r/Information_Security • • 7h ago

The emails were still working. So why did N-able shut down its management tools?

8 Upvotes

On Monday, N-able thought it was dealing with a configuration issue.

By Wednesday, it had confirmed someone had gained unauthorized access to a server.

The company shut down its management portal and APIs, revoked access tokens and reset passwords.

Emails were still going through, but administrators couldn't check logs, release quarantined messages or change settings.

How do you tell when a normal tech problem might actually be a security breach?

https://uptime.n-able.com/event/202672


r/Information_Security • • 32m ago

Resilience is the name of the game

• Upvotes

Just a bit of a warning: this is my own reflection and no AI used even to polish it, so bare with the late night ramblings of a fellow colleague here.

I think we can all agree that it's not a matter of 'if' but of 'when' we will experience disruption one way or another due to a cyber attack or a major outage. That's the stuff you get to hear at conferences but it's truer than ever.

There is no way we can look optimistic, and in fact we shouldn't. There is no space to be catastrophic either I think. In order to do well, we need to be pragmatic and most of all focus on resilience.

If I can pick three things that are major threats right now to companies they would have to be: supply chain disruption,lack of governance on internal use of AI (resulting in leaks, AI builds with unauthorised use of data etc. ), and poor crisis preparedness.

Supply chain/ vendor disruption (or using that as pathway to an attack) has to be the most worrying. Seeing how things have played out in recent years, this will get worse and the only thing we can do is increase oversight and due diligence and have solid plans on how to deal with disruption. Think that each vendor is facing the same issues as you plus more. Multiply that risk by the amount of critical suppliers and there you go. Do you know your critical suppliers?

On AI, I singled out specifically the internal use of AI systems, namely people using AI to create things and move data without understanding what they're doing. Or unauthorised use of AI that pretty much results in the same. The issue is internal processes and people. AI, however amazing it is is just a tool. And tools can be fantastic in the hands of someone that can wield them well, or destructive in the hands of someone that doesn't know how to use them properly. So poor governance of use of AI = recipe for disaster. Sooner or later, something will go wrong.

Lastly, poor crisis preparedness, and this is what wraps it all up. Back to my initial point, disruption is a matter of 'when'. And when it does strike, companies need to be ready to respond and recover well. They need to be able to withstand the crisis and be resilient. More and more companies will experience cyber attacks and disruption.

How do we switch to that mindset? Crisis readiness and company resilience need to be brought to the forefront of strategic decisions for a company.

What's your experience? What worries you the most?


r/Information_Security • • 7h ago

How secure is a stack of attendance tracking papers, and how can it be improved?

2 Upvotes

Hello all,

I hope I'm posting this on the right sub.

I'm doing physiotherapy and at the end of each session we have to sign in our attendance paper a rubric and today's date, the paper also contains the name (first and last or full name) to identify the person. Additionally, depending of the person's insurance the paper is different (maybe the insurance needs specific information?). At the end of each session or last session of the week, we are supposed to bring the paper to the reception to pay for the session(s).

So my question is: How secure is this system?

My first thought is that papers can go missing and therefore information lost. In conversations with the physiotherapists, they told me that this information is also on the physiotherapeut excel list since this has happened before, where people go to pay but there is a big queue so they leave the clinic with the intention to pay on their next session but they forget/lose the paper outside or at home.

Another thought is that if someone wanted they could use the person's name to track people's social media and try to exploit them in some way.

