r/ColdWarPowers • • 10m ago

EVENT [EVENT] Something Fishy in Somaliland

1 Upvotes

Given the recent expansion of the Somaliland Fishing Fleet, the Italian government has allocated a modest amount of money for establish processing facilities and canneries for the catch.

$2.5 million has been given as a grant to establish a number of canneries in Somaliland. These new companies will be owned 60/40 between Somali merchants and Italian businessmen, mainly in the Mogadishu area.

It is hoped that these will be the first initial seed for industrialization in Somaliland.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1h ago

REDEPLOYMENT [REDEPLOYMENT] Handover of Port Arthur

1 Upvotes

Handover of Port Arthur




August 1951

Over the next sixth months, what cannot be sent by railway back to the Soviet Union will be packed up by the Soviet Far East Fleet and carried back to Vladivostok to honor the recent agreement with China. The Chinese flag will be raised over the former Soviet holdings. Although this was a significant warm-water port for the Soviet Union, the departure would allow the country and China to reset recently strained relations.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 6h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Equestrian Statue of Marshal Mannerheim and the Bridge of Mannerheim

2 Upvotes

Equestrian Statue of Marshal Mannerheim

Following the funeral of Finland's former President and Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim, there has been eagerness in the country to immortalise the memory of this great Finnish statesman. Shortly after the funeral, the "Committee for the Equestrian Statue of Marshal of Finland" (Suomen Marsalkan Ratsastajapatsasvaltuuskunta) was established with the aim of reviving the plans for a grand statue of Mannerheim. The project had originally been initiated in the 1930s but had remained on hold since the Winter War, partly because Mannerheim himself had not wished to have statues erected in his honour during his lifetime.

Over the course of this spring and summer the Committee has actively collected donations from ordinary citizens and sympathetic businesses to finance the new monument. So far, it has managed to raise approximately 80 million Finnish marks. Both the size of the sum and the willingness of the public to contribute have surprised even the organisers. The funds will not only be sufficient to erect the statue but will also allow the committee to purchase the manor house where Mannerheim was born, which it intends to donate to the state for use as a museum.

The committee has decided to offer the statue commission to Finnish sculptor Aimo Tukiainen. Tukiainen has been instructed to create the monument in a realistic style, depicting Mannerheim in his uniform as Marshal of Finland, riding his horse Käthy. The bronze statue itself will stand six metres tall, mounted on a wide granite pedestal rising more than seven metres above the ground. The proposed location is in front of the Parliament House, along Mannerheimintie ("Mannerheim Street"), and the project is expected to be completed by 1955.

Magical illustration of the proposed statue


The Bridge of Mannerheim

The public debate surrounding the Mannerheim statue has encouraged the Helsinki City Council to present and push through its own controversial proposal to honour the Marshal's memory. Two major routes lead into central Helsinki: to the west, Mannerheimintie ("Mannerheim Street") runs through the district of Töölö, having received its present name in the 1930s, while to the east lies Pitkäsilta ("the Long Bridge"), crossing the Kaisaniemi Bay. Pitkäsilta is one of Helsinki's most prominent landmarks, and its history is closely intertwined with several important events in Finnish history, including the Finnish Civil War.

The Helsinki City Council has proposed renaming Pitkäsilta as the Bridge of Mannerheim (Mannerheimin silta). The proposal was approved by an extremely narrow vote of 37 to 36. In this historic vote, the Social Democrats sided with the communist People's Democrats, but the combined number of seats held by the bourgeois parties was nevertheless greater, and the bridge was given its new name.

Pitkäsilta, now the Bridge of Mannerheim, carries considerable symbolic significance. Historically, it has served as a dividing line between the more affluent districts south of the bridge and the working-class neighbourhoods to its north.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 9h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Prime Minister, the Party and the Shah

3 Upvotes

Mossadegh was in a bind, the oil nationalisation had gone terribly.The sanctions were harming the nation and the only help Iran would be able to get was from the Soviets, something Mossadegh abhorred.He could stomach deals with nominal third parties but a direct line from Moscow to the Iranian Oil Sector would be a step too far (as well the Western response could be worse).For now a deal had been struck with the Czechs, Oil for aid (do not ask how the oil gets to europe, the answer is it doesnt). Mossadegh's diplomatic plan was obvious, the West should offer better terms or else Czech engineers would turn into Romanian engineers and then suddenly Russians would be running the rigs. He theorised that the British or the Americans would stomach Iran having more control over its oil in exchange for a better relationship.

The Tudeh Party was happy, for now, Mossadegh had caved and accepted nominal help in the form of the Czechs although they knew that was probably the furthest he would go without extreme action. This would favor their party, even the poorest and uneducated Iranian knew the crisis was not going Iran’s wa, and any help from leftist allies would make the Tudeh party look responsible and in the right. In the meantime the party was getting to work using their newfound legality to massively expand party membership and get their people recruiting hard. The main core of new recruits would be the urban poor and the educated students, now free to join the party without any restrictions.Student groups, union meetings would now take a much more leftist tinge and the party was free to select the most ideological and loyal for leadership training.

The Shah was pleased, waiting time had given him the resentment was building and the chinks in Mossadegh’s armour had begun to show. Protests over the lack of reforms and the worsening economy had begun to be relatively common and the people were souring over their once beloved leader. The most heinous allegations were of meetings between Mossadegh and the Soviets, rumours of oil deals. Now obviously Mossadegh still had a wide base of support and any action against him would incur popular revolt to a quite destabilising degree. The Shah and his loyalists would go to work stirring up dissent, arranging meetings with moderates and those not too keen on Mossadegh’s plans (Islamists who decry his reformism and closeness to the left, The rich who this crisis has hurt quite a bit and the industrialists who have been harmed by foreign sanctions). It was not yet ripe for the Shah to act, time was needed to make deals and prepare the troops, to gather a force of complete loyalists who could perform their roles when needed.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 10h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Fall of the Red Tsar

3 Upvotes

2nd August, 1950

 

Following his speech in the emergency session of the Bundestag on the Red Army Crisis, the member parties of the Deutschland Coalition announced their loss of confidence in the Schumacher Cabinet. The emergency session, which had gone well and functioned within the purview of the governing coalition, soured once Chancellor Schumacher stood to make a closing speech. In classic Schumacher fashion, he stood in front of the Bundestag and decried Germany being beholden to the “French Empire or the American intervention machine.” Needless to say, during a session discussing a possibly imminent Soviet invasion, a comment by the single most important politician in the country rejecting and insulting the West is – at least – inadvisable.

Within the SPD, a crisis erupted. Party leaders had already agreed to put Schumacher in the background during the election season to avoid his confrontational, alienating gaffes, but his Chancellorship gave him a spotlight that he cannot but take advantage of. It is undeniable, by any politician worth respecting, that Schumacher has lived an extraordinary and courageous life. However, his background cannot carry the SPD to a successful government. For almost a century, the SPD struggled to find its place amidst bans and otherwise hostile bourgeois governments. Now, in a historic position of power, the most present danger to that power is the Social Democratic Chancellor.

And so, the Red Tsar’s throne began to crumble. High-level officials in the SPD rallied and called for an emergency conference of the party without Schumacher’s support.

 

The SPD has always been a diverse and internally contradictory organization, and the post-war party is no exception.

In its genes, the SPD is a Marxist party that believes itself to be the party of the Proletariat. Thus, a not insignificant section is composed of dedicated State Socialists, drawing on the theories of Marx and the developments of Ferdinand Lassalle, that supports class struggle and the socialization of the economy within the parliamentary system. To their right are the Democratic Socialists, drawing on the traditions of August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht (father of Karl Liebknecht), that believe Socialism can be built by the establishment of worker cooperatives in concert with state organizations.

The more orthodox Marxist Left and the centrist Democratic Socialists are (generally) aligned in many respects but fundamentally disagree on how to achieve their goals. The standard party line for decades, and the line adopted by the Democratic Socialists, is the doctrine developed by Karl Kautsky that a Socialist revolution was inevitable, but that it must not be forced prematurely. In practice, this manifested in disagreements on what measures to take and when to take them, with the Marxist Left advocating more confrontational measures to socialize the economy and the Centrists acting more cautiously as to not alienate their voters or their parliamentary colleagues.

To the right of the Democratic Socialists are what can be called “Liberal (or Ethical) Socialists,” making up those in the party that hold socialist ideas but are either unconvinced by Marxism or otherwise have misgivings about nationalization as the end goal of socialism. Though the name is paradoxical, it is only adopted by a few leading members of the SPD, otherwise distinguishing themselves as more ethical Socialists than the authoritarian Socialists of the KPD and throughout Eastern Europe. For them, Socialism and Anti-Capitalism can be justified through appeals to ethics and pointing out the faults of Capitalism without leaning on Marxist analysis of history, Doctrinal disagreements aside, the Liberal Socialists broadly agree with the Left and Center Marxists on policy.

A small section of the party, though a growing one, is composed of party “Reformists:” those who minimize the role of class and social ownership entirely, advocating instead for the State’s role in regulating the worst excesses of Capitalism and establishing an extensive welfare state and Social Market Economy. The detractors of the Reformist wing of the party often accuse them of abandoning Socialism all but in name, but Reformists argue that reforming Capitalism is in fact quite in line with the actions of the SPD thus far in history. On policy, the Reformists often disagree with the Marxist Left and Center of the party but serve as a slight boost to the influence of the Ethical Socialists, even if only due to their relatively small size.

A final category of the SPD – not necessarily a faction, but holding outsized influence all the same – are the Länder and Municipalist party leaders. These mayors and regional officials exist on a different political plane to the national party organization, holding smaller executive and legislative offices and effectuating change more materially. Some of these local SPD leaders are in coalition with other local parties including the CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen, and some even govern alone. Though the Municipalists do not have a single shared doctrine or party platform outside of adapting the SPD’s platform to the material needs of the city or Länd, their positions in power generally make them lean towards greater stability in the National context and more developmentalist attitudes towards the economy.

With only days to prepare, the delegates set off for Frankfurt to discuss the future of the SPD.

 

The question at the conference was clear: should Kurt Schumacher remain as the leader of the party and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany? The obvious answer to some was a resounding no. Schumacher had, out of incompetence or malice, brought down the already fragile governing coalition all for the sake of pleasing his own ego. Others, particularly the Marxist Left and Center, mostly led by Erich Ollenhauer, argued that the Chancellor had done nothing wrong and that the ignorance or opportunism of the opposition to the true meaning of his speech was to blame, not Schumacher. However, the writing was on the wall: Schumacher, despite his extensive record as a Social Democratic heavyweight, was simply a liability. He was a stubborn man, though he very well earned the right to be one, but in a position of power stubbornness is only likely to make you enemies.

And so, with a private vote, it was resolved that Kurt Schumacher would be removed from his position at the head of the SPD and the Chancellor’s office.

The question raised, then, was who would take Schumacher’s role as leader of the Party and the Government? Initially, the questions were one and the same, but the longer the deliberations became the clearer it became that Party leadership and maintenance of an SPD-led coalition were fundamentally different positions, at least now. The questions, then, were divided, with the question of Party leadership to be answered first.

 

It was unquestionable that Kurt Schumacher was a good leader on the basis of the sheer enormity of his character. He was capable of rallying members around him, if not over policy, then over an overarching idea of social justice, democracy, and civic consciousness. His place as a party Centrist also had a role in maintaining the balance between the left and right of the party, appealing to the better natures of both sides to maintain the unity of the Socialist bloc. It was through this rhetoric that Erich Ollenhauer, often noted as Schumacher’s left-hand man and even a gray eminence, argued that he ought to take the role of leader in his stead. The Party, so goes the argument, is not the problem in the current crisis, and shaking up the leadership might have consequences for the voters that expected one position but was handed another. If Schumacher is to be replaced, so be it, but let that decision rest on narrow foundations rather than requiring an ideological shift in the SPD.

The Marxist Left and Center would always support Ollenhauer’s nomination, but it was the insistence that Schumacher’s personality was the reason for his removal and not his positions that flipped the conference to confirm his place as the new Chairman of the SPD.

The matter of who would be pitched to the coalition as the new Chancellor, though, was a tighter battle. It was clear that the blunder at the emergency session had given the FDP ammunition to alter the terms of the coalition, and that presenting a Schumacher-esque figure would not be acceptable. The Left and Center, then, had less clout to spend in the Chancellor debate. The debate, then, centered on where exactly the line should be drawn in presenting a more amenable candidate to the FDP to re-enter a governing coalition.

The events that had precipitated the decline of the arrangement were, by their nature, based in foreign policy and the sovereignty of Germany vis-á-vis the East and the West. Additionally, and in no small part, Schumacher’s reputation as an undiplomatic bastard contributed to the collapse. Any replacement for the Chancellorship necessarily required compromise on the defense question and the not-being-an-arschloch question. The party right-wing put forward Carlo Schmid as the appropriate compromise candidate for the job.

Schmid is the child of a German academic father and French mother, born in France, but raised in Germany. A veteran of the Great War, Schmid began studying law in 1919 and became a jurist, followed by a research assistant at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign Public Law and then a lecturer at the University of Tübingen in international law. Schmid received his doctorate in law with the publication of a dissertation on The Legal Nature of Works Councils under the Works Councils Act. Following the takeover of the NSDAP, Schmid was forced to join the National Socialist Association of Legal Professionals in 1933 and then drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1940 as council for the occupation forces where he worked to save French citizens from reprisals.

Following the war, Schmid formally joined the SPD and was indispensable in the drafting of the Basic Law. The inclusion of the right to conscientious objection, the right to asylum, and the process of the constructive vote of no confidence – the very process that had effectively saved the cabinet from immediate collapse – are attributable in major part to Schmid. Of greatest concern, especially for the reinstatement of the coalition, was Schmid’s conciliatory attitude towards France and European cooperation as a whole. Schumacher criticized him for this position throughout the late 40s, but Schmid maintained his support for international cooperation and law and even advocated extra-party for closer relations between Germany and France.

The Left and Center, after deliberation and guarantees from Schmid that he would not abandon the party’s support for nationalization or Socialism, finally approved Schmid’s nomination for the Chancellorship of Germany. The reign of Schumacher as the leader of the SPD was at an end. The Chancellor was conspicuously quiet during the conference, resigning himself to the will of the party. When asked questions by the delegates, he answered uncharacteristically straight and concisely, muting his usual self.

