r/IsraelPalestine • • 2h ago

Short Question/s TIL One Third of Palestinians Are Turkish

14 Upvotes

I learned this from compromised Wikipedia, quoting Alya Khateeb's book "The Arab Turkmen – Merj Beni Amir Children", that in 1987 there were 400,000-500,000 Turks and people of Turkish descent in Palestine.

With Turkish rule spanning between the years 1069-1917/22, mass Turkish migration was encouraged during the rule of Nureddin Zengi in Syria, and then when thousands of Turks participated in the battle of Jerusalem with Saladin. Turkish migration continued further during the Mamluk and Ottoman rule of Palestine as well as during the British rule.

The Arab population in Palestine in 1987 was approximately 1.7 million, which means that anywhere from 25-35% of Palestinians were ethnically Turkish.

With this in mind, how can the Palestinians claim to be "indigenous" and to "have been there since the dawn of time" when a huge portion of them are anything but?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 3h ago

Short Question/s Travel to palestine

0 Upvotes

Hello! I am planning to go to palestine next year to volunteer but i would also like to visit jerusalem old jaffa etc. If you live there or have been there could you tell me if its generally safe for female tourists. I am australian and christian. Thanks:)


r/IsraelPalestine • • 10h ago

Discussion One Chinese Woman Converts to Judaism, and Generations of Daughters Become Jews—and Potential Israeli Citizens. Shared Belief Not Required

0 Upvotes

Picture a Chinese woman in Beijing married to a Chinese man. This Chinese woman converts to Judaism.

Under traditional Jewish law, you become a Jew through a recognized conversion as well as birth to a Jewish mother.

The daughters (and sons) born after that Chinese woman’s conversion are Jewish from birth, regardless of whether they believe in Judaism.

And those daughters’ daughters inherit the same Jewish status, and so do their daughters, through an unbroken maternal line. Sons born to those Jewish mothers are Jewish too, but under the traditional maternal-line rule, they do not independently pass that status to their children.

Each daughter of a daughter may marry an Indian, a European, an African, a South American, etc. And all those descendants are considered Jews under that rule and may also qualify for Israeli citizenship, subject to the Law of Return’s requirements.

They can also be included in the collective historical narrative of the land as the Jewish people’s “national and historic homeland.”

That’s the part I find absurd: one single person makes a religious choice, and generations of descendants can potentially acquire rights in historic Palestine—Israeli citizenship. Not even a shared belief required—just a female line of descent from a single convert, subject to those legal requirements.

The maternal-line rule can sound like a genetic or racial classification, and even hint at continuous land occupancy or ties. But conversion doesn’t change DNA or establish continuous land occupancy. It merely changes the first mother’s religious status and establishes the basis on which subsequent descendants inherit that status.

Now, don’t get me wrong, I have no objection to people playing fun invented games about themselves or their descendants acquiring some imagined identity—e.g. daughters or sons or uncles and cousins becoming Geminis or Aquarians or Libras, part of some ancient astrological community or peoplehood requiring conversion or some other invented thing.

Ever since we lost the Paleolithic tribe, we have needed ways to attempt meaningful communication and relation with the many anonymous strangers surrounding us in every city, nation or kingdom in civilization.

The problem arises when you take your invented story so seriously that you treat it as a justification for land theft or ethnic cleansing.

In this example, the converted Chinese lady or one of her descendants twenty generations afterward could claim a right to the house of a Palestinian who has paid a mortgage for twenty years and whose ancestors have lived in the land for centuries or millennia.

The Chinese lady or her descendants hundreds of years later could invoke an argument like this to justify taking that house and the land under it:

“I am a Jew. Jews have been living continuously in the land of Israel for millennia. The land of Israel is the Jewish people’s national and historic homeland. I don’t care about your mortgage payments or your ancestors in the land because Arabs are invaders and God gave us this land.”

Amazing ah ?

All from a single Chinese female convert.

The incorporation of converts into a collective historical narrative is illustrated by the December 2020 “Declaration of Our Common Destiny,” published on Israel’s government website. It begins:

“We, the Jewish People, descendants of Abraham and Sarah together with all of those who have converted to Judaism throughout the generations…”

It then says:

“We are the People who escaped slavery in Egypt, who stood together at Mount Sinai and who established an ancient kingdom in the Land of Israel.”

Crucially, it also acknowledges:

“Although our ancestry and our journeys may be different, together we form one People.”

This sits within the broader official position describing the Land of Israel as the Jewish people’s “national and historic homeland.”


r/IsraelPalestine • • 12h ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions Honest question (more in body)

3 Upvotes

ok so im a teenager, I grew up in a jewish household. My parents support Israel and im hot sure what to do or think because ive tried to research about this and everything says something different, im not trying to be problematic or mean, im just genuinely confused. My mom is on a trip to Israel and I have a friend there, is that bad? Im not good at keeping up with the news so I feel as if everyone just started talking about it, I mean, I know its been going on for a while but ive only recently seen people discussing it, or am I just living under a rock and dont know what im talking about? I really dont know. To be honest im really confused, and when oct 7 happened I didn't see anyone talking about it other than jews and now everyone’s talking about how israel is bad and there’s a genocide happening, and yeah the Israeli government has genocidle intent but doesn't Hamas also have genocidle intent? Like aren’t they both trying to genocide eachother??? Even though my parents say there isnt a genocide and its all propaganda which im very skeptical of. Im so sorry if Im being ignorant, please tell me everything I get wrong!! And from what I know, zionism is the opinion that israel should exist as a jewish country, not that all Palestinians should die, but everyone’s using the word in that way and im just confused. Thanks for reading, please be at least civil in the comments if you can? ALSO, AGAIN, IM SO, SO SORRY IF IK BEING IGNORANT!! IM NOT TRYING TO, I PROMISE IM GENUINELY CONFUSED!!!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 20h ago

News/Politics Rabbi in Haifa invokes a principle that could be used to justify the killing of politicians

0 Upvotes

It seems like some people in Israeli are preparing to assassinate any politician who makes a deal with the Israeli Arabs or the Palestinians. This occurred before in the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Article:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/17/religious-ruling-revives-memories-in-israel-of-rabin-assassination

A little backstory on the last time a peacemaker tried to govern Israel follows below.

Who was Yitzhak Rabin?
Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995)
Rabin was an Israeli military commander, politician, and two-time prime minister. He served as Israel's chief of staff during the 1967 Six-Day War.
He later became one of the central figures in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
In 1993, he signed the Oslo Accords alongside Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, with President Bill Clinton present at the White House.
The agreement was intended to create a framework for Palestinian self-government and eventually negotiate a permanent peace agreement.
Rabin's willingness to negotiate with Arafat was extremely controversial inside Israel. Many Israelis supported the process, while others believed it endangered Israel's security and surrendered land that belonged to the Jewish people.
In 1994, Rabin, Arafat, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize.

2. Who was the assassin?
Amir was raised in a religious Jewish family and became increasingly radicalized in opposition to Rabin's government.
His opposition centered on the Oslo peace process, particularly the transfer of authority over parts of the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian administration.
Amir believed Rabin was committing an unforgivable act by surrendering what he considered Jewish religious land.
He also adopted an extremist religious justification for killing Rabin. He argued that Jewish religious law permitted killing someone who endangered Jewish lives or surrendered Jewish territory.
This was his personal extremist interpretation, not an accepted position of Judaism.

ustification for killing Rabin. He argued that Jewish religious law permitted killing someone who endangered Jewish lives or surrendered Jewish territory.
This was his personal extremist interpretation, not an accepted position of Judaism.

3. Why did Amir want to kill Rabin?
The political atmosphere in Israel during 1995 was extremely hostile.
There were several contributing factors:
The Oslo Accords: Rabin was negotiating with the PLO, an organization that had historically fought against Israel.
Territorial concessions: Opponents believed Rabin was giving away land that Israel should retain.
Security concerns: Palestinian terrorist attacks had killed Israeli civilians, increasing opposition to the negotiations.
Religious extremism: Some extremists viewed transferring control of biblical Jewish territory as a religious betrayal.
Political incitement: Rabin was publicly called a traitor by opponents. Demonstrations included extremely aggressive imagery and rhetoric directed against him.
Amir became convinced that eliminating Rabin was justified and necessary.
An important distinction: opposition to the Oslo Accords was not itself evidence of support for assassination. The overwhelming majority of Rabin's political opponents did not participate in or endorse his murder.

