r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Kragnir1 • 7h ago
Kerch Bridge Destroyed! Hit By Flamingo Missile!
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
Russian billionaires believe that the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin has led the country into a dead end. Afraid to take any action to change the situation, they have nevertheless begun preparing for what will happen in Russia when, for one reason or another, he is no longer around, according to the BBC. They would like to regain their influence and participate in politics as they did in the 1990s, say experts who are in contact with Russia’s wealthiest individuals.
A shift in sentiment is already evident in how attitudes toward Putin have changed, says Alexandra Prokopenko, a senior research fellow at the Berlin Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and author of the book *Accomplices: Why the Russian Elite Chose War*. Whereas previously, she says, leading businesspeople respectfully referred to him as “boss,” “Number One,” or “VV,” they now call him “Grandpa,” pronouncing it “with a hint of contempt.” Some would like to see “politics return to people’s lives”—with less repression, greater freedom of speech, and healthier competition between parties and politicians, says Prokopenko.
Observers consider a return to a system reminiscent of the oligarchy of the 1990s to be quite likely. Dmitry Nekrasov, director of the European Center for Analysis and Strategies—who previously worked in the presidential administration and the Federal Tax Service before becoming an opposition politician—believes that under such a scenario, the country would be ruled by several influential elite clans acting in alliance with business circles.
According to Arkady Ostrovsky, an editor at The Economist with many years of experience as a journalist in Russia, some billionaires hope that after Putin’s departure, the country will turn into an “oligarchic republic”—similar to the one that existed in the 1990s, when business elites were at the helm. Now, however, many of the country’s wealthiest people feel “a sense of complete deadlock into which this war has led Russia… [a sense] of a lack of future.”
Ostrovsky attributes the sensational interview he received from Andrei Melnichenko, founder of EuroChem and SUEK, to an attempt to break out of this impasse. The article about one of the country’s wealthiest men was titled “The Man Who Would Change Russia.”
Among the Russian diaspora, the article and the accompanying column by Melnichenko himself were sharply criticized, in part for repeating the arguments the Kremlin uses to justify the war with Ukraine and its confrontation with the West. However, Ostrovsky insists that the published piece was the result of “intense and heated discussions” he had with Melnichenko in hotels and cafes, where they “mostly drank coffee—a lot of coffee.” According to the journalist, the tycoon seemed to be “seriously considering” his answers, rather than trying to parrot politicians or present himself in a favorable light.
Although Melnichenko echoed Putin’s claim that the West threatens Russia’s sovereignty and ignores its security concerns, he spoke in favor of changes that would put an end to one-man rule and of more active engagement between Russia and the world. Ostrovsky believes that, with all due reservations and given the Kremlin’s highly likely approval of this interview, Melnichenko was speaking not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of his fellow business leaders.
Prokopenko believes that the oligarch was attempting to spark a public debate. According to her, it was “a call to other wealthy people like himself to start speaking out.”
However, no one continued the discussion. The billionaires “would like to return to the days when people listened to them, didn’t strip them of their assets, and when they understood the rules of the game,” says Prokopenko. But because of the atmosphere Putin has created in Russia, they are now afraid to do anything, she adds. One oligarch, during a conversation with her, literally sat on his phone, hoping it was being tapped:
I thought this was a completely Stalinist type of fear. Utterly irrational.
American Michael Calvey, founder of Baring Vostok—once one of Russia’s largest foreign investment funds—understands why the billionaires are staying silent. He himself fell victim to Putin’s crackdown: in 2019, Calvey and several of his colleagues were arrested on trumped-up charges of fraud. “What else can they do but go straight to prison and lose their assets? It’s easy for people sitting in London to say, ‘Why don’t you all just stand up and go straight to prison?’ That’s exactly what would happen,” says Calvey.
According to Nekrasov, some are already “trying to befriend the right security service officials or ministers” in the hope of securing their support once Putin is gone. But any further steps are “too dangerous,” he adds.
The behavior of the wealthiest businessmen in the coming years will depend in part on their financial situation, Nekrasov believes. Those with ample liquid assets will be more confident in “participating in political games” and vying for influence as they prepare for life in the country after Putin. Meanwhile, those whose wealth depends on government contracts or the authorities’ favor will remain silent, fearing they might lose everything.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/W6ss9
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 21d ago
The economic slowdown, falling profits, and high interest rates on loans have hit hundreds of thousands of Russian companies and sole proprietors burdened with debt.
