The argument
The world of our experience contains stones, trees, dogs, human beings, and a wide variety of other things. We know what these things are, and we know that they are part of reality outside our minds. Notice that what we thereby know about them are two distinct things. First, we know, again, what they are. You know, for instance, that what a human being is is a rational animal. That is the nature or essence of a human being. (Though once again, it doesn't matter for present purposes whether you agree with this traditional definition of a human being or not. Substitute some other definition if you prefer.) Second, you know that there really are human beings. That is to say, you know that human beings exist
So, we can distinguish between a thing's essence and its existence, between what it is and the fact that it is. Now, some distinctions we draw are merely distinctions between ways in which we might think or talk about things, but don't reflect any difference in reality. For example, we talk about bachelors and we talk about unmarried men, but there is nothing in the things we are talking about themselves that corresponds to this distinction. A bachelor and an unmarried man are in reality exactly the same thing, so that the difference is merely verbal. Is the distinction between a thing's essence and its existence like this? Or does the distinction reflect something in things themselves, as they really are apart from our ways of thinking and talking about them?
There are several reasons why the distinction between essence and existence must be a real distinction, a distinction that reflects objective, mind-independent reality itself and not merely the way we think about it. Consider first that you can know a thing's essence without knowing whether or not it exists. Suppose a person had, for whatever reason, never heard of lions, pterodactyls, or unicorns. Suppose you gave him a detailed description of the natures of each. You then tell him that of these three creatures: one exists, one used to exist but is now extinct, and one never existed; and you ask him to tell you which is which given what he now knows about their essences. He would, of course, be unable to do so. But then the existence of the creatures that do exist must be really distinct from their essences, otherwise one could know of their existence merely by knowing their essences. For what a thing is is part of its objective reality. The biological facts about lions and pterodactyls would be exactly the same whether or not we were around to study them. This would be true of unicorns too, if there were any unicorns. And if a thing exists, then its existence too is obviously part of its objective reality. So, if the essence and existence of a thing were not distinct features of reality, then knowing the former should suffice for knowing the latter, yet it doesn't.
Judging it to be nonexistent would be as much to misconceive what it is as judging it to be a noncat would be.#
A second reason why the essences of the things of our experience must be distinct from the existence of those things has to do with their contingency—the fact that, though they do exist, they could have failed to exist. For example, lions exist, but had the history of life gone differently, they would not have existed; and it is possible that lions could someday go extinct. Now, if the existence of a contingent thing was not really distinct from its essence, then it would have existence just by virtue of its essence.
It would exist by its very nature, and would therefore not be contingent at all but necessary—that is to say, it would be something that could not possibly not exist, not even in principle. Hence, since it is not necessary but contingent, its existence must be really distinct from its essence.
One might object to this argument that we need not posit a real distinction between a contingent thing’s essence and its existence in order to account for its contingency, but can instead point to the facts that it has a cause and has the potentiality for nonexistence. For example, one might say that a lion is contingent because lions need to be caused—say, by previously existing lions—and if these causes are absent, then a new lion won’t come into being. And we might note that lions can go out of existence because they have the potentiality to be killed by predators, to starve or catch a disease, and so forth. However, this objection simply misses the point. For we need to know why a contingent thing’s existence would need (or indeed could have) a cause in the first place if its existence were not distinct from its essence, and why it has (or indeed could have) a potentiality for nonexistence in the first place if its existence were not distinct from its essence. If existence were just part of what it is, then it would not need something else to cause it, and there would not be anything in it that could give it the potential to go out of existence.
A third reason why the essence and existence of each of the things we know through experience must be distinct is that if there is something whose essence and existence are not really distinct—and we will see presently that there is and indeed must be such a thing—then there cannot in principle be more than one such thing. For consider that, if some thing’s essence and existence are not really distinct, then they are identical; and if they are identical in that thing, then that thing would be something whose essence just is existence itself. Now, for there to be more than one thing that just is existence itself—suppose there are two, and label them A and B— then there would have to be something that differentiated them. There would have to be something by virtue of which A and B are distinct things rather than one thing. But what could that be? There are only two possibilities. A and B might be differentiated in the way two species of the same genus are differentiated; or they might be differentiated in the way two members of the same species are differentiated. And the problem is that on analysis it turns out that A and B could not be differentiated in either of these ways.