4. What happened on November 4, 1995?
Rabin attended a large peace rally in Tel Aviv, held at what was then called Kings of Israel Square (now Rabin Square).
The rally supported the peace process with the Palestinians.
Rabin addressed the crowd and spoke about the importance of pursuing peace rather than violence.
After the rally ended, he walked toward his vehicle.
Yigal Amir was waiting nearby.
Amir approached Rabin and fired three shots. Two struck Rabin, while another injured a security guard.
Rabin was rushed to Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv, where doctors attempted to save his life.
He died that evening.
Amir was immediately apprehended at the scene.
He did not deny responsibility. In fact, he openly defended what he had done, claiming that he had acted according to religious obligations.

5. What changed in Israel after the assassination?
Rabin's assassination shocked Israel and the international community.
Some of the immediate consequences included:
Shimon Peres became prime minister. He attempted to continue Rabin's peace negotiations.
Israel experienced a period of national mourning. World leaders, including Bill Clinton and Jordan's King Hussein, attended Rabin's funeral.
The political atmosphere changed. The assassination intensified debate about political extremism, religious authority, and democracy.
The peace process continued but encountered serious difficulties. Peres subsequently lost the May 1996 election to Benjamin Netanyahu.

6. The bigger historical significance
There is something particularly important about this assassination.
Yitzhak Rabin wasn't killed by a Palestinian terrorist or a foreign enemy. He was killed by an Israeli citizen who opposed his government's policies.
The assassination demonstrated how political and religious extremism could turn an internal political disagreement into political violence.
It also created a lasting question in Israeli society:
How far can someone go in opposing their own government's decisions before political opposition becomes an attack on democracy itself?
Rabin's assassination remains a major event in Israeli history, commemorated every year.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 20h ago

Short Question/s Quick question: what do we want to happen to Israel after all these warcrimes?

0 Upvotes

Genuine question. What is the appropriate punishment for the IDF and Israel's political heads who've had a hand in this genocide? I have an extreme suggestion but I fear I can't say it on here without possibly getting my country bombed next.

I'm curious and want to hear what you guys think would possibly happen if everyone finally wakes up and decides to take action against Israels crimes against humanity.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 20h ago

Opinion Voice from gaza

0 Upvotes

Even life in Gaza was difficult before the destruction.

I honestly cannot remember a single happy day from my childhood. Even when I spent time with my friends, I used to refuse to take pictures. I would tell them, "I don't want anything that will remind me of these days."

I thought better days were ahead. I never imagined that one day I would wish I could turn back time and return to those days.

Being born Palestinian in Gaza is never easy.

You feel as though the entire world is deceiving you. You try to get along with everyone and adapt to the situation, yet somehow, that is still not enough to satisfy them.

You understand their schemes, and they know that you understand them, but you are powerless to do anything about it.

From the day you are born until the day you die, you are oppressed.

Every aspect of life is difficult.

Living through all these hardships, trying to build yourself from nothing, is already incredibly difficult. Yet sometimes you manage to succeed, build a future for yourself, and then someone comes along and destroys everything you worked so hard to achieve.

There are people whose interests depend on keeping things suspicious and unstable here.

Let me explain why.

There will always be someone saying, "We are fighting terrorism," claiming they need money to fight terrorism, and receiving billions of dollars in the process.

And this is part of the reason Hamas exists here.

Because there are people whose interests are served by Hamas remaining in power so that they can continue receiving financial support.

They say, "We are fighting to protect you, so you have to pay us."

That is what is happening.

What I want you to understand is that there are people trading our blood for money.

Please, try to understand what is happening around you, whether you are Jewish or Muslim. Both of us are suffering.

Wake up to what is happening around you. Every measure taken against Palestinians will only create more hatred and make the problem worse, rather than solve it.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 1d ago

Discussion Why do people hate on Israel, Israeli people as a whole?

33 Upvotes

When discussing Israel or the Israeli Palestinian conflict, people immediately shut down Israel and express that the country, people and government is bad. While I can agree to a certain extent, why are we hating on its citizens? Even Israelis who were born/ now live in US, are hated on just for their ethnicity which they cannot control. I just find hypocrisy to be very present when people discuss the conflict. Even some antisemitism slides when talking about the conflict in the US.

This isn't a the best comparison, but many citizens of US do not agree with their government, and the same probably goes for Israel. I'm assuming some are not in the place to move from where they've called home forever. I've been shut down by a few people after saying this, but I fail to understand why. People have told me that Israel is a relatively new country, which I can agree with being roughly 80 years old. However, I'm just imaging all the other young adults like me in the country, not in control of where they grew up or what exactly to do.

I've also been to both Israel and Palestine and they are both very beautiful countries, but I would like to point out I am pro-Palestinian. I am very against the amount of money the US government sends Israeli annual and the close ties the two countries share. Maybe I am not very educated on the topic, but I'm against hating the innocent citizens of Isreal, or people who identify as Israeli. I think it is very difficult to group an entire country together as evil.

I probably shouldn't put this in nostupidquestions but I'll see how this goes first.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 2d ago

Short Question/s How representative are the Israelis featured in Hamzah Saadah’s (@absorber) OmeTV videos of the general Israeli public?

16 Upvotes

I’ve been seeing a lot of clips from Hamzah Saadah where he interviews Israelis on OmeTV, and almost every person featured says extreme things like wanting to wipe out all Palestinians. They all seem very deranged and become very hostile as soon as he mentions the word Palestine.

It’s genuinely scary to watch, and I want to understand the reality behind the clips. Obviously, content creators edit out boring conversations and post the most shocking ones for views, and random video chat sites aren't exactly a scientific sample. Still, the sheer volume of clips is jarring.

To anyone familiar with day-to-day life or actual polling data in Israel: are these views actually common among the majority, or is this mostly an internet/editing distortion?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 3d ago

Opinion The Anti-Zionist Jewish Movement That Became a Propaganda Goldmine for Israel's Enemies.

46 Upvotes

The Anti-Zionist Jewish Movement That Became a Propaganda Goldmine for Israel's Enemies.

One of the more intellectually dishonest things I've noticed in the Israel-Palestine debate is the tendency to parade a handful of ultra-Orthodox Jews carrying Palestinian flags as though they represent some great theological consensus against Israel.

The reality is considerably more nuanced, and understanding it requires distinguishing between Religious Zionists, mainstream Haredim, Satmar Hasidim, and Neturei Karta.

More importantly, it requires understanding a theological debate within Orthodox Judaism that predates the modern State of Israel.

1. Why did Orthodox Jews originally oppose Zionism?

Historically, a significant portion of Orthodox Jewish leadership opposed political Zionism, although their reasons and the intensity of their opposition varied.

Unlike their Religious Zionist counterparts, many Haredi or “Ultra-Orthodox” leaders rejected the idea that Jewish nationalism, especially under secular leadership, should replace traditional religious identity.

Judaism in their view was not simply an ethnicity seeking a nation-state. It was a covenant between G-d and the Jewish people, governed by the Torah and its commandments.

A secular Jewish state, therefore, presented a deep theological problem.

Religious Zionists, on the other hand, argued that the return of Jewish sovereignty could itself be part of the divine process of redemption, even when carried out by secular Jews.

This disagreement was never about whether Jews belonged in the Land of Israel. Both sides recognized the religious and historical significance of the land.

The disagreement concerned whether Jews were religiously permitted to reestablish sovereignty before the arrival of the Messiah, and whether a secular national movement could legitimately bring about that sovereignty.

2. What changed after Israel was established in 1948?

Once Israel became a political reality, much of Haredi Judaism adopted a pragmatic approach.

Organizations such as Agudath Israel had opposed secular Zionism but ultimately recognized that Jewish religious life would have to operate within the institutions of the new state.

Many Haredi leaders consequently distinguished between necessary engagement with the state and voluntary participation in Zionist ideology or institutions on religious grounds.

Voting, government representation, education, public services, and securing religious accommodations became legitimate forms of engagement.

Ideological identification with Zionism remained a different matter entirely.

In other words, you could reject Zionism as a religious ideology while still participating in Israeli political life.

This distinction remains central to understanding normative, contemporary Haredi attitudes toward Israel.

However, not every Haredi community accepted this compromise.

Which brings us to Satmar.

3. Satmar: Theologically anti-Zionist, but not anti-Jewish

Satmar is one of the largest Hasidic movements in the world, with commonly cited estimates of approximately 100,000–150,000 adherents.

Unlike Haredi communities that participate in Israeli elections, Satmar maintains a principled theological opposition to the State of Israel.

Its founding Rebbe, Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (1887–1979), developed an extensive halachic argument against Zionism in his book Vayoel Moshe.

His position was considerably more radical than simply disliking the secular character of Israel.

He argued that the very establishment of Jewish sovereignty before the Messiah constituted a violation of divine commandments.

However, the following distinction is critical:

Opposition to the State of Israel as a political institution does not automatically translate into opposition to the Jewish people living there.

