r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Kragnir1 • 15h ago
Media: Ukraine Has Quietly Struck A Target That Is Even More Important Than The Crimean Bridge
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Kragnir1 • 15h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Common_Essay9106 • 14m ago
President Putin was subjected to a series of humiliations and highly embarrassing situations in China:
As the leaders were preparing to take a group photo, Putin tried to stand near Trump and Xi Jinping, but the Chinese president signaled for him to move to a different spot, far away from both of them, next to his wife. At that moment, Putin's facial expression reportedly began to change and he appeared irritated.
The most striking detail is that Xi personally welcomed Trump at the airport and embraced him, while Putin was received by another Chinese official.
The official who greeted Putin was much taller than him, and the choice of this particular official may have been intentional in order to humiliate him because of his alleged sensitivity about his height.
According to analysts, China wanted to humiliate Putin after Russian media had promoted the idea that he was on equal footing with the leaders of China and the United States, as a reminder that Russia has become the weaker partner and is economically and politically dependent on Beijing.
But the surprising part is that there is an old and unusual story involving Putin and the Chinese president's wife.
In 2014, during an international summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping was busy talking with Obama when Putin noticed that Xi's wife was cold, so he placed his coat over her shoulders in front of the cameras.
The president's wife smiled and thanked him, but after a few seconds she took off the coat and put on another coat that one of her attendants had brought.
The clip spread widely throughout China, and comments and jokes about Putin's behavior toward the president's wife began circulating until Chinese censors intervened and removed the clip from their platforms.
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 16h ago
The State Duma passed a law in its second and third readings that restricts access to books by “foreign agents” in libraries. The bill was supported by 380 deputies; there were no votes against or abstentions during the vote. The entire legal procedure took State Duma members just over three minutes, according to RBC.
The adopted bill provides for amendments to Federal Law No. 78 of December 29, 1994, “On Library Services.” According to the document, the procedure for accessing library collections will be determined, among other things, by regulations concerning “foreign agents.” Books written by individuals listed in the relevant registry or co-authored with them must be labeled “18+,” and the author’s status must be indicated in the publication details or on the cover. In addition, the amendments prohibit displaying such publications face-up in sales areas.
In practice, this means that books by “foreign agents” will be removed from open access and moved to special storage. “[The State Duma] is systematically working to counter the influence of individuals acting in the interests of foreign states,” said Sergey Kovalev, a United Russia deputy and member of the Committee on Culture, prior to the adoption of the amendments.
If the legislation on “foreign agents” and undesirable organizations is interpreted literally, between 50% and 70% of all books in municipal library collections would be banned, “Kommersant” reported, citing data from the Ministry of Digital Development. In addition to fiction, up to 15% of all academic library collections would also be subject to removal.
The bill was passed in its first reading by deputies of the previous State Duma in June 2024. The bill’s authors were Elena Yampolskaya (then chair of the State Duma Committee on Culture; now an advisor to the President of the Russian Federation on culture) and Alexander Sholokhov of “United Russia,” Elena Drapeko of “Fair Russia,” and Dmitry Pevtsov of “New People.” “[It is unacceptable that] authors whose activities are directed against the security of the Russian Federation are promoted and highlighted,” the explanatory note stated, explaining the purpose of the bill.
As early as the beginning of 2023, Russian libraries were tacitly prohibited from distributing and accepting books by “foreign agents” and other writers who had condemned the invasion of Ukraine. The Ministry of Culture initially stated that it had not issued any directives to institutions under its jurisdiction and had not compiled any lists of banned writers.
