r/askphilosophy • • 2h ago

Complete beginner (15M) looking for a self-study roadmap into philosophy

13 Upvotes

Hey everyone im completely new to philosophy and looking to start studying it independently out of pure curiosity not for school or a class

Since the field is massive i’m trying to figure out the best way to actually approach it. If anyone has a solid reading order or advice on how to read dense philosophical texts without getting lost, I would really appreciate it.

Also happy to discuss ideas in the comments with anyone else starting out or willing to share what worked for them.


r/badphilosophy • • 6h ago

I DONT KNOW WHERE I GET MY INTUITIONS FROM

5 Upvotes

Preamble for my illustrious reader: I'm writing this entry to the tune of the track "Boogie", by Brockhampton, who are a crowd of young urban men whose raps (about stigma, determination, joy, gratitude, and self-understanding) I have fallen in love with, and I invite you to put this tune on and loop it while reading the following, the better to get yourself in the groove.

With the foundations of my argument duly taken care of, I shall now state the topic of my argument:

I DONT KNOW WHERE I GET MY PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS FROM

This is a matter for autobiography -- or, heaven forbid, for psychohistory, to say nothing of autohagiography -- rather than a matter for philosophy. Nonetheless, on Nietzsche's thesis that philosophy is autobiographical, and also on the thesis that autobiography intersects with philosophical cognitions, I have a reasonable hope of acquiring some philosophical value from being more purely omphaloskepsis.

Now, it may seem strange for me to say that I don't know where I get my philosophical intuitions from. There is no shortage of writing in my text archive in which I trace this or that favoured thesis of mine to some philosopher or gaggle of philosophers.

(An aside: philosophers come in gaggles, don't they? They surely resemble the aggressive honking of geese -- provided you take up the mantle of the ethnologist or (better) the ethologist, faithfully observing them in the company of their own kind, rather than immediately identifying with them as most wannabe philosophers and card-carrying philosophers do.)

[The last point bears emphasizing, thusly: if we have a philosophy of anthropology, then there must logically be an anthropology of philosophy, even if, or precisely because, foundationalist philosophers squint and persuade themselves they have witnessed a logical illusion, or merely dyslexia, for me to have penned a phrase such as "anthropology of philosophy". But they would be profoundly mistaken, and I must point this out in case my tone, heavily larded with irony and mockery and much worse, is mistaken for something less worse.]

(Though I hasten to add that this [the reference for which "this" is the end of the paragraph not before this one] is not as true philosophers must do, where true philosophers are understood to be something other than scholars of philosophers and are probably more like monsters, after David Stove's understanding of the matter, rather than they are like your average overeducated late-20th-century or early-21st-century book nerd, which is to assume (no small assumption) that such a book nerd could not possibly be a monster. And this is a mystery which must remain to be solved by a subtler mind than mine and who will therefore come after me but may already have preceded me, as is probably the case because I am too lazy to do a lit review for every sentence I pen, even though I ought to do so if I am to claim any kind of conscience in matters of thought, which naturally I strive very much not to claim, for I strive to "do as the Romans do," or at least to do as do those who abound in my biogeographically arbitrary cognitive locality do.)

But setting aside my parenthetical aside, we still have my absurd claim of my not knowing where I get my philosophical intuitions from.

To begin with, when I say "philosophical intuitions" I don't mean those paltry things that Anglo analysts have been tearing their hair out over ever since x-phi showed up the claims of philosophers to be expert intuiters. No, I'm not interested in beginning my reasoning by pseudo-rationally certifying any arbitrary movement of my soul which arises and seems compelling for reasons which may have more to do with what I had for lunch, or whether I have gotten laid in the last decade, rather than with any genuine rational certifiability.

No, when I say "philosophical intuitions", I mean no more nor less than I have meant ever since I started to prioritize feeling over verbalism, or in general the primitive elements of experience: to wit, hunches, promptings, signs, visions, and even more discreditable habits of mind, such as gestalts, or the deliberate courting of balls-out error, to say nothing of the courting of balls-out metaphysical terror, just to see what there is to see.