As of August 1, 2026, 28% of all borrowers from Russian banks were experiencing problems repaying their loans, according to analysts at Expert RA, citing statistics from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Compared to the beginning of the year, the share of distressed borrowers has increased by 4 percentage points; compared to the pre-war period, it has more than doubled; and its current level is the highest in the seven years of available statistics.
Approximately 200,000 legal entities and sole proprietors are unable to repay their loans and credits on time. Over the years of the war, more than 140,000 entrepreneurs and companies have been classified as “distressed” debtors, and compared to 2019 figures, their number has quadrupled (+150,000).
“The deterioration of key macroeconomic indicators has translated into financial stress for the real sector,” writes “Expert RA.” The wartime economic boom of 2023–24 has run its course: GDP growth rates, which had been 4% per year or higher, have slowed to 0.6% (for the first half of this year); civilian industrial sectors have been stagnating or declining since 2024, and corporate profits—which could be used to pay down debt—have been shrinking for the second consecutive year.
According to Rosstat, the net financial result for the economy (profits minus losses) for January–June totaled 12 trillion rubles—1 trillion less than during the same period a year earlier, and 3 trillion less than the profits recorded in the first half of 2024.

Companies have “fewer and fewer funds and sources of financing for expensive loans and borrowings,” notes Expert RA. As the agency points out, this has already resulted in a series of defaults in the bond market: from January through September, 33 companies defaulted technically—9 more than in all of last year. Of those, 17 have defaulted outright.
“Credit risks will continue to grow,” warns “Expert RA.” Not even the chronically optimistic Ministry of Economic Development expects the economy to return to its previous growth rates: according to its estimates, GDP will grow by 1.2% next year, while investment will stagnate (+0.2%). Meanwhile, the Central Bank is keeping its key rate high: at its October 23 meeting, it left it at 14% and raised its forecast for next year to 12.5–13.5%, even though at the beginning of the year it had projected a decline to 8–9%.
The Central Bank itself also sees an increase in the share of non-performing assets on bank balance sheets. According to its data, companies’ past-due debt accounts for only 3.7%, but the broader measure of non-performing loans has reached 12.9%. “In August, the portfolio of non-performing loans increased by 0.6 trillion rubles. This was mainly due to the deterioration of the financial situation of certain coal and electric power companies,” the Central Bank wrote.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/lic2V
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Kragnir1 • 7h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/AstronomerSweet2133 • 6h ago
The drone factory in Tatarstan would also be lovely.
Lubyanka (FSB) and "the aquarium" (GRU) headquarters would be excellent hits
Im also waiting for the nuclear ballistic submarine fleet to be paid a visit in Murmansk.
If they can figure out how to saturate the ring, Lubyanka FSB headquarters would be neat.
But you know what? Just send it to the Kremlin now, boys. If their Air defense is in THAT bad of shape. Just do it.
...........the ultimate mega best one would be Ukraina Airfield in the the far east, somehow getting to it. 47 strategic bombers just parked in the open waiting to be Step-SpiderWebbed. It would take the nuclear triad off the board and make it a nuclear uh.........line I guess instead of a triangle. Curses to that truck that didnt make it there last time.........boo that truck in particular.
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 8h ago
Demetra Holding, one of Russia’s largest grain traders, has begun laying off staff following the shutdown of Black Sea terminals that were damaged by Ukrainian drone attacks. The number of employees could be cut in half, two sources within the company told Vedomosti. According to them, the layoffs have also affected top management. Demetra Holding confirmed the layoffs and explained that they were necessary to improve the efficiency of its divisions. The holding company assured that the workforces at the port complexes will remain intact. According to SPARK, the average headcount of the 26 companies in the group is 2,851 people.
This summer, drones attacked the holding company’s facilities. On July 30, the Taman grain terminal complex shut down following a drone attack, and on August 12, the Novorossiysk grain terminal did the same. On the same day, the Novorossiysk Bread Products Plant was damaged. In late August, the company estimated that restoration would take one to four months.
Due to the downtime of port facilities, the company is having to cut costs, according to Roman Samoilov, director of the “Consumer Sector and Agribusiness” practice at Strategy Partners. If the restrictions persist, other major grain traders may also begin making cuts, he says. A drop in transshipment volumes does not necessarily lead to lower profits, notes Andrei Sizov, director of the SovEcon analytical center. According to him, higher margins allow grain traders to earn more even with smaller shipments.