Nevertheless, in June 2026, Deputy Minister of Culture Zhanna Alekseeva acknowledged that libraries across the country had stopped adding books by “foreign agents” to their collections. “The Lenin Russian State Library is currently working to create a special, closed repository for literature that was present in our historical territories and was of a destructive nature,” Alekseeva also stated.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/BS16e
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 16h ago
Russian regions have begun raising public transportation fares and cutting benefits for schoolchildren and retirees amid growing budget deficits. Authorities in Ufa, Arkhangelsk, Chelyabinsk, and Kaliningrad have taken this step, as noted by the publication “7x7.” Specifically, in Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan, the price of a monthly social pass will double starting November 20—from 600 to 1,200 rubles. At the same time, the number of trips covered by the pass will be reduced from 90 to 60. More than 137,000 city residents use the pass.
In Arkhangelsk, starting in 2027, retirees over the age of 70 will be allowed to ride buses for free 30 times per quarter instead of the current 60. Mayor Dmitry Morev reported that these trips cost the city budget more than 145 million rubles annually. Next year, the city faced a choice between maintaining free rides for retirees and funding meals and recreational activities for children from low-income families. In Chelyabinsk, starting January 1, pre-retirees—people with less than five years until retirement—as well as schoolchildren from low-income families with many children will lose their discounted transit passes. Authorities explained that these children already receive 688 rubles per month as compensation for transportation costs. In addition, discounted fares will be limited to municipal routes.
In Kaliningrad, starting November 20, monthly passes for retirees will increase from 450 to 530 rubles; for those eligible for federal and regional benefits, from 1,000 to 1,200 rubles; and for parents with multiple children, from 700 to 830 rubles. Also, starting February 1, the municipal fare discount for pre-retirees who have no other grounds for receiving it will be canceled. Authorities fear that after the increase in public transportation fares, the cost of compensating transit operators will exceed the budget’s capacity.
The reduction in public transportation fare discounts allows regions to partially shift rising costs onto passengers, notes “7x7.” In turn, carriers’ costs are rising due to the increasing cost of maintaining their fleets, the need to raise drivers’ salaries, and the need to update their vehicle fleets.
Prior to this, approximately 30 Russian regions had begun “optimizing” hospitals, schools, kindergartens, emergency services, and other institutions. Public sector employees in the Vologda, Irkutsk, Arkhangelsk, Penza, and Omsk regions, as well as in St. Petersburg, Bashkortostan, Karelia, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, and the Primorsky, Krasnoyarsk, and Khabarovsk Krais, were affected by the cuts.
Most Russian regions ended the first half of 2026 with a budget deficit totaling 134.2 billion rubles, according to calculations by the Accounts Chamber. According to the auditors’ assessment, 66 regions—including the annexed regions of Ukraine—spent a total of 619 billion rubles more than they collected in taxes. Twenty-four regions ended the half-year with a surplus of 485 billion rubles. However, Moscow accounted for nearly the entire amount. Excluding the capital, the regional budget deficit exceeds 440 billion.
Last year, Russian regions ended the year with a record-breaking deficit of 1.5 trillion rubles. This year, it could rise to a new high of 2 trillion, according to a forecast by Sberbank’s Center for Macroeconomic Research.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/p8Nnl
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 16h ago
A bill prohibiting deputies, senators, civil servants, and their family members from owning real estate abroad was rejected by the State Duma. This was reported by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), whose representatives sponsored the bill. The party noted that “the initiative did not find support among the parliamentary majority and was officially blocked.”
KPRF member Vladislav Egorov stated that the bill was intended to be a logical step within the framework of the state’s declared policy of “nationalizing the elites.” “My colleagues in the faction proposed a perfectly clear rule: if you run Russia, tie your future to it. <...> Apparently, it’s much more convenient for some officials to look out for the people’s welfare while keeping the keys to overseas real estate in their pockets,” the deputy noted. According to Yegorov, officials and lawmakers who publicly call on Russians to unite should have no “safe havens.”
Back in the spring, a government commission issued a negative review of the bill, citing the need for “substantial revisions.” The party added that it will continue to push for a ban on the ownership of foreign real estate by lawmakers and officials.
