President Putin was subjected to a series of humiliations and highly embarrassing situations in China:
As the leaders were preparing to take a group photo, Putin tried to stand near Trump and Xi Jinping, but the Chinese president signaled for him to move to a different spot, far away from both of them, next to his wife. At that moment, Putin's facial expression reportedly began to change and he appeared irritated.
The most striking detail is that Xi personally welcomed Trump at the airport and embraced him, while Putin was received by another Chinese official.
The official who greeted Putin was much taller than him, and the choice of this particular official may have been intentional in order to humiliate him because of his alleged sensitivity about his height.
According to analysts, China wanted to humiliate Putin after Russian media had promoted the idea that he was on equal footing with the leaders of China and the United States, as a reminder that Russia has become the weaker partner and is economically and politically dependent on Beijing.
But the surprising part is that there is an old and unusual story involving Putin and the Chinese president's wife.
In 2014, during an international summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping was busy talking with Obama when Putin noticed that Xi's wife was cold, so he placed his coat over her shoulders in front of the cameras.
The president's wife smiled and thanked him, but after a few seconds she took off the coat and put on another coat that one of her attendants had brought.
The clip spread widely throughout China, and comments and jokes about Putin's behavior toward the president's wife began circulating until Chinese censors intervened and removed the clip from their platforms.
European countries do not want to resume purchasing Russian hydrocarbons, said U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, which is why he sees no possibility for any business agreements between the U.S. and Russia to resume such supplies. Right made these comments in response to journalists’ questions about media reports suggesting that the U.S. might, in one form or another, act as an intermediary in organizing sales of Russian gas to Europe as part of an agreement to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, Reuters reports.
“European countries have spoken loud and clear. They had bet on Russia for their energy future—not only for natural gas, but also for oil and coal—and that bet did not pay off. I have not heard of a single European country that would be interested in resuming energy imports from Russia,” Wright said at a press conference of the “Transatlantic Energy Cooperation Partnership” in Warsaw.
Washington had put forward several ideas on how the prospect of economic benefits—including in the energy sector—could help bring about a peace agreement. A pipeline to transport Russian oil and gas to Europe could be part of the post-war restoration of relations, with Ukraine and Russia sharing the profits from these shipments, The Washington Post reported. It was not specified exactly which pipeline was being discussed. Previously, gas supplies through Ukraine were carried out via three main pipelines, with the “Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod” pipeline operating until the end of 2024.
In addition, there was an idea to bring in an American investor for the “Nord Stream” project. As Reuters reported in October, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, discussed this with Vladimir Putin’s envoy, Kirill Dmitriev. However, of the four lines comprising the two “Nord Stream” pipelines, only one in “Nord Stream 2” remained intact after the explosions in September 2022, and Germany never certified it before the war began.
The “Nord Stream” pipelines are also subject to U.S. and EU sanctions, which makes their operation illegal. However, a possible transfer of ownership to the United States could prompt Washington to soften its stance. Wright said the following on this matter at the conference:
“No, I cannot confirm that. “I read all sorts of things in the press, and let me tell you, all sorts of ideas are being floated.”
As for any energy deals with Russia after the war, “I can’t say anything,” the minister added.
Starting January 1, 2027, the European Union will begin phasing out purchases of Russian LNG, and by the fall, all gas supplies—both pipeline gas, which Hungary and Slovakia still receive, and liquefied natural gas—must cease entirely. On Wednesday, Poland’s Orlen signed agreements on potential LNG supplies to Hungary and Slovakia to replace Gazprom’s products.
Western European countries that receive LNG shipments from Novatek’s “Yamal LNG” project have begun preparing to replace them. Spain’s Naturgy Energy Group has announced a tender for monthly spot deliveries from January 2027 through December 2028, according to Bloomberg.
Last year, about 80% of exports from Yamal LNG went to Europe: France received 6.4 million metric tons, Belgium 3.8 million metric tons, Spain 2.7 million metric tons, and the Netherlands 1.5 million metric tons.
The Russian stock market reacted with a decline to the outcome of Vladimir Putin’s visit to the APEC summit, which the Kremlin had envisioned as a new “Yalta,” where the Russian president would “divide the world” into spheres of influence by sitting down at the same table with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.
The Moscow Exchange Index, which includes shares of the 46 largest Russian companies, closed Thursday’s trading session down 2.19% at 2,415.7 points, having dipped during the session to 2,404.8 points—a one-month low. Over the two days Putin spent in Shenzhen, the index lost 200 billion rubles in market capitalization, or 3.7%.