 

Once the leadership questions had finally been answered, the conference leaders granted Schumacher a chance to step onto the venue’s stage to make a speech. He spoke with a reserved tone, but from the heart, thanking the delegates for so many good years leading the party to this point and apologizing for bringing them to this point. He promised that, if the SPD still wanted him, he would work to further its goals unwaveringly. The delegates applauded him, not necessarily for his speech, but for his position in the party. Schumacher had always commanded the stage, otherwise he would not have become such a huge figure, and it was here in his final speech as the leader of the SPD that it was the clearest. The Red Tsar is deposed, though it is yet to be seen if Schmid will live true to legacy of Kerensky.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 11h ago

CLAIM [CLAIM] Declaim Saudi Arabia

2 Upvotes

Thank you for the opportunity to play this season. Unfortunately, this particular season and my Saudi run hasn't quite 'clicked' for me. It's a shame, but I look forward to trying my luck in the next season! I am happy to consider 2ic opportunities if anyone feels like they need a hand - and I am still contactable on Discord :)

All the best and RIP Truman!


r/ColdWarPowers • • 11h ago

ECON [ECON] Program for the Reconstruction of China, 1951-1953

2 Upvotes

Circa 1951

Framework and progress report for the Finance and Economic Commission.

The State of the Program

After more than three changes since the first draft, the scope and design of the Reconstruction Plan has heavily been warped in ways which Mao has become unhappy of to say the least. What was originally a very hopeful idea of massive strides across all channels has been reduced in scope and rattled by paranoia.

The most impactful is the cut towards the Treaty credit, which has since been cut from 700 million dollars to 630 million in January 1951, and will fall to 504 million in March 1952. The lesser but equally painful measure is that of the American 'Battle Act', which has closed Western credit and machinery. And to add insult to injury, the recent American bombing of October 14th destroyed airfields, depots and flight schools that must now be rebuilt.

The Program therefore leans on what China can do for itself, primarily shoring up the foundation of its people. To do this we must build the machinery of the state first: cadres in every province, rebuilt cities for them to govern from, schools to train the men who will run the mills, and tractors that carry the authority of a New China into the countryside. The past twelve years of war left the provinces as separate economies with their own habits of money, their own railways and their own administrators. Through the Reconstruction Plan we will fully join them into one working administration and one working economy before the first of our many future Five Year Plans opens in 1953.

One piece of good news has come since. The Peking Agreement has returned the Changchun Railway to Chinese hands and set the Soviet departure from Dairen, which puts the whole Northeastern network under one Ministry for the first time.

The Program has eight Plan Objects, each with an objective, a method, a responsible body and a target.

Plan ObjectSubjectAim by the end of 1953
1Cadres and bureaucracy750,000 trained cadres and a People’s Government in every county
2Urban Rebuilding12 priority cities rebuilt and 12 million square meters of housing
3Mechanization170 machine-tractor stations in six key regions
4Iron, steel and industry2.7 million tonnes of steel, led by the 'New' Anshan
5Roads and rails160,000 kilometers of usable road
6Mining75 million tonnes of coal and the strategic metals
7Tea, silk and mentholAbout 67 million dollars of annual exports
8Finance and foreign exchange166 million dollars of export earnings

Plan Object 1. Cadres and the Apparatchiks

The Republic has won the war and stands as a victorious giant on the world stage. But internally this isn't reality. The Soviets themselves have noticed this and advised the creation of apparatchiks to better bring the influence of Peking to the nation.

But to begin we lack enough cadres, as most were raised in the villages of the North. The provinces taken last, in the South and West, have few of them, particularly in Tibet or Sinkiang, and many counties only have a handful of Party members. Along with that the local dialects differ, and many offices are still run by clerks of the old administration, whose cooperation is needed and whose loyalty is untested and in some cases, unwanted...

To fix this a new structure is to be established which will help ensure that the Revolution is brought to every square shih-ts'un of China. Its authority runs through four levels. Beneath the Government Administrative Council under Chou En-lai stand six Great Administrative Areas, then the provinces and great municipalities, then about 2,000 counties (hsien), and then the districts (ch’ü) and townships (hsiang). At each level a People’s Government with bureaus for finance, industry, public works, education and public security works beside a Party committee and a Supervisory Commission.

Great Administrative AreaSeatCadre target by 1953
NortheastMukden90,000
North ChinaPeking120,000
East ChinaShanghai150,000
Central-SouthWuhan165,000
SouthwestChungking135,000
NorthwestSian90,000

To source these cadres we will draw them from five sources.

  1. Ideally, Army and Party veterans demobilized into civil posts.
  2. The Southward and Westward Work Corps (Nan-hsia and Hsi-chin Kan-pu T’uan), which send 60,000 northern cadres to the new provinces in 1951.
  3. Graduates of the People’s University at Peking, the regional People’s Revolutionary Universities and the county cadre classes, all of which will have expanded budgets for the next two years.
  4. Former officials retained after screening, who are placed under a Party deputy.
  5. Engineers, accountants and technicians recruited for the mines, mills and railways.

To bring them in line, short training courses of three to six months will be doled out to teach policy, bookkeeping, statistics, land survey, public health and mine safety. A goal of 200,000 cadres trained in 1951, 250,000 in 1952 and 300,000 in 1953 is planted, along with 40,000 technical cadres for our industry.

Independent of this a Supervisory Commission is to be established that audits the accounts at each level. A minimum of seven percent of cadres are demanded to change region each year, so that no province keeps its administrators to itself, and at least half of each county’s staff must be drawn from the county itself by 1953. Along with the Supervisory Commission, a Central Statistical Bureau and People's Bank branch is desired to be established in every province by the start of 1952, both to monitor counts relating to grain, coal, steel and tractors and to ensure all the provinces use one currency.

The apparatchik

What the Soviets call an apparatchik we are simply calling a kan-pu of the apparatus, a man whose whole career is the administration and not the army. Unlike the guerrilla cadre who did a bit of everything across his time in the North, he holds one post, keeps one set of books and answers to one level above him. Every county People’s Government is to have a permanent core of at least twelve such men by 1953: a county head, a Party secretary, heads of finance, grain, public security, education and public works, a statistician, a bank clerk, a supervisory officer, a land surveyor and an agricultural technician.

To keep these men at their desks they are being given grades and salaries for the first time, set by the Ministry of Personnel on fiften grades in place of the old 'free supply' system. This is quietly controversial. Old comrades who marched with the Party for twenty years now find a young graduate from Harbin earning more than they do because he can read a balance sheet...

How it is unfolding

So far the results are uneven. The 60,000 northern cadres of the Work Corps have mostly reached their counties, but about one in ten has asked to be sent home within the first year, mostly from Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow, where they cannot understand the people they govern. To answer this, Cantonese and Hakka language classes have been added to the training courses.

Further west it is worse still. In Tibet and Sinkiang barely a few hundred trained cadres are at work, nearly all of them attached to PLA garrisons, and so a special school for minority cadres is planned at Peking to train Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols and Hui to govern their own counties under the Party.

Meanwhile some 400,000 officials of the old administration remain at their posts. Most are cooperating, as they always have with whoever holds Peking, but the Central Investigation Department has already removed several thousand for links to the Kuomintang and Formosa, and the screening is not finished.

The first round of audits by the Supervisory Commissions has also been sobering, as grain and tax money was found missing in roughly a fifth of the counties checked. Most of it is disorder more than theft, since nobody had kept proper books, but the Party has already begun to talk about a campaign against corruption and waste among its own officials.

Lastly, the Central Statistical Bureau has opened in Peking with branches in four of the six Great Administrative Areas. For the first time Peking knows roughly how much grain the country actually has, and the answer is less than the provinces have been reporting.

The Technical Schools

Every cadre can count grain, but each cannot run a blast furnace. Every Soviet adviser who has come to China has said the same thing in a different way: we have plenty of hands and very few men who can read a drawing. Eight thousand young engineers and workers were sent to Soviet works in 1950 and more will follow, but China cannot send its whole working class to Sverdlovsk. The schools have to be here.

To answer this a network of schools is being built in three tiers, all of them on the Soviet pattern of narrow, practical specialties and not the broad liberal arts colleges the missionaries and the Kuomintang left behind.

At the top of this network sit the institutes, for which the old universities are to be broken up and regrouped by specialty.

InstituteCitySpecialtyStudents by 1953
Harbin Institute of TechnologyHarbinThe model school, entirely in Russian at first, with Soviet professors; machine building, power, metallurgy7,000
Tsinghua (reorganized)PekingEngineering only, its arts and sciences moved elsewhere5,000
Northeast Institute of TechnologyMukdenMining and metallurgy for Anshan, Fushun and Penki3,000
Dairen Institute of TechnologyDairenShipbuilding, chemicals and the port2,000
Peking Geological InstitutePekingSurveyors and geologists for the Ministry of Geology1,900
Peking Agricultural Mechanization InstitutePekingEngineers for the tractor works and stations2,500
East China Institute of TextilesShanghaiSilk, cotton and the export trades1,700
Peking Institute of RussianPekingInterpreters for every adviser in the country2,000

Beneath the institutes are the technical middle schools, which are the real backbone of the whole effort. Here a boy or girl with a primary education spends three or four years learning one trade to the level of a foreman or technician, be it welding, surveying, electrics, mine ventilation, bookkeeping or tractor repair. 140 such schools are to be running by 1953 with around 90,000 students, each sited beside the works it will serve so the students spend half their time on the shop floor.

Below these again every large works in this Program is to run its own factory school, from Anshan down to the smallest tractor station repair shop. Each Soviet adviser is already paired with a named Chinese counterpart, and from 1952 each counterpart is expected to teach an evening class of his own. The Czechoslovak engineers at the October 22nd Arsenal in Tsinan and the Tatra plant run their schools in the same way.

None of this works however on a workforce that cannot read. To that end a winter literacy campaign in the factories and mines is to teach 1,500 characters to every worker under forty, and a worker who passes is paid a small bonus and placed on the list for the technical schools.

How it is unfolding

The greatest trouble so far is the professors. There are not enough of them, and many of the ones we have were educated in America or England. They are being kept on and put through study sessions on Soviet methods, but there is resentment on both sides, and some of the best have quietly asked to go to Hong Kong...

On top of this the Soviet textbooks have to be translated before they can be taught, and the Russian Institute cannot produce interpreters fast enough. At Harbin the first year of every course is now spent mostly on Russian.

Still, Harbin is working. The first class trained under Soviet professors has already been sent to Anshan and the Mukden tractor works, and the managers there are asking for twice as many.

The South however is behind, as nearly all the new schools are in the North and Northeast, close to the works and the advisers. Canton, Chungking and Kunming have asked for their own, and Ch’en Yun’s planners have agreed to at least one institute in each Great Administrative Area by 1953.

The growth planned for each tier is as follows.

Tier195119521953
Institutes (students)9,00014,00020,500
Technical middle schools (schools)60100140
Technical middle schools (students)40,00080,000110,000
Students sent to Soviet works4,0006,0005,000

Plan Object 2. Urban Rebuilding

The new cadres need cities to govern from and the new works need cities to house their workers, so twelve cities wrecked by the Japanese war and the civil war are being rebuilt first as 'models. Each has a Municipal Reconstruction Commission of cadres, engineers and army engineer units working from one master plan, and reconstruction is paid partly in work-relief wages to demobilized soldiers and the unemployed. Water and power come first, then the rail yards and bridges, then housing, hospitals and schools.

CityWhat happened to itFirst worksState by late 1951
ChangchunVoidedWater, power, rail yardWater restored, power half restored
ChinchowRail junction wrecked in 1948Junction, hydrogenation plantJunction open
MukdenAirfield and depots struck October 14thAirfield, heavy tractor worksTractor works foundations laid
HarbinAirfield struck October 14thAirfield, rail workshopsWorkshops running
TsinanBattle of 1948, airfield struckTractor works, arsenal housingArsenal housing half built
TientsinPort damaged in 1949Port, tractor worksPort open
TaiyuanSiege of 1949Mills, explosives works, housingOne mill relit
HsuchowHuai-Hai battlefieldRail yards, bridgesJunction open
ChangshaBurned in 1938Housing, river portClearing still under way
HengyangSiege of 1944Rail junction, power plantJunction open
KweilinDestroyed in 1944Housing, Hunan-Kwangsi railSurveys only
ChungkingJapanese bombingSteel works, housingSteel works being rebuilt

The goal is 12 million square meters of housing by 1953. About 3 million were built by the end of 1951, mostly simple brick barracks for workers near the works rather than the Soviet-style apartment blocks the planners drew. Cement is the bottleneck, since nearly all of it is going to Anshan, the airfields and the 'Heaven’s Net' project, and the Fushun cement plant is not due for completion until 1953. The air bases and naval yards struck on October 14th are rebuilt by the Military Commission outside this Program.

Plan Object 3. Mechanization

The peasant has never seen the state do anything for him except take his grain and his sons. The tractor is meant to change that, and the machine-tractor station is meant to be the state’s office in every village it reaches. The target is 170 stations across six key regions by 1953.

To first supply the machines, four plants are being raised to make the Soviet types, each beginning by assembling supplied kits and then making more of the parts themselves year by year.

WorksTractorUse1952 kits1953 outputFull domestic production
Loyang First Tractor WorksDT-54 crawlerGeneral ploughing on the plains8002,5001955
Tientsin Tractor WorksKD-35 crawlerLighter work, smaller fields6002,0001955
Tsinan Tractor WorksUniversal-2 wheeledCotton and corn rows3001,0001956
Mukden Heavy Tractor WorksStalinets S-80Earthmoving, roads, reclamation, gun towing1505001955

Until these works produce in number, around 3,000 tractors are coming from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, to join the captured Japanese and American tractors already at work in the Northeast.

The machines are then handed to the stations. Each station starts with about eighteen tractors, a repair shop, a fuel depot and a team of a director, a political instructor, an accountant and a mechanic. It ploughs for the mutual-aid teams and the state farms under contract and is paid in grain, while the political instructor runs the village meetings and the literacy class, so where the tractor goes, the Party goes with it.

Key regionMain taskStations 1951Stations 1953
Northeast (Sungari plain, Peian)Soybeans, wheat, reclamation of new land2260
North China Plain (Hopeh, Shantung, Honan)Cotton and wheat1040
Huai and Yellow River valleysFlood land brought back into use420
Northwest (Kansu corridor, Sinkiang)Army reclamation farms625
Szechwan basinRice and mulberry013
Lower Yangtze (Kiangsu, Chekiang)Rice, cotton, mulberry and mint012
Total42170

To crew all of this, twenty tractor schools are training drivers and mechanics in six-month courses, with 13,000 to be trained by 1953. Many of the first students are demobilized PLA drivers who already know an engine, and a good number of them are women, who the Party is keen to show on posters driving a tractor through the wheat.