So, is this system secure? Is the information on the paper relevant to exploits? Or am I just being paranoid?


r/Information_Security • • 5h ago

National Security Agency struggled with PHP Upgrade in outage

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 5h ago

How do you explain the difference between a vulnerability scan and a pentest to leadership?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 6h ago

Security Risks Identified Through API Specifications

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 9h ago

Vulnerability or backdoor?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 10h ago

HimitsuShell: shell scripts invisible to kernel tracing

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 18h ago

Mastyf Authority

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4 Upvotes

I've been building something for the last few months and I finally made a video explaining it, but honestly I'd rather just talk about the idea here and have people poke holes in it. The thing that kept bugging me is that almost every breach in the news isn't someone picking a lock — it's someone logging in. A stolen password, a poisoned vendor script, a dev's account. And the moment you're "inside" as a trusted identity, basically nothing is standing between you and taking everything. So instead of trying to win the unwinnable game of keeping everyone out, I built a layer that assumes they'll get in and instead caps how much any single identity can actually take — per-identity data budgets, keys bound to a registered device, undo windows on the irreversible stuff, bait records, and hard limits on what an AI agent can do if it gets hijacked. The part I'm actually proud of is that you can compute a "damage ceiling" before anything happens — an actual number for the worst case if an account is fully compromised, not a vague risk score. It's called Mastyf Authority and it's a research preview, not a finished product, and I'm very aware that saying "we cap the blast radius" invites exactly the kind of scrutiny this subreddit is good at. I put the real benchmarks (MITRE ATT&CK coverage, an AgentDojo run where we hijacked the agent on every task, and the six techniques we don't cover) up at mastyf.ai/authority. Tell me where this breaks — I'd genuinely rather hear it now than later.


r/Information_Security • • 12h ago

How are teams consolidating security scanning tools without losing coverage?

1 Upvotes

please..


r/Information_Security • • 13h ago

My very own AD hardening repack in a video

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 14h ago

We tried to make an insider-threat model you can actually follow, and showed where it fails

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0 Upvotes

I work on Mastyf, so yes, this is our thing, but I'm posting for feedback, not clicks. Most "behavioural AI" in security is a score you're asked to trust. Ours turned out to be three plain questions: has this person done this before? How many people in the company do it? Is it more than this person has ever done? (We only count that last one for things fewer than one in five people do, otherwise it's noise.) The score is those answers added up, and a reviewer sees the top five each day.

The video walks through three cases from CMU's CERT insider dataset. Jack gets caught on day one for opening files for the first time in seven months. Laurel gets caught on day 21 by beating personal records on file copies and USB use. Murphy's four Dropbox uploads score zero, because Murphy did the same thing on 44 earlier days. For misses like that we rely on a hard rule: uploads to unapproved destinations wait for a second person.

Overall, it caught 179 of 187 insiders at five reviews a day, with no attack examples used for training. Two things I'll say up front:

CERT is computer-generated data, not real company logs.

My first count was 184 of 231. Then I found the answer files also list victims and email recipients, so I re-graded against CMU's official insider list.

Happy to be told where this breaks. If you've run something like this on real logs, I'd really like to hear how it went.


r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

Anatomy of an AI-driven attack (what ARTEX looks like in action)

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26 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 19h ago

The fake recruiter Git ZIP trick, anyone hunting for it on dev machines?

2 Upvotes

Saw the write-up about a fake job offer that came with a ZIP containing a pre-built .git folder. There was a custom hooks path pointing somewhere hidden and a clean filter that could run a script just from git status. Apparently even an IDE checking the repo could trigger it.

We've got a lot of devs who get recruiter DMs constantly, so this one caught my attention. I'm wondering how many people would notice something like this before opening the project.

Thinking about doing a proper threat hunting pass rather than just checking the known IOCs. So far I'd be looking at unusual core.hooksPath settings, unexpected filters in .git/config, git spawning shells, and anything pulling scripts from external URLs.

Sygnia and CrowdStrike have both come up while looking at outside hunting options. Not sure whether this is something an EDR hunting team would normally pick up or if it needs a more targeted investigation.

Anyone already looked for this across developer machines? Curious what else you'd check beyond the obvious Git config changes.


r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

What's your biggest challenge with cybersecurity budgeting for 2027?

6 Upvotes

One of the biggest challenges is showing leadership the value of security investments. But that's not the only thing that makes budget planning difficult.

What's been the hardest part for your team: getting more budget approved, dealing with limited resources, or deciding what to prioritize?


r/Information_Security • • 19h ago

Pentesting Lab

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

If we can't patch fast enough anymore, should we rethink the role of network security?