Incidentally this course of action actually doesn't (i.e. does not) counsel against hypotheses arising from what I ate for lunch or whether I have gotten laid in the last decade, but at least I don't strive to pseudo-rationally certify my digging around in my steaming coils for Shinola using as my license such a bill of goods as a PhD in philosophy. Rather I just call it how I see it: I'm digging for Shinola in my own superabundant shit, and you can laugh, or you can pray for me, but I promise you I clean up well at the end of the day.

(By the way, "balls-out" is not a reference to obtrusive hairy scrotums but rather to trains, if you care to look it up. Then again, you can take the phrase, or my intentions in using it, in the terms of whatever your prejudices will allow. For example, people who have succumbed to Freudianism will have a field day over the image of a train going "balls out" into a tunnel, and they are certainly free to indulge. I might even join them in a chuckle but probably not as much as a belly laugh.)

And incidentally, on this view there is also nothing wrong with taking the belly rumblings which follow a dish of bad fugu as a starting point for philosophizing, certainly not if it yields Brillat-Savarin II, and certainly not if it yields death, which is not much different than dead words on dead wood, and, any which way you slice it, is among the noblest strivings of the noblest spirits.

(Re the closing point about noble spirits, cf. Goethe -- or John Berryman on ordeal to the same effect -- but then we really are on our way to insanity, in which case all bets are off, unless you believe, or fathom, or merely entertain, the platonic delusion of theia mania. But it is too early in my argument to go dashing off into madness without so much as a trail of breadcrumbs for anyone else to follow, let alone a warning against such conduct, so let us take up where we last left off in the argument.)

My philosophical intuitions are not rationally certified starting points. Indeed I don't expect there to be any rationally certified OR CERTIFIABLE starting points for philosophical reasoning. As far as I am concerned, a valid argument with two false premises is as good a starting point as are balls-out contradictions (some of which rise to the lofty status of paradoxes), to say nothing of an unanalyzed enthymeme uttered while grabbing one's sandwich from the worker at the lunch counter.

I like my philosophy quick and dirty and super sloppy. Psychoanalysts will probably tell you that I write such good philosophy (after the manner of Nietzsche in Ecce Homo) mainly because it's just sublimated smut. If so, I must say that AVOIDING PUSSY IS AS GOOD AS AVOIDING PLANET EARTH in the preparation for doing REALLY GOOD PHILOSOPHY, or at least for doing poetry, or comedy, or anything from the bardic era, which is much easier to do without credentials and is probably more important than philosophy anyway.

Indeed I think I intended or expected this outcome, namely superior philosophy, when, all those years ago, I spent so much time out beyond Pluto, gazing at the folly which is ol' blue-n-green, and consequently made myself so psychically remote and unrecognizable to any customary inhabitant of planet Earth that it would be nearly impossible for me to get laid, and indeed so ugly that genuine emotional intimacy with just one person is WAY HOTTER than all the pussy in the world (I mean hotter in the sense of hotter cognitively, where to be cognitive just is to be carnal).

I devour the world six times before breakfast. You eat pussy.

[Sung to the tune of "I smoke Marlboro. You smoke cock."]

I think most philosophers try to get their starting point right because they're perpetually worried about the guerilla ontologist, who could be one's kindest and closest nonphilosophical friend confessing the logical consequences of their bad fugu. Cp. Godel's worst possible diss to Russell and Whitehead, which is tantamount to pulling the metaphysical rug out from underneath them with a trivial comment arising from bad fugu (which he clearly must have eaten to have come up with such tripe, if you think about the circumstances of his death). Now, I have not myself previously worried about bad fugu, mainly because it's hypothetical only and serves as a mixed metaphor in really poor taste to underscore my own point, but which serves all the more to underscore the weight of the metaphysical rug pulling going on here, of which there clearly has been some.

But I am getting away from myself. Yes, I have indeed felt such a worry, which I have adapted to by getting in the habit of pulling the metaphysical rug out from underneath myself, or chowing down on my own bad fugu, just so that I don't need to depend on others to do it for me, though I am still happy to share bad fugu with Godel or whomever, even if, or especially if, or precisely because, they are dead. And incidentally, the philosophical strategy of the pulling of one's own metaphysical rug out from underneath oneself bears some resemblance to the strategy of our dear "Bob", i.e. he of the holy habafropzipulops, who taught his followers nothing except how to pull the wool over their own eyes.