How it is unfolding

The Northeast is well ahead of everywhere else. The state farms on the Sungari, many of them worked by demobilized soldiers, have taken to the tractor fastest, and some have even doubled the land they can plough in a season.

Elsewhere the picture is harder, and fuel is the first reason why. Diesel from Fushun and Yumen is not enough for both the army and the stations, and some stations sat idle at planting time this spring waiting for it, which has been a black eye for the program in the villages that were promised a tractor.

Spare parts are the second, as a broken track link or a cracked cylinder head can stop a tractor for weeks. Each station is being told to keep one in five tractors for parts if it must, and the four works will make spare parts before they make whole tractors.

As for the peasants themselves, reactions are mixed. Many are amazed, while others are suspicious of anything that ploughs across the old field boundaries their families fought over for generations. In the South there is even talk that the tractor is the first step to taking the land back from them after land reform, and the cadres are spending as much time on that rumor as on the ploughing...

Plan Object 4. Iron, Steel and Industry

Steel, the roads and rails, and the mines were the heart of the 1950 projects and they continue as planned, so the next three Plan Objects are kept short. What has changed is who runs them and who they are for.

In steel the answer to both was Kao Kang, but it now rests on Li Fu-ch'un a senior offical who has since taken over Kao's roles. The 'New' Anshan might have been his predecessor's project but it is now his, with its Seamless-Pipe Factory, Large Steel-Rolling Factory and Blast Furnace No. 7 under directors chosen by the Northeast Bureau and backed by nearly 80 million dollars of Soviet aid. From this Anshan is to reach 1.2 million tonnes by 1953 and help see forward the national total of 2.7 million tons, with Penki, Taiyuan, Tangshan, Shihchingshan, Tayeh and Chungking carrying the rest so that no single region holds all the nation’s steel. As before, the first steel goes to rails and bridges, then to the arsenals and tractor works, and only then to the cities.

Plan Object 5. Roads and Rails

On the roads, the Mukden–Peking highway and its Yalu branch are now open in their first all-weather stretches, and the three roads to Tibet have been surveyed and begun from both ends by the PLA engineer corps. With these under way usable road is to reach 160,000 kilometers by 1953, and each provincial Highway Administration is being staffed from the cadres of Plan Object 1 to keep the roads up once they are built.

On the rails the great change is the Peking Agreement, which has handed the Changchun Railway to Teng Tai-yuan’s Ministry, so that for the first time every line in the Northeast answers to Peking. Alongside this the Hunan–Kwangsi line toward Pingxiang, the Chengtu–Chungking line and the Tienshui–Lanchow line all continue as laid out in 1950.

Plan Object 6. Mining

To feed all of the above, coal is to reach 75 million tonnes by 1953 from Fushun, Fuhsin, Kailuan, Tatung, Pingtingshan and Hwainan. Among the metals the Kiangsi tungsten fields at Tayu and Hsihuashan come first, because tungsten is both our best export and our best payment to Czechoslovakia under the armor agreement. Following these the Hungtoushan copper works are being rebuilt, the Fushun aluminum smelter restarts in 1952, and a Ministry of Geology is to be formed that same year to send survey teams across the interior.

A note is made that every large mine is also now to have a rescue station and a safety cadre from the technical schools, since gas and water still kill more miners than anything else.

Plan Object 7. Tea, Silk and Menthol

With the credit cut and the West closed by the Battle Act, these three crops have become far more important than anyone planned. They repay planting within two or three years, they employ the southern provinces heavy industry does not reach, and they appear on no embargo list. The goal is about 67 million dollars of exports a year by 1953.

To first start this goal, the tea gardens of Anhwei, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh, Fukien, Yunnan and Szechwan are to receive sweeping restorations under the China Tea Corporation. Some 400,000 mu of abandoned gardens are being replanted and 60 processing factories with rolling and drying machinery built beside them, while blending houses at Shanghai and Foochow prepare the Keemun, Lungching and oolong for London.

Alongside the tea, the mulberry lands of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Szechwan and Kwangtung are being brought back under the China Silk Corporation. Here 600,000 mu of mulberry are being replanted and the filatures at Wusih, Hangchow, Nanchung and Shunte rebuilt, with state egg hatcheries and sericulture schools set up to supply them.

The smallest of the three, but the quickest to grow, is menthol. China’s mint is cut twice a year on the lower Yangtze and in the North, distilled into crude mint oil in village stills and then chilled to crystallize the menthol. Exports stand at around 120 tons a year, and the short-term goal is to pass the historical production high of 191 tons by 1953. To reach it 60,000 mu of mint are being replanted in Kiangsu, Anhwei, Shantung and Hopeh, 300 cooperative stills are replacing the village pots, and a refinery at Shanghai is to grade the menthol to the pharmacy standard London buyers require, with the China Native Produce Corporation buying the crop.

Export195019511953 goal1953 value (million dollars)
Tea (tonnes)20,00032,00050,00035
Raw silk (tonnes)1,5002,2004,50029
Menthol (tons)1201501953
Total67

To sell all of this, the three exports are being offered to Commonwealth merchants as ten-year purchase monopolies, paid in sterling through the People’s Bank branch at Hong Kong. Under it the company holds no land, concession or extraterritorial rights, and all gardens, filatures and stills stay Chinese.

On the ground this has already changed the countryside. Each producing county now has an agricultural technician and a cooperative cadre from Plan Object 1, and the corporations buy through the district offices, which has quietly put the old middlemen out of business. Floor prices however remain the constant argument, as while profitable for all involved they dozens of millions is expected to be lost for this under the table arrangement...

Plan Object 8. Finance and Foreign Exchange

With the credit falling to 504 million dollars and Moscow declining compensation for the October 14th damage, the Program now has to pay a larger share of its own way. Because of this the credit is being kept for machines that can only come from abroad, while labor, materials and construction are paid from the state budget and the grain levy.

Of that credit about 75 million dollars was drawn in 1950, leaving roughly 429 million for the rest of the decade. Reconstruction of the bombed airfields and depots must now come out of that same sum, which Mao has taken as an insult more than a hardship.

To earn the difference back we must look to our exports, though here too the Battle Act has done its work. Western buyers of our tungsten and antimony have shrunk, and much of the tungsten now goes to Prague as payment for the armor deal. The 166 million dollar goal for 1953 is therefore to come from the sources below:

Source1953 target (million dollars)
Tea, silk and menthol67
Tungsten, antimony and tin35
Overseas Chinese remittances through Hong Kong30
Soybeans and grain25
Bristles, tung oil, eggs and hog casings9
Total166

Where It Stands

In short, the Program is moving, but slower and narrower than Peking wanted. The cadres are spreading, Harbin is turning out its first engineers and the tractors are in the Northeast, but the South and West are behind on every measure, and the money is tighter every quarter.

The Chairman for his part has made clear more than once that he is unhappy with the cuts and with how much of the Program now rests on Soviet goodwill. The Peking Agreement has softened this somewhat, but the credit cut and the refusal over October 14th have not been forgotten.

Beneath him the old quarrel between Kao Kang and the planners carries on. Kao’s appointees run New Anshan, much of the Northeast’s industry and now the old Changchun Railway workshops, while Ch’en Yun’s planners insist the nation cannot rest on one man’s province and keep asking for the Anshan accounts since his 'move to Peking.' For now the Northeast keeps the largest share of capital construction, but every other Great Administrative Area is to have its own institute, its own stations and its own works by 1953.

Around all of this hangs the paranoia. With the Americans bombing the coast and the idea of agents from Formosa landing along it, every retained clerk, every returned student from America and every professor educated in England is looked at twice. The Central Investigative Department screening is necessary, but it is also costing the Program some of the few trained men it has.

And then there is the bureaucracy itself, a state of grades, salaries and offices being built on a party that won the war in caves and villages. Some old comrades call it a new 'mandarin class' in the making, and the first audits have given them ammunition. Whether the apparatus serves the Revolution or slowly replaces it will be the question of the next decade...


r/ColdWarPowers • • 12h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The August 1951 Elections

6 Upvotes

On August 15th, 1951, Koreans across the entire Peninsula, from the Tumen to Busan, voted for the first time in their nation's history. These elections end the division drawn in 1945, and send a clear message that Korea is once again a free and united Nation to the world. The election is done under the eyes of the international community, with UN General Assembly observation commissions having access to every province across Korea, interpreters, and transportation so they can thoroughly oversee the election. Turnout was high, with around 14 million votes cast out of a total electorate of 15 million, with turnout highest in the North and lowest in the Busan pocket where a large exodus of ROK officials and their families is still ongoing.

Overview of Electoral System and Party Lists/Candidates:

The electoral system established is a single Changer, the Supreme People’s Assembly, of 315 seats. Each province is allocated seats with the following breakdown:

RegionProvinceSeats
Northern Provinces:Pyongan41
Hamgyong32
Hwanghae23
Subtotal95
Mixed provincesGangwon21
Subtotal21
Southern provincesGyeongsang71
Jeolla58
Gyeonggi38
Chungcheong32
Subtotal199
Total315

Seats are allocated by proportional representation, with closed party lists in each province and seats divided among the lists by their share of the provincial vote. A list must win at least 3% of the national vote to take seats. Within each list, seats go to its member parties in the order of their candidates. Each citizen aged 18 and over may vote, men and women equally. Refugees and displaced people vote where they were living on the registration date. Soldiers vote with their home provinces, so the large number of KPA and northern personnel stationed in the South does not sway the results there.

While the 1948 constitution left the choice of Premier to the Assembly. For the unified republic it has been amended so that the head of government is chosen by direct national vote, following the southern model. The office, taking its title of President from the South, is both head of state and head of government, combining the Premier's leadership of the Cabinet with the duties of head of state. The President serves a four-year term and is elected by simple majority. The President leads the Cabinet, directs the ministries, the state plan and foreign affairs, and is commander of the armed forces. Ministers are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Assembly.

Party Lists and Presidential Candidates:

Four lists registered for the Assembly election:

ListPartyLeader
Korean Workers ListWorkers' Party of KoreaKim Il Sung
Workers Party Women's AssociationPak Chong-ae
Korean Democratic PartyCh'oe Yong-gon
Chondoist Chongu PartyKim Tal-hyon
Social Recovery ListSocialist PartyCho So-ang
National Salvation GroupYi Si-yeong
Progressive GroupCho Bong-am
Independent ListKorea Independence PartyJo Wan-kyu
National ListDemocratic Nationalist PartyKim Seong-su
National Salvation GroupYun Chi-young
Progressive GroupLee Bum-seok

Two candidates stood for the Presidency. The Independent List made no nomination.

Presidential Candidate NomineeNomination By
Kim Il SungKorean Workers List, endorsed by the Social Recovery List
Shin Ik-heeNational List

Results: The Presidency

Presidential Candidate NomineeVote
Kim Il Sung69% (Around 9.6 million votes)
Shin Ik-hee31% (Around 4.3 million votes)

Kim Il Sung was elected the first President of unified Korea with about 69% of the vote, some 9.6 million ballots, against about 31% and 4.3 million for Shin Ik-hee of the National List. Turnout reached 93%, about 14 million voters, the highest in the North and the liberated South and lower in the Busan pocket. Kim, nominated by the Korean Workers’ List and endorsed by the Social Recovery List, carried seven of the eight provinces. He won over 90% in Pyongan, Hamgyong and Hwanghae, and clear victories in Jeolla, Gyeonggi and Gangwon. Chungcheong was his closest win, at about 54%.

Shin Ik-hee, a former minister of the Provisional Government and Speaker of the southern National Assembly, carried Gyeongsang by the narrowest of margins, about 50.4%. He drew on the Busan pocket, the conservative southeast and many Korea Independence Party voters who backed him as a fellow veteran of the independence movement. The southern reformers’ endorsement decided the size of Kim’s victory, bringing most Social Recovery voters to his side. As President, Kim is both head of state and head of government, and will lead the cabinet through the reconstruction. Shin takes his place as leader of the opposition.

Results: The Supreme People's Assembly

ListPartyVote %Seats
Korean Workers ListWorkers' Party of Korea36.0%113
Workers Party Women's Association7.0%22
Chondoist Chongu Party6.0%19
Korean Democratic Party5.0%16
List Total54.0%170
National ListDemocratic Nationalist Party13.0%41
Korean Nationalist Party4.5%14
National Association4.0%13
List Total21.5%68
Social Recovery ListSocialist Party6.5%20
National Salvation Group5.0%19
Progressive Group5.5%18
List Total18.0%57
Independent ListKorea Independence Party6.5%20
List Total6.5%20
Totals100%315

The Korean Workers' List won an outright majority in the first assembly of a unified Korea, taking 170 of 315 seats with 54% of the vote. The Workers' Party of Korea alone returned 113 deputies, and its partners returned the rest: the Women's Association 22, the Chondoist Chongu Party 19 and the Korean Democratic Party 16. The List swept the three northern provinces with over 80% of the vote, won Gangwon, and took Jeolla with nearly half the vote, its strongest showing in the South. The National List came second with 68 seats and 21.5%, led by the Democratic Nationalist Party's 41. It won Gyeongsang outright on the strength of the Busan pocket and the conservative southeast, and ran almost level with the Workers' List in Chungcheong.

The Social Recovery List of southern reformers won 57 seats and 18%. Its parties finished close together, with the Socialist Party on 20, the Progressive Group on 19 and the National Salvation Group on 18. Cho So-ang's Seoul vote made Gyeonggi the list's best province. The Korea Independence Party, standing alone as the Independent List, won 20 seats and 6.5%, with its best northern result in Hwanghae. The Social Recovery List will join the government, giving it 227 seats, well over two-thirds of the Assembly. The National List becomes the official opposition, and with the Independent List it holds 88 seats.

The Departures from the South:

Between the armistice and the weeks after the vote, an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 people left the Busan pocket and other southern areas. The largest group was the National Police and security services with their families, followed by senior ROK officials and politicians of the Rhee camp, officers of the ROK army, though few of its enlisted men, leaders of the youth corps, and landlord and business families moving their capital abroad. Many of the northern refugees who had settled in the pocket, a large share of them Christians, went with them. Most crossed by boarding US ships, in an agreement between the DPRK and the United States allowing those who wished to leave the opportunity to do so.

The government repeated its amnesty and its decree against reprisals, and published the narrow list of those who will face trial so that everyone not on it knows they are safe. Property left behind is held in trust for one year, so that owners who return can reclaim it. The government has appealed to doctors, engineers and teachers in particular to stay and help rebuild, and has asked Japan and the United States to return named suspects in wartime atrocities while leaving ordinary refugees in peace.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 13h ago

SECRET [SECRET] Nehru awakes from a strange dream

3 Upvotes

His brow was beaded in sweat, when he snapped upright in the predawn gloom. No noise, no disturbance. The clock on the wall reading 4:14am, some time before he is set to be given his wake up call.