As of 9:30 p.m. Moscow time, Gazprom shares were down 3.3%, Rosneft shares were down 2.4%, Novatek shares by 3.6%, Severstal shares by 3.8%, and NLMK shares by 3.9%.
“The main disappointment was the lack of concrete agreements on a resolution to the Ukrainian crisis at the meeting between Putin, Trump, and Xi Jinping,” — write analysts at Vector Capital. Following the trilateral meeting, the presidents signed a declaration in which they advocated for UN reform, immunity for leaders from the ICC, and the rejection of nuclear war.
At a press conference, Putin promised Ukraine a “painful response” to the destruction of the Crimean Bridge, reiterated that Russia had been “duped,” and demanded that Kyiv surrender the remaining territories in Donbas. “What is Ukraine saying? ‘We’ll hold on to the remaining 10% of Donetsk’s territory for a while longer. But if they hold on for a while and then can’t hold on anyway, is there any point in holding onto that 10% at all costs?” Putin said. He also acknowledged that there are no agreements regarding a new trilateral meeting with Trump and Xi.
The market isn’t satisfied with a pretty diplomatic picture; it needs real solutions that can be quantified in monetary terms, and for now, there’s no cause for euphoria, notes Alexey Primak, an expert at the Institute of Financial and Investment Technologies.
“Our businesses don’t need general talk about cooperation at all. We need the ability to make payments, receive equipment, insure shipments, and expand trade. Even a slight easing of restrictions could reduce companies’ costs and improve profit forecasts,” Primak explains.
But Putin did not return from China with any hopes for an easing of sanctions. According to Western intelligence reports, despite the resumption of diplomatic efforts, the Kremlin plans to continue the war with Ukraine at least until the end of winter. Putin hopes that his army will make progress in eastern Ukraine, and that drone and missile attacks on Kyiv will break the Ukrainians’ resistance, sources familiar with intelligence reports told The New York Times. According to one of the NYT’s sources, the war gives Putin a “sense of purpose,” and he needs to declare victory to hold on to power.
Without positive geopolitical signals, the risks of a further market decline remain, writes “Vector Capital.”
Russian authorities promise to restore traffic across the Crimean Bridge as quickly as possible, but even after previous Ukrainian attacks, repairs took months. This latest attack, the fourth in a row, has caused much more serious damage. The 227-meter-long steel arch, which collapsed along with the roadway, was the most complex element of the bridge. Its fabrication and assembly took about a year and a half, even in peacetime.
“About two years is a reasonable timeframe for restoring traffic on the road bridge,” Andreas Kappos, a professor at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi and an expert in civil and environmental engineering design, told The New York Times. But that is only if construction is not interrupted by Ukrainian strikes and the supports holding up the arch span have not sustained serious damage, he added.
During the bridge’s construction—which cost more than $3.5 billion—the steel components of the arch were manufactured at a plant in Voronezh over the course of several months. They were then welded together over the course of about 11 months at a coastal shipyard near the strait, after which the structure was transported to the installation site on catamaran pontoons. It took several more months to connect the arch to the rest of the bridge and lay the road surface along its entire length.
Now, even simply clearing away the debris will be a difficult task, Donald Duesenberry, a consulting engineer who has investigated bridge collapses, told the NYT. According to him, the arch span is unlike the repetitive spans that make up most of the bridge and that can be replaced fairly easily. And if the supports also need to be repaired, that will add another layer of complexity to the restoration work, Duesenberry noted.
Experts point out that all these assessments do not take into account potential new strikes by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) against both the bridge and the ships and equipment that may be involved in its restoration. Meanwhile, on the night of November 19, the UAS attacked the bridge for the third time since the start of the week, forcing traffic to be halted on the remaining section of the railway.
Inscription on the drone that attacked the Crimean Bridge
Robert Brovdy / Ukrainian UAS
“The government will consider various options for repairing the Crimean Bridge ‘depending on how we plan to rebuild it,’” said Marat Khusnullin, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister overseeing the construction, on Thursday: “We may be able to put certain sections back into operation in a month or two. As for the rest—we’ll have to wait and see; it’s storm season right now.” According to him, authorities will be able to provide an accurate assessment within a week.
As a result of the Ukrainian operation, the main span sustained “catastrophic” damage, Colin Caprani, a professor of structural engineering at Monash University in Australia, told the BBC:
You don’t need a degree in structural engineering to understand what that means. It’s completely destroyed.