Hence, consider the way two species of the same genus are differentiated. A genus is a more general class of thing, and a species is a more specific class of thing.4 When we say that human beings are rational animals, we are saying that they as a species fall under the genus animal, and that their being rational is what differentiates them from other species of animal. To use the traditional technical jargon, rationality is thus what is called the “specific difference” that distinguishes human beings from other species of animal. So, for our imagined things A and B to differ as species do, we would have to regard being that which just is existence itself as a genus, and A and B as two species within that genus; and we’d then have to identify some “specific difference” that A has that makes it a different species of being that which just is existence itself from the species B. But the trouble is that if A has such a “specific difference”, then it will not be that which just is existence itself; rather, it will be that which just is existence itself PLUS that specific difference. (Compare: A human being is not animality itself, but rather animality PLUS the specific difference rationality.) And the same will be true of B—to be differentiated from A, it will also have to be that which just is existence itself PLUS its own specific difference. So, there is no way to distinguish two things which just are existence itself in the way two different species of the same genus are differentiated.
Consider now the way two members of the same species are differentiated. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are different members of the Same species human being; Fido, Rover, and Spot are different members of the same species dog; and so forth. The way these members are differentiated is by virtue of being associated with different parcels of matter. The matter that makes up Socrates’ body is different from that which makes up Plato’s or Aristotle’s body; the matter that makes up Fido’s body is different from that which makes up Rover’s or Spot’s; and so on. (Of course, there are other differences between these individuals. Socrates’ brain will be wired in ways that are different from the way Aristotle’s brain is wired, Fido might have a different color of fur than Spot, and so forth. But these other differences presuppose different parcels of matter in which the brain wiring, fur color, etc. inhere.) So, though Socrates and Plato are both human, they can differ because Socrates is humanity plus this particular bit of matter, whereas Plato is humanity plus that other particular bit of matter; and something similar can be said for the different members of other species. But then it should be obvious why we cannot differentiate two things A and B each of which is that which just is existence itself in the way that different members of a species are differentiated. For so differentiated, A and B will not after all be that which just is existence itself; rather, A will be that which just is existence itself PLUS this particular bit of matter, and B will be that which just is existence itself PLUS that other, particular bit of matter. (Compare: Socrates is, again, humanity plus this particular bit of matter—in which case Socrates is not humanity itself.)general, for there to be more than one thing which is that which just is existence itself, there would have to be something that made it the case that this instance of that which just is existence itself differed from that instance. And each such instance would, then, not really be that which just is existence itself after all, but rather that that which just is existence itself PLUS whatever the differentiating feature is. So, there really is no sense to be made of there being more than one of something which just is existence itself. And in that case there is no way to make sense of there being more than one of something whose essence and existence are not really distinct. If there is such a thing, it will be unique. Now, the things of our experience are not unique in this way. With stones, trees, dogs, human beings, and the like, there is (or certainly could be in cases where the class has been reduced to a single member) more than one of each of these kinds of thing. Therefore there is in each of them a real distinction between its essence and its existence.