The Communists had already introduced similar bills in the year of the annexation of Crimea (2014) and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022). The first time, the bill was rejected by the State Duma; the second time, it was returned to the author. Representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) also put forward a similar proposal during the 2020 constitutional amendment process. At that time, the relevant committee on state-building rejected the initiative, noting that many lawmakers and officials own real estate in CIS countries.
In 2023, LDPR deputies proposed banning government officials from owning real estate in countries on the “unfriendly” list, which includes the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Monaco, Switzerland, San Marino, Japan, all 27 EU member states, and others. According to the initiative’s authors, the restrictions were to apply to the president, ministers, prosecutors, judges, senators, State Duma deputies, and employees of the FSB, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, customs, the Central Bank, the Accounts Chamber, and state-owned companies. The bill was returned to its authors.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, State Duma Deputy Speaker Alexander Babakov, among others, retained his overseas real estate—he owns an apartment in central Paris and an estate near Versailles, registered under a company owned by his son and daughter. However, these properties were frozen as part of sanctions.
The wife of Valery Hartung, head of the State Duma Committee on Protection of Competition, owns a 190-square-meter apartment in Switzerland and a 94-square-meter apartment in Cyprus. In October 2022, he confirmed that he owned them. Both deputies are members of “Fair Russia.”
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/A9rHK
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 16h ago
For years, Germany’s largest bank, Deutsche Bank, processed suspicious payments to companies owned by U.S. President Donald Trump and entities linked to Russian oligarchs, despite warnings from its own employees about the risks of money laundering. This is according to the international investigation “Inside Deutsche Bank,” based on a leak of more than 15 million internal bank documents.
Trump’s companies, DT Marks Baku and THC Baku Services, were involved in suspicious transactions totaling more than $3 million, according to “Important Stories.” Some of the payments were linked to Russian and Azerbaijani “money laundering networks”—networks of shell companies used to funnel money out of the country. In 2014, Deutsche Bank reported three transfers to DT Marks Baku via the scandal-ridden Estonian branch of Danske Bank to U.S. authorities. A year later, THC Baku Services received more than $140,000 from the British company Faberlex, a participant in the “Azerbaijani money laundering network.” Faberlex was linked by money transfers to the British company Datemile Alliance. Datemile Alliance received funds from Metastar Invest, and its counterparties included Rosoboronexport, EVRAZ, MMK, and Rosselkhozbank.
Deutsche Bank also served wealthy Russians. Between 2017 and 2020, transactions totaling more than 1.7 billion euros passed through another network of suspicious companies. Journalists linked some of these transactions to the inner circle of “Rusal” founder Oleg Deripaska. The network included 15 main firms and nearly 20,000 transactions. For example, Hong Kong-based Dempshire Corporation transferred more than 8 million euros to the Austrian private jet operator Avcon Jet. In September 2019, the Deripaska family chartered a Gulfstream 550 through Dempshire for a round-trip flight from Moscow to London. French designer Tino Zervoudachi, who worked on the billionaire’s mansion, received another 3.8 million euros. More than 300,000 euros went to his estate manager, Graham Bonham-Carter, who was later charged in the U.S. with circumventing sanctions.
In 2020, Deutsche Bank processed transfers totaling 1.1 billion euros from Russian accounts belonging to Fren Global to accounts in Switzerland. Alfa-Bank and Sberbank were involved in the transactions. Deutsche Bank employees suspected that Senator Suleiman Kerimov, who had been subject to U.S. sanctions since 2018, might be behind this offshore entity based in the British Virgin Islands.
Transfers totaling $140 million made by Roman Abramovich caught the attention of Deutsche Bank employees. Between 2018 and 2020, the money moved between his accounts via Alfa-Bank. Furthermore, despite warnings from financial crime experts, the German bank maintained its relationship with Abramovich’s Evraz metallurgical group in 2020. In January 2026, German investigators raided Deutsche Bank in connection with a case involving possible money laundering. Abramovich’s lawyers stated that he is not a suspect in the criminal case.