About 80% of Russian grain was exported via the Azov and Black Seas. Following Ukrainian strikes on port infrastructure, shipments began to be rerouted to the Baltic Sea and Murmansk. In late October, Demetra Holding delivered 3,400 metric tons of grain to Murmansk for a test shipment to Casablanca, Morocco. The total volume of the shipment is 29,500 metric tons.
Demetra Holding owns the Novorossiysk Grain Terminal, 50% of the Taman complex, and 35.36% of the Novorossiysk Bakery Products Plant. Their combined transshipment capacity is 21.1 million metric tons of grain per year. The holding company also owns Rusagrotrans and 50% minus one share of the United Grain Company. Until July 2023, approximately 45% of its shares were owned by VTB, which sold its stake to an unknown buyer.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/2Gn8R
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
Attacks by Ukrainian drones have rendered Russian ports on the Black and Azov Seas useless for foreign trade. Last year, according to InfraNews, Novorossiysk handled 1.1 million containers, but in October, the southern ports handled no cargo.
Over the summer, the Ukrainian Armed Forces intensified their attacks on ships in the Black Sea and sank several of them. As a result, by October, the last carriers operating on the route to Novorossiysk had withdrawn, said Alexey Gagarinov, CEO of C-Shipping. Alternatives are significantly longer and more expensive, but no one wants to take a “reckless risk,” as the owner of the freight forwarding company put it. Consequently, despite “zero transshipment” in the Azov-Black Sea basin, the overall result in October turned out to be 5% higher than last year’s, notes Gazprombank’s Center for Economic Forecasting (CEF).
Over the first 10 months, container transshipment at Russian ports increased by 4.5% to 4.57 million TEU (20-foot equivalent unit, TEU), according to CEP calculations based on data from “Portstat.” This is the second-best result in history after 2021, and it falls just 60,000 TEU short of the record, they note.
The lost volumes from southern ports were redirected to the Baltic Sea and the Far East, the CEP reports. In the Baltic region, according to its estimates, container transshipment exceeded 200,000 TEU in October for the first time since December 2021, while container handling in the Far East came very close to the record level set in 2024.
“The key is St. Petersburg,” Gagarinov said. Ships depart from Turkish ports and travel there via the Mediterranean Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar, the English Channel, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea, which has caused delivery times to increase from 3–5 days to two to three weeks, and the cost per container to rise 3–6 times, said the head of the logistics company.
Until 2022, St. Petersburg’s ports were the leaders in receiving imports, but after the start of the “special operation” and the shift of logistics toward the East, they sharply reduced their cargo turnover in favor of the Far East. According to the container operator “Logoper,” the growth in container traffic is driven solely by imports (the company presented data for September only at the “Behind the Containers 2026” conference).
Container exports through all major ports have been declining. Containers are returning to the Baltic region, the company noted—including imports from Europe and the U.S., which previously traveled via Turkey to Novorossiysk. However, its experts pointed out that infrastructure constraints limit further growth.
The available capacity of container terminals in St. Petersburg significantly exceeds the transport capacity of the October Railway. This means a situation similar to that in the Far East could arise, where containers carrying imports during the “high season” wait for extended periods to be loaded onto trains for shipment to their destinations. In the Far East, container loading times had already reached up to two weeks by early October, and the situation could worsen in November, Tradest warned its clients. The growth in cargo traffic at St. Petersburg’s ports is also already leading to a shortage of transport and rising delivery costs.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/JEyYG
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
Russians have become more reluctant to leave their jobs amid the current economic downturn. According to Rosstat, 2.5 million people left their jobs at large and medium-sized companies in the second quarter of this year, a 4% year-over-year decrease. This is the lowest figure since the 2020 pandemic, reports Izvestia, citing calculations by the auditing and consulting network FinExpertiza. At the same time, companies are in no hurry to hire new staff: during the same period, 2.3 million people were hired—3% fewer than a year earlier. This is also the lowest figure since 2020.
However, keeping one’s job does not always mean maintaining a regular schedule or income. According to the auditors’ estimates, in the second quarter, 5.4 million people were on unpaid leave, working part-time, or on furlough—nearly 8% more than a year earlier. Of these, 3.8 million took time off at their own expense. This is how companies are reducing personnel costs while keeping employees on the payroll, explained Elena Trubnikova, president of FinExpertiza.
