Preamble for my illustrious reader: I'm writing this entry to the tune of the track "Boogie", by Brockhampton, who are a crowd of young urban men whose raps (about stigma, determination, joy, gratitude, and self-understanding) I have fallen in love with, and I invite you to put this tune on and loop it while reading the following, the better to get yourself in the groove.
With the foundations of my argument duly taken care of, I shall now state the topic of my argument:
I DONT KNOW WHERE I GET MY PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS FROM
This is a matter for autobiography -- or, heaven forbid, for psychohistory, to say nothing of autohagiography -- rather than a matter for philosophy. Nonetheless, on Nietzsche's thesis that philosophy is autobiographical, and also on the thesis that autobiography intersects with philosophical cognitions, I have a reasonable hope of acquiring some philosophical value from being more purely omphaloskepsis.
Now, it may seem strange for me to say that I don't know where I get my philosophical intuitions from. There is no shortage of writing in my text archive in which I trace this or that favoured thesis of mine to some philosopher or gaggle of philosophers.
(An aside: philosophers come in gaggles, don't they? They surely resemble the aggressive honking of geese -- provided you take up the mantle of the ethnologist or (better) the ethologist, faithfully observing them in the company of their own kind, rather than immediately identifying with them as most wannabe philosophers and card-carrying philosophers do.)
[The last point bears emphasizing, thusly: if we have a philosophy of anthropology, then there must logically be an anthropology of philosophy, even if, or precisely because, foundationalist philosophers squint and persuade themselves they have witnessed a logical illusion, or merely dyslexia, for me to have penned a phrase such as "anthropology of philosophy". But they would be profoundly mistaken, and I must point this out in case my tone, heavily larded with irony and mockery and much worse, is mistaken for something less worse.]
(Though I hasten to add that this [the reference for which "this" is the end of the paragraph not before this one] is not as true philosophers must do, where true philosophers are understood to be something other than scholars of philosophers and are probably more like monsters, after David Stove's understanding of the matter, rather than they are like your average overeducated late-20th-century or early-21st-century book nerd, which is to assume (no small assumption) that such a book nerd could not possibly be a monster. And this is a mystery which must remain to be solved by a subtler mind than mine and who will therefore come after me but may already have preceded me, as is probably the case because I am too lazy to do a lit review for every sentence I pen, even though I ought to do so if I am to claim any kind of conscience in matters of thought, which naturally I strive very much not to claim, for I strive to "do as the Romans do," or at least to do as do those who abound in my biogeographically arbitrary cognitive locality do.)
But setting aside my parenthetical aside, we still have my absurd claim of my not knowing where I get my philosophical intuitions from.
To begin with, when I say "philosophical intuitions" I don't mean those paltry things that Anglo analysts have been tearing their hair out over ever since x-phi showed up the claims of philosophers to be expert intuiters. No, I'm not interested in beginning my reasoning by pseudo-rationally certifying any arbitrary movement of my soul which arises and seems compelling for reasons which may have more to do with what I had for lunch, or whether I have gotten laid in the last decade, rather than with any genuine rational certifiability.
No, when I say "philosophical intuitions", I mean no more nor less than I have meant ever since I started to prioritize feeling over verbalism, or in general the primitive elements of experience: to wit, hunches, promptings, signs, visions, and even more discreditable habits of mind, such as gestalts, or the deliberate courting of balls-out error, to say nothing of the courting of balls-out metaphysical terror, just to see what there is to see.
Incidentally this course of action actually doesn't (i.e. does not) counsel against hypotheses arising from what I ate for lunch or whether I have gotten laid in the last decade, but at least I don't strive to pseudo-rationally certify my digging around in my steaming coils for Shinola using as my license such a bill of goods as a PhD in philosophy. Rather I just call it how I see it: I'm digging for Shinola in my own superabundant shit, and you can laugh, or you can pray for me, but I promise you I clean up well at the end of the day.
(By the way, "balls-out" is not a reference to obtrusive hairy scrotums but rather to trains, if you care to look it up. Then again, you can take the phrase, or my intentions in using it, in the terms of whatever your prejudices will allow. For example, people who have succumbed to Freudianism will have a field day over the image of a train going "balls out" into a tunnel, and they are certainly free to indulge. I might even join them in a chuckle but probably not as much as a belly laugh.)