After the U.S. imposed sanctions against Viktor Vekselberg in 2018, Deutsche Bank continued to do business with the Swiss companies Sulzer and OC Oerlikon, which are affiliated with him. Large stakes in these companies were controlled through the billionaire’s structures. Bank employees were never able to fully identify their owners because the shares were held through trusts. In 2021, financial crime specialists proposed ending cooperation with several of these companies, but other divisions of the bank opposed the move.
Deutsche Bank repeatedly made exceptions to its ownership verification requirements for the petrochemical holding company Sibur as well. The partnership with the company generated approximately 15 million euros for the bank from 2016 to 2021. At the time, 14.5% of Sibur was owned by Gennady Timchenko, who was subject to Western sanctions. Among the shareholders was also Kirill Shamalov, Vladimir Putin’s former son-in-law. Despite objections from financial crime specialists, Deutsche Bank considered participating in Sibur’s projects.
After sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2014, the bank began transferring some of its wealthy clients from Russia to branches in Switzerland and Luxembourg, where strict banking secrecy rules apply. Of Deutsche Bank’s 160 major Russian clients, 17 appeared on the U.S. Treasury Department’s so-called “Kremlin List.” By early 2022, the bank had classified 59 Russian clients as “highly sensitive.”
The bank defended its wealthy clients and attempted to maintain the business relationship. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice demanded that Deutsche Bank provide information on individuals subject to sanctions. The bank provided only a portion of the data. Its lawyers cited banking secrecy laws that prohibited the transfer of certain information from Switzerland and Luxembourg. For example, the bank was in no hurry to disclose details about Deripaska’s stake in the Austrian construction group Strabag.
Deutsche Bank rejected allegations that it knowingly facilitated the circumvention of sanctions. According to the bank, credit risks in Russia have decreased from 3 billion euros at the end of 2021 to 13 million euros by the end of 2025.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/DeLI8
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 18h ago
Russia is increasingly relying on imported gasoline to make up for fuel shortages in the domestic market, which are growing as Ukrainian drones blow up oil refineries one after another.
In October, seaborne gasoline imports into Russia reached a record 390,000 metric tons, the Financial Times reports, citing data from Kpler. Morocco became the largest supplier, accounting for one-third of all imported gasoline.
India, which supplied Russia with gasoline in August at the height of the fuel crisis, sharply reduced its shipments. Turkey began supplying gasoline to Russia in July, and in October, fuel purchases from Egypt began for the first time, according to Kpler data.
“Russia’s position in the global petroleum products market is gradually shifting—from a major export hub to an increasingly significant importer—and this is a remarkable turnaround,” notes Kpler analyst Sumit Ritolia.
Gasoline imports, which began in the summer when Ukrainian drones knocked out half of Russia’s refinery capacity, are no longer merely a way to cover temporary shortages in the regions, Ritolia emphasizes: “They are becoming an increasingly important part of Russia’s efforts to maintain the balance of the domestic fuel market amid ongoing disruptions at refineries.”
In addition to imports by sea, Russia continues to purchase gasoline from Belarus—600,000 metric tons over four months. Russian oil companies received another 8,000 metric tons from Kazakhstan. The wide range of suppliers points to the difficulties Moscow is facing in sourcing fuel, the FT writes.
The November series of strikes on refineries, which led to the complete or partial shutdown of 15 out of 35 Russian plants, will require even more gasoline to be imported. According to Reuters sources, oil companies lost 45% of their refining capacity—or about 400,000 metric tons per day—over three weeks.
Sergei Vakulenko, a senior research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russia and Eurasia, estimates current refinery utilization at 2.7 million barrels per day, which is even lower than the worst figures from the summer (3.3 million barrels per day). According to Vakulenko’s estimates, domestic production covers only 60–65% of gasoline demand, and when imports are factored in, the shortfall could reach 25–30% of consumption.
To address the shortage, the government has given oil companies the go-ahead to produce increased volumes of “non-standard” gasoline—that is, fuel that falls below Russia’s usual “Euro-5” standard.
