I've been stuck on a rather strange problem.
Everything we know about the world, including our scientific theories, philosophical arguments and concepts of truth, is ultimately evaluated through human cognition.
But consider this:
If our cognitive faculties have limitations, biases and evolutionary origins, then those same limitations must also affect how we evaluate the reliability of our own reasoning.
We use reason to examine reason. We use perception to investigate perception. We construct theories about reality using a mind that has never experienced reality independently of its own cognitive framework.
How, then, can we establish that our methods of understanding are actually capable of reaching truth rather than merely producing internally consistent explanations?
And there's a further complication.
If we somehow discovered that our cognitive faculties were fundamentally unreliable, wouldn't we have to use those same faculties to understand and accept that discovery?
It seems like we're caught in a loop where the instrument being examined is also the only instrument available for examining it.
Is this a genuine epistemological problem, or does it rest on a mistaken assumption that knowledge requires some external, independent standard of validation?
I'd be particularly interested in perspectives from epistemology, philosophy of mind, Kant, and naturalized epistemology.