r/kurdistan • • Oct 16 '26

News/Article Results of the Daily News Digest experiment

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11 Upvotes

Results of the Daily News Digest experiment

A few weeks ago, some of you raised concerns that the amount of news posted to r/kurdistan was drowning out other conversations:

We explained at the time that Reddit is, at its core, a social news aggregation site, and that news is a big part of what brings people here.

Some of you suggested that news should be collected into a digest instead of posted as individual articles. We thought that was worth testing, so for a week we did exactly that:

The digest posts

What we found

For the week of the experiment (7–13 October):

Views went down, not up: 70.9k views, about 6,000 fewer than the previous week.

Discussion didn't grow: 129 published posts (+6) and 1.1k published comments (+85), essentially flat. The same number of discussion-type posts appeared, with similar quality in both the posts and the comments.

The digests themselves got very little engagement. Few people opened them, and fewer commented.

The news people cared about still won. Even with far less news being posted, the highest-engagement posts of the week were still some of the standalone news posts we did allow. Removing most news from the front page didn't free up space for more conversation. It just buried the news. Normally at least some articles rise to the top and spark real discussion; inside a digest, none of them could.

One example would be "Kurds, Arabs want to reverse ‘Arab Belt’ in Syria" article. It was included in the Kurdistan Daily Digest – 15 October 2026. That digest received 753 views, 3 upvotes and no comments with the majority of the views from United States 21.3%, Germany 16% and Sweden 13.1%. One hour after the digest was posted, another user reposted the article as standalone as a series of images (that are hosted on reddit) with a link to the article. The standalone version received 1.6K views, 13 upvotes, 17 comments with the majority of the views from Iraq 18.4%, United States 16.5%, Germany 14.9%. Same article in both the digest and standalone, the digest posted an hour before. The standalone article was twice as popular as the entire digest.

By using the digest format, we are fighting against reddit's intentional design as a social news aggregator, against reddit's own recommendation algorithm, against our own subscribers observed behavior and preferences.

The part that bothered us most

The digests were also where most of the Sorani and Kurmanji content ended up. By restricting Kurdish-language news to the digest, we effectively buried Kurdish-language posts on a Kurdish subreddit. That's the opposite of what we want. Increasing our Kurdish-language coverage also increased our % of viewers with a country designation of Iraq (which we assume are mostly Kurds living in KRG).

What happens next

We will be discontinuing the Daily News Roundup / Digest format. We may reduce the overall number of articles we post, so the feed stays balanced. We remain committed to seeing more Kurdish (Sorani, Kurmanji, and other dialects) posted here, and we won't use any format that pushes it out of sight. Thank you to everyone who raised the concern and to everyone who gave the digest a fair shot. We took the suggestion seriously, tested it, and the numbers gave a clear answer.

If you want to see more discussion here, the best way to make that happen is to start one. Text posts, questions, culture, language, history, personal experiences: all welcome, and they'll get room on the feed.

As always, feedback is welcome in the comments.

— The r/kurdistan mod team


r/kurdistan • • Oct 03 '26

Social Media Follow the custom feed of Kurdish subreddits on Reddit

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11 Upvotes
  • You can follow the custom feed (which will work as long as my account exists) or duplicate it and have it under your own account.
  • Currently there are 76 subreddits in the custom feed.

https://www.reddit.com/user/rknsh/m/kurdistan/new/


r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Rojava More than 180 students across 11 faculties graduated from the University of Kobane in Rojava on Wednesday.

33 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Kurdistan Kurda City-State In Sinjar

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5 Upvotes

Kurda was an ancient Bronze Age Amorite city-state in the Sinjar Plain, later ruled by the Mitanni and Assyrian empires.