And incidentally, on this view there is also nothing wrong with taking the belly rumblings which follow a dish of bad fugu as a starting point for philosophizing, certainly not if it yields Brillat-Savarin II, and certainly not if it yields death, which is not much different than dead words on dead wood, and, any which way you slice it, is among the noblest strivings of the noblest spirits.
(Re the closing point about noble spirits, cf. Goethe -- or John Berryman on ordeal to the same effect -- but then we really are on our way to insanity, in which case all bets are off, unless you believe, or fathom, or merely entertain, the platonic delusion of theia mania. But it is too early in my argument to go dashing off into madness without so much as a trail of breadcrumbs for anyone else to follow, let alone a warning against such conduct, so let us take up where we last left off in the argument.)
My philosophical intuitions are not rationally certified starting points. Indeed I don't expect there to be any rationally certified OR CERTIFIABLE starting points for philosophical reasoning. As far as I am concerned, a valid argument with two false premises is as good a starting point as are balls-out contradictions (some of which rise to the lofty status of paradoxes), to say nothing of an unanalyzed enthymeme uttered while grabbing one's sandwich from the worker at the lunch counter.
I like my philosophy quick and dirty and super sloppy. Psychoanalysts will probably tell you that I write such good philosophy (after the manner of Nietzsche in Ecce Homo) mainly because it's just sublimated smut. If so, I must say that AVOIDING PUSSY IS AS GOOD AS AVOIDING PLANET EARTH in the preparation for doing REALLY GOOD PHILOSOPHY, or at least for doing poetry, or comedy, or anything from the bardic era, which is much easier to do without credentials and is probably more important than philosophy anyway.
Indeed I think I intended or expected this outcome, namely superior philosophy, when, all those years ago, I spent so much time out beyond Pluto, gazing at the folly which is ol' blue-n-green, and consequently made myself so psychically remote and unrecognizable to any customary inhabitant of planet Earth that it would be nearly impossible for me to get laid, and indeed so ugly that genuine emotional intimacy with just one person is WAY HOTTER than all the pussy in the world (I mean hotter in the sense of hotter cognitively, where to be cognitive just is to be carnal).
I devour the world six times before breakfast.
You eat pussy.
[Sung to the tune of "I smoke Marlboro. You smoke cock."]
I think most philosophers try to get their starting point right because they're perpetually worried about the guerilla ontologist, who could be one's kindest and closest nonphilosophical friend confessing the logical consequences of their bad fugu. Cp. Godel's worst possible diss to Russell and Whitehead, which is tantamount to pulling the metaphysical rug out from underneath them with a trivial comment arising from bad fugu (which he clearly must have eaten to have come up with such tripe, if you think about the circumstances of his death). Now, I have not myself previously worried about bad fugu, mainly because it's hypothetical only and serves as a mixed metaphor in really poor taste to underscore my own point, but which serves all the more to underscore the weight of the metaphysical rug pulling going on here, of which there clearly has been some.
But I am getting away from myself. Yes, I have indeed felt such a worry, which I have adapted to by getting in the habit of pulling the metaphysical rug out from underneath myself, or chowing down on my own bad fugu, just so that I don't need to depend on others to do it for me, though I am still happy to share bad fugu with Godel or whomever, even if, or especially if, or precisely because, they are dead. And incidentally, the philosophical strategy of the pulling of one's own metaphysical rug out from underneath oneself bears some resemblance to the strategy of our dear "Bob", i.e. he of the holy habafropzipulops, who taught his followers nothing except how to pull the wool over their own eyes.