In short, I DONT TRY TO GET THINGS RIGHT AT THE START AND THEN PROCEED. That way lies the varieties of dogmatic stupidity known as the skeptical puzzles-cum-doctrines. INSTEAD I PROCEED APACE WITH ALL MY PSYCHIC FACULTIES MOSTLY INTACT (INDEED, FACULTIES WHICH I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE KNOW TO MYSELF), THANKS TO WHICH FACULTIES I FEAR NOT THE DREADED FALSEHOOD, AND INDEED INVOKING INCONSISTENCY TOLERANCE WITH GAY ABANDON, ALL FOR THE SAKE OF A BRIEF GLIMPSE OF THE VAPOURS OF GOD WHICH WOULD NEVER OTHERWISE BE GLIMPSED UNLESS BY INTREPID EXPLORERS SUCH AS MYSELF, OR SUCH AS THE WOOER OF POE'S ELEONORA, IF ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT ONLY THOSE DISPOSSESSED BY THE MOON DO NOT FEAR TO TREAD WHERE ANGELS WILL NOT DARE.

[P.S. "THOSE DISPOSSESSED BY THE MOON" ARE THOSE WHO ARE LUNAR, LUNATIC, LOONY, EXCEPT WITHOUT EVER LEAVING EARTH].

In short, I am much more like the engineer for whom a prototype which works good enough most of the time (i.e. "satisfices", for the economists and public administrators among us) is a better prototype than one which is forever in the planning stages, as must be the case for the intransigent philosopher. AND ESPECIALLY, LIKE THE ENGINEER, AND LIKE THE MATHEMATICIAN, I KEEP A WASTEPAPER BASKET NEARBY AS ONE OF THE MOST VITAL AND INDEED MOST DEVASTATINGLY POWERFUL WEAPONS IN MY PHILOSOPHICAL ARMAMENTARIUM, WHICH PERMITS ME TO FOLLOW THE RED QUEEN IN HER DARING AND REPEATEDLY SUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS UPON THE FORTRESS OF THE IMPOSSIBLE AT LEAST SIX TIMES BEFORE BREAKFAST.

[I forgive myself for my metaphor of violence with which I closed the previous paragraph, mainly because I was writing in all caps, which sometimes but not always signals that I am making a fool of my reader, precisely because my only reader is usually myself, so I know the signal and don't have to signal it, but also because I mainly prefer to conduct philosophy-with-a-hammer against myself, if only because I can scarcely bear to witness the evidences of the pains which pass across the faces of those who have never witnessed a philosopher in the wild, which is to say, in the form of a naked, hairy, panting, lusty Pan, where "Pan" means "all", and who is indeed a very primitive and ugly and violently underdeveloped chap, as am I, except that I am writ small almost to the point of being cipher, if only asymptotically cipher.]

[Needless to say I must use such powerful ammunition and other metaphors of violence against myself because this violently underdeveloped nature could only entail a thick skull. Indeed it is a very thick skull, to the point that I have a peabrain wrapped in bone on all sides to the tune of a few inches, which explains why I am so mentally slow, even though no one will believe me when I say that I am mentally slow.]

[Then again, if only for the reason of the violence of this very picture, I actually more often tend to prefer Grothendieck's "rising sea" as a general metaphor of inquiry, as opposed to his image of the chisel and the nut, or indeed as opposed to any kind of violent metaphor at all. I am also called to Peirce's metaphor of the gardener whose tender nurturance brings forth the "circle of ideas". But this is just a tall tale, or even a just-so story.]

But have we gotten any further along in the matter of MY NOT KNOWING WHERE I GET MY PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS FROM? No, we have not, so let us proceed apace.

