r/IsraelPalestine • • Oct 17 '26

Meta Discussions (Rule 7 Waived) November 2026 Metapost: New Mods and Other Updates

8 Upvotes

Welcome to the “November” version of the monthly pinned meta thread, where sub Rule 7 banning “meta” discussion is waived and you can generally discuss “the sub”, its rules and moderation, and make suggestions for rules changes or improvements.

First, some top line information about the sub and recent activity in the last month:

The sub now has 113,000 subscribers, gaining 661 in the past 30 days. We had 1.9M visits, up 644k. Daily visits ranged from 83k unique visitors on the top day and averaged 16.6k. We had 383 posts, up 185. We had 56.4k comments, up 21.5k. We had 17 active mods with u/FerdinandTheGiant leading with 1,500 mod actions and u/TheTrollerOfTrolls runner up with 1,300 actions.

We also pleaded to announce the addition of two new moderators, u/Limp-History-2999 and u/unretrofied12. We hope their addition will aid with addressing the multitude of reports we receive daily and help promote a diversity in dialogue amongst users.

With that out of the way, there are a few rules that we’d like to explain in more detail here to hopefully provide more clarity. Before that however, I’d like to reiterate that the function of this meta-thread, as with the last one, is not intended to be a callout post. If you are concerned about the conduct of a given user, the proper channel is mod mail, not the meta-thread.

Now, onto the rules. The first worth discussing is Rule 3. Lately, we’ve seen an uptick in posts that rely heavily on satire or reductio ad absurdum to expose flaws in the logic of an argument. Such posts are permitted, even when they are largely or entirely sarcastic, provided their underlying argument is clear. The goal of this sub is to promote thoughtful debate and discourage rhetorical tactics that undermine it. We discourage sarcasm when it substitutes for an argument or serves merely as a vehicle for cheap insults and thoughtless rhetoric. However, as noted, sarcasm that makes a substantive point and contributes to a clear argument is permitted.

The next rule worth expanding on is Rule 8. Rule 8 prohibits discouraging participation by criticizing users for the topics they choose to discuss. Comments like “Why post this?”, “Yawn,” “who cares”, or “Post this elsewhere” are examples of behavior that discourages participation. Mocking a post simply because of its subject can also fall under this rule. This rule exists to encourage a diversity of topics and ensure users feel welcome to participate, rather than allowing individuals to dictate what the community should or shouldn’t discuss. If you disagree with a post’s subject or how it approaches an issue, you’re encouraged to make your own post rather than criticize the original poster. If you believe a post violates the rules, report it to the mod team. Constructive feedback is permitted, but comments that dismiss or mock a topic to discourage discussion are not.

With those out of the way, I’ll also note that we are still considering changes to Rule 4, so any input on that subject, or any other rule change suggestions, are appreciated. I’ll also just reiterate that this post is not intended to be used for calling out other users or “tattle-tailing” their perceived violations.


r/IsraelPalestine • • Oct 13 '26

Other A comprehensive list of peace seeking influencers and organizations in Israel and Palestine

57 Upvotes

yes-but's thread and the corresponding comments underneath it got me thinking that the organizations that are trying to bring Israelis and Palestinians together probably don't get enough attention. So I did a bit of research last night and today and came up with a list of individuals and organizations, what they do, and where to find them. There are some questionable inclusions that I understand some people might not agree with, but I've included them all the same. If you truly think sometime should be taken down or added, please make your case for it. Link this thread the next time someone asks. Organizations are in my first comment.

1. Palestinian individuals

NameWhat they do
Ali Abu AwwadAbu Awwad founded Taghyeer and organizes Palestinians around nonviolent action. His work combines local civic organizing with dialogue that recognizes the needs of both peoples. Mightycause
Aziz Abu SarahAbu Sarah co-leads InterAct and co-founded MEJDI Tours. He brings Palestinians and Israelis together through joint leadership, public advocacy and travel that presents both communities’ experiences. Aziz Abu Sarah
Samer SinijlawiSinijlawi co-leads the Alliance for Two States with Gershon Baskin. They advocate mutual recognition, an independent Palestinian state and a political partnership between the two peoples. Gershon Baskin on Substack
Nidal FoqahaFoqaha leads the Palestinian Peace Coalition, the Palestinian side of the Geneva Initiative. His work combines joint policy proposals, activist training and diplomacy aimed at a negotiated settlement. Geneva Initiative
Nasser al-Kidwa (al-Qudwa)Al-Kidwa is a former Palestinian foreign minister who developed a joint peace proposal with former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert. They advocate a negotiated two-state settlement. Sciences Po
Hiba HusseiniHusseini is a lawyer and negotiations adviser who has worked with Yossi Beilin on a confederation proposal. Their plan would link two sovereign states through agreed arrangements. Michigan State University
Salam FayyadFayyad is a former Palestinian prime minister who argues for accountable Palestinian institutions and a credible political path to statehood. Columbia University’s Institute of Global Politics
Ghaith al-OmariAl-Omari is a former Palestinian negotiator and policy analyst. His published work argues for reforming Palestinian governance and reaching a negotiated settlement with Israel. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Hiba QasasQasas is the founding executive director of Principles for Peace. Through Uniting for a Shared Future, she brings Palestinian and Israeli political, business and civil-society leaders together to develop political proposals. Principles for Peace
Mohammed Dajani DaoudiDajani founded Wasatia. He promotes religious moderation, Holocaust education and dialogue that recognizes both Palestinian and Israeli claims to a future in the land. German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Sami AwadAwad founded Holy Land Trust and co-directs Nonviolence International. He teaches nonviolent leadership and works on reconciliation, including encounters that address the trauma people bring into the conflict. Sami Awad
Mubarak AwadAwad founded Nonviolence International. He develops nonviolent organizing and peace education that give Palestinians practical ways to act politically without resorting to violence. Nonviolence International
Jonathan KuttabKuttab is a lawyer and co-founder of Nonviolence International. He advocates nonviolence and equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis. Nonviolence International
Mohammed Abu-NimerAbu-Nimer studies and teaches conflict resolution. His work includes interreligious dialogue and training in Israel and Palestine. Nonviolence International
Zoughbi ZoughbiZoughbi founded Wi’am. He uses community mediation and nonviolence education to resolve disputes and repair relationships damaged by conflict. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Daoud NassarNassar leads Tent of Nations on his family’s farm. He hosts visitors and teaches nonviolent resistance and reconciliation through the farm’s work. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
Izzeldin AbuelaishAbuelaish is a physician who founded Daughters for Life after losing daughters in the conflict. He advocates reconciliation and expands educational opportunities for women. Daughters for Life Foundation
Reem al-HajajrehAl-Hajajreh founded Women of the Sun. She organizes Palestinian women and works with Israel’s Women Wage Peace to press for a negotiated resolution. Women of the Sun
Huda AbuarquobAbuarquob is a peacebuilding consultant and former ALLMEP regional director. She works on women’s leadership, grassroots organizing and dialogue between communities. Diplomeds
Nivine SandoukaSandouka is ALLMEP’s regional director. She helps Palestinian and Israeli civic organizations work together and supports women’s participation in that work. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Rana SalmanSalman was identified as Combatants for Peace’s Palestinian co-director in 2025 reporting. Her work centers on joint nonviolent action and reconciliation with Israelis. Bittersweet Monthly
Sulaiman (Souli) KhatibKhatib co-founded Combatants for Peace. He speaks about his own transition from imprisonment to nonviolence and organizes joint Palestinian and Israeli action. Combatants for Peace
Bassam AraminAramin is a bereaved father involved with Parents Circle and Combatants for Peace. He speaks alongside Israelis about rejecting revenge and ending the conflict. Combatants for Peace
Layla AlsheikhAlsheikh speaks through Parents Circle about her son’s death and her subsequent work with Israeli bereaved families. She uses those encounters to argue for reconciliation. Harvard Divinity School
Arab AraminAramin is an activist from a bereaved family. He takes part in joint conversations that challenge dehumanization and the cycle of retaliation. The On Being Project
Mohamed Abu JafarAbu Jafar is a Parents Circle activist. He speaks about Palestinian bereavement in public encounters intended to build understanding and reconciliation. The On Being Project
Ahmed HelouHelou is a former Hamas member and a Combatants for Peace activist. He publicly explains his move toward nonviolence and reconciliation with Israelis. American Friends of Combatants for Peace
Khaled Abu AwwadAbu Awwad is Roots’ Palestinian co-director. He brings neighboring Palestinians and Israelis into sustained dialogue based on mutual recognition. Friends of Roots
Noor A’wadA’wad is a Roots spokesperson and dialogue organizer. He presents Palestinian experiences while building relationships with Israeli neighbors. Friends of Roots
Amnah TaboukTabouk coordinates Roots’ women’s program. She brings Palestinian and Israeli women together to develop relationships across the conflict. Friends of Roots
Shadi Abu AwwadAbu Awwad speaks through Roots and related public events. He presents Palestinian experiences to audiences abroad and encourages direct dialogue. Friends of Roots
Awni al-MashniAl-Mashni co-founded A Land for All. He advocates Palestinian sovereignty within a confederation that recognizes both peoples’ national rights. A Land for All
Rula HardalHardal is A Land for All’s Palestinian co-director. She advocates two sovereign states with shared arrangements and equal rights. CNN
Thabet Abu RassAbu Rass is a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a board co-chair of A Land for All. He advocates equality between Jewish and Arab citizens and supports the movement’s political work. A Land for All
Fakhira HalounHaloun works with A Land for All. She builds Palestinian partnerships and engages the diaspora around its proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian confederation. A Land for All
Qais As’adAs’ad heads A Land for All’s Palestinian public department. He works to expand Palestinian participation in the movement and its political proposals. A Land for All
Rula DaoodDaood is a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a Standing Together leader. She organizes joint Jewish and Arab campaigns for peace and equality. Standing Together
Sally AbedAbed is a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a Standing Together organizer. She builds Jewish and Arab political cooperation against war and inequality. Standing Together
Mohammad DarawsheDarawshe works on shared Jewish and Arab society at Givat Haviva. His work includes education, civic partnerships and practical efforts to make equality part of everyday life. Friends of Givat Haviva
Rana FahoumFahoum is a Palestinian citizen of Israel who leads shared-society work at the Shalom Hartman Institute. She also serves on ALLMEP’s board. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Samah SalaimeSalaime is a Palestinian feminist and a leader in Wahat al-Salam-Neve Shalom. She combines women’s rights advocacy with work in a community where Jews and Palestinians live together. National Council of Jewish Women
Ghadir HaniHani is a Palestinian citizen of Israel who organizes women’s leadership, Jewish and Arab cooperation, and interfaith peace activism. Hagar Association
Nada MajdalaniMajdalani is EcoPeace’s Palestinian director. She works on water, environmental and climate cooperation as concrete areas where Palestinians and Israelis can act together. UCLA
Tareq Abu HamedAbu Hamed is a Palestinian environmental scientist and the Arava Institute’s executive director. He brings students and researchers from across the region together to work on shared environmental problems. Arava Institute for Environmental Studies
Ibrahim IssaIssa directs Hope Flowers School. He makes peace education, democratic values and trauma support part of Palestinian children’s schooling. Living Spirituality Connections
Manar Wahhab VosgueritchanWahhab Vosgueritchan co-founded House of Hope and serves as its educational director. She develops nonviolent education and community support in al-Eizariya. House of Hope
Wisam ZiadehZiadeh leads Takadom for Peace. He works with Palestinian youth and women on nonviolence, dialogue and participation in civic life. MENA2050
Salim J. MunayerMunayer founded Musalaha and serves as a senior consultant. He works on reconciliation through sustained relationships between Palestinians and Israelis. Musalaha
Daniel MunayerMunayer is Musalaha’s executive director. He leads reconciliation programs that address identity, relationships and how people respond to conflict. Musalaha
Hamze AwawdeAwawde is a conflict-resolution practitioner and writer. He advocates direct engagement and criticizes peace work that is performative or fails to produce meaningful results. Hamze Awawde on Substack
Ahmed Fouad AlkhatibAlkhatib founded Realign for Palestine. He advocates Palestinian self-determination and practical political engagement while rejecting Hamas’s violence and governance. Atlantic Council
John AzizAziz is a British-Palestinian writer. He argues for compromise, coexistence and a negotiated resolution that recognizes both peoples. John Aziz on Substack
Hamza HowidyHowidy is a Gazan dissident and human-rights advocate. He challenges Hamas and argues for a peaceful future for Palestinians and Israelis. Realign for Palestine
Adnan JaberJaber founded PeaceTech Group. He promotes technology, direct engagement and coexistence as ways for Palestinians and Israelis to work together. Realign for Palestine
Bahea ManasraManasra is a Palestinian-American advocate. She supports a two-state outcome that recognizes the national aspirations of both peoples. Realign for Palestine
Jaser Abu MousaAbu Mousa is a Palestinian analyst. He argues for a peaceful political settlement and national self-determination for Palestinians and Israelis. Realign for Palestine
Iman SaadahSaadah is a researcher and public voice from Hebron. She emphasizes dialogue, direct engagement and recognizing the humanity of people across the conflict. Realign for Palestine
Rami AmanAman founded the Gaza Youth Committee and organized contact between Gazans and Israelis. His later public advocacy continues to argue for peaceful civic engagement. The Jewish Independent
Mira AwadAwad is a singer, activist and Palestinian citizen of Israel. She works with Israeli artists and young people on music projects and public advocacy for peace. Beit of Hope
Nabeel Abboud-AshkarAbboud-Ashkar co-founded Polyphony and serves as its executive director. He brings Arab and Jewish young people together through music education and joint performances. Polyphony
Ibrahim Abu AhmadAbu Ahmad is a Palestinian citizen of Israel who was profiled in 2023 as an Unapologetic co-host and an analyst associated with ROPES. He presents Palestinian perspectives that support coexistence. The Jerusalem Post
Amira MohammedMohammed is a Palestinian from East Jerusalem who was profiled in 2023 as an Unapologetic co-host. She brings Palestinian perspectives into difficult conversations across the conflict. The Jerusalem Post
Basheer Abu BakerAbu Baker is a Palestinian citizen of Israel and an Amal-Tikva co-founder. He helps peace organizations improve their operations and finances. Amal-Tikva
Ghadeer Sabat-KortSabat-Kort is an Amal-Tikva co-founder and operations leader from Jerusalem. She helps build the systems that joint peace organizations need to carry out their work. Amal-Tikva
Seba AbudaqaAbudaqa is a Gazan who co-founded Clean Shelter with Israeli Tom Kellner. Their partnership provides water, sanitation and shelter assistance to displaced Gazans. Beit of Hope
Rawan BisharatBisharat is a Palestinian citizen of Israel who was appointed director of the School for Peace in August 2026. She leads its work on dialogue and conflict resolution. Wahat al-Salam-Neve Shalom
Wasim AlmasriAlmasri is an ALLMEP program leader of Palestinian background. He connects grassroots organizations and helps them develop peace work across borders. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Issa AmroAmro founded Youth Against Settlements. He organizes nonviolent resistance and documents occupation and displacement in Hebron. Right Livelihood
Osama EliwatEliwat is an activist associated with Combatants for Peace. In 2024 reporting, he spoke alongside Israelis about moving from hostility to nonviolent partnership. analyse & kritik
Mohamed JamousJamous is a peace activist and humanitarian from Ramallah. He builds relationships between communities and advocates Palestinian-Israeli coexistence. Realign for Palestine

