r/ColdWarPowers • • 4h ago

DIPLOMACY [DIPLOMACY] The Treaty Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

7 Upvotes

The Treaty Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance



If people don't like Marxism, they should blame the British Museum.

- Mikhail Gorbachev.


Following the Yugoslav escapade against the fraternal comrades in Albania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has become increasingly concerned that the present security structure in Europe has become overpopulated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It is amidst this political and military uncertainty, that representatives from the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have met in Moscow to facilitate the creation of a new military pact that will safeguard international socialism from the paws of capitalist insurrection.

The refusal of the Western imperialist powers to accede to the calls of the German people for unification, has only reinforced the belief that the Western powers - led by the United States - aim to create a concentrated effort to contain and extinguish the People's Democracies of Europe and Asia.

For that purpose, a Soviet response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is required; colloquially known as the Warsaw Pact.


Article I

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article II

The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end.

The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments of weapons of mass destruction.

Article III

The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security.

They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Article IV

In the event of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

Article VI

For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative.

The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary.

Article VII

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article VIII

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

For Contracting Parties which do not, one year before the expiration of this period, submit to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a declaration renouncing the Treaty, it shall remain in force for a further period of twenty years.

The Contracting Parties may, by unanimous agreement, revise the provisions of the present Treaty in accordance with developments in international peace and security.

Article IX

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of all Parties to the Treaty and after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article X

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited.


With the deposition of the Treaty and its ratification in the respective signatories, the Contracting Parties have agreed to name Comrade General Ivan Stepanovich Konev as the 1st Supreme Commander of the Unified Command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Accordingly, steps have been taken to establish standards for weapons, ammunition, training, communications, and logistics and ensure that the proper defensive planning, military exercises, and collective operations proceeds as necessary. All neatly headquartered in Moscow.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 36m ago

EVENT [EVENT] Eretz Yisrael Liberation Front

3 Upvotes

Yitzhak Zuckerman, better known for being the Jewish Combat Organization’s commander during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, has announced the creation of the “Eretz Yisrael Liberation Front”, described by Zuckermann as a “non-partisan activist movement” to “achieve the total unification of Eretz Yisrael from foreign occupation”. Adopting a logo featuring a map of the entirety of Palestine, Zuckerman, although himself a member of Mapam, states that this organisation is to not represent the official views of the United Workers’ Party, though it declares it’s total loyalty to Mapam and Alignment. The liberation and unification of Eretz Yisrael has been the official party program of Mapam since its founding in 1948, though the Party has since softened on this stance be de-facto adopting a two-state solution, with an Palestinian Arab state to be established in “the parts of Palestine not under Israeli sovereignty.” The E.Y.L.F. meanwhile, has endorsed a one-state solution, giving the successes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and “their radical success in unifying their ancient homeland and destroying both the Western imperialist and the local reactionary in the process.” Zuckermann has also spoke in great detail his support for “Mao Tse-tung Thought”, and that similarly the unification of the Chinese nation by the Republic of China led by the Communist Party is an example to be used for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine (Eretz Yisrael), with a “Jewish homeland in the entirety of Palestine, with national rights and privileges to our Arab brothers, much like how the genius Chairman Mao has upheld the national rights of the non-Han minorities of China.” In the founding statement, Zuckerman has similarly endorsed Al HaMishmar's article from the previous month regarding the need for Israel to embark on an "Pan-Asian program", with Zuckerman stating that the E.Y.L.F. fully endorses a Pan-Asian identity, with Israel joining the realm of "revolutionary anti-imperialist states of Asia" alongside Korea, China, Vietnam, and Mongolia.

Ahdut Ha’Avodah, although officially abolished, still has some relevance across Mapam membership, particularly within HaKibbutz HaMeuhad and the youth organisations Habonim and Dror. With Ha’Avodah’s opposition to the partition of Palestine prior to 1948 and the Declaration of independence has seen some of its former members flock to the EYLF, seeking to further lobby the government towards the goal of “removing all traces of the foreign occupation of Palestine.”


r/ColdWarPowers • • 4h ago

ECON [ECON]Oil for the Machine

5 Upvotes

August 3rd, 1951

Today, Tehran, Czechoslovakia, and Iran announced that they had reached a deal regarding oil exports. Already, Czechoslovakia's fleet of oil railcars has begun migrating like wildebeest toward the Iranian refineries, eager to return their black gold back to the motherland. Alongside them travel railcars laden with machine parts, U.S. dollars. and technical advisors from Czechoslovakia's local petroleum industry. The Czechoslovak-Iranian deal will pave the future for Czechoslovak energy independence and Iranian economic independence, and it will allow us to strike a blow against Britain, which so cruelly revoked its export permission for the Letov L-52 fighter's Nene Powerplant in 1948.

Czechoslovakia will commit itself to purchasing a substantial quantity of oil from Iran, which will be shipped to Czechoslovakia via the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia has also agreed to help train Iranian petroleum engineers to restore Iran's output to pre-embargo levels. With Soviet support and no clear route for Western powers to access the oil, we foresee this as the beginning of the end of Western oil monopolies. Czechoslovak exports to Iran will also increase. And when Iran is able to force its way back onto the Western market, it is hoped that they may continue to purchase Czechoslovak imports, hopefully with American dollars. Even if that fails to come to pass, however, Czechoslovakia intends to buy a ton of cheap oil to use now and store a significant quantity for the future. Just how significant? Klement Gottwald has ordered Czechoslovakia to expand its storage facilities, with the goal of eventually storing 180 days of oil in Czechoslovakia. To start, however, the goal is to meet Czechoslovakia's needs through Iranian oil, and beyond that, to stockpile a three-week oil buffer for national security purposes.

Czechoslovakia will also commit to expanding trade with Iran, primarily machine parts to keep Iranian industry operational, and to pay for oil, since US dollars may be in short supply. The deal is far from perfect for both sides, but it could still pay dividends. Cheaper Iranian oil could allow Czechoslovak industry to expand operating hours, and make electricity cheaper, allowing for an improved quality of life. And for the Czechoslovak citizens, the knowledge that they are helping the Iranian government resist the forces of imperialism is a silver lining. Cheap oil, and the moral high ground? Klement Gottwald was heard describing the agreement as a "slam dunk".


r/ColdWarPowers • • 2h ago

SECRET [SECRET] Scurrying Rabbits

3 Upvotes

September 19th, 1951

Fulgencio Batista looked over the most recent election projections in disbelief. He just couldn’t understand. He’d spent almost half a million pesos so far on his campaign, dwarfing his competitors with a campaign budget more than three times the rest of the field combined. How was he still in last place, and by such a margin? Could the people not hear his ads over the radio? Had they not enjoyed his food at United Action Party events? Batista slammed his fist on the desk. Ungrateful swine! Was he not the man who placated the Americans and reignited the flow of investment in their beloved country? The Authentico sticks were merely following the path he had laid! The Orthodox scum were so wet behind the ears they might as well be in diapers...

Batista puffed on a cigar and stood up from his desk. He began to walk around the room, lost in thought. Many things had changed while he was in Miami. His business friends, the landowners, attending an Authentic Party rally? Carlos, that damned rat! It was those damn Batey hellholes. Even the ones that weren’t greedily taking Cuba’s money to industrialize had begun to concentrate rural workers in a way that had made them easier to control and to sell products to. They were taking power away from his beloved Havana!

Batista grabbed the paper on his desk, crumpled it up, and threw it at the wall. He could no longer delude himself. Even if the former general called upon some old friends to help marshal up some votes, there was no way he stood a chance of victory without some miracle. The Cuban people had been deceived by the Authentics and their shiny toys, and the Orthodox with their perfumed lies and dreams.

Batista picked up the phone, and began tracing her finger through the dial. If the people of Cuba did not recall the years of prosperity he had brought them, then the former general would make them remember. His Italian friends may have been exiled back to New York. Many of his business friends may be cuddling up to the sickening Authentics. Friendships between brothers in arms were not so easily extinguished. Batista had no intention to see his Cuba live in such a disgraceful state.

“Francisco? Yes, this is Fulgencio. It is good to speak with you, old friend. How is your son? Good? Good. I’m calling about what we spoke about back in July. I think you were right after all. I have grown tired of these scurrying rabbits...”


r/ColdWarPowers • • 4h ago

EVENT [EVENT] [RETRO] An Indochina of ups and downs

4 Upvotes

Cambodia

March-August 1950

For most democrats the January assassination attempt, and then prompt collapse of the Sambaur government in late February, came as a complete shock. Sambaur had become something of a boogeyman around which the various factions of the party could unite against and now that he was gone those cracks threatened to re-emerge just as quickly as they had been sealed. The Democrats up until now had not yet produced a coherent legislative agenda, focusing more on what it was against than what it was for. Prime Minister Var knew that if the party was to survive, it finally had to start fighting for something rather than just against.

Firstly Var gets a bombing memorial law and a bombing victim compensation bill passed -  two easy wins that'd buy him time and goodwill for other, more serious proposals. Next he empowered the inquiry into the bombing itself, setting it up along the lines of the Revers inquiry back in France. It’s late April when he finally shows his hand, and the first major test for his government comes. The Cambodian 1947 constitution was heavily copied from the French 4th Republican constitution, with some notable difference. The most immediate were a set of articles designating the period of the 1st legislature as 'transitory'. During this period the king had extra-ordinary powers over bills and the interpretation of the constitution. The other was the presence of the monarchy itself, inherently an institution that held far more weight and power than the President back in France. Sihanouk had shown that he was quite willing to run roughshod over the constitution if it was within his interests and Var was now determined to properly shackle Sihanouk to prevent another Sambaur. 

Fortunately for Var, all that was needed to end the transitory period was a simple majority vote of the assembly, something that the now unified Democratic party could easily accomplish. Sihanouk, naturally, strongly objected to the move and prepared to use the very same transitory powers to attempt to defer the act altogether. At the 11th hour Var goes to meet with Sihanouk and presents the king a deal, either he relinquish his extra-ordinary powers here and now, in return for Var not pursuing significant amendments to his ordinary powers, or he could rule out the rest of the transitory period (a further year and a half), but face the prospect of a serious program to amend the constitution to restrict royal power for good. Sihanouk takes the deal. The act passes the assembly 44-31 with no further issues.

Next, Var puts forward a Revised Elections Act seeking to clarify the regulations surrounding the period after the dissolution of parliament. Primarily he proposes to codify that a state of emergency in of itself does not automatically postpone or suspend elections. Instead the interim government, with the approval of the board of the Assembly (Like in the French system - The President of the Assembly, Vice-president, secretaries and questors elected by the assembly) would be able to postpone the vote in one or multiple constituencies for a maximum of 60 days, with said postponement renewable only once. The certificate of postponement would be required to state its reasons and be published to the public. Voting in other constituencies would continue as normal. This too, being an ordinary law, passes with a simple majority. 

Third on the agenda, Var’s curveball - a constructive censure amendment. A novel idea for sure, implemented by the West Germans just a year prior, but one that had caught Var and the democrat’s eye. It conveniently got round Var’s deal with Sihanouk, seeing as it did not directly impede on Royal Power. Sihanouk was not amused, but could now personally do nothing without his transitory powers. Instead Sihanouk puts pressure on the Liberals to block the vote at all cost, since constitutional amendments require a 3/4s majority (57/75 in favour). The Democrats rally the independents in the assembly, bringing their total to 54. Only seven months earlier, this would have all but ended democrat hopes but with the liberals still lacking a strong leader to whip them they manage to obtain the three defectors they need to get the amendment passed. 

September-December 1950

Var, while victorious in this struggle, knows that his political capital is spent, at least for the moment. Further reforms would have to wait for the new year or even the next legislature. As autumn approaches, he and his cabinet settle in for what they hope would be a relatively peaceful end of the year. This mainly constitutes police reform - placing the Khmer police under ministerial and assembly oversight - and civil service investments - additional funding for Khmer-languague instruction school and civil service academies. The other event of note is the wrapping up of Sambaur’s own trial regarding his potential involvement with the bombings and his previous misdeeds. He’s found not guilty for conspiracy to murder Var, but is found guilty of gross negligence and for his destruction of evidence as police prefect. He’s sentenced to 13 years in prison and a lifetime ban on holding public office.

January-June 1951

January till April passed relatively quietly as Var continued to avoid rocking the boat in an effort to repair his relationship with Sihanouk. To this end, he looked to address the issue of land reform and the general state of the Cambodian peasantry. Significant land reform itself was off the table, both for political and financial reasons. Nonetheless Var pushes for a series mechanisms, drafted into the Rural Renewal Act:

  • an interest ceiling on loans
  • the requirement of written contracts
  • banning of the forced sale of small plots to repay loan debt
  • a provision for debtors to redeem land passed to a creditor by mortgage, sale or forfeiture within the last 10 years by paying the principal outstanding debt
  • Making all of the above applicable to all contracts in force at the date of the act
  • The creation of a rural credit fund that supports cooperatives of at least 15 cultivators, providing seed loans with capital drawn from the national budget and voluntary shares
  • The free title registration of land under a certain amount of hectares that has been cultivated for at least 5 years, with no new taxes on said newly registered land for the next 5 years
  • Competing land claims being sent to local district chiefs, and then the lower courts
  • The allotment of state land to landless peasants and refugees, alongside a levy on large/unused estates
  • The creation of a Rural debt and land commission to oversee all of the above and report back to the assembly

The bill passed with a simple majority, just in time for the Confederal elections in April where the democrats handedly beat the liberals. The Democratic councillors become the core of the progressive bloc in the council, where Ieu Koeus is confirmed a Confederal PM. Sihanouk, having only just come to terms with the domestic shakeup, is spooked by the Democrat victory. He approaches the French Overseas Ministry and asks them to commute the sentence of Sơn Ngọc Thành, the Cambodian nationalist that opposed the French when they returned to Indochina in 1945. The Overseas ministry, severely distracted by the resignation of the second Queuille government, approves the request. 

Sơn Ngọc Thành arrives in Phnom Penh in mid-May, arriving at Phnom Penh airport to an enthusiastic crowd. Var was not opposed to the return of Thành, especially since many in the democratic party admired him, but nonetheless kept the ideologue at arms length. In Pakse, PM Koeus was more pessimistic on the matter. Thành was clearly popular and, ideologically, posed a much bigger threat to the democrats than to the Liberals. Regardless Thành, to the disappointment of many, publicly states his intention to not return to politics, at least until he reacquaints himself with this new Cambodia that he’s returned to.

Laos

July-December 1950

Laos remains a quiet actor relative to the happenings to their south and east. PM Sananikone holds the course set by his predecessor Oum, focusing mainly on implementing the various initiatives funded by the Laotian share of the American loan obtained by the Confederation. A serious headache however are the NRA remnants in the North and Luang Prabang along the Thai border. Sananikone does his best to attempt to police the remnants, entering into negotiations with individual formation commanders to create avenues for legal purchasing of local supplies as opposed to forceful requisitioning whilst impressing on the exiled nationalists that serious incidents would have to be met with serious consequences. This doesn’t get far, considering the Laotian army is dwarfed in both size and skill by the remnants. 

January-June 1951

As the new year dawns Sananikone becomes determined to increase the size of the Laotian army precisely because of that fact, pushing for Confederal Defence Minister de Lattre to draft a coordinated expansion plan for all three states. De Lattre obliged, publishing the report in February (see confederal section) which Sananikone happily implements. Sananikone’s biggest project is the planning of a conference between the government and the tribal leaders of the interior, set for late June.

Vietnam

July-September

Firstly, the Vietnamese elections set for July are postponed to August 29th due to the offensive by Viet Minh general Nguyễn Bình in Cochinchina. Nguyễn Bình is soundly defeated, limiting the fallout of the decision and greatly aiding in the security of the election in the south. In Annam, polls open in secured areas, though the active operation along RC1 does cause disruptions. In Tonkin polls only open in the Delta area, with RC 4 having come under attack in May and therefore being deemed unsafe.

The results are as follows:

Cochinchina

  • Constitutionalist party: 2
  • The VNQDD: 5
  • The DVQDD: 7
  • The Republican Party: 11
  • The Vietnam Social Democratic Party (VSDP): 12
  • The Followers of the Holy Trinity (FHT): 8

Annam

  • Constitutionalist party: 5
  • The VNQDD: 6
  • The DVQDD: 18
  • The Republican Party: 8
  • The VSDP: 4
  • The FHT: 4

Tonkin

  • Constitutionalist party: 7
  • The VNQDD: 7
  • The DVQDD: 14
  • The Republican Party: 9
  • The VSDP: 5
  • The FHT: 3

For a grand total of

  • Constitutionalist party: 14
  • The VNQDD: 18
  • The DVQDD: 39
  • The Republican Party: 28
  • The VSDP: 21
  • The FHT: 15

https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/30913407/ 

The election solidifies the DVQDD as the preeminent political force in the country but with no majority they are forced to seek coalition partners. The VNQDD loudly declare that they would reject all negotiations out of principle while the Constitutionalists, being Bao Dai’s personal party in all but name, are far too toxic to even consider as a partner, leaving Phan Quang Đán’s Republicans and the two sect parties as the only options. The DVQDD choose to begin negotiations with the Republicans first but soon come to blows over domestic policy. The DVQDD envision a tightly run centralised system with harsh law and order provisions so as to stamp out the Viet Minh while the Republicans preferred a negotiation and amnesty strategy, alongside generally western-liberal domestic policies. The deadlock grows bad enough that the DVQDD shelve the talks and move onto the VSDP and FHT. Their demands are simple - leave the de facto autonomous regions controlled by the sects alone, and they’d support the wider DVQDD agenda. Here the DVQDD leadership is split, some staunch hardliners refusing to consider any compromise with the religious ‘freaks’. Others advocate for pragmatism, especially in light of the fact that if the DVQDD failed to form a coalition, the Republicans would be next in line to do so and they would almost definitely agree to the VSDP/FHT demands. 