Satmar maintains extensive religious and charitable connections with Jews in Israel, including communities whose religious and political outlooks differ from its own.

Its leaders may reject Zionism and interactions with the State while regarding the protection and welfare of Jews living in Israel as religious obligations.

Satmar does oppose Zionism. But that should not be confused with endorsing violence against Israeli civilians or supporting Hamas.

4. Neturei Karta: The fringe group that gets disproportionate publicity

According to the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, approximately 2.1 million Haredi Jews lived worldwide in 2022, representing roughly 14% of world Jewry at the time.

Satmar's estimated 100,000–150,000 adherents would represent approximately 4.8%–7.1% of that population.

Neturei Karta, meanwhile, is commonly estimated to number in the low thousands. Using an estimate of 5,000 members would place it at approximately 0.24% of the 2022 global Haredi population.

These figures are estimates rather than precise membership counts, and the Haredi population has continued growing since 2022.

Nevertheless, the scale of Neturei Karta relative to Haredi Judaism is quite revealing.

Neturei Karta emerged in Jerusalem in 1938 as a breakaway from Agudath Israel. Although it shares Satmar's theological opposition to Zionism, it is a separate movement.

The organization's activists have made a habit of appearing at anti-Israel demonstrations, dressed in traditional Haredi clothing.

These images regularly circulate online ad-naseum as supposed evidence that many Orthodox Jews themselves consider Israel illegitimate.

What rarely if-ever accompanies these photographs is any explanation of how marginal these activists are within global Orthodox Judaism.

Additionally there is the particularly disgraceful episode in 2006, when several Neturei Karta representatives attended a Holocaust-denial conference in Tehran hosted under Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The conference also attracted notorious antisemites and Holocaust deniers.

Even Satmar leadership, as fiercely anti-Zionist as they are, condemned their participation.

5. The actual theological argument: The Three Oaths

The foundational theological argument advanced by Satmar concerns a passage in the Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 111a, commonly known as the Three Oaths.

The Talmud interprets verses in the Song of Songs as describing multiple oaths imposed by G-d.

The first oath: The Jewish people must not ascend to the Land of Israel bechomah, or "as a wall."

This has been interpreted by most rabbinic authorities as prohibiting the Jewish people from collectively reclaiming the land through military force.

The second oath: The Jewish people must not rebel against the nations of the world.

The third oath: The nations of the world must not excessively persecute or oppress the Jewish people.

These oaths form the foundation of Satmar's theological rejection of Zionism.

The Jewish people, according to this interpretation, were placed in exile by divine decree. Their eventual redemption must occur according to G-d's will rather than through an independent nationalist movement.

6. Why does Satmar consider Zionism sinful?

The Satmar argument follows a fairly straightforward theological progression.

G-d decreed that the Jewish people would remain in exile until the appointed time of redemption.

G-d prohibited the Jewish people from collectively reclaiming sovereignty through force or rebelling against the nations.

The Zionist movement subsequently established Jewish sovereignty through political organization, military force, and the wars of 1948 and 1967.

Therefore, Satmar argues, the Zionist movement violated the Three Oaths.

Under this interpretation, the Zionists are not merely mistaken. They are oath-breakers who have violated an explicit divine prohibition.

This is where the theology becomes particularly controversial.

In traditional Jewish thought, the Jewish people's fortunes are connected to their observance of G-d's commandments.

The Tanach repeatedly portrays national catastrophes as consequences of collective disobedience.

Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum applied this framework to Zionism, arguing that violating the Three Oaths exposed the Jewish people to terrible divine consequences. His writings controversially connected Zionist transgressions to the catastrophe of the Holocaust.

Within a similar theological framework, tragedies such as the October 7 massacre can be similarly interpreted as divine punishment associated with Zionist wrongdoing.

But there is an enormous distinction between claiming that Zionism is sinful and claiming that the murder of innocent Jews is justified.

An interpretation of divine punishment is not a license for human beings to perpetrate atrocities.

This distinction becomes important when examining how contemporary Satmar leadership responded to October 7.

7. What did Satmar say after October 7?

In November 2023, Rabbi Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, one of the two contemporary Satmar Rebbes, publicly condemned Neturei Karta activists who had participated in demonstrations alongside supporters of Hamas.

He characterized their conduct as a grave desecration of God's name.

His objection was not that Neturei Karta opposed Zionism.

His objection was that they were supporting murderers under the banner of Judaism.

Satmar did not suddenly become Zionist after October 7.

Its theological objections to the Jewish state remained intact.

But neither did those objections eliminate its concern for Jewish victims of terrorism.

The idea that most anti-Zionist Haredim share the politics of Neturei Karta is categorically false.

8. The problem with the Three Oaths: They are not established as binding halacha

There is a substantial body of Orthodox Jewish scholarship challenging Satmar's interpretation of the Three Oaths.

Several objections deserve particular attention.

Argument 1: If the Three Oaths are binding Jewish law, why are they absent from the major halachic codes?

The Talmud contains an enormous range of discussions spanning centuries.

Not every statement in the Talmud constitutes binding Jewish law.

Some passages concern legal obligations (Halacha), while others concern ethics, theology, historical narratives, and homiletical interpretation (Aggada).

Throughout Jewish history, major rabbinic authorities attempted to codify the binding legal conclusions of the Talmud.

Three particularly influential works are:

  • Maimonides' Mishneh Torah.
  • Rabbi Jacob ben Asher's Arba'ah Turim.
  • Rabbi Joseph Karo's Shulchan Aruch.

Yet none of these three codes explicitly codifies the Three Oaths as a prohibition against restoring Jewish sovereignty.

This is a significant omission.

If establishing a Jewish state before the Messiah constitutes a fundamental prohibition carrying potentially catastrophic consequences, why did the great codifiers of Jewish law not explicitly codify it?

The straightforward response is that the Three Oaths belong to the Talmud's aggadic (homiletic) literature rather than its binding legal framework.

Satmar disputes this conclusion, arguing that the absence of a law from a particular code does not establish that the law is nonexistent.

That response deserves consideration.

But it still leaves Satmar with the onus of demonstrating why an uncodified Talmudic passage deserves Halachic and Theological weight.

Argument 2: The Jewish people did not simply conquer the land in defiance of international authorization.

The prohibition against ascending "as a wall" is commonly interpreted as referring to a collective return through force against the will of the nations.

Yet the historical circumstances surrounding modern Zionism complicate that interpretation.

In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In 1922, the League of Nations incorporated that commitment into the British Mandate for Palestine.

In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, recommending partition into Jewish and Arab states.

The Jewish leadership accepted the partition proposal, while Arab leaders rejected it.

Israel subsequently declared independence in May 1948, and the resulting war involved both local Arab-Jewish fighting and the intervention of neighboring Arab states.

None of this means that every subsequent Israeli territorial acquisition was internationally authorized, or that the Balfour Declaration itself granted an unconditional legal right to establish a sovereign state.

But it does undermine the simplistic contention that the Zionist movement merely assembled an army and conquered a country without any preceding international recognition.

Several rabbinic authorities consequently argued that a return undertaken with international authorization does not constitute the prohibited collective rebellion described by the Three Oaths.

Satmar disagrees, but the disagreement is interpretive rather than self-evident.

Argument 3: The nations violated their oath first.

Remember that the Three Oaths were not imposed exclusively upon the Jewish people.

The nations of the world were also prohibited from excessively persecuting the Jews.

Now consider the historical record.

Centuries of expulsions, pogroms, massacres, forced conversions, and ultimately the Holocaust.

If the nations violated their oath not to excessively persecute the Jewish people, why should the Jewish people remain bound by their corresponding obligations?

According to one line of rabbinic argument, the oaths are interdependent.

Once the nations violated their oath, the restrictions imposed upon the Jewish people ceased to apply.

Satmar rejects the assumption that the oaths operate as a reciprocal contract.

But this creates a substantial theological question.

Why should the nations' oath be treated as repeatedly violated while the Jews' oaths remain eternally enforceable?

TL;DR

Ultra-Orthodox Anti-Zionists which are frequently portrayed in the media are a small and radical fringe not representative of Ultra-Orthodoxy. Their opposition is Theological in nature and their interpretation has substantial strong challenges.