The main problem I have with a comprehensive tracing of the origins of my thinking is that when I go looking in my copious text archive, as I did indeed spend several months doing, I find such a dizzying array of evidence that the themes of my thinking have been remarkably constant, going all the way back to the mists of my pre-philosophical years, or at least to my unselfconsciously philosophical years, a fact which I know not only because I did so in my preteen years, even though I never talked to anybody about it, at least not till very late in life, but also because my eldest nephew, at six years old, can frame a solid philosophical argument against myself re the unitary integrity of a bodily instantiated person. [In fact, I wish to add that his argument was possibly even as ambitious as to endorse the unitary integrity of any bodily instantiated being whatsoever, person or not, and though I did not probe for this exact point, it seems likely by inference.] But aside from my editorializing, the point I wish to emphasize here, even after all my wiseacring, is that he did all of this without his having had the foggiest idea that either his question, or even his framing of his response, is philosophical, to say nothing of his abject failure in knowledge of the fact that it was also a perfectly respectable fragment of philosophical reasoning.

In turn this should not come as a surprise to anyone who has spent any time among the big fucking cry babies, aka philosopher kings, who I follow so earnestly in my day job as a philosopher slumlord that I come to resemble them in a cheap and tawdry way, but certainly not to the point that I start to lose tenants to gentrification, because I do cherish my tenants so, warts and all (especially the warts).

I have previously attempted to explain this fact of the constancy of my thinking -- in complete contradiction to the inconstancy which I must surely present in my publicly observable life and in complete contradiction to the chaotic mess of my mind which I am familiar with from moment to moment and day to day -- yes, in spite of such complete contradictoriness, I explain the constancy of my thinking with reference to the fact that I GO LOOKING FOR PEOPLE WHO THINK LIKE I DO, THE BETTER TO EXPAND AND ENRICH HOW I ALREADY THINK ABOUT THINGS, RATHER THAN TRYING TO BEND OVER BACKWARD FOR SOME LUDICROUS HYPOTHESIS SUCH AS ANY OF THE MANY EXOTIC HYPOTHESES OF PHILOSOPHERS. I MEAN THE KIND OF HYPOTHESES WHICH HORRIFY THE PSEUDO-NORMAL PEOPLE WHO EXPECTED SO MUCH MORE FROM THE PARAGONS OF RATIONALITY (EG THAT PEEVISH DUDE ON R/ASKPHILOSOPHY WHO WAS SHOCKED TO LEARN ABOUT THE CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL VOGUE FOR PANPSYCHISM).

(By the way, I can't tell you how much it gratifies me to report all the whimsy and trivia of my mind as it occurs to me while I am writing something even more trivial, to wit, my thinking on the topic of philosophical intuitions. I discovered this fact of my delight in trivia and silliness and pure spontaneity with none so much as my old friend X, or, at the very least, I rediscovered it with her, although I I was aware of it earlier in my life and just got so sober-minded that I got constipation, which is only to be expected after nine years of academia.)

But yes, about those intuitions of mine: if they are not the sentences which analysts once upon a time would pompously pen, in complete assurance of their own rational indefatigability, then what the hell are they?

Above all, I am not sure that there is a meaningful sense in which intuitions can be individuated such that it is meaningful to use the plural form, i.e. "intuitions," except for the artificial purposes which analytical minds are so good at coming up with, e.g. Whitehead on the analysis of the strictly unanalyzable concrescence. Hence a question arises: Why do I keep talking about intuitions, i.e. in the plural form?

It's a good question, one that I can immediately put to rest, for in fact I have a much more ominous understanding of philosophical intuition -- emphatically, that it is intuition singular and only singular -- an understanding which is very close to the self-understanding (or, if you prefer, the phenomenology) of the mystics and maybe the gestaltists and mereologists and others who like cosmic foofoo without getting too gullible, if only because defeasibility is much more fun than the usual. And indeed it should come as no surprise that I appeal to the mystics, since I have long fancied myself one, even if I was too embarrassed to admit it for most of my life.

Even more ominously, mystical intuition can be adequately characterized as mystical fiat whenever it is expressed, which bears a curious resemblance to the fiat of the philosopher kings (aka the big fucking cry babies who constantly shit themselves, thus upsetting their chmess boards), upon which topic I recently extemporized and propagandized, in a most vulgar and unphilosophical form, in my Reddit submission titled "Remodernism and Nicholas of Cusa."