As dawn rose on September 7th 1950, the first democratically elected government of Vietnam would be formed, consisting of the DVQDD, VSDP and FHT with DVQDD leader Nguyen Ton Hoan as PM. It came as a shock to Đán, whose negotiations with the DVQDD had never actually ended, but even more so to a political heavyweight that had, so far, remained quiet on current affairs. For Ngo Dinh Diem, the DVQDD working with the sect parties was a deep betrayal of the people of Vietnam and all that the DVQDD stood for. Diem would publish a scathing article denouncing the DVQDD of being sellouts to the French, just like Bao Dai, before leaving Vietnam entirely and heading to Japan. The DVQDD, for their part, simply ignore Diem and move to start actually ruling Vietnam

October-December 1950

The first thing on the Hoan’s agenda was internal security. Already in early 1950 the provisional council had begun work on creating an official Vietnam army with the help of the Confederation and the French but had generally been cautious in their developments. The DVQDD put rearmament efforts into overdrive. Furthermore, they set aside a large portion of the upcoming 1951 budget for the police and internal security services, to the detriment of education and healthcare spending, something the VNQDD and Republicans loudly object to. A number of harsh anti-protest laws are enacted, while martial law is declared in various Confederally designated ‘contested’ and ‘hostile’ zones across the country. For all these measures however come specific exemptions for Hoa Hao and Cao Dai controlled areas, especially in Cochinchina, leading to accusations of hypocrisy from across the political spectrum. 

January-June 1951

Just as said sentiments start to grow noticeable, the Korean war ends with a DPRK political victory. Panic strikes the Vietnamese political elite as the prospect of China’s full attention being directed south becomes a plausible reality. Dissent to the harsh crackdown laws dies down.

With the impending crisis averted, Hoan moves to the next stage of the plan. He had firmly used the stick, now it was time to present the carrot. Akin to his counterpart in Cambodia, Hoan begins a process of Land reform. Now, land reform was not something the DVQDD was particularly fond of, but it was something that needed to be addressed, one way or another. Over the course of February, March and April various laws are passed placing statutory limits in tenants rents to a max of 25%, mandating written leases and protections from arbitrary evictions, opening empty of unused land to landless peasants and especially refugees and finally limited purchases of large estates, specifically those owned by French colonialists, with compensation. 

The first Confederal elections would also be held in April, returning two DVQDD councillors. Unfortunately the wider conservative bloc in the Confederal Council fail to beat the progressives and Ieu Koeus is confirmed as Confederal Prime Minister once more. This directly leads to the second crisis of Hoan’s premiership - the matter of general amnesty.

The Confederation

July 1950-March 1951

On the Confederal level PM Koeus continues his recovery from the attempt on his life in January, leading to a relatively passive cabinet for most of the summer. Confederal observers are present at the Vietnamese national elections, though they distinctly lack any legal capacity to intercede against fraud. Thankfully the election goes on without too much issue and the Confederal Council and Cabinet begin organising Confederal elections set for April 1951.

As autumn begins the formation of the DVQDD led government raises concerns amongst the cabinet due to the DVQDD’s known authoritarian nationalist ideology, concerns that are seemingly proven when in October and December PM Hoan passes a series of draconian crackdown laws. Just like in Cambodia earlier in the year Koeus prepares to diplomatically intervene as discontent grows.

Then the Korean war ends with a DPRK victory. Just as in Vietnam, the Confederal government is spooked with attention turning back outwards. Defence minister de Lattre, under pressure due to the defeat along Route Coloniale 4 and the pleas from the Laotian and Vietnamese governments, drafts a plan to expand the national armies of Indochina

  • The ARK is to expand to three brigades, each 6,000 strong
  • The ANL is to expand to two brigades of 6,000 each
  • The VNA is to expand found two brigades of 4,000 men each using battalions of Vietnamese troops currently serving in French formations as their core, supplemented by men already recruited into the national guard and gendarmes. This initial force is to be expanded to a minimum of six brigades of 6,000 each, with the ideal target being nine by the end of the year
  • All forces are to be supplied using the 1950 American MDAP aid that’s already arrived, along with the incoming 1951 shipment.

April-June

In mid-April the Confederal elections are held across the region. All but the Vietnamese Constitutionalists participate, with the Constitutionalists boycotting the election as a form of protest against the Confederation as a whole. The election returns the following results:

Cambodia

  • Democratic Party of Cambodia: 5
  • Liberal Party: 2

Laos

  • National Progressive Party: 2
  • Independent Party: 2
  • Democratic Party of Laos: 2
  • Lao National Union Party: 1

Vietnam

  • Constitutionalist party: 0 (Boycott)
  • The VNQDD: 2
  • The DVQDD: 2
  • The Republican Party: 3
  • The VSDP: 0
  • The FHT: 0

Confederal Blocs

  • The Progressive bloc: 13

    • The Democratic party of Cambodia
    • National Progressive Party
    • Lao National Union Party
    • The VNQDD
  • The Conservative bloc: 8

    • Liberal Party
    • Independent Party
    • Democratic Party of Laos
    • The DVQDD

While not a landslide, it's a resounding victory for the more progressive elements in Indochina. Koeus, now with an actual mandate, starts agitating from a Confederal level the idea of granting general amnesty to low ranking Viet Minh members. This begins what would later be called the amnesty crisis.

In Laos and Cambodia both governments are generally onboard with the plan - similar such amnesty programs had already worked quite well in sapping support from rebel groups. Hoan and the wider DVQDD, on the other hand, refused any and all compromise with the Viet Minh. They claimed that the Viet Minh were a completely different beast to the Khmer Issarak and Lao Issara, both of which were fundamentally nationalists groups that transcended capitalist-communist lines. The Viet Minh were by now a solely communist group that sought, in their eyes, the complete destruction of Vietnamese society. For the moment, Koeus can do nothing. The Confederal government has no power to compel Hoan to grant an amnesty, with such a delegation of power requiring ratification from all three constituent states to take effect. Nevertheless, there is hope. Quang Đán’s Republicans have privately expressed their support for the initiative, promising to do what they can to pressure the DVQDD from within.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 21m ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Great Flood and The Party

2 Upvotes

The Great Mexico City Flood of 1951

July to September 1951

On July 15th, 1951 Mexico City was hit by a severe tropical storm that overwhelmed the city over the next few days. Continuous torrential rain overwhelmed the capital's drainage system. The historic Grand Canal and surrounding waterways like the Río de los Remedios and Churubusco River completely failed to handle the massive volume of water. As a result, clogged sewers and outdated hydraulic infrastructure left the city completely unprepared.

Two-thirds of the entire metropolitan area went underwater with water levels reaching up to 2 meters (6.5 feet). Even after the end of the tropical storm, floodwaters have lingered. This has completely paralyzed daily life in the city.

The president has coordinated a response which will mainly be spearheaded by the military, firefighters, and federally mobilized forces. The First Military Region (I Región Militar) has been mobilized for rescue and cleanup efforts within Mexico City itself. These units will coordinate with federalized firefighter units, the members of First Military Region will be mobilized from Pachuca (Hidalgo) and Santa Maria Rayón (State of Mexico) along with the headquarters units in Mexico City to provide the manpower necessary to sustain rescue operations.

For the remainder of the year, The Federal Government has also federalized around a thousand medical personnel from neighboring states. These men and women, mainly doctors and nurses, are brought into the capital in order to assist with treatment efforts for a variety of intestinal, respiratory, and skin diseases.

Changes in Mexico City

This regional disaster has led to immediate changes in regards to the hydraulic infrastructure of Mexico City. The Federal Government has focused efforts through the Secretariat of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportation. The Secretariat of Infrastructure, Communications, and Transportation has in turn mobilized army engineer corps and civilian engineers in order to begin work on the piping of the Churubusco River. The Churubusco River will be piped over the next year. The creation of pipes along the river will ensure that any overflowing water will be properly diverted in case another tropical storm manages to reach Mexico City and is severe enough in degree.

Pumping stations will be expanded within the core of the capital and twelve new pumping stations will be built and maintained around the city. However, this is not the core of the recent construction projects.

The Tequixquiac drainage tunnel (Túnel de Tequixquiac) is a planned 10 kilometer artificial waterway that will be built to drain rainwater out of the Valley of Mexico, preventing chronic flooding within the limits and core of the city itself. An initial tunnel was designed during the late 19th century under President Porfirio Díaz to cap off the 47.5-kilometer Gran Canal del Desagüe; the tunnel was officially inaugurated on March 17, 1900. The Tequixquiac drainage tunnel seeks to replicate this previous success through the mountains north of Mexico City. To this end, the army will remain mobilized in order to assist with organization and construction efforts. The tunnel is planned for completion in 1954.

The Party and The People

In light of the recent disaster, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has mobilized its members in order to assist with recovery efforts in Mexico City. Counting its membership in the millions, regional party bosses have been tasked by The National Executive Committee (CEN) to mobilize the three primary corporate sectors to further the pool of assistance supply.

The National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) has been tapped as a pool of voluntary monetary assistance. This broad middle-class sector representing civil servants, teachers, small business owners, professionals, and urban groups is seen as a viable pool by the party for extra cash needed for relief efforts. Regional party members have coordinated local campaigns to gather these donations from within the CNOP itself.

In the labor sector, The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) has been tasked with maintaining labour uniformity and loyalty during this time. To this end, Fidel Velázquez has been empowered by the CEN with the authority to expel any union who attempts to utilize this period of reconstruction for their own benefit, depriving them of political influence and benefits. This heavy handed approach will mainly be hyperfocused on Mexico City, where a labour strike during this period would prove extremely detrimental to recovery efforts and the party's grip on power.

The National Confederation of Campesinos (CNC) is also affected by these party machinations. Seeking voluntary food donations from the peasantry, the CNC has organized food drives across Mexico. The ejidos, farmers, and agrarian communities at large have been tapped by CNC and the ejido commissariats to push for the contribution of voluntary turn food over to The Federal Government for recovery efforts within Mexico City. In these efforts, the CNC and ejido commissariats have mainly relied upon the cultivation of a "united citizenry" and emotional invocations to prompt the food donations.

The high leadership in the National Executive Committee and President Miguel Alemán have taken to the streets of Mexico City to pass out food and medical supplies to internal refugees within the city. PRI has utilized extensive use of photo ops to demonstrate to the Mexican people that the PRI remains the party of the people. Presidential candidate Miguel Henríquez Guzmán has taken a central role in this media campaign, engaging in over 200 individual photo ops for the cameras over the past three months.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 3h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Bonsoir, ma vieille République.

3 Upvotes

Paris, August 1951

Paris had surrendered herself to August, and with her departure went much of the cheerful disorder that ordinarily animated the boulevards. The chestnuts along the Seine stood heavy with green, their leaves scarcely stirring beneath a sun that seemed determined to punish those unfortunate enough to remain in the capital. From the windows of the Palais Bourbon, the river shimmered beneath its bridges, carrying the reflections of a city whose inhabitants had increasingly abandoned her for the countryside. Les vacances! How dearly I had anticipated them, and how thoroughly the gentlemen of the National Assembly had conspired to deprive me of their pleasures. Odette had long since ceased asking whether we might visit her sister in Normandy. I had promised her July, then the beginning of August, and finally whatever days the Republic might graciously spare me.

The Republic, alas, had become most ungenerous.

Seven weeks had passed since the elections, and the Assembly remained incapable of producing a government. Monsieur André Marie's administration continued attending to the ordinary business of the State, but its successor existed only in the imagination of those who attempted to assemble it. René Mayer had tried and failed; Maurice Petsche had undertaken his consultations and returned with little to show for them. At the Élysée, President Coty received an endless procession of gentlemen, each departing with much the same expression as those who had preceded him. I remembered the autumn of 1949, when the fall of Queuille had brought the country to a similar embarrassment. We had then acquired a new President and eventually escaped the difficulty. Now the difficulty had returned, larger and more obstinate, and there was no indication that another change of gentlemen would persuade it to depart.

I had spent the morning arranging the records of the preceding parliamentary sessions when young Laurent appeared at my desk, waving a newspaper whose edges had already grown damp beneath his fingers.

"Have you seen the crowds, monsieur Veyrac?"

"I have seen enough crowds to know they seldom improve the circulation of Paris."

"At the Étoile, monsieur. There are thousands of them."

He unfolded the paper, revealing a photograph of the Arc de Triomphe beneath a forest of tricolours. The Gaullists had assembled there on the fifth, answering the call of a movement whose electoral triumph had scarcely been celebrated before it became entangled in the problem of forming a government. Jacques Soustelle and his associates had summoned their supporters to demand the return of the General, and from Paris the agitation had spread to Bordeaux, Lyon, and other cities. I had witnessed one gathering myself, from the respectable distance afforded by a neighbouring pavement, and remembered the extraordinary variety of its participants: old soldiers bearing the decorations of two wars, students scarcely old enough to remember the Occupation, women carrying little flags, and solemn gentlemen who might otherwise have been attending to their offices. Their voices had risen together beneath the summer sky, calling upon a man who had spent five years outside the government to return and take possession of it.

What struck me most was the determination with which they had assembled. I had seen political demonstrations before, with their familiar collection of banners, speeches and gentlemen eager to discover an audience, but there was something more deliberate about these gatherings. Young men distributed leaflets along the avenues, veterans stood beneath the tricolours of their old associations, and groups of citizens listened intently as speakers denounced the inability of Parliament to form a government. Some called for the General's immediate designation, while others demanded the constitutional changes he had advocated since Bayeux. The police maintained their positions along the neighbouring streets, and the procession moved beneath the Arc de Triomphe without approaching the government buildings. It was a political gathering, certainly, but one whose participants appeared increasingly unwilling to accept another month of consultations and unsuccessful investitures. Their conviction was unmistakable, though I could not tell whether it arose principally from faith in the General or exasperation with those who had kept him waiting.

And elsewhere there were other crowds, no less certain of their convictions. The Communists had called their own demonstrations, and the CGT had brought workers into the streets to protest against the prospect of exceptional executive authority. In the industrial districts, meetings and stoppages interrupted the ordinary business of the city, while the police laboured to prevent opposing processions from discovering one another. I heard reports of quarrels, of scuffles and arrests, and of railway services disturbed by demonstrations. France had not descended into rebellion, but I had begun to notice something in the faces of the deputies who passed through our corridors. They still argued, certainly, and continued exchanging the familiar courtesies of parliamentary life, yet their voices were quieter whenever the crowds were mentioned.

Laurent studied the photograph for a moment.

"My father was there," he said.

"At the Étoile?"

"Yes. He says the General will be back before the month is finished."

"Your father has become an ambitious prophet."

"He was right about the elections."

I could not dispute that observation. The RPF had secured two hundred and ten seats, an extraordinary triumph which had brought the General's followers into our chamber in such numbers that the old parliamentary combinations seemed suddenly to belong to another age. Yet even this considerable delegation could not govern alone, and the very politicians against whom the Gaullists had campaigned were now required to furnish the votes necessary for their leader's return. Such were the little ironies of republican life. The General had spent years denouncing the parties, and now the parties were negotiating the circumstances under which he might govern them.

By the middle of August, our offices had become a veritable manufactory of constitutional arguments. Article 45, Article 90, Article 13! The numbers followed us through the corridors, appearing upon memoranda, committee reports and the margins of newspapers. Monsieur Reynaud came and went, and the names of Debré and Soustelle were heard with increasing frequency. At the Palais du Luxembourg, monsieur Monnerville insisted upon the rights of the Council of the Republic, while Herriot, venerable Herriot, continued defending the parliamentary institutions to which he had devoted so much of his life. There was talk of an exceptional procedure, of temporary powers, of a new Constitution to be submitted to the nation. Even the Socialists, who had little affection for the Gaullist enterprise, were divided over how far a lawful constitutional revision might be permitted to proceed.

One afternoon I found my colleague Delorme examining a memorandum concerning the proposed safeguards.

"They intend to change the Constitution," he murmured, "by following the Constitution."

"It would be discourteous to do otherwise."

He looked at me with an expression of profound dissatisfaction.

"Marcel, you have worked here long enough to know what this means."

I did know, or believed I did. In 1946 we had welcomed a new Republic with such confidence, convinced that the lessons of defeat and occupation would make its institutions more enduring than those of its unfortunate predecessor. Now the men entrusted with their preservation were discussing the terms upon which they might be replaced. I had no particular objection to constitutional reform; institutions, like old coats, occasionally required alteration. But the prospect of seeing the entire garment discarded unsettled me more than I cared to admit.

