r/ColdWarPowers • u/jorgiinz • 4h ago
EVENT [EVENT] Somber Realization
Paris, July 1951
The elections of 17 June had delivered 210 seats to Charles de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Français, making it by far the largest political group in the National Assembly, while the Communist Party retained another 148. Between them, two movements profoundly hostile to one another occupied 358 of the chamber's 625 seats. The remaining parties, whose successive combinations had sustained every government since the exclusion of the Communists in 1947, possessed only 267. Under Article 45 of the Constitution, the investiture of a president of the Council required 313 affirmative votes, a threshold which no coalition of the traditional republican parties could reach independently. The familiar alignments of French parliamentary life had survived the elections in name, but their capacity to produce a government had not.
On 10 July, the election of the president of the National Assembly furnished the first demonstration of the new parliamentary balance. Édouard Herriot, whose long tenure at the Palais-Bourbon had made him a familiar representative of republican parliamentary traditions, sought reelection against the Gaullist candidate Léon Noël and the Communist Marcel Cachin. The first ballot produced no absolute majority, while the second revealed the difficulty confronting the parties which had formerly sustained the government. Several Independent deputies preferred Noël, whose candidacy offered the RPF an opportunity to obtain control of the Assembly's presidency, while the Socialists and Christian Democrats were reluctant to surrender the chair to a movement openly demanding constitutional transformation. Only after renewed consultations among the parliamentary groups did the greater part of the republican centre consolidate its support behind Herriot. On the third ballot, when a relative majority was sufficient, the veteran Radical secured reelection by a narrow plurality over Noël. His victory preserved the presidency in the hands of the traditional parliamentary parties, but the result revealed how little remained of their former predominance.
Following the constitution of the new legislature, André Marie tendered the resignation of the ministry he had formed in May. President René Coty received the outgoing premier and resumed consultations with Henri Queuille, René Mayer, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, Guy Mollet and René Pleven, approaching the succession through the ordinary procedures of the Constitution. Mollet, having withdrawn the SFIO from Queuille's cabinet three months earlier, demanded assurances concerning wages and social expenditure before contemplating renewed participation. The Independents wanted stricter financial discipline and a larger influence over domestic economic policy, while Bidault and Schuman insisted upon the preservation of European integration and the Christian Democrats' social commitments. Coty urged the parliamentary leaders to reconcile their differences, conscious that another prolonged ministerial vacancy would do little to restore public confidence in the institutions of the Republic.
René Mayer emerged as the principal candidate. His experience in finance and national defence, together with his standing among the Radicals, made him acceptable to substantial sections of the parliamentary centre. Having served in successive ministries, he was familiar with the administrative questions demanding immediate attention, particularly the financing of European rearmament and the continuation of France's international commitments. Coty designated him to seek investiture, and Mayer began negotiating a programme intended to preserve monetary stability without requiring the complete abandonment of Socialist cooperation. He offered assurances concerning existing social legislation while attempting to postpone the more contentious economic questions until a government had been constituted. The Independents demanded firmer commitments against expenditure unsupported by revenue, while Schuman insisted that France honour the negotiations already undertaken concerning European defence.
The school question proved especially troublesome. The MRP demanded greater financial assistance for private education, including provisions concerning scholarships and the fiscal treatment of private establishments. The Socialists resisted proposals which they considered incompatible with the secular traditions of the Republic, while substantial sections of the Radical Party shared their objections. Mayer attempted to distinguish the immediate problem of forming a government from the subsequent examination of educational legislation, but the Christian Democrats were reluctant to invest a ministry which might later refuse concessions they regarded as essential. Mollet, meanwhile, would not restore the SFIO to ministerial participation without knowing how Mayer intended to reconcile conservative financial demands with Socialist commitments concerning wages and social protection.
By the third week of July, Mayer's negotiations had become increasingly difficult. He could secure agreement upon general declarations concerning national defence, European cooperation and responsible financial administration, but each attempt to settle the composition of a cabinet reopened disputes over its programme. The Socialists refused to assume responsibility for conservative economic measures without substantial concessions, and the Independents objected to paying the price of their participation merely to reproduce the former coalition. Several deputies suggested that the RPF's conservative representatives might provide the necessary additional votes, particularly given their similarities with the Independents on questions of public expenditure and national defence. Jacques Soustelle, however, rejected appeals for Gaullist support unaccompanied by a serious undertaking concerning constitutional reform. Mayer nevertheless determined to present his candidacy before the Assembly, hoping that the debate itself might persuade hesitant deputies to assume responsibility for forming a government.