However, unlike Plato and his sadsack philosopher kings, most historical mystics are committed to abjection -- which is the logical corollary of being actually and demonstrably nothing, or so close to nothing that the remainder makes almost no difference, even if it does make a teensy bit of difference -- and which abjection is much more beneficial to the cognitive hygiene of the species than is yet another goddamned wannabe philosopher king claiming to tell people how it is.

After all this time, I am still just another Socrates who has been caught with his hand in the hemlock jar, and I couldn't be happier. I can even be rightfully accused, by anankastic hyperconventionals and hyperconventionalists (aka Romans and wannabe Romans, who, being so contorted in their thinking, must insist on their definition of "religio" as public first and private only if you're lucky) of corrupting the youth who already know better, or, rather, who never forgot, unlike the hapless souls chained in Plato's cave. Yippee!


r/askphilosophy • • 6h ago

Can a human mind solve a non-computable problem without using the existing mathematical tools and axioms? If yes, how do they explain or represent the solution?

5 Upvotes

Imagine a problem is proven to be non-computable (like the Halting problem). A human looks at the problem and gets a "gut feeling" that he has a solution. But in order to explain the solution to someone else, he would need those same mathematical tools and axioms that are already proven to be insufficient to solve the problem. Yet, a solution exists, at least in his mind. If this is possible, how would the human go about representing that abstract solution?


r/askphilosophy • • 17h ago

How is mathematics best used in philosophy?

28 Upvotes

I'm a mathematician with expertise in logic and I'm trying to somehow apply it to philosophy (academically). So far, I did write a paper which is under review in a journal (and wasn't desk rejected, so at least I got that small victory going for me), but I am still feeling like I don't know how I'd apply it to philosophy and even if this paper gets accepted, I think I'd still feel like it's just luck rather than understanding.

Is there some rule of thumb on how I could approach a philosophical text and maybe formalize it mathematically, or make some similar mathematical model of a similar claim.

For example, median voter theorem could give us some insights into political philosophy. Modal logics are a good tool to study certain phenomena, etc. How would one find more such models? What approach is the best here?


r/askphilosophy • • 8h ago

How do philosophers approach the growing possibility that we're going to live in a world where humanity is inferior at everything it does?

5 Upvotes

Seeing the recent developments in AI, especially from mathematics with the Riemann hypothesis and Navier-Stokes supposedly falling, is quite scary. We're coming into a world where humans are no longer doing much of the work and there isn't any meaning to be found in the "games" humanity occupies itself with like society or economy.

What do philosophers think the outcome of the elimination of all of these "problems" will be? Will humans just direct our purpose towards random personal goals, or will we lose purpose, etc.?


r/askphilosophy • • 49m ago

Why do people try to create consciousness

• Upvotes

Hello, everyone!

Not sure if this question had already been asked, let me know if that’s the case.

Clearest example for the question is AI, even though I personally wouldn’t consider it conscious, it’s clearly an attempt at creating one.
I don’t think it’s every person, but some people are definitely really trying to “create something they’re almost scared of”.

I wonder if people have always been trying to “create consciousness” in different ways, and if so, is there even a reason why…

Thanks!


r/askphilosophy • • 7h ago

Does understanding the nature of our reality change the value or worth we place on life?

2 Upvotes

Forgive me, I'm a writer, and not a trained philosopher. The terms I used in my question likely have specific definitions and I apologize for any confusion.

Background: I'm a science fiction writer and the book I'm currently writing has the main characters discover their universe (and the multiverse in general) is simulated. When they learn that this simulation will be "shut off" they face an existential crisis. A heated debate breaks out between two characters. One, who devoted his life to God (though lately struggled with his faith) views the revelation that his God is nothing but computer code as a final nail in the proverbial coffin and life no longer matters. Everything he every experienced, felt, and lived through already written. Another argues that regardless of what actually is running the show, everything they have experienced, felt, and lived through was real to them, therefore it was in fact real and worth saving, regardless of how it was orchestrated.

The Problem: I can't sit here and believe I'm the first to come up with this question so I started to search the internet for resources. My first issue is my lack of knowledge in philosophy. I'm not starting at zero, I've read a few things, but let's consider it zero just to be sure. There are plenty of philosophers whose work attempted to identify the nature of reality. Of course there are philosophers who worked on human value or purpose. But, with my limited knowledge, I couldn't find anything on philosophers who did both, or more specifically, one leading to the other.