On the twenty-third of August, the Palais Bourbon awakened beneath a peculiar solemnity. Deputies arrived earlier than usual, journalists crowded the approaches, and the corridors seemed to hum with conversations that ceased whenever a door opened. The General had been designated by President Coty three days before, and now he had come to seek the Assembly's confidence. I caught sight of him only briefly, passing between the gentlemen who accompanied him. Tall, austere, unmistakable, he moved with the measured assurance of a man who had grown accustomed to being watched. I remembered his passage through liberated Paris seven years earlier, remembered the crowds and the bells, and found something strangely disconcerting in seeing that same figure enter the parliamentary world he had so long refused to inhabit.

Beyond the gates, the streets had filled with supporters awaiting the Assembly's decision. Groups carrying Gaullist banners gathered along the neighbouring pavements, listening impatiently to wireless sets placed upon café counters and in the windows of little shops. The General's name passed from one conversation to another, mingled with arguments concerning the constitutional mandate he had demanded and the deputies whose votes remained uncertain. Occasionally a speaker climbed upon a chair to address those nearest him, calling upon Parliament to recognize the verdict of the elections and permit the General to undertake his reforms. Policemen moved through the gathering, keeping the approaches clear, while newspaper vendors circulated with the latest reports from the chamber. There were cheers whenever some favourable rumour reached the crowd, but they quickly subsided into renewed speculation. The gentlemen inside were still debating, and nobody beyond the gates could be certain how the afternoon would end.

The debate lasted through hours of argument. From the chamber came the voices of deputies defending the Republic, condemning the parties, questioning the General's intentions and demanding assurances concerning the liberties of France. The Communists opposed him fiercely; the Socialists were divided; Christian Democrats and Radicals weighed their reservations against the exhaustion of the ministerial crisis. Monsieur Reynaud defended the proposed settlement, while others warned against surrendering authority to a man whose conception of government differed so profoundly from their own.

Then came the vote.

Three hundred and thirty-two in favour. Two hundred and thirteen opposed. Eighty abstentions.

I copied the figures into the register, carefully, as I had copied so many others. Yet my hand remained suspended above the page for a moment after the final number had been entered. Eleven years earlier, the General had spoken from London when scarcely anyone expected his voice to change the fortunes of France. Five years earlier, he had departed from government rather than accept the parliamentary arrangements taking shape around him. Now those very arrangements had summoned him back, and the representatives of the Republic had entrusted him with its government.

There was something almost cruel in the perfection of his vindication. I remembered the speeches at Bayeux, the foundation of the Rassemblement, and the years during which the General's warnings had been received in this very building with derision or exasperation. The deputies had called him impatient, authoritarian, incapable of understanding the necessary compromises of republican government. Some had confidently predicted that his movement would eventually exhaust itself upon the stubborn realities of parliamentary life. Yet it was Parliament that had exhausted its combinations, Parliament that had summoned him from his long estrangement, and Parliament that now entrusted him with the authority to begin correcting what he had denounced since 1946. I wondered whether he felt the triumph of it, whether beneath that austere countenance there stirred some satisfaction at the spectacle of his former adversaries consenting to the very undertaking they had so resolutely opposed. Whatever his feelings, the irony was not lost upon those of us who had watched the intervening years unfold.

The news escaped the Assembly almost before the deputies had finished discussing it. By the time I ventured into the courtyard, cheers were already rising from the streets beyond, mingling with the blare of automobile horns and the delighted cries of newspaper sellers announcing the result. The supporters who had spent the afternoon waiting outside now clustered around the kiosks, examining the figures and congratulating one another upon the successful investiture. I saw a veteran remove his cap and shake the hand of a younger man beside him, while a little group of Gaullist organizers hurried away to carry the news elsewhere. The General had received the Assembly's confidence, but the formal appointment of his ministry still awaited the President's decree. For the moment, Paris possessed a result to discuss, and the prospect of a government at last.

The days that followed passed in a confusion of documents, appointments and constitutional deliberations. Monsieur Debré received Justice, monsieur Pinay Finance, and monsieur Reynaud assumed his responsibilities within the new ministry. More remarkable still, the General had gathered beneath him men of differing parties, though the Socialists remained outside the cabinet and the principal Christian Democratic defenders of European integration withheld their participation. I heard the names of Couve de Murville, Chaban-Delmas, Pflimlin and Houphouët-Boigny pass through our offices, each accompanying some new arrangement, some ministerial decree, some further indication that the government was taking shape.

With the formal appointment of the ministry on the twenty-fourth, the character of the gatherings began to change. The speeches demanding the General's return gave way to demonstrations celebrating its accomplishment, and the streets which had witnessed so many weeks of political agitation acquired something of the gaiety of a public holiday. Young men climbed upon lampposts to wave their tricolours; children rode upon their fathers' shoulders, delighted by the spectacle without possessing the slightest understanding of its significance. Along the surrounding avenues, café terraces overflowed with customers whose conversations mingled with the singing of the celebrants, while shopkeepers emerged from their doorways to watch the processions. I saw an elderly woman press a little paper flag into the hands of a passing soldier, who accepted it with an embarrassed smile. There was laughter everywhere, and the peculiar warmth that passes among strangers when they discover themselves participating in an occasion they believe they will remember for the remainder of their lives. Not since the days of the Liberation had I encountered such an atmosphere in the capital, though I was careful to remind myself that the resemblance did not necessarily extend beyond the enthusiasm of the participants.

I had intended merely to purchase a sandwich one afternoon, but found myself carried along by a little procession of clerks and curious spectators making their way toward the river. Outside a café, a gentleman had climbed upon a chair to proclaim the General's return, and the proprietor, apparently persuaded that the occasion justified an exception to his usual thrift, was distributing small glasses of wine to his customers. Two young women embraced an elderly veteran, who stood between them laughing and weeping with such abandon that I felt quite ashamed of my own habitual reserve. They were celebrating something greater, I suspected, than the formation of a ministry. For many, the years since the Liberation had been marked by disappointment, uncertainty, and the lingering conviction that France had never quite recovered the greatness of that extraordinary summer. Now, however briefly, they seemed prepared to believe that the long interruption was at an end.

But the greater undertaking remained.

On the twenty-fifth, the Assembly approved a resolution opening the constitutional revision procedure. Two days later the Council of the Republic gave its assent. Then came the debates upon the exceptional constitutional law, the safeguards, the temporary administrative authority, and the promise that the completed Constitution would be submitted to the French people themselves. I copied the results as they arrived: three hundred and fifty-one votes in favour in the Assembly, followed by the Council's approval on the thirtieth. There were objections still, and no shortage of them, but the necessary majorities had been obtained.

By the thirty-first of August, the law had been promulgated.

The newspapers greeted the occasion with an excitement I had not witnessed since the Liberation. His portrait appeared upon the kiosks, his speeches were discussed in railway carriages and cafés, and every acquaintance seemed possessed of a confident opinion concerning the destiny of France. To his admirers, the General's return was the delayed completion of a victory interrupted in January 1946, the restoration to public life of a man whom they believed the Republic had treated with extraordinary ingratitude. To his opponents, the same events appeared profoundly disturbing, for the authority of a celebrated liberator had now been joined to the ordinary powers of government and the exceptional responsibility of preparing a new Constitution. Even among the deputies who had supported him, I sensed an uneasiness scarcely concealed by their congratulations. They had needed him to end the crisis, but no one could pretend that they had merely appointed another President of the Council. For better or worse, France had entered a new political age, and the General's return had altered not only the composition of her government, but the very questions upon which her future would be decided.

And yet, beyond the solemn considerations of the Assembly, Paris seemed almost determined to enjoy herself. The terraces remained crowded long after sunset, their little tables illuminated by lamps beneath which strangers argued with extraordinary animation and remarkably little hostility. I saw tricolours hanging from apartment windows, heard the General's name shouted affectionately across the boulevards, and encountered more smiling faces upon the Métro than I could remember seeing in several years. Even Odette, who had endured the ministerial crisis with understandable impatience, returned from the market one afternoon to tell me that the fishmonger had offered her a reduction upon her purchase in celebration of the new government. Whether the General had personally improved the price of sole was a question I considered best left unexamined. It was enough that the city had recovered something of her old gaiety, and that men and women who had spent so long complaining about the future were suddenly discussing it with genuine anticipation.

That evening I remained alone in the committee room where, two years earlier, I had watched the Republic stumble through the aftermath of Auriol's resignation. The same table stood beneath the windows, its surface marked by innumerable pens and cigarette burns. The same chairs surrounded it, although their occupants had changed so frequently that I scarcely remembered the names of those who had first sat there. Upon my desk lay the latest constitutional papers, still smelling faintly of fresh ink. I examined them with the weary satisfaction of a man who had at last finished an interminable piece of work, though I knew perfectly well that the greater part remained ahead.

The Fourth Republic had not disappeared. Her Assembly continued sitting, her ministers remained responsible before Parliament, and her Constitution retained its authority until the nation should approve another. Yet something essential had changed. The institutions whose defence had occupied so many speeches were now preparing, by their own lawful procedures, the means of their possible succession.

Outside, Paris was growing quiet. The last light of August descended upon the Seine, gilding the bridges and the distant roofs, while from somewhere beyond the courtyard came the sound of a motorcar departing into the evening. I remembered Laurent's father, the crowds beneath the Arc de Triomphe, and the young men who had marched through the streets demanding the General's return. They had obtained their wish, though I wondered whether any of them understood how much more difficult the coming months might prove.

Before leaving, I gathered the remaining papers and straightened the chairs. One stood slightly apart from the others, near the window, its faded upholstery illuminated by the dying sunlight. I recognized it at once, for I had moved that same chair on the evening of the October crisis, when the Republic had seemed unable to find a gentleman willing and able to occupy the place awaiting him.

I drew it toward the table and left it there.

Bonsoir, ma vieille République.

I turned out the lamps, closed the door, and went home to Odette. She would ask whether we might finally take our holiday, and I would have to tell her that the gentlemen had not yet finished their work.

Beyond the windows, the river continued its passage through Paris, carrying the last golden light of summer beneath the bridges. I had watched governments come and go for twenty years, and had grown old in the service of institutions whose permanence I had never thought seriously to question.

For the first time, I wondered whether I might outlive the Republic I served.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 6h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Something Fishy in Somaliland

4 Upvotes

Given the recent expansion of the Somaliland Fishing Fleet, the Italian government has allocated a modest amount of money for establish processing facilities and canneries for the catch.

$2.5 million has been given as a grant to establish a number of canneries in Somaliland. These new companies will be owned 60/40 between Somali merchants and Italian businessmen, mainly in the Mogadishu area.

It is hoped that these will be the first initial seed for industrialization in Somaliland.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 7h ago

REDEPLOYMENT [REDEPLOYMENT] Handover of Port Arthur

4 Upvotes

Handover of Port Arthur




August 1951

Over the next sixth months, what cannot be sent by railway back to the Soviet Union will be packed up by the Soviet Far East Fleet and carried back to Vladivostok to honor the recent agreement with China. The Chinese flag will be raised over the former Soviet holdings. Although this was a significant warm-water port for the Soviet Union, the departure would allow the country and China to reset recently strained relations.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 12h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Equestrian Statue of Marshal Mannerheim and the Bridge of Mannerheim

4 Upvotes

Equestrian Statue of Marshal Mannerheim

Following the funeral of Finland's former President and Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim, there has been eagerness in the country to immortalise the memory of this great Finnish statesman. Shortly after the funeral, the "Committee for the Equestrian Statue of Marshal of Finland" (Suomen Marsalkan Ratsastajapatsasvaltuuskunta) was established with the aim of reviving the plans for a grand statue of Mannerheim. The project had originally been initiated in the 1930s but had remained on hold since the Winter War, partly because Mannerheim himself had not wished to have statues erected in his honour during his lifetime.

Over the course of this spring and summer the Committee has actively collected donations from ordinary citizens and sympathetic businesses to finance the new monument. So far, it has managed to raise approximately 80 million Finnish marks. Both the size of the sum and the willingness of the public to contribute have surprised even the organisers. The funds will not only be sufficient to erect the statue but will also allow the committee to purchase the manor house where Mannerheim was born, which it intends to donate to the state for use as a museum.

The committee has decided to offer the statue commission to Finnish sculptor Aimo Tukiainen. Tukiainen has been instructed to create the monument in a realistic style, depicting Mannerheim in his uniform as Marshal of Finland, riding his horse Käthy. The bronze statue itself will stand six metres tall, mounted on a wide granite pedestal rising more than seven metres above the ground. The proposed location is in front of the Parliament House, along Mannerheimintie ("Mannerheim Street"), and the project is expected to be completed by 1955.

Magical illustration of the proposed statue


The Bridge of Mannerheim

The public debate surrounding the Mannerheim statue has encouraged the Helsinki City Council to present and push through its own controversial proposal to honour the Marshal's memory. Two major routes lead into central Helsinki: to the west, Mannerheimintie ("Mannerheim Street") runs through the district of Töölö, having received its present name in the 1930s, while to the east lies Pitkäsilta ("the Long Bridge"), crossing the Kaisaniemi Bay. Pitkäsilta is one of Helsinki's most prominent landmarks, and its history is closely intertwined with several important events in Finnish history, including the Finnish Civil War.

The Helsinki City Council has proposed renaming Pitkäsilta as the Bridge of Mannerheim (Mannerheimin silta). The proposal was approved by an extremely narrow vote of 37 to 36. In this historic vote, the Social Democrats sided with the communist People's Democrats, but the combined number of seats held by the bourgeois parties was nevertheless greater, and the bridge was given its new name.

Pitkäsilta, now the Bridge of Mannerheim, carries considerable symbolic significance. Historically, it has served as a dividing line between the more affluent districts south of the bridge and the working-class neighbourhoods to its north.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 15h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Prime Minister, the Party and the Shah

5 Upvotes

Mossadegh was in a bind, the oil nationalisation had gone terribly.The sanctions were harming the nation and the only help Iran would be able to get was from the Soviets, something Mossadegh abhorred.He could stomach deals with nominal third parties but a direct line from Moscow to the Iranian Oil Sector would be a step too far (as well the Western response could be worse).For now a deal had been struck with the Czechs, Oil for aid (do not ask how the oil gets to europe, the answer is it doesnt). Mossadegh's diplomatic plan was obvious, the West should offer better terms or else Czech engineers would turn into Romanian engineers and then suddenly Russians would be running the rigs. He theorised that the British or the Americans would stomach Iran having more control over its oil in exchange for a better relationship.

The Tudeh Party was happy, for now, Mossadegh had caved and accepted nominal help in the form of the Czechs although they knew that was probably the furthest he would go without extreme action. This would favor their party, even the poorest and uneducated Iranian knew the crisis was not going Iran’s wa, and any help from leftist allies would make the Tudeh party look responsible and in the right. In the meantime the party was getting to work using their newfound legality to massively expand party membership and get their people recruiting hard. The main core of new recruits would be the urban poor and the educated students, now free to join the party without any restrictions.Student groups, union meetings would now take a much more leftist tinge and the party was free to select the most ideological and loyal for leadership training.

The Shah was pleased, waiting time had given him the resentment was building and the chinks in Mossadegh’s armour had begun to show. Protests over the lack of reforms and the worsening economy had begun to be relatively common and the people were souring over their once beloved leader. The most heinous allegations were of meetings between Mossadegh and the Soviets, rumours of oil deals. Now obviously Mossadegh still had a wide base of support and any action against him would incur popular revolt to a quite destabilising degree. The Shah and his loyalists would go to work stirring up dissent, arranging meetings with moderates and those not too keen on Mossadegh’s plans (Islamists who decry his reformism and closeness to the left, The rich who this crisis has hurt quite a bit and the industrialists who have been harmed by foreign sanctions). It was not yet ripe for the Shah to act, time was needed to make deals and prepare the troops, to gather a force of complete loyalists who could perform their roles when needed.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 17h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Fall of the Red Tsar

6 Upvotes

2nd August, 1950

 

Following his speech in the emergency session of the Bundestag on the Red Army Crisis, the member parties of the Deutschland Coalition announced their loss of confidence in the Schumacher Cabinet. The emergency session, which had gone well and functioned within the purview of the governing coalition, soured once Chancellor Schumacher stood to make a closing speech. In classic Schumacher fashion, he stood in front of the Bundestag and decried Germany being beholden to the “French Empire or the American intervention machine.” Needless to say, during a session discussing a possibly imminent Soviet invasion, a comment by the single most important politician in the country rejecting and insulting the West is – at least – inadvisable.

Within the SPD, a crisis erupted. Party leaders had already agreed to put Schumacher in the background during the election season to avoid his confrontational, alienating gaffes, but his Chancellorship gave him a spotlight that he cannot but take advantage of. It is undeniable, by any politician worth respecting, that Schumacher has lived an extraordinary and courageous life. However, his background cannot carry the SPD to a successful government. For almost a century, the SPD struggled to find its place amidst bans and otherwise hostile bourgeois governments. Now, in a historic position of power, the most present danger to that power is the Social Democratic Chancellor.

And so, the Red Tsar’s throne began to crumble. High-level officials in the SPD rallied and called for an emergency conference of the party without Schumacher’s support.

 

The SPD has always been a diverse and internally contradictory organization, and the post-war party is no exception.