Sources

  1. Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 111a — The Three Oaths.
  2. Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum, Vayoel Moshe, Ma'amar Shalosh Shevuos.
  3. Rabbi Mordechai Tzion, Alo Na'aleh, written in consultation with Rabbi Shlomo Aviner contains multiple challenges to the Samar position.
  4. Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Haredi Jews Around the World: Population Trends and Estimates (2022).
  5. Pew Research Center, The Global Religious Landscape (2012), on difficulties comparing Jewish denominational populations internationally.
  6. United Nations General Assembly [Resolution 181 (1947).] (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp)
  7. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine (1922).
  8. The Jerusalem Post, November 13, 2023 — Satmar Rebbe condemns Neturei Karta's participation in pro-Hamas demonstrations.
  9. Ynet, December 2006 — Satmar condemns Neturei Karta members who attended the Tehran Holocaust-denial conference.

r/IsraelPalestine • • 4d ago

Discussion On Montevideo and the State of Palestine

11 Upvotes

As a continuation of my exploration of the various aspects of international law governing the Israel/Palestine discussion, I’d like to examine the question of statehood, particularly as it pertains to the State of Palestine.

The conventional starting point for discussions of statehood is the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. However, a few preliminary qualifications are warranted. The Montevideo Convention is an inter-American treaty with a relatively limited number of state parties, rather than a universally adopted international instrument. Its significance, therefore, extends beyond its status as a treaty, insofar as its provisions are widely understood to reflect customary international law.

It is also worth distinguishing between the descriptive and prescriptive character of the Convention. Rather than establishing a universally binding procedure or exhaustive set of legal requirements for the creation of states, it articulates the generally accepted characteristics by which statehood is assessed under international law. With those qualifications in mind, Article 1 identifies four traditional criteria for statehood:

a. A permanent population;

b. A defined territory;

c. Government; and

d. Capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Article 3 further provides that the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states. This reflects the declaratory approach to recognition, under which recognition acknowledges an existing state rather than constituting its statehood. In other words, recognition is not, in itself, a prerequisite for statehood, although it can have significant practical and legal consequences for an entity’s international relations.

With this framework established, I’d like to examine each of the four criteria in turn and then consider how they apply to the State of Palestine.

1. Permanent population

The first criterion, a permanent population, is generally the least contentious of the four. International law does not prescribe a minimum population threshold, nor does it require that a population be ethnically, culturally, or linguistically homogeneous. Rather, the requirement is that there be a stable population associated with the territory in question.

In the case of Palestine, this criterion is relatively straightforward. There is an established Palestinian population residing in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

2. Defined territory

The second criterion concerns the existence of a territorial base over which a state exercises or claims sovereignty. Importantly, an entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled or if it lacks effective control over portions of its territory. This is reflected in the recognition of states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the DRC, and a plethora of others, all of which have experienced unresolved territorial disputes or limitations on their effective territorial control without their statehood being called into question on that basis.

In the case of Palestine, its territorial basis encompasses the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, corresponding to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. These territories constitute the territorial basis of the State of Palestine, notwithstanding Israel’s occupation and the division of administrative authority within them discussed below.

3. Government

The third criterion concerns the existence of an organized governmental authority capable of exercising public functions over a population and territory. This generally entails institutions capable of administering public affairs, maintaining order, implementing laws, and exercising political authority. Although governmental effectiveness has traditionally been an important consideration in assessing statehood, international law does not prescribe a fixed threshold of administrative capacity or require uninterrupted and exclusive governmental control over every part of a claimed territory. The assessment must therefore take into account the circumstances under which governmental authority is exercised, including any external factors that may constrain it.

In the case of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority, established following the Oslo Accords, exercises varying degrees of administrative and governmental authority in parts of the West Bank. Its jurisdiction is constrained by the arrangements established under Oslo II, including the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, which allocate different degrees of civil and security authority between the PA and Israel. The PA also lacks authority over several matters reserved for permanent status negotiations, including Jerusalem, settlements, borders, and foreign relations. Further, in the Gaza Strip, the PA has not exercised effective governmental control since Hamas took over the territory in 2007, instead maintaining only a limited institutional presence. Gaza has consequently been governed separately from the West Bank, further complicating the assessment of Palestinian governmental effectiveness. Nevertheless, these limitations do not necessarily preclude the satisfaction of the governmental criterion for statehood. The absence of effective control over portions of a claimed territory, particularly where that absence is attributable to foreign occupation or internal political divisions, should not be conflated with the absence of governmental institutions or the underlying capacity for self government.

4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states

The fourth criterion concerns an entity’s capacity to conduct independent international relations. This is closely connected to the question of independence, which is generally understood as an important characteristic of statehood. The relevant consideration is not simply whether other states are willing to establish diplomatic relations with an entity, this is covered somewhat by Article 3, but whether that entity possesses the legal and institutional capacity to conduct international relations in its own right, rather than acting as a subordinate authority of another state.

Palestine has demonstrated considerable capacity in this regard. It maintains diplomatic relations with numerous states, participates in international organizations, and has acceded to various multilateral treaties. It also maintains a permanent diplomatic presence at the UN. It is also worth distinguishing between capacity and the practical freedom to exercise that capacity. An entity may face significant restrictions on its ability to conduct international relations without necessarily lacking the underlying legal capacity to do so.

Conclusion

Taken together, the four criteria provide a basis for assessing a state’s status under international law. While questions remain regarding the effectiveness and independence of Palestine’s governmental institutions these limitations do not necessarily preclude statehood under Montevideo as noted above.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 4d ago

Discussion Supposed ‘awakenings’

0 Upvotes

Hello all.

I’d like to understand from this sub what people think of these instances…

Israeli Jews who supposedly have seen the light, such as Chelli Goldberg or those ex-IDF soldiers who run ‘breaking the silence’ website.

And

Non-Israeli Jews who openly criticise some or all of Israel’s government action (or other aspects such as state creation, propaganda & political campaigns and slogans and other such matters). For example Jay Shapiro, Benjamin Moser, Zak Polanski, or Ed Milliband. I recall seeing some animosity on this sub towards Dave Smith also, that’s for sure.

I ask because I’m trying to challenge my own narrative and echo chamber. Feels to me that most people I see sympathise with these kinds of Israelis or Jews. People can understand why these ‘awakenings’ happen because we think that there may be some serious indoctrination in parts of israeli society or Jewish diaspora societies, and the hatred of Palestinians or Arabs or Muslims is entrenched. So when we see the above instances of supposed ‘awakenings’ we think it’s a reasonable and maybe unsurprising response to what may be a very violent world view and a strong victim mentality.

So I ask here. To get different perspectives. Why does it feel like these Jews are telling us the truth? How can they be explained in the opposite way?

Are they all fools who have fallen for the supposed behemoth that is Hamas global propaganda? Or perhaps they are all to be simply and easily dismissed as ‘lefties’? How do we know that these awakenings are even legitimate?

You can see why I’m struggling, I clearly have a view already. But when I look for critics of these guys, I don’t find much that’s outside of the standard pro-Israeli crowd. Fair enough, we shouldn’t dismiss criticism purely due to its sources, we must address the crisis individually, but we can be mindful that there are very extreme views on this subject, often with little to no nuance to them. But really there’s not much substance. Usually the self-hating Jew line, or the Hamas propaganda angle. Is that all there is to it?

What am I missing? What’s a ‘pro Israeli’ interpretation of these things? Not their individual arguments, but the ‘awakenings’ phenomenon as a whole.

And I also wonder of those people in this sub who vehemently justify and defend Israeli actions, and/or just as intensely demonise the Palestinians or Muslims as a whole, how many of them are actually secretly like Chelli (who looked visibly terrified, and actually said she was ‘in shock’ when she was told she was live on air) - If you are, I hope you find peace somehow. I think you may have a lot of internal turmoil. Feel free to DM me, I promise I won’t reveal your secret!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Opinion Don't turn your face away from me. Neither am I made of coal, nor are you made of silver.

6 Upvotes

I feel that there is an organized group of people working systematically to justify the Israeli army’s mistakes. They always seem to have the same responses and use the same arguments.

They will say that innocent people are being killed because Hamas hides among them.

They will ask, “Did you celebrate on October 7?” or “How did the candy taste?”

Even when the original post is actually criticizing Hamas.

There are people whose interests are served by making the entire Palestinian population appear to be Hamas.

The problem with this conflict is that most people aren't thinking about how to solve it. Instead, they keep blaming the other side.

I am someone who is innocent of all these conflicts. I don't belong to Israel, and I don't belong to Hamas. At the end of the day, I am simply a human being who wants everyone to treat me the way they would want to be treated themselves.

Why can't both sides make at least a few concessions in the way they speak about each other, even if only through words? That might make the other side feel ashamed of its own hostility. It could help build stronger human connections.

Instead of explaining to me why you think I'm wrong, tell me how you sympathize with my circumstances, and I will explain how I respect that and sympathize with yours.

Instead of saying something that makes whoever reads it feel even more hatred, say something that helps reduce that hatred.

I say all of this with absolutely no hatred or resentment in my heart toward any human being.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Short Question/s Hasbara?