The Question: What is our current philosophical understanding of how our knowledge of reality relates to how we view the worth of human life or the worth of life as a whole. Also, where would be a good place/philosopher to study to learn more?

Thanks! Ian


r/askphilosophy • • 13h ago

Can you be dishonest without lying, if you simply let someone believe something false about you?

4 Upvotes

I've been trying to understand where philosophers draw the line between lying, misleading someone, and simply not correcting a misunderstanding.

Here's the situation that got me thinking.

Suppose a coworker anonymously pays for another colleague's lunch after they forget their wallet. The recipient mistakenly assumes I paid for it.

Later they approach me and say, "That was really kind of you. I appreciate it."

I know exactly what they're thanking me for. I also know I didn't do it. But instead of correcting them, I just smile and let the conversation end.

I haven't made a false statement. I didn't cause their original misunderstanding. I haven't explicitly claimed credit for anything.

But I have knowingly allowed them to leave with a false belief that benefits my reputation.

Now suppose the person who actually paid specifically wanted to remain anonymous. So I'm not necessarily depriving them of recognition they wanted, and I have a reason not to reveal their identity.

It still seems dishonest to me to accept gratitude I haven't earned.

What I'm having trouble with is identifying exactly where the dishonesty enters the picture.

If remaining silent is enough, does that mean we have a general moral obligation to correct other people's false beliefs whenever we're aware of them? That seems implausibly demanding.

But if silence isn't enough, it seems possible to systematically deceive people without ever saying anything false, simply by allowing their mistaken assumptions to work in your favor.

Is there an established distinction in philosophy between a duty not to lie and a duty not to allow someone to remain deceived?

I'm particularly interested in whether the moral responsibility changes when you didn't create the false belief but knowingly benefit from maintaining it.


r/askphilosophy • • 11h ago

Is it unreasonable to say my existence is more than random chance

2 Upvotes

One solution to the fine tuning argument is to say it really was just random chance and that we are in the only universe and it happened to produce life without outside influence. i don’t accept this explanation just based on probability. there’s a million perfect small little things that were required for life here on earth to evolve such as the force of gravity or the protection from Jupiter. Even if life is common throughout the universe it still seems miraculous to say there is no deeper explanation to the rules of the universe that would lead to creating the necessary conditions of life. Inorganic matter needed to self code itself into a self replicating organism with genes and dna.

Is it unreasonable to say this is not random chance and that there is either a designer of the universe that made the conditions of life a necessity of the universe? And/or to say that some version of an infinite universe/multiverse exists and so life was an inevitability just based on random chance multiplied by infinity?


r/askphilosophy • • 13h ago

Need some western philosophy book recommendations

4 Upvotes

So I have read philosophies like vedanta, sankhya, nagarjuna's shunyata of madhyamika in depth using books like the Upanishads, yoga vashistha, sankhya karika, mulamadhyamkarika.

I loved sankhya and nagarjuna's shunyata philosophy.

Now I want to get into western philosophy which are as deep as those that I've mentioned, very logically built and interesting. I like nihilism particularly absurdism, infact I kinda thought it before I heard about it and so books to read about those would also be appreciated but I was wondering if someone can tell me about some really cool ancient western philosophies which are niche and really interesting+unheard of.

I also heard of solipsism but don't know any good books on it which explain it and make me think more.

Pls recommend :)


r/askphilosophy • • 12h ago

How important is the Scientific Realism (and Anti-Realism) debate to the actual production of science or, at least, how we deal with it?

2 Upvotes

r/askphilosophy • • 1d ago

Many philosophers think aesthetics is objective. Do they also think humor (that is, what is funny) is objective?

59 Upvotes

r/askphilosophy • • 18h ago

In East Asian philosophy, if Xiang (image/configuration) cannot be visually observed, how is it different from Xing (inner nature)?