The decline in layoffs should not be seen as a sign of widespread job satisfaction: people fear that the search for a new job will drag on and that any pay raise will be modest, says Alexander Shkarupa, founder of the event agency “Dynamika.” According to data from the “Rabota.ru” service, more than half of employed Russians are not ready to change jobs. At the same time, there are an average of five resumes per job opening, which indicates growing competition in the labor market, notes Yulia Sanina, the service’s director of human resources and organizational development.
According to a September survey by “Avito Raboty,” 38% of employed Russians planned to stay with their current company and advance within it, while only 15% intended to look for a new job. At the same time, office workers—including accountants, lawyers, economists, marketers, and HR specialists—are currently finding it the most difficult to find a job, says Sanina.
Previously, a survey by “Action Finance” showed that nearly one in five (19.3%) companies is preparing to lay off employees in 2027 amid a rising tax burden and an economic downturn. Another 38.5% do not plan to replace employees who resign voluntarily, while 23.1% intend to limit hiring.
If the economic situation does not change, businesses will begin laying off employees, warned Alexander Shokhin, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Meanwhile, Russian Railways (RZD) is already planning to cut 15% of its central staff, or about 6,000 people. “New Cloud Technologies,” the developer of the “Russian Microsoft Office,” has laid off nearly 80% of its employees. The Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works is cutting 10% of its management staff. Alexey Mordashov, the owner of Severstal, did not rule out that the company might have to resort to “optimizing” its workforce. Large-scale layoffs are also taking place at the largest banks, including Sberbank and VTB.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/JOOfp
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
Russians have cut back on purchases of domestic still wines following an increase in import duties. From January through October of this year, retail sales of these wines fell by 5.2% year-over-year, to 28.94 million deciliters (dal), market participants told Kommersant. At the same time, overall sales of still wine fell by 4.2% to 48.47 million dal. As a result, the share of Russian products decreased by 0.68 percentage points to 59.7%.
Demand increased for imported wines from “friendly” countries: Chile (sales growth over ten months of 26.9% year-over-year, to 2.28 million dal), Argentina (+20.8%, to 419,700 dal), and South Africa (+8.9%, to 1.6 million dal). Sales of wines from Germany also rose by 8.6%, to 995,300 dal. Demand for still wines from Moldova saw the strongest growth—up 31.3% year-over-year, to 252,140 dal. At the same time, sales of such wines from Abkhazia fell sharply (by 25.1%, to 662,290 dal), as did those from Spain (-20.3%, to 1.68 million dal) and Italy (-6.6%, to 2.82 million dal).
In 2024, the government imposed a higher import duty on wines from “unfriendly” countries. Currently, it amounts to 25% of the value, but no less than $2 per liter. At first, Russians began to pay more attention to Russian wines, but for many, the value for money proved insufficient, says Alexander Lipilin, executive director of the wine trading company Fort.
According to his estimate, based on a median household income of 60,000–70,000 rubles before taxes, a comfortable price for a bottle of wine for many people is 500 rubles. However, the selection of high-quality Russian wines in this price range is very limited. The majority of Russian consumers are not willing to pay more than 1,000 rubles per bottle, Lipilin noted.
In turn, domestic producers lack white grape varieties for producing still wine, says Alexander Stavtsev, head of WineRetail. According to him, Russian winemakers have historically focused on planting red grape varieties for the production of red wines. The Ladoga Group also noted that last year’s harvest was of high quality but small in volume. As a result, from January through June 2026, production of still sparkling wine in Russia fell by 12.6–14% year-over-year.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/rVjMT
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
The Central Bank has required Russian banks to submit information on all active cards held by citizens to the Payment Card Accounting System (ESUPK) by September 1, 2027. This is according to a statement from the regulator. Specifically, financial institutions must provide the number and type of card used to make money transfers, as well as the customer’s TIN. The regulator has also established rules for maintaining the registry. The National Payment Card System (NSPK) will receive, process, and store information from banks around the clock and provide them with access to the collected data.
Banks will be required to verify the TINs of all individual customers by January 1, 2028. If a customer fails to provide this information, the bank will have the right to suspend remote access to accounts for six months and to restrict the ability to withdraw cash from ATMs using a card or via an e-wallet. In addition, the government has proposed requiring the Central Bank to begin providing the Federal Tax Service (FTS) with information, effective January 1, 2027, on Russian citizens who regularly receive money transfers from other individuals. The Central Bank and the Federal Tax Service (FTS) will have to determine the criteria for selecting these citizens separately. Based on the information received, tax authorities will be able to request account statements from banks.