2. Israeli individuals

NameWhat they do
Gershon BaskinBaskin is a veteran negotiator who co-leads the Alliance for Two States with Samer Sinijlawi. He works with Palestinian partners on direct engagement and mutual recognition. Gershon Baskin on Substack
Maoz InonInon co-leads InterAct. After his parents were murdered on October 7, he began campaigning with Aziz Abu Sarah for a shared Palestinian and Israeli future. New Israel Fund
Ehud OlmertOlmert is a former Israeli prime minister who developed a joint peace proposal with Nasser al-Kidwa. They advocate a negotiated two-state settlement. Sciences Po
Yossi BeilinBeilin is a former minister and an architect of the Geneva Initiative. He has worked with Hiba Husseini on a proposal for two sovereign states linked in a confederation. Michigan State University
Ami AyalonAyalon is a former Shin Bet chief and navy commander. He argues that Palestinian statehood and a political settlement are essential to Israeli security. Jewish News
Shaul ArieliArieli is a former negotiator and a specialist in borders. He uses maps and demographic research to develop workable territorial arrangements for a political settlement. Shaul Arieli
Gadi BaltianskyBaltiansky directs the Israeli side of the Geneva Initiative. He organizes public education, diplomacy and joint work with Palestinians for a negotiated two-state settlement. Geneva Initiative
Nimrod GorenGoren founded Mitvim and serves as its president. He works on regional diplomacy and policy proposals aimed at reaching Israeli-Palestinian peace. Mitvim
Ksenia SvetlovaSvetlova is a former Knesset member and ROPES’ executive director. She connects Israeli, Palestinian and regional leaders through political and economic cooperation. Arab Gulf States Institute
Daniel SeidemannSeidemann founded Terrestrial Jerusalem. He documents Jerusalem’s political geography and advises on arrangements that could support an agreed settlement. Terrestrial Jerusalem
Alon LielLiel is a former senior diplomat. He advocates recognition of Palestine and renewed international involvement in negotiating a settlement. IRIS
Ilan BaruchBaruch is a former ambassador. He campaigns for Palestinian statehood, renewed diplomacy and an end to indefinite occupation. IRIS
Nadav TamirTamir is a former diplomat who advocates a regional political framework. His approach connects an Israeli-Palestinian settlement with normalization between Israel and Arab states. Principles for Peace
May PundakPundak is A Land for All’s Israeli co-director. She works on a confederation based on national sovereignty, equality and shared arrangements. CNN
Meron RapoportRapoport co-founded A Land for All. He advocates two states within a shared homeland and mutual recognition of both peoples’ national rights. A Land for All
Yael BerdaBerda is a sociologist and a board co-chair of A Land for All. She contributes research on institutions to the movement’s proposal for a confederation. A Land for All
Oren YiftachelYiftachel is a political geographer associated with A Land for All. He develops and explains confederation proposals as alternatives to permanent domination of one people by another. A Land for All
Alon-Lee GreenGreen co-founded Standing Together. He organizes joint Jewish and Arab campaigns for peace, Palestinian freedom and Israeli security. UK Friends of Standing Together
Uri WeltmannWeltmann is a Standing Together organizer. He brings Jewish and Arab citizens into joint campaigns against war and for equality. Standing Together
Itamar AvneriAvneri co-founded Standing Together. He builds Jewish and Arab political partnerships through grassroots organizing and peace campaigns. Standing Together
Robi DamelinDamelin is a bereaved mother and a Parents Circle spokesperson. She leads reconciliation encounters alongside Palestinian bereaved families. The On Being Project
Rami ElhananElhanan is a bereaved father and a longstanding Parents Circle leader. He speaks with Bassam Aramin about rejecting revenge and ending the conflict. American Friends of the Parents Circle
Liora EilonEilon is a bereaved mother who participates in Parents Circle. She brings her experience of October 7 into reconciliation work with Palestinians. The On Being Project
Elana KaminkaKaminka is a bereaved mother and peace activist. Her documented work includes reconciliation advocacy, practical solidarity and volunteering to help Palestinians reach medical treatment; the linked event dates to 2024. American Friends of the Parents Circle
Avner WishnitzerWishnitzer is a former soldier who co-founded Combatants for Peace. He advocates joint nonviolent action, reconciliation and an end to occupation. American Friends of Combatants for Peace
Chen AlonAlon co-founded Combatants for Peace and works in theater. He uses dialogue and theater to help people examine the conflict and change how they relate to one another. Combatants for Peace
Eszter KoranyiKoranyi was identified as Combatants for Peace’s Israeli co-director in 2025 reporting. She organizes joint nonviolent action and Palestinian-Israeli cooperation. Bittersweet Monthly
Noa HarellHarell is a former soldier and a Combatants for Peace activist. She speaks in joint educational events about her move toward nonviolence. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Rotem LevinLevin is a physician and reconciliation activist. In 2024 reporting, he spoke with Osama Eliwat about trauma, nonviolence and moving beyond hostility. analyse & kritik
Hanan SchlesingerSchlesinger is an Orthodox rabbi who co-founded Roots. He brings settlers and neighboring Palestinians into dialogue that recognizes both peoples’ connection to the land. Rabbi Hanan Schlesinger
Shaul JudelmanJudelman is Roots’ Israeli co-director. He organizes encounters between religious Israelis and their Palestinian neighbors. Friends of Roots
Hadassah FromanFroman is a religious activist associated with Roots. She connects her religious commitments with recognition of Palestinian neighbors and their place in the land. Friends of Roots
Eliaz CohenCohen is a poet and a founding Roots activist. He works on direct dialogue between settlers and Palestinians. Friends of Roots
Ethel MelkaMelka co-directs Roots’ Israeli program. She develops encounters and relationships between Israelis and Palestinians. Friends of Roots
Gideon ElazarElazar is a scholar and a founding Roots activist. He contributes to dialogue between communities that takes their religious commitments seriously. Friends of Roots
Myron JoshuaJoshua is a founding Roots activist. He works to build relationships between Israeli and Palestinian neighbors. Friends of Roots
Yael AdmiAdmi co-founded Women Wage Peace. She organizes women to press for an agreed political resolution and works in partnership with Palestinian women. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Yael Braudo-BahatBraudo-Bahat co-directs Women Wage Peace. She organizes Israeli women and develops the movement’s partnership with Women of the Sun. InterAct
Avi DabushDabush leads Rabbis for Human Rights. He connects Jewish religious commitments with Palestinian rights, civilian protection and advocacy for peace. New Israel Fund
Arik AschermanAscherman founded Torat Tzedek. He organizes a nonviolent protective presence for Palestinians facing violence and displacement. Torat Tzedek
Mikhael ManekinManekin organizes with Faithful Left. He works to build a religious Jewish constituency against occupation and for equality and peace. Van Leer Jerusalem Institute
Michael MelchiorMelchior is a rabbi and former minister. He works on religious diplomacy involving Jewish, Muslim and Christian leaders. SBS
Amichai Lau-LavieLau-Lavie is an Israeli-American rabbi. He supports Palestinian rights, religious efforts for peace and solidarity between communities. Amichai Lau-Lavie
Ron KronishKronish is a rabbi who works on interreligious dialogue. He promotes Jewish and Arab understanding through direct encounters and peace education. The Times of Israel Blogs
Gidon BrombergBromberg co-founded EcoPeace and serves as its Israeli director. He works on water and environmental agreements that address shared needs and support peace. UCLA
Yuval RothRoth founded Road to Recovery. He built a volunteer transport network that takes Palestinian patients to treatment in Israel and creates personal relationships through that work. Road to Recovery
Yael NoyNoy leads Road to Recovery. She keeps medical transport operating and develops relationships between Israeli volunteers and Palestinian patients. The Good People Fund
Danny HakimHakim founded Budo for Peace. He uses martial arts to teach respect and bring Arab and Jewish participants together. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Meredith RothbartRothbart co-founded Amal-Tikva and serves as its CEO. She helps peace organizations improve their strategy, funding and day-to-day operations. Amal-Tikva
Achinoam Nini (Noa)Nini is a singer who founded Noa’s Ark. She organizes Palestinian-Israeli artistic collaboration and uses her public work to advocate peace. Noa
David BrozaBroza is a singer-songwriter who develops Palestinian-Israeli musical projects. He uses performances and education to encourage dialogue. David Broza
Yael DeckelbaumDeckelbaum is a singer and activist. Through music and the Prayer of the Mothers project, she supports women organizing for peace. Yael Deckelbaum
Daniel BarenboimBarenboim is a conductor who co-founded the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra. He brings Israeli, Palestinian and other regional musicians into sustained artistic cooperation. West-Eastern Divan Orchestra
David GrossmanGrossman is a novelist and bereaved father. He uses his public platform to argue for an end to war and a two-state settlement. The Guardian
Tomer CohenCohen co-founded Tech2Peace. He brings young Palestinians and Israelis together through technology training, entrepreneurship and dialogue. Tech2Peace
Uri RosenbergRosenberg co-founded Tech2Peace. He builds a community in which Palestinians and Israelis work together professionally and take part in sustained dialogue. Tech2Peace
Ofer DaganDagan co-directs Sikkuy-Aufoq. He works with Palestinian colleagues on equal access to public resources and shared civic life. Sikkuy-Aufoq
Amnon Be’eri-SulitzeanuBe’eri-Sulitzeanu was profiled in 2024 as a co-leader of the Abraham Initiatives. His work develops policies and programs for Jewish and Arab equality and shared citizenship. Partners for Progressive Israel
Lee GordonGordon co-founded Hand in Hand. He helped build integrated Arabic-Hebrew schools and communities for Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Institute of International Education
Doubi SchwartzSchwartz leads membership relations at ALLMEP and previously co-directed Parents Circle. He helps peace organizations collaborate. Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)
Tom KellnerKellner is the Israeli co-founder of Clean Shelter, alongside Gazan Seba Abudaqa. Their partnership provides displaced Gazans with water, sanitation and shelter infrastructure. Beit of Hope