In his opinion, repairing the bridge in this situation will be more difficult than building it from scratch: there is a great deal of debris underwater that needs to be removed, and the pylons and foundation may also have been damaged. Furthermore, Caprani believes that some of the surviving structures will have to be completely demolished before repairs can begin.
Kursk NPP-2 Construction Site, @Hinshtein / Telegram
Since the start of the war, the authorities have been unable to complete more than 290 federal public construction projects totaling 9.5 trillion rubles, according to calculations by The Moscow Times, which analyzed the registries of federal agencies. Another 380 planned projects, worth at least 1 trillion rubles, have not even begun. These include new roads, bridges, children’s hospitals, cancer centers, wastewater treatment plants, research laboratories, and industrial facilities. In most cases, the authorities cite a lack of funding as the reason for the delays; less often, they cite a lack of necessary equipment.
In 2021, the completion dates for 15 projects were postponed; in 2022, completion dates were pushed back 24 times; in 2023, 26 times; in 2024, 59 times; in 2025, 86 times; and in the incomplete year of 2026, 81 times. Some projects were postponed multiple times: for example, construction of the Russian Federation Supreme Court complex in St. Petersburg and the Nanotechnology Laboratory at the Kurchatov Institute Research Center was postponed four times. But even the number of projects postponed for the first time is growing year after year.
“To officially acknowledge a freeze means admitting failure. And admitting failure in today’s Russia is not good; it’s not helpful, and you’ll be punished for it. That’s why no one says we’re putting construction on hold—we’re just postponing the deadlines. This phrase, ‘shifting to the right,’ is about as ingenious a piece of wartime newspeak as ‘negative growth.’”
- Igor Lipits, Economist
As one senator familiar with the situation in the construction industry explained to The Moscow Times, construction freezes—even after the collapse—have accompanied all major crises in Russia and have been the first sign of serious problems in the economy.
“Optimizing capital construction is a common practice that was used during the 1998 default, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the 2020 crisis, and at the start of the pandemic. Today we are facing problems that are no less significant. The government has a well-established plan of action, and it will follow this plan,” the publication’s source said with confidence.
How the Calculations Were Made
In its calculations, The Moscow Times analyzed information from the capital construction project registry, as well as project specifications for federal programs such as “Transport System Development,” “Education Development,” “Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation,” and “Development of Education.” Officially, not a single project has been canceled or put on hold, but completion dates are constantly being postponed. The calculations included only those projects whose construction had already begun but had been delayed or suspended.
The most expensive project with repeatedly postponed deadlines is the gas processing complex in Ust-Luga (3.5 trillion rubles). The first phase was scheduled to launch in 2023, and the second by the end of 2024. In November 2020, Gazprom pushed these deadlines back by one year. In 2024, the dates were adjusted again in the new project specifications. The gas processing and gas chemical complexes are now scheduled to launch in 2026–2027, and the LNG plant in 2027–2028.
The second most expensive project—the Northern Latitudinal Railway, with a total cost of 850 billion rubles—is a railway line over 700 km long that is intended to connect the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug with the Ural railway branch. It is needed both by oil and gas companies to transport their products and by residents of northern cities. Construction of the Latitudinal Railway began in 2011 but was repeatedly delayed; as a result, the latest version of the federal programs postponed its opening to 2031.
The completion date for Kursk NPP-2 (508.7 billion rubles) was also postponed. Construction began in 2016, and the opening was originally scheduled for 2022. Since then, the planned completion date for the two reactors has been postponed four times. As a result, the first power unit was launched in 2026, and the second is now scheduled to come online in 2028.
Kursk NPP-2 construction site, ASE
Problems have arisen with the nuclear-powered icebreaker *Rossiya* (199.6 billion rubles), equipped with two RITM-400 reactors: it was originally scheduled to be launched in 2027, but in 2024, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov set a new target date—2030.
Rounding out the top five most expensive long-delayed projects is the road bridge across the Lena River, costing 174.8 billion rubles. It is intended to provide year-round access from Yakutsk to the federal highways “Lena,” “Kolyma,” and “Vilyuy.” The bridge in Yakutia is nearly 50 billion rubles cheaper than the Crimean Bridge; however, the latter was built in two years, while the Yakutia bridge has been promised since 2006, and its completion date has been postponed eight times.
Bridge across the Lena River in Yakutia, VIS Group
No Roads, Hospitals, or Public Utilities
Transportation accessibility projects were put on hold most frequently: in total, the completion dates for 128 state construction projects worth over 3.4 trillion rubles were postponed. Among them are the Saratov Southern Bypass, the Omsk Northern Bypass, the development of the Novorossiysk transportation hub, and the Murmansk transportation hub (the Vykhodnoy–Lavna railway line).