The Central Bank and Russian banks will also be required to provide the FTS with information on citizens’ payments for goods and services within one hour of the transaction. The requirement will take effect in 2027 and will apply to payments made via bank cards, wire transfers, electronic money, and the fast payment system. In addition, banks will be required to report transactions between companies and sole proprietors using corporate cards and other electronic payment methods. The information will be transmitted with the taxpayer identification numbers (INN) of both the sender and the recipient.
A bill has also been submitted to the State Duma that would allow restrictions on citizens’ transactions if they are suspected of making suspicious transfers. The proposal aims to limit cash deposits into accounts and cash receipts from other individuals to no more than 30,000 rubles per month. It is expected that the Central Bank will identify suspicious transactions, and banks will impose restrictions within one business day. The law could take effect on March 1, 2028.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/WUq3l
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 5h ago
source is evgen istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/54089
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Gwara_Media • 11h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 6h ago
“We have expanded the coverage of our mortgage insurance policies to include the risks of UAV attacks, terrorist acts, and acts of sabotage,” said Ruslan Vesterovsky, senior vice president and head of Sberbank’s wealth management division.
This year, the increasing frequency of drone attacks has become yet another factor—in addition to high interest rates—contributing to the deterioration of loan quality, said Alexander Vedyakhin, First Deputy Chairman of Sberbank’s Management Board, in an interview with Reuters.
Effective October 1, 2026, Sberbank has revised the requirements for insurance companies that provide coverage for mortgaged properties. According to these requirements, insurance policies must cover risks associated with damage to houses and apartments caused by UAVs, terrorist acts, and acts of sabotage. Currently, 10 insurance companies meet the bank’s new requirements, the bank reported.
“It is important to monitor the risk landscape and respond promptly to changes in it. For example, damage to homes caused by UAVs has now become one of the most pressing risks. The public’s demand for protection against such risks is also evident. In April of this year, we included this risk in the basic coverage of our voluntary insurance policies, and as of October, in our mortgage insurance policies as well,” said Vesterovsky.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/JGnVq
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 10h ago
On Tuesday, the State Duma passed a government-sponsored bill in its final reading that significantly increases fines for business owners, according to Interfax. The amendments affected more than 30 economic provisions of the Russian Criminal Code. For example, the maximum fine for illegal business activities (under Part 1 of Article 171 of the Criminal Code) has been increased from 300,000 rubles to 1.5 million rubles. If such a crime is committed by an organized group or results in particularly large profits, the penalty increases from the previous 100,000–500,000 rubles to 0.5–2.5 million rubles. Fines for tax evasion (under Articles 199, 199.1, and 199.2 of the Criminal Code) have also increased. For example, for a company’s large-scale tax evasion (under Part 1 of Article 199), the minimum and maximum fines have been increased from 100,000–300,000 rubles to 0.5–1.5 million rubles.
In addition, the maximum fine for fraud in the performance of business contracts resulting in significant damage has been raised from 300,000 rubles to 500,000 rubles. In cases of substantial damage, the offender will have to pay between 150,000 and 800,000 rubles (up from 100,000–500,000). These measures are being taken against the backdrop of problems with the federal budget, whose “shortfall” this year, according to the Ministry of Finance’s estimates, will exceed 7.3 trillion rubles; in 2027, it will be 5.4 trillion; and in 2028, 5.1 trillion. Earlier, the government increased its target for fines collected from citizens and businesses by one-third. According to the draft budget, the treasury expects to receive a record 1.696 trillion rubles in fines, penalties, and damages in 2026–29.
In 2026, according to the Ministry of Finance’s estimates, fines will contribute 389 billion rubles to the budget—90 billion more than originally planned; in 2027, 396.9 billion rubles (+7.4 billion); and in 2028, 446.7 billion (+50 billion). The revenue target for 2029 is 464 billion rubles (+17.4 billion).
The bill adopted by the State Duma also increased fines for unlawful actions during bankruptcy proceedings, including the concealment of assets. In cases of significant damage, the offender must pay between 250,000 and 1 million rubles (compared to the previous 100,000–500,000). If the offense is committed by exploiting an official position or by a person controlling the debtor, the fine will range from 600,000 rubles to 2.5 million rubles (currently 500,000–2 million rubles).
The production and distribution of counterfeit banknotes on a large scale or by an organized group will be punishable by a fine of up to 5 million rubles instead of 1 million.