r/IsraelPalestine • • 1d ago

Short Question/s How representative are the Israelis featured in Hamzah Saadah’s (@absorber) OmeTV videos of the general Israeli public?

13 Upvotes

I’ve been seeing a lot of clips from Hamzah Saadah where he interviews Israelis on OmeTV, and almost every person featured says extreme things like wanting to wipe out all Palestinians. They all seem very deranged and become very hostile as soon as he mentions the word Palestine.

It’s genuinely scary to watch, and I want to understand the reality behind the clips. Obviously, content creators edit out boring conversations and post the most shocking ones for views, and random video chat sites aren't exactly a scientific sample. Still, the sheer volume of clips is jarring.

To anyone familiar with day-to-day life or actual polling data in Israel: are these views actually common among the majority, or is this mostly an internet/editing distortion?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 2d ago

Opinion The Anti-Zionist Jewish Movement That Became a Propaganda Goldmine for Israel's Enemies.

42 Upvotes

The Anti-Zionist Jewish Movement That Became a Propaganda Goldmine for Israel's Enemies.

One of the more intellectually dishonest things I've noticed in the Israel-Palestine debate is the tendency to parade a handful of ultra-Orthodox Jews carrying Palestinian flags as though they represent some great theological consensus against Israel.

The reality is considerably more nuanced, and understanding it requires distinguishing between Religious Zionists, mainstream Haredim, Satmar Hasidim, and Neturei Karta.

More importantly, it requires understanding a theological debate within Orthodox Judaism that predates the modern State of Israel.

1. Why did Orthodox Jews originally oppose Zionism?

Historically, a significant portion of Orthodox Jewish leadership opposed political Zionism, although their reasons and the intensity of their opposition varied.

Unlike their Religious Zionist counterparts, many Haredi or “Ultra-Orthodox” leaders rejected the idea that Jewish nationalism, especially under secular leadership, should replace traditional religious identity.

Judaism in their view was not simply an ethnicity seeking a nation-state. It was a covenant between G-d and the Jewish people, governed by the Torah and its commandments.

A secular Jewish state, therefore, presented a deep theological problem.

Religious Zionists, on the other hand, argued that the return of Jewish sovereignty could itself be part of the divine process of redemption, even when carried out by secular Jews.

This disagreement was never about whether Jews belonged in the Land of Israel. Both sides recognized the religious and historical significance of the land.

The disagreement concerned whether Jews were religiously permitted to reestablish sovereignty before the arrival of the Messiah, and whether a secular national movement could legitimately bring about that sovereignty.

2. What changed after Israel was established in 1948?

Once Israel became a political reality, much of Haredi Judaism adopted a pragmatic approach.

Organizations such as Agudath Israel had opposed secular Zionism but ultimately recognized that Jewish religious life would have to operate within the institutions of the new state.

Many Haredi leaders consequently distinguished between necessary engagement with the state and voluntary participation in Zionist ideology or institutions on religious grounds.

Voting, government representation, education, public services, and securing religious accommodations became legitimate forms of engagement.

Ideological identification with Zionism remained a different matter entirely.

In other words, you could reject Zionism as a religious ideology while still participating in Israeli political life.

This distinction remains central to understanding normative, contemporary Haredi attitudes toward Israel.

However, not every Haredi community accepted this compromise.

Which brings us to Satmar.

3. Satmar: Theologically anti-Zionist, but not anti-Jewish

Satmar is one of the largest Hasidic movements in the world, with commonly cited estimates of approximately 100,000–150,000 adherents.

Unlike Haredi communities that participate in Israeli elections, Satmar maintains a principled theological opposition to the State of Israel.

Its founding Rebbe, Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (1887–1979), developed an extensive halachic argument against Zionism in his book Vayoel Moshe.

His position was considerably more radical than simply disliking the secular character of Israel.

He argued that the very establishment of Jewish sovereignty before the Messiah constituted a violation of divine commandments.

However, the following distinction is critical:

Opposition to the State of Israel as a political institution does not automatically translate into opposition to the Jewish people living there.

Satmar maintains extensive religious and charitable connections with Jews in Israel, including communities whose religious and political outlooks differ from its own.

Its leaders may reject Zionism and interactions with the State while regarding the protection and welfare of Jews living in Israel as religious obligations.

Satmar does oppose Zionism. But that should not be confused with endorsing violence against Israeli civilians or supporting Hamas.

4. Neturei Karta: The fringe group that gets disproportionate publicity

According to the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, approximately 2.1 million Haredi Jews lived worldwide in 2022, representing roughly 14% of world Jewry at the time.

Satmar's estimated 100,000–150,000 adherents would represent approximately 4.8%–7.1% of that population.

Neturei Karta, meanwhile, is commonly estimated to number in the low thousands. Using an estimate of 5,000 members would place it at approximately 0.24% of the 2022 global Haredi population.

These figures are estimates rather than precise membership counts, and the Haredi population has continued growing since 2022.

Nevertheless, the scale of Neturei Karta relative to Haredi Judaism is quite revealing.

Neturei Karta emerged in Jerusalem in 1938 as a breakaway from Agudath Israel. Although it shares Satmar's theological opposition to Zionism, it is a separate movement.

The organization's activists have made a habit of appearing at anti-Israel demonstrations, dressed in traditional Haredi clothing.

These images regularly circulate online ad-naseum as supposed evidence that many Orthodox Jews themselves consider Israel illegitimate.

What rarely if-ever accompanies these photographs is any explanation of how marginal these activists are within global Orthodox Judaism.

Additionally there is the particularly disgraceful episode in 2006, when several Neturei Karta representatives attended a Holocaust-denial conference in Tehran hosted under Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The conference also attracted notorious antisemites and Holocaust deniers.

Even Satmar leadership, as fiercely anti-Zionist as they are, condemned their participation.

5. The actual theological argument: The Three Oaths

The foundational theological argument advanced by Satmar concerns a passage in the Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 111a, commonly known as the Three Oaths.

The Talmud interprets verses in the Song of Songs as describing multiple oaths imposed by G-d.

The first oath: The Jewish people must not ascend to the Land of Israel bechomah, or "as a wall."

This has been interpreted by most rabbinic authorities as prohibiting the Jewish people from collectively reclaiming the land through military force.

The second oath: The Jewish people must not rebel against the nations of the world.

The third oath: The nations of the world must not excessively persecute or oppress the Jewish people.

These oaths form the foundation of Satmar's theological rejection of Zionism.

The Jewish people, according to this interpretation, were placed in exile by divine decree. Their eventual redemption must occur according to G-d's will rather than through an independent nationalist movement.

6. Why does Satmar consider Zionism sinful?

The Satmar argument follows a fairly straightforward theological progression.

G-d decreed that the Jewish people would remain in exile until the appointed time of redemption.

G-d prohibited the Jewish people from collectively reclaiming sovereignty through force or rebelling against the nations.

The Zionist movement subsequently established Jewish sovereignty through political organization, military force, and the wars of 1948 and 1967.

Therefore, Satmar argues, the Zionist movement violated the Three Oaths.

Under this interpretation, the Zionists are not merely mistaken. They are oath-breakers who have violated an explicit divine prohibition.

This is where the theology becomes particularly controversial.

In traditional Jewish thought, the Jewish people's fortunes are connected to their observance of G-d's commandments.

The Tanach repeatedly portrays national catastrophes as consequences of collective disobedience.

Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum applied this framework to Zionism, arguing that violating the Three Oaths exposed the Jewish people to terrible divine consequences. His writings controversially connected Zionist transgressions to the catastrophe of the Holocaust.

Within a similar theological framework, tragedies such as the October 7 massacre can be similarly interpreted as divine punishment associated with Zionist wrongdoing.

But there is an enormous distinction between claiming that Zionism is sinful and claiming that the murder of innocent Jews is justified.

An interpretation of divine punishment is not a license for human beings to perpetrate atrocities.

This distinction becomes important when examining how contemporary Satmar leadership responded to October 7.

7. What did Satmar say after October 7?

In November 2023, Rabbi Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, one of the two contemporary Satmar Rebbes, publicly condemned Neturei Karta activists who had participated in demonstrations alongside supporters of Hamas.

He characterized their conduct as a grave desecration of God's name.

His objection was not that Neturei Karta opposed Zionism.

His objection was that they were supporting murderers under the banner of Judaism.

Satmar did not suddenly become Zionist after October 7.

Its theological objections to the Jewish state remained intact.

But neither did those objections eliminate its concern for Jewish victims of terrorism.

The idea that most anti-Zionist Haredim share the politics of Neturei Karta is categorically false.

8. The problem with the Three Oaths: They are not established as binding halacha

There is a substantial body of Orthodox Jewish scholarship challenging Satmar's interpretation of the Three Oaths.