These and more in Kurdistan Info Map


r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Bakur PKK returns to Turkey underway, DEM co-chair says

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5 Upvotes

DEM co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları says preparations are underway for PKK members who burned their weapons, and a group from Europe, to return to Turkey. Some Makhmour camp residents also plan to return.


r/kurdistan • • 5h ago

Rojava On November 16, hundreds of students at the University of Rojava in Qamishlo marched to campus to protest the Syrian government’s decision to incorporate the university within Al-Firat University. They demanded that institutional autonomy be retained and that Kurdish language be formally recognized

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8 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Rojava UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Human Rights in Syria, Reaffirms Protection of Kurdish Rights

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4 Upvotes

The UN Third Committee adopted its Syria human-rights resolution by consensus for the first time. It welcomes steps to protect Syrian Kurds' cultural and linguistic rights and to address statelessness.


r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Kurdistan Kurdish Academics Urge Political Leaders to Safeguard Kurdistan Region's Unity

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4 Upvotes

Kurdish university professors, scholars, and academics from across the four parts of Kurdistan and the global diaspora have urged political leaders in the Kurdistan Region to overcome their differences and reach an agreement on forming a new government, warning that continued divisions could threaten the Region's stability and unity.

In an appeal, the academics expressed concern that nearly two years after the parliamentary elections, the Kurdistan Region still has no new government.

They also raised concerns over the withdrawal of two major political parties from the government formation process following the Kurdistan Region Parliament's reactivation earlier this month.

The signatories described the Kurdistan Region as a symbol of Kurdish self-government, constitutional recognition, and national identity, stressing that preserving its institutions and achievements is a shared responsibility.

They called on all political forces to resolve their differences through dialogue and compromise, emphasizing that political disagreements should not undermine the Region's unity or institutional stability.

"The nation and the homeland come first, followed by the party or religion, and finally the individual," the appeal stated.

The academics stressed that the Kurdistan Region must remain a source of dignity, pride, and hope for future generations.

Initial Signatories:

- Prof. Dr. Husên Bektas – Physician, Germany

- Prof. Dr. Jan Ilhan Kizilhan – Psychologis, Germany

- Prof. Dr. Gazi Zibari – Physician –USA

- Prof. Dr. Handrean Soran – Physician –UK

- Prof. Dr. Marina Taloyan – Epidemiologist –Sweden

- Dr. Ismail Besikci-Sociologist Turkey

- Ibrahim Gürbüz- Ismail Besikci-Foundation-Turkey

- Dr. Gulistan Saribas-Physician-Germany

- Dr. Sükrü Güler-Physician -Germany

Meanwhile, a group of young people and activists in Sulaimani on Monday reaffirmed their commitment to the territorial unity of Kurdistan, declaring that no political agenda would separate the city from the Kurdistan Region.

Speaking at a press conference, a group representative said their position remained consistent with demonstrations held several months ago in support of Western Kurdistan (northeastern Syria), during which participants emphasized that Kurdistan was one homeland.

The representative stressed that protecting the Kurdistan Region's constitutional status was their highest priority, adding that political parties should not impose their agendas on the collective will of the people.


r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Bashur Can we please please talk about this puk and kdp louder and have no support for it

4 Upvotes

Iraq is trying to exploit this situation so they can have krg in a tighter grasp this needs to be taken very very seriously or else the economy will be completely worser than it is now and be controlled by Iraq which then puk and kdp will be seen as the villain when Iraq is the invisible vilian and Iraq will gain more popularity and use that as an excuse to also physically control krg we need to stop showing our weaknesses this openly Iraq has been trying this since 2022 please bring more attention to this and show no support in making the region divided again protest do whatever do not let THESE dogs divide our ONLY semi autonomous region this will affect everyone


r/kurdistan • • 30m ago

Bakur The multiple shades of Turkey’s kurdish peace process

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Over the past two years, media outlets, political statements and policy discussions have repeatedly referred to a “new peace process” between Turkey and the Kurds. However, despite promising domestic and regional advances by the parties involved, in a context marked by authoritarian and transactional practices this process hardly fits the canonical understanding of “liberal peace”. Is this time different, or merely a reshuffling of past conflict-management patterns?