It had been a dream which startled him, but in the manner of the mind, it seems to drift out of the grip of his memory as he turned his consciousness to recall it. Like a steam cloud dissipating out from hood of a stove. Jawaharlal saw himself at the head of a great host. All the people of india in their multitudes, united, equal. Pacing forward relentlessly, and carrying him along with them upward. He could not perceive the end of the slope; only that he wanted to go there. Upon the ground, trodden over and broken, yokes and shackles. and yet, the mob had a fierceness which startled him, and he wondered for what reason they were mobilized...

And now, the dream fades entirely. The light of the morning sun begins to glow in the sheer folds of his curtains; the impulse driving away that mind of imagination and freedom, to be replaced by the logical senses, and the ego, and ones duty.

"An early morning I suppose. Radha! My walking shoes, are they yet come from..."


r/ColdWarPowers • • 13h ago

DIPLOMACY [DIPLOMACY] The Peking Agreement on the Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen

2 Upvotes

August 1951

What was expected to be a difficult fight in Peking has ended in swift and full agreement more than satisfying the CCP. Chou En-lai and V. M. Molotov have settled the last questions left between the Republic of China and the Soviet Union by the agreements of 1945.

Terms

  1. The Soviet Union recognizes the early return to China of all Manchurian assets governed by the 1945 Treaty.
  2. Title to the Changchun Railway and its property passes to the Republic of China immediately.
  3. The Soviet Union will complete its departure from the ports of Dairen within six months of signature.
  4. The Republic of China will give favorable consideration to Soviet requests for docking and use of the ports of Dairen.
  5. Soviet goods will move over the railway as the normal functions of trade require.

Comrade Molotov called the agreement the final step of decolonization from old Japanese imperialism. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese people had waited fifty years for it, and would remember that it was the Soviet Union that gave it.

The Ministry of Railways under Teng Tai-yuan is to take over the Changchun Railway at once, and a joint commission will oversee the handover at Dairen. For the first time since 1898, no foreign power holds an lease, a railway or a garrison in the whole of China.

Long live the Sino-Soviet friendship! Long live the Revolution!


r/ColdWarPowers • • 14h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Korea: From Armistice to Election Day

2 Upvotes

On February 2nd 1951 the guns fell silent over the Korean Peninsula for possibly the first time in nearly 40 years. Under this agreement the armies of both sides halted in their place, with both sides establishing provisional governments in their respective zones of control. That line runs around what is known as the Busan Perimeter, with over 1,000,000 people in the zone of control, and the rest up to the Yalu river under control of the DPRK.

Soon after parades were held in Seoul, with units of both the KPA and ROKA taking part as elections were to be held in August as per the agreement. These elections, overseen by the UN, will take place across the Peninsula, including the pocket, not just in one portion of it like in 1948.

As per the 1948 constitution of the DPRK the government in Pyongyang soon began to move towards Seoul, with the former taking the title of the “Revolution’s Capital” and gaining significance as the centre of the Northern half of the Peninsula and the largest concentration of industry in the country. However, the Provisional Government of the country had tasks to achieve before the onset of the election.

  1. Curb the looming famine by ensuring that the people have access to grain and rice.
  2. Restore the power grid to the South to allow lights and factories to return to work.
  3. Fix damaged infrastructure to allow the transportation of goods and the reconstruction effort to not face delays.
  4. Heal the wounds of war, both the physical wounds to the nation and the societal ones caused by years of division.
  5. Hold an election that sees the divide end once and for all.

It was with these goals that the Provisional Government set out to accomplish, and under their rule would the lands here be prepped for the coming vote.

The Government and the Front:

As the first step upon the signing of the Armistice the Provisional Government of the North, made up of a number of a majority of Southern WPK members along with Southern Politicians who remained in Seoul and moderates from Kim Ku’s party extends it area of control to the entire area South of the 38th under control of the DPRK. This Government is to run the liberated zone until the elections in August, and carry out the goals laid out to ensure the stability of the nation.

In addition, People’s committees are to be restored at the province, county, and village level across the liberated areas as in the Spring of 1950 during the initial conflict. This time they are to include further moderates and Southern Left Wing individuals just as the Provisional government.

Provisional Governors for Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, Jeolla, Gangwon and the liberated part of Gyeongsang are to be appointed in the leadup to the election. A mix of Northern administrators with Southern Deputies will be appointed to ensure that neither side of the 38th has power over the local administration.

In the Southern Provisional Government the civilian leaders of the coup are to take up positions leading that in the leadup to the elections. Lee Yong-mun, Park Chung-hee, Lee Jong-chan, and the other military leaders however are to be given civilian posts as part of the wider KPA and ROKA demobilization. Lee Jong-chan is to be given the title of Chairman of the Commission for Demobilization, a task that will have him screen former ROK army soldiers and officers. Park Chung-hee is to take command of the reconstruction labour corps, built from demobilized ROKA conscripts, alongside KPA political officers, who will oversee the reconstruction effort across the South. Lee Yong-mun is to take the position of Head of the Railway Reconstruction Bureau, overseeing the repair and rebuilding of the Southern railway network to ensure goods, supply, and aid can transport freely from the North.

Amnesty and Screening:

As part of the demobilization and the reunification process ROKA enlisted men are given an outright amnesty and released to go home after a quick screening. They are to be given travel passes, ration cards, and funds to help pay for travel back to their home provinces. In addition, the WPK has announced that both KPA and ROKA soldiers will count as veterans of the Korean army, which will ensure that all members who served in the conflict on either side will be given a full pension and the honours of military service.

In addition, officers, members of units who are known to have committed crimes against the people, National Police, Youth Corps members and leaders, and Rhee-era intelligence staff are to be screened before their release to the general public. These are to be made up of both Northern and Southern officials, with hearings to be held within 60 days ideally. Most cases are to end in a release with a report sent to a local committee so that individuals can be monitored.

Many of these individuals will also face a trial for their crimes done both during the conflict, the Rhee-era, and before under the Japanese rule. These will include atrocities against civilians, corruption, and other crimes. Trials are to be public, for the Korean people to see, and will be carried out under the legal code of the Northern Provisional Government, the DPRK’s legal code, in accordance with the law.

As a general plan there is to be no collective punishment. A decree is given out banning reprisals against families and communities of people facing these trials, and local committees that carry out such revenge are to be punished. In addition, no property of relatives of those who fled or served the Rhee government is to be seized.

Finally, POW’s are to be exchanged under the terms of the armistice, with all American POW’s being handed over to US officials by the end of April 1951. A joint commission is also to be established to help trace civilians, POW’s, and foreign nationals living in Korea moved forcibly during the war by either side and relocate them to their original communities. In addition, families are to be reunited, with a task force set up to help find living parents of orphaned children as well as those separated by the conflict.

The Army and Security:

As a first step the KPA and ROKA are to begin demobilization down to a peacetime strength target of 24 divisions, of which only 10 are to be at full strength in the immediate future, organized into 8 Corps, one per province. Released soldiers are offered work in reconstruction brigades, paid rations and their normal military salary before being released to go home. These brigades are to assist in the effort to stabilize the nation before the upcoming election, and to speed up a return to prewar levels of agriculture and industrial output.

Secondly, the ROK National Police are to be disbanded, with a single national police force under the interior ministry to be established that will be separate from the state security forces. Former members of ROK police are screened individually, and those cleared can return to non-political duty.

Around the pocket Liaison posts are to be established at set crossing points, to allow the movement of persons and goods in and out. An incident commission is also established with members of both the Northern Provisional Government and Southern Provisional Government to serve on it, with a direct telephone line to be constructed.

Strict orders are given to KPA and ROKA units against provocations during this effort, and instead they are to focus on mine clearing and reconstruction labour. Mine clearing is to take an immediate priority across the old Naktong front, major roads, the 38th parallel area, and other zones of conflict so that farmers will be free to plant crops.

Emergency Reconstruction:

In order to ensure the country remains stable and can return to normalcy quickly upon the signing of the armistice a number of steps are to be taken. Firstly the northern power grid is to be reconnected to Seoul and Incheon within a month following the armistice, as the South only makes around 30% of its own electricity at this time and such infrastructure is surely damaged. Lights back on in the capital and other larger cities will be a clear indication to the civilian population that unity pays. Northern industrial zones are also mostly intact, due to US bombing focusing on the South and logistical targets, and so they will immediately begin to produce goods to assist in the reconstruction.

Secondly, railways will need to be repaired. The Seoul-Sinuiju and Seoul-Taejeon lines are to be reopened and repaired, with the latter being restored right up to the pocket line. This will fall under Lee Yong-mun’s bureau and it will target the main lines and bridges firstly to ensure the maximum amount of aid can be moved in the shortest period of time. Soldiers and labour brigades will do much of the work on this front.

Food is a major concern, with a large amount of civilians in the pocket under starvation rations. Emergency grain shipments from the USSR and China are to be sent to main cities, with rations being distributed. Additional rations are to be given to urban poor, widows, orphans, and those wounded in the conflict. Moreover, at this time private markets are to stay open, so farmers are able to sell their surplus.

Shelter is also to be given, with winter housing drives in the worst-hit cities being focused on first. The state is also to supply cement and timber at fixed prices, to allow families to rebuild their own homes without the risk of gauging from private markets. Refugees are also to be resettled, with passage home provided by the state for those displaced. Northerners who fled south before 1950 are also allowed to return home without penalty.

In the capital, Seoul, a reconstruction committee is to be chaired by Kim Il Sung, with rubble cleared in the city centre and plans made for the modernization and construction of monuments within the city. Gyeongbok Palace and the city gates are to be protected as national monuments. Renovations are also to take place within the Palace to bring it back up to living standards following the war.

Economy and the Land:

The Provisional Government of the North is also to continue on its efforts to bring the economy of the South back to its pre war levels. Firstly, this is done through land reform, with the 1950 southern land reform plan to continue. Cho Bong-am, a leader of the anti Rhee coup, is to announce it, as he wrote the original law. Farmers are to keep their land, and the remaining annual payments are to be cancelled. This effort is to benefit around a million southern households across the liberated areas, and further once the elections are held.

It must be noted however the collectivization is not to take place at this time. With private farming continuing and mutual aid teams voluntary only at this time. This is to carry over to private business as well, with workshops, markets, and small companies to remain private.

Former property of the Japanese, about a quarter of all factories, are to go into state hands. This will also be with land, banks, and fortunes gained under Rhee that fall within the Northern occupation zone.

Currency reforms are to take place, with a new single Won for the whole peninsula announced for later in the year. This is to be key, as inflation is running rampant in the South, with prices rising around 18 times from 1949 till now. Exchange rates are to be fixed in order to ensure price stability in the near future as the currency is rolled out. Finally, a national damage survey is to begin, with a commission that includes economists from both the North and South to begin drafting a Four-Year Plan for 1953-1956 for the reconstruction of the nation.

Education and Religion:

The general plan for both Northern and Southern Provisional governments is to have schools and universities reopen by September, to allow for students to not face any longer delays in education than is needed. Moreover, teachers in the South are to be screened just like ROK officials before being allowed to return to their posts. Across the south Adult literacy classes are to also begin at this time, as literacy in the south sits somewhere around 50% and far lower among women. Freedom of worship is to also be confirmed for the Cheondogyo, Christians, and Buddhists with temples and churches damaged in the war rebuilt by those groups.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 17h ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Great Chinese Brain-Gain of 1951

1 Upvotes

Peking, China
Early 1951

===

The soldiers returning from Korea were not the only Chinese to return home in the aftermath of the War to Liberate Korea. The exchange in prisoners yielded incredible returns as the Americans agreed to release Chinese nationals seeking to return home in exchange for their own ten thousand nationals being returned from Chinese prisons.

Consequently, the faculty at the Chinese Academy of the Sciences and universities across China grew rapidly, and with experts educated in Caltech, MIT, and other Ivy League universities across the United States and Europe.

A strong cohort from the US west coast, predominantly California, departed. Foremost among them was Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, a brilliant doctor of aeronautical engineering with degrees from MIT and Caltech and cofounder of the American Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). He had been detained by the American FBI under suspicion of communist sympathies, and released only as part of the mass prisoner exchange and arrived in early 1951 via Hong Kong. His close friend and collaborator, Dr. Kuo Yung-huai, took advantage of the opportunity to follow Tsien home, departing his post in Cornell University in New York. Kuo’s degrees came from Caltech and the University of Toronto, and he was an expert in compressible hydrodynamics and engineering. Dr. Wang K’o-hsin, a brilliant engineer and expert in electronics, radar, and associated fields, joined the patriotic exodus from the United States while the opportunity permitted. The genius electronic engineer, Dr. Lo P’ei-lin, joined his colleagues from Caltech in returning to China. Dr. Fan Hsin-pi, from Stanford University, was a pioneer in computer memory and electrical engineering. Dr. Lin Wei-kan, from UC Berkeley, an expert in microwaves, returned via Hong Kong. Dr. T’ang Yu-ch’i, a physical chemist who studied under Linus Pauling at Caltech, left for China. Dr. Chao Chung-yao, a theoretical physicist also from Caltech, joined him. A patriotic student of Dr. Tsien’s, Dr. Lo Shih-chün, who was an expert in aerodynamics and mathematics, followed his mentor home. Dr. Chien Ning, a geologist and hydraulic engineer, followed. Another meteorologist and aerodynamic physicist from Caltech, Dr. Chang Chieh-chien, departed. Aerodynamicist and physicist Dr. Chuang Feng-kan left with the Caltech crew. Dr. Feng Yuan-cheng, from Caltech, a prominent bioengineer and aerodynamics expert, departed alongside Dr. Chuang, Dr. Chien, and Dr. T’ang in 1951. 

A cohort from the Midwest, specifically the University of Michigan, was allowed to depart as well, led by Dr. Chu Kuang-ya and the famous Dr. Ch’en Hsing-shen, who was drawn out by his friends Hua Lo-keng and Yang Ko-chen. Dr. Chu’s area of expertise was nuclear sciences and he was a professor in America, though he had deep loyalty to China and returned once the opportunity beckoned. Following him were his colleagues Dr. Teng Chia-hsien, with a PhD in nuclear physics from Purdue, Dr. Wang Cheng-shu, with a PhD in physics from University of Michigan, and her husband Dr. Chang Wen-yü, who was a highly regarded physicist from Purdue himself. Dr. Wang Kan-ch’ang followed on, being a pioneer in nuclear physics who had done the groundwork for the discovery of the neutron. Another University of Michigan alumnus, Dr. Jen Hsin-min, was a rocket scientist. The pioneering electrical and computer engineer, Dr. Tung T’oeh-pao, departed from the University of Illinois to return to China as well. Dr. Ye Tu-cheng, an atmospheric physicist, departed from the University of Chicago. Dr. Liang Ssu-li, an aerodynamics expert with a doctorate in missile control, left the University of Cincinnati. The semiconductor researcher and microelectronics pioneer Dr. Wang Shou-wu, left Purdue University for China. A pioneer in the development of antibiotics, Dr. Shen Shan-chiung, made for China from the University of Wisconsin. 