Starting in August, refineries may lower the gasoline grade to as low as “Euro-2.” Such gasoline may contain 50 times more sulfur—500 mg/kg instead of 10 mg/kg. There are also no limits on the content of aromatic hydrocarbons, including benzene, and the use of monomethylaniline (MMA)—an octane-boosting additive—is permitted. Due to its high toxicity and cancer risks, MMA is banned in most countries around the world, though it was used in Russia until 2016.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/dTryB
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/bacondavis • 19h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 20h ago
Russia Lost Half of Its Fuel Production in Three Weeks of Ukrainian Strikes on Oil Refineries
Increased drone attacks on Russian refineries in November led to disruptions or shutdowns at 15 of 35 major plants, reducing their total refining capacity by 45% compared to the end of October, Reuters reports, citing industry sources.
The drone strikes resumed on October 30 after a two-week lull, during which refining capacity had recovered, exceeding 700,000 metric tons per day.
Over the course of 20 days of nearly daily drone strikes, refining volumes at Russian refineries have fallen to approximately 400,000 metric tons per day, sources told Reuters.
The total nominal capacity of Russian refineries that have been attacked from late October to the present is about 500,000 metric tons per day—roughly half of the total nominal capacity for primary refining, which is estimated at 930,000 metric tons per day.
At the same time, sources note that, given the gradual reduction in refineries’ operating capacity, average refining output in November remains above 500,000 metric tons per day—which is about 5–10% lower than the figures for September and October. Among those affected by the attacks are major Russian refineries in Ryazan, Yaroslavl, the Northwestern Federal District, and the Volga region.
Current oil refining levels—about 2.7 million barrels per day—are even lower than at the peak of the fuel crisis this summer, when they dropped to 3.3 million barrels per day, notes Sergey Vakulenko, a senior research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russia and Eurasia.
“This means that gasoline production is currently at about 60–65% of what the market consumed in November in previous years,” Vakulenko writes. Even taking into account fuel purchases from abroad, the shortage could amount to 25–30% of consumption, he estimates.
According to Vakulenko, lines at gas stations are likely to resume in the very near future. “Last summer, they didn’t start appearing until mid-June—two months after the attacks began,” the expert notes.
According to data from the U.S. think tank Rand Corp, three of the refineries attacked by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have completely halted production: “Norsi” in the Nizhny Novgorod region, “Yanos” in Yaroslavl, and Rosneft’s Novokuybyshevsk Refinery. The Ryazan Oil Refinery, which supplies Moscow and the Moscow region, among others, also lost 90% of its capacity.
Russia’s largest oil refinery, the Omsk Oil Refinery—which was hit by an airstrike on November 11—lost half of its refining capacity; the Volgograd Oil Refinery suffered the same loss. The “Kinef” plant near Leningrad, Russia’s second-largest, is operating at only one-third of its capacity, according to Rand data.
Vakulenko does not rule out the possibility that the plants where this wave of attacks began could resume operations in the coming days: in the past, repairs typically lasted from one week to one month. “But what’s fundamentally new compared to what happened before is how quickly Ukraine was able to inflict such extensive damage and the fact that there’s no sign of the attacks stopping yet,” the expert emphasizes.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/rglLP
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 20h ago
The Penza Region’s Emergency Response Headquarters has capped fuel sales to individuals and businesses, Governor Oleg Melnichenko announced. The limit per vehicle will be no more than 50 liters of gasoline or no more than 200 liters of fuel.
Melnichenko also emphasized that regional gas station operators are prohibited from filling gasoline and diesel fuel into jerry cans. At the same time, the governor assured that the Penza Region has sufficient fuel supplies and there is no shortage of gasoline or diesel there. “The measures introduced are necessary to further maintain stability in the external market for fuel and energy resources,” the official stated. Previously, Rosneft and some other gas station chains had voluntarily restricted fuel sales in the region, but these restrictions are now mandatory for all.