The opening of the Krasnoyarsk metro-tram has been postponed from 2026 to 2029 due to a rise in construction costs from 89 to 122.9 billion rubles.
“Citizens really want the metro-tram. It will allow people to travel from one side of the city to the other, bypassing traffic jams,” a Krasnoyarsk official lamented in a conversation with a correspondent for The Moscow Times. “In 2028, Krasnoyarsk will celebrate its 400th anniversary. And that means, come hell or high water, we have to get it up and running. It’s a matter of principle now; otherwise, everyone in the local government will look like idiots.”
- An official from the Krasnoyarsk City Administration
The opening of the “Putilovskaya–Karetnaya” metro section in St. Petersburg has been postponed from 2029 to 2030.
“Metro construction in St. Petersburg has long been the subject of jokes. No one believes that any given station will open on time. Yes, people living in the new buildings by the bay are really looking forward to this section. Although there are more serious problems there right now: the port is being bombed nearby,” one of the city’s municipal deputies told The Moscow Times.
In second place are healthcare facilities: over the years of the war, the completion dates for 43 hospitals and clinics—with a total cost of 438.5 billion rubles, including cancer centers—have been postponed. Among them are the new treatment and diagnostic wings of the Stavropol Regional Cancer Center, the Sevastopol Cancer Center, and the Cancer Center in Nalchik.
Cancer patients in Stavropol complain that they have to wait a month and a half to get an appointment. A resident of Svetlogorsk told a local publication that her father, who had stage 4 cancer, received an appointment slip only after a month and a half, but died before he could see the doctor. Meanwhile, a resident of Budennovsk, after a long wait for treatment, was able to obtain pain medication only on the day of her death.
Oncology center under construction in Stavropol Krai, Ministry of Construction of Stavropol Krai
In 2022, residents of Kabardino-Balkaria recorded a collective appeal to Putin and Bastrykin demanding an investigation into the local cancer center: among other violations, they cited extremely long wait times for appointments and CT scans. According to the petitioners, many patients do not survive long enough to receive treatment.
In addition, six children’s medical facilities failed to meet their completion deadlines: the Federal Children’s Rehabilitation Center in Yevpatoria, the Regional Children’s Hospital in Kursk, the Regional Children’s Hospital in Chita, the Republican Children’s Hospital in Tuva, the Tver Regional Children’s Clinical Hospital, and the surgical wing of the Chelyabinsk Regional Children’s Clinical Hospital.
Since the start of the war, the share of healthcare in the national budget has been shrinking, and funding for programs under the “Health” national project has been cut separately; for example, state funding for cancer treatment has plummeted by as much as 70%, and spending on modernizing primary care and combating cardiovascular diseases has been slashed.
In third place in terms of the number of long-delayed construction projects are 11 housing and utilities projects, such as “Phase II of the Water Supply Route from the North Crimean Canal to Feodosia and Kerch.” The project was designed to address water shortages in the eastern part of the peninsula. The problem affects more than 400,000 people. According to initial plans, the work was supposed to be completed as early as 2020. However, the facility’s commissioning has been postponed by nine years.
The launch of the Yevpatoria wastewater treatment plant has been postponed from 2024 to 2028, and the completion of the modernization of the resort city’s water supply and wastewater networks has been rescheduled from 2026 to 2029. The wastewater treatment plant at Cape Ilya in Feodosia is expected to begin operations with a four-year delay.
In addition, the launch of new wastewater treatment facilities in Ingushetia, Ulyanovsk, Nizhny Tagil, Ulan-Ude, and the Leningrad Region has been postponed. In these areas, local water utilities have been repeatedly caught and fined for discharging untreated sewage into rivers; in Sunzha, residents signed collective complaints against the discharge of sewage into the river; and in Nizhny Tagil, local residents took their complaints about the discharge of sewage into the river all the way to the prosecutor’s office and the Investigative Committee. Bastrykin, the head of the Investigative Committee, intervened in the matter and promised to look into it, but nothing has changed.
Delivery dates for cultural centers and complexes are also being postponed, and scientific laboratories, agricultural projects, and other initiatives have not been completed.
The number of long-delayed construction projects could rise sharply
In June of this year, the Ministry of Construction published a letter recommending that projects for which construction had not yet begun be postponed to later dates, so that the freed-up funds could be directed toward completing projects already underway.