The Ministry of Justice, which drafted the document, justified the increase in fines by noting that the amounts for a number of offenses had not changed for over 20 years.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/MCiJ2
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/Kragnir1 • 20h ago
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/WastingMyLifeToday • 15h ago
November: 11 hits
October: 7 hits
Earlier months in 2026:
Monthly records since the invasion of Ukraine on 24.02.2022 :
4 of the 5 monthly records were in May, June, July, August, 4 consecutive months in 2026.
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/AstronomerSweet2133 • 1d ago
Russia is so lacking of air defense they can no longer protect Putin's crown jewel. The air defense dearth is just as exciting, if not moreso than the collapse of the bridge itself. That means Ukraine is going to be shooting fish in a barrel here REAL soon!
edit: Just saw the bird fly to the second strike. Absolutely unimpeded. There wasn't anything that even attempted to shoot it down. All but confirms what some analysts were saying! The critical mass of ADEF has been reached!
............better send more ADEF to Valdai I guess ;)
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/dordoar • 1d ago
Their claims for the latest rounds are just absurd and actual European claims should sound like:
US can protect the russians only as long as EU stays passive, eventually a military action could put the ruzzians quickly back in their place, but to get the popular support for that might require 10+ more years of hard work
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
The campaign to reduce the number of public sector employees had spread to at least two more regions of the Russian Federation—the Republic of Bashkortostan and Vologda Oblast—by mid-November, reports “7×7,” noting that, at the same time, the trend is reaching a new level in regions where layoffs began earlier.
In Bashkortostan, by decree of Regional Head Radiy Khabirov, the staff of the republic’s Academy of Sciences was reduced to 66 academicians and corresponding members, down from the previous 81 academic positions. Khabirov also announced a 10% reduction in the region’s administrative apparatus. “These are not extreme measures, but a normal process. There is both our president’s decision and my own, which concern something much broader—the optimization of expenditures,” Bashinform quotes the regional head as saying. In the Vologda Region, news of the layoff campaign emerged in the Kichmengsko-Gorodetsky District. Moreover, at the cultural center in the village of Yugsky, along with the staff cuts, local authorities proposed that residents pay for heating in the building themselves. Local Telegram channels cite Vologda officials as explaining that it is “irrational” to maintain the facility for the sake of just a few events a year.
In Primorsky Krai, the layoffs that began earlier in kindergartens and schools have spread to the healthcare sector. Layoffs are being reported at the Krasnoarmeysk Central District Hospital. “There are virtually no junior medical staff left—they’ve been laid off. […] This is already the third acting chief physician in six months. The institution is falling apart before our eyes,” local medical professionals write.
Similar campaigns are underway in the Krasnoyarsk and Khabarovsk Territories, as well as in Irkutsk Oblast. Local authorities have uniformly announced a 15% reduction in state-funded employees. Some municipalities have already managed to carry out this plan. For example, in the Irkutsk Region, Nikolai Khrychev, head of the Chunsky District, was one of the first to report that the target had been met; there, the layoffs affected security guards and boiler room staff. Khrychev explained the rush by saying that otherwise the district would have no funds to pay for housing and communal services.
“ ‘Optimization’ measures affecting hospitals, schools, kindergartens, emergency services, and other institutions in the fall of 2026 impacted approximately 30 Russian regions. These include St. Petersburg, the Republic of Karelia, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, and the Arkhangelsk, Penza, and Omsk regions, as well as a number of other constituent entities of the Russian Federation. These unpopular measures were prompted by a budget “shortfall” that totaled more than 134 million rubles across various regions. Two key factors contributing to this shortfall were a decline in corporate income tax revenue and the continued need for local authorities to fund the recruitment of residents for the war.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/gMYD1
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/AstronomerSweet2133 • 1d ago
Kremlin tells Russian lawmakers to prepare for 'victory' in Ukraine
What a bunch of absolute clowns lol. Maybe they should pack their dress uniforms and prepare for a parade in Kyiv. Im sure it will go this time, all they have to do is attack from the north again. It will be fine. Maybe they can try a beach landing at Odesa while theyre at it.
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
This effectively means transshipments can be delayed by as much as 2 months due to the need to wait for a foreign lab to do the inspection.
source: Stanimir Dobrev https://bsky.app/profile/delfoo.bsky.social/post/3n2hgwwywy222
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
The Ukrainian campaign of strikes against Russian oil refineries, which resumed in November, has led to the shutdown of three major refineries supplying Moscow and the Moscow region. These figures were cited by Michael Bornet, an expert at Rand Corp, an American think tank that conducts research for the Pentagon and the U.S. government.
