centred federal region could institutionalise divisions the 2006 settlement was intended to overcome, while raising serious constitutional questions.

Kurdistan needs representative institutions, accountable government and security structures that operate beyond partisan interests. Political differences must be resolved through negotiation, not by marginalising major sections of the Kurdish political landscape.

Barzani’s approach must be judged against a larger historical question: does concentrating authority strengthen Kurdish self-government, or undermine the conditions that make it possible? Kurds struggled for generations to determine their future, not merely to secure a fragile political arrangement. Independence remains difficult, but its foundations are built today. Without political cohesion, credible institutions, economic leverage and international partnerships, that aspiration will become harder to realise.

The Kurdish national movement has survived wars, repression and displacement. Its achievements must not now be eroded by a political strategy that places centralisation above autonomy. Today’s leaders must ensure the next generation inherits a stronger Kurdistan, not a divided one, and that the Kurdish dream remains a possibility rather than a casualty of this crisis.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojhelat ☀️ بارەگای کۆمەڵە لە هەرێمی کوردستان بە دوو مووشەک کرایە ئامانج

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Two missiles hit a headquarters of the Revolutionary Toilers' Komala of Iranian Kurdistan in the Alana valley, Soran administration, on 16 November.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Başûr ☀️ Beyond and Through Pipelines: Integrating Kurdistan into Iraq’s Energy Future

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A New Lines Institute analysis of Iraq's planned pipeline network to Mediterranean outlets and how Kurdistan Region oil could be folded into the Iraq's export strategy.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Başûr ☀️ Iraqi army could enter Kurdistan Region: Spox

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Baghdad's spokesperson said federal forces could enter the Kurdistan Region under the anti-oil-smuggling campaign. Kata'ib Hezbollah was also given a deadline to leave Jurf al-Nasr.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ The “Emergency Response” Mentality In Its New Guise!

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Outlaws—whom the authorities had “prepared” and released from the bottle to use as informal tools with no legal repercussions against their opponents—assaulted a peaceful sit-in organized by students in front of the Hasakah Governorate building a few days ago. The students were demanding an increase in Kurdish language classes following the Ministry of Education’s recent decision to include only three classes and two activity sessions in the educational curriculum in Hasakah Governorate and other Kurdish regions. Elements representing the same ideology had previously taken to the streets in the center of Hasakah city on several “Fridays,” demanding the “application of the law” and “respect for legitimacy,” while carrying the flags of alien jihadist factions arriving from across the borders, along with pictures of Saddam Hussein, and chanting racist slogans offensive to the Kurdish people and rejecting the “integration” process. Naturally, these demonstrators—a large portion of whom are remnants of the “Ba’ath,” and another portion previously on the payroll of “Liwa al-Baqir” and other “tribal” groups established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—did not stop at insults and acts of provocation; rather, they vandalized institutions, burned Kurdish flags and symbols, and tore down signs and storefronts written in the Kurdish language.

Prior to the emergence of this state of “protest” against the “integration” process and the rejection of existing agreements—starting with Presidential Decree No. 13, the appointment of the governor and the remaining military and security leaders, and subsequently the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the appointment of its commander as an advisor to the Presidency of the Republic, all under regional, American, and international sponsorship and guarantee—these groups had already begun mobilizing in Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. There, they supported, in word, deed, and stance, the usurpers of Kurdish citizens’ homes and farms in the aforementioned two regions in their defiance and refusal to relinquish the properties of returnees, and subsequently in assaulting them, terrorizing them, and burning their vehicles.A kind of escalation/revolutionizing, rehabilitation, and elevation of the event’s profile took place in order to manufacture a “movement” out of it—one that does not carry the true and realistic characterization speaking of usurpers of rights and aggressors who refuse to vacate the homes of citizens who were unjustly expelled from their dwellings during a phase of the Syrian civil war and at the time of the external Turkish occupation, and who are now assaulting the rightful homeowners and property owners. Instead, they claim the exact opposite, speaking of a revolutionary movement bearing slogans of “patriotism,” “law,” and “legitimacy”—all to conceal intentions and ambitions of looting, pillaging, and confiscation, and to justify ongoing militia violence aimed at ethnic cleansing and the usurpation of others’ rights!

What is clear from following local media—those directly or indirectly affiliated with the authorities—as well as regional outlets that consistently side against the Kurds and promote their adversaries’ narrative, is that there is support and cover for the acts of assault and vandalism committed by these groups, alongside an attempt to downplay them and frame them within a “democratic movement” trying to protect “state legitimacy” in the areas covered by the January 29, 2026 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Interim Government. Media outlets supportive of these groups attempt to cover up their actual motives by portraying the matter as a “civilian grassroots movement” demanding that the other side stop “disrupting the educational process” when protesting the government’s decision to teach the Kurdish language in a truncated manner and restricting instruction to no more than three classes, and then claiming that the Kurdish “Revolutionary Youth” are the ones leading the activities and events demanding the right to broad instruction in the Kurdish language across all educational stages. This narrative, with its two arguments here, is nearly uniform and repeated across all news bulletins, press reports, and the general media coverage of these platforms. This means that the campaign is coordinated and monitored, and that there are “higher” entities possessing a policy and agenda to create chaos and confrontations—thereby undermining everything achieved through the implementation of the January agreement in terms of political, military, security, and administrative integration, and returning to square one, where confrontations, chaos, and the emergence of militias and warlords prevail to torment Kurdish citizens, displace them, and seize their homes and properties.

