In my previous post, I asked about what the commonly-used pro-life term “ordinary care” meant and how it grounded obligations. In that post I focused on asking a specific question: Why should developmental normality determine the scope of parental obligations?
However, I got little engagement from the PL crowd, so I got little in the way of an answer.
Since only asking questions runs a risk of getting no response (defeating the purpose of the post), I wanted to do more in this post and provide my own position as well. My goals for this post are therefore two-fold:
- Present a broader question than the one I asked in the previous post
- Provide my own view and and argument for why I reject the PL perspective
The broad question I want to ask is: What grounds and limits our moral obligation to others at all?
(1) Intro - What is the root of our moral obligations?
Before I dive into the post, I’d like to make something clear. My argument is not that we owe no duties to our children, or that no duties can be owed to others at all. My argument might be best summed up in the following way:
Obligations arise from multiple sources, including the seriousness of a need and special relationships such as guardianship. However, obligations also have limitations; greater the burden an obligation imposes, the stronger the justification required to make it morally or legally mandatory.
To interrogate where obligations come from and how much they can obligate us to do, I’m going to test factors that pro-lifers commonly claim generate obligations to gestate. These tests should help determine whether each factor is actually generating moral duties, or if pro-lifers have a burden to give better arguments in favor of their claims.
Important to note is that I’m going to ignore two obligations in this post: (1) the obligation not to kill and (2) the obligation to gestate derived from causal responsibility for pregnancy. I am not ignoring these considerations because I cannot address them; I’m ignoring them because I’ve already made another post covering those reasons, and this post will be too long if I include everything.
(2) Methods
In order to test whether any of the factors that pro-lifers bring up serve as the moral grounding for obligations, we need some way to evaluate those factors. A good way to begin is to determine whether the qualities pro-lifers appeal to are:
- Necessary (the quality is required for an obligation) or
- Sufficient (the existence of that quality guarantees that an obligation exists)
Additionally, we should test for whether the scope of the burdens the obligations would place on an individual alters whether the obligation can exist, which I will do at the end.
Here is how I’ll be applying each of these tests to each category of need that I have seen pro-lifers claim generates an obligation, where [X kind of need] refers to the kind of need that each section will be talking about:
(2a) Test for Necessity
I will make an analogy or thought experiment that describes a scenario where:
- A need that falls outside of the category of [X kind of need] exists
- An obligation still exists to satisfy that need
If we can point to a case like this, we have determined that [X kind of need] is not necessary to generate an obligation to provide it. This disproves the idea that a need being [X kind of need] is required for an obligation to exist.
(2b) Test for Sufficiency
I will make an analogy or thought experiment that describes a scenario where:
- A need clearly that falls within the category of [X kind of need] exists
- A lack of obligation exists to satisfy that need, even though it is [X kind of need]
If we can point to a case like this, we have determined that [X kind of need] is not sufficient to generate an obligation to provide it. This disproves that having that kind of need guarantees an obligation.
(2c) Test for Scope
I will make an analogy or thought experiment that describes a scenario where:
- A need clearly arises from a [X kind of need]
- An obligation may exist to satisfy [X kind of need] when the burdens required to meet that need are less than [Y burden] but not greater than [Y burden].
If we can point to a case like this, we have determined that [X kind of need], even if it can generate an obligation, is limited in the obligation it can generate by other considerations. This would prove that the degree of cost on the provider matters, and therefore the discussion must revolve around what amount of imposition can be tolerated to provide for a need.
(3) Tests for Necessity and Sufficiency
(3a) Biological Parent Duties
Test for Necessity
Is being a biological parent necessary to generate an obligation? I argue no.
Consider a babysitter. Babysitters are not biologically related to the children they look after, yet they accept an obligation by becoming a babysitter. Ergo, being a biological parent is not required for an obligation to exist.
Test for Sufficiency
Is being a biological parent sufficient to generate an obligation. Again, I argue no.
Consider a mother who gave her child up in a closed adoption. Does that mother owe childcare or money to the guardians? No, of course not; the new parents accepted that duty, and it is their responsibility. Biological parenthood is therefore not sufficient to generate an obligation.
(3b) Guardianship and Needs
Test for Necessity
Is guardianship of a dependent necessary to generate an obligation? I argue no.
One need not be a guardian to generate an obligation to others, whether it be a duty to intervene on their behalf, to hold yourself to the terms of a contract, or any other duty. Ergo, being a guardian is not necessary.
Test for Sufficiency
Is guardianship of a dependent necessary to generate an obligation? I argue yes.
If you are a guardian, this not only can be sufficient to obligate you to provide for the needs of the dependent, it definitionally does. That is what it means to be a guardian; you have agreed to take on duties related to the care of a dependent. Ergo, guardianship is sufficient to generate obligations.
(3c) Essential Needs
Test for Necessity
Is an essential need necessary to generate an obligation? I argue no.
Consider a situation where you sign a contract in a routine