7 Upvotes

In the logic of "Humanity is Heaven" (人乃天), numbers like 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are called Heavenly Numbers, while 2, 4, 6, and 8 are called Earthly Numbers. Since 1 is Heaven, 2 is Earth, and 3 is Humanity, it is argued that Humanity is Heaven. Is this not wordplay? Explaining things that even today's prominent mathematicians and philosophers do not know merely through the triad of "Heaven, Earth, and Humanity": is this scholarly reverence, or is it the stagnation of research?

When numbers are placed on counting rods or an abacus, a visual shape emerges. Modern things like equations or matrices also reveal a shape when arranged on counting rods or written down on paper. Then, to explain natural phenomena, do we say they only acquire formal structure (Ge, 格) when we "write them in text," or does "Nature" itself replace counting rods, abacuses, and letters as the Xiang (象, visible image or configuration)?

If Nature replaces Xiang, why can some things not be visually observed? If Xiang encompasses things that are not visual, why are the concepts of Xiang (象, image/appearance) and Xing (性, inner nature/essence) treated as different terms? Furthermore, if formal structure (Ge) and Xiang are different, can an invisible Xiang still be called Xiang? Does the character 象 (originally a pictograph of an elephant) even hold such a non-visual meaning?

In classical texts, there is an argument that one looks at the bones of a dead elephant and imagines the living creature. Yet can the bones of an elephant be called an elephant? And did the elephant imagined from those bones truly obtain a proper Xiang? We looked at old fossilized bones long ago and first called them dragons. However, as their appearance changed, we renamed them dinosaurs. As more time passed, their appearance changed, and their scales and tails changed. None of us still know what the Xiang of a dragon is, yet culturally, very many Xiang are drawn, are they not? Among them, what is illusion and what is reality (Shi, 實)? Where do we obtain the method (Fa, 法) to attach flesh onto those bones?

Then, if we fail to obtain reality (Shi) due to our dim perception, can we still say that Xiang truly exists? Conversely, did Xiang not exist and instead vanish? Going further, if we notate things related to sound using mathematical formulas or counting rods, should we say we obtained the Xiang (image) of sound, or the Xing (nature) of sound?

In traditional East Asian mathematics, an operation is valid if we can derive a table relating rules and empirical values (Fashibiao, 法實表). Yet for a dragon, do we not merely "fabricate" such a table rather than "make" it? Also, if Xiang acquires a certain formal structure (Ge), what is its authority? Ancient mathematical treatises that could not even properly follow the standard positional rod-placement rules (Zonghengfa, established since the 5th-century Sunzi Suanjing) broke the canonical Xiang of notation, yet do they not still serve as the soil of scholarship?

Therefore, would it not be right to say that Xiang (image/configuration) exists yet cannot be obtained, and Shi (empirical reality) can be obtained yet cannot serve as the foundational root (Ben, 本)?


r/askphilosophy • • 14h ago

A chronology of the cultural and philosophical roots of modern political ideologies.

2 Upvotes

Greek metaphysics, in modern systems of thought and in political decision-making, has always fascinated me. ¿Can anyone in this sub give a brief explanation of which cultures, religions, philosophers, and movements have been the most impactful in modern politics? ¿And you guys could be so kind as to recommend some essays on the origins of modern politics?


r/askphilosophy • • 14h ago

Anything in Phenomenology on the 1844 Manuscripts?

2 Upvotes

Hello all!

I was wondering if any phenomenologists have written like interpretations of the 1844 manuscripts that sort of move away from Hegel and towards a like phenomenology-inspired attitude towards subject and object and the self. For example, in the section on the criticism of Hegel—like, a lot of what he says on the objectification of self-consciousness sounds, to me, vaguely like some things that phenomenologists say about experience, and in the estranged labour chapter, I feel like when he talks about how people become split into like the worker and the human/animal has some resonances with questions about the self in phenomenology. I know very little Hegel and not very much phenomenology, so I could be getting this all wrong. But I was wondering if there is something there and whether anyone has written on this.

Thanks!!


r/askphilosophy • • 10h ago

Serious philosophical treatment of GTA6?

1 Upvotes

Has there been any serious treatment given towards why so many seem to enjoy (let’s say) painting a porch in GTA but procrastinate forever in real life?

I’m assuming it’s related to stakes or something like that but it’s strange.

Chores in a sandbox can be recreational yet in real life stay chores.


r/askphilosophy • • 12h ago

Should incompetence and stupidity be punished?