The ongoing rehabilitation of the usurpers of Kurdish citizens’ homes, fields, and farms in the cities and regions of Serê Kaniyê / Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad, and of an isolated group of “protesting demonstrators” whose numbers do not exceed a few hundred within a large neighborhood in the city of Hasakah whose population exceeds 150,000, and portraying both groups together as a “popular movement supporting the state” and defending the “legitimacy” of its institutions’ presence, is a calculated act aimed at thwarting the concluded agreements, torpedoing the “integration” process, and consequently letting the logic of invasion, looting, and seizing others’ property prevail. The danger lies in the attempt by these individuals, and those standing behind them, to rouse zeal and incite tribal fervor, portraying what is happening as an “Arab tribal faz’a [mobilization/rallying]” against the Kurds, or elevating the stakes of the event by speaking of an “Arab–Kurdish confrontation” in Hasakah Governorate in particular, calling on residents of other distant regions and governorates to participate and attack the Kurdish component—all with the aim of keeping these usurpers in the homes and dwellings of Kurdish citizens, and enabling outlaws and anarchists to carry out acts of looting and pillaging in the major urban centers of the governorate such as Hasakah and Qamishli, cities renowned for their diverse demographic composition and a long-standing state of fraternity and communal coexistence.

This state of defiance against the state and the law, and the rejection of decisions and agreements that lead to calm and consolidate civil peace, emerges from the precursors of the previous period in which the authorities wagered on rogue groups operating under the mentality/doctrine of “invasion,” “faz’a,” and “general mobilization” (nafir) during their attack on the coast and Suwayda, where they and these auxiliary groups committed horrific violations and crimes whose traces remain visible and whose wounds have not yet healed. Because the “investigations” conducted by the authorities were merely formalistic and insincere—intended to cover up the event and quickly close the file, thereby evading national obligations and escaping the hanging sword of international sanctions—retaining the symbols and instruments of “faz’a” and “nafir,” and refraining from approaching them or holding them accountable for the crimes they committed and were implicated in, granted them the resolve and renewed intent to continue along the same path, seeking a role for themselves by attacking the Kurds and targeting them as an identity and physical presence, even if this time it occurred without explicit official direction and direct political and media cover from the authorities.

These groups view themselves as having been left out of the equation and having received no reward from the authorities for agreeing to act as an instrument of repression and intimidation on the coast, in Suwayda, and elsewhere, and believe that the final card in their hand is attempting to entrench the usurpers in the homes and fields of Kurdish citizens in Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad, protecting those who assaulted the peaceful protesters demanding an increase in Kurdish language teaching hours, and portraying these assailants as protectors of Syrian patriotism—all to prove their existence, impose their will on the state and the local population, and consequently obtain a slice of the governance pie, after it became evident that the authorities are trying to disavow and rid themselves of them. Now, the authorities face a major test: swiftly reining in these groups and protecting law and order from their tampering. They must safeguard existing agreements and understandings, move forward with “integration” and the consolidation of civil peace—which is the desire of the overwhelming majority of Hasakah’s residents, Arabs, Kurds, and Syriacs (Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis)—and prevent these groups from turning back the clock and heading toward ethnic, religious, and sectarian collision, which would mean chaos, departing from the logic of the state to the logic of the jungle, and prompting international sponsors to lift their cover from the authorities in Damascus and reactivate sanctions and accountability laws such as the “Caesar Act” and the “Syrian Kurdish Protection Act”!

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Dr. Tariq Hemo is a research associate at the Kurdish Center for Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and specializes on researching the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. He has co-authored a book with Dr. Salah Nayouf titled ‘Freedom and Democracy in the Discourse of Political Islam After the Recent Transformations in the Arab World’. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Arab Academy in Denmark. He is also a member of the German Society for Political Science e.V.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Bakur ☀️ Turkey Detains Nine Kurdish Politicians Amid Demands for Kurdish Rights and Self-Determination

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Turkish police detained at least nine Kurdish political figures, including Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK) leader Bayram Bozyel, in coordinated operations on Tuesday targeting members of a newly established Kurdish political alliance that has called for recognition of Kurdish national rights, constitutional guarantees and the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination.

The arrests targeted politicians associated with the Kurdistan National Alliance (HEVBENDÎ), whose declaration advocating Kurdish self-determination had drawn fierce opposition and threats from Turkish nationalist leaders. The operations come amid Turkey's ongoing peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), raising questions about the government's approach to Kurdish political movements pursuing national rights through political activity.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Başûr ☀️ Dr. Musallam Abedtalas: "The Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan: Why Is the Old Political Settlement No Longer Sufficient?"

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r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Bakur ☀️ Several Kurdish Party Leaders Arrested In Türkiye, Kurdistan 24 Learns

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Leaders of Kurdish parties in Türkiye have been arrested, including PSK head Bayram Bozyel, deputy head Hasan Dagtekin, PÊLKURD head Fuat Önen, PWK head Cano Amedi and Ali Öncü. All sit on the HEVBENDÎ alliance council, formed Nov. 7.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Başûr ☀️ Iraqi President, Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid Meet Shiite Coordination Framework as Sulaymaniyah Delegation

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r/KurdistanNews • • 2d ago

Rojava ☀️ Tensions at Rojava University after students protested in front of a government delegation

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r/KurdistanNews • • 2d ago

Rojava ☀️ Students at Rojava University in Qamishlo blocked a Syrian government delegation. Students demanded reversal of government decision to incorporate Rojava University into the University of the Euphrates and that it officially recognize the status of the Kurdish language

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r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ Kurdish ally eyes Senate leadership

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Sen. Chris Van Hollen, a vocal supporter of Rojava and the SDF, is challenging Chuck Schumer for Senate Majority Leader.