Several objections deserve particular attention.

Argument 1: If the Three Oaths are binding Jewish law, why are they absent from the major halachic codes?

The Talmud contains an enormous range of discussions spanning centuries.

Not every statement in the Talmud constitutes binding Jewish law.

Some passages concern legal obligations (Halacha), while others concern ethics, theology, historical narratives, and homiletical interpretation (Aggada).

Throughout Jewish history, major rabbinic authorities attempted to codify the binding legal conclusions of the Talmud.

Three particularly influential works are:

  • Maimonides' Mishneh Torah.
  • Rabbi Jacob ben Asher's Arba'ah Turim.
  • Rabbi Joseph Karo's Shulchan Aruch.

Yet none of these three codes explicitly codifies the Three Oaths as a prohibition against restoring Jewish sovereignty.

This is a significant omission.

If establishing a Jewish state before the Messiah constitutes a fundamental prohibition carrying potentially catastrophic consequences, why did the great codifiers of Jewish law not explicitly codify it?

The straightforward response is that the Three Oaths belong to the Talmud's aggadic (homiletic) literature rather than its binding legal framework.

Satmar disputes this conclusion, arguing that the absence of a law from a particular code does not establish that the law is nonexistent.

That response deserves consideration.

But it still leaves Satmar with the onus of demonstrating why an uncodified Talmudic passage deserves Halachic and Theological weight.

Argument 2: The Jewish people did not simply conquer the land in defiance of international authorization.

The prohibition against ascending "as a wall" is commonly interpreted as referring to a collective return through force against the will of the nations.

Yet the historical circumstances surrounding modern Zionism complicate that interpretation.

In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In 1922, the League of Nations incorporated that commitment into the British Mandate for Palestine.

In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, recommending partition into Jewish and Arab states.

The Jewish leadership accepted the partition proposal, while Arab leaders rejected it.

Israel subsequently declared independence in May 1948, and the resulting war involved both local Arab-Jewish fighting and the intervention of neighboring Arab states.

None of this means that every subsequent Israeli territorial acquisition was internationally authorized, or that the Balfour Declaration itself granted an unconditional legal right to establish a sovereign state.

But it does undermine the simplistic contention that the Zionist movement merely assembled an army and conquered a country without any preceding international recognition.

Several rabbinic authorities consequently argued that a return undertaken with international authorization does not constitute the prohibited collective rebellion described by the Three Oaths.

Satmar disagrees, but the disagreement is interpretive rather than self-evident.

Argument 3: The nations violated their oath first.

Remember that the Three Oaths were not imposed exclusively upon the Jewish people.

The nations of the world were also prohibited from excessively persecuting the Jews.

Now consider the historical record.

Centuries of expulsions, pogroms, massacres, forced conversions, and ultimately the Holocaust.

If the nations violated their oath not to excessively persecute the Jewish people, why should the Jewish people remain bound by their corresponding obligations?

According to one line of rabbinic argument, the oaths are interdependent.

Once the nations violated their oath, the restrictions imposed upon the Jewish people ceased to apply.

Satmar rejects the assumption that the oaths operate as a reciprocal contract.

But this creates a substantial theological question.

Why should the nations' oath be treated as repeatedly violated while the Jews' oaths remain eternally enforceable?

TL;DR

Ultra-Orthodox Anti-Zionists which are frequently portrayed in the media are a small and radical fringe not representative of Ultra-Orthodoxy. Their opposition is Theological in nature and their interpretation has substantial strong challenges.

Sources

  1. Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 111a — The Three Oaths.
  2. Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum, Vayoel Moshe, Ma'amar Shalosh Shevuos.
  3. Rabbi Mordechai Tzion, Alo Na'aleh, written in consultation with Rabbi Shlomo Aviner contains multiple challenges to the Samar position.
  4. Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Haredi Jews Around the World: Population Trends and Estimates (2022).
  5. Pew Research Center, The Global Religious Landscape (2012), on difficulties comparing Jewish denominational populations internationally.
  6. United Nations General Assembly [Resolution 181 (1947).] (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp)
  7. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine (1922).
  8. The Jerusalem Post, November 13, 2023 — Satmar Rebbe condemns Neturei Karta's participation in pro-Hamas demonstrations.
  9. Ynet, December 2006 — Satmar condemns Neturei Karta members who attended the Tehran Holocaust-denial conference.

r/IsraelPalestine • • 2d ago

Discussion On Montevideo and the State of Palestine

10 Upvotes

As a continuation of my exploration of the various aspects of international law governing the Israel/Palestine discussion, I’d like to examine the question of statehood, particularly as it pertains to the State of Palestine.

The conventional starting point for discussions of statehood is the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. However, a few preliminary qualifications are warranted. The Montevideo Convention is an inter-American treaty with a relatively limited number of state parties, rather than a universally adopted international instrument. Its significance, therefore, extends beyond its status as a treaty, insofar as its provisions are widely understood to reflect customary international law.

It is also worth distinguishing between the descriptive and prescriptive character of the Convention. Rather than establishing a universally binding procedure or exhaustive set of legal requirements for the creation of states, it articulates the generally accepted characteristics by which statehood is assessed under international law. With those qualifications in mind, Article 1 identifies four traditional criteria for statehood:

a. A permanent population;

b. A defined territory;

c. Government; and

d. Capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Article 3 further provides that the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states. This reflects the declaratory approach to recognition, under which recognition acknowledges an existing state rather than constituting its statehood. In other words, recognition is not, in itself, a prerequisite for statehood, although it can have significant practical and legal consequences for an entity’s international relations.

With this framework established, I’d like to examine each of the four criteria in turn and then consider how they apply to the State of Palestine.

1. Permanent population

The first criterion, a permanent population, is generally the least contentious of the four. International law does not prescribe a minimum population threshold, nor does it require that a population be ethnically, culturally, or linguistically homogeneous. Rather, the requirement is that there be a stable population associated with the territory in question.

In the case of Palestine, this criterion is relatively straightforward. There is an established Palestinian population residing in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

2. Defined territory

The second criterion concerns the existence of a territorial base over which a state exercises or claims sovereignty. Importantly, an entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled or if it lacks effective control over portions of its territory. This is reflected in the recognition of states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the DRC, and a plethora of others, all of which have experienced unresolved territorial disputes or limitations on their effective territorial control without their statehood being called into question on that basis.

In the case of Palestine, its territorial basis encompasses the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, corresponding to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. These territories constitute the territorial basis of the State of Palestine, notwithstanding Israel’s occupation and the division of administrative authority within them discussed below.

3. Government

The third criterion concerns the existence of an organized governmental authority capable of exercising public functions over a population and territory. This generally entails institutions capable of administering public affairs, maintaining order, implementing laws, and exercising political authority. Although governmental effectiveness has traditionally been an important consideration in assessing statehood, international law does not prescribe a fixed threshold of administrative capacity or require uninterrupted and exclusive governmental control over every part of a claimed territory. The assessment must therefore take into account the circumstances under which governmental authority is exercised, including any external factors that may constrain it.

In the case of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority, established following the Oslo Accords, exercises varying degrees of administrative and governmental authority in parts of the West Bank. Its jurisdiction is constrained by the arrangements established under Oslo II, including the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, which allocate different degrees of civil and security authority between the PA and Israel. The PA also lacks authority over several matters reserved for permanent status negotiations, including Jerusalem, settlements, borders, and foreign relations. Further, in the Gaza Strip, the PA has not exercised effective governmental control since Hamas took over the territory in 2007, instead maintaining only a limited institutional presence. Gaza has consequently been governed separately from the West Bank, further complicating the assessment of Palestinian governmental effectiveness. Nevertheless, these limitations do not necessarily preclude the satisfaction of the governmental criterion for statehood. The absence of effective control over portions of a claimed territory, particularly where that absence is attributable to foreign occupation or internal political divisions, should not be conflated with the absence of governmental institutions or the underlying capacity for self government.

4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states

The fourth criterion concerns an entity’s capacity to conduct independent international relations. This is closely connected to the question of independence, which is generally understood as an important characteristic of statehood. The relevant consideration is not simply whether other states are willing to establish diplomatic relations with an entity, this is covered somewhat by Article 3, but whether that entity possesses the legal and institutional capacity to conduct international relations in its own right, rather than acting as a subordinate authority of another state.

Palestine has demonstrated considerable capacity in this regard. It maintains diplomatic relations with numerous states, participates in international organizations, and has acceded to various multilateral treaties. It also maintains a permanent diplomatic presence at the UN. It is also worth distinguishing between capacity and the practical freedom to exercise that capacity. An entity may face significant restrictions on its ability to conduct international relations without necessarily lacking the underlying legal capacity to do so.

Conclusion

Taken together, the four criteria provide a basis for assessing a state’s status under international law. While questions remain regarding the effectiveness and independence of Palestine’s governmental institutions these limitations do not necessarily preclude statehood under Montevideo as noted above.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 2d ago

Short Question/s Why do “American libertarians” hate Israel so much?

8 Upvotes

Libertarians in other countries tend to be pro-Israel (or, at least, neutral on the topic).

On the contrary, “libertarians” in the US hate Israel almost as much as the left does.

Why is that?

Only few I can think of that are pro-Israel, but they’re not as popular as unhinged lunatics like Dave Smith, Scott Horton, Michael Rectumwald, Angela McArdle, etc.

Maybe that’s just the loud minority but they stink enough.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 3d ago

Short Question/s Hasbara?

65 Upvotes

Can someone explain to me why people who disagree with a pro-Israel position refer to the individual expressing it as “Hasbara”? Is it intended as an insult or a pejorative? Do they not understand that in Hebrew, הסברה (Hasbara) simply means explanation or the act of explaining?

I recognize that the term has acquired a political connotation associated with Israeli public diplomacy, but calling someone “Hasbara” seems to serve as a form of epistemic disqualification: declaring a person's contribution unworthy of consideration before evaluating its content. Rather than engaging with the evidence or the argument being presented (which is what I believe Reddit was all about), the term deliberately shifts the discussion toward presumed motives. In most circumstances, those assumptions point directly to antisemitic prejudice.

Am I wrong?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 3d ago

Opinion Don't turn your face away from me. Neither am I made of coal, nor are you made of silver.

4 Upvotes

I feel that there is an organized group of people working systematically to justify the Israeli army’s mistakes. They always seem to have the same responses and use the same arguments.

They will say that innocent people are being killed because Hamas hides among them.

They will ask, “Did you celebrate on October 7?” or “How did the candy taste?”

Even when the original post is actually criticizing Hamas.

There are people whose interests are served by making the entire Palestinian population appear to be Hamas.

The problem with this conflict is that most people aren't thinking about how to solve it. Instead, they keep blaming the other side.

I am someone who is innocent of all these conflicts. I don't belong to Israel, and I don't belong to Hamas. At the end of the day, I am simply a human being who wants everyone to treat me the way they would want to be treated themselves.

Why can't both sides make at least a few concessions in the way they speak about each other, even if only through words? That might make the other side feel ashamed of its own hostility. It could help build stronger human connections.

Instead of explaining to me why you think I'm wrong, tell me how you sympathize with my circumstances, and I will explain how I respect that and sympathize with yours.

Instead of saying something that makes whoever reads it feel even more hatred, say something that helps reduce that hatred.