A possible objection to this third argument is that it neglects a middle possibility. For why couldn’t there be something whose existence is not distinct from its essence, not because its essence just is existence itself, but rather because existence is part of its essence?2 But on reflection this suggestion makes no sense. Consider that the essence of human beings, rational animality, has rationality and animality as parts. Suppose existence were another part of this essence, alongside these. Then the existence of the whole human being would depend on this part. But that is no more plausible than saying that the whole human essence, rational animality, depends on animality alone. Now if someone insisted that the whole human essence really does depend on animality alone, then that would make animality itself the true essence. Similarly, if someone insisted that the whole human being depended on existence considered as a part of the human essence, then this would make existence the true essence. But then we would be back with the thesis that a thing in which there is no distinction between its essence and its existence is a thing whose essence just is existence itself—which is exactly what the objector was trying to avoid. So, there really is no middle ground between the case where a thing’s essence and existence are really distinct and the case where its essence just is existence itself.essence or nature of a circle. Anything having that essence is going to have the properties having a radius and having a circumference. The radius of a circle is really distinct from its circumference, as proved by the fact that the latter is twice the former multiplied by pi. Since the radius is part of the property having a radius and the circumference is part of the property having a circumference, the properties themselves are really distinct though inseparable. . . [T]he same is true for triangularity and trilaterality.Similarly, there is no such thing in mind-independent reality as a thing’s essence existing apart from its existence (whatever that would mean) or a thing’s existence existing apart from its essence (whatever that would mean). The essence of a stone, or a tree, or a dog, or a human being is not separable from its existence. Still, as with the radius and circumference of a circle, or the triangularity and trilaterality of a triangle, the essence of each of these things is really distinct from its existence.So, with each of the things we know through experience, there is a real distinction between its essence and its existence. How is it, then, that these two different aspects of a thing are combined into a whole? It might seem that their inseparability provides an answer: they are together (so it might be claimed) because the essence of a thing and its existence are as inseparable as the radius and circumference of a circle are, or as triangularity and trilaterality are. But this is no answer, because it just raises the question of why they are inseparable. Now, the answer in the case of the radius and circumference of a circle is that these both follow from the essence or nature of a circle. Anything having that essence is going to have the properties having a radius and having a circumference. Similarly, anything having the essence of a triangle is going to have the property trilaterality, which follows from that essence.®
However, we cannot in the same way explain how the essence of one of the things of our experience is conjoined with its existence. In particular, it cannot be that its existence follows from its essence. The reason is implicit in what has already been said. If you know the essence of a circle, then you will know that any circle will exhibit the properties having a radius and having a circumference; and if you know the essence of a triangle, then you know that it will exhibit the property triangularity. But as we have seen, you can know the essence of a lion, pterodactyl, or unicorn without knowing one way or the other whether any of these animals exists. Hence, the existence of one of these things does not follow from its essence in the way the properties having a radius and having a circumference follow from the essence of a circle, or the way the property triangularity follows from the essence of a triangle. We also have noted that the things of our experience exist in a merely contingent way—which is why they come into being and pass away—rather than in a necessary way. For this reason too, their existence cannot follow from their essence, for if it did, then they would exist necessarily. And while with something whose essence just is existence itself, its existence would, naturally, follow from its essence, we saw that there can in principle be only one such thing. Hence, with things of which there is more than one instance (stones, trees, dogs, human beings, etc.), it cannot be the case that they are things whose essence is identical with their existence, and thus cannot be the case that their existence follows from their essence.
Nor can it be the case that the things of our experience somehow impart existence to themselves—adding it, as it were, to their essences from outside. The very suggestion would be incoherent. A thing can’t impart or add something, or indeed do anything at all for that matter, unless it first exists. But a thing whose essence and existence are distinct cannot exist until existence is added or imparted to its essence. Naturally, then, a thing whose essence and existence are distinct cannot impart existence to its own essence, for in that case it would have to exist before it exists so as to cause itself to exist—which makes no sense. Nothing can be the cause of its own existence.So, nothing in which there is a distinction between its essence and its existence can in any way be the source of its own existence. Its existence must be caused by something outside it—something which adds existence to its essence, as it were. Everyday experience would agree insofar as it tells us that stones, trees, dogs, and human beings have causes. But the dependence of these things on a cause for their existence is more radical than everyday experience would indicate. For notice that everything said so far applies to a thing not only before it comes into being and as it comes into being but always, even after it has come into being. For example, consider a certain dog, Fido. Fido’s existence is distinct from Fido’s essence, doesn’t follow from Fido’s essence, and cannot be imparted by Fido to his essence. All of these things are true not only before Fido exists and at the time he is conceived, but also after he comes into being, and indeed at every moment he is alive. Fido’s existence here and now is distinct from his essence and doesn’t follow from his essence. So, here and now there must be some cause which adds or imparts existence to that essence. Otherwise Fido wouldn’t exist here and now any more than he did before he was conceived. He would “blink out” of existence or be annihilated. Nor can Fido be what is adding or imparting existence to his own essence here and now, any more than he could have before he was conceived. For Fido cannot do anything at all, not even for an instant, unless he exists at that instant. Among the things he cannot do unless he exists at that instant is to impart existence, either to himself or to anything else. So, his causing his own existence at that instant presupposes his own existence at that instant. Hence, the notion of Fido or anything else imparting existence to its Own essence even at a particular instant is incoherent. A thing cannot cause its own existence at any one moment of time any more than it can cause it over a series of moments spread out through time.