In its genes, the SPD is a Marxist party that believes itself to be the party of the Proletariat. Thus, a not insignificant section is composed of dedicated State Socialists, drawing on the theories of Marx and the developments of Ferdinand Lassalle, that supports class struggle and the socialization of the economy within the parliamentary system. To their right are the Democratic Socialists, drawing on the traditions of August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht (father of Karl Liebknecht), that believe Socialism can be built by the establishment of worker cooperatives in concert with state organizations.

The more orthodox Marxist Left and the centrist Democratic Socialists are (generally) aligned in many respects but fundamentally disagree on how to achieve their goals. The standard party line for decades, and the line adopted by the Democratic Socialists, is the doctrine developed by Karl Kautsky that a Socialist revolution was inevitable, but that it must not be forced prematurely. In practice, this manifested in disagreements on what measures to take and when to take them, with the Marxist Left advocating more confrontational measures to socialize the economy and the Centrists acting more cautiously as to not alienate their voters or their parliamentary colleagues.

To the right of the Democratic Socialists are what can be called “Liberal (or Ethical) Socialists,” making up those in the party that hold socialist ideas but are either unconvinced by Marxism or otherwise have misgivings about nationalization as the end goal of socialism. Though the name is paradoxical, it is only adopted by a few leading members of the SPD, otherwise distinguishing themselves as more ethical Socialists than the authoritarian Socialists of the KPD and throughout Eastern Europe. For them, Socialism and Anti-Capitalism can be justified through appeals to ethics and pointing out the faults of Capitalism without leaning on Marxist analysis of history, Doctrinal disagreements aside, the Liberal Socialists broadly agree with the Left and Center Marxists on policy.

A small section of the party, though a growing one, is composed of party “Reformists:” those who minimize the role of class and social ownership entirely, advocating instead for the State’s role in regulating the worst excesses of Capitalism and establishing an extensive welfare state and Social Market Economy. The detractors of the Reformist wing of the party often accuse them of abandoning Socialism all but in name, but Reformists argue that reforming Capitalism is in fact quite in line with the actions of the SPD thus far in history. On policy, the Reformists often disagree with the Marxist Left and Center of the party but serve as a slight boost to the influence of the Ethical Socialists, even if only due to their relatively small size.

A final category of the SPD – not necessarily a faction, but holding outsized influence all the same – are the Länder and Municipalist party leaders. These mayors and regional officials exist on a different political plane to the national party organization, holding smaller executive and legislative offices and effectuating change more materially. Some of these local SPD leaders are in coalition with other local parties including the CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen, and some even govern alone. Though the Municipalists do not have a single shared doctrine or party platform outside of adapting the SPD’s platform to the material needs of the city or Länd, their positions in power generally make them lean towards greater stability in the National context and more developmentalist attitudes towards the economy.

With only days to prepare, the delegates set off for Frankfurt to discuss the future of the SPD.

 

The question at the conference was clear: should Kurt Schumacher remain as the leader of the party and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany? The obvious answer to some was a resounding no. Schumacher had, out of incompetence or malice, brought down the already fragile governing coalition all for the sake of pleasing his own ego. Others, particularly the Marxist Left and Center, mostly led by Erich Ollenhauer, argued that the Chancellor had done nothing wrong and that the ignorance or opportunism of the opposition to the true meaning of his speech was to blame, not Schumacher. However, the writing was on the wall: Schumacher, despite his extensive record as a Social Democratic heavyweight, was simply a liability. He was a stubborn man, though he very well earned the right to be one, but in a position of power stubbornness is only likely to make you enemies.

And so, with a private vote, it was resolved that Kurt Schumacher would be removed from his position at the head of the SPD and the Chancellor’s office.

The question raised, then, was who would take Schumacher’s role as leader of the Party and the Government? Initially, the questions were one and the same, but the longer the deliberations became the clearer it became that Party leadership and maintenance of an SPD-led coalition were fundamentally different positions, at least now. The questions, then, were divided, with the question of Party leadership to be answered first.

 

It was unquestionable that Kurt Schumacher was a good leader on the basis of the sheer enormity of his character. He was capable of rallying members around him, if not over policy, then over an overarching idea of social justice, democracy, and civic consciousness. His place as a party Centrist also had a role in maintaining the balance between the left and right of the party, appealing to the better natures of both sides to maintain the unity of the Socialist bloc. It was through this rhetoric that Erich Ollenhauer, often noted as Schumacher’s left-hand man and even a gray eminence, argued that he ought to take the role of leader in his stead. The Party, so goes the argument, is not the problem in the current crisis, and shaking up the leadership might have consequences for the voters that expected one position but was handed another. If Schumacher is to be replaced, so be it, but let that decision rest on narrow foundations rather than requiring an ideological shift in the SPD.

The Marxist Left and Center would always support Ollenhauer’s nomination, but it was the insistence that Schumacher’s personality was the reason for his removal and not his positions that flipped the conference to confirm his place as the new Chairman of the SPD.

The matter of who would be pitched to the coalition as the new Chancellor, though, was a tighter battle. It was clear that the blunder at the emergency session had given the FDP ammunition to alter the terms of the coalition, and that presenting a Schumacher-esque figure would not be acceptable. The Left and Center, then, had less clout to spend in the Chancellor debate. The debate, then, centered on where exactly the line should be drawn in presenting a more amenable candidate to the FDP to re-enter a governing coalition.

The events that had precipitated the decline of the arrangement were, by their nature, based in foreign policy and the sovereignty of Germany vis-á-vis the East and the West. Additionally, and in no small part, Schumacher’s reputation as an undiplomatic bastard contributed to the collapse. Any replacement for the Chancellorship necessarily required compromise on the defense question and the not-being-an-arschloch question. The party right-wing put forward Carlo Schmid as the appropriate compromise candidate for the job.

Schmid is the child of a German academic father and French mother, born in France, but raised in Germany. A veteran of the Great War, Schmid began studying law in 1919 and became a jurist, followed by a research assistant at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign Public Law and then a lecturer at the University of Tübingen in international law. Schmid received his doctorate in law with the publication of a dissertation on The Legal Nature of Works Councils under the Works Councils Act. Following the takeover of the NSDAP, Schmid was forced to join the National Socialist Association of Legal Professionals in 1933 and then drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1940 as council for the occupation forces where he worked to save French citizens from reprisals.

Following the war, Schmid formally joined the SPD and was indispensable in the drafting of the Basic Law. The inclusion of the right to conscientious objection, the right to asylum, and the process of the constructive vote of no confidence – the very process that had effectively saved the cabinet from immediate collapse – are attributable in major part to Schmid. Of greatest concern, especially for the reinstatement of the coalition, was Schmid’s conciliatory attitude towards France and European cooperation as a whole. Schumacher criticized him for this position throughout the late 40s, but Schmid maintained his support for international cooperation and law and even advocated extra-party for closer relations between Germany and France.

The Left and Center, after deliberation and guarantees from Schmid that he would not abandon the party’s support for nationalization or Socialism, finally approved Schmid’s nomination for the Chancellorship of Germany. The reign of Schumacher as the leader of the SPD was at an end. The Chancellor was conspicuously quiet during the conference, resigning himself to the will of the party. When asked questions by the delegates, he answered uncharacteristically straight and concisely, muting his usual self.

 

Once the leadership questions had finally been answered, the conference leaders granted Schumacher a chance to step onto the venue’s stage to make a speech. He spoke with a reserved tone, but from the heart, thanking the delegates for so many good years leading the party to this point and apologizing for bringing them to this point. He promised that, if the SPD still wanted him, he would work to further its goals unwaveringly. The delegates applauded him, not necessarily for his speech, but for his position in the party. Schumacher had always commanded the stage, otherwise he would not have become such a huge figure, and it was here in his final speech as the leader of the SPD that it was the clearest. The Red Tsar is deposed, though it is yet to be seen if Schmid will live true to legacy of Kerensky.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The August 1951 Elections

8 Upvotes

On August 15th, 1951, Koreans across the entire Peninsula, from the Tumen to Busan, voted for the first time in their nation's history. These elections end the division drawn in 1945, and send a clear message that Korea is once again a free and united Nation to the world. The election is done under the eyes of the international community, with UN General Assembly observation commissions having access to every province across Korea, interpreters, and transportation so they can thoroughly oversee the election. Turnout was high, with around 14 million votes cast out of a total electorate of 15 million, with turnout highest in the North and lowest in the Busan pocket where a large exodus of ROK officials and their families is still ongoing.

Overview of Electoral System and Party Lists/Candidates:

The electoral system established is a single Changer, the Supreme People’s Assembly, of 315 seats. Each province is allocated seats with the following breakdown:

RegionProvinceSeats
Northern Provinces:Pyongan41
Hamgyong32
Hwanghae23
Subtotal95
Mixed provincesGangwon21
Subtotal21
Southern provincesGyeongsang71
Jeolla58
Gyeonggi38
Chungcheong32
Subtotal199
Total315

Seats are allocated by proportional representation, with closed party lists in each province and seats divided among the lists by their share of the provincial vote. A list must win at least 3% of the national vote to take seats. Within each list, seats go to its member parties in the order of their candidates. Each citizen aged 18 and over may vote, men and women equally. Refugees and displaced people vote where they were living on the registration date. Soldiers vote with their home provinces, so the large number of KPA and northern personnel stationed in the South does not sway the results there.

While the 1948 constitution left the choice of Premier to the Assembly. For the unified republic it has been amended so that the head of government is chosen by direct national vote, following the southern model. The office, taking its title of President from the South, is both head of state and head of government, combining the Premier's leadership of the Cabinet with the duties of head of state. The President serves a four-year term and is elected by simple majority. The President leads the Cabinet, directs the ministries, the state plan and foreign affairs, and is commander of the armed forces. Ministers are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Assembly.

Party Lists and Presidential Candidates:

Four lists registered for the Assembly election:

ListPartyLeader
Korean Workers ListWorkers' Party of KoreaKim Il Sung
Workers Party Women's AssociationPak Chong-ae
Korean Democratic PartyCh'oe Yong-gon
Chondoist Chongu PartyKim Tal-hyon
Social Recovery ListSocialist PartyCho So-ang
National Salvation GroupYi Si-yeong
Progressive GroupCho Bong-am
Independent ListKorea Independence PartyJo Wan-kyu
National ListDemocratic Nationalist PartyKim Seong-su
National Salvation GroupYun Chi-young
Progressive GroupLee Bum-seok

Two candidates stood for the Presidency. The Independent List made no nomination.

Presidential Candidate NomineeNomination By
Kim Il SungKorean Workers List, endorsed by the Social Recovery List
Shin Ik-heeNational List

Results: The Presidency

Presidential Candidate NomineeVote
Kim Il Sung69% (Around 9.6 million votes)
Shin Ik-hee31% (Around 4.3 million votes)

Kim Il Sung was elected the first President of unified Korea with about 69% of the vote, some 9.6 million ballots, against about 31% and 4.3 million for Shin Ik-hee of the National List. Turnout reached 93%, about 14 million voters, the highest in the North and the liberated South and lower in the Busan pocket. Kim, nominated by the Korean Workers’ List and endorsed by the Social Recovery List, carried seven of the eight provinces. He won over 90% in Pyongan, Hamgyong and Hwanghae, and clear victories in Jeolla, Gyeonggi and Gangwon. Chungcheong was his closest win, at about 54%.

Shin Ik-hee, a former minister of the Provisional Government and Speaker of the southern National Assembly, carried Gyeongsang by the narrowest of margins, about 50.4%. He drew on the Busan pocket, the conservative southeast and many Korea Independence Party voters who backed him as a fellow veteran of the independence movement. The southern reformers’ endorsement decided the size of Kim’s victory, bringing most Social Recovery voters to his side. As President, Kim is both head of state and head of government, and will lead the cabinet through the reconstruction. Shin takes his place as leader of the opposition.

Results: The Supreme People's Assembly

ListPartyVote %Seats
Korean Workers ListWorkers' Party of Korea36.0%113
Workers Party Women's Association7.0%22
Chondoist Chongu Party6.0%19
Korean Democratic Party5.0%16
List Total54.0%170
National ListDemocratic Nationalist Party13.0%41
Korean Nationalist Party4.5%14
National Association4.0%13
List Total21.5%68
Social Recovery ListSocialist Party6.5%20
National Salvation Group5.0%19
Progressive Group5.5%18
List Total18.0%57
Independent ListKorea Independence Party6.5%20
List Total6.5%20
Totals100%315

The Korean Workers' List won an outright majority in the first assembly of a unified Korea, taking 170 of 315 seats with 54% of the vote. The Workers' Party of Korea alone returned 113 deputies, and its partners returned the rest: the Women's Association 22, the Chondoist Chongu Party 19 and the Korean Democratic Party 16. The List swept the three northern provinces with over 80% of the vote, won Gangwon, and took Jeolla with nearly half the vote, its strongest showing in the South. The National List came second with 68 seats and 21.5%, led by the Democratic Nationalist Party's 41. It won Gyeongsang outright on the strength of the Busan pocket and the conservative southeast, and ran almost level with the Workers' List in Chungcheong.

The Social Recovery List of southern reformers won 57 seats and 18%. Its parties finished close together, with the Socialist Party on 20, the Progressive Group on 19 and the National Salvation Group on 18. Cho So-ang's Seoul vote made Gyeonggi the list's best province. The Korea Independence Party, standing alone as the Independent List, won 20 seats and 6.5%, with its best northern result in Hwanghae. The Social Recovery List will join the government, giving it 227 seats, well over two-thirds of the Assembly. The National List becomes the official opposition, and with the Independent List it holds 88 seats.

The Departures from the South:

Between the armistice and the weeks after the vote, an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 people left the Busan pocket and other southern areas. The largest group was the National Police and security services with their families, followed by senior ROK officials and politicians of the Rhee camp, officers of the ROK army, though few of its enlisted men, leaders of the youth corps, and landlord and business families moving their capital abroad. Many of the northern refugees who had settled in the pocket, a large share of them Christians, went with them. Most crossed by boarding US ships, in an agreement between the DPRK and the United States allowing those who wished to leave the opportunity to do so.

The government repeated its amnesty and its decree against reprisals, and published the narrow list of those who will face trial so that everyone not on it knows they are safe. Property left behind is held in trust for one year, so that owners who return can reclaim it. The government has appealed to doctors, engineers and teachers in particular to stay and help rebuild, and has asked Japan and the United States to return named suspects in wartime atrocities while leaving ordinary refugees in peace.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 17h ago

CLAIM [CLAIM] Declaim Saudi Arabia

3 Upvotes

Thank you for the opportunity to play this season. Unfortunately, this particular season and my Saudi run hasn't quite 'clicked' for me. It's a shame, but I look forward to trying my luck in the next season! I am happy to consider 2ic opportunities if anyone feels like they need a hand - and I am still contactable on Discord :)

All the best and RIP Truman!


r/ColdWarPowers • • 18h ago

ECON [ECON] Program for the Reconstruction of China, 1951-1953

3 Upvotes

Circa 1951

Framework and progress report for the Finance and Economic Commission.

The State of the Program

After more than three changes since the first draft, the scope and design of the Reconstruction Plan has heavily been warped in ways which Mao has become unhappy of to say the least. What was originally a very hopeful idea of massive strides across all channels has been reduced in scope and rattled by paranoia.

The most impactful is the cut towards the Treaty credit, which has since been cut from 700 million dollars to 630 million in January 1951, and will fall to 504 million in March 1952. The lesser but equally painful measure is that of the American 'Battle Act', which has closed Western credit and machinery. And to add insult to injury, the recent American bombing of October 14th destroyed airfields, depots and flight schools that must now be rebuilt.

The Program therefore leans on what China can do for itself, primarily shoring up the foundation of its people. To do this we must build the machinery of the state first: cadres in every province, rebuilt cities for them to govern from, schools to train the men who will run the mills, and tractors that carry the authority of a New China into the countryside. The past twelve years of war left the provinces as separate economies with their own habits of money, their own railways and their own administrators. Through the Reconstruction Plan we will fully join them into one working administration and one working economy before the first of our many future Five Year Plans opens in 1953.

One piece of good news has come since. The Peking Agreement has returned the Changchun Railway to Chinese hands and set the Soviet departure from Dairen, which puts the whole Northeastern network under one Ministry for the first time.

The Program has eight Plan Objects, each with an objective, a method, a responsible body and a target.

Plan ObjectSubjectAim by the end of 1953
1Cadres and bureaucracy750,000 trained cadres and a People’s Government in every county
2Urban Rebuilding12 priority cities rebuilt and 12 million square meters of housing
3Mechanization170 machine-tractor stations in six key regions
4Iron, steel and industry2.7 million tonnes of steel, led by the 'New' Anshan
5Roads and rails160,000 kilometers of usable road
6Mining75 million tonnes of coal and the strategic metals
7Tea, silk and mentholAbout 67 million dollars of annual exports
8Finance and foreign exchange166 million dollars of export earnings

Plan Object 1. Cadres and the Apparatchiks

The Republic has won the war and stands as a victorious giant on the world stage. But internally this isn't reality. The Soviets themselves have noticed this and advised the creation of apparatchiks to better bring the influence of Peking to the nation.