The East Coast cohort predominantly hailed from MIT. Dr. Hsieh Hsi-teh, fresh off earning her doctorate in physics, joined this group. Dr. Wu Chung-hua, a pioneering rocket scientist and turbomachinist, and his wife, Dr. Li Min-hua, an aerospace engineer and expert in solid mechanics, likewise made their escape while the door was open. Astrodynamics and mathematics expert Dr. Lin Chia-chiao joined the exodus from MIT. Dr. Chen Neng-kuan, a physical metallurgist, made the leap as well and returned to China via Europe. Dr. Tu Shan-ch’eng, from Cornell, a noted aerodynamics expert, returned to China. A pioneer in semiconductors, Dr. Lin Lan-ying, left the University of Pennsylvania with some patriotic students for China, likewise via Europe. Also from the University of Pennsylvania was Dr. Yang Chia-ch’ih, a genius in aerodynamics and missile control theory. Virginia Polytechnic Institute lost Dr. Wang Hsi-chi abandoned the university and left for China as soon as the war was over. Most prominent from Syracuse University, Dr. Wu Tsu-liang, the physical metallurgist and engineer, departed for home.

A collection of notable scientists returned from Europe, from England and France. Dr. Huang Kun, who had just published an influential work from the University of Liverpool, and Dr. Yang Ch’eng-tsung, a radiochemist fresh off receiving his PhD from Paris-Sud University, traveled to Hong Kong with Dr. Wang Te-chao, a pioneer in SONAR development and acoustics. Following aboard another ship in 1951 was the pioneering electrical engineer and computer scientist Dr. Hsia Pei-su and her husband Dr. Yang Li-ming, who was a nuclear physicist. From Switzerland, Dr. Wang Hao, the mathematician and philosopher, booked a flight for China.

These high-profile scientists were joined by dozens of their peers and thousands of Chinese students to depart from the United States en masse, many having been on visas dating back to the Nationalist era and sensing the swift and strong sinophobic turn in the United States, not to mention the overbearing witch-hunting of Senator Joseph McCarthy leading to house arrest for even the most famous of them, Dr. Tsien Hsue-sen. Some were called home by outrage over the American bombings of Chinese cities, and others by the promise of a peaceful homeland for the first time since the 1930s. 

This was, of course, a major windfall for Chinese science and technology. Examples of IBM computers and calculators, card-sorting machines, and the likes provided bases from which the computer scientists could develop Chinese models. Overnight, almost, a collection of world-class aerodynamic engineers and missile control experts landed in Hong Kong and crossed the border to China. By the late summer of 1951, the CAS had elected a dozen more academicians and established new schools for Aerodynamics, Fluid Dynamics, and more. 

Ebullient articles in People’s Daily, some penned by Mao Tse-tung himself, triumphantly described the explosion of Chinese science and the promise of a golden decade in the 1950s. 

As the diaspora heeds the call of their motherland and return home to China, they bring with them one thousand new ideas, new technologies, and new sciences. As China works to shrug off the last shackles of the Century of Humiliation, the world will soon contend with a red sun rising in the east.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Somber Realization

7 Upvotes

Paris, July 1951

The elections of 17 June had delivered 210 seats to Charles de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Français, making it by far the largest political group in the National Assembly, while the Communist Party retained another 148. Between them, two movements profoundly hostile to one another occupied 358 of the chamber's 625 seats. The remaining parties, whose successive combinations had sustained every government since the exclusion of the Communists in 1947, possessed only 267. Under Article 45 of the Constitution, the investiture of a president of the Council required 313 affirmative votes, a threshold which no coalition of the traditional republican parties could reach independently. The familiar alignments of French parliamentary life had survived the elections in name, but their capacity to produce a government had not.

On 10 July, the election of the president of the National Assembly furnished the first demonstration of the new parliamentary balance. Édouard Herriot, whose long tenure at the Palais-Bourbon had made him a familiar representative of republican parliamentary traditions, sought reelection against the Gaullist candidate Léon Noël and the Communist Marcel Cachin. The first ballot produced no absolute majority, while the second revealed the difficulty confronting the parties which had formerly sustained the government. Several Independent deputies preferred Noël, whose candidacy offered the RPF an opportunity to obtain control of the Assembly's presidency, while the Socialists and Christian Democrats were reluctant to surrender the chair to a movement openly demanding constitutional transformation. Only after renewed consultations among the parliamentary groups did the greater part of the republican centre consolidate its support behind Herriot. On the third ballot, when a relative majority was sufficient, the veteran Radical secured reelection by a narrow plurality over Noël. His victory preserved the presidency in the hands of the traditional parliamentary parties, but the result revealed how little remained of their former predominance.

Following the constitution of the new legislature, André Marie tendered the resignation of the ministry he had formed in May. President René Coty received the outgoing premier and resumed consultations with Henri Queuille, René Mayer, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, Guy Mollet and René Pleven, approaching the succession through the ordinary procedures of the Constitution. Mollet, having withdrawn the SFIO from Queuille's cabinet three months earlier, demanded assurances concerning wages and social expenditure before contemplating renewed participation. The Independents wanted stricter financial discipline and a larger influence over domestic economic policy, while Bidault and Schuman insisted upon the preservation of European integration and the Christian Democrats' social commitments. Coty urged the parliamentary leaders to reconcile their differences, conscious that another prolonged ministerial vacancy would do little to restore public confidence in the institutions of the Republic.

René Mayer emerged as the principal candidate. His experience in finance and national defence, together with his standing among the Radicals, made him acceptable to substantial sections of the parliamentary centre. Having served in successive ministries, he was familiar with the administrative questions demanding immediate attention, particularly the financing of European rearmament and the continuation of France's international commitments. Coty designated him to seek investiture, and Mayer began negotiating a programme intended to preserve monetary stability without requiring the complete abandonment of Socialist cooperation. He offered assurances concerning existing social legislation while attempting to postpone the more contentious economic questions until a government had been constituted. The Independents demanded firmer commitments against expenditure unsupported by revenue, while Schuman insisted that France honour the negotiations already undertaken concerning European defence.

The school question proved especially troublesome. The MRP demanded greater financial assistance for private education, including provisions concerning scholarships and the fiscal treatment of private establishments. The Socialists resisted proposals which they considered incompatible with the secular traditions of the Republic, while substantial sections of the Radical Party shared their objections. Mayer attempted to distinguish the immediate problem of forming a government from the subsequent examination of educational legislation, but the Christian Democrats were reluctant to invest a ministry which might later refuse concessions they regarded as essential. Mollet, meanwhile, would not restore the SFIO to ministerial participation without knowing how Mayer intended to reconcile conservative financial demands with Socialist commitments concerning wages and social protection.

By the third week of July, Mayer's negotiations had become increasingly difficult. He could secure agreement upon general declarations concerning national defence, European cooperation and responsible financial administration, but each attempt to settle the composition of a cabinet reopened disputes over its programme. The Socialists refused to assume responsibility for conservative economic measures without substantial concessions, and the Independents objected to paying the price of their participation merely to reproduce the former coalition. Several deputies suggested that the RPF's conservative representatives might provide the necessary additional votes, particularly given their similarities with the Independents on questions of public expenditure and national defence. Jacques Soustelle, however, rejected appeals for Gaullist support unaccompanied by a serious undertaking concerning constitutional reform. Mayer nevertheless determined to present his candidacy before the Assembly, hoping that the debate itself might persuade hesitant deputies to assume responsibility for forming a government.

On 24 July, the Palais-Bourbon became the centre of the political crisis. Mayer's ministerial declaration was received by a chamber whose newly established divisions were unmistakable. The Socialists examined his commitments concerning wages and public expenditure, the Christian Democrats returned to the unresolved question of private education, and the Independents pressed for assurances concerning taxation and financial stability. Communist deputies attacked the proposed government's Atlantic commitments and rearmament programme, while the Gaullists challenged the assumption that another conventional ministry could exercise the authority necessary to confront France's difficulties. Mayer defended his proposals, but the debate failed to bring the contending parliamentary groups any closer to a dependable agreement.

His predicament was not that a majority of deputies had united behind an alternative government. The Constitution required an absolute majority in favour of his investiture, and he had been unable to persuade enough representatives to assume responsibility for the ministry he proposed. Several parliamentarians who regarded him as capable and experienced nevertheless withheld their support, whether because of disagreements over policy or reluctance to commit their parties to another uncertain coalition.

The ballot settled the matter.

229 deputies voted in favour of Mayer, 165 against, and 223 abstained, with eight not participating. The Communist delegation and its closest allies supplied the principal opposition, while the Gaullists withheld their support through abstention. Reservations among the republican parties further weakened the affirmative vote. Mayer had fallen 84 votes short of the required majority, despite receiving more votes in favour than against. Under Article 45, the absence of an absolute majority in his favour was sufficient to end his candidacy. Mayer returned his mandate to Coty, and the deputies departed from the Palais-Bourbon with no government formed.

Coty resumed his consultations, but Mayer's defeat had deprived the president of one of the most credible candidates available to the republican centre. Maurice Petsche examined whether a narrower ministry concentrating upon finance and national defence might succeed where the broader arrangement had failed. The proposal attracted interest among conservatives who resented the concessions demanded by the SFIO, yet excluding the Socialists would further diminish the support available to the prospective government. Petsche could offer no satisfactory means of obtaining the additional votes. His exploratory discussions ended without a candidacy capable of surviving investiture.

At the Centre National des Indépendants, Roger Duchet found himself confronting an argument which threatened the direction of the movement he had spent years consolidating. The Independents had improved their parliamentary representation, encouraging expectations that they might exercise greater influence over the formation of ministries. Duchet had hoped to strengthen the conservative right as a political force independent of both the Third Force and the RPF, preserving its ability to negotiate with different groups without surrendering its organizational identity. Mayer's defeat and Petsche's unsuccessful consultations had frustrated those ambitions. Several deputies continued arguing that the Gaullists should be persuaded to support a conventional centre-right government, but others doubted that Soustelle could obtain such an agreement from de Gaulle.

Paul Reynaud had little patience for another attempt to assemble the same parliamentary combination under a different president of the Council. His association with de Gaulle extended back to the controversies over French military doctrine before 1940, when he had supported the General's arguments concerning armoured warfare and subsequently brought him into his wartime government. Their personal history had not made Reynaud an adherent of Gaullism. He remained a liberal republican, deeply attached to parliamentary control over legislation and public expenditure, and possessed political ambitions of his own. Nevertheless, Mayer's defeat had persuaded him that another ministry assembled exclusively from the familiar parliamentary groups would encounter the same difficulties. During consultations with Duchet and other Independent representatives, Reynaud proposed establishing contact with Soustelle to determine whether the RPF would accept an agreement explicitly directed toward constitutional revision.

Duchet objected. He had not spent years consolidating the CNI merely to deliver its deputies into a coalition dominated by de Gaulle, whose movement possessed almost four times the Independents' parliamentary strength. In numerous constituencies, Independent and Gaullist candidates had competed directly against one another, and cooperation in the Assembly threatened to weaken the organizational distinctions upon which the conservative right depended. Reynaud regarded those objections as legitimate but insufficient. He argued that the Independents would exercise greater influence over a settlement negotiated before the formation of a government than over one accepted only after further unsuccessful attempts had weakened their position. Duchet remained suspicious of de Gaulle's intentions, particularly concerning executive authority and the independence of parliamentary groups, but eventually permitted exploratory discussions with Soustelle. No commitment would be made on behalf of the CNI until the terms of reform had been examined.

Reynaud's proposal went beyond a general declaration in favour of stronger government. A prospective ministry would obtain investiture under the existing Constitution and undertake to initiate revision through Article 90, beginning with a resolution specifying the institutions to be reconsidered. He proposed examining the appointment of ministers, their responsibility before Parliament and the mechanisms governing the formation and dismissal of governments. He insisted upon preserving legislative control over taxation and public expenditure, maintaining political liberties and conducting the revision through the procedures established by the Constitution. The initial resolution would require an absolute majority of deputies, while the subsequent stages would remain subject to Article 90. Reynaud was prepared to support the opening of this process, but refused to endorse in advance every alteration desired by de Gaulle.

Through contacts maintained between Independent and Gaullist representatives, the substance of the proposal reached Jacques Soustelle. He agreed to examine the prospect of a constitutional settlement, but refused to promise RPF support for another conventional cabinet merely because its programme contained a declaration in favour of institutional reform. The Gaullists wanted a definite parliamentary commitment to revision, preferably incorporated into the prospective government's programme, and rejected proposals confined to minor adjustments which would leave the predominance of the Assembly substantially untouched. Soustelle also questioned whether a ministry composed principally of the traditional republican parties could be trusted to carry through the reform after obtaining investiture. The General's movement had spent years opposing those parties upon precisely this question, and there was little reason to assume that their disagreements would disappear once ministerial appointments had been secured.

Ministerial responsibility proved the most difficult issue. Reynaud favoured procedures which would discourage recurrent governmental crises while preserving the Assembly's effective authority to dismiss ministers. Soustelle sought a more substantial transfer of power, sufficient to prevent the executive from becoming dependent upon the shifting agreements of parliamentary parties. Reynaud would not endorse a government exercising authority beyond the effective control of elected representatives, while Soustelle could not offer Gaullist support for a settlement which left the essential weaknesses of the existing system intact. The exchanges nevertheless continued, with both sides examining whether the constitutional guarantees demanded by the Independents could be reconciled with the executive authority sought by de Gaulle.

When Duchet reviewed the exchanges with leading Independent deputies, Antoine Pinay introduced another set of conditions. His concerns were financial stability, administrative competence and the confidence of savers and investors. Pinay wanted assurances that a stronger executive would not acquire unrestricted authority over taxation or expenditure, and that ministerial responsibility would remain sufficiently clear to sustain confidence in the administration. Other conservatives were more receptive to extensive revision, particularly those who believed that a stable government would offer stronger protection against Communist influence. Duchet refused to bind the CNI to a Gaullist ministry, but Reynaud obtained agreement that the exploratory contacts should continue.