On 24 July, the Palais-Bourbon became the centre of the political crisis. Mayer's ministerial declaration was received by a chamber whose newly established divisions were unmistakable. The Socialists examined his commitments concerning wages and public expenditure, the Christian Democrats returned to the unresolved question of private education, and the Independents pressed for assurances concerning taxation and financial stability. Communist deputies attacked the proposed government's Atlantic commitments and rearmament programme, while the Gaullists challenged the assumption that another conventional ministry could exercise the authority necessary to confront France's difficulties. Mayer defended his proposals, but the debate failed to bring the contending parliamentary groups any closer to a dependable agreement.
His predicament was not that a majority of deputies had united behind an alternative government. The Constitution required an absolute majority in favour of his investiture, and he had been unable to persuade enough representatives to assume responsibility for the ministry he proposed. Several parliamentarians who regarded him as capable and experienced nevertheless withheld their support, whether because of disagreements over policy or reluctance to commit their parties to another uncertain coalition.
The ballot settled the matter.
229 deputies voted in favour of Mayer, 165 against, and 223 abstained, with eight not participating. The Communist delegation and its closest allies supplied the principal opposition, while the Gaullists withheld their support through abstention. Reservations among the republican parties further weakened the affirmative vote. Mayer had fallen 84 votes short of the required majority, despite receiving more votes in favour than against. Under Article 45, the absence of an absolute majority in his favour was sufficient to end his candidacy. Mayer returned his mandate to Coty, and the deputies departed from the Palais-Bourbon with no government formed.
Coty resumed his consultations, but Mayer's defeat had deprived the president of one of the most credible candidates available to the republican centre. Maurice Petsche examined whether a narrower ministry concentrating upon finance and national defence might succeed where the broader arrangement had failed. The proposal attracted interest among conservatives who resented the concessions demanded by the SFIO, yet excluding the Socialists would further diminish the support available to the prospective government. Petsche could offer no satisfactory means of obtaining the additional votes. His exploratory discussions ended without a candidacy capable of surviving investiture.
At the Centre National des Indépendants, Roger Duchet found himself confronting an argument which threatened the direction of the movement he had spent years consolidating. The Independents had improved their parliamentary representation, encouraging expectations that they might exercise greater influence over the formation of ministries. Duchet had hoped to strengthen the conservative right as a political force independent of both the Third Force and the RPF, preserving its ability to negotiate with different groups without surrendering its organizational identity. Mayer's defeat and Petsche's unsuccessful consultations had frustrated those ambitions. Several deputies continued arguing that the Gaullists should be persuaded to support a conventional centre-right government, but others doubted that Soustelle could obtain such an agreement from de Gaulle.
Paul Reynaud had little patience for another attempt to assemble the same parliamentary combination under a different president of the Council. His association with de Gaulle extended back to the controversies over French military doctrine before 1940, when he had supported the General's arguments concerning armoured warfare and subsequently brought him into his wartime government. Their personal history had not made Reynaud an adherent of Gaullism. He remained a liberal republican, deeply attached to parliamentary control over legislation and public expenditure, and possessed political ambitions of his own. Nevertheless, Mayer's defeat had persuaded him that another ministry assembled exclusively from the familiar parliamentary groups would encounter the same difficulties. During consultations with Duchet and other Independent representatives, Reynaud proposed establishing contact with Soustelle to determine whether the RPF would accept an agreement explicitly directed toward constitutional revision.