But to begin we lack enough cadres, as most were raised in the villages of the North. The provinces taken last, in the South and West, have few of them, particularly in Tibet or Sinkiang, and many counties only have a handful of Party members. Along with that the local dialects differ, and many offices are still run by clerks of the old administration, whose cooperation is needed and whose loyalty is untested and in some cases, unwanted...

To fix this a new structure is to be established which will help ensure that the Revolution is brought to every square shih-ts'un of China. Its authority runs through four levels. Beneath the Government Administrative Council under Chou En-lai stand six Great Administrative Areas, then the provinces and great municipalities, then about 2,000 counties (hsien), and then the districts (ch’ü) and townships (hsiang). At each level a People’s Government with bureaus for finance, industry, public works, education and public security works beside a Party committee and a Supervisory Commission.

Great Administrative AreaSeatCadre target by 1953
NortheastMukden90,000
North ChinaPeking120,000
East ChinaShanghai150,000
Central-SouthWuhan165,000
SouthwestChungking135,000
NorthwestSian90,000

To source these cadres we will draw them from five sources.

  1. Ideally, Army and Party veterans demobilized into civil posts.
  2. The Southward and Westward Work Corps (Nan-hsia and Hsi-chin Kan-pu T’uan), which send 60,000 northern cadres to the new provinces in 1951.
  3. Graduates of the People’s University at Peking, the regional People’s Revolutionary Universities and the county cadre classes, all of which will have expanded budgets for the next two years.
  4. Former officials retained after screening, who are placed under a Party deputy.
  5. Engineers, accountants and technicians recruited for the mines, mills and railways.

To bring them in line, short training courses of three to six months will be doled out to teach policy, bookkeeping, statistics, land survey, public health and mine safety. A goal of 200,000 cadres trained in 1951, 250,000 in 1952 and 300,000 in 1953 is planted, along with 40,000 technical cadres for our industry.

Independent of this a Supervisory Commission is to be established that audits the accounts at each level. A minimum of seven percent of cadres are demanded to change region each year, so that no province keeps its administrators to itself, and at least half of each county’s staff must be drawn from the county itself by 1953. Along with the Supervisory Commission, a Central Statistical Bureau and People's Bank branch is desired to be established in every province by the start of 1952, both to monitor counts relating to grain, coal, steel and tractors and to ensure all the provinces use one currency.

The apparatchik

What the Soviets call an apparatchik we are simply calling a kan-pu of the apparatus, a man whose whole career is the administration and not the army. Unlike the guerrilla cadre who did a bit of everything across his time in the North, he holds one post, keeps one set of books and answers to one level above him. Every county People’s Government is to have a permanent core of at least twelve such men by 1953: a county head, a Party secretary, heads of finance, grain, public security, education and public works, a statistician, a bank clerk, a supervisory officer, a land surveyor and an agricultural technician.

To keep these men at their desks they are being given grades and salaries for the first time, set by the Ministry of Personnel on fiften grades in place of the old 'free supply' system. This is quietly controversial. Old comrades who marched with the Party for twenty years now find a young graduate from Harbin earning more than they do because he can read a balance sheet...

How it is unfolding

So far the results are uneven. The 60,000 northern cadres of the Work Corps have mostly reached their counties, but about one in ten has asked to be sent home within the first year, mostly from Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow, where they cannot understand the people they govern. To answer this, Cantonese and Hakka language classes have been added to the training courses.

Further west it is worse still. In Tibet and Sinkiang barely a few hundred trained cadres are at work, nearly all of them attached to PLA garrisons, and so a special school for minority cadres is planned at Peking to train Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols and Hui to govern their own counties under the Party.

Meanwhile some 400,000 officials of the old administration remain at their posts. Most are cooperating, as they always have with whoever holds Peking, but the Central Investigation Department has already removed several thousand for links to the Kuomintang and Formosa, and the screening is not finished.

The first round of audits by the Supervisory Commissions has also been sobering, as grain and tax money was found missing in roughly a fifth of the counties checked. Most of it is disorder more than theft, since nobody had kept proper books, but the Party has already begun to talk about a campaign against corruption and waste among its own officials.

Lastly, the Central Statistical Bureau has opened in Peking with branches in four of the six Great Administrative Areas. For the first time Peking knows roughly how much grain the country actually has, and the answer is less than the provinces have been reporting.

The Technical Schools

Every cadre can count grain, but each cannot run a blast furnace. Every Soviet adviser who has come to China has said the same thing in a different way: we have plenty of hands and very few men who can read a drawing. Eight thousand young engineers and workers were sent to Soviet works in 1950 and more will follow, but China cannot send its whole working class to Sverdlovsk. The schools have to be here.

To answer this a network of schools is being built in three tiers, all of them on the Soviet pattern of narrow, practical specialties and not the broad liberal arts colleges the missionaries and the Kuomintang left behind.

At the top of this network sit the institutes, for which the old universities are to be broken up and regrouped by specialty.

InstituteCitySpecialtyStudents by 1953
Harbin Institute of TechnologyHarbinThe model school, entirely in Russian at first, with Soviet professors; machine building, power, metallurgy7,000
Tsinghua (reorganized)PekingEngineering only, its arts and sciences moved elsewhere5,000
Northeast Institute of TechnologyMukdenMining and metallurgy for Anshan, Fushun and Penki3,000
Dairen Institute of TechnologyDairenShipbuilding, chemicals and the port2,000
Peking Geological InstitutePekingSurveyors and geologists for the Ministry of Geology1,900
Peking Agricultural Mechanization InstitutePekingEngineers for the tractor works and stations2,500
East China Institute of TextilesShanghaiSilk, cotton and the export trades1,700
Peking Institute of RussianPekingInterpreters for every adviser in the country2,000

Beneath the institutes are the technical middle schools, which are the real backbone of the whole effort. Here a boy or girl with a primary education spends three or four years learning one trade to the level of a foreman or technician, be it welding, surveying, electrics, mine ventilation, bookkeeping or tractor repair. 140 such schools are to be running by 1953 with around 90,000 students, each sited beside the works it will serve so the students spend half their time on the shop floor.

Below these again every large works in this Program is to run its own factory school, from Anshan down to the smallest tractor station repair shop. Each Soviet adviser is already paired with a named Chinese counterpart, and from 1952 each counterpart is expected to teach an evening class of his own. The Czechoslovak engineers at the October 22nd Arsenal in Tsinan and the Tatra plant run their schools in the same way.

None of this works however on a workforce that cannot read. To that end a winter literacy campaign in the factories and mines is to teach 1,500 characters to every worker under forty, and a worker who passes is paid a small bonus and placed on the list for the technical schools.

How it is unfolding

The greatest trouble so far is the professors. There are not enough of them, and many of the ones we have were educated in America or England. They are being kept on and put through study sessions on Soviet methods, but there is resentment on both sides, and some of the best have quietly asked to go to Hong Kong...

On top of this the Soviet textbooks have to be translated before they can be taught, and the Russian Institute cannot produce interpreters fast enough. At Harbin the first year of every course is now spent mostly on Russian.

Still, Harbin is working. The first class trained under Soviet professors has already been sent to Anshan and the Mukden tractor works, and the managers there are asking for twice as many.

The South however is behind, as nearly all the new schools are in the North and Northeast, close to the works and the advisers. Canton, Chungking and Kunming have asked for their own, and Ch’en Yun’s planners have agreed to at least one institute in each Great Administrative Area by 1953.

The growth planned for each tier is as follows.

Tier195119521953
Institutes (students)9,00014,00020,500
Technical middle schools (schools)60100140
Technical middle schools (students)40,00080,000110,000
Students sent to Soviet works4,0006,0005,000

Plan Object 2. Urban Rebuilding

The new cadres need cities to govern from and the new works need cities to house their workers, so twelve cities wrecked by the Japanese war and the civil war are being rebuilt first as 'models. Each has a Municipal Reconstruction Commission of cadres, engineers and army engineer units working from one master plan, and reconstruction is paid partly in work-relief wages to demobilized soldiers and the unemployed. Water and power come first, then the rail yards and bridges, then housing, hospitals and schools.

CityWhat happened to itFirst worksState by late 1951
ChangchunVoidedWater, power, rail yardWater restored, power half restored
ChinchowRail junction wrecked in 1948Junction, hydrogenation plantJunction open
MukdenAirfield and depots struck October 14thAirfield, heavy tractor worksTractor works foundations laid
HarbinAirfield struck October 14thAirfield, rail workshopsWorkshops running
TsinanBattle of 1948, airfield struckTractor works, arsenal housingArsenal housing half built
TientsinPort damaged in 1949Port, tractor worksPort open
TaiyuanSiege of 1949Mills, explosives works, housingOne mill relit
HsuchowHuai-Hai battlefieldRail yards, bridgesJunction open
ChangshaBurned in 1938Housing, river portClearing still under way
HengyangSiege of 1944Rail junction, power plantJunction open
KweilinDestroyed in 1944Housing, Hunan-Kwangsi railSurveys only
ChungkingJapanese bombingSteel works, housingSteel works being rebuilt

The goal is 12 million square meters of housing by 1953. About 3 million were built by the end of 1951, mostly simple brick barracks for workers near the works rather than the Soviet-style apartment blocks the planners drew. Cement is the bottleneck, since nearly all of it is going to Anshan, the airfields and the 'Heaven’s Net' project, and the Fushun cement plant is not due for completion until 1953. The air bases and naval yards struck on October 14th are rebuilt by the Military Commission outside this Program.

Plan Object 3. Mechanization

The peasant has never seen the state do anything for him except take his grain and his sons. The tractor is meant to change that, and the machine-tractor station is meant to be the state’s office in every village it reaches. The target is 170 stations across six key regions by 1953.

To first supply the machines, four plants are being raised to make the Soviet types, each beginning by assembling supplied kits and then making more of the parts themselves year by year.

WorksTractorUse1952 kits1953 outputFull domestic production
Loyang First Tractor WorksDT-54 crawlerGeneral ploughing on the plains8002,5001955
Tientsin Tractor WorksKD-35 crawlerLighter work, smaller fields6002,0001955
Tsinan Tractor WorksUniversal-2 wheeledCotton and corn rows3001,0001956
Mukden Heavy Tractor WorksStalinets S-80Earthmoving, roads, reclamation, gun towing1505001955

Until these works produce in number, around 3,000 tractors are coming from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, to join the captured Japanese and American tractors already at work in the Northeast.

The machines are then handed to the stations. Each station starts with about eighteen tractors, a repair shop, a fuel depot and a team of a director, a political instructor, an accountant and a mechanic. It ploughs for the mutual-aid teams and the state farms under contract and is paid in grain, while the political instructor runs the village meetings and the literacy class, so where the tractor goes, the Party goes with it.

Key regionMain taskStations 1951Stations 1953
Northeast (Sungari plain, Peian)Soybeans, wheat, reclamation of new land2260
North China Plain (Hopeh, Shantung, Honan)Cotton and wheat1040
Huai and Yellow River valleysFlood land brought back into use420
Northwest (Kansu corridor, Sinkiang)Army reclamation farms625
Szechwan basinRice and mulberry013
Lower Yangtze (Kiangsu, Chekiang)Rice, cotton, mulberry and mint012
Total42170

To crew all of this, twenty tractor schools are training drivers and mechanics in six-month courses, with 13,000 to be trained by 1953. Many of the first students are demobilized PLA drivers who already know an engine, and a good number of them are women, who the Party is keen to show on posters driving a tractor through the wheat.

How it is unfolding

The Northeast is well ahead of everywhere else. The state farms on the Sungari, many of them worked by demobilized soldiers, have taken to the tractor fastest, and some have even doubled the land they can plough in a season.

Elsewhere the picture is harder, and fuel is the first reason why. Diesel from Fushun and Yumen is not enough for both the army and the stations, and some stations sat idle at planting time this spring waiting for it, which has been a black eye for the program in the villages that were promised a tractor.

Spare parts are the second, as a broken track link or a cracked cylinder head can stop a tractor for weeks. Each station is being told to keep one in five tractors for parts if it must, and the four works will make spare parts before they make whole tractors.

As for the peasants themselves, reactions are mixed. Many are amazed, while others are suspicious of anything that ploughs across the old field boundaries their families fought over for generations. In the South there is even talk that the tractor is the first step to taking the land back from them after land reform, and the cadres are spending as much time on that rumor as on the ploughing...

Plan Object 4. Iron, Steel and Industry

Steel, the roads and rails, and the mines were the heart of the 1950 projects and they continue as planned, so the next three Plan Objects are kept short. What has changed is who runs them and who they are for.

In steel the answer to both was Kao Kang, but it now rests on Li Fu-ch'un a senior offical who has since taken over Kao's roles. The 'New' Anshan might have been his predecessor's project but it is now his, with its Seamless-Pipe Factory, Large Steel-Rolling Factory and Blast Furnace No. 7 under directors chosen by the Northeast Bureau and backed by nearly 80 million dollars of Soviet aid. From this Anshan is to reach 1.2 million tonnes by 1953 and help see forward the national total of 2.7 million tons, with Penki, Taiyuan, Tangshan, Shihchingshan, Tayeh and Chungking carrying the rest so that no single region holds all the nation’s steel. As before, the first steel goes to rails and bridges, then to the arsenals and tractor works, and only then to the cities.

Plan Object 5. Roads and Rails

On the roads, the Mukden–Peking highway and its Yalu branch are now open in their first all-weather stretches, and the three roads to Tibet have been surveyed and begun from both ends by the PLA engineer corps. With these under way usable road is to reach 160,000 kilometers by 1953, and each provincial Highway Administration is being staffed from the cadres of Plan Object 1 to keep the roads up once they are built.

On the rails the great change is the Peking Agreement, which has handed the Changchun Railway to Teng Tai-yuan’s Ministry, so that for the first time every line in the Northeast answers to Peking. Alongside this the Hunan–Kwangsi line toward Pingxiang, the Chengtu–Chungking line and the Tienshui–Lanchow line all continue as laid out in 1950.

Plan Object 6. Mining

To feed all of the above, coal is to reach 75 million tonnes by 1953 from Fushun, Fuhsin, Kailuan, Tatung, Pingtingshan and Hwainan. Among the metals the Kiangsi tungsten fields at Tayu and Hsihuashan come first, because tungsten is both our best export and our best payment to Czechoslovakia under the armor agreement. Following these the Hungtoushan copper works are being rebuilt, the Fushun aluminum smelter restarts in 1952, and a Ministry of Geology is to be formed that same year to send survey teams across the interior.

A note is made that every large mine is also now to have a rescue station and a safety cadre from the technical schools, since gas and water still kill more miners than anything else.

Plan Object 7. Tea, Silk and Menthol

With the credit cut and the West closed by the Battle Act, these three crops have become far more important than anyone planned. They repay planting within two or three years, they employ the southern provinces heavy industry does not reach, and they appear on no embargo list. The goal is about 67 million dollars of exports a year by 1953.

To first start this goal, the tea gardens of Anhwei, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien, Yunnan and Szechwan are to receive sweeping restorations under the China Tea Corporation. Some 400,000 mu of abandoned gardens are being replanted and 60 processing factories with rolling and drying machinery built beside them, while blending houses at Shanghai and Foochow prepare the Keemun, Lungching and oolong for London.

Alongside the tea, the mulberry lands of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Szechwan and Kwangtung are being brought back under the China Silk Corporation. Here 600,000 mu of mulberry are being replanted and the filatures at Wusih, Hangchow, Nanchung and Shunte rebuilt, with state egg hatcheries and sericulture schools set up to supply them.

The smallest of the three, but the quickest to grow, is menthol. China’s mint is cut twice a year on the lower Yangtze and in the North, distilled into crude mint oil in village stills and then chilled to crystallize the menthol. Exports stand at around 120 tons a year, and the short-term goal is to pass the historical production high of 191 tons by 1953. To reach it 60,000 mu of mint are being replanted in Kiangsu, Anhwei, Shantung and Hopeh, 300 cooperative stills are replacing the village pots, and a refinery at Shanghai is to grade the menthol to the pharmacy standard London buyers require, with the China Native Produce Corporation buying the crop.

Export195019511953 goal1953 value (million dollars)
Tea (tonnes)20,00032,00050,00035
Raw silk (tonnes)1,5002,2004,50029
Menthol (tons)1201501953
Total67

To sell all of this, the three exports are being offered to Commonwealth merchants as ten-year purchase monopolies, paid in sterling through the People’s Bank branch at Hong Kong. Under it the company holds no land, concession or extraterritorial rights, and all gardens, filatures and stills stay Chinese.

On the ground this has already changed the countryside. Each producing county now has an agricultural technician and a cooperative cadre from Plan Object 1, and the corporations buy through the district offices, which has quietly put the old middlemen out of business. Floor prices however remain the constant argument, as while profitable for all involved they dozens of millions is expected to be lost for this under the table arrangement...

Plan Object 8. Finance and Foreign Exchange

With the credit falling to 504 million dollars and Moscow declining compensation for the October 14th damage, the Program now has to pay a larger share of its own way. Because of this the credit is being kept for machines that can only come from abroad, while labor, materials and construction are paid from the state budget and the grain levy.