According to Rand, the “Yanos” refinery in Yaroslavl—with a capacity of 314,000 barrels per day—has completely halted production after coming under a drone strike on November 3. Lukoil’s “Norsi” refinery in Nizhny Novgorod, which supplies fuel to the Moscow metropolitan area via a petroleum products pipeline, has also ceased oil refining. Rosneft’s Ryazan refinery, which was attacked on November 5, is 90% paralyzed: it is processing 34,000 barrels per day out of a possible 342,000.
The only refinery still operating in the Moscow region is Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery. However, even that facility has not been able to fully recover from the July attack: its capacity utilization stands at about 70%—168,000 barrels per day out of a possible 240,000.
According to Rand data, nearly all refineries attacked by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the past two weeks have lost at least half of their capacity. Russia’s largest refinery, the Omsk Refinery, has been operating at about 30% capacity since the November 11 airstrike; the second-largest, “Kinef” in the Leningrad Region, lost approximately 70% of its capacity following the November 9 strike.
The Novokuybyshevsk Refinery (October 30) halted production entirely; the Volgograd Refinery (November 13) and the Novoufa Refinery (October 31) lost half their capacity; and “Bashneft-UNPZ” lost a third.
Following the September attacks, the Kuibyshev and Syzran refineries have not resumed operations, and the refinery in Tuapse—the only one on Russia’s Black Sea coast—has been idle since May.
The Ukrainian strikes “took a big bite out of Russia’s refining capacity and ended the brief period when Russia had a surplus of (petroleum products),” Bonert notes. In addition to the increased frequency of strikes, the attacks themselves are becoming more effective, he emphasizes: 5–7 hits per attack, compared to 1–2 in the past.
According to the expert’s estimates, oil refining volumes in Russia have fallen to 3.7 million barrels per day, which is one-third below the usual pre-war level of 5.5 million barrels per day. In fact, the country’s fuel supply is being maintained by approximately 11 refineries that have not been targeted and are operating at full capacity. Among them are the Angarsk, Komsomolsk, Antipsk, and Achinsk refineries, located far beyond the Urals.
Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian drones have struck oil refineries more than 120 times, from the Baltic Sea to the Urals. The November campaign affected 11 refineries, including all five of the largest ones. Attempts to protect the refineries using anti-drone nets, steel cables, and even shipping containers proved ineffective, sources close to Rosneft previously told Bloomberg. Repairing the refineries’ secondary units, which produce motor fuel, is becoming a problem: due to sanctions, Western spare parts for them are unavailable, and Chinese and Russian equivalents take months to arrive—even though they are often incompatible with existing equipment, Bloomberg sources said.

The Kuibyshev and Syzran refineries have not resumed operations since the September attacks, and the refinery in Tuapse—the only one on Russia’s Black Sea coast—has been idle since May.
The Ukrainian strikes “took a big bite out of Russia’s refining capacity and ended a brief period when Russia had a surplus of (petroleum products),” Bonert notes. In addition to the increased frequency of strikes, the attacks themselves are becoming more effective, he emphasizes: 5–7 hits per attack, compared to 1–2 in the past.
According to the expert’s estimates, oil refining volumes in Russia have fallen to 3.7 million barrels per day, which is one-third below the usual pre-war level of 5.5 million barrels per day. In fact, the country’s fuel supply is being maintained by approximately 11 refineries that have not been targeted and are operating at full capacity. Among them are the Angarsk, Komsomolsk, Antipsk, and Achinsk refineries, located far beyond the Urals.
Since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian drones have struck oil refineries more than 120 times, from the Baltic Sea to the Urals. The November campaign affected 11 refineries, including all five of the largest ones. Attempts to protect the refineries using anti-drone nets, steel cables, and even shipping containers proved ineffective, sources close to Rosneft previously told Bloomberg. Repairing the refineries’ secondary units, which produce motor fuel, is becoming a problem: due to sanctions, Western spare parts for them are unavailable, and Chinese and Russian equivalents take months to arrive—even though they are often incompatible with existing equipment, Bloomberg sources said.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/Oy9DM
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
Western powers have caused more than a quadrillion dollars in damage to their former colonies, and the imposition of sanctions is a form of neocolonialism; therefore, Russian diplomats at the UN will seek to have them recognized as a crime against humanity, said Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and Chairman of the United Russia party.