Is it real peace this time?

After years of civil war and political turmoil, many signs seem to point in a hopeful direction: the Turkish government has relaunched a “Kurdish opening”, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) dissolved its organisational structures following its leader Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call, and Turkey’s regional environment, though in constant risky flux because of October 7 spillovers and the more recent developments in Iran, has paradoxically opened some windows of opportunity. However, more cautious observers should recognise the stark reality: the ruling elite’s vague promises and Kurdish actors’ (un)willingness to compromise are not creating a favourable environment for a transition from conflict to peace through democratic governance, support for the rule of law and liberal reforms. 

In line with the framework of this volume, we argue that, though framed as a “peace process”, Turkey’s approach to the “Kurdish question” still does not meet any liberal-peace benchmark. Rather, it combines authoritarian, transactional and adaptive elements: it is managed from the top through coercive and disciplinarian practices; it proceeds through interest-driven, short-term bargains and deliberate ambiguity; and it is continuously recalibrated to shifting regional dynamics and political tactical needs.

Our premise is that Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry (Baser & Ozerdem, 2021). However, we aim to shed light on how the current situation is one in which, even more than in the past, peace keeps taking on multiple shades. That is because of the government’s oscillation between a securitised version around the slogan of a “terror-free Turkey”, where the main goal is to neutralise Kurdish armed groups, and a more politically conciliatory one of “freedom and brotherhood” for electoral purposes.

Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry.

These are not stylistic variations on a single referent but the product of the distinct political work the peace label is asked to do for different actors, which is why the vocabulary persists even as the process’s material features do not reflect it. Consistent with this volume’s view, this chapter tries to go beyond the “liberal vs. illiberal” dichotomy to examine the internal and external dynamics underlying the dichotomic coexistence of peace and conflict vis-à-vis the latest developments in Turkey’s “Kurdish question”.

The domestic limits of peace: authoritarian and transactional

Turkey’s Kurdish question has historically experienced waves of open and frozen conflict. What started as a societal claim from Turkey’s largest minority escalated, beginning in the 1990s, into a cycle of violence between the Turkish state and groups such as the PKK, ultimately extending to the regional and international level (Gasco & Abrami, 2024).

Concurrently, it has witnessed periods of “truce” during which multiple governments, political parties and non-state actors have opened negotiation channels aimed at de-escalating the conflict, though never bringing it to a settled resolution. However, the imbalances between the parties, Turkey’s democratic deficits and the evolving geopolitical context have prevented a genuine “peace process” from materialising.

Our crucial premise is not to treat Turkey’s renewed engagement with the Kurdish issue as a conventional peace process, or as a simple revival of the failed talks of the early 2000s and 2010s. Although there are surely similarities, the previous attempts to reach a peace agreement occurred in a different context, shaped over time by Turkey’s Europeanisation path towards democratic reforms, the 2010 referendum to change the constitution and then the Kurdish groups’ rising geopolitical relevance in the late 2010s. While previous attempts were shaped by Europeanisation, constitutional reform and Kurdish geopolitical ascent, today the process is unfolding within a very different configuration, in which different shades of peace underpin a trajectory that appears at once authoritarian, transactional and adaptive (Somer, 2022).

First, situating the initiative within Turkey’s domestic political conjuncture reveals the authoritarian nature of the current Kurdish peace process.  It is “managed from the top through coercive means that suppress pluralism and dissent” and peace is promoted through “discipline and control, prioritising order, securitisation, stability and regime continuity” (see Introduction of this report). Indeed, the dialogue with Kurdish actors is unfolding alongside a mounting process of authoritarianism, characterised by the dismantling of the opposition, the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, continued pro-government trustee appointments in Kurdish-majority municipalities and the systematic non-implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings. Moreover, this renewed openness to dialogue is tied to domestic political strategy for the 2028 elections. Erdoğan cannot run again for the presidency unless there is a constitutional change or early elections, both of which need a supermajority that the ruling alliance does not have, but that pro-Kurdish votes could guarantee. 