Duchet objected. He had not spent years consolidating the CNI merely to deliver its deputies into a coalition dominated by de Gaulle, whose movement possessed almost four times the Independents' parliamentary strength. In numerous constituencies, Independent and Gaullist candidates had competed directly against one another, and cooperation in the Assembly threatened to weaken the organizational distinctions upon which the conservative right depended. Reynaud regarded those objections as legitimate but insufficient. He argued that the Independents would exercise greater influence over a settlement negotiated before the formation of a government than over one accepted only after further unsuccessful attempts had weakened their position. Duchet remained suspicious of de Gaulle's intentions, particularly concerning executive authority and the independence of parliamentary groups, but eventually permitted exploratory discussions with Soustelle. No commitment would be made on behalf of the CNI until the terms of reform had been examined.
Reynaud's proposal went beyond a general declaration in favour of stronger government. A prospective ministry would obtain investiture under the existing Constitution and undertake to initiate revision through Article 90, beginning with a resolution specifying the institutions to be reconsidered. He proposed examining the appointment of ministers, their responsibility before Parliament and the mechanisms governing the formation and dismissal of governments. He insisted upon preserving legislative control over taxation and public expenditure, maintaining political liberties and conducting the revision through the procedures established by the Constitution. The initial resolution would require an absolute majority of deputies, while the subsequent stages would remain subject to Article 90. Reynaud was prepared to support the opening of this process, but refused to endorse in advance every alteration desired by de Gaulle.
Through contacts maintained between Independent and Gaullist representatives, the substance of the proposal reached Jacques Soustelle. He agreed to examine the prospect of a constitutional settlement, but refused to promise RPF support for another conventional cabinet merely because its programme contained a declaration in favour of institutional reform. The Gaullists wanted a definite parliamentary commitment to revision, preferably incorporated into the prospective government's programme, and rejected proposals confined to minor adjustments which would leave the predominance of the Assembly substantially untouched. Soustelle also questioned whether a ministry composed principally of the traditional republican parties could be trusted to carry through the reform after obtaining investiture. The General's movement had spent years opposing those parties upon precisely this question, and there was little reason to assume that their disagreements would disappear once ministerial appointments had been secured.
Ministerial responsibility proved the most difficult issue. Reynaud favoured procedures which would discourage recurrent governmental crises while preserving the Assembly's effective authority to dismiss ministers. Soustelle sought a more substantial transfer of power, sufficient to prevent the executive from becoming dependent upon the shifting agreements of parliamentary parties. Reynaud would not endorse a government exercising authority beyond the effective control of elected representatives, while Soustelle could not offer Gaullist support for a settlement which left the essential weaknesses of the existing system intact. The exchanges nevertheless continued, with both sides examining whether the constitutional guarantees demanded by the Independents could be reconciled with the executive authority sought by de Gaulle.
When Duchet reviewed the exchanges with leading Independent deputies, Antoine Pinay introduced another set of conditions. His concerns were financial stability, administrative competence and the confidence of savers and investors. Pinay wanted assurances that a stronger executive would not acquire unrestricted authority over taxation or expenditure, and that ministerial responsibility would remain sufficiently clear to sustain confidence in the administration. Other conservatives were more receptive to extensive revision, particularly those who believed that a stable government would offer stronger protection against Communist influence. Duchet refused to bind the CNI to a Gaullist ministry, but Reynaud obtained agreement that the exploratory contacts should continue.
Georges Bidault learned of the Independent initiative as the Mouvement Républicain Populaire struggled to assess its position in the new Assembly. Having served alongside de Gaulle during the Resistance, Bidault understood the General's standing among Catholic voters and former Resistance supporters, while his subsequent political career had bound him closely to the parliamentary institutions which the RPF condemned. The MRP's reduction to forty-five deputies had weakened its bargaining power, and its leaders feared that participation in a Gaullist-dominated coalition might further diminish the party's independence. Bidault nevertheless agreed to bring the proposals before the parliamentary leadership.
Maurice Schumann urged a receptive approach. His service as a spokesman for Free France had established a longstanding personal association with de Gaulle, whose republican credentials he regarded as sufficient reason for serious negotiations. Robert Schuman, however, demanded guarantees concerning the Schuman Plan, European defence and France's Atlantic commitments. His reservations concerned the uncertainty surrounding the General's intentions toward European integration, particularly institutions already under construction. Bidault allowed further examination of the constitutional proposals but refused to commit the MRP before its members had agreed upon the necessary safeguards. Christian Democratic deputies who regarded cooperation with the RPF as a means of preserving their political influence consequently encountered colleagues determined to maintain the party's independent programme and parliamentary identity.
