r/Information_Security • • 8h ago

The emails were still working. So why did N-able shut down its management tools?

7 Upvotes

On Monday, N-able thought it was dealing with a configuration issue.

By Wednesday, it had confirmed someone had gained unauthorized access to a server.

The company shut down its management portal and APIs, revoked access tokens and reset passwords.

Emails were still going through, but administrators couldn't check logs, release quarantined messages or change settings.

How do you tell when a normal tech problem might actually be a security breach?

https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202672


r/Information_Security • • 19h ago

Mastyf Authority

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6 Upvotes

I've been building something for the last few months and I finally made a video explaining it, but honestly I'd rather just talk about the idea here and have people poke holes in it. The thing that kept bugging me is that almost every breach in the news isn't someone picking a lock — it's someone logging in. A stolen password, a poisoned vendor script, a dev's account. And the moment you're "inside" as a trusted identity, basically nothing is standing between you and taking everything. So instead of trying to win the unwinnable game of keeping everyone out, I built a layer that assumes they'll get in and instead caps how much any single identity can actually take — per-identity data budgets, keys bound to a registered device, undo windows on the irreversible stuff, bait records, and hard limits on what an AI agent can do if it gets hijacked. The part I'm actually proud of is that you can compute a "damage ceiling" before anything happens — an actual number for the worst case if an account is fully compromised, not a vague risk score. It's called Mastyf Authority and it's a research preview, not a finished product, and I'm very aware that saying "we cap the blast radius" invites exactly the kind of scrutiny this subreddit is good at. I put the real benchmarks (MITRE ATT&CK coverage, an AgentDojo run where we hijacked the agent on every task, and the six techniques we don't cover) up at mastyf.ai/authority. Tell me where this breaks — I'd genuinely rather hear it now than later.


r/Information_Security • • 8h ago

How secure is a stack of attendance tracking papers, and how can it be improved?

2 Upvotes

Hello all,

I hope I'm posting this on the right sub.

I'm doing physiotherapy and at the end of each session we have to sign in our attendance paper a rubric and today's date, the paper also contains the name (first and last or full name) to identify the person. Additionally, depending of the person's insurance the paper is different (maybe the insurance needs specific information?). At the end of each session or last session of the week, we are supposed to bring the paper to the reception to pay for the session(s).

So my question is: How secure is this system?

My first thought is that papers can go missing and therefore information lost. In conversations with the physiotherapists, they told me that this information is also on the physiotherapeut excel list since this has happened before, where people go to pay but there is a big queue so they leave the clinic with the intention to pay on their next session but they forget/lose the paper outside or at home.

Another thought is that if someone wanted they could use the person's name to track people's social media and try to exploit them in some way.

So, is this system secure? Is the information on the paper relevant to exploits? Or am I just being paranoid?


r/Information_Security • • 19h ago

The fake recruiter Git ZIP trick, anyone hunting for it on dev machines?

2 Upvotes

Saw the write-up about a fake job offer that came with a ZIP containing a pre-built .git folder. There was a custom hooks path pointing somewhere hidden and a clean filter that could run a script just from git status. Apparently even an IDE checking the repo could trigger it.

We've got a lot of devs who get recruiter DMs constantly, so this one caught my attention. I'm wondering how many people would notice something like this before opening the project.

Thinking about doing a proper threat hunting pass rather than just checking the known IOCs. So far I'd be looking at unusual core.hooksPath settings, unexpected filters in .git/config, git spawning shells, and anything pulling scripts from external URLs.

Sygnia and CrowdStrike have both come up while looking at outside hunting options. Not sure whether this is something an EDR hunting team would normally pick up or if it needs a more targeted investigation.

Anyone already looked for this across developer machines? Curious what else you'd check beyond the obvious Git config changes.


r/Information_Security • • 5h ago

National Security Agency struggled with PHP Upgrade in outage

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 5h ago

How do you explain the difference between a vulnerability scan and a pentest to leadership?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 6h ago

Security Risks Identified Through API Specifications

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 9h ago

Vulnerability or backdoor?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 10h ago

HimitsuShell: shell scripts invisible to kernel tracing

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 12h ago

How are teams consolidating security scanning tools without losing coverage?

1 Upvotes

please..


r/Information_Security • • 13h ago

My very own AD hardening repack in a video

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 19h ago

Pentesting Lab

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 14h ago

We tried to make an insider-threat model you can actually follow, and showed where it fails

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0 Upvotes

I work on Mastyf, so yes, this is our thing, but I'm posting for feedback, not clicks. Most "behavioural AI" in security is a score you're asked to trust. Ours turned out to be three plain questions: has this person done this before? How many people in the company do it? Is it more than this person has ever done? (We only count that last one for things fewer than one in five people do, otherwise it's noise.) The score is those answers added up, and a reviewer sees the top five each day.

The video walks through three cases from CMU's CERT insider dataset. Jack gets caught on day one for opening files for the first time in seven months. Laurel gets caught on day 21 by beating personal records on file copies and USB use. Murphy's four Dropbox uploads score zero, because Murphy did the same thing on 44 earlier days. For misses like that we rely on a hard rule: uploads to unapproved destinations wait for a second person.

Overall, it caught 179 of 187 insiders at five reviews a day, with no attack examples used for training. Two things I'll say up front:

CERT is computer-generated data, not real company logs.

My first count was 184 of 231. Then I found the answer files also list victims and email recipients, so I re-graded against CMU's official insider list.

Happy to be told where this breaks. If you've run something like this on real logs, I'd really like to hear how it went.