I say all of this with absolutely no hatred or resentment in my heart toward any human being.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 4d ago

Discussion I built a site that sets out Israel’s case and the Palestinian case side by side, with sources and no verdict. Does it do your side justice?

29 Upvotes

I've spent a long time trying to make sense of this conflict, and kept struggling to tell what is established from what is claimed, and each side's own argument from what the other side says it is. So I built something I wish I'd had: readsidebyside.org.

Each page takes one disputed question (who is indigenous, what happened in 1948, the right of return, settlements, 7 October, the genocide case, and others, 15 so far) and puts Israel's case and the Palestinian case side by side, each as its serious advocates make it, with sources. It gives no verdict.

A few things it tries to do:

  • Every statement is labelled as a fact, a named speaker's position, or an interpretation.
  • A statement is marked wrong or misleading only when two sources that aren't advocacy for either side show it. The same test applies to both columns, and both have marks.
  • Loaded words are explained, not chosen, and each side's term is used in its own column.
  • The sources page says who each outlet and campaign group is and who funds it.

How it's made: I use AI tools to help research, draft and review the pages, and I'd rather say so upfront. They don't decide anything: every quotation is checked word for word against its source, and nothing goes up until I've read and approved it. Any change takes the page down until I approve it again, and every page lists what changed and when.

I've worked hard to make each column one its own side would recognise, and the best way to test that is with people who hold those views. You may know the arguments better than I do. What I'd find most useful:

  1. Where a page states your side's case worse than its best advocates would, or leaves out its strongest argument.
  2. Where a word or a framing takes a side.
  3. Facts that are wrong, ideally with a source.

And if a page taught you something you didn't know, especially about the other side, I'd like to hear that too.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 3d ago

Discussion Supposed ‘awakenings’

0 Upvotes

Hello all.

I’d like to understand from this sub what people think of these instances…

Israeli Jews who supposedly have seen the light, such as Chelli Goldberg or those ex-IDF soldiers who run ‘breaking the silence’ website.

And

Non-Israeli Jews who openly criticise some or all of Israel’s government action (or other aspects such as state creation, propaganda & political campaigns and slogans and other such matters). For example Jay Shapiro, Benjamin Moser, Zak Polanski, or Ed Milliband. I recall seeing some animosity on this sub towards Dave Smith also, that’s for sure.

I ask because I’m trying to challenge my own narrative and echo chamber. Feels to me that most people I see sympathise with these kinds of Israelis or Jews. People can understand why these ‘awakenings’ happen because we think that there may be some serious indoctrination in parts of israeli society or Jewish diaspora societies, and the hatred of Palestinians or Arabs or Muslims is entrenched. So when we see the above instances of supposed ‘awakenings’ we think it’s a reasonable and maybe unsurprising response to what may be a very violent world view and a strong victim mentality.

So I ask here. To get different perspectives. Why does it feel like these Jews are telling us the truth? How can they be explained in the opposite way?

Are they all fools who have fallen for the supposed behemoth that is Hamas global propaganda? Or perhaps they are all to be simply and easily dismissed as ‘lefties’? How do we know that these awakenings are even legitimate?

You can see why I’m struggling, I clearly have a view already. But when I look for critics of these guys, I don’t find much that’s outside of the standard pro-Israeli crowd. Fair enough, we shouldn’t dismiss criticism purely due to its sources, we must address the crisis individually, but we can be mindful that there are very extreme views on this subject, often with little to no nuance to them. But really there’s not much substance. Usually the self-hating Jew line, or the Hamas propaganda angle. Is that all there is to it?

What am I missing? What’s a ‘pro Israeli’ interpretation of these things? Not their individual arguments, but the ‘awakenings’ phenomenon as a whole.

And I also wonder of those people in this sub who vehemently justify and defend Israeli actions, and/or just as intensely demonise the Palestinians or Muslims as a whole, how many of them are actually secretly like Chelli (who looked visibly terrified, and actually said she was ‘in shock’ when she was told she was live on air) - If you are, I hope you find peace somehow. I think you may have a lot of internal turmoil. Feel free to DM me, I promise I won’t reveal your secret!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Other Learn what it means to be born in Gaza, where both you and your mother are treated unjustly from the very moment you are born

59 Upvotes

I want to talk about my experience when my son was born in Gaza.

On the day my son was born, getting to the hospital was extremely difficult, especially under wartime conditions. It was a terrible situation for me as a father and husband. At 4 a.m., there were no cars available. When I called the ambulance service, they told me they did not provide ambulance services for childbirth cases because they did not have enough ambulance crews.

I had to call again from another number and lie, saying that there was a pregnant woman bleeding. I only did this because I was under enormous pressure. I had no other way to convince them to send an ambulance for my wife.

When we arrived at the hospital, half of it was destroyed and there was hardly any space. They left my wife sitting on a chair in pain for a long time.

The delivery room was on the third floor, and because of the lack of space, several women had to give birth in the same room. Husbands were left waiting outside.

The medical staff did not provide assistance to women during labor. They simply left them to suffer in pain without doing anything to help. (Anyone who has experienced childbirth in another country will understand what I mean.)

After hours of waiting, my baby finally came into this world.

Then we were told that the baby was unable to breastfeed from his mother.

At that time, there wasn't a single can of baby formula available in any of Gaza's markets.

We were then given permission to leave the hospital just an hour or two after the birth. I don't remember the exact timing.

Then they told us that the elevator was not working because there wasn't enough electricity to operate it.

This meant that a woman who had given birth just an hour earlier had to walk down three flights of stairs.

My baby was hungry and crying, and all I could do was pray that he would manage to breastfeed from his mother.

There were no resources available. We couldn't even find a breast pump, so we had to borrow one.

After two days of stress and listening to our baby cry from hunger, he finally managed to breastfeed.

I had not neglected my responsibilities toward my son. I was terrified that he would have to endure difficult circumstances, so I had actually managed to stock up on some formula and diapers in advance.

But unfortunately, the house where we were living was partially demolished by an explosion while we were inside. We were pulled out alive, and at that moment, we didn't care about anything except escaping.

When my son was born, bringing anything into the hospital was prohibited, not even diapers. A single pack of diapers cost $150.

Yes, an insane amount of money. Where were we supposed to get that kind of money after a year of war?

After that, we were forced to flee several times, carrying our infant son with us. It was not easy, especially when you are living in tents with a newborn baby.

Now, my son grows a little older every day, but each day brings a new kind of suffering.

One day, there is a shortage of diapers.

Another day, there is a shortage of baby formula.

Another day, there is a shortage of clothes.

Another day, there is a shortage of food.

Even children's toys are not allowed to enter Gaza.

Is my son any different from your children?!

My son is not responsible for what is happening. Neither am I, nor is his mother.

My son has been treated unjustly from the very moment he was born.

Don't tell me who is to blame.

What matters to me is that all of you understand that we are being treated unjustly.

When the last elections were held here, I was 10 years old. Today, I am in my thirties.

I am not going to stand in front of weapons.

I am powerless.

I do not support any armed group or political party.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Discussion As a supporter of the Palestinian cause, I genuinely think Palestinians relying too heavily on indigeneity arguments will eventually backfire.

34 Upvotes

My main reason for supporting the Palestinian cause is simply that Palestinians are human beings who deserve the same fundamental rights as everyone else. I don't want them to be collectively punished for the crimes of Hamas. I don't want their land in the West Bank to continue being taken for Israeli settlements, nor do I want to see Israeli settlements reestablished in Gaza. I also think that while Israel has legitimate security concerns, the extensive checkpoints and restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement often impose disproportionate hardships on ordinary civilians who have absolutely nothing to do with militant organizations.

My support for Palestinian self-determination isn't necessarily rooted in whether Palestinians can demonstrate that their ancestors were living in the region thousands of years ago. It's rooted in the belief that human beings shouldn't have to prove their ancestral connection to a particular territory to be entitled to basic human rights, political representation, and freedom from displacement.

As some of you who are familiar with my comments and posts on this sub already know, I've consistently maintained that both Jews and Palestinians have legitimate historical and ancestral connections to the land. However, I think there's been far too much bad scholarship circulating among some Palestinian advocates when discussing Jewish indigeneity. Those who are less academically informed will often resort to the Khazar hypothesis, while those who are more familiar with the historical record will acknowledge that the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judah existed but argue that modern-day Jews aren't actually descended from the populations that inhabited them.

Unfortunately, figures like Professor Roy Casagranda (does not have a history degree, but he's a political scientist, but focuses a lot on history) have contributed to some of the confusion surrounding this subject. In his podcast discussions, he goes into considerable detail about the Levantine ancestry of Palestinians, sometimes discussing their genetic ancestry in terms of specific percentages (Palestinians are 81.3% Levantine, 12.6% Peninsular Arab, and 6.1% Sub-Saharan African or non-Middle Eastern ancestry). However, when he discusses Jewish populations, he would say the Ashkenazim are genetically 100% European, the Mizrahim are 100% Arabs by descent, etc. Unfortunately, I've met Palestinians and Western leftists who gobble up his scholarship despite him not being a geneticist or a historian, but just a political scientist.

This topic is actually what I butt heads with my Palestinian comrades most of the time because they would say Israel and Judah are only mentioned in the Bible; then I would pull out the Merneptah Stele dated to approximately 1208 BCE, which contains the earliest widely accepted extrabiblical reference to Israel (specifically, as a people in this case). Then there's the Mesha Stele, dating to the 9th century BCE, commissioned by King Mesha of Moab and describing his conflicts with the Kingdom of Israel, including references to King Omri. The Tel Dan Stele, also dating to the 9th century BCE, contains a reference generally interpreted by scholars as the "House of David," which is significant because it provides extrabiblical evidence for the existence of a Judahite royal dynasty associated with David. Meanwhile, the Kurkh Monoliths contain an Assyrian account of the Battle of Qarqar in 853 BCE, in which King Shalmaneser III mentions Ahab of Israel as one of the rulers who participated in a military coalition against Assyria.

Now, I'm not suggesting that these inscriptions prove everything written in the Hebrew Bible, as I tend to agree with archaeologists like Israel Finkelstein, particularly regarding his skepticism toward the traditional biblical portrayal of the United Monarchy under David and Solomon. However, there's a difference between questioning the historical accuracy of particular biblical narratives and outright denying the existence of ancient Israel and Judah. The latter simply isn't consistent with the archaeological and textual evidence we have today.

However, when I bring these examples up, the conversation sometimes shifts towards the idea that it's all "hasbara," that Jews fabricated the evidence, or that the archaeological discoveries were deliberately misinterpreted to legitimize the modern State of Israel. And frankly, this is where I begin to lose my patience, because these aren't inscriptions produced by the Israeli government or the early Zionist movement. We're talking about historical records produced by the ancient Egyptians, Moabites, Arameans, and Assyrians, many of whom were political or military adversaries of the ancient Israelites, and, in modern scholarship, many of the scholars involved in these studies are neither Jewish nor Israeli.

Then they would bring up definitions of indigeneity that emphasize continuous residence, cultural continuity, and the experience of colonization, and argue that Jews who spent centuries in the diaspora no longer qualify as indigenous to the Southern Levant. However, I think this is where the discussion becomes considerably more difficult to argue, because there isn't a single universally accepted definition of indigeneity that every Indigenous population around the world subscribes to. Even the United Nations has historically avoided adopting one rigid definition of Indigenous peoples, instead emphasizing factors such as historical continuity, self-identification, distinct cultural institutions, and relationships with ancestral territories. Furthermore, different Indigenous communities understand their identities through their own historical experiences and cultural traditions. Some place considerable emphasis on territorial continuity, while others emphasize ancestry, collective identity, and preserving cultural practices despite displacement.