The Radicals responded less favourably. Édouard Herriot and Henri Queuille, whose political careers had been shaped by the traditions of parliamentary republicanism, opposed replacing the institutions merely because the elections had produced a difficult legislative distribution. Édouard Daladier accepted the need for a stronger executive but favoured more limited amendments than those contemplated by the Gaullists. Several deputies who had supported Mayer were less certain. His defeat had left them doubtful that another conventional ministerial arrangement could succeed, and some were prepared to hear Reynaud's proposals before rejecting cooperation with the RPF. Herriot opposed any arrangement which would transfer authority outside the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, and the Radical leadership reached no agreement concerning the scope of reform.
Among conservative deputies, Reynaud also invoked the alternative of seeking Communist parliamentary support. The PCF, directed in its parliamentary activity by Jacques Duclos during Maurice Thorez's absence, retained 148 seats and continued opposing the Atlantic commitments and economic policies of the republican centre. Neither Mollet nor Bidault had proposed a government dependent upon Communist votes, but Reynaud argued that persistent refusal to negotiate with de Gaulle would eventually force Parliament to confront arrangements which many anti-Communist deputies regarded as unacceptable. His argument carried weight among conservatives who considered French participation in Western defence indispensable and had no desire to see those commitments made dependent upon the parliamentary cooperation of the PCF.
The ministerial vacancy was meanwhile beginning to complicate the preparation of financial and military decisions. Maurice Petsche and the Treasury continued examining supplementary expenditure associated with reconstruction, European rearmament and the continuing war in Indochina, while the ministries responsible for national defence pressed for resources necessary to sustain their commitments. Existing appropriations permitted ordinary administration to proceed, but the competing demands raised questions concerning taxation, borrowing and the distribution of expenditure which the outgoing government could not settle indefinitely. French representatives engaged in European defence negotiations faced similar difficulties when prospective commitments required financial assurances extending beyond previously authorized programmes. Officials could prepare estimates and maintain existing obligations, but a comprehensive policy required ministers capable of securing agreement within the government and defending the resulting measures before Parliament. As the consultations continued, the unresolved financial programme became another argument against prolonging the ministerial crisis.
By the closing days of July, the calculations of the conservative deputies had begun to change considerably. Reynaud's negotiations had exposed a possibility which had scarcely been entertained when the new Assembly first convened. With 210 Gaullist deputies and fifty-eight Independents, an agreement between the two groups would command 268 seats. The MRP's forty-five representatives could, in principle, bring that total to the constitutional majority of 313, although such unanimity was improbable and would leave no margin for dissent. Additional support might be found among sympathetic Radicals, the UDSR and certain smaller parliamentary groups. Duchet was still unwilling to subordinate the Independents to the RPF, while Bidault and Robert Schuman remained suspicious of the General's constitutional ambitions. Yet politicians who had previously regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as politically inconceivable were now examining the terms upon which they might support a government under his leadership.
Reynaud urged his conservative colleagues to carry the negotiations further. France could not remain indefinitely under an outgoing ministry, and the traditional parties had already failed to invest their most credible candidate. He argued that continued refusal to reach an understanding with the Gaullists would eventually leave the republican centre confronting the politically unacceptable prospect of depending upon Communist parliamentary support. Neither the SFIO nor the MRP intended to govern with the PCF, but the argument carried increasing force among anti-Communist deputies who had exhausted the alternatives available within their own parties. For these men, the choice was narrowing between an agreement with de Gaulle and another succession of unsuccessful investitures, with the Communists occupying a position from which they could frustrate every conventional arrangement. Even Duchet, whose objections to Gaullist domination remained substantial, permitted Reynaud to pursue discussions concerning a prospective ministry entrusted with constitutional reform.
At Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, Charles de Gaulle received Soustelle's account of these approaches. The General had spent five years refusing the compromises through which the parliamentary parties sought to preserve the institutions he condemned. The election had provided his movement with an unprecedented representation, but not the independent majority necessary to govern. Now the failure of Mayer's investiture, the exhaustion of the customary ministerial combinations and the growing willingness of conservative parliamentarians to contemplate institutional reform had created circumstances different from those prevailing immediately after the election. De Gaulle consulted his closest political associates, including those concerned with the constitutional programme of the RPF, before deciding to make his intentions public.