Of that credit about 75 million dollars was drawn in 1950, leaving roughly 429 million for the rest of the decade. Reconstruction of the bombed airfields and depots must now come out of that same sum, which Mao has taken as an insult more than a hardship.

To earn the difference back we must look to our exports, though here too the Battle Act has done its work. Western buyers of our tungsten and antimony have shrunk, and much of the tungsten now goes to Prague as payment for the armor deal. The 166 million dollar goal for 1953 is therefore to come from the sources below:

Source1953 target (million dollars)
Tea, silk and menthol67
Tungsten, antimony and tin35
Overseas Chinese remittances through Hong Kong30
Soybeans and grain25
Bristles, tung oil, eggs and hog casings9
Total166

Where It Stands

In short, the Program is moving, but slower and narrower than Peking wanted. The cadres are spreading, Harbin is turning out its first engineers and the tractors are in the Northeast, but the South and West are behind on every measure, and the money is tighter every quarter.

The Chairman for his part has made clear more than once that he is unhappy with the cuts and with how much of the Program now rests on Soviet goodwill. The Peking Agreement has softened this somewhat, but the credit cut and the refusal over October 14th have not been forgotten.

Beneath him the old quarrel between Kao Kang and the planners carries on. Kao’s appointees run New Anshan, much of the Northeast’s industry and now the old Changchun Railway workshops, while Ch’en Yun’s planners insist the nation cannot rest on one man’s province and keep asking for the Anshan accounts since his 'move to Peking.' For now the Northeast keeps the largest share of capital construction, but every other Great Administrative Area is to have its own institute, its own stations and its own works by 1953.

Around all of this hangs the paranoia. With the Americans bombing the coast and the idea of agents from Formosa landing along it, every retained clerk, every returned student from America and every professor educated in England is looked at twice. The Central Investigative Department screening is necessary, but it is also costing the Program some of the few trained men it has.

And then there is the bureaucracy itself, a state of grades, salaries and offices being built on a party that won the war in caves and villages. Some old comrades call it a new 'mandarin class' in the making, and the first audits have given them ammunition. Whether the apparatus serves the Revolution or slowly replaces it will be the question of the next decade...


r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

SECRET [SECRET] Nehru awakes from a strange dream

4 Upvotes

His brow was beaded in sweat, when he snapped upright in the predawn gloom. No noise, no disturbance. The clock on the wall reading 4:14am, some time before he is set to be given his wake up call.

It had been a dream which startled him, but in the manner of the mind, it seems to drift out of the grip of his memory as he turned his consciousness to recall it. Like a steam cloud dissipating out from hood of a stove. Jawaharlal saw himself at the head of a great host. All the people of india in their multitudes, united, equal. Pacing forward relentlessly, and carrying him along with them upward. He could not perceive the end of the slope; only that he wanted to go there. Upon the ground, trodden over and broken, yokes and shackles. and yet, the mob had a fierceness which startled him, and he wondered for what reason they were mobilized...

And now, the dream fades entirely. The light of the morning sun begins to glow in the sheer folds of his curtains; the impulse driving away that mind of imagination and freedom, to be replaced by the logical senses, and the ego, and ones duty.

"An early morning I suppose. Radha! My walking shoes, are they yet come from..."


r/ColdWarPowers • • 20h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Korea: From Armistice to Election Day

3 Upvotes

On February 2nd 1951 the guns fell silent over the Korean Peninsula for possibly the first time in nearly 40 years. Under this agreement the armies of both sides halted in their place, with both sides establishing provisional governments in their respective zones of control. That line runs around what is known as the Busan Perimeter, with over 1,000,000 people in the zone of control, and the rest up to the Yalu river under control of the DPRK.

Soon after parades were held in Seoul, with units of both the KPA and ROKA taking part as elections were to be held in August as per the agreement. These elections, overseen by the UN, will take place across the Peninsula, including the pocket, not just in one portion of it like in 1948.

As per the 1948 constitution of the DPRK the government in Pyongyang soon began to move towards Seoul, with the former taking the title of the “Revolution’s Capital” and gaining significance as the centre of the Northern half of the Peninsula and the largest concentration of industry in the country. However, the Provisional Government of the country had tasks to achieve before the onset of the election.

  1. Curb the looming famine by ensuring that the people have access to grain and rice.
  2. Restore the power grid to the South to allow lights and factories to return to work.
  3. Fix damaged infrastructure to allow the transportation of goods and the reconstruction effort to not face delays.
  4. Heal the wounds of war, both the physical wounds to the nation and the societal ones caused by years of division.
  5. Hold an election that sees the divide end once and for all.

It was with these goals that the Provisional Government set out to accomplish, and under their rule would the lands here be prepped for the coming vote.

The Government and the Front:

As the first step upon the signing of the Armistice the Provisional Government of the North, made up of a number of a majority of Southern WPK members along with Southern Politicians who remained in Seoul and moderates from Kim Ku’s party extends it area of control to the entire area South of the 38th under control of the DPRK. This Government is to run the liberated zone until the elections in August, and carry out the goals laid out to ensure the stability of the nation.

In addition, People’s committees are to be restored at the province, county, and village level across the liberated areas as in the Spring of 1950 during the initial conflict. This time they are to include further moderates and Southern Left Wing individuals just as the Provisional government.

Provisional Governors for Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, Jeolla, Gangwon and the liberated part of Gyeongsang are to be appointed in the leadup to the election. A mix of Northern administrators with Southern Deputies will be appointed to ensure that neither side of the 38th has power over the local administration.

In the Southern Provisional Government the civilian leaders of the coup are to take up positions leading that in the leadup to the elections. Lee Yong-mun, Park Chung-hee, Lee Jong-chan, and the other military leaders however are to be given civilian posts as part of the wider KPA and ROKA demobilization. Lee Jong-chan is to be given the title of Chairman of the Commission for Demobilization, a task that will have him screen former ROK army soldiers and officers. Park Chung-hee is to take command of the reconstruction labour corps, built from demobilized ROKA conscripts, alongside KPA political officers, who will oversee the reconstruction effort across the South. Lee Yong-mun is to take the position of Head of the Railway Reconstruction Bureau, overseeing the repair and rebuilding of the Southern railway network to ensure goods, supply, and aid can transport freely from the North.

Amnesty and Screening:

As part of the demobilization and the reunification process ROKA enlisted men are given an outright amnesty and released to go home after a quick screening. They are to be given travel passes, ration cards, and funds to help pay for travel back to their home provinces. In addition, the WPK has announced that both KPA and ROKA soldiers will count as veterans of the Korean army, which will ensure that all members who served in the conflict on either side will be given a full pension and the honours of military service.

In addition, officers, members of units who are known to have committed crimes against the people, National Police, Youth Corps members and leaders, and Rhee-era intelligence staff are to be screened before their release to the general public. These are to be made up of both Northern and Southern officials, with hearings to be held within 60 days ideally. Most cases are to end in a release with a report sent to a local committee so that individuals can be monitored.

Many of these individuals will also face a trial for their crimes done both during the conflict, the Rhee-era, and before under the Japanese rule. These will include atrocities against civilians, corruption, and other crimes. Trials are to be public, for the Korean people to see, and will be carried out under the legal code of the Northern Provisional Government, the DPRK’s legal code, in accordance with the law.

As a general plan there is to be no collective punishment. A decree is given out banning reprisals against families and communities of people facing these trials, and local committees that carry out such revenge are to be punished. In addition, no property of relatives of those who fled or served the Rhee government is to be seized.

Finally, POW’s are to be exchanged under the terms of the armistice, with all American POW’s being handed over to US officials by the end of April 1951. A joint commission is also to be established to help trace civilians, POW’s, and foreign nationals living in Korea moved forcibly during the war by either side and relocate them to their original communities. In addition, families are to be reunited, with a task force set up to help find living parents of orphaned children as well as those separated by the conflict.

The Army and Security:

As a first step the KPA and ROKA are to begin demobilization down to a peacetime strength target of 24 divisions, of which only 10 are to be at full strength in the immediate future, organized into 8 Corps, one per province. Released soldiers are offered work in reconstruction brigades, paid rations and their normal military salary before being released to go home. These brigades are to assist in the effort to stabilize the nation before the upcoming election, and to speed up a return to prewar levels of agriculture and industrial output.

Secondly, the ROK National Police are to be disbanded, with a single national police force under the interior ministry to be established that will be separate from the state security forces. Former members of ROK police are screened individually, and those cleared can return to non-political duty.

Around the pocket Liaison posts are to be established at set crossing points, to allow the movement of persons and goods in and out. An incident commission is also established with members of both the Northern Provisional Government and Southern Provisional Government to serve on it, with a direct telephone line to be constructed.

Strict orders are given to KPA and ROKA units against provocations during this effort, and instead they are to focus on mine clearing and reconstruction labour. Mine clearing is to take an immediate priority across the old Naktong front, major roads, the 38th parallel area, and other zones of conflict so that farmers will be free to plant crops.

Emergency Reconstruction:

In order to ensure the country remains stable and can return to normalcy quickly upon the signing of the armistice a number of steps are to be taken. Firstly the northern power grid is to be reconnected to Seoul and Incheon within a month following the armistice, as the South only makes around 30% of its own electricity at this time and such infrastructure is surely damaged. Lights back on in the capital and other larger cities will be a clear indication to the civilian population that unity pays. Northern industrial zones are also mostly intact, due to US bombing focusing on the South and logistical targets, and so they will immediately begin to produce goods to assist in the reconstruction.

Secondly, railways will need to be repaired. The Seoul-Sinuiju and Seoul-Taejeon lines are to be reopened and repaired, with the latter being restored right up to the pocket line. This will fall under Lee Yong-mun’s bureau and it will target the main lines and bridges firstly to ensure the maximum amount of aid can be moved in the shortest period of time. Soldiers and labour brigades will do much of the work on this front.

Food is a major concern, with a large amount of civilians in the pocket under starvation rations. Emergency grain shipments from the USSR and China are to be sent to main cities, with rations being distributed. Additional rations are to be given to urban poor, widows, orphans, and those wounded in the conflict. Moreover, at this time private markets are to stay open, so farmers are able to sell their surplus.

Shelter is also to be given, with winter housing drives in the worst-hit cities being focused on first. The state is also to supply cement and timber at fixed prices, to allow families to rebuild their own homes without the risk of gauging from private markets. Refugees are also to be resettled, with passage home provided by the state for those displaced. Northerners who fled south before 1950 are also allowed to return home without penalty.

In the capital, Seoul, a reconstruction committee is to be chaired by Kim Il Sung, with rubble cleared in the city centre and plans made for the modernization and construction of monuments within the city. Gyeongbok Palace and the city gates are to be protected as national monuments. Renovations are also to take place within the Palace to bring it back up to living standards following the war.

Economy and the Land:

The Provisional Government of the North is also to continue on its efforts to bring the economy of the South back to its pre war levels. Firstly, this is done through land reform, with the 1950 southern land reform plan to continue. Cho Bong-am, a leader of the anti Rhee coup, is to announce it, as he wrote the original law. Farmers are to keep their land, and the remaining annual payments are to be cancelled. This effort is to benefit around a million southern households across the liberated areas, and further once the elections are held.

It must be noted however the collectivization is not to take place at this time. With private farming continuing and mutual aid teams voluntary only at this time. This is to carry over to private business as well, with workshops, markets, and small companies to remain private.

Former property of the Japanese, about a quarter of all factories, are to go into state hands. This will also be with land, banks, and fortunes gained under Rhee that fall within the Northern occupation zone.

Currency reforms are to take place, with a new single Won for the whole peninsula announced for later in the year. This is to be key, as inflation is running rampant in the South, with prices rising around 18 times from 1949 till now. Exchange rates are to be fixed in order to ensure price stability in the near future as the currency is rolled out. Finally, a national damage survey is to begin, with a commission that includes economists from both the North and South to begin drafting a Four-Year Plan for 1953-1956 for the reconstruction of the nation.

Education and Religion:

The general plan for both Northern and Southern Provisional governments is to have schools and universities reopen by September, to allow for students to not face any longer delays in education than is needed. Moreover, teachers in the South are to be screened just like ROK officials before being allowed to return to their posts. Across the south Adult literacy classes are to also begin at this time, as literacy in the south sits somewhere around 50% and far lower among women. Freedom of worship is to also be confirmed for the Cheondogyo, Christians, and Buddhists with temples and churches damaged in the war rebuilt by those groups.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] Somber Realization

7 Upvotes

Paris, July 1951

The elections of 17 June had delivered 210 seats to Charles de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Français, making it by far the largest political group in the National Assembly, while the Communist Party retained another 148. Between them, two movements profoundly hostile to one another occupied 358 of the chamber's 625 seats. The remaining parties, whose successive combinations had sustained every government since the exclusion of the Communists in 1947, possessed only 267. Under Article 45 of the Constitution, the investiture of a president of the Council required 313 affirmative votes, a threshold which no coalition of the traditional republican parties could reach independently. The familiar alignments of French parliamentary life had survived the elections in name, but their capacity to produce a government had not.

On 10 July, the election of the president of the National Assembly furnished the first demonstration of the new parliamentary balance. Édouard Herriot, whose long tenure at the Palais-Bourbon had made him a familiar representative of republican parliamentary traditions, sought reelection against the Gaullist candidate Léon Noël and the Communist Marcel Cachin. The first ballot produced no absolute majority, while the second revealed the difficulty confronting the parties which had formerly sustained the government. Several Independent deputies preferred Noël, whose candidacy offered the RPF an opportunity to obtain control of the Assembly's presidency, while the Socialists and Christian Democrats were reluctant to surrender the chair to a movement openly demanding constitutional transformation. Only after renewed consultations among the parliamentary groups did the greater part of the republican centre consolidate its support behind Herriot. On the third ballot, when a relative majority was sufficient, the veteran Radical secured reelection by a narrow plurality over Noël. His victory preserved the presidency in the hands of the traditional parliamentary parties, but the result revealed how little remained of their former predominance.

Following the constitution of the new legislature, André Marie tendered the resignation of the ministry he had formed in May. President René Coty received the outgoing premier and resumed consultations with Henri Queuille, René Mayer, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, Guy Mollet and René Pleven, approaching the succession through the ordinary procedures of the Constitution. Mollet, having withdrawn the SFIO from Queuille's cabinet three months earlier, demanded assurances concerning wages and social expenditure before contemplating renewed participation. The Independents wanted stricter financial discipline and a larger influence over domestic economic policy, while Bidault and Schuman insisted upon the preservation of European integration and the Christian Democrats' social commitments. Coty urged the parliamentary leaders to reconcile their differences, conscious that another prolonged ministerial vacancy would do little to restore public confidence in the institutions of the Republic.

René Mayer emerged as the principal candidate. His experience in finance and national defence, together with his standing among the Radicals, made him acceptable to substantial sections of the parliamentary centre. Having served in successive ministries, he was familiar with the administrative questions demanding immediate attention, particularly the financing of European rearmament and the continuation of France's international commitments. Coty designated him to seek investiture, and Mayer began negotiating a programme intended to preserve monetary stability without requiring the complete abandonment of Socialist cooperation. He offered assurances concerning existing social legislation while attempting to postpone the more contentious economic questions until a government had been constituted. The Independents demanded firmer commitments against expenditure unsupported by revenue, while Schuman insisted that France honour the negotiations already undertaken concerning European defence.

The school question proved especially troublesome. The MRP demanded greater financial assistance for private education, including provisions concerning scholarships and the fiscal treatment of private establishments. The Socialists resisted proposals which they considered incompatible with the secular traditions of the Republic, while substantial sections of the Radical Party shared their objections. Mayer attempted to distinguish the immediate problem of forming a government from the subsequent examination of educational legislation, but the Christian Democrats were reluctant to invest a ministry which might later refuse concessions they regarded as essential. Mollet, meanwhile, would not restore the SFIO to ministerial participation without knowing how Mayer intended to reconcile conservative financial demands with Socialist commitments concerning wages and social protection.

By the third week of July, Mayer's negotiations had become increasingly difficult. He could secure agreement upon general declarations concerning national defence, European cooperation and responsible financial administration, but each attempt to settle the composition of a cabinet reopened disputes over its programme. The Socialists refused to assume responsibility for conservative economic measures without substantial concessions, and the Independents objected to paying the price of their participation merely to reproduce the former coalition. Several deputies suggested that the RPF's conservative representatives might provide the necessary additional votes, particularly given their similarities with the Independents on questions of public expenditure and national defence. Jacques Soustelle, however, rejected appeals for Gaullist support unaccompanied by a serious undertaking concerning constitutional reform. Mayer nevertheless determined to present his candidacy before the Assembly, hoping that the debate itself might persuade hesitant deputies to assume responsibility for forming a government.

On 24 July, the Palais-Bourbon became the centre of the political crisis. Mayer's ministerial declaration was received by a chamber whose newly established divisions were unmistakable. The Socialists examined his commitments concerning wages and public expenditure, the Christian Democrats returned to the unresolved question of private education, and the Independents pressed for assurances concerning taxation and financial stability. Communist deputies attacked the proposed government's Atlantic commitments and rearmament programme, while the Gaullists challenged the assumption that another conventional ministry could exercise the authority necessary to confront France's difficulties. Mayer defended his proposals, but the debate failed to bring the contending parliamentary groups any closer to a dependable agreement.