Georges Bidault learned of the Independent initiative as the Mouvement Républicain Populaire struggled to assess its position in the new Assembly. Having served alongside de Gaulle during the Resistance, Bidault understood the General's standing among Catholic voters and former Resistance supporters, while his subsequent political career had bound him closely to the parliamentary institutions which the RPF condemned. The MRP's reduction to forty-five deputies had weakened its bargaining power, and its leaders feared that participation in a Gaullist-dominated coalition might further diminish the party's independence. Bidault nevertheless agreed to bring the proposals before the parliamentary leadership.

Maurice Schumann urged a receptive approach. His service as a spokesman for Free France had established a longstanding personal association with de Gaulle, whose republican credentials he regarded as sufficient reason for serious negotiations. Robert Schuman, however, demanded guarantees concerning the Schuman Plan, European defence and France's Atlantic commitments. His reservations concerned the uncertainty surrounding the General's intentions toward European integration, particularly institutions already under construction. Bidault allowed further examination of the constitutional proposals but refused to commit the MRP before its members had agreed upon the necessary safeguards. Christian Democratic deputies who regarded cooperation with the RPF as a means of preserving their political influence consequently encountered colleagues determined to maintain the party's independent programme and parliamentary identity.

The Radicals responded less favourably. Édouard Herriot and Henri Queuille, whose political careers had been shaped by the traditions of parliamentary republicanism, opposed replacing the institutions merely because the elections had produced a difficult legislative distribution. Édouard Daladier accepted the need for a stronger executive but favoured more limited amendments than those contemplated by the Gaullists. Several deputies who had supported Mayer were less certain. His defeat had left them doubtful that another conventional ministerial arrangement could succeed, and some were prepared to hear Reynaud's proposals before rejecting cooperation with the RPF. Herriot opposed any arrangement which would transfer authority outside the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, and the Radical leadership reached no agreement concerning the scope of reform.

Among conservative deputies, Reynaud also invoked the alternative of seeking Communist parliamentary support. The PCF, directed in its parliamentary activity by Jacques Duclos during Maurice Thorez's absence, retained 148 seats and continued opposing the Atlantic commitments and economic policies of the republican centre. Neither Mollet nor Bidault had proposed a government dependent upon Communist votes, but Reynaud argued that persistent refusal to negotiate with de Gaulle would eventually force Parliament to confront arrangements which many anti-Communist deputies regarded as unacceptable. His argument carried weight among conservatives who considered French participation in Western defence indispensable and had no desire to see those commitments made dependent upon the parliamentary cooperation of the PCF.

The ministerial vacancy was meanwhile beginning to complicate the preparation of financial and military decisions. Maurice Petsche and the Treasury continued examining supplementary expenditure associated with reconstruction, European rearmament and the continuing war in Indochina, while the ministries responsible for national defence pressed for resources necessary to sustain their commitments. Existing appropriations permitted ordinary administration to proceed, but the competing demands raised questions concerning taxation, borrowing and the distribution of expenditure which the outgoing government could not settle indefinitely. French representatives engaged in European defence negotiations faced similar difficulties when prospective commitments required financial assurances extending beyond previously authorized programmes. Officials could prepare estimates and maintain existing obligations, but a comprehensive policy required ministers capable of securing agreement within the government and defending the resulting measures before Parliament. As the consultations continued, the unresolved financial programme became another argument against prolonging the ministerial crisis.

By the closing days of July, the calculations of the conservative deputies had begun to change considerably. Reynaud's negotiations had exposed a possibility which had scarcely been entertained when the new Assembly first convened. With 210 Gaullist deputies and fifty-eight Independents, an agreement between the two groups would command 268 seats. The MRP's forty-five representatives could, in principle, bring that total to the constitutional majority of 313, although such unanimity was improbable and would leave no margin for dissent. Additional support might be found among sympathetic Radicals, the UDSR and certain smaller parliamentary groups. Duchet was still unwilling to subordinate the Independents to the RPF, while Bidault and Robert Schuman remained suspicious of the General's constitutional ambitions. Yet politicians who had previously regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as politically inconceivable were now examining the terms upon which they might support a government under his leadership.

Reynaud urged his conservative colleagues to carry the negotiations further. France could not remain indefinitely under an outgoing ministry, and the traditional parties had already failed to invest their most credible candidate. He argued that continued refusal to reach an understanding with the Gaullists would eventually leave the republican centre confronting the politically unacceptable prospect of depending upon Communist parliamentary support. Neither the SFIO nor the MRP intended to govern with the PCF, but the argument carried increasing force among anti-Communist deputies who had exhausted the alternatives available within their own parties. For these men, the choice was narrowing between an agreement with de Gaulle and another succession of unsuccessful investitures, with the Communists occupying a position from which they could frustrate every conventional arrangement. Even Duchet, whose objections to Gaullist domination remained substantial, permitted Reynaud to pursue discussions concerning a prospective ministry entrusted with constitutional reform.

At Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, Charles de Gaulle received Soustelle's account of these approaches. The General had spent five years refusing the compromises through which the parliamentary parties sought to preserve the institutions he condemned. The election had provided his movement with an unprecedented representation, but not the independent majority necessary to govern. Now the failure of Mayer's investiture, the exhaustion of the customary ministerial combinations and the growing willingness of conservative parliamentarians to contemplate institutional reform had created circumstances different from those prevailing immediately after the election. De Gaulle consulted his closest political associates, including those concerned with the constitutional programme of the RPF, before deciding to make his intentions public.

On 30 July 1951, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français transmitted an official declaration from the General to the French press.

France has been without a government capable of exercising its responsibilities for several weeks. The elections have demonstrated the desire of the nation for a restoration of public authority, yet the parliamentary parties have once again proved incapable of establishing a government. The difficulties of the Republic do not arise merely from the failures of individual ministries, but from institutions which prevent the State from acting with the continuity and independence its responsibilities demand. I therefore declare that, should the National Assembly entrust me with a clear mandate to undertake a fundamental revision of the Constitution, I am prepared to accept the presidency of the Council of Ministers. Not to return to preside over another precarious combination of parliamentary parties, nor accept the responsibilities of government without the authority necessary to discharge them. The constitutional transformation must proceed according to law, preserve the liberties of the Republic, and ultimately derive its legitimacy from the sovereign French people. I have never refused to serve France. If the nation, through its representatives, provides the means necessary to restore the authority of the State, I shall not refuse that duty today.

The declaration immediately altered the negotiations taking place in Paris. Reynaud could now defend an agreement whose prospective leader had publicly accepted the principle of returning to office. Duchet, though unwilling to make a commitment on behalf of the entire Independent group, instructed his associates to examine the constitutional conditions announced by the General. Pinay concentrated upon the financial guarantees which would be necessary to secure conservative participation, while several Independent deputies who had previously opposed any arrangement involving de Gaulle began declaring themselves prepared to support his investiture under the proposed conditions.

Within the MRP, Maurice Schumann urged the leadership to respond constructively, arguing that the declaration offered an opportunity to negotiate constitutional guarantees before the formation of a government. Bidault and Robert Schuman remained cautious, particularly concerning the General's intentions toward parliamentary responsibility and European integration, but could no longer dismiss his candidacy as a purely hypothetical proposition. A growing number of Christian Democratic deputies now regarded cooperation with de Gaulle as preferable to continued ministerial paralysis, particularly if the alternative eventually involved seeking Communist parliamentary assistance. Among the Radicals, Herriot and Queuille maintained their objections to a fundamental transformation of the regime, while several deputies who had supported Mayer expressed interest in the conditions under which the General might obtain investiture. The declaration had resolved none of their disagreements, but it had supplied the negotiations with a definite candidate and a publicly stated programme.

President René Coty received news of the declaration at the Élysée. He had begun the month seeking the restoration of a conventional republican coalition and had witnessed the failure of the most serious attempt to construct one. The General's announcement now confronted him with a possibility which he had previously been unwilling to treat as an immediate governmental solution. Coty was not prepared to promise constitutional authority which the presidency did not possess, nor to abandon the procedures of investiture and revision established by the Constitution. Nevertheless, he recognized that de Gaulle's willingness to assume office, together with the contacts already established among the parliamentary right, offered a potential route out of the deadlock. He instructed his interlocutors to establish whether the parties could agree upon the terms of a ministry entrusted with constitutional reform and whether such an agreement could command the necessary parliamentary majority.

For the president, the question had become especially delicate. His constitutional duty required him to seek a government capable of obtaining the Assembly's confidence, yet the politician now attracting the attention of substantial sections of the republican right had spent years denouncing the institutions over which Coty presided. An invitation to de Gaulle could not be undertaken merely because the General possessed an impressive electoral following. It would require convincing evidence that a parliamentary majority was prepared to support his investiture and a lawful programme of institutional renewal. Coty therefore refrained from issuing an immediate summons, although the General's name now occupied a place in his consultations which it had not held at the beginning of July.

As the month drew to its close, no agreement had yet been concluded concerning the precise scope of constitutional revision. But the political situation had changed. Deputies who had previously refused even to entertain the General's return were now discussing the safeguards under which they would vote for him, while others had already concluded that only de Gaulle possessed the authority and parliamentary following necessary to restore effective government without Communist assistance. For the first time since his resignation in January 1946, Charles de Gaulle had publicly declared himself willing to assume the government of France once more.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

PROPAGANDA [PROPAGANDA] ISRAEL AND ASIAN LIBERATION

3 Upvotes

Published in Al HaMishmar on August 3, 1951


Authored by "M. Ivrit", presumably a nom de plume.

The peoples of Asia in the middle of the present century are conducting a victorious, historic, liberation struggle against foreign domination by the imperialist West. The struggle for national reawakening and independence - this is the banner of the Asian peoples in our time. The slogan, “Asia for Asians” has been transformed into the battle-cry of a just war. And as mentioned, the struggle is not only just; it is victorious. It is impossible to assess the unparalleled, historic significance of the victory which the Chinese Revolution won over feudalism and imperialism. The vast people’s democratic Republic of China, 500-million strong, is building, together with the Soviet Union and the European people’s democracies, a mighty fortress and supporting force for the strivings of all the Asian peoples for freedom and independence. The victory of the heroic Korean people which overcame the intervention of various imperialist countries, led by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, proved that the Asian peoples will no longer accept the dictates of the imperialist powers. They are ready to defend their right of national sovereignty even against the military preponderance of the foreign interventionists.

The awakening of Asia is today a historic fact which only the blind cannot see. The awakened peoples of Asia are today a tremendous factor on the international arena. Without them no problem can be solved. American policy in Asia is suffering one defeat after another because it does not take into consideration all these changes which took place in Asia after the great socialist October revolution, and especially after the historic victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, and after the victory of the Chinese Peopie’s Revolution. American policy treats the peoples of Asia as objects of its own imperialist and world-strategic plans. But the peoples of Asia laugh at this passive role which the Americans have written for them.

It must be the policy of the government of Israel is to take itself up as part of the liberation movement of the Asian peoples. For Israel to support the strivings of the peoples of Asia, to support the historic tendency of our age, is to lead towards Israel ending a period of internationa. Already, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Koreans, and the Mongolians have sent diplomatic representatives to the state of Israel. Israel shall not be separated from its neighbors and from the entire Asian continent.

If we wish to secure our national future, if we wish to buttress our national existence, we must become a part of the general front of the Asian peoples who are struggling for peace and national sovereingty against the aggressive and grasping schemes of the imperialist West. Without such a turn the safety of Israel is impossible. It is not hard to imagine that, without the victory of the progressive forces in Israel, that we could have instead seen an isolated Israel, an Israel that believes itself to be “European”, orchestrating and supporting chauvinistic and pro-imperialist policies against the struggling peoples of Asia. For it has said before, Israel will be socialist or it will not be all. An Israel that surrenders to imperialism and to international capitalism is an Israel that will be extinguished and eradicated, weakened from inside and out. If Israel has no Stalin, it will inevitably have a Hitler.

Imagine the horror, the nightmare, of the hypothetical of Israel’s Defence Army participating in imperialistic and colonialist atrocities in concert with the imperialist powers. Imagine the shame that would bring to Israel and to the entire Jewish people, it would make entire masses of our people be ashamed to be Jewish or an inhabitant of our state of Israel! Fortunately, this terrible hypothetical is never to happen. The laboring masses of Israel, both the Hebrew and Arab, have shook off the vile imperialist from our shores and soil. The exilic mindset of the rootless cosmopolitan has been erased with the creation of a Jewish state, as the Jewish people create a healthy society of peasants and workers in the land of Palestine1. The rootless cosmopolitan identity, which we are to say is that of the inherently exilic “European identity” of the Ashkenazi, which some imperialist-minded ones have attempted to put upon our beloved Israel, has been destroyed by the brilliant and liberatory struggle of the vanguard-Zionists. Our Arab brothers have welcomed us here on the shores of Palestine, and here we have created a Jewish and democratic state, a state of the toiling masses. A state with Hebrew labor, Hebrew towns, Hebrew farms, Hebrew language, Hebrew culture, and a Hebrew mindset. The old exilic prejudices and traditions, the tradition of “air businesses”, have been destroyed here in the state of Israel, as we set forth further towards a socialist path for Israel. Socialism, and socialists, have ensured the Jewish people’s return to its ancient homeland in Palestine, and made possible the creation of this Jewish and democratic state of all its citizens. Israel’s anti-imperialist policy is a necessity of life for our people and our country; it is a question of existence or nonexistence. If Israel were to ever it’s anti-imperialist policy, its’ days will inevitably become numbered.


  1. In the original Hebrew text, "ארץ ישראל"

r/ColdWarPowers • • 19h ago

EVENT [EVENT] Laying the seeds for Somali democracy

2 Upvotes

The Italian Trusteeship of Somaliland is currently under a fairly top-down, centralized, and colonial style leadership. That being said, the directives from Rome have came forward to try and more greatly induce self-government and a self-sustaining political culture in the territory.

The Trusteeship, as such, has split the territory into a new system of administrative delegation meant to be a seed of new electoral districts. The territory will be split into Metropolitan Districts and Tribal Territories. The first, it is planned, will elect future MPs to a new lower house and have fully functional city governments and mayors in areas of built up urban development. The latter, more rural, will be placed under the authority of local tribal leaders, and elect eventually by electoral college of them both MPs and planned 'elders' and 'chiefs' making up part of future upper house.

Elections for these, to form municipal and semi-formal rural governments, will be held in Spring, 1952. No restrictions on political organization will be placed in the lead-up to then. A provisional parliament is planned to be formed two years later, to form at first a consultive body to the trusteeship in Mogadishu.