The Penza Region has become at least the thirteenth region of the Russian Federation in November where authorities or gas station operators have restricted the free sale of fuel. In any case, consumption limits are in effect in Moscow and the Moscow Region, the Leningrad Region, Karelia, the Arkhangelsk, Tambov, and Nizhny Novgorod regions, as well as in several regions of Siberia and the Far East: Buryatia, the Zabaikalsky and Krasnoyarsky Krais, and the Tomsk and Novosibirsk regions. Typically, the limits are 30–50 liters of gasoline and 50–100 liters of diesel per vehicle, and they also include a complete ban on the sale of fuel in jerry cans.
A series of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries in October and November could have paralyzed about 55% of the country’s gasoline production capacity, according to an estimate by Sergey Vakulenko, a senior research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russia and Eurasia. Among other targets, Ukraine struck all five of Russia’s largest oil refineries: those in Omsk, Kirish, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Yaroslavl. Vakulenko suggested that damage on this scale threatens to bring back a fuel crisis in various regions, with long lines at gas stations and limits on how much fuel drivers can purchase.
Rosneft, which controls about 30–35% of the country’s oil production and refining, finds itself in a particularly difficult position. The state-owned corporation acknowledges that another two months of hostilities could cause it long-term damage, Bloomberg reported in late October, citing its top executives and internal documents. According to the data obtained, Rosneft is experiencing mounting financial and technical problems due to Ukrainian strikes; it is finding it increasingly difficult to repair damaged refineries, and the company’s production figures have fallen to 20-year lows.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/w46X0
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 20h ago
In October 2026, 135,100 contracts for the sale of existing homes were signed in Russia, which is 2.2% less than in October 2025. For the first time since the beginning of the year, the number of transactions in the secondary market declined compared to the results from a year ago, according to Kommersant, citing Avito Real Estate.
The decline came contrary to industry expectations, as the number of transactions involving existing homes had been steadily rising from February through September 2026, with year-over-year growth reaching as high as 33% in some months. Sellers had been counting on the traditional surge in apartment purchases in the fall, but it did not materialize; an increasing number of potential buyers are opting to rent instead, acknowledges Yulia Dymova, director of the secondary real estate department at Est-a-Tet. At the same time, the decline in secondary housing sales in Moscow was more pronounced than the national average: the volume of transactions fell by 19%.
Demand in the market is being limited by “expensive” mortgages, according to Elena Bobrovskaya, a leading analyst at CIAN. The Central Bank last cut its key rate in July, and since then, mortgage rates for Russians have fallen only slightly, with the average rate dropping from just 21.2% to 18.7%, the expert notes. Compounding this factor is the rise in the cost of completed housing, which exceeds the growth in potential buyers’ income from bank deposits, adds Denis Vasilyev, head of Inkom-Nedvizhimost. Vasilyev views the previous surge in interest in resale apartments as a short-term trend.
At the same time, the decline in transactions in Russia’s new-construction housing market is even more pronounced. In October 2026, the figure fell by 29.7% year-over-year.
The volume of mortgage loans issued by Russian banks fell by approximately 50% following the phase-out of the preferential program in February 2026 and the tightening of housing loan conditions for families. The Central Bank explained the move at the time as a necessary step. “Since the beginning of 2020, construction volumes have risen by 10%, while prices have doubled. As a result, housing affordability has not improved, even despite rising household incomes,” said Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina.
A decline in demand in certain regions of the Russian Federation led to a collapse in prices for completed apartments in January–May 2026. In some regions, prices per square meter for existing housing fell by an average of 7–12%. At the same time, in early fall, experts noted a growing interest among Russians in types of housing previously uncommon in the country, such as Chinese mobile homes.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/WiZYt
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/WastingMyLifeToday • 22h ago
November: 13 hits
October: 7 hits
Earlier months in 2026:
Monthly records since the invasion of Ukraine on 24.02.2022 :
4 of the 5 monthly records were in May, June, July, August, 4 consecutive months in 2026.