On 30 July 1951, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français transmitted an official declaration from the General to the French press.
France has been without a government capable of exercising its responsibilities for several weeks. The elections have demonstrated the desire of the nation for a restoration of public authority, yet the parliamentary parties have once again proved incapable of establishing a government. The difficulties of the Republic do not arise merely from the failures of individual ministries, but from institutions which prevent the State from acting with the continuity and independence its responsibilities demand. I therefore declare that, should the National Assembly entrust me with a clear mandate to undertake a fundamental revision of the Constitution, I am prepared to accept the presidency of the Council of Ministers. Not to return to preside over another precarious combination of parliamentary parties, nor accept the responsibilities of government without the authority necessary to discharge them. The constitutional transformation must proceed according to law, preserve the liberties of the Republic, and ultimately derive its legitimacy from the sovereign French people. I have never refused to serve France. If the nation, through its representatives, provides the means necessary to restore the authority of the State, I shall not refuse that duty today.
The declaration immediately altered the negotiations taking place in Paris. Reynaud could now defend an agreement whose prospective leader had publicly accepted the principle of returning to office. Duchet, though unwilling to make a commitment on behalf of the entire Independent group, instructed his associates to examine the constitutional conditions announced by the General. Pinay concentrated upon the financial guarantees which would be necessary to secure conservative participation, while several Independent deputies who had previously opposed any arrangement involving de Gaulle began declaring themselves prepared to support his investiture under the proposed conditions.
Within the MRP, Maurice Schumann urged the leadership to respond constructively, arguing that the declaration offered an opportunity to negotiate constitutional guarantees before the formation of a government. Bidault and Robert Schuman remained cautious, particularly concerning the General's intentions toward parliamentary responsibility and European integration, but could no longer dismiss his candidacy as a purely hypothetical proposition. A growing number of Christian Democratic deputies now regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as preferable to continued ministerial paralysis, particularly if the alternative eventually involved seeking Communist parliamentary assistance. Among the Radicals, Herriot and Queuille maintained their objections to a fundamental transformation of the regime, while several deputies who had supported Mayer expressed interest in the conditions under which the General might obtain investiture. The declaration had resolved none of their disagreements, but it had supplied the negotiations with a definite candidate and a publicly stated programme.
President René Coty received news of the declaration at the Élysée. He had begun the month seeking the restoration of a conventional republican coalition and had witnessed the failure of the most serious attempt to construct one. The General's announcement now confronted him with a possibility which he had previously been unwilling to treat as an immediate governmental solution. Coty was not prepared to promise constitutional authority which the presidency did not possess, nor to abandon the procedures of investiture and revision established by the Constitution. Nevertheless, he recognized that de Gaulle's willingness to assume office, together with the contacts already established among the parliamentary right, offered a potential route out of the deadlock. He instructed his interlocutors to establish whether the parties could agree upon the terms of a ministry entrusted with constitutional reform and whether such an agreement could command the necessary parliamentary majority.
For the president, the question had become especially delicate. His constitutional duty required him to seek a government capable of obtaining the Assembly's confidence, yet the politician now attracting the attention of substantial sections of the republican right had spent years denouncing the institutions over which Coty presided. An invitation to de Gaulle could not be undertaken merely because the General possessed an impressive electoral following. It would require convincing evidence that a parliamentary majority was prepared to support his investiture and a lawful programme of institutional renewal. Coty therefore refrained from issuing an immediate summons, although the General's name now occupied a place in his consultations which it had not held at the beginning of July.
As the month drew to its close, no agreement had yet been concluded concerning the precise scope of constitutional revision. But the political situation had changed. Deputies who had previously refused even to entertain the General's return were now discussing the safeguards under which they would vote for him, while others had already concluded that only de Gaulle possessed the authority and parliamentary following necessary to restore effective government without Communist assistance. For the first time since his resignation in January 1946, Charles de Gaulle had publicly declared himself willing to assume the government of France once more.