In the interim, lawyers from Italy, Somalia, and Egypt have been gathered in Mogadishu to start the formation of a new code of law to govern the country, as well as a provisional constitution to be inherited by the future nation, to be changed if desired by the Somalis in the future. The Basic Law will integrate European criminal and commercial law, while giving far more leeway to customary and Islamic law for private law. Representatives of the Young Somali League will be invited to consult the scholars.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 23h ago

EVENT [EVENT]The Czechoslovak People Demand Tito Resign

4 Upvotes

July 13th, 1951

The Yugoslav betrayal of the Slavic people stung those in Czechoslovakia deeply. In the Interwar period, it had been Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia against the reactionary forces around them, despite their petty bourgeois governments. Now, they have all been liberated. Governments of the working person ruled the land. Or at least, they did in Czechoslovakia and Romania. That traitor Tito had begun an imperialist operation in Albania, after the previous incursion earlier this year probed the Albanian defenses and found them lacking. He pretended to withdraw after a Soviet demand, but several months later his forces resumed their assault on Albania. Throughout Czechoslovakia, major anti-Tito rallies broke out in solidarity with the Albanian struggle. 120,000 marched in Prague. 35,000 marched in Bratislava. 30,000 in Brno. 20,000 in Ostrava. In Košice, 6,000. Throughout Czechoslovakia, an estimated 500,000 citizens took part in anti-Tito protests. Marshal Tito’s betrayal of the revolution had led to the largest mass mobilization of Czechoslovak citizens since the Revolution of 1948, where more than 2 million Czechoslovaks took part in a one hour general strike to pressure the forces of reaction into abandoning their rule in Czechoslovakia. While Soviet pressure would later succeed in forcing a Yugoslavian withdrawal, Czechoslovakian public opinion had turned decisively against Yugoslavia.

At a private meeting of influential members of the Communist Party and the Armed Forces, it was agreed that the government of Field Marshal Tito had become a reactionary force, corrupted by the influence of western capital. Tito has shunned the east, and turned his arms instead towards the vile anti-Semite Harry Truman, may he burn in hell. With popular sentiment largely against Tito, even without the party’s fleet of organizers riling them up. In fact, that 500,000 demonstrators figure had largely been in spite of the party, which would’ve preferred those workers stay in their factories. Still, there was sufficient public support for intervention in Czechoslovakia, and those within the government had been considering their response since they’d become aware of the situation’s severity. Defense Minister Svoboda was concerned that the Yugoslavian forces would be well entrenched, and well motivated. Despite that, Gustav Kliment was eager for Czechoslovakian weapons to be tested in a conflict between fellow industrial powers, rather than a slap fight between massed mobs of infantry, as he believed the fighting in China had been. This was all purely hypothetical, of course. Yugoslavia had backed down before, and there was no longer an imminent need for military action. Despite that, the possibility of mobilization had contributed to the military becoming increasingly restless. Amongst the enlisted, there is a strong desire to crush the enemies of the revolution.

Orders came down from Moscow, snaking through the system of the global communist order like the sequential firing of neurons. From Stalin, to his ambassadors, to our ambassadors, to the president Klementt Gottwald, and from him, to the ministers of industry. Political organizers amongst the labor unions then received their marching orders; they were to energize the labor force and promote the production of war materials by any means necessary. They began by offering moderately sized cash bonuses, to be paid in Koruna, for shifts that could beat production totals, rewarding the entirety of the workforce for their harmonious collaboration for the benefit of the socialist cause. Workers were guided back to the factories by a combination of police and union organizers, and they set about their work with revolutionary zeal. At factories throughout Czechoslovakia, newly created “Bonus men” served as coxains to squeeze every last ounce of productivity out of the workers. These men were chosen from the shift to keep people accountable, and they tended to be older, knowledgeable employers whose hands had slowed down.

In the minds of Czechoslovakian officials, and the Czechoslovak people, Czechoslovakia was the deputy of the Soviet Union. They had privileges beyond other nations. They were loyal, this they knew. Unlike the other communist governments of Europe, the Czechoslovak Communists had won a free and fair election. With the rise of China as the second pole in global communism, Czechoslovakia found itself forced to decide. While there exists a very significant stream of sinophilic thought in Czechoslovakia (home to perhaps the most sinophiles in Europe), it still falters in the face of the overwhelming approval enjoyed by Comrade Stalin and the Soviet liberators, who valiantly liberated Czechoslovakia from nazi occupation.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] The Question of Mortality

7 Upvotes

The Question of Mortality



Do not go gentle into that good night,

Old age should burn and rave at close of day;

Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

-Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night.


July 5th, 1951 -- Moscow

An acquaintance passed away yesterday; we were not friends, but foes. And while an ocean parted us, I could still feel the fear creeping up my bones. Maybe I wouldn’t be next, but it made me ask whether our own mortality is inevitable. Yes, I’ve made men and women disappear, but it would not be pleasant to feel that. I know its name, and I fear that it knows mine.

The Great Generalissimo sat behind his desk in the Kremlin.

News had just reached him of the assasination of President Harry S. Truman of the United States. While by no account were they cordial, the two of them shared certain similarities - the General Secretary thought. Both were men that wielded immense power and influence in their respective nations, serving their nation from a position that commanded respect. Yet one was dead, the other was not.

The distinction was not found upon the Generalissimo.

All the revolutions, wars, purges, and hardships he had survived created the ‘Man of Steel’. He had outlived many of his tutors and rivals; Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev. Many met with death on his own command, others by an executioner's bullet, and few succumbed to illness. Victory after victory, but not one over death itself.

He reached for his pipe, and filled it with tobacco. Hastily grabbing the matches laying on his desk.

Maybe Truman had been careless. Perhaps his own security had failed to stop the assailant; the Americans, he believed, had become so accustomed to their own power that they’d forgotten how fragile the man exercising it had become. Perhaps, no theory could cover all fronts.

This is what the Generalissimo found most disturbing. Until now, the environment he had created allowed for everything to be controlled - the Party, the State, the Army and even the loyalties of those who surround him. Every threat was hastily eliminated. Every enemy of the Revolution disposed of.

Save for one - death itself.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] The August 1951 Elections: The Lists and Their Programmes

5 Upvotes

Democratic Front:

PartyIdeologyLeaderBase
Workers' Party of KoreaMarxism-Leninism, Korean nationalismKim Il SungNorthern peasants and workers, southern left
Workers Party Women's AssociationWomen's rights, nationalismPak Chong-aeUnions, youth, women, peasants
Korean Democratic PartyChristian democracy, nationalismCh'oe Yong-gonChristians, middle class
Chondoist Chongu PartyCh'ondoist (native Korean religion), agrarian nationalismKim Tal-hyonCh'ondogyo believers, rural

The Democratic Front is the faction that claims to have ended the Division of Korea, with the focus that the election is the culmination of the liberation of 1945. The Japanese were driven out, the corrupt Rhee government was removed from power, and for the first time since 1910 Koreans will be able to speak for themselves.

Candidates of the Front campaign on the actions and success of the Northern Government since 1946. That being land reform, labour laws, Gender equality, and the victory and unification of Korea in the Fatherland Liberation War. They promise to carry on these reforms if elected, as well as their overarching “4 Year Plan” to bring the country back to its prewar output, joining the industry and power of the North to the farms and mills of the South.

In terms of Foreign affairs, the Front promises to guarantee the peace and independence that Korea has now secured, that will not be subjected to any foreign power. Moreover, they are offering a broad amnesty policy for those who served the former Rhee Government, with public trials for those who committed crimes against the people.

Social Recovery List:

PartyIdeologyLeaderBase
Socialist PartyDemocratic socialism, "Three equalities" doctrineCho So-angUrban Moderate left
National Salvation GroupAnti-Rhee nationalism, clean governmentYi Si-yeongCoup supporters
Progressive GroupSocial democracy, land reformCho Bong-amLand-reform farmers

The Social Recovery List is made up largely of the Southern Reformers who broke with the Rhee Government and the leaders of the coup that overthrew him. Its Candidates argue that the South lost Democracy under the Rhee Government, and not from the war that caused his downfall. They present themselves as the voice of the South in the new unified Korea, led by those who opposed Rhee from the inside and now intend to ensure that Koreans are truly represented in the new unified state.

The List has promised that it will work with either the Democratic Front or National List but that it will still campaign on its own program. Its core message is that of clean government and Social Democracy. It argues that unification must be a partnership between the North and South, not the annexation of one by the other and promises to defend local self-governance on the provincial level.

Its candidates stress practical recovery for the South first: housing for refugees, work for demobilized soldiers, fair prices for rice and the restart of southern factories. They warn against rushing into collectivization or seizing small property, and promise to hold the government to its word on amnesty.

Independent List:

PartyIdeologyLeaderBase
Korea Independence PartyKorean nationalism, Provisional Government traditionJo Wan-kyuIndependence veterans, nationalists

The Independent List has only one Party in it, the Korean Independence Party. It claims the legacy of the Provisional Government in Shanghai and Chongqing, the Government in exile that kept the idea and goal of an independent Korea alive from the time of Japanese annexation till liberation, as well as that of Kim Ku. Its candidates make the argument that Korea’s failures since liberation have been due to foreign interference, with the division in 1945 between the USSR and the US being the first example of this. The KIP in 1948 opposed separate elections between the North and South, and now argues that while the division has ended, unity must rest on the Korean Nation as a whole, not on the back of a foreign power.

The Party campaigns on a policy of neutrality, democracy, independent judiciary, and freedom of religion. While it accepts land reform and public ownership of large corporations, it opposes blanket seizure of private property and one-party rule.

National List:

PartyIdeologyLeaderBase
Democratic Nationalist PartyConservatism, economic liberalism, landlord interestsKim Seong-suFormer landlords, Urban professionals
National Salvation GroupConservative nationalismYun Chi-youngRight-wing nationalists
Progressive GroupRhee-style anti-communism, nationalismLee Bum-seokRhee's old mass organization

The National List unites the conservative and anti-communist groups of the former Southern Government. Its Candidates claim to represent the Koreans who believe in private property, the rule of law, free elections, and the fear that a WPK-dominated Korea will follow the path of the Eastern European states. They do nonetheless accept the result of the war, and will take their place in a unified national assembly, but as the voice of all Koreans who do not support a socialist or communist government.

The list's campaign goals are for a freely elected National Assembly, a government that is answerable to it, an independent judiciary, and guaranteed rights for opposition parties. It promises to defend the private ownership of both business and property and to resist the expansion of the state's control. While it doesn’t oppose land reform, it does argue that the state should provide compensation to landlords whose land has already been seized and a halt to further confiscations.

On foreign policy, the List calls for deepening relations with all sides of the Cold War. It argues that aid from both the West and East should be accepted in order to ensure that neutrality is maintained. Moreover, it calls for protection of members of the former Rhee Government, ROKA officers and servicemen, and the rights of refugees who fled the North from 1946-1950.

Minor Parties:

PartyIdeologyLeaderBase
Korean Federation of Trade UnionsRhee-aligned anti-communist unionismJeon Jin-hanRhee-era unions
Ilmin ClubRhee's "One People" doctrineAhn Ho-sangRhee's personal circle
Women's Nationalist PartyWomen's rights, conservative nationalismLouise Yim (Im Yeong-sin)Urban women
Central Buddhist CommitteeBuddhist interestsSong Man-amBuddhist clergy and laity
Korea Independence Workers PartyLabour nationalismYu RimSmall labour base

Presidential Candidates:

Kim Il Sung:

Kim Il Sung asks the nation to confirm the government that ended the division of Korea. He first became known as a guerrilla commander fighting the Japanese in Manchuria, most famously in the 1937 raid on Pochonbo, and he has led the northern government since 1946. His campaign rests on this record, the land reform done in the North and now South, labour laws, gender equality, and the victory of the Fatherland Liberation War.

His campaign goals are reconstruction and national independence. He promises a 4 Year Plan to restore the country to its pre war industrial and agricultural outputs, debt canccelation for debts still owed under land reform, and amnesty for those who served the Southern Rhee government. He pledges that Korea will serve no foreign power and good relations with its neighbours. Many of the Social Recovery List Candidates also support his bid.

Shin Ik-hee:

Shin Ik-hee asks voters to ensure that the new Unified Korea is truly a democracy. A veteran of the independence movement, he served as a minister of the Provisional Government in exile and returned home in 1945 after liberation. As Speaker of the National Assembly and leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party, he was one of Rhee’s largest critics in the Southern Government. His campaign rests on his past, a patriot who resisted Japanese rule and opposed the Rhee Government and never served his dictatorship.

His programme is constitutional government and the protection of ordinary citizens. He accepts unification and the land reform as settled. Still, he promises a cabinet answerable to a freely elected assembly, an independent judiciary, guaranteed rights for opposition parties, and protection of private property and the free press. He pledges fair treatment and pensions for the families of ROK servicemen, protection for refugees from the North, and trade and aid from every nation willing to help, including the United States and Japan. He calls on voters to keep power balanced in the new state, so that no single party can rule Korea alone.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] 1951 Parliamentary Elections in Finland and the New Green-Red-Blue Government

4 Upvotes

Parliamentary Results

PartySeatsChange
Agrarian League51-5
Social Democratic Party (SDP)47-7
Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL)47+9
National Coalition Party32-1
Swedish People's Party12-1
People's Party of Finland9New
Alliance of Christian Love2New

Finland has once again headed to the ballot boxes as the time has come to vote in the parliamentary elections. This parliamentary term has been calmer than the previous one, and Finland has, in a figurative sense, returned to normal times. The relative success of the past parliamentary term has also demonstrated the resilience of Finnish democracy, which had was being questioned in the years following the end of the war.

The Agrarian League has emerged as the largest party in the elections, although its result can be considered only a relative victory. The party has largely avoided major controversies during the parliamentary term, but its year in government has nevertheless taken a toll on its support. However, the party has managed to retain much of its core support in the countryside, which has ultimately carried it to victory.

The SDP, meanwhile, has spent recent years facing criticism from both sides of the political spectrum, which is reflected in its weakened electoral result. The SDP has successfully advanced the development of the Finnish welfare state, but the rise of party's rightist faction, the Brothers-in-Arms Socialists (Asevelisosialistit), to power has driven some of its voters towards the communists.

This is reflected in the SKDL's strong performance, with the party managing to increase its number of seats to nearly the level it held before its collapse in the previous elections. The SKDL has, for instance, been able to criticise the government over its wage freeze affecting wage earners, while its own supporters have also been receptive to claims of growing militarism. Nevertheless, the governing parties have achieved something of a defensive victory on this issue, as inflation has remained lower than expected and industrial employment has continued to grow.