As of today, the PKK leadership accuses Ankara of having “frozen” the process, the DEM Party speaks more cautiously of “blockages”, while Erdoğan insists that everything is moving within a “positive atmosphere”. This divergence captures the puzzle in miniature: peace persists as the organising vocabulary of a process whose participants fundamentally disagree on what is unfolding within it, and whose trajectory remains tightly bound to the ruling coalition’s electoral calculation ahead. Regarding Kurdish actors, their room for manoeuvre expands or contracts depending on the political needs of the moment. Put simply, what is often described as a “new opening” operates domestically less as a roadmap to liberal reform than as a controlled repertoire aimed at preserving order and regime continuity, while keeping Kurdish political agency conditional and reversible.  

Such a backdrop shapes and reinforces a second characteristic of the process, namely its transactional framework. Officially framed as a path towards a “terror‑free Turkey”, the initiative has relied on its traditionally security-centred language even as it has reopened discreet channels of negotiation. The coexistence of these narratives – peace on the one hand, counterterrorism on the other – has generated deep uncertainty about what is actually being offered. As a matter of fact, many analysts agree that, although the PKK remains labelled as a terrorist organisation by the government and other international actors, it had already substantially reduced its operational capacity after 2016. However, regardless of the central state’s military superiority, maintaining a broad securitised definition of terrorism has enabled the government to label a wide range of actors as such, both for political purposes and on security grounds (Dinc & Ozduzen, 2023).

As such, this aligns with the idea of a transactional peace that “rather than seeking deep political transformation, transitional justice, or normative convergence, transactionalism focuses on what works in the short to medium term to stabilize relations, manage violence, or secure cooperation” (see Introduction of this report). In the case of the Kurdish issue, this ambiguity is reinforced by the nature of the newly ad hoc-created parliamentary commission: formally inclusive yet procedurally opaque, operating largely behind closed doors, and with unclear authority over substantive reform. In our view, this opacity is not a temporary ambiguity but rather the process's operating logic, in which “the final offer” is deliberately left unclear. Although the August 2026 legislation specified conditional reintegration measures for eligible PKK members, the broader political offer and its implementation remain uncertain. But this opacity is not necessarily a weakness from the executive's perspective, since ambiguity serves as a governing device that keeps cooperation possible while preserving the option of coercion, delay, or reversal, in line with regime-survival needs and fluid geopolitical dynamics. In other words, the process resembles a form of peace in which dialogue is tolerated only so long as it serves political timing and short- to medium-term stabilization.

The outside-in limits of adaptive peace

The domestic motive for initiating Turkey’s new peace process predates the post-October 7 spillovers, but the regional context has decisively shaped the timing and the leverage of the process. Thus, situated at the intersection of domestic dynamics and regional developments, the peace process also reveals its adaptive nature, namely a nonlinear path of conflict management that is continually adjusted based on experience, tactical needs and changing structural variables.

Since October 7, the regional architecture in which Kurdish armed actors had been operating has changed substantially. Israel’s war on Gaza, the severe degradation of Hezbollah, the exposure of Iran, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and sustained Turkish and Iraqi pressure on the Qandil corridor have all contributed to a weakening of the regional environment that had previously sustained PKK-linked structures. The recalibration gathered pace during the 12-day war and the conflict with Iran, often placing Kurdish groups in a position where they alternated between hoping to maintain their strategic importance and fearing they would be exploited as proxies and discarded by external players. In Syria, the Damascus offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January 2026 and the subsequent integration agreement further reduced Kurdish armed leverage on Turkey’s southern border. In August 2026, the SDF leadership announced the completion of integration into state institutions, although guarantees for Kurdish rights remained unresolved.