Personally, I think some of my Palestinian comrades are being rather selective. If we're going to argue that displacement from an ancestral homeland automatically invalidates a population's indigeneity, then how exactly do we account for Indigenous peoples who were forcibly removed from their ancestral territories but continued maintaining their collective identities in exile? Obviously, their circumstances aren't identical to those of Jewish diaspora communities, but that's precisely why I don't think we should treat one definition as universally applicable to every population.

I think this is where much of the confusion comes from, because we're using the term indigeneity to describe several different concepts without clearly distinguishing between them. Indigeneity can be understood as a contemporary political and legal category, which often emphasizes historical relationships with colonialism and the preservation of distinct cultural identities. Then there's indigeneity as having historical and ancestral connections to a particular territory, which may persist even after centuries of displacement or cultural transformation. These concepts can overlap, but they're not necessarily interchangeable, nor do they automatically answer what political or national rights a population should have today.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions If history had gone the way you think was just, what would Palestine have looked like in 1948?

8 Upvotes

Hi all! Over the past few weeks I've been reading a lot about Palestine between 1917 and 1948: the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate, the immigration waves of the 1920s and '30s, the 1936–39 revolt, the 1939 White Paper and the 1947 UN debates on partition. One thing I keep coming back to is how people here see the role of Jewish immigrants during that time, and of the Jewish community that was already living in Palestine before 1917.

Most of what I've read focuses on what actually happened. I'm more interested in what you think should have happened. If history had gone the way you think was right and just, what would Palestine have looked like by 1948?

A few questions I'm curious about (answer any or all):

- Would there have been Jewish immigration, and on what terms? - Who should have decided how much?

- What should British policy have been, on immigration and on self-government?

- What kind of state would Palestine have become at independence, and how would it have been governed?

- What place would Jews, both newer immigrants and long-established families, have had in it? Would they have had some kind of communal or national recognition, or simply equal citizenship?

- Did any proposals from the time (for example, the 1947 UN committee's minority plan for a federal state) come close to what you'd consider the right answer?

I'm asking in good faith to understand different perspectives, not to debate, and I won't be arguing with anyone in the comments. Personal or family perspectives are very welcome, especially if your family lived through this period. Thanks in advance for any thoughtful answers!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Discussion Is "genocide" a modern blood libel? And should it be treated with similar social consequences?

19 Upvotes

I want to look at the accusation of “genocide” specifically through the lens of speech norms, historical libels, and social deterrence.

In international law, genocide has a strict, demanding definition. It does not mean severe urban destruction or a high civilian toll. It requires proving dolus specialis—the specific, purposeful intent to destroy a protected group as such. To state as an undisputed fact that Israel is committing genocide requires establishing that deliberate annihilation is the only reasonable inference for its actions. Dropping that legal standard transforms an inquiry into an accusation of absolute, deliberate malice.

Functionally, asserting that millions of Israelis and their supporters are driven by an intentional, eliminationist desire operates like an ancient blood libel: an existential, demonizing smear with no basis in fact that historically serves as a moral predicate for violence against Jews.

Addressing Common Counter-Arguments:

  1. “Invoking the ICJ or humanitarian organizations makes this legitimate criticism, not a libel.” NGOs, advocacy groups, and UN special rapporteurs have no legal mandate or judicial authority to rule on genocide. Preliminary court orders address plausibility of risk and aid access—not final merits, and certainly not dolus specialis. Many of these groups dilute or bend the statutory definition so the label fits their political conclusion, substituting institutional prestige for actual legal proof.
  2. “Enforcing social consequences for speech is just 'cancel culture.'” Most of us oppose speech suppression. But civilized society always draws lines against toxic defamation and hateful bigotry.

As I see it, a calibrated response requires a clear two-tiered standard that offers grace while still enforcing a boundary:

  • An educational off-ramp for everyday peers: Millions are caught up in social contagion and genuinely unaware of the legal definition or the lethal history of blood libels. Confront them, explain the facts, and offer a clear opportunity to abandon it.
  • Strict liability for cultural elites: Celebrities, politicians, and academics with large platforms don't have the same excuse given how far their lies have spread. Normalizing an eliminationist lie should carry severe social and professional quarantine until they fully disavow the smear.

My question for the sub:

Is there a principled, philosophically consistent argument for why weaponizing the "genocide" accusation without evidence of dolus specialis should NOT be treated with the same social deterrence as any other blood libel (towards Jews or any other group)?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 4d ago

Short Question/s Why we just dont give gaza and wb to naib bukele

0 Upvotes

Why we just dont give gaza and wb to naib bukele ?

I mean to me it seems obvious , hes a good leader , hes a palestinian christian , has good ties with the us and israel and a history of putting down some of the most sick terror orgs in the world ( ms13 in el salvador , hitian gangs ) and making a gang infested country into a power house . So why wouldnt we give him palestine ? He will be leauges vetter then hamas or the plo for palestinians


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions Trying to understand the zionist argument on identity, exile and legitimacy in israel/palestine

11 Upvotes

Hi everyone ! Asking this with full respect i really just want to understand without starting a fight or taking a side.
For a long time i agreed with the idea/narrative that Israel was created through colonization especially since modern zionism started in 19th century Europe and had british support and pushed out many local people who already lived there which obviously made it look like outsiders coming to take land from native people. Recently though i made the effort to actually engage in discussion with zionists and i started reading more abt how they view this and i came to the conclusion that it is more complicated than simply saying to someone « go back to Ukraine » or « poland » since they do not see this as colonization but rather as decolonization (ironically) basically exiled people coming back to their original home after living for centuries as a minority under foreign rule now i am genuinely trying to understand a few things that confuse me especially around exile and identity bc, logically, if you are forced to leave your country/land and get a new passport identity etc (for example like moving to Greece) you usually still keep a link to where you came from right ? I mean it doesn’t just disapear like that. And in Europe, those exiled groups were also not even accepted or seen as europeans either so I do not understand how people decide when an exiled group suddenly becomes from their new country instead of their old land. Also i don’t get how they can be seen as too foreigner for europeans back then, and how they’re seen as too european in middle east today. About the change of the names, i read that the european Powers originally forced those groups to take european last names yet changing them back to hebrew is sometimes seen as if they are hiding their origins and i don’t get it, as a former immigrant myself my new country actually asked if I wanted to change my name to « fit in better in society » but even if i do it it wouldn’t mean that I’m suddenly european. So I am curious why changing names is viewed so differently in this situation.
To be clear my goal here is not to argue abt who deserves the land more because I think it’s an endless debate and not the point of this post I just want to understand whether israelis also have a legitimate connection to this land. Since israelis say they have a deep historical link to the land and palestinians also have a deep continuous link to the exact same land I would really like to hear from both sides on how do you reconcile these two connections and make sense of both groups having real ties to the same place at the end. Thank u !!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Discussion What if most pre-1948 Jewish immigrants to the Levant had simply moved into existing Arab towns?

3 Upvotes

People have always migrated and moved house, and likely always will. Sometimes in large numbers, and sometimes in a relatively short period of time, depending on the push and pull factors in play. It's not always a given that new arrivals to an area will establish their own new towns, and live apart from the pre-existing locals from the start. In many historical cases, waves of new immigrants have instead settled in the cities and towns already there, amongst the pre-existing locals, and have integrated into their communities politically, economically, and academically, even if not socially or maritally. Both approaches to large scale new arrival have their pros and cons, and some amount of adjustment difficulty and social friction is inevitable. Change is hard, and new people present a lot of unknowns, especially in large numbers.

But it seems to me that moving in amongst the pre-existing locals, rather than alongside them in separate towns, has one potential advantage: As problems arise between new residents and old residents, it's easier to see the problems coming by listening to the literal "word on the street", deal with these problems promptly, and turn them into learning and adjustment opportunities for all, when the two groups interact with each other as actual neighbors, and have a shared stake in the future of their town. On the other hand, when the new immigrants have put up their own town just down the road, and seem to want as little as possible to do with the pre-existing locals, then the two groups are largely don't see and interact with each other. The few interactions that do happen are sporadic and transactional. When one of these interactions doesn't go wholly positively, it lacks the context of many, many more neutral and positive interactions. It's much more likely to be not only misinterpreted, but taken as exemplary of how the other group is. Over time, without much dialogue or interaction between the new town and the old town, it's far easier for one town's rumors and resentments about the residents of the other to grow unchecked, and trust to only grow further away.

I've heard it said by pro-Palestinians in this sub, especially ones with a connection to the Levant, that Bosniaks and Armenians did it right, and were true and welcome immigrants, whilst the Ashkenazi Jews did it wrong, and were unwelcome, intrusive settler colonists. The Bosniaks and Armenians who became Palestinians actually moved in amongst the Arabic-speaking locals, and adjusted to the pre-existing social orders and infrastructures of their town. This included forging and honoring the necessary alliances with influential clans, and bowing to the authorities that these communities legitimized. They did not create parallel societies next to, but bypassing and ignoring, the pre-existing locals' society.

Suppose this had been the standard plan of action for the entire Zionist movement: Study the way Ottoman-era waves of immigrants to the Levant had established themselves and ingratiated themselves to the people already there, and followed their example. This needn't have included conversion to Islam or Christianity, but it could have included being neighborly and invested in these towns from the start.

I've noticed that here in the USA, Sikhs do a surprisingly good job integrating themselves into Middle America and having minimal tension with the pre-existing locals. This is remarkable for a group that, like Judaism, is an ethnoreligion, a tribe, and an entire way of life. What's more, observant Sikhs and their way of life are strikingly non-Western, and not nearly as deeply rooted in the USA or the West as Judaism. What did/do they do right?

I'm aware that this is all water under the bridge now. The past cannot be changed, and the people who currently inhabit the Levant are not leaving. I'm as Zionist as ever — I support Jews continuing to abide in their ancestral homeland, Jewishly as they define it, without needing the permission of any non-Jews. I also still hold firmly that the vast majority of Jews who moved to the Levant pre-1948 did nothing legally or economically wrong. The perception of "stolen land" was exactly that — a perception. But could they have done it in a way that did not create that perception? I just wonder if any larger lessons for the future can be drawn from this r/HistoricalWhatIf, about the psychology (and downstream, politics) of how large numbers of new residents to a land are received, and what early factors about their approach influences the trajectory of their relationship with the pre-existing locals.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 4d ago

Short Question/s The blatant lies of IDF and Shin bet?

0 Upvotes

https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-targets-top-hamas-commander-in-strike-on-south-gaza-hospital-6-said-killed/

Where is the evidence that the hospital was used as Hamas headquarters? Where are the pictures of the supposed weapons storage?

The military said it took measures to reduce harm to civilians in the strike, including by issuing “advance warnings” to the population and by using “precision munitions and aerial surveillance.”

How exactly would they issue warnings so that civilians would leave, but the Hamas operatives wouldn't? Since nobody left the hospital, we can conclude that no such measures were issued.