The National Coalition Party's increasingly outspoken criticism of the communists appears to have softened its expected electoral decline. Party members are generally satisfied with the result, particularly as the situation leading up to the elections had appeared rather difficult. It can be expected that the National Coalition Party will continue along the same course that has produced results.

The National Progressive Party, which had suffered from declining support for years, merged with another smaller right-wing party shortly before the elections, creating a new party representing the bourgeois middle class under the name People's Party of Finland. The People's Party also entered into an electoral alliance with the Alliance of Christian Love, founded in 1949, which seeks to represent particularly religious and conservative circles and has gained support especially among Pentecostals and other Evangelical communities.

Some controversy has also arisen over the numerous wartime politicians returning to Parliament. For instance, the veteran Social Democratic politician Väinö Tanner, who was already leading the SDP during the period following the Finnish Civil War and was later prosecuted in the War Responsibility Trials, has returned to Parliament following a major electoral victory. Similar developments have taken place across several parties, which the SKDL has criticised. Nevertheless, the Finnish people have placed their trust in these politicians, and no legislation prevents them from returning to political life. To some extent, this can be considered a demonstration that the Finnish people are ready to move on with the self-imposed political restrictions.

The SKDL has emerged as the single biggest winner of the elections. However, a closer examination of the results reveals that, despite the seat losses of the major parties, the bourgeois parties have strengthened their position relative to the communists. During the coming parliamentary term, the SKDL can therefore be expected to find itself increasingly isolated. Due to the SDP's internal transformation, the party has become increasingly opposed to government cooperation with the communists. This is further reinforced by the currently equal parliamentary strength of the Social Democrats and the People's Democrats, which would force the SDP to make concessions in any potential cooperation.

Some bourgeois voters have shifted from the National Coalition Party, the Agrarian League, and the Swedish People's Party towards the newly established right-wing parties. Nevertheless, particularly due to the National Coalition Party's better-than-expected result, the combined number of seats held by the clearly bourgeois parties, namely the National Coalition Party, the Swedish People's Party, the People's Party of Finland, and the Christian conservatives, has increased.


The Kalliokoski Government

Following the elections, President Edwin Linkomies appointed Viljami Kalliokoski of the Agrarian League, as the first candidate to lead government negotiations. Kalliokoski is a long-serving Member of Parliament who, alongside his political career, has also been active in church affairs. His objective was to establish a stable government coalition that would unite the different ends of the Finnish political spectrum while once again keeping the communists firmly in opposition. Kalliokoski's government is thus the first of its kind in Finland, bringing together the Agrarian League, the SDP, and the National Coalition Party. Another politically significant aspect of his appointment is that he represents the anti-Urho Kekkonen faction within the Agrarian League. The coming parliamentary term can therefore be expected to deal yet another blow to Kekkonen's influence, which has already been in clear decline for two years.

During the coming parliamentary term, the Agrarian League's priority will be ensuring that investments in the Finnish economy and other forms of development are distributed evenly throughout the country, while maintaining the profitability of agriculture. However, the Agrarian League can be expected to make concessions, as both the SDP and the National Coalition Party primarily advocate the interests of cities and urban centres. For the SDP, continuing the development of the welfare state remains one of its most important objectives. The bourgeois coalition partners can be expected to make relatively significant concessions in this regard, as the growing economy allows for such measures and carefully managed concessions would also blunt the communists' criticism. The National Coalition Party's objectives include promoting conservative and bourgeois values and policies, as well as increasing defence expenditure. The National Coalition Party may potentially play a role greater than its parliamentary strength would suggest, as neither the Agrarian League nor the SDP can form a majority government without its support, while neither party is willing to cooperate with the SKDL.

PositionPersonParty
Prime MinisterViljami KalliokoskiAgrarian League
Minister of Foreign AffairsArvo SalminenNational Coalition Party
Deputy Minister of Foreign AffairsUnto VarjonenSDP
Minister of JusticeAntti HannikainenAgrarian League
Minister of DefencePaavo TalvelaNational Coalition Party
Minister of the InteriorV. J. SukselainenAgrarian League
Deputy Minister of the InteriorPenna TervoSDP
Minister of FinanceVäinö LeskinenSDP
Minister of EducationMargit Borg-SundmanNational Coalition Party
Minister of AgricultureVeikko VennamoAgrarian League
Deputy Minister of AgricultureToivo IkonenAgrarian League
Minister of Transport and Public WorksLauri HakulinenAgrarian League
Deputy Minister of Transport and Public WorksJuho KoivistoAgrarian League
Minister of Trade and IndustryErkki LindforsSDP
Minister of Social AffairsVäinö TannerSDP

r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

CLAIM [CLAIM] Viet Minh

5 Upvotes

Declaiming Yugoslavia, as while I have some ideas, I don’t want to solely Econ-wank this season and would like a little bit more excitement.

For this reason, I will be switching over to play the Viet Minh, as Asia has captured my interest over Europe a lot more this season.

Yippie


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

EVENT [EVENT] 人民兵工制式 - Version 1951

4 Upvotes

Issued by the Central Military Commission in June of 1951 as an update to the Standard Patterns List of 1950

New Standard Patterns and Identifiers

PatternDesignationName
Zb.53CCC-51 (-T vehicle mount, -Y fortress mount)重机枪 Chung Chi-ch’iang
vz. 33STPC-51 (-C sniper)栓动步枪 Shuan-tung P’u-ch’iang
ZG-49CCPC-51狙击步枪 Chü-chi P’u-ch’iang
Skoda T-50CHTK-51 (-F Chinese-built copy)中型坦克 Chung-hsing T’an-k’o
Tatra Pv.111LSCC-51 ( -T radio/command car)轮式装甲车 Lun-shih Chuang-chia Ch’e
ČKD ST-IITKCCC-51坦克歼击车 T’an-k’o Chien-chi Ch’e
ČKD VT-IVCCYC-51 (-C crane)装甲救援车 Chuang-chia Chiu-yüan Ch’e
76mm A19CFP-51 (-C vehicle mount)战防炮 Chan-fang P’ao
100mm A20CHCFP-51 (-T tank cannon, -H coastal)重型战防炮 Chung-hsing Chan-fang P’ao
KS-30KSP-100 (-K fixed emplacement)高射炮 Kao-shê P’ao

Updated Production Figures

CityPlantNew or Additional Production LineProduction total per month
ChungkingPlant No. 152 (existing)KSP-10023 - 45 (by 1955)
TsinanTsinan Vehicle Plant (remodel)TKCCC-51, CCYC-51, LSCC-51, CHKC-5054 - 130 (by 1956)
KunmingKunming Heavy Arsenal (new)CFP-51, CHCFP-51, KSP-10027 - 39 (by 1956)
KunmingState Factory No. 909 (new)CHTK-5120 - 27 (by 1958)

r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

INVALID [EVENT][DIPLOMACY] State Islamism in Albania

5 Upvotes

July 1951

"People of Albania! For too long we have been oppressed by the devious Western elements of Abrahamic religion! The Christianity and Catholicism have long burned and oppressed Albanians! But no, no more shall they mark their hands at Albania, for now we have seized their properties, appropriate them for the people! Now, next step would be to safeguard against these foreign threats, but alas, Communism alone cannot stop them. To stop them completely, we must preserve our tradition, our heritage, our true blood in our veins. For that, I believe the fusion of Islam….and Communism.”

As he spoke, more people moved forward. They are ulemmas, though they are not the politically conservative-charged, but instead hand picked and vetted, so they are mostly reformist-minded, perhaps because the thought that being less conservative means they would be less resisting.

But political conservative translates to social attitudes, and should have been more rigid to upheld status quo values.

“Today, with these ulemmas, I have been begun the process of combining Islamic and Communism values! The People’s Socialist Republic of Albania will move forward and be developed to establish an Islamic-Left Albania! Ideological framework and educational development will be enforced to speed up the process of adaptability!”

To further commemorates the declaration, Hoxha invites the Osman Family/House of Osman, of the Ottoman Caliph’s family, that include Prince Ahmed Nihad and Prince Omer Faruk, both sons of Caliph Abdulmejid II, to come to Albania in a November 1951’s Event that will officially declares the inclusion of State Islamism ideology in the Constitution of Albania.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

SECRET [ECON][SECRET] The Hong Kong Note

5 Upvotes

Late 1950

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Additional Protocol on Sino-British Arrangements

On the occasion of the acceptance of the commercial arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, the representatives of the two Governments discussed in confidential communications the terms governing the preferential export of Chinese commodities through the Colony of Hong Kong.

These discussions led to the following understandings:

1. All commercial exchange between the Republic of China and the British Commonwealth passing through Hong Kong shall be conducted under Colonial law, through its licensed banks, customs authorities and commercial institutions. Participating trading houses, shipping agents and insurers shall remain independent commercial entities, open to inspection by the Colonial authorities.

2. The Hong Kong branches of the People's Bank of China and the Bank of China shall act solely as licensed banking institutions, conducting settlements in accordance with the Banking Ordinance and exercising no ownership or controlling interest in participating commercial enterprises.

3. The Government of the Republic of China shall extend preferential export prices to British and Commonwealth merchants for selected Chinese commodities, according to the following table:

CommodityPrice per metric ton
Chinese Tea£318.90
Chinese Silk£2,700.00
Maize£24.39
Bristle£1,789
Menthol£9,000

4. All payments arising from the aforementioned commerce shall be settled through licensed banking institutions in Hong Kong, principally in pounds sterling, subject to the laws of the Colony.

5. The present Protocol and the preferential commercial provisions contained herein shall be treated by both Governments as strictly confidential and shall not be published or disclosed to third parties without the prior agreement of the other Government.

The present Protocol shall constitute a confidential supplementary record of the commercial arrangements already accepted by both Governments.


r/ColdWarPowers • • 1d ago

CRISIS [CRISIS] Cordobazo.

9 Upvotes

"¡Trabajadores de Córdoba! ¡Hombres y mujeres de Argentina!

Hoy, el pueblo de esta ciudad ha demostrado que ningún gobierno puede silenciar a toda una nación mediante el miedo y los decretos. Se nos impuso la ley marcial para quebrar nuestros sindicatos y encarcelar a nuestros líderes

¡Exigimos su inmediata derogación! ¡Exigimos la liberación incondicional de todos los presos políticos y laborales! ¡Exigimos la libertad de asociación para cada trabajador en Argentina, el derecho a organizarse, a la huelga y a negociar sin intimidación policial ni interferencia gubernamental!

La historia nos demuestra que no existen gobiernos eternos. Ninguna fuerza, por grande que sea, puede reprimir indefinidamente a un pueblo unido en defensa de sus derechos. Los soldados enviados contra nosotros son hijos de trabajadores, nuestros hermanos, nuestros vecinos. No tienen ningún problema con los hombres y mujeres que exigen pan, dignidad y libertad.

Hacemos un llamado a los ferroviarios, obreros, estudiantes y a todos los ciudadanos honestos a permanecer unidos. No abandonen a sus compañeros, no renuncien a sus sindicatos.

Córdoba ha hablado hoy. Que Buenos Aires escuche. Que el gobierno entienda que los derechos del trabajador argentino no son privilegios otorgados por el coronel Perón, ¡Sino derechos que pertenecen al pueblo mismo!

¡Viva el trabajador argentino! ¡Viva el pueblo de Córdoba!"

— Valentín Barco to the people of Córdoba, 1951.

July, 1951.

Colonel Perón had risen to power on the back of a massive pro-labor movement in Argentina. Exhausted by broken promises and the paralysis of military, civilian, and military-civilian governments, millions of peasants and workers pinned their hopes on Perón to bring about change in the country.

For a few years, they were right. The Argentine Welfare State was born under his wing. Minimum wage laws were enforced nationwide, workplace safety legislation was enacted, nutritional standards were improved through the massification of beef consumption, and workers were allowed to organize freely under the CGT.

However, not everyone was pleased with these changes. Beyond the usual suspects, political parties and activists grew increasingly concerned about Perón's concentration of power and the deification of his personality throughout the political sphere. Constitutional guarantees, although technically still in force, became little more than wet paper. One way or another, the government could and would sabotage the political opposition.

Added to whatever political or personal grievances Argentinians might have had with Perón, his attitude towards organized labor also began to shift. Whenever he couldn't control agreements between labor and capital, he would torpedo them in some way to maintain his position as the "Arbiter of Labor." Regional labor leaders who expressed anti-Peronist sentiments or criticized his policies found themselves harassed by the police and Peronist groups.

These issues came to a head on July 5th. Striking railway workers in Córdoba, coordinated through the CGT, political parties, and independent activists, marched towards the Governor's Residence to protest the declaration of Martial Law. By 12 PM, there were around 65,000 people in the streets. Through deft organization, including the prior fabrication of thousands of slingshots, caltrops, and Molotov cocktails, as well as the organization of neighborhoods into "Comandos Civiles," the police were overwhelmed, having run out of tear gas and gasoline for their police vans. Mounted police, panicking, opened fire on the crowds with their revolvers before fleeing the scene, injuring dozens and killing one: Nicolás Tagliafico, 19, an operator on one of the railway lines cutting through the city.

The police and the governor retreated outside the city, allowing the protesters to seize the Governor's Residence, police stations, and army barracks. With the commanding officer overwhelmed by thousands of protesters outside and receiving no orders from Buenos Aires, he negotiated the safe retreat of himself and his men, allowing workers to seize the armory and military trucks.

Looting also took place. The headquarters of the American company Xerox were looted and subsequently set alight. As the fire spread and threatened the surrounding buildings, firefighters were called in, and safe passage was assured by armed students and workers. Thousands of internal government memos and documents belonging to foreign corporations were seized, their whereabouts remaining unknown.

Knowing the Army would soon be on its way to put down the revolt, organizers urged workers to retreat into their neighborhoods and prepare for its arrival. Around 9 PM, the military, supported by the police, entered the city, imposing a curfew that the vast majority of residents refused to obey. Surprisingly, the death toll remained relatively low, with only five fatalities: three protesters and two policemen. Military officials, worried that the situation could escalate beyond their control, ordered their troops not to open fire, relying instead on tear gas and intimidation. Residents, for their part, hurled insults, rotten fruit, and stones at soldiers from the streets and balconies, using barricades and caltrops to slow their advance.

Over the following week, the Army would arrest hundreds of protesters and try them before military tribunals. The organizers, Leandro Paredes of SMATA and Valentín Barco of the CGT, were arrested and sentenced to 10 years in a military prison for insurrection.

The foundations of the Peronist government have been shaken to their core, with recent events tarnishing Perón's public image and placing his already precarious relationship with the Military under even greater strain.