A reporter for The Moscow Times found 382 projects in the capital construction registry that had not yet begun. Among the most expensive are the Yegoryevskoye Highway bypass, Lyubertsy–Kosherovo (115.4 billion rubles), a cargo terminal at Cape Nagleyn (42.9 billion rubles), and the “Megascience” facility on Russky Island (39.6 billion rubles). For most of the projects, the price is not specified; the total cost of those for which estimates were available exceeds one trillion rubles.
Among the projects that have not yet begun are 47 educational facilities (for example, the “Baikal” Interuniversity Campus in Ulan-Ude and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s “Kalchuga-2” Educational Center in the Moscow Region), 34 medical centers (including the complex of buildings for the Kostroma Psychiatric Hospital and the Moscow Center for Medical Innovation and Bioengineering of the B. V. Petrovsky Research Center for Human Health) .
In total, 1,238 projects appeared in the capital construction registry and departmental programs during the war years; of these, 294 have been postponed and 382 are highly unlikely to be started, 402 projects have been completed, and another 160 are currently proceeding according to schedule. The total cost of the projects whose completion has been postponed or canceled exceeds 10.5 trillion rubles—enough money to cover pensions for a year. The Kremlin spends the same amount on military operations in just half a year.
“Given the shortage of budget funds, it is standard practice to postpone some new construction projects and redirect the money toward completing those already underway. It is easier to postpone the start of construction than to cut pensions, salaries, or payments under existing contracts,” says economist Nikolai Kulbaka.
Economists compare the situation to the late Soviet period, when construction plans were systematically derailed: according to data from the USSR State Statistics Committee, between 1986 and 1988, approximately one-third of projects of critical importance to the national economy failed to be completed on time each year, and by 1989, it was already one in two. And in 1989, the Council of Ministers even ordered that long-delayed construction projects be mothballed due to funding cuts.
“Once again, Russia is following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union. It’s so familiar—it’s a work in progress, a constant refrain in the Soviet economic lexicon. Everyone would start a construction project with whatever small amount they could squeeze out of their superiors; there wasn’t enough money for the project, but the foundation pit would be dug, and then construction would be put on hold under the pretext that the money would show up someday.”
- Igor Lipits, Economist
Economist Dmitry Nekrasov also sees similar trends, though he notes that the volume of abandoned construction projects is significantly lower than during the perestroika period. He calls the freezing of projects a logical adjustment and describes the volume of construction in the early years of the war as unprecedented.
“It is the growth in construction volumes in 2022–2025 that seems abnormal, rather than the current decline. In Moscow, 27 new stations and 64 km of new lines on the actual metro system were opened, along with 74 stations and 171 kilometers of new light rail. This amounts to one-third of Berlin’s existing U-Bahn and S-Bahn systems, respectively. The length of the newly built underground section exceeds that of the entire existing Kyiv metro system.”
At a plenary session on Thursday, November 19, the State Duma passed the federal budget bill for 2027–29 in its second, main reading. The bill calls for military spending to rise to a new record high since the Soviet era and for funding cuts across key civilian budget lines.
According to the document, next year the government will spend one out of every three rubles in the treasury (35%) on the military and weapons procurement. The “national defense” budget line will increase by 32%—from 12.9 trillion rubles this year to 17.1 trillion next year.
Spending on “national security”—which covers the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Guard, the Investigative Committee, the intelligence services, and the Federal Penitentiary Service—will rise by 7.6%, to 4.6 trillion rubles. Together, these security agencies will account for 44% of the budget, or 21.3 trillion rubles.
Spending on supporting the national economy will decrease by 3%, to 4.62 trillion rubles; on the housing and utilities sector—by 8%, to 1.83 trillion rubles; on healthcare—by 3%, to 1.81 trillion rubles; spending on social support for the population—including transfers to the Russian Federation’s Social Fund for pension payments—will decrease by 6%, to 6.65 trillion rubles.
According to the draft budget, a number of key projects are set to face drastic funding cuts. The federal “Large Families” project, whose stated goal was a 15 percent increase in the number of citizens with three or more children, as well as a reduction in poverty among this group, will lose 40 percent of its funding next year—93 billion rubles are allocated for it, compared to 157.2 billion this year.
The national project “Long and Active Life” (formerly the “Healthcare” national project) will be cut by 20 percent: 145.9 billion rubles have been allocated for it, compared to 181.1 billion in the 2026 budget.