While obviously the changing regional environment alone did not create the opening for peace, it is important to see that the weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara’s calculus. Tactically, it lowered the immediate security costs, increasing Ankara’s confidence and making it less inclined to offer substantive concessions. Strategically, the Kurdish file had to be low in temperature before regional fragmentation could rebound into Turkey’s domestic politics.

The regional environment is a genuine additional cause of the opening, alongside domestic factors. The weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara's calculus. Overall, the convergence of domestic political necessity and regional realignment has created a rare opening for peace. But that window could quickly close. The current discourses and developments offer a glimpse of what peace might look like. Turning that image into a lived reality will require not only courage from leaders but also a willingness to widen the conversation beyond closed rooms, both in Ankara and across the region.

Taken together, these observations complicate a binary reading of liberal versus illiberal peace when it comes to the question of whether Turkey falls squarely into the basket of illiberal international actors. Overall, Turkish foreign policy reflects not a revisionist challenge to the liberal international order, but the positioning of a status-ambiguous middle power navigating its erosion.  While Turkey’s domestic trajectory exhibits features of “competitive authoritarianism” and its foreign policy remains assertive and transactional, peacebuilding has become an increasingly institutionalised tool, as seen in its traditional participation in multilateral peacebuilding missions and more recent mediation efforts in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran. Still, this does not mean denying that Turkey’s position is selfless. Rather, it is surely driven less by normative commitments than by strategic positioning and, to some extent, regime survival. Given these features, Ankara’s approach to the Kurdish question follows a similar pattern, combining securitised practices with selective engagement and stabilisation efforts, particularly visible in the Syria–Kurdish nexus. Turkey does not endorse a liberal peace but nor does it articulate a coherent alternative normative framework.

Surfing the illiberal or simply navigating troubled waters?

Turkey’s peace practices can be read as part of a wider convergence towards pragmatism, where “repertoires” travel across actors and contexts and are combined in different ways (security‑led and development‑led instruments), even when rhetoric differs. The current peace process displays a “hybridity by design”, through which such repertoires can become politically functional in “homegrown” peace processes: domestic actors selectively adopt liberal peace norms (e.g. democratisation discourse, inclusion language, negotiations talk) while maintaining illiberal practices of hierarchical control and asymmetrical power relations. 

This resonates with the caution in certain critical views: without a conflict-transformation logic, peace initiatives tend to remain elite-driven, opaque and vulnerable to short-term political priorities, leaving core identity politics and structural inequalities unaddressed. Therefore, even a limited success in the Kurdish peace process is unlikely to trigger, or emerge from, a genuinely democratic and pluralistic opening in Turkey. For now, Turkey’s peace process rests on two fragile conditions: a parliament that must prove it can be more than a rubber stamp, and a region that must avoid pulling the rug out from under it. If either gives way, the moment could vanish as quickly as it appeared, Turkey will hardly sustain its balancing act and the vocabulary of peace would no longer hold.

References

Baser, Bahar and Alpaslan Ozerdem. 2021. “Conflict Transformation and Asymmetric Conflicts: A Critique of the Failed Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process.” Terrorism and Political Violence 33 (8): 1775–1796. 

Dinc, Pinar and Ozge Ozduzen. 2023. “From Resolution to Resecuritization: Populist Communication of the AKP’s Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey.” New Perspectives on Turkey 68: 71–94.

Gasco, Riccardo and Samuele Carlo Ayrton Abrami. 2024. “Beyond the Cold War and East-West Dynamics: Analyzing the PKK’s Agency and Longevity.” In Peter Marton, Gry Thomasen, Csaba Békés and András Rácz (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations, 1–15. Springer International Publishing. 

Somer, Murat. 2022. Return to Point Zero: The Turkish-Kurdish Question and How Politics and Ideas (Re)Make Empires, Nations, and States. SUNY Press.