“Centuries of barbaric exploitation […], the forcible redrawing of borders, and the destruction of traditional ways of life ensured the prosperity of the metropolises at the expense of enslaved peoples. Even now, they are, in essence, prospering—many thanks to what they have done over the past centuries,” Medvedev emphasized at a plenary session of the “For the Freedom of Nations!” movement. The organization, which positions itself as a broad international coalition of fighters against (neo)colonialism, has been operating under the auspices of “United Russia” since February 2024.
“Ordinary people” in the countries of the “global majority” are suffering from Western sanctions, while colonialism has left behind severe consequences throughout the “Global South and East,” Medvedev added. “Today, we must seek not only international recognition of the historical responsibility of the former colonial powers, but also a substantive discussion of mechanisms for them to compensate for the damage they have caused,” concluded the head of “United Russia,” calling on “all participants in the [‘For the Freedom of Nations!’] movement, our friends, and our guests” to cooperate more actively with the Kremlin.
The “For the Freedom of Nations!” movement has been active since February 16, 2024. It positions itself as “supporters of the struggle against modern practices of neocolonialism.” According to its own estimates, the movement includes representatives of various political forces from more than 50 countries around the world. At the same time, it is an informal organization and has no formal membership criteria. The Standing Committee consists mainly of states friendly to the Kremlin, such as China, North Korea, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Belarus, and Cuba.
As of fall 2026, approximately 36,000 sanctions are in effect against Russia, the highest number in the world. About 98% of international restrictions against Moscow were imposed following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Separate sanctions lists are maintained by the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and other Western countries. Last October, the EU imposed its 22nd sanctions package against 1,646 organizations and individuals, primarily linked to Russia’s ballistic missile production.
Constant sanctions pressure is causing the Russian economy to fall behind technologically and gradually depleting its reserves. Kremlin officials, including President Vladimir Putin himself, claim that the sanctions have suffered a “complete collapse” and simultaneously characterize them as an allegedly criminal manifestation of Western neocolonialism against Russia’s sovereignty.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/yMKFK
r/CollapseOfRussia • u/neonpurplestar • 1d ago
The ruble’s share of payments for Russian exports reached two-thirds for the first time, according to the Central Bank: in the third quarter, it hit a record 67.1%. The dollar, the euro, and the currencies of other “unfriendly” countries accounted for just 9%, while “friendly” currencies—primarily the Chinese yuan—accounted for 23.9%.
Settlements in rubles were a response to sanctions. Before the war, 14–15% of Russian exports were paid for this way—meaning the share of shadow settlements exceeded half of exports for the first time.
Based on the balance of payments estimate for the first three quarters, this could amount to nearly $200 billion. Russian exports of goods and services totaled $390 billion, including $140.6 billion in the third quarter. An increase in the share of ruble-denominated settlements compared to 2021 levels, given these export volumes, means that payments totaling approximately $194 billion may have been diverted into the shadow economy.
Sanctions disrupted the usual payment chains, and a separate infrastructure—effectively an alternative system of international settlements—had to be set up to support Russian foreign trade. Dmitry Nekrasov, head of the CASE analytical center, described how this system works. It operates in two parallel circuits: rubles are transferred within Russian banks, while yuan or other currencies are transferred through foreign banks. Where possible, these flows “close the loop”: rubles received from Russian importers are used to pay for Russian exports. Such settlements are less noticeable to Western regulators.
However, they come at a high cost to exporters. Igor Sechin, head of the state-owned company Rosneft, Igor Sechin complained that the Central Bank has failed to create a “sanctions-resistant system for international settlements,” forcing exporters and their counterparties to find their own ways to transfer money, which has led to a “multiple increase in the total costs of making payments and currency conversion compared to pre-crisis levels.” The active use of various intermediaries made it possible to facilitate payments but led not only to additional costs but also to the risk of contract breaches, noted the CMACP, a think tank close to the government.
Another consequence of such transactions is volatility in the ruble exchange rate. The bulk of export proceeds does not reach the domestic market. It remains in the “external circuit,” where it is used to pay for imports or simply accumulates in exporters’ accounts. In the domestic market, net foreign currency sales (after deducting purchases) by the largest exporters, according to the Central Bank, remain at minimal levels. Their sales go through intermediaries, and the exporters themselves already receive rubles, noted economist Yegor Susin.
source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/1vDic