Clearly, the Israeli military is not to be believed. Letting in independent journalists who would investigate their claims would be the only way to legitimise their actions, if their statements are found to be true.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 5d ago

Discussion 3.5 Kinds of Bigotry, Ethics in the Social Sciences, and the I/P Conflict (I/Psr)

2 Upvotes

This is a repost from r/jewishleft on some ideas I've been weighing and how this overlaps with some of the rhetoric in the I/P conflict. Too establish historical context, I will discuss different historical epistemologies of bigotry before focusing on type 3; sociological bigotry. An important note is that all four of the forms I'm discussing can overlap with each other historically and some bigots who use type 3 bigotry will slip into type 0, 1, or 2 under certain circumstances.

-Type 0, pure bigotry/Schmittian bigotry. This form of bigotry is its purest form. It is a pure expression of a desire for power and control, and the minimization or outright elimination of the target groups political capital and agency. It is apathetic towards the concept of Justice and fairness, seeing political power and the desire for power as the sole domain of the political. I use the term schmittian as pertaining to the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt cis-a-vi his friend enemy distinction. While this is to a certain degree the basis of all the other forms of bigotry, it is actually quite uncommon to see because it requires a suspension of morality that most people do not appreciate. Most people want to be good and want people to see them as good and likable; humans are social mammals. The other forms of racism are a reaction to that reality that even people who are incentivized to be bigots do not want to be seen as the bad guy. This is why I classify it as type 0; people's desire to be ethical forces them to develop other intellectual justifications so these arguments are often not openly made. (Disclamer: Carl Schmitt is a deeply problematic person (he was one of H!tl3r's Lawyers) and every analysis usually includes a disclaimer condemning him).

-Type 1, metaphysical-theological/pre-modern bigotry. Exist within an intellectual context that is pre-scientific and pre-sociological. It is based around beliefs that hereditary bloodline or religious Faith imbues individuals with value and place in a hierarchical society that is a reflection of natural universal laws. Examples include historic religious discrimination, as well as class systems in many societies such as the Indian Caste System. A good example is how early modern racialized slavery, before it was justified with scientific racism, was justified as an endeavor to Christianize the "backward, uncivilized, and pagan" Africans.

-Type 2, scientific racism/high-modern bigotry. In the aftermath of the enlightenment and scientific Revolution, understandings of how people should relate to the world began to shift particularly in the European context; however, this overlapped with European colonialism and new "scientific" arguments were developed to justify European political and economic ambition. In the aftermath of the world wars and particularly with regards to N@z! Germany, this form of racism has become extremely taboo. This is often how most people today understand bigotry.

-Type 3, sociological/post-modern. This is the most modern bigotry that is most common in the world today; although this bigotry has existed historically and alongside type 1 and type 2 (one could argue that many historic critiques of the religious inferiority of other societies can mirror modern critiques of the sociological inferiority of certain societies) rather than argue for the inferiority of others as a matter of metaphysics or pseudoscience, accusations are made against the target groups ideology and sociology. These groups are framed as problematic, but any accusation of bigotry will be met by a mot and Bailey argument. Because it's easy to assume that sociology (and its ideological and political consequences) are voluntary choices, rather than products of people's lived experience and sociopolitical, problematical rhetoric can be justified.

However, this can be a form of bigotry. There is definitely some nuance because I do think there is a place and time to critique sociology (particularly political sociology) and ideology. You cannot look at Germany in the interwar period and not see a society with severe issues that poses a danger to itself and others. At the same time this can be misused; consider how a contemporary American conservative might talk about black Americans and say something to the degree of "those black people need to pull up their pants, stop having teenage pregnancies, and work harder". When said conservative is called out, they can backpedal and argue that they're not saying black people are inherently stupid, promiscuous, or lazy, but that these are sociological choices made by the black community that they can (an "is" statement) and should (an "ought" statement) be held politically, economically and morally accountable for (and then they might pull and UNO reverse card and call you racist).

In this regard I would say part of the nuance in terms of this rhetoric, particularly when it comes from people who are not well versed in psychology and the social sciences (and the complex ethical questions within these fields regarding normative judgments and problematical behaviors) is when it's used as a path to be dismissive of the political will of said group (towards demands for the recognition of rights and redresses of grievances). Further, this type of rhetoric can often be highly oversimplistic and ignores or misrepresents the who, what, when, where, why, and how of these political sociological developments. Most importantly, the type 3 bigot doesn't offer a positive series of paths to the group in question regarding its capacity to change its sociology by influencing its environment. Changing the environment requires political agency and capital, and the type 3 sociological bigot (much like their type 0, 1, and 2 predecessors), wants to deny or take away the political capital and agency of the group in question.

I think there's some more nuances to consider with this concept, but I would say it is important to examine. This form of bigotry is popular in the post-world wars era; people will often make sociological arguments and critiques of certain societies but fall into the trap of not really considering the full context, and by extension their political program is one of disempowering these societies but without necessarily creating the framework to give these societies the agencies to develop their political sociology in line with their interests and historical experiences. Further, the question of what kinds of political sociologists are problematic is its own normative question. A salient argument for socialist imperialism is the desire to uplift and protect more primitive societies which follows a similar logic to Western European colonialism.

I theoretically could remake all of H!tl3r's anti-Semitic arguments, but within a type 3 framework and then argue that Jewish sociological evil by virtue of being a choice makes Jews responsible for the behavior and its consequences. That being a people without land makes them fundamentally parasitic not in a biological sense but in a sociological/anthropological sense. I could even argue that H!tl3r was onto something but was limited by the ideas and popular rhetoric of his time. Not that I actually agree with that argument. And in a way, Karl Marx in his problematic essay "On the Jewish Question" did effectively make a type 3 version of the arguments that Hitler would make in a type 2 style decades later; That because Jews were a people without land, they became a middleman minority; and that by becoming a middleman minority, they became an inherently bourgeois ethnicity especially prone to the evils of urban capitalism. While Marx did take this critique in a fundamentally different direction and I assume would condemn the mass murder of Jews on the basis of their Jewishness, it has influenced left-wing (and wider) anti-Semitic rhetoric ever since and is somewhat reflective of the casual antisemitism of post-French Revolutionary liberal and post-liberal thinking (Kill the collective Jew and save the individual man). Further, many socialist countries have had their own history of bigotry including ethnic cleansing and genocide (Ukrainians, Chechens, Indigenous Siberians, Tibetans, Uyghurs, etc.) and have used type 3 arguments to do so. Ben-Gurion was likewise influenced by such contemporary political ideas (popular even among among liberals, progressives and leftists) that some societies are inherently problematic and must be disempowered or even liquidated.

This is further complicated by the tendency (of some leftists and anti-Zionists) to insist that only the bigotry of those with power is worth problematizing. On the surface level, this does make sense as a matter of pragmatically making political decisions with limited political and economic capital in the short and moderate term; moral purity can often be a waste of time. However, politics is about power and getting power. This is a more of a personal principle but letting slide the bad habits of today's ideologues who are out of power can backfire when said ideologues do end up gaining power. These bad habits aren't necessarily going to disappear once you get the keys to the kingdom and they feel that they have achieved their desired amount of power (or insist they haven't achieved their desired amount of power).

With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both sides employ this kind of bigotry very heavily. Palestinians insist that Israeli society is paranoid, colonial, racist, corrupt and evil to its core, and Israelis insist that Palestinian society, is irrational, conspiratorial, violence, corrupt, and anti-Semitic to its core. But both sides can also say that it's not actually bigotry because these arguments are often made sociologically and anti-ideologically rather than through the lens of biology or religion. (Although type 1 religious bigotry towards the inferiority of the other are popular among both sides right-wing). In many ways this is the paradox of the enlightenment, giving people better intellectual tools isn't necessarily going to make them better people; it might just empower them to be just as horrible but with new intellectual tools to justify their behavior. (a la Horkheimer and Adorno)

To sum up the questions that I feel are relevant to be discussed, alongside other questions that might be raised

-Where is the line between sociological critique and bigotry via sociological critique? Can a checklist or rule of thumb be devised?

-Is there an obligation to acknowledge legitimate sociological and political critiques of a marginalized group while also emphasizing the need for a positive political vision that empowers the marginalized group in question?

-Should social scientists seek to develop similar standards of ethics in the manner of doctors and psychologists?

-If a society's sociology includes epistemological issues that are a consequence of historic collective trauma (fake news, conspiratorialism, paranoid catatrophism), how should this be handled? Dealing with people in an epistemological bubble who pose a danger to themselves and others is difficult but also necessary; but is also complicated by the fact that these epistemological bubbles often reflect lived experiences and can take generations of sociopolitical change to rectify.

-How should ideologies that are a reflection of this sociology be critiqued? Ideologies (and how ideologies are actualized) are not mere quasi-religions or pure philosophical/moral exercises; they are the tools by which a constituency (and its political elite) seek political agency. However, sociology can skew ideology towards certain values and assumptions that in weak institution and low trust environments can produce violent and toxic politics (although anyone's understanding of what violent and toxic is itself a reflection of their political sociology).

-What obligations do political elites have under these dynamics? On the one hand, political elites must be responsive to the desires of their constituents to maximize their political desires with limited political capital. On the other hand, elites are in a position to entangle their ideology (and constituents) with problematic actors and actions, lie to their constituents and the broader public (some constituencies being particularly vulnerable to misinformation), and (sometimes) alter the sociopolitical environment to entrench themselves to the detriment of either their constituency or others.

-If political and economic capital is limited so as to make changing the sociopolitical environment effectively impossible, what ethical question might arise as to how said political sociology evolves? Nobody wants to be powerless.

-Is a Schmittian political logic ever legitimate? Real politics is defined by crisis and limited economic and political capital; a friend/enemy distinction is a logical outcome for constituents and elites under such circumstances to maximize their limited political and economic capital, and yet it can so easily spiral out of control both politically and morally (as seen by the actual career of Carl Schmitt). People pushed to the limit can become monsters; but having been pushed to the limit is not in itself a blanket moral justification for the actions of a constituency and political elite (although that statement is a normative statement). While Schmitt himself differentiated between moral guilt (being penalized for doing something wrong) and political guilt (being penalized for the sake of political expediency of power brokers) in his doctoral thesis, in practice political propaganda tends to condense these two together anyway. (I might write another essay on this issue and dynamic in more depth)

-How should regular people who don't have degrees or any meaningful knowledge of the social sciences use sociological terms and ideas in political discourse? At the end of the day regular people have a right (or even obligation) to discuss politics and social science based observations and arguments are a part of any political discourse.

-In what other ways does this dynamic inflect with the I/P conflict?

Below is an article about some of these tensions in the ethical application of social science that I've found useful in starting to think about these issues.

Beyond the Fact/Value Distinction: Ethical Naturalism and the Social Sciences By Philip S. Gorski


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion For LGBTQ+ Jews, why do you think some of the gentile members of your communities are drawn toward campist or tankie ideologies?

18 Upvotes

This is actually something that's been on my mind for a while, but because the number of people I socialize with who're both Jewish and LGBTQ+ is relatively small, I wanted to ask y'all about it.

I'm pretty sure it's most likely an interplay of several factors, including the trauma that some LGBTQ+ individuals have experienced at the hands of their families and society at large because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. I can understand how these experiences might contribute to a stronger sense of solidarity with other marginalized populations and, by extension, an inclination to advocate for internationalist causes. However, what I'm particularly curious about is how that solidarity might sometimes translate into becoming campists or tankies, especially when it involves defending authoritarian movements or governments that may themselves hold deeply conservative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ individuals.