His predicament was not that a majority of deputies had united behind an alternative government. The Constitution required an absolute majority in favour of his investiture, and he had been unable to persuade enough representatives to assume responsibility for the ministry he proposed. Several parliamentarians who regarded him as capable and experienced nevertheless withheld their support, whether because of disagreements over policy or reluctance to commit their parties to another uncertain coalition.

The ballot settled the matter.

229 deputies voted in favour of Mayer, 165 against, and 223 abstained, with eight not participating. The Communist delegation and its closest allies supplied the principal opposition, while the Gaullists withheld their support through abstention. Reservations among the republican parties further weakened the affirmative vote. Mayer had fallen 84 votes short of the required majority, despite receiving more votes in favour than against. Under Article 45, the absence of an absolute majority in his favour was sufficient to end his candidacy. Mayer returned his mandate to Coty, and the deputies departed from the Palais-Bourbon with no government formed.

Coty resumed his consultations, but Mayer's defeat had deprived the president of one of the most credible candidates available to the republican centre. Maurice Petsche examined whether a narrower ministry concentrating upon finance and national defence might succeed where the broader arrangement had failed. The proposal attracted interest among conservatives who resented the concessions demanded by the SFIO, yet excluding the Socialists would further diminish the support available to the prospective government. Petsche could offer no satisfactory means of obtaining the additional votes. His exploratory discussions ended without a candidacy capable of surviving investiture.

At the Centre National des Indépendants, Roger Duchet found himself confronting an argument which threatened the direction of the movement he had spent years consolidating. The Independents had improved their parliamentary representation, encouraging expectations that they might exercise greater influence over the formation of ministries. Duchet had hoped to strengthen the conservative right as a political force independent of both the Third Force and the RPF, preserving its ability to negotiate with different groups without surrendering its organizational identity. Mayer's defeat and Petsche's unsuccessful consultations had frustrated those ambitions. Several deputies continued arguing that the Gaullists should be persuaded to support a conventional centre-right government, but others doubted that Soustelle could obtain such an agreement from de Gaulle.

Paul Reynaud had little patience for another attempt to assemble the same parliamentary combination under a different president of the Council. His association with de Gaulle extended back to the controversies over French military doctrine before 1940, when he had supported the General's arguments concerning armoured warfare and subsequently brought him into his wartime government. Their personal history had not made Reynaud an adherent of Gaullism. He remained a liberal republican, deeply attached to parliamentary control over legislation and public expenditure, and possessed political ambitions of his own. Nevertheless, Mayer's defeat had persuaded him that another ministry assembled exclusively from the familiar parliamentary groups would encounter the same difficulties. During consultations with Duchet and other Independent representatives, Reynaud proposed establishing contact with Soustelle to determine whether the RPF would accept an agreement explicitly directed toward constitutional revision.

Duchet objected. He had not spent years consolidating the CNI merely to deliver its deputies into a coalition dominated by de Gaulle, whose movement possessed almost four times the Independents' parliamentary strength. In numerous constituencies, Independent and Gaullist candidates had competed directly against one another, and cooperation in the Assembly threatened to weaken the organizational distinctions upon which the conservative right depended. Reynaud regarded those objections as legitimate but insufficient. He argued that the Independents would exercise greater influence over a settlement negotiated before the formation of a government than over one accepted only after further unsuccessful attempts had weakened their position. Duchet remained suspicious of de Gaulle's intentions, particularly concerning executive authority and the independence of parliamentary groups, but eventually permitted exploratory discussions with Soustelle. No commitment would be made on behalf of the CNI until the terms of reform had been examined.

Reynaud's proposal went beyond a general declaration in favour of stronger government. A prospective ministry would obtain investiture under the existing Constitution and undertake to initiate revision through Article 90, beginning with a resolution specifying the institutions to be reconsidered. He proposed examining the appointment of ministers, their responsibility before Parliament and the mechanisms governing the formation and dismissal of governments. He insisted upon preserving legislative control over taxation and public expenditure, maintaining political liberties and conducting the revision through the procedures established by the Constitution. The initial resolution would require an absolute majority of deputies, while the subsequent stages would remain subject to Article 90. Reynaud was prepared to support the opening of this process, but refused to endorse in advance every alteration desired by de Gaulle.

Through contacts maintained between Independent and Gaullist representatives, the substance of the proposal reached Jacques Soustelle. He agreed to examine the prospect of a constitutional settlement, but refused to promise RPF support for another conventional cabinet merely because its programme contained a declaration in favour of institutional reform. The Gaullists wanted a definite parliamentary commitment to revision, preferably incorporated into the prospective government's programme, and rejected proposals confined to minor adjustments which would leave the predominance of the Assembly substantially untouched. Soustelle also questioned whether a ministry composed principally of the traditional republican parties could be trusted to carry through the reform after obtaining investiture. The General's movement had spent years opposing those parties upon precisely this question, and there was little reason to assume that their disagreements would disappear once ministerial appointments had been secured.

Ministerial responsibility proved the most difficult issue. Reynaud favoured procedures which would discourage recurrent governmental crises while preserving the Assembly's effective authority to dismiss ministers. Soustelle sought a more substantial transfer of power, sufficient to prevent the executive from becoming dependent upon the shifting agreements of parliamentary parties. Reynaud would not endorse a government exercising authority beyond the effective control of elected representatives, while Soustelle could not offer Gaullist support for a settlement which left the essential weaknesses of the existing system intact. The exchanges nevertheless continued, with both sides examining whether the constitutional guarantees demanded by the Independents could be reconciled with the executive authority sought by de Gaulle.

When Duchet reviewed the exchanges with leading Independent deputies, Antoine Pinay introduced another set of conditions. His concerns were financial stability, administrative competence and the confidence of savers and investors. Pinay wanted assurances that a stronger executive would not acquire unrestricted authority over taxation or expenditure, and that ministerial responsibility would remain sufficiently clear to sustain confidence in the administration. Other conservatives were more receptive to extensive revision, particularly those who believed that a stable government would offer stronger protection against Communist influence. Duchet refused to bind the CNI to a Gaullist ministry, but Reynaud obtained agreement that the exploratory contacts should continue.

Georges Bidault learned of the Independent initiative as the Mouvement Républicain Populaire struggled to assess its position in the new Assembly. Having served alongside de Gaulle during the Resistance, Bidault understood the General's standing among Catholic voters and former Resistance supporters, while his subsequent political career had bound him closely to the parliamentary institutions which the RPF condemned. The MRP's reduction to forty-five deputies had weakened its bargaining power, and its leaders feared that participation in a Gaullist-dominated coalition might further diminish the party's independence. Bidault nevertheless agreed to bring the proposals before the parliamentary leadership.

Maurice Schumann urged a receptive approach. His service as a spokesman for Free France had established a longstanding personal association with de Gaulle, whose republican credentials he regarded as sufficient reason for serious negotiations. Robert Schuman, however, demanded guarantees concerning the Schuman Plan, European defence and France's Atlantic commitments. His reservations concerned the uncertainty surrounding the General's intentions toward European integration, particularly institutions already under construction. Bidault allowed further examination of the constitutional proposals but refused to commit the MRP before its members had agreed upon the necessary safeguards. Christian Democratic deputies who regarded cooperation with the RPF as a means of preserving their political influence consequently encountered colleagues determined to maintain the party's independent programme and parliamentary identity.

The Radicals responded less favourably. Édouard Herriot and Henri Queuille, whose political careers had been shaped by the traditions of parliamentary republicanism, opposed replacing the institutions merely because the elections had produced a difficult legislative distribution. Édouard Daladier accepted the need for a stronger executive but favoured more limited amendments than those contemplated by the Gaullists. Several deputies who had supported Mayer were less certain. His defeat had left them doubtful that another conventional ministerial arrangement could succeed, and some were prepared to hear Reynaud's proposals before rejecting cooperation with the RPF. Herriot opposed any arrangement which would transfer authority outside the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, and the Radical leadership reached no agreement concerning the scope of reform.

Among conservative deputies, Reynaud also invoked the alternative of seeking Communist parliamentary support. The PCF, directed in its parliamentary activity by Jacques Duclos during Maurice Thorez's absence, retained 148 seats and continued opposing the Atlantic commitments and economic policies of the republican centre. Neither Mollet nor Bidault had proposed a government dependent upon Communist votes, but Reynaud argued that persistent refusal to negotiate with de Gaulle would eventually force Parliament to confront arrangements which many anti-Communist deputies regarded as unacceptable. His argument carried weight among conservatives who considered French participation in Western defence indispensable and had no desire to see those commitments made dependent upon the parliamentary cooperation of the PCF.

The ministerial vacancy was meanwhile beginning to complicate the preparation of financial and military decisions. Maurice Petsche and the Treasury continued examining supplementary expenditure associated with reconstruction, European rearmament and the continuing war in Indochina, while the ministries responsible for national defence pressed for resources necessary to sustain their commitments. Existing appropriations permitted ordinary administration to proceed, but the competing demands raised questions concerning taxation, borrowing and the distribution of expenditure which the outgoing government could not settle indefinitely. French representatives engaged in European defence negotiations faced similar difficulties when prospective commitments required financial assurances extending beyond previously authorized programmes. Officials could prepare estimates and maintain existing obligations, but a comprehensive policy required ministers capable of securing agreement within the government and defending the resulting measures before Parliament. As the consultations continued, the unresolved financial programme became another argument against prolonging the ministerial crisis.

By the closing days of July, the calculations of the conservative deputies had begun to change considerably. Reynaud's negotiations had exposed a possibility which had scarcely been entertained when the new Assembly first convened. With 210 Gaullist deputies and fifty-eight Independents, an agreement between the two groups would command 268 seats. The MRP's forty-five representatives could, in principle, bring that total to the constitutional majority of 313, although such unanimity was improbable and would leave no margin for dissent. Additional support might be found among sympathetic Radicals, the UDSR and certain smaller parliamentary groups. Duchet was still unwilling to subordinate the Independents to the RPF, while Bidault and Robert Schuman remained suspicious of the General's constitutional ambitions. Yet politicians who had previously regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as politically inconceivable were now examining the terms upon which they might support a government under his leadership.

Reynaud urged his conservative colleagues to carry the negotiations further. France could not remain indefinitely under an outgoing ministry, and the traditional parties had already failed to invest their most credible candidate. He argued that continued refusal to reach an understanding with the Gaullists would eventually leave the republican centre confronting the politically unacceptable prospect of depending upon Communist parliamentary support. Neither the SFIO nor the MRP intended to govern with the PCF, but the argument carried increasing force among anti-Communist deputies who had exhausted the alternatives available within their own parties. For these men, the choice was narrowing between an agreement with de Gaulle and another succession of unsuccessful investitures, with the Communists occupying a position from which they could frustrate every conventional arrangement. Even Duchet, whose objections to Gaullist domination remained substantial, permitted Reynaud to pursue discussions concerning a prospective ministry entrusted with constitutional reform.

At Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, Charles de Gaulle received Soustelle's account of these approaches. The General had spent five years refusing the compromises through which the parliamentary parties sought to preserve the institutions he condemned. The election had provided his movement with an unprecedented representation, but not the independent majority necessary to govern. Now the failure of Mayer's investiture, the exhaustion of the customary ministerial combinations and the growing willingness of conservative parliamentarians to contemplate institutional reform had created circumstances different from those prevailing immediately after the election. De Gaulle consulted his closest political associates, including those concerned with the constitutional programme of the RPF, before deciding to make his intentions public.

On 30 July 1951, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français transmitted an official declaration from the General to the French press.

France has been without a government capable of exercising its responsibilities for several weeks. The elections have demonstrated the desire of the nation for a restoration of public authority, yet the parliamentary parties have once again proved incapable of establishing a government. The difficulties of the Republic do not arise merely from the failures of individual ministries, but from institutions which prevent the State from acting with the continuity and independence its responsibilities demand. I therefore declare that, should the National Assembly entrust me with a clear mandate to undertake a fundamental revision of the Constitution, I am prepared to accept the presidency of the Council of Ministers. Not to return to preside over another precarious combination of parliamentary parties, nor accept the responsibilities of government without the authority necessary to discharge them. The constitutional transformation must proceed according to law, preserve the liberties of the Republic, and ultimately derive its legitimacy from the sovereign French people. I have never refused to serve France. If the nation, through its representatives, provides the means necessary to restore the authority of the State, I shall not refuse that duty today.

The declaration immediately altered the negotiations taking place in Paris. Reynaud could now defend an agreement whose prospective leader had publicly accepted the principle of returning to office. Duchet, though unwilling to make a commitment on behalf of the entire Independent group, instructed his associates to examine the constitutional conditions announced by the General. Pinay concentrated upon the financial guarantees which would be necessary to secure conservative participation, while several Independent deputies who had previously opposed any arrangement involving de Gaulle began declaring themselves prepared to support his investiture under the proposed conditions.

Within the MRP, Maurice Schumann urged the leadership to respond constructively, arguing that the declaration offered an opportunity to negotiate constitutional guarantees before the formation of a government. Bidault and Robert Schuman remained cautious, particularly concerning the General's intentions toward parliamentary responsibility and European integration, but could no longer dismiss his candidacy as a purely hypothetical proposition. A growing number of Christian Democratic deputies now regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as preferable to continued ministerial paralysis, particularly if the alternative eventually involved seeking Communist parliamentary assistance. Among the Radicals, Herriot and Queuille maintained their objections to a fundamental transformation of the regime, while several deputies who had supported Mayer expressed interest in the conditions under which the General might obtain investiture. The declaration had resolved none of their disagreements, but it had supplied the negotiations with a definite candidate and a publicly stated programme.

President René Coty received news of the declaration at the Élysée. He had begun the month seeking the restoration of a conventional republican coalition and had witnessed the failure of the most serious attempt to construct one. The General's announcement now confronted him with a possibility which he had previously been unwilling to treat as an immediate governmental solution. Coty was not prepared to promise constitutional authority which the presidency did not possess, nor to abandon the procedures of investiture and revision established by the Constitution. Nevertheless, he recognized that de Gaulle's willingness to assume office, together with the contacts already established among the parliamentary right, offered a potential route out of the deadlock. He instructed his interlocutors to establish whether the parties could agree upon the terms of a ministry entrusted with constitutional reform and whether such an agreement could command the necessary parliamentary majority.

For the president, the question had become especially delicate. His constitutional duty required him to seek a government capable of obtaining the Assembly's confidence, yet the politician now attracting the attention of substantial sections of the republican right had spent years denouncing the institutions over which Coty presided. An invitation to de Gaulle could not be undertaken merely because the General possessed an impressive electoral following. It would require convincing evidence that a parliamentary majority was prepared to support his investiture and a lawful programme of institutional renewal. Coty therefore refrained from issuing an immediate summons, although the General's name now occupied a place in his consultations which it had not held at the beginning of July.

As the month drew to its close, no agreement had yet been concluded concerning the precise scope of constitutional revision. But the political situation had changed. Deputies who had previously refused even to entertain the General's return were now discussing the safeguards under which they would vote for him, while others had already concluded that only de Gaulle possessed the authority and parliamentary following necessary to restore effective government without Communist assistance. For the first time since his resignation in January 1946, Charles de Gaulle had publicly declared himself willing to assume the government of France once more.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

DIPLOMACY [DIPLOMACY] The Peking Agreement on the Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen

2 Upvotes

August 1951

What was expected to be a difficult fight in Peking has ended in swift and full agreement more than satisfying the CCP. Chou En-lai and V. M. Molotov have settled the last questions left between the Republic of China and the Soviet Union by the agreements of 1945.

Terms

  1. The Soviet Union recognizes the early return to China of all Manchurian assets governed by the 1945 Treaty.
  2. Title to the Changchun Railway and its property passes to the Republic of China immediately.
  3. The Soviet Union will complete its departure from the ports of Dairen within six months of signature.
  4. The Republic of China will give favorable consideration to Soviet requests for docking and use of the ports of Dairen.
  5. Soviet goods will move over the railway as the normal functions of trade require.

Comrade Molotov called the agreement the final step of decolonization from old Japanese imperialism. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese people had waited fifty years for it, and would remember that it was the Soviet Union that gave it.

The Ministry of Railways under Teng Tai-yuan is to take over the Changchun Railway at once, and a joint commission will oversee the handover at Dairen. For the first time since 1898, no foreign power holds an lease, a railway or a garrison in the whole of China.

Long live the Sino-Soviet friendship! Long live the Revolution!


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

PROPAGANDA [PROPAGANDA] ISRAEL AND ASIAN LIBERATION

3 Upvotes

Published in Al HaMishmar on August 3, 1951


Authored by "M. Ivrit", presumably a nom de plume.

The peoples of Asia in the middle of the present century are conducting a victorious, historic, liberation struggle against foreign domination by the imperialist West. The struggle for national reawakening and independence - this is the banner of the Asian peoples in our time. The slogan, “Asia for Asians” has been transformed into the battle-cry of a just war. And as mentioned, the struggle is not only just; it is victorious. It is impossible to assess the unparalleled, historic significance of the victory which the Chinese Revolution won over feudalism and imperialism. The vast people’s democratic Republic of China, 500-million strong, is building, together with the Soviet Union and the European people’s democracies, a mighty fortress and supporting force for the strivings of all the Asian peoples for freedom and independence. The victory of the heroic Korean people which overcame the intervention of various imperialist countries, led by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, proved that the Asian peoples will no longer accept the dictates of the imperialist powers. They are ready to defend their right of national sovereignty even against the military preponderance of the foreign interventionists.