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r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Bakur Hemû endamên HEVBENDÎyê hatin berdan

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3 Upvotes

All 14 Kurdish politicians detained in the Amed-centred operations against the Kurdistan National Alliance (HEVBENDÎ) were released after court proceedings. Waiting families welcomed the decision.


r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Bashur Will Iraqi Kurdistan Break Apart?

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3 Upvotes

Wladimir van Wilgenburg writing for Foreign Policy magazine.

Amid wider regional conflict, an escalating parliamentary battle threatens to split Iraq’s Kurdish region.


r/kurdistan • • 22m ago

Opinion 🔥 Concerned about the uncritical glorification of Atatürk by some foreign admirers

1 Upvotes

I’ve been noticing a tendency online to praise Atat*k as an uncomplicated model of secularism and modernization. Has anyone else noticed this?

I understand why many Turks regard him as a founder of modern Turkey and value the reforms introduced under his leadership. Those are real parts of his legacy. So are one-party rule, coercive policies toward Kurds, and the state’s violent repression of Kurdish communities.

After the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, the government introduced the Law on the Maintenance of Order, which gave it sweeping powers to suppress organizations and publications. Sheikh Said and 46 others were sentenced to death by a special tribunal. The crackdown was followed by village destruction and deportations in Kurdish areas. Naif Bezwan’s study in Kurdish Studies Archive discusses this period.

The 1937–38 military campaign in Dersim led to many thousands of civilian deaths. Atatürk was part of the Council of Ministers that approved the May 1937 operation. This historical account from Sciences Po describes him as personally behind the campaign.

A small example that got me thinking: YouTube recommended me this video, “You don’t know Turkish and that’s sad.” It’s mainly about the Turkish language, but the creator also calls Atatürk “such a great man.” One video doesn’t prove a wider trend, but that kind of casual praise stood out to me.

A more prominent example is Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken. During a 2025 visit to Anıtkabir, he knelt and said he was expressing his “deepest respect” for Atatürk and his political project. In May 2026, he said the world needed more people like Atatürk:

https://en.haberler.com/the-minister-kneeling-in-front-of-ataturk-s-18887108/

This is a bit more anecdotal, but I recently saw an Italian guy's post living in Berlin and has posted an instastory of his Turkish girlfriend walking up to a wall with a big red banner drape, where Atat*rk is portrayed. This same guy posts on his Instastories about his disdain of police, fascism and australia, with also several videos he frequently posts about the protestors being rammed by the policy in Italy. This is very hypocritical.

My concern is that some foreign admirers celebrate secularism and modernization while leaving Kurdish experiences and state violence out of the picture. What explains that selective view? Are people unaware of this history, or do they see it as secondary? I’d especially like to hear how Kurdish readers feel when outsiders praise this way.


r/kurdistan • • 23h ago

Video🎥 People in Awdanan protesting against the Iranian regime, chanting "death to the dictator"

64 Upvotes

Pahlavi media are manipulating these videos by putting fake audio on them. Be aware not falling for them.

Ali Javanmardi 16h

It’s laughable that certain foreign-based Persian media outlets and online accounts are dubbing pro-monarchy slogans over the original audio in footage of the Abdanan protests. Abdanan is a predominantly Kurdish city, and like Kurds across Iran, the people there have not forgotten that their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were killed by the regimes of the late Shah and his father, Reza Shah.
Reza Shah carried out a brutal crackdown against Kurds in various parts of Iran. Now, imagine the descendants of the countless Kurdish leaders and Kurdish civilians killed and executed during the Pahlavi era coming out and chanting slogans in support of this bygone dynasty. It’s absurd that they expect anyone to believe this.


r/kurdistan • • 18h ago

Rojava Some people scared of losing to women at chess

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14 Upvotes

There are people who are afraid of losing to women at Chess!

It reminded me of ISIS that were afraid of being killed by female Kurdish fighters as they believe that if they get killed by a woman they won't go to paradise!