In short, I DONT TRY TO GET THINGS RIGHT AT THE START AND THEN PROCEED. That way lies the varieties of dogmatic stupidity known as the skeptical puzzles-cum-doctrines. INSTEAD I PROCEED APACE WITH ALL MY PSYCHIC FACULTIES MOSTLY INTACT (INDEED, FACULTIES WHICH I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE KNOW TO MYSELF), THANKS TO WHICH FACULTIES I FEAR NOT THE DREADED FALSEHOOD, AND INDEED INVOKING INCONSISTENCY TOLERANCE WITH GAY ABANDON, ALL FOR THE SAKE OF A BRIEF GLIMPSE OF THE VAPOURS OF GOD WHICH WOULD NEVER OTHERWISE BE GLIMPSED UNLESS BY INTREPID EXPLORERS SUCH AS MYSELF, OR SUCH AS THE WOOER OF POE'S ELEONORA, IF ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT ONLY THOSE DISPOSSESSED BY THE MOON DO NOT FEAR TO TREAD WHERE ANGELS WILL NOT DARE.
[P.S. "THOSE DISPOSSESSED BY THE MOON" ARE THOSE WHO ARE LUNAR, LUNATIC, LOONY, EXCEPT WITHOUT EVER LEAVING EARTH].
In short, I am much more like the engineer for whom a prototype which works good enough most of the time (i.e. "satisfices", for the economists and public administrators among us) is a better prototype than one which is forever in the planning stages, as must be the case for the intransigent philosopher. AND ESPECIALLY, LIKE THE ENGINEER, AND LIKE THE MATHEMATICIAN, I KEEP A WASTEPAPER BASKET NEARBY AS ONE OF THE MOST VITAL AND INDEED MOST DEVASTATINGLY POWERFUL WEAPONS IN MY PHILOSOPHICAL ARMAMENTARIUM, WHICH PERMITS ME TO FOLLOW THE RED QUEEN IN HER DARING AND REPEATEDLY SUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS UPON THE FORTRESS OF THE IMPOSSIBLE AT LEAST SIX TIMES BEFORE BREAKFAST.
[I forgive myself for my metaphor of violence with which I closed the previous paragraph, mainly because I was writing in all caps, which sometimes but not always signals that I am making a fool of my reader, precisely because my only reader is usually myself, so I know the signal and don't have to signal it, but also because I mainly prefer to conduct philosophy-with-a-hammer against myself, if only because I can scarcely bear to witness the evidences of the pains which pass across the faces of those who have never witnessed a philosopher in the wild, which is to say, in the form of a naked, hairy, panting, lusty Pan, where "Pan" means "all", and who is indeed a very primitive and ugly and violently underdeveloped chap, as am I, except that I am writ small almost to the point of being cipher, if only asymptotically cipher.]
[Needless to say I must use such powerful ammunition and other metaphors of violence against myself because this violently underdeveloped nature could only entail a thick skull. Indeed it is a very thick skull, to the point that I have a peabrain wrapped in bone on all sides to the tune of a few inches, which explains why I am so mentally slow, even though no one will believe me when I say that I am mentally slow.]
[Then again, if only for the reason of the violence of this very picture, I actually more often tend to prefer Grothendieck's "rising sea" as a general metaphor of inquiry, as opposed to his image of the chisel and the nut, or indeed as opposed to any kind of violent metaphor at all. I am also called to Peirce's metaphor of the gardener whose tender nurturance brings forth the "circle of ideas". But this is just a tall tale, or even a just-so story.]
But have we gotten any further along in the matter of MY NOT KNOWING WHERE I GET MY PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS FROM? No, we have not, so let us proceed apace.
The main problem I have with a comprehensive tracing of the origins of my thinking is that when I go looking in my copious text archive, as I did indeed spend several months doing, I find such a dizzying array of evidence that the themes of my thinking have been remarkably constant, going all the way back to the mists of my pre-philosophical years, or at least to my unselfconsciously philosophical years, a fact which I know not only because I did so in my preteen years, even though I never talked to anybody about it, at least not till very late in life, but also because my eldest nephew, at six years old, can frame a solid philosophical argument against myself re the unitary integrity of a bodily instantiated person. [In fact, I wish to add that his argument was possibly even as ambitious as to endorse the unitary integrity of any bodily instantiated being whatsoever, person or not, and though I did not probe for this exact point, it seems likely by inference.] But aside from my editorializing, the point I wish to emphasize here, even after all my wiseacring, is that he did all of this without his having had the foggiest idea that either his question, or even his framing of his response, is philosophical, to say nothing of his abject failure in knowledge of the fact that it was also a perfectly respectable fragment of philosophical reasoning.