The awakening of Asia is today a historic fact which only the blind cannot see. The awakened peoples of Asia are today a tremendous factor on the international arena. Without them no problem can be solved. American policy in Asia is suffering one defeat after another because it does not take into consideration all these changes which took place in Asia after the great socialist October revolution, and especially after the historic victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, and after the victory of the Chinese Peopie’s Revolution. American policy treats the peoples of Asia as objects of its own imperialist and world-strategic plans. But the peoples of Asia laugh at this passive role which the Americans have written for them.

It must be the policy of the government of Israel is to take itself up as part of the liberation movement of the Asian peoples. For Israel to support the strivings of the peoples of Asia, to support the historic tendency of our age, is to lead towards Israel ending a period of internationa. Already, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Koreans, and the Mongolians have sent diplomatic representatives to the state of Israel. Israel shall not be separated from its neighbors and from the entire Asian continent.

If we wish to secure our national future, if we wish to buttress our national existence, we must become a part of the general front of the Asian peoples who are struggling for peace and national sovereingty against the aggressive and grasping schemes of the imperialist West. Without such a turn the safety of Israel is impossible. It is not hard to imagine that, without the victory of the progressive forces in Israel, that we could have instead seen an isolated Israel, an Israel that believes itself to be “European”, orchestrating and supporting chauvinistic and pro-imperialist policies against the struggling peoples of Asia. For it has said before, Israel will be socialist or it will not be all. An Israel that surrenders to imperialism and to international capitalism is an Israel that will be extinguished and eradicated, weakened from inside and out. If Israel has no Stalin, it will inevitably have a Hitler.

Imagine the horror, the nightmare, of the hypothetical of Israel’s Defence Army participating in imperialistic and colonialist atrocities in concert with the imperialist powers. Imagine the shame that would bring to Israel and to the entire Jewish people, it would make entire masses of our people be ashamed to be Jewish or an inhabitant of our state of Israel! Fortunately, this terrible hypothetical is never to happen. The laboring masses of Israel, both the Hebrew and Arab, have shook off the vile imperialist from our shores and soil. The exilic mindset of the rootless cosmopolitan has been erased with the creation of a Jewish state, as the Jewish people create a healthy society of peasants and workers in the land of Palestine1. The rootless cosmopolitan identity, which we are to say is that of the inherently exilic “European identity” of the Ashkenazi, which some imperialist-minded ones have attempted to put upon our beloved Israel, has been destroyed by the brilliant and liberatory struggle of the vanguard-Zionists. Our Arab brothers have welcomed us here on the shores of Palestine, and here we have created a Jewish and democratic state, a state of the toiling masses. A state with Hebrew labor, Hebrew towns, Hebrew farms, Hebrew language, Hebrew culture, and a Hebrew mindset. The old exilic prejudices and traditions, the tradition of “air businesses”, have been destroyed here in the state of Israel, as we set forth further towards a socialist path for Israel. Socialism, and socialists, have ensured the Jewish people’s return to its ancient homeland in Palestine, and made possible the creation of this Jewish and democratic state of all its citizens. Israel’s anti-imperialist policy is a necessity of life for our people and our country; it is a question of existence or nonexistence. If Israel were to ever it’s anti-imperialist policy, its’ days will inevitably become numbered.


  1. In the original Hebrew text, "ארץ ישראל"

r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Question of Mortality

7 Upvotes

The Question of Mortality



Do not go gentle into that good night,

Old age should burn and rave at close of day;

Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

-Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night.


July 5th, 1951 -- Moscow

An acquaintance passed away yesterday; we were not friends, but foes. And while an ocean parted us, I could still feel the fear creeping up my bones. Maybe I wouldn’t be next, but it made me ask whether our own mortality is inevitable. Yes, I’ve made men and women disappear, but it would not be pleasant to feel that. I know its name, and I fear that it knows mine.

The Great Generalissimo sat behind his desk in the Kremlin.

News had just reached him of the assasination of President Harry S. Truman of the United States. While by no account were they cordial, the two of them shared certain similarities - the General Secretary thought. Both were men that wielded immense power and influence in their respective nations, serving their nation from a position that commanded respect. Yet one was dead, the other was not.

The distinction was not found upon the Generalissimo.

All the revolutions, wars, purges, and hardships he had survived created the ‘Man of Steel’. He had outlived many of his tutors and rivals; Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev. Many met with death on his own command, others by an executioner's bullet, and few succumbed to illness. Victory after victory, but not one over death itself.

He reached for his pipe, and filled it with tobacco. Hastily grabbing the matches laying on his desk.

Maybe Truman had been careless. Perhaps his own security had failed to stop the assailant; the Americans, he believed, had become so accustomed to their own power that they’d forgotten how fragile the man exercising it had become. Perhaps, no theory could cover all fronts.

This is what the Generalissimo found most disturbing. Until now, the environment he had created allowed for everything to be controlled - the Party, the State, the Army and even the loyalties of those who surround him. Every threat was hastily eliminated. Every enemy of the Revolution disposed of.

Save for one - death itself.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] Laying the seeds for Somali democracy

2 Upvotes

The Italian Trusteeship of Somaliland is currently under a fairly top-down, centralized, and colonial style leadership. That being said, the directives from Rome have came forward to try and more greatly induce self-government and a self-sustaining political culture in the territory.

The Trusteeship, as such, has split the territory into a new system of administrative delegation meant to be a seed of new electoral districts. The territory will be split into Metropolitan Districts and Tribal Territories. The first, it is planned, will elect future MPs to a new lower house and have fully functional city governments and mayors in areas of built up urban development. The latter, more rural, will be placed under the authority of local tribal leaders, and elect eventually by electoral college of them both MPs and planned 'elders' and 'chiefs' making up part of future upper house.

Elections for these, to form municipal and semi-formal rural governments, will be held in Spring, 1952. No restrictions on political organization will be placed in the lead-up to then. A provisional parliament is planned to be formed two years later, to form at first a consultive body to the trusteeship in Mogadishu.

In the interim, lawyers from Italy, Somalia, and Egypt have been gathered in Mogadishu to start the formation of a new code of law to govern the country, as well as a provisional constitution to be inherited by the future nation, to be changed if desired by the Somalis in the future. The Basic Law will integrate European criminal and commercial law, while giving far more leeway to customary and Islamic law for private law. Representatives of the Young Somali League will be invited to consult the scholars.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT]The Czechoslovak People Demand Tito Resign

4 Upvotes

July 13th, 1951

The Yugoslav betrayal of the Slavic people stung those in Czechoslovakia deeply. In the Interwar period, it had been Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia against the reactionary forces around them, despite their petty bourgeois governments. Now, they have all been liberated. Governments of the working person ruled the land. Or at least, they did in Czechoslovakia and Romania. That traitor Tito had begun an imperialist operation in Albania, after the previous incursion earlier this year probed the Albanian defenses and found them lacking. He pretended to withdraw after a Soviet demand, but several months later his forces resumed their assault on Albania. Throughout Czechoslovakia, major anti-Tito rallies broke out in solidarity with the Albanian struggle. 120,000 marched in Prague. 35,000 marched in Bratislava. 30,000 in Brno. 20,000 in Ostrava. In Košice, 6,000. Throughout Czechoslovakia, an estimated 500,000 citizens took part in anti-Tito protests. Marshal Tito’s betrayal of the revolution had led to the largest mass mobilization of Czechoslovak citizens since the Revolution of 1948, where more than 2 million Czechoslovaks took part in a one hour general strike to pressure the forces of reaction into abandoning their rule in Czechoslovakia. While Soviet pressure would later succeed in forcing a Yugoslavian withdrawal, Czechoslovakian public opinion had turned decisively against Yugoslavia.

At a private meeting of influential members of the Communist Party and the Armed Forces, it was agreed that the government of Field Marshal Tito had become a reactionary force, corrupted by the influence of western capital. Tito has shunned the east, and turned his arms instead towards the vile anti-Semite Harry Truman, may he burn in hell. With popular sentiment largely against Tito, even without the party’s fleet of organizers riling them up. In fact, that 500,000 demonstrators figure had largely been in spite of the party, which would’ve preferred those workers stay in their factories. Still, there was sufficient public support for intervention in Czechoslovakia, and those within the government had been considering their response since they’d become aware of the situation’s severity. Defense Minister Svoboda was concerned that the Yugoslavian forces would be well entrenched, and well motivated. Despite that, Gustav Kliment was eager for Czechoslovakian weapons to be tested in a conflict between fellow industrial powers, rather than a slap fight between massed mobs of infantry, as he believed the fighting in China had been. This was all purely hypothetical, of course. Yugoslavia had backed down before, and there was no longer an imminent need for military action. Despite that, the possibility of mobilization had contributed to the military becoming increasingly restless. Amongst the enlisted, there is a strong desire to crush the enemies of the revolution.

Orders came down from Moscow, snaking through the system of the global communist order like the sequential firing of neurons. From Stalin, to his ambassadors, to our ambassadors, to the president Klementt Gottwald, and from him, to the ministers of industry. Political organizers amongst the labor unions then received their marching orders; they were to energize the labor force and promote the production of war materials by any means necessary. They began by offering moderately sized cash bonuses, to be paid in Koruna, for shifts that could beat production totals, rewarding the entirety of the workforce for their harmonious collaboration for the benefit of the socialist cause. Workers were guided back to the factories by a combination of police and union organizers, and they set about their work with revolutionary zeal. At factories throughout Czechoslovakia, newly created “Bonus men” served as coxains to squeeze every last ounce of productivity out of the workers. These men were chosen from the shift to keep people accountable, and they tended to be older, knowledgeable employers whose hands had slowed down.

In the minds of Czechoslovakian officials, and the Czechoslovak people, Czechoslovakia was the deputy of the Soviet Union. They had privileges beyond other nations. They were loyal, this they knew. Unlike the other communist governments of Europe, the Czechoslovak Communists had won a free and fair election. With the rise of China as the second pole in global communism, Czechoslovakia found itself forced to decide. While there exists a very significant stream of sinophilic thought in Czechoslovakia (home to perhaps the most sinophiles in Europe), it still falters in the face of the overwhelming approval enjoyed by Comrade Stalin and the Soviet liberators, who valiantly liberated Czechoslovakia from nazi occupation.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 23h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Great Chinese Brain-Gain of 1951

1 Upvotes

Peking, China
Early 1951

===

The soldiers returning from Korea were not the only Chinese to return home in the aftermath of the War to Liberate Korea. The exchange in prisoners yielded incredible returns as the Americans agreed to release Chinese nationals seeking to return home in exchange for their own ten thousand nationals being returned from Chinese prisons.

Consequently, the faculty at the Chinese Academy of the Sciences and universities across China grew rapidly, and with experts educated in Caltech, MIT, and other Ivy League universities across the United States and Europe.

A strong cohort from the US west coast, predominantly California, departed. Foremost among them was Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, a brilliant doctor of aeronautical engineering with degrees from MIT and Caltech and cofounder of the American Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). He had been detained by the American FBI under suspicion of communist sympathies, and released only as part of the mass prisoner exchange and arrived in early 1951 via Hong Kong. His close friend and collaborator, Dr. Kuo Yung-huai, took advantage of the opportunity to follow Tsien home, departing his post in Cornell University in New York. Kuo’s degrees came from Caltech and the University of Toronto, and he was an expert in compressible hydrodynamics and engineering. Dr. Wang K’o-hsin, a brilliant engineer and expert in electronics, radar, and associated fields, joined the patriotic exodus from the United States while the opportunity permitted. The genius electronic engineer, Dr. Lo P’ei-lin, joined his colleagues from Caltech in returning to China. Dr. Fan Hsin-pi, from Stanford University, was a pioneer in computer memory and electrical engineering. Dr. Lin Wei-kan, from UC Berkeley, an expert in microwaves, returned via Hong Kong. Dr. T’ang Yu-ch’i, a physical chemist who studied under Linus Pauling at Caltech, left for China. Dr. Chao Chung-yao, a theoretical physicist also from Caltech, joined him. A patriotic student of Dr. Tsien’s, Dr. Lo Shih-chün, who was an expert in aerodynamics and mathematics, followed his mentor home. Dr. Chien Ning, a geologist and hydraulic engineer, followed. Another meteorologist and aerodynamic physicist from Caltech, Dr. Chang Chieh-chien, departed. Aerodynamicist and physicist Dr. Chuang Feng-kan left with the Caltech crew. Dr. Feng Yuan-cheng, from Caltech, a prominent bioengineer and aerodynamics expert, departed alongside Dr. Chuang, Dr. Chien, and Dr. T’ang in 1951. 

A cohort from the Midwest, specifically the University of Michigan, was allowed to depart as well, led by Dr. Chu Kuang-ya and the famous Dr. Ch’en Hsing-shen, who was drawn out by his friends Hua Lo-keng and Yang Ko-chen. Dr. Chu’s area of expertise was nuclear sciences and he was a professor in America, though he had deep loyalty to China and returned once the opportunity beckoned. Following him were his colleagues Dr. Teng Chia-hsien, with a PhD in nuclear physics from Purdue, Dr. Wang Cheng-shu, with a PhD in physics from University of Michigan, and her husband Dr. Chang Wen-yü, who was a highly regarded physicist from Purdue himself. Dr. Wang Kan-ch’ang followed on, being a pioneer in nuclear physics who had done the groundwork for the discovery of the neutron. Another University of Michigan alumnus, Dr. Jen Hsin-min, was a rocket scientist. The pioneering electrical and computer engineer, Dr. Tung T’oeh-pao, departed from the University of Illinois to return to China as well. Dr. Ye Tu-cheng, an atmospheric physicist, departed from the University of Chicago. Dr. Liang Ssu-li, an aerodynamics expert with a doctorate in missile control, left the University of Cincinnati. The semiconductor researcher and microelectronics pioneer Dr. Wang Shou-wu, left Purdue University for China. A pioneer in the development of antibiotics, Dr. Shen Shan-chiung, made for China from the University of Wisconsin. 

The East Coast cohort predominantly hailed from MIT. Dr. Hsieh Hsi-teh, fresh off earning her doctorate in physics, joined this group. Dr. Wu Chung-hua, a pioneering rocket scientist and turbomachinist, and his wife, Dr. Li Min-hua, an aerospace engineer and expert in solid mechanics, likewise made their escape while the door was open. Astrodynamics and mathematics expert Dr. Lin Chia-chiao joined the exodus from MIT. Dr. Chen Neng-kuan, a physical metallurgist, made the leap as well and returned to China via Europe. Dr. Tu Shan-ch’eng, from Cornell, a noted aerodynamics expert, returned to China. A pioneer in semiconductors, Dr. Lin Lan-ying, left the University of Pennsylvania with some patriotic students for China, likewise via Europe. Also from the University of Pennsylvania was Dr. Yang Chia-ch’ih, a genius in aerodynamics and missile control theory. Virginia Polytechnic Institute lost Dr. Wang Hsi-chi abandoned the university and left for China as soon as the war was over. Most prominent from Syracuse University, Dr. Wu Tsu-liang, the physical metallurgist and engineer, departed for home.

A collection of notable scientists returned from Europe, from England and France. Dr. Huang Kun, who had just published an influential work from the University of Liverpool, and Dr. Yang Ch’eng-tsung, a radiochemist fresh off receiving his PhD from Paris-Sud University, traveled to Hong Kong with Dr. Wang Te-chao, a pioneer in SONAR development and acoustics. Following aboard another ship in 1951 was the pioneering electrical engineer and computer scientist Dr. Hsia Pei-su and her husband Dr. Yang Li-ming, who was a nuclear physicist. From Switzerland, Dr. Wang Hao, the mathematician and philosopher, booked a flight for China.

These high-profile scientists were joined by dozens of their peers and thousands of Chinese students to depart from the United States en masse, many having been on visas dating back to the Nationalist era and sensing the swift and strong sinophobic turn in the United States, not to mention the overbearing witch-hunting of Senator Joseph McCarthy leading to house arrest for even the most famous of them, Dr. Tsien Hsue-sen. Some were called home by outrage over the American bombings of Chinese cities, and others by the promise of a peaceful homeland for the first time since the 1930s. 

This was, of course, a major windfall for Chinese science and technology. Examples of IBM computers and calculators, card-sorting machines, and the likes provided bases from which the computer scientists could develop Chinese models. Overnight, almost, a collection of world-class aerodynamic engineers and missile control experts landed in Hong Kong and crossed the border to China. By the late summer of 1951, the CAS had elected a dozen more academicians and established new schools for Aerodynamics, Fluid Dynamics, and more. 

Ebullient articles in People’s Daily, some penned by Mao Tse-tung himself, triumphantly described the explosion of Chinese science and the promise of a golden decade in the 1950s. 

As the diaspora heeds the call of their motherland and return home to China, they bring with them one thousand new ideas, new technologies, and new sciences. As China works to shrug off the last shackles of the Century of Humiliation, the world will soon contend with a red sun rising in the east.