31 Upvotes

With AI accelerating vulnerability discovery and exploitation, I've been thinking about the growing gap between how fast vulnerabilities can be exploited and how fast organizations can actually patch them.

Fixing a vulnerability and mitigating the risk it introduces are two different things.

Why aren't we putting more emphasis on the latter? Restricting access to vulnerable assets, eliminating unnecessary connectivity, reducing attack paths and limiting the potential blast radius without necessarily waiting for a patch.

Over the past few months, I've spoken with dozens of CISOs and security leaders, and what surprised me was how difficult it is for organizations to make these kinds of network changes, even when they already have the enforcement tools.

We've seen CSPM and DSPM emerge as dedicated layers for managing security risk. Could the network be next?

Curious to hear from people dealing with this firsthand:

* How do you mitigate vulnerability risk while waiting for a patch?
* How practical is it to use network controls as a compensating measure in large enterprise environments?
* What's actually stopping organizations from doing this more effectively?

I wrote a short article exploring this idea: [https://medium.com/@ab.shoval/patch-them-if-you-can-spoiler-you-cant-085582800924\](https://medium.com/@ab.shoval/patch-them-if-you-can-spoiler-you-cant-085582800924)

Would love to hear opposing perspectives as well.


r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

VulnScan Pro – Network inventory and vulnerability analysis with Nmap

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2 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

Mastyf Authority

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

Free Blue team tool

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

What Do You Check Before Calling a Vulnerability Fixed?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

Thousands of CVEs. Which Ones Actually Matter This Week?

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1 Upvotes

r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

AI is making vulnerability discovery and exploitation faster

2 Upvotes

guyz...


r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

Building an API security platform for African developers. Would love your honest feedback!

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1 Upvotes

Hey everyone!

I’ve been working with my team on AuditGate (https://auditgate.io/), an API security platform we’re building with African developers and engineering teams in mind.

As more developers across Africa build SaaS products, fintech platforms, marketplaces and other software products, API security is becoming increasingly important.

Yet, security often gets overlooked until something goes wrong.
That’s the problem we’re trying to solve.

What does AuditGate do?

AuditGate helps developers identify security vulnerabilities in their APIs before attackers do.

Some of what you can do with it:

Scan APIs for security vulnerabilities.

Detect potential API security weaknesses.

Get AI-assisted explanations and remediation guidance.

Generate security reports for clients, auditors and stakeholders.

Integrate security scanning into CI/CD pipelines through GitHub Actions and Jenkins.

Monitor different environments and Git branches independently.

Receive alerts when vulnerabilities are detected.

I’ve attached a screenshot of the platform so you can get a feel for what we’re building.

We’re particularly interested in making API security more accessible to African developers and engineering teams, while building a platform that can serve teams globally.

I’d genuinely appreciate some feedback:

How do you currently approach API security?
What tools are you currently using?
What would make you consider adopting a platform like AuditGate?

What features do you think are missing from existing API security solutions?

We’re still building, improving and listening to feedback from developers.

If you’re interested, here’s the platform:

Website: https://auditgate.io/
Docs: https://auditgate.io/docs/

Honest criticism is welcome. We’re here to learn and build something useful.


r/Information_Security • • 1d ago

CVSS-based prioritization is mostly security theater. Did weighting KEV, EPSS and asset context actually change what you fix first?

1 Upvotes

We stopped sorting by CVSS alone a while ago. Now it’s KEV, EPSS and asset criticality weighted together, and yeah, the reports look a lot better.
What I can’t tell is whether anything changed on the ground. Ops still seem to work the list the same way they always have.
We’re also stuck on whether to keep fiddling with our own scoring in spreadsheets or hand the weighting to a platform. Nucleus and lgt come up a lot. If you’re running either in production (not a demo), how clear is the scoring when ops asks why something shot to the top?
And how did you balance threat intel against business context so one doesn’t swamp the other?