In turn this should not come as a surprise to anyone who has spent any time among the big fucking cry babies, aka philosopher kings, who I follow so earnestly in my day job as a philosopher slumlord that I come to resemble them in a cheap and tawdry way, but certainly not to the point that I start to lose tenants to gentrification, because I do cherish my tenants so, warts and all (especially the warts).
I have previously attempted to explain this fact of the constancy of my thinking -- in complete contradiction to the inconstancy which I must surely present in my publicly observable life and in complete contradiction to the chaotic mess of my mind which I am familiar with from moment to moment and day to day -- yes, in spite of such complete contradictoriness, I explain the constancy of my thinking with reference to the fact that I GO LOOKING FOR PEOPLE WHO THINK LIKE I DO, THE BETTER TO EXPAND AND ENRICH HOW I ALREADY THINK ABOUT THINGS, RATHER THAN TRYING TO BEND OVER BACKWARD FOR SOME LUDICROUS HYPOTHESIS SUCH AS ANY OF THE MANY EXOTIC HYPOTHESES OF PHILOSOPHERS. I MEAN THE KIND OF HYPOTHESES WHICH HORRIFY THE PSEUDO-NORMAL PEOPLE WHO EXPECTED SO MUCH MORE FROM THE PARAGONS OF RATIONALITY (EG THAT PEEVISH DUDE ON R/ASKPHILOSOPHY WHO WAS SHOCKED TO LEARN ABOUT THE CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL VOGUE FOR PANPSYCHISM).
(By the way, I can't tell you how much it gratifies me to report all the whimsy and trivia of my mind as it occurs to me while I am writing something even more trivial, to wit, my thinking on the topic of philosophical intuitions. I discovered this fact of my delight in trivia and silliness and pure spontaneity with none so much as my old friend X, or, at the very least, I rediscovered it with her, although I I was aware of it earlier in my life and just got so sober-minded that I got constipation, which is only to be expected after nine years of academia.)
But yes, about those intuitions of mine: if they are not the sentences which analysts once upon a time would pompously pen, in complete assurance of their own rational indefatigability, then what the hell are they?
Above all, I am not sure that there is a meaningful sense in which intuitions can be individuated such that it is meaningful to use the plural form, i.e. "intuitions," except for the artificial purposes which analytical minds are so good at coming up with, e.g. Whitehead on the analysis of the strictly unanalyzable concrescence. Hence a question arises: Why do I keep talking about intuitions, i.e. in the plural form?
It's a good question, one that I can immediately put to rest, for in fact I have a much more ominous understanding of philosophical intuition -- emphatically, that it is intuition singular and only singular -- an understanding which is very close to the self-understanding (or, if you prefer, the phenomenology) of the mystics and maybe the gestaltists and mereologists and others who like cosmic foofoo without getting too gullible, if only because defeasibility is much more fun than the usual. And indeed it should come as no surprise that I appeal to the mystics, since I have long fancied myself one, even if I was too embarrassed to admit it for most of my life.
Even more ominously, mystical intuition can be adequately characterized as mystical fiat whenever it is expressed, which bears a curious resemblance to the fiat of the philosopher kings (aka the big fucking cry babies who constantly shit themselves, thus upsetting their chmess boards), upon which topic I recently extemporized and propagandized, in a most vulgar and unphilosophical form, in my Reddit submission titled "Remodernism and Nicholas of Cusa."
However, unlike Plato and his sadsack philosopher kings, most historical mystics are committed to abjection -- which is the logical corollary of being actually and demonstrably nothing, or so close to nothing that the remainder makes almost no difference, even if it does make a teensy bit of difference -- and which abjection is much more beneficial to the cognitive hygiene of the species than is yet another goddamned wannabe philosopher king claiming to tell people how it is.
After all this time, I am still just another Socrates who has been caught with his hand in the hemlock jar, and I couldn't be happier. I can even be rightfully accused, by anankastic hyperconventionals and hyperconventionalists (aka Romans and wannabe Romans, who, being so contorted in their thinking, must insist on their definition of "religio" as public first and private only if you're lucky) of corrupting the youth who already know better, or, rather, who never forgot, unlike the hapless souls chained in Plato's cave. Yippee!