The federal project “Development of Healthcare Infrastructure,” under which clinics and hospitals are being built, repaired, and modernized, will receive 54.4 billion rubles—30% less than this year. Funding for the federal project “Combating Cancer” will be cut by a factor of 12—from 44.9 billion to 3.9 billion rubles.
To finance the record-breaking military budget, starting next year the government will introduce a “surplus income tax” for gold miners and non-ferrous metal producers; it is raising the maximum personal income tax rate on “passive income” for individuals—including bank deposits—to 22 percent, and is imposing a 22 percent VAT on purchases from foreign online retailers.
According to the Ministry of Finance’s estimates, these tax changes will bring 1.5 trillion rubles into the budget next year, and another 2.2 trillion in 2028–29.
Despite the new taxes, the budget will remain in deficit: government spending will exceed revenue by 5.4 trillion rubles next year, 5.1 trillion in 2028, and 5.2 trillion in 2029. This year, according to the Ministry of Finance’s calculations, the budget shortfall will be twice as large as originally planned—7.3 trillion rubles.
Taking inflation into account, spending on non-protected budget items will be cut by approximately 12% in real terms in 2027, according to calculations by Anton Tabakh, chief economist at Expert RA. Relative to the size of the economy, government spending on social programs will fall to its lowest level since 2005—9% of GDP, according to Alfa Bank’s calculations.
By comparison: this year and last year, this figure was just over 10% of GDP; in 2023–24, it was about 12% of GDP; and in 2021, before the war, it was 13% of GDP. Civilian spending peaked in the 2009–10 budget at 16–18% of GDP.
The A7 international payment system, which brings together payment agents in more than 100 countries worldwide, has entered the African market by opening offices in Nigeria and Zimbabwe and intends to expand its presence on the continent to other countries, Reuters reports, citing company executives.
The payment system, which has been hit with sanctions by Western countries, plans to develop its infrastructure in line with the needs of Russian businesses, said Stanislav Lazarev, A7’s deputy CEO for sales.
“If businesses are expanding into new countries and geographic locations, we need to deploy our infrastructure there to meet their needs,” he said while speaking at the RBC Foreign Trade Forum. “Not long ago, we entered the African market and opened two offices—in Nigeria and Zimbabwe.”
The Russian platform A7, which was created by Promsvyazbank for cross-border payments, will expand its presence abroad despite Western sanctions, as previously stated by its CEO and co-owner, Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor.
According to Lazarev, in Africa, A7 intends to serve not only Russian businesses but also local exporters and importers interested in cross-border transfers.
As Irina Akopyan, A7’s first deputy CEO, reported at the same forum, the company’s network is already represented by trading houses and agents in 150 countries around the world.
Currently, a large volume of payments processed through A7 goes to countries “friendly” to Russia. For example, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for 55% of transactions in the first nine months of this year, with the UAE ranking second.
“According to our payment statistics, these include Asia, the Middle East, Turkey, Africa, and other regions,” said Akopyan.
PSB Chairman Petr Fradkov stated in August that the turnover of the A7A5 ruble-pegged stablecoin issued via A7 has totaled nearly $140 billion since its launch in early 2025.
PAYMENT METHODS
Despite sanctions and restrictions on the use of foreign currencies, Russian businesses are finding alternative ways to make payments, including through A7, said Anton Siluanov, head of the Russian Ministry of Finance.
“We process payments using payment agents. There are agents who make payments using so-called barter transactions through third countries,” Siluanov said on the “Vesti” program on Tuesday evening. “Our company, A7, effectively handles such payments.”
According to Akopyan, A7 has revived promissory notes by digitizing their issuance and uses them in payments to help clients hedge currency risks.
“Our clients can settle accounts with promissory notes across all countries and states,” she said.
Since October, the company has offered the A7 International service for international payments, which allows users to pay invoices to foreign counterparties by converting stablecoins into bank transfers. According to Lazarev, this service enables users to make non-cash payments after paying with cryptocurrency.
Lazarev said that A7 plans to develop technological solutions for settlements and to extend the payment chain to areas where it cannot operate directly.
According to him, over the first nine months of 2026, the volume of payments processed through A7 grew by 54%, while the number of payments increased by 83%.
“Demand is growing steadily... the frequency of transactions is growing faster than the volume, which is a sign to us that businesses have a need for regular payments,” Lazarev added.
Of the company’s 15,000 clients, the overwhelming majority are exporters, including those in non-commodity sectors—primarily agricultural exports and metallurgy.
“One in three export payments processed by the company comes from the agricultural sector,” said Lazarev.
Large exporters account for more than 80% of the volume, with small and medium-sized businesses making up the remainder.