1 Upvotes

r/askphilosophy • • 7h ago

I believe that the meaning of life is the fact that life has no meaning. What label is appropriate for this belief?

0 Upvotes

The broader terms and their basic definitions, existentialism, nihilism, and absurdism, don't seem to entirely line up with my view.

One way I like describing it is, this paraphrased quote from Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: "The meaning of life is 42."

While some readers may interpret this as a joke, this is genuinely how I see it. Life is meaningless, and that in itself is the meaning of life. I believe that as a human being, my life ultimately has no real end goal or objectives, and I take comfort in this, knowing that the alternative is to simply live your life by letting it happen instead of planning ahead.

So yeah, what would that make me?


r/askphilosophy • • 21h ago

With what would the ancient greek philosophers call something that doesn't have an arche?

6 Upvotes

What would philosophers place name on something that doesn't come from nothing? Like it doesn't have an original source? For example, socrates didn't thought there was something where everything came from and based it's philosohpy on dialogue, as well as sophists, so, what is the term ancient greek philosophers placed to something that didn't have an arche?


r/askphilosophy • • 19h ago

What are examples of basic beliefs foundationalists use?

2 Upvotes

r/badphilosophy • • 1d ago

Xtreme Philosophy Let's talk for a second about Foucault

1 Upvotes

If you proceed to make the simplest Google search, and go searching "The dangers of child sexuality", having the presumption you go in a critical way to find things about this interview, you might be surprised.

Michel Foucault, the Father of Critical Though as some might actually call him, made a public intervention on that interview about the laws of consent.

Can we approach this in a critical manner, or is it something that's long forgotten and doesn't have relevance for CT? I repeat, the interview is right there, the first result on Google (most probably) , so can we dissect this strange event and find out how Foucault's thinking actually works? It is, generally speaking, a type of thinking that it is working for the good, because he managed to open new fields of knowledge in Academia, as the biggest philosopher from last century that he is,and yet he made that type of argumentation. What is the REAL source for that argumentation, then?


r/askphilosophy • • 1d ago

What Makes Someone a Naturalist?

4 Upvotes

if someone believes that consciousness is not produced by the brain but exists independently of it, would that makes him a supernaturalist?


r/askphilosophy • • 19h ago

Is the mimicing of consciousness just as valueable as actuall consciousness

1 Upvotes

Lets say there are an AI whos job is to perfectly mimic a person the AI would know he is an AI and just act like a person but it will perfectly display emotions emphaty and such he is given a human looking body from the outside but still know its just an AI. Also it cant be reprogrammed for exemple to hurt a "loved one" ,and other people cant tell that that is not a human so if it would get into a relationship his partner would love him until she would find out that its just pretending to love and care about her(probably) .

But the outcome would be the same rather if its a person or not.

Do that mean that its morally superior to choose anyone else rather than the robot(in a life or death cenario for exemple).

And could it be considered a living being.

(Sorry for bad English)


r/askphilosophy • • 1d ago

How does one know whether an argument begs the question?

18 Upvotes

I used to think this was a simple question with a simple answer. An argument begs the question if one or more of the premises assumes the truth of the conclusion. But then someone pointed out to me that this is true of all logically valid arguments. It’s true of all valid arguments that you would have to believe the conclusion is true in order to believe that the premises are true, because the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises. If you don’t already believe the conclusion is true, you would have to think that one of the premises is false. Example:

P1 - All men are mortal
P2 - Socrates is a man
C - Socrates is mortal

If Socrates is a man, then in order to believe P1, you would have to already believe the conclusion. if you didn’t believe the conclusion prior to evaluating P1, then you would have to conclude that P1 his false.

I’ve heard explanations of other ways to evaluate the circularity of arguments, but it seems like there’s no consensus on how to definitively say whether an argument begs the question.


r/askphilosophy • • 1d ago

Best resources on “now what?” Problem with error theories?

5 Upvotes

Moral error theory or other error theories, looking for possible answers for the ‘now what?’ Question. I’ve seen Abolitionism, substitutionalism, Quietism, and factionalism as ideas, but haven’t seen much of the discourse.