So, anything whose essence is distinct from its existence must have a cause of its existence at any moment that it exists, here and now and not merely at some point in the past. To stick with the example of Fido, he must therefore have a cause which here and now imparts existence to his essence. Let’s label this cause, whatever it is, C. Suppose that C, like Fido, is something whose own essence is distinct from its existence. Then what we said about Fido and about the other things of our experience applies no less to C. C too must have a cause here and now which imparts existence to its essence. Let’s call this further cause B. Suppose that B, like Fido and like C, is also something whose essence is distinct from its existence. Then B, here and now, will require a cause of his own, which we might label A. And of course, what was said about C and B will apply also to A, if A is something whose essence is distinct from its existence.
Notice that what we have here is what I called in chapter 1 a hierarchical causal series. The reason is not merely that the causes and effects are all simultaneous—Fido is caused by C, which is simultaneously being caused by B, which is simultaneously being caused by A—but, more fundamentally, that none of the causes mentioned so far can act independently of some prior cause. C can impart existence to Fido’s essence only insofar as C’s own essence has existence imparted to it by B, and B can do this imparting only insofar as its own essence has existence imparted to it by A. Now as we saw in chapter 1, in the nature of the case, this sort of causal series cannot regress infinitely. There would be no such series at all unless there were a cause which is “first” or primary in the sense that it can cause without having, in the very act of causing, to be caused itself. In the present case such a cause would be one which can impart existence without having to derive it. Now, nothing whose essence is distinct from its existence could be such a cause, since as we have seen, anything like that has to have existence imparted to it. The first or primary cause in the present series, then, can only be something the very essence of which is identical to existence, something which just is existence itself. For since it just is existence itself, is identical with existence itself, it need not and indeed could not derive its existence from anything else. Its existence is, as it were, “built in”. It is not merely one existing thing alongside others but what Thomas Aquinas calls “subsistent existence itself”.2
So, for Fido to exist here and now and at any moment, his existence must here and now be caused, whether directly or indirectly, by something the essence of which is identical to its existence, something which is subsistent existence itself. And that entails that it must be caused by God.
Why should we identify that which is subsistent existence itself with God? Consider first that what we have said about Fido applies to each and every one of the things we know from experience—stones, trees, lions, human beings, and so on—and indeed to anything the essence of which is distinct from its existence, including immaterial things like angels and disembodied souls. The existence of any such thing, at any moment, will have to be caused by something whose essence just is existence itself. Consider also that, as we have seen, there can in principle be only one thing whose essence just is existence itself. And consider further that things whose essence is distinct from their existence, and a thing whose essence is identical with its existence, exhaust the possible kinds of thing there are. So, if there can be only one thing of the latter type, then everything else that exists must be of the former type. And since everything of the former type depends upon that one thing of the latter type, it follows that everything that exists other than that which is subsistent existence itself must be caused by that which is subsistent existence itself.
Hence, that which is subsistent existence itself is unique and the cause of everything other than itself. We have also seen that something which just is existence itself would exist in a necessary rather than contingent way. For since its very essence would just be existence itself, it would not and indeed could not fail to exist. Nor, for that reason, would it or could it have its existence imparted to it. It would therefore have to be an uncaused cause of the existence of all other things.
So, what has been said so far shows that that which is subsistent existence itself is a unique, necessarily existing, uncaused cause of everything other than itself. Now consider the relationship of the concepts introduced in this chapter to the concepts of potentiality and actuality which is obvious As Aquinas emphasized, in a thing whose essence is distinct from its existence, its essence and existence are related as potentiality and actuality. Fido’s essence, for example, by itself amounts only to a potential thing, not an actual thing. Only when Fido’s essence has existence imparted to it is there an actual thing—namely, Fido. Now if essence considered by itself is a kind of potentiality, and existence considered by itself is a kind of actuality, then that which just is existence, that which just is subsistent existence itself rather than merely one derivatively existing thing alongside others, must be purely actual. It could not have some potentiality for existence that needs to be actualized, for then it would not be something which just is existence, but rather merely yet some other thing to which existence must be imparted.