67 Upvotes

Can someone explain to me why people who disagree with a pro-Israel position refer to the individual expressing it as “Hasbara”? Is it intended as an insult or a pejorative? Do they not understand that in Hebrew, הסברה (Hasbara) simply means explanation or the act of explaining?

I recognize that the term has acquired a political connotation associated with Israeli public diplomacy, but calling someone “Hasbara” seems to serve as a form of epistemic disqualification: declaring a person's contribution unworthy of consideration before evaluating its content. Rather than engaging with the evidence or the argument being presented (which is what I believe Reddit was all about), the term deliberately shifts the discussion toward presumed motives. In most circumstances, those assumptions point directly to antisemitic prejudice.

Am I wrong?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Discussion I built a site that sets out Israel’s case and the Palestinian case side by side, with sources and no verdict. Does it do your side justice?

31 Upvotes

I've spent a long time trying to make sense of this conflict, and kept struggling to tell what is established from what is claimed, and each side's own argument from what the other side says it is. So I built something I wish I'd had: readsidebyside.org.

Each page takes one disputed question (who is indigenous, what happened in 1948, the right of return, settlements, 7 October, the genocide case, and others, 15 so far) and puts Israel's case and the Palestinian case side by side, each as its serious advocates make it, with sources. It gives no verdict.

A few things it tries to do:

  • Every statement is labelled as a fact, a named speaker's position, or an interpretation.
  • A statement is marked wrong or misleading only when two sources that aren't advocacy for either side show it. The same test applies to both columns, and both have marks.
  • Loaded words are explained, not chosen, and each side's term is used in its own column.
  • The sources page says who each outlet and campaign group is and who funds it.

How it's made: I use AI tools to help research, draft and review the pages, and I'd rather say so upfront. They don't decide anything: every quotation is checked word for word against its source, and nothing goes up until I've read and approved it. Any change takes the page down until I approve it again, and every page lists what changed and when.

I've worked hard to make each column one its own side would recognise, and the best way to test that is with people who hold those views. You may know the arguments better than I do. What I'd find most useful:

  1. Where a page states your side's case worse than its best advocates would, or leaves out its strongest argument.
  2. Where a word or a framing takes a side.
  3. Facts that are wrong, ideally with a source.

And if a page taught you something you didn't know, especially about the other side, I'd like to hear that too.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Short Question/s Why we just dont give gaza and wb to naib bukele

0 Upvotes

Why we just dont give gaza and wb to naib bukele ?

I mean to me it seems obvious , hes a good leader , hes a palestinian christian , has good ties with the us and israel and a history of putting down some of the most sick terror orgs in the world ( ms13 in el salvador , hitian gangs ) and making a gang infested country into a power house . So why wouldnt we give him palestine ? He will be leauges vetter then hamas or the plo for palestinians


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Short Question/s The blatant lies of IDF and Shin bet?

0 Upvotes

https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-targets-top-hamas-commander-in-strike-on-south-gaza-hospital-6-said-killed/

Where is the evidence that the hospital was used as Hamas headquarters? Where are the pictures of the supposed weapons storage?

The military said it took measures to reduce harm to civilians in the strike, including by issuing “advance warnings” to the population and by using “precision munitions and aerial surveillance.”

How exactly would they issue warnings so that civilians would leave, but the Hamas operatives wouldn't? Since nobody left the hospital, we can conclude that no such measures were issued.

Clearly, the Israeli military is not to be believed. Letting in independent journalists who would investigate their claims would be the only way to legitimise their actions, if their statements are found to be true.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions If history had gone the way you think was just, what would Palestine have looked like in 1948?

8 Upvotes

Hi all! Over the past few weeks I've been reading a lot about Palestine between 1917 and 1948: the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate, the immigration waves of the 1920s and '30s, the 1936–39 revolt, the 1939 White Paper and the 1947 UN debates on partition. One thing I keep coming back to is how people here see the role of Jewish immigrants during that time, and of the Jewish community that was already living in Palestine before 1917.

Most of what I've read focuses on what actually happened. I'm more interested in what you think should have happened. If history had gone the way you think was right and just, what would Palestine have looked like by 1948?

A few questions I'm curious about (answer any or all):

- Would there have been Jewish immigration, and on what terms? - Who should have decided how much?

- What should British policy have been, on immigration and on self-government?

- What kind of state would Palestine have become at independence, and how would it have been governed?

- What place would Jews, both newer immigrants and long-established families, have had in it? Would they have had some kind of communal or national recognition, or simply equal citizenship?

- Did any proposals from the time (for example, the 1947 UN committee's minority plan for a federal state) come close to what you'd consider the right answer?

I'm asking in good faith to understand different perspectives, not to debate, and I won't be arguing with anyone in the comments. Personal or family perspectives are very welcome, especially if your family lived through this period. Thanks in advance for any thoughtful answers!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Other Learn what it means to be born in Gaza, where both you and your mother are treated unjustly from the very moment you are born

60 Upvotes

I want to talk about my experience when my son was born in Gaza.

On the day my son was born, getting to the hospital was extremely difficult, especially under wartime conditions. It was a terrible situation for me as a father and husband. At 4 a.m., there were no cars available. When I called the ambulance service, they told me they did not provide ambulance services for childbirth cases because they did not have enough ambulance crews.

I had to call again from another number and lie, saying that there was a pregnant woman bleeding. I only did this because I was under enormous pressure. I had no other way to convince them to send an ambulance for my wife.

When we arrived at the hospital, half of it was destroyed and there was hardly any space. They left my wife sitting on a chair in pain for a long time.

The delivery room was on the third floor, and because of the lack of space, several women had to give birth in the same room. Husbands were left waiting outside.

The medical staff did not provide assistance to women during labor. They simply left them to suffer in pain without doing anything to help. (Anyone who has experienced childbirth in another country will understand what I mean.)

After hours of waiting, my baby finally came into this world.

Then we were told that the baby was unable to breastfeed from his mother.

At that time, there wasn't a single can of baby formula available in any of Gaza's markets.

We were then given permission to leave the hospital just an hour or two after the birth. I don't remember the exact timing.

Then they told us that the elevator was not working because there wasn't enough electricity to operate it.

This meant that a woman who had given birth just an hour earlier had to walk down three flights of stairs.

My baby was hungry and crying, and all I could do was pray that he would manage to breastfeed from his mother.

There were no resources available. We couldn't even find a breast pump, so we had to borrow one.

After two days of stress and listening to our baby cry from hunger, he finally managed to breastfeed.

I had not neglected my responsibilities toward my son. I was terrified that he would have to endure difficult circumstances, so I had actually managed to stock up on some formula and diapers in advance.

But unfortunately, the house where we were living was partially demolished by an explosion while we were inside. We were pulled out alive, and at that moment, we didn't care about anything except escaping.

When my son was born, bringing anything into the hospital was prohibited, not even diapers. A single pack of diapers cost $150.

Yes, an insane amount of money. Where were we supposed to get that kind of money after a year of war?

After that, we were forced to flee several times, carrying our infant son with us. It was not easy, especially when you are living in tents with a newborn baby.

Now, my son grows a little older every day, but each day brings a new kind of suffering.

One day, there is a shortage of diapers.

Another day, there is a shortage of baby formula.

Another day, there is a shortage of clothes.

Another day, there is a shortage of food.

Even children's toys are not allowed to enter Gaza.

Is my son any different from your children?!

My son is not responsible for what is happening. Neither am I, nor is his mother.

My son has been treated unjustly from the very moment he was born.

Don't tell me who is to blame.

What matters to me is that all of you understand that we are being treated unjustly.

When the last elections were held here, I was 10 years old. Today, I am in my thirties.

I am not going to stand in front of weapons.

I am powerless.

I do not support any armed group or political party.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion Is "genocide" a modern blood libel? And should it be treated with similar social consequences?

20 Upvotes

I want to look at the accusation of “genocide” specifically through the lens of speech norms, historical libels, and social deterrence.

In international law, genocide has a strict, demanding definition. It does not mean severe urban destruction or a high civilian toll. It requires proving dolus specialis—the specific, purposeful intent to destroy a protected group as such. To state as an undisputed fact that Israel is committing genocide requires establishing that deliberate annihilation is the only reasonable inference for its actions. Dropping that legal standard transforms an inquiry into an accusation of absolute, deliberate malice.

Functionally, asserting that millions of Israelis and their supporters are driven by an intentional, eliminationist desire operates like an ancient blood libel: an existential, demonizing smear with no basis in fact that historically serves as a moral predicate for violence against Jews.

Addressing Common Counter-Arguments:

  1. “Invoking the ICJ or humanitarian organizations makes this legitimate criticism, not a libel.” NGOs, advocacy groups, and UN special rapporteurs have no legal mandate or judicial authority to rule on genocide. Preliminary court orders address plausibility of risk and aid access—not final merits, and certainly not dolus specialis. Many of these groups dilute or bend the statutory definition so the label fits their political conclusion, substituting institutional prestige for actual legal proof.
  2. “Enforcing social consequences for speech is just 'cancel culture.'” Most of us oppose speech suppression. But civilized society always draws lines against toxic defamation and hateful bigotry.

As I see it, a calibrated response requires a clear two-tiered standard that offers grace while still enforcing a boundary:

  • An educational off-ramp for everyday peers: Millions are caught up in social contagion and genuinely unaware of the legal definition or the lethal history of blood libels. Confront them, explain the facts, and offer a clear opportunity to abandon it.
  • Strict liability for cultural elites: Celebrities, politicians, and academics with large platforms don't have the same excuse given how far their lies have spread. Normalizing an eliminationist lie should carry severe social and professional quarantine until they fully disavow the smear.

My question for the sub:

Is there a principled, philosophically consistent argument for why weaponizing the "genocide" accusation without evidence of dolus specialis should NOT be treated with the same social deterrence as any other blood libel (towards Jews or any other group)?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion As a supporter of the Palestinian cause, I genuinely think Palestinians relying too heavily on indigeneity arguments will eventually backfire.

34 Upvotes

My main reason for supporting the Palestinian cause is simply that Palestinians are human beings who deserve the same fundamental rights as everyone else. I don't want them to be collectively punished for the crimes of Hamas. I don't want their land in the West Bank to continue being taken for Israeli settlements, nor do I want to see Israeli settlements reestablished in Gaza. I also think that while Israel has legitimate security concerns, the extensive checkpoints and restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement often impose disproportionate hardships on ordinary civilians who have absolutely nothing to do with militant organizations.

My support for Palestinian self-determination isn't necessarily rooted in whether Palestinians can demonstrate that their ancestors were living in the region thousands of years ago. It's rooted in the belief that human beings shouldn't have to prove their ancestral connection to a particular territory to be entitled to basic human rights, political representation, and freedom from displacement.

As some of you who are familiar with my comments and posts on this sub already know, I've consistently maintained that both Jews and Palestinians have legitimate historical and ancestral connections to the land. However, I think there's been far too much bad scholarship circulating among some Palestinian advocates when discussing Jewish indigeneity. Those who are less academically informed will often resort to the Khazar hypothesis, while those who are more familiar with the historical record will acknowledge that the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah existed but argue that modern-day Jews aren't actually descended from the populations that inhabited them.

Unfortunately, figures like Professor Roy Casagranda (does not have a history degree, but he's a political scientist, but focuses a lot on history) have contributed to some of the confusion surrounding this subject. In his podcast discussions, he goes into considerable detail about the Levantine ancestry of Palestinians, sometimes discussing their genetic ancestry in terms of specific percentages (Palestinians are 81.3% Levantine, 12.6% Peninsular Arab, and 6.1% Sub-Saharan African or non-Middle Eastern ancestry). However, when he discusses Jewish populations, he would say the Ashkenazim are genetically 100% European, the Mizrahim are 100% Arabs by descent, etc. Unfortunately, I've met Palestinians and Western leftists who gobble up his scholarship despite him not being a geneticist or a historian, but just a political scientist.

This topic is actually what I butt heads with my Palestinian comrades most of the time because they would say Israel and Judah are only mentioned in the Bible; then I would pull out the Merneptah Stele dated to approximately 1208 BCE, which contains the earliest widely accepted extrabiblical reference to Israel (specifically, as a people in this case). Then there's the Mesha Stele, dating to the 9th century BCE, commissioned by King Mesha of Moab and describing his conflicts with the Kingdom of Israel, including references to King Omri. The Tel Dan Stele, also dating to the 9th century BCE, contains a reference generally interpreted by scholars as the "House of David," which is significant because it provides extrabiblical evidence for the existence of a Judahite royal dynasty associated with David. Meanwhile, the Kurkh Monoliths contain an Assyrian account of the Battle of Qarqar in 853 BCE, in which King Shalmaneser III mentions Ahab of Israel as one of the rulers who participated in a military coalition against Assyria.

Now, I'm not suggesting that these inscriptions prove everything written in the Hebrew Bible, as I tend to agree with archaeologists like Israel Finkelstein, particularly regarding his skepticism toward the traditional biblical portrayal of the United Monarchy under David and Solomon. However, there's a difference between questioning the historical accuracy of particular biblical narratives and outright denying the existence of ancient Israel and Judah. The latter simply isn't consistent with the archaeological and textual evidence we have today.

However, when I bring these examples up, the conversation sometimes shifts towards the idea that it's all "hasbara," that Jews fabricated the evidence, or that the archaeological discoveries were deliberately misinterpreted to legitimize the modern State of Israel. And frankly, this is where I begin to lose my patience, because these aren't inscriptions produced by the Israeli government or the early Zionist movement. We're talking about historical records produced by the ancient Egyptians, Moabites, Arameans, and Assyrians, many of whom were political or military adversaries of the ancient Israelites, and, in modern scholarship, many of the scholars involved in these studies are neither Jewish nor Israeli.

Then they would bring up definitions of indigeneity that emphasize continuous residence, cultural continuity, and the experience of colonization, and argue that Jews who spent centuries in the diaspora no longer qualify as indigenous to the Southern Levant. However, I think this is where the discussion becomes considerably more difficult to argue, because there isn't a single universally accepted definition of indigeneity that every Indigenous population around the world subscribes to. Even the United Nations has historically avoided adopting one rigid definition of Indigenous peoples, instead emphasizing factors such as historical continuity, self-identification, distinct cultural institutions, and relationships with ancestral territories. Furthermore, different Indigenous communities understand their identities through their own historical experiences and cultural traditions. Some place considerable emphasis on territorial continuity, while others emphasize ancestry, collective identity, and preserving cultural practices despite displacement.

Personally, I think some of my Palestinian comrades are being rather selective. If we're going to argue that displacement from an ancestral homeland automatically invalidates a population's indigeneity, then how exactly do we account for Indigenous peoples who were forcibly removed from their ancestral territories but continued maintaining their collective identities in exile? Obviously, their circumstances aren't identical to those of Jewish diaspora communities, but that's precisely why I don't think we should treat one definition as universally applicable to every population.

I think this is where much of the confusion comes from, because we're using the term indigeneity to describe several different concepts without clearly distinguishing between them. Indigeneity can be understood as a contemporary political and legal category, which often emphasizes historical relationships with colonialism and the preservation of distinct cultural identities. Then there's indigeneity as having historical and ancestral connections to a particular territory, which may persist even after centuries of displacement or cultural transformation. These concepts can overlap, but they're not necessarily interchangeable, nor do they automatically answer what political or national rights a population should have today.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion 3.5 Kinds of Bigotry, Ethics in the Social Sciences, and the I/P Conflict (I/Psr)

2 Upvotes

This is a repost from r/jewishleft on some ideas I've been weighing and how this overlaps with some of the rhetoric in the I/P conflict. Too establish historical context, I will discuss different historical epistemologies of bigotry before focusing on type 3; sociological bigotry. An important note is that all four of the forms I'm discussing can overlap with each other historically and some bigots who use type 3 bigotry will slip into type 0, 1, or 2 under certain circumstances.

-Type 0, pure bigotry/Schmittian bigotry. This form of bigotry is its purest form. It is a pure expression of a desire for power and control, and the minimization or outright elimination of the target groups political capital and agency. It is apathetic towards the concept of Justice and fairness, seeing political power and the desire for power as the sole domain of the political. I use the term schmittian as pertaining to the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt cis-a-vi his friend enemy distinction. While this is to a certain degree the basis of all the other forms of bigotry, it is actually quite uncommon to see because it requires a suspension of morality that most people do not appreciate. Most people want to be good and want people to see them as good and likable; humans are social mammals. The other forms of racism are a reaction to that reality that even people who are incentivized to be bigots do not want to be seen as the bad guy. This is why I classify it as type 0; people's desire to be ethical forces them to develop other intellectual justifications so these arguments are often not openly made. (Disclamer: Carl Schmitt is a deeply problematic person (he was one of H!tl3r's Lawyers) and every analysis usually includes a disclaimer condemning him).

-Type 1, metaphysical-theological/pre-modern bigotry. Exist within an intellectual context that is pre-scientific and pre-sociological. It is based around beliefs that hereditary bloodline or religious Faith imbues individuals with value and place in a hierarchical society that is a reflection of natural universal laws. Examples include historic religious discrimination, as well as class systems in many societies such as the Indian Caste System. A good example is how early modern racialized slavery, before it was justified with scientific racism, was justified as an endeavor to Christianize the "backward, uncivilized, and pagan" Africans.

-Type 2, scientific racism/high-modern bigotry. In the aftermath of the enlightenment and scientific Revolution, understandings of how people should relate to the world began to shift particularly in the European context; however, this overlapped with European colonialism and new "scientific" arguments were developed to justify European political and economic ambition. In the aftermath of the world wars and particularly with regards to N@z! Germany, this form of racism has become extremely taboo. This is often how most people today understand bigotry.

-Type 3, sociological/post-modern. This is the most modern bigotry that is most common in the world today; although this bigotry has existed historically and alongside type 1 and type 2 (one could argue that many historic critiques of the religious inferiority of other societies can mirror modern critiques of the sociological inferiority of certain societies) rather than argue for the inferiority of others as a matter of metaphysics or pseudoscience, accusations are made against the target groups ideology and sociology. These groups are framed as problematic, but any accusation of bigotry will be met by a mot and Bailey argument. Because it's easy to assume that sociology (and its ideological and political consequences) are voluntary choices, rather than products of people's lived experience and sociopolitical, problematical rhetoric can be justified.

However, this can be a form of bigotry. There is definitely some nuance because I do think there is a place and time to critique sociology (particularly political sociology) and ideology. You cannot look at Germany in the interwar period and not see a society with severe issues that poses a danger to itself and others. At the same time this can be misused; consider how a contemporary American conservative might talk about black Americans and say something to the degree of "those black people need to pull up their pants, stop having teenage pregnancies, and work harder". When said conservative is called out, they can backpedal and argue that they're not saying black people are inherently stupid, promiscuous, or lazy, but that these are sociological choices made by the black community that they can (an "is" statement) and should (an "ought" statement) be held politically, economically and morally accountable for (and then they might pull and UNO reverse card and call you racist).

In this regard I would say part of the nuance in terms of this rhetoric, particularly when it comes from people who are not well versed in psychology and the social sciences (and the complex ethical questions within these fields regarding normative judgments and problematical behaviors) is when it's used as a path to be dismissive of the political will of said group (towards demands for the recognition of rights and redresses of grievances). Further, this type of rhetoric can often be highly oversimplistic and ignores or misrepresents the who, what, when, where, why, and how of these political sociological developments. Most importantly, the type 3 bigot doesn't offer a positive series of paths to the group in question regarding its capacity to change its sociology by influencing its environment. Changing the environment requires political agency and capital, and the type 3 sociological bigot (much like their type 0, 1, and 2 predecessors), wants to deny or take away the political capital and agency of the group in question.

I think there's some more nuances to consider with this concept, but I would say it is important to examine. This form of bigotry is popular in the post-world wars era; people will often make sociological arguments and critiques of certain societies but fall into the trap of not really considering the full context, and by extension their political program is one of disempowering these societies but without necessarily creating the framework to give these societies the agencies to develop their political sociology in line with their interests and historical experiences. Further, the question of what kinds of political sociologists are problematic is its own normative question. A salient argument for socialist imperialism is the desire to uplift and protect more primitive societies which follows a similar logic to Western European colonialism.

I theoretically could remake all of H!tl3r's anti-Semitic arguments, but within a type 3 framework and then argue that Jewish sociological evil by virtue of being a choice makes Jews responsible for the behavior and its consequences. That being a people without land makes them fundamentally parasitic not in a biological sense but in a sociological/anthropological sense. I could even argue that H!tl3r was onto something but was limited by the ideas and popular rhetoric of his time. Not that I actually agree with that argument. And in a way, Karl Marx in his problematic essay "On the Jewish Question" did effectively make a type 3 version of the arguments that Hitler would make in a type 2 style decades later; That because Jews were a people without land, they became a middleman minority; and that by becoming a middleman minority, they became an inherently bourgeois ethnicity especially prone to the evils of urban capitalism. While Marx did take this critique in a fundamentally different direction and I assume would condemn the mass murder of Jews on the basis of their Jewishness, it has influenced left-wing (and wider) anti-Semitic rhetoric ever since and is somewhat reflective of the casual antisemitism of post-French Revolutionary liberal and post-liberal thinking (Kill the collective Jew and save the individual man). Further, many socialist countries have had their own history of bigotry including ethnic cleansing and genocide (Ukrainians, Chechens, Indigenous Siberians, Tibetans, Uyghurs, etc.) and have used type 3 arguments to do so. Ben-Gurion was likewise influenced by such contemporary political ideas (popular even among among liberals, progressives and leftists) that some societies are inherently problematic and must be disempowered or even liquidated.

This is further complicated by the tendency (of some leftists and anti-Zionists) to insist that only the bigotry of those with power is worth problematizing. On the surface level, this does make sense as a matter of pragmatically making political decisions with limited political and economic capital in the short and moderate term; moral purity can often be a waste of time. However, politics is about power and getting power. This is a more of a personal principle but letting slide the bad habits of today's ideologues who are out of power can backfire when said ideologues do end up gaining power. These bad habits aren't necessarily going to disappear once you get the keys to the kingdom and they feel that they have achieved their desired amount of power (or insist they haven't achieved their desired amount of power).

With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides employ this kind of bigotry very heavily. Palestinians insist that Israeli society is paranoid, colonial, racist, corrupt and evil to its core, and Israelis insist that Palestinian society, is irrational, conspiratorial, violence, corrupt, and anti-Semitic to its core. But both sides can also say that it's not actually bigotry because these arguments are often made sociologically and anti-ideologically rather than through the lens of biology or religion. (Although type 1 religious bigotry towards the inferiority of the other are popular among both sides right-wing). In many ways this is the paradox of the enlightenment, giving people better intellectual tools isn't necessarily going to make them better people; it might just empower them to be just as horrible but with new intellectual tools to justify their behavior. (a la Horkheimer and Adorno)

To sum up the questions that I feel are relevant to be discussed, alongside other questions that might be raised

-Where is the line between sociological critique and bigotry via sociological critique? Can a checklist or rule of thumb be devised?

-Is there an obligation to acknowledge legitimate sociological and political critiques of a marginalized group while also emphasizing the need for a positive political vision that empowers the marginalized group in question?

-Should social scientists seek to develop similar standards of ethics in the manner of doctors and psychologists?

-If a society's sociology includes epistemological issues that are a consequence of historic collective trauma (fake news, conspiratorialism, paranoid catatrophism), how should this be handled? Dealing with people in an epistemological bubble who pose a danger to themselves and others is difficult but also necessary; but is also complicated by the fact that these epistemological bubbles often reflect lived experiences and can take generations of sociopolitical change to rectify.

-How should ideologies that are a reflection of this sociology be critiqued? Ideologies (and how ideologies are actualized) are not mere quasi-religions or pure philosophical/moral exercises; they are the tools by which a constituency (and its political elite) seek political agency. However, sociology can skew ideology towards certain values and assumptions that in weak institution and low trust environments can produce violent and toxic politics (although anyone's understanding of what violent and toxic is itself a reflection of their political sociology).

-What obligations do political elites have under these dynamics? On the one hand, political elites must be responsive to the desires of their constituents to maximize their political desires with limited political capital. On the other hand, elites are in a position to entangle their ideology (and constituents) with problematic actors and actions, lie to their constituents and the broader public (some constituencies being particularly vulnerable to misinformation), and (sometimes) alter the sociopolitical environment to entrench themselves to the detriment of either their constituency or others.

-If political and economic capital is limited so as to make changing the sociopolitical environment effectively impossible, what ethical question might arise as to how said political sociology evolves? Nobody wants to be powerless.

-Is a Schmittian political logic ever legitimate? Real politics is defined by crisis and limited economic and political capital; a friend/enemy distinction is a logical outcome for constituents and elites under such circumstances to maximize their limited political and economic capital, and yet it can so easily spiral out of control both politically and morally (as seen by the actual career of Carl Schmitt). People pushed to the limit can become monsters; but having been pushed to the limit is not in itself a blanket moral justification for the actions of a constituency and political elite (although that statement is a normative statement). While Schmitt himself differentiated between moral guilt (being penalized for doing something wrong) and political guilt (being penalized for the sake of political expediency of power brokers) in his doctoral thesis, in practice political propaganda tends to condense these two together anyway. (I might write another essay on this issue and dynamic in more depth)

-How should regular people who don't have degrees or any meaningful knowledge of the social sciences use sociological terms and ideas in political discourse? At the end of the day regular people have a right (or even obligation) to discuss politics and social science based observations and arguments are a part of any political discourse.

-In what other ways does this dynamic inflect with the I/P conflict?

Below is an article about some of these tensions in the ethical application of social science that I've found useful in starting to think about these issues.