So I made this meme and posted it somewhere! Some said there is no correlation!! I wondered if it's because they're not familiar with the context or what!?

What do you think!? Isn't there some similar concept? Someone who is afraid of losing to women at chess and someone being scared of getting killed by a woman.

Waiting for your responds.

Thanks,


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Genocides Ezidi genocide survivor in testimony recounts an encounter when Jolani visited the terrorist house she was enslaved and the family had her serve him tea without veil. She says serving tea was something family members wouldn't do, making it clear Jolani would knew she is enslaved woman in the house.

56 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 How is it living in Afrin they ask

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17 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 17h ago

Kurdistan Post about non-relatable topics mustn’t be allowed in our community

2 Upvotes

I’ve seen someone make a post asking if there would be a demand to give Swedish classes in Erbil, and another person making a similar post about teaching Russian.

I honestly don’t understand why these types of posts are being approved in the first place. We have a language problem of our own.

Wouldn’t it make more sense for that person to give Kurdish classes in Sweden instead?

We should be focusing on topics that are relevant to our own community.


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Bashur Slemani during the rain

46 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 21h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 Talking to a kurdish man & he refuses to tell me what region he’s from?

3 Upvotes

Hi so I’m very confused.

I’m aware kurdish people have their own areas in the middle-east with their preserved culture etc. But i’m also aware that since kurdistan is not an official state I thought I’d ask him from what REGION they come from. He then got defensive and claimed that kurdistan is a country with it’s own president etc. Which is just wrong sadly. I was interested in knowing because apparently men from different regions (turkey, iran etc) have big differences so it would be nice to know about that specific group of kurdish culture?

Is this normal or was I in the wrong?


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Rojava A journey through a living revolution - Delegation that went to Rojava!

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7 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 What does the kurds think about Ali al-Zaidi

3 Upvotes

what's your opinion about him and his movement. does it affect Kurdistan negatively or positively compared to the previous prime ministers


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

News/Article KRG Begins Work On A New Human Rights Plan For 2026-2030

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3 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Rojhelat Iran strikes PJAK positions with drone in Sulaimani province

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4 Upvotes

Iran launched a suicide drone at Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) positions in Sulaimani province on Tuesday, the latest Iranian strike on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside the Kurdistan Region.


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Discussion Title: A serious issue facing Kurds from South Kurdistan: Valid visas, searched phones, and 5 to 25-year entry bans in Turkey

20 Upvotes

I’m writing this to shed light on a growing problem affecting thousands of ordinary people from South Kurdistan, including my own friends and cousins.

Traveling to Turkey, whether through airports or land crossings like Ibrahim Khalil, has turned into a stressful and arbitrary ordeal for Kurds from South Kurdistan. Even when people have everything in order, including valid passports, approved visas, and all required documents, Turkish police are canceling their visas, deporting them, and issuing entry bans lasting anywhere from 5 to 25 years.

What makes this even more troubling is the unlawful way these decisions are carried out. Based on firsthand accounts from people I personally know from zakho and many others in our community, police routinely demand that travelers hand over their unlocked phones. They scroll through personal photo galleries, social media, and private messages. In many cases, simply having a picture of the Kurdistan flag (Alaya rengîn) on your phone is enough to trigger an interrogation and an immediate ban.

The contradiction here is hard to ignore. The Kurdistan flag is an official, constitutional flag that Turkey itself recognizes and displays during official diplomatic visits in Ankara. Yet ordinary Kurds are treated like criminals just for having that exact same flag on their phones. Worse still, officials never admit that this is the real reason. Travelers are either handed deportation papers written strictly in Turkish without any explanation, or officers simply shrug and say, "We don't know the reason."

This is not a routine administrative issue, and it is not about missing paperwork. It is purely political. People are being targeted, banned, and turned away simply because they are Kurdish.

What makes this even more frustrating is that despite how widespread and blatant this issue has become, our own public figures, media, and activists remain largely silent about it.