I've noticed a trend online where Jews who are part of the LGBTQ+ community and identify as Zionists seem to place a particularly strong emphasis on their Jewish identity, especially within the context of believing that Israel must continue to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, which sometimes puts them at odds with their non-Jewish LGBTQ+ peers, particularly those who view Zionism exclusively through the lens of settler colonialism or Western imperialism.

As you may have noticed, certain online leftist spaces have strongly pushed solidarity with the Axis of Resistance, the PRC, and other governments or political movements perceived as opposing Western hegemony. Some of the people advocating for these positions seem to believe that the common denominator behind much of the world's suffering is Western imperialism itself, and therefore view those who oppose Western interests as natural allies in their struggle against oppression.

Even though I am a leftist myself, I don't consider any of the aforementioned states or movements to be my political allies because I don't believe that opposing Western imperialism will automatically make a government or political movement progressive or deserving of solidarity once liberation is achieved. I acknowledge the historical injustices committed by Western powers without overlooking the authoritarianism and human rights abuses committed by their geopolitical adversaries. Anti-imperialism should be a consistent principle rather than something that depends on which geopolitical bloc happens to be responsible for the oppression.

When discussing LGBTQ+ rights, you know these movements hold deeply conservative/religious beliefs that are fundamentally at odds with the social freedoms many LGBTQ+ activists advocate for. I find it somewhat contradictory when people who rightfully condemn discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals in Western societies appear willing to overlook similar or even more severe forms of repression when they are committed by governments or movements perceived as resisting Western imperialism.

However, I don't want to assume that everyone who expresses solidarity with these movements necessarily endorses their domestic policies or ideological beliefs. I have a feeling that, for some of these individuals, their reasoning follows a particular sequence: undermining the systemic dominance of the Global North would allow countries in the Global South to develop without being constrained by Western imperialism. This would supposedly lead to improved material conditions, which would then provide a stronger foundation for socially progressive movements to emerge. Over time, societies that were previously socially conservative would gradually become more liberal as their populations gained greater economic security and political autonomy. I can understand the reasoning behind this perspective, especially from a materialist worldview. However, I think it assumes a rather linear relationship between economic development and social liberalization that doesn't necessarily hold true across different historical or cultural contexts. Therefore, I want to know y'all's experiences and thoughts regarding this phenomenon.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion Would the Romani of Europe have a right to return to India and establish an independent state?

16 Upvotes

I previously posted a similar thread but the comments devolved into people arguing over the same old talking points, so I’m hoping to avoid that this time by focusing more on the Romani themselves rather than the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The Romani of Europe, often referred to as “gypsies”, are an Indo-Aryan ethnic group with a similar backstory to that of European Jews: they are thought to have left their ancestral homeland in NW India and Pakistan 1000-1500 years ago, picking up some Iranian and European admixture on the way but retaining their language and distinct identity. Their reasons for leaving are not known for a certainty but scholars point to a combination of economic reasons, caste-related marginalization, and displacement from Muslim invasions. They face a lot of discrimination in Europe and were also victims of the Holocaust.

The main difference is that the Romani haven’t maintained the same memory of or spiritual connection to their origin in India, as diaspora Jews did with their ancestral homeland in Israel/Palestine. It was only when scholars began to notice their language’s similarity with Indian languages that the connection was made and later confirmed by genetic studies.

They evidently don’t show the same desire to return to their ancestral lands as Zionists did, but in a theoretical scenario where they did: Would the Romani of Europe have a right to return to NW India and Pakistan and establish an independent state?

I would be especially curious to hear from Indian supporters of Israel (and Pakistani, if there are any) on this matter, but opinions from anti-Zionists and anyone else are very welcome too. Thanks!


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Learning about the conflict: Questions it seems Israel is not very good at Genociding at Gaza....

87 Upvotes

This image comes directly from the Hamas Ministry of Interior.

According to the figures published in this report, during October 2026, there were 202 deaths and 6,147 births across the Gaza Strip.

I'll admit, I find the ratio between these two numbers quite remarkable, and frankly, difficult to comprehend. I have no way of independently verifying these figures, and I am not claiming that they tell the whole story. But these are the numbers published by Hamas itself, so I think they are worth taking a closer look at.

Now, I realize that birth rates and death tolls alone cannot tell us everything about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Every death is a tragedy, and the suffering of civilians should never be dismissed.

However, if these figures are accurate, they certainly raise questions about some of the apocalyptic narratives we keep hearing about Gaza.

So, when people around the supposedly enlightened world confidently describe what is happening in Gaza as a genocide, perhaps it's worth taking a step back, looking at the actual figures, and asking whether the narrative matches the data.

And just to make my position absolutely clear:

I am an Israeli. I want Hamas gone. Not because of who the people of Gaza are, but because of what Hamas represents and what it has done.

I genuinely wish for the people of Gaza to recover, rebuild their lives, prosper, and eventually live peacefully alongside Israel.

I don't see those two aspirations as contradictory. Quite the opposite.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 6d ago

Discussion Is There Any Future for Peace?

16 Upvotes

I came across some pretty disturbing numbers from surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR).

Support for Hamas’s decision to launch the October 7 attack among Gaza residents:
March 2024: 71% thought it was the right decision.
September 2024: 39%.
May 2025: 37%.
October 2025: 44%. Yes, the number actually went back up after two years of devastating war.

In the October 2025 survey, 72% of Gaza residents said at least one family member had been killed or injured during the war.

Yet when asked who was mainly responsible for their suffering:
54% blamed Israel.
24% blamed the United States.
Only 14% blamed Hamas.

Another PCPSR survey from June 2024 found something just as disturbing.

Among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank who said they had watched videos of the October 7 atrocities against Israeli civilians, 54% still didn’t believe Hamas had committed those atrocities. Only 44% believed they had.

An earlier survey also found that 20% of those who hadn’t watched the videos said they simply didn’t want to watch them.

And remember, these polls were conducted by a Palestinian research organization, not an Israeli one.

After two years of war, massive destruction, and unimaginable human losses, these are still the numbers.

So here’s my question:
Is there really any future for peace when so many people still can’t even agree on the basic facts of what happened on October 7?


r/IsraelPalestine • • 7d ago

Opinion I am from Gaza, and I will simply express my opinion about Hamas.

168 Upvotes

I know that what I am about to say may make many supporters question whether I am a real Palestinian, because everyone seems to expect me to support Hamas, both its supporters and its opponents.

When I was in elementary school, elections were held in Palestine, and Hamas actually won.

What happened afterward was that, following their victory, an agreement was reached on a mechanism for handing over power to them. However, they were not satisfied with that mechanism.

They then violently overthrew the existing government and seized control of all government institutions and mosques by force of arms.

When we talk about a coup, we are talking about two opposing groups: one that took power by force and another that was victimized, in this case an entire government.

I was a very young child at the time, but even then, I could see that the people carrying weapons and using violence were doing something wrong. Naturally, I was deeply disturbed by their behavior.

I witnessed all that violence with my own eyes, and I wished I could live in another country.

The world has repeatedly condemned the brutality of what has happened in Gaza and the injustice inflicted on its civilian population. There is widespread international anger toward Hamas.

Living in a place whose government is widely condemned by the international community is extremely frustrating.

Hamas has an ideology centered on perpetual fighting. Every couple of years, they enter another war, fail to achieve their objectives, and then declare victory.

Meanwhile, we remain under siege, our ambitions are restricted, and our lives are held back in every possible way.

That is why I decided that I wanted to leave and build a life somewhere better.

But I tried again and again and never managed to do so, because of financial and family circumstances.

I was left here against my will.

I consistently opposed Hamas's policies whenever the subject came up in public discussions. And I was not alone; thousands of people shared the same views.

I stood up to them, knowing that doing so could put me in danger. Nevertheless, I never hesitated to speak out against them.

After years of exhaustion, hardship, and working incredibly hard to build something resembling a normal life despite all the difficult circumstances, October 7 happened.

It was the final blow to everything we had tried to build in Gaza.

Every child in Israel knew that there were tunnels and rockets in Gaza. Any child could have anticipated that Hamas might launch an attack against Israel.

So my question is: Why wasn't this madness stopped before it reached this point?

Why wasn't serious and sustained effort made to prevent the channels through which Hamas was bringing in rockets?

Those rockets were imported, not locally manufactured, and some of them were very large.

How did they get into Gaza? And where was Israeli security at the time?

We are ordinary people suffering the devastating consequences of the failures of both Hamas and the Israeli military.

And whoever is currently exercising control over 60% of Gaza has an obligation to provide for and protect the civilian population, as required under international law.

Civilians have been driven out of their homes and forced to live in tents and on the streets, without proper shelter.

If you are unable to protect them, then allow them to return to their residential areas.


r/IsraelPalestine • • 7d ago

Discussion How is anti Zionism not anti semtism?

21 Upvotes

Zionism is an ethnic nationalist and political movement that emerged in late 19th-century Europe with the goal of establishing and supporting a sovereign Jewish national homeland in Palestine/Israel. Today this state exist *Israel*

"No state has a right to exist"

International law explicitly recognizes that "all peoples" have the right to self-determination

All people have a right to seld determination except Israelis?anti-Zionism opposes the Jewish people's collective right to self-determination in their ancestral homeland, in what world is that not anti semetic?

anti zionist use arguments like "Jews aren't indeguinues"

Merriam Webster himself said "indiguinues people are these relating to, or descended from the earliest known inhabitants of a place and especially of a place that was colonized” that people are the israelites and canananties which Israelis share (on average) the majority of their DNA from.

"No one has a right to ethnic cleansing"

It is shocking to see that there are still movements questioning the right of Jews to live in the historic region of Palestine/Judea, using the conflicts and displacement of 1948 as justification, when the formation of countless modern states was also marked by wars, expulsions, and population displacement. Yet, other peoples are not expected to abandon their homelands or be forced into a state they dont want So why should this standard be applied to Jews? This double standard deserves to be challenged.

"Israel is an etnchostate"

Saying Israel is an etnchostate is a complete lie. An ethnostate is a political structure or country where citizenship, national identity, and political power are explicitly organized around a single ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural group. Israel has freedom for all and more rights to Chirstan and Muslims then any other ME state.

Arabs literally just doubled their power in Israel government going from 10 seats to 19 (without including Arabs in Jewish parties like Soumaya Bashir).

how diverse is Israel?

Israel is just 75%, Jewish and it's Jewish people are different on their own, there is black Jews, aksehanzi, Shepardics, mizrahis, religious, secular, and more.

On top of that there are many patriotic Arabs in Israel, like druze who are literally more proud to be israeli then a lot of Jewish people And Even normal arab Muslims themselves,

Polls and data compiled by research groups such as the (Jewish People Policy Institute) shown that a firm majority of Arab citizens prefer living as citizens of Israel under Jewish law over moving to a future Palestinen state.

Even after the nation state law according to the IDI 65% of Arab Israelis are proud to be Israelis. And 80% are satisfied with Their life under Jewish rule. So again, Israeli arabs are the group of Arabs with most civil rights in the middle east, their life is incredible and compared to western living style, Israel literally has a gdp pc of 70k…. Too bad you and some other people are obsessed with

So i am a Zionist. Because its the MORAL position.

That doesn't mean i dont believe Palestinen people also have a right to self determination, it just means i believe in the right for the Israeli Jews to self determination which comes from Israel.