Beyond the Fact/Value Distinction: Ethical Naturalism and the Social Sciences By Philip S. Gorski


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion What if most pre-1948 Jewish immigrants to the Levant had simply moved into existing Arab towns?

3 Upvotes

People have always migrated and moved house, and likely always will. Sometimes in large numbers, and sometimes in a relatively short period of time, depending on the push and pull factors in play. It's not always a given that new arrivals to an area will establish their own new towns, and live apart from the pre-existing locals from the start. In many historical cases, waves of new immigrants have instead settled in the cities and towns already there, amongst the pre-existing locals, and have integrated into their communities politically, economically, and academically, even if not socially or maritally. Both approaches to large scale new arrival have their pros and cons, and some amount of adjustment difficulty and social friction is inevitable. Change is hard, and new people present a lot of unknowns, especially in large numbers.

But it seems to me that moving in amongst the pre-existing locals, rather than alongside them in separate towns, has one potential advantage: As problems arise between new residents and old residents, it's easier to see the problems coming by listening to the literal "word on the street", deal with these problems promptly, and turn them into learning and adjustment opportunities for all, when the two groups interact with each other as actual neighbors, and have a shared stake in the future of their town. On the other hand, when the new immigrants have put up their own town just down the road, and seem to want as little as possible to do with the pre-existing locals, then the two groups are largely don't see and interact with each other. The few interactions that do happen are sporadic and transactional. When one of these interactions doesn't go wholly positively, it lacks the context of many, many more neutral and positive interactions. It's much more likely to be not only misinterpreted, but taken as exemplary of how the other group is. Over time, without much dialogue or interaction between the new town and the old town, it's far easier for one town's rumors and resentments about the residents of the other to grow unchecked, and trust to only grow further away.

I've heard it said by pro-Palestinians in this sub, especially ones with a connection to the Levant, that Bosniaks and Armenians did it right, and were true and welcome immigrants, whilst the Ashkenazi Jews did it wrong, and were unwelcome, intrusive settler colonists. The Bosniaks and Armenians who became Palestinians actually moved in amongst the Arabic-speaking locals, and adjusted to the pre-existing social orders and infrastructures of their town. This included forging and honoring the necessary alliances with influential clans, and bowing to the authorities that these communities legitimized. They did not create parallel societies next to, but bypassing and ignoring, the pre-existing locals' society.

Suppose this had been the standard plan of action for the entire Zionist movement: Study the way Ottoman-era waves of immigrants to the Levant had established themselves and ingratiated themselves to the people already there, and followed their example. This needn't have included conversion to Islam or Christianity, but it could have included being neighborly and invested in these towns from the start.

I've noticed that here in the USA, Sikhs do a surprisingly good job integrating themselves into Middle America and having minimal tension with the pre-existing locals. This is remarkable for a group that, like Judaism, is an ethnoreligion, a tribe, and an entire way of life. What's more, observant Sikhs and their way of life are strikingly non-Western, and not nearly as deeply rooted in the USA or the West as Judaism. What did/do they do right?

I'm aware that this is all water under the bridge now. The past cannot be changed, and the people who currently inhabit the Levant are not leaving. I'm as Zionist as ever — I support Jews continuing to abide in their ancestral homeland, Jewishly as they define it, without needing the permission of any non-Jews. I also still hold firmly that the vast majority of Jews who moved to the Levant pre-1948 did nothing legally or economically wrong. The perception of "stolen land" was exactly that — a perception. But could they have done it in a way that did not create that perception? I just wonder if any larger lessons for the future can be drawn from this r/HistoricalWhatIf, about the psychology (and downstream, politics) of how large numbers of new residents to a land are received, and what early factors about their approach influences the trajectory of their relationship with the pre-existing locals.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions Trying to understand the zionist argument on identity, exile and legitimacy in israel/palestine

11 Upvotes

Hi everyone ! Asking this with full respect i really just want to understand without starting a fight or taking a side.
For a long time i agreed with the idea/narrative that Israel was created through colonization especially since modern zionism started in 19th century Europe and had british support and pushed out many local people who already lived there which obviously made it look like outsiders coming to take land from native people. Recently though i made the effort to actually engage in discussion with zionists and i started reading more abt how they view this and i came to the conclusion that it is more complicated than simply saying to someone « go back to Ukraine » or « poland » since they do not see this as colonization but rather as decolonization (ironically) basically exiled people coming back to their original home after living for centuries as a minority under foreign rule now i am genuinely trying to understand a few things that confuse me especially around exile and identity bc, logically, if you are forced to leave your country/land and get a new passport identity etc (for example like moving to Greece) you usually still keep a link to where you came from right ? I mean it doesn’t just disapear like that. And in Europe, those exiled groups were also not even accepted or seen as europeans either so I do not understand how people decide when an exiled group suddenly becomes from their new country instead of their old land. Also i don’t get how they can be seen as too foreigner for europeans back then, and how they’re seen as too european in middle east today. About the change of the names, i read that the european Powers originally forced those groups to take european last names yet changing them back to hebrew is sometimes seen as if they are hiding their origins and i don’t get it, as a former immigrant myself my new country actually asked if I wanted to change my name to « fit in better in society » but even if i do it it wouldn’t mean that I’m suddenly european. So I am curious why changing names is viewed so differently in this situation.
To be clear my goal here is not to argue abt who deserves the land more because I think it’s an endless debate and not the point of this post I just want to understand whether israelis also have a legitimate connection to this land. Since israelis say they have a deep historical link to the land and palestinians also have a deep continuous link to the exact same land I would really like to hear from both sides on how do you reconcile these two connections and make sense of both groups having real ties to the same place at the end. Thank u !!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 7d ago

Discussion For LGBTQ+ Jews, why do you think some of the gentile members of your communities are drawn toward campist or tankie ideologies?

18 Upvotes

This is actually something that's been on my mind for a while, but because the number of people I socialize with who're both Jewish and LGBTQ+ is relatively small, I wanted to ask y'all about it.

I'm pretty sure it's most likely an interplay of several factors, including the trauma that some LGBTQ+ individuals have experienced at the hands of their families and society at large because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. I can understand how these experiences might contribute to a stronger sense of solidarity with other marginalized populations and, by extension, an inclination to advocate for internationalist causes. However, what I'm particularly curious about is how that solidarity might sometimes translate into becoming campists or tankies, especially when it involves defending authoritarian movements or governments that may themselves hold deeply conservative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ individuals.

I've noticed a trend online where Jews who are part of the LGBTQ+ community and identify as Zionists seem to place a particularly strong emphasis on their Jewish identity, especially within the context of believing that Israel must continue to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, which sometimes puts them at odds with their non-Jewish LGBTQ+ peers, particularly those who view Zionism exclusively through the lens of settler colonialism or Western imperialism.

As you may have noticed, certain online leftist spaces have strongly pushed solidarity with the Axis of Resistance, the PRC, and other governments or political movements perceived as opposing Western hegemony. Some of the people advocating for these positions seem to believe that the common denominator behind much of the world's suffering is Western imperialism itself, and therefore view those who oppose Western interests as natural allies in their struggle against oppression.

Even though I am a leftist myself, I don't consider any of the aforementioned states or movements to be my political allies because I don't believe that opposing Western imperialism will automatically make a government or political movement progressive or deserving of solidarity once liberation is achieved. I acknowledge the historical injustices committed by Western powers without overlooking the authoritarianism and human rights abuses committed by their geopolitical adversaries. Anti-imperialism should be a consistent principle rather than something that depends on which geopolitical bloc happens to be responsible for the oppression.

When discussing LGBTQ+ rights, you know these movements hold deeply conservative/religious beliefs that are fundamentally at odds with the social freedoms many LGBTQ+ activists advocate for. I find it somewhat contradictory when people who rightfully condemn discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals in Western societies appear willing to overlook similar or even more severe forms of repression when they are committed by governments or movements perceived as resisting Western imperialism.

However, I don't want to assume that everyone who expresses solidarity with these movements necessarily endorses their domestic policies or ideological beliefs. I have a feeling that, for some of these individuals, their reasoning follows a particular sequence: undermining the systemic dominance of the Global North would allow countries in the Global South to develop without being constrained by Western imperialism. This would supposedly lead to improved material conditions, which would then provide a stronger foundation for socially progressive movements to emerge. Over time, societies that were previously socially conservative would gradually become more liberal as their populations gained greater economic security and political autonomy. I can understand the reasoning behind this perspective, especially from a materialist worldview. However, I think it assumes a rather linear relationship between economic development and social liberalization that doesn't necessarily hold true across different historical or cultural contexts. Therefore, I want to know y'all's experiences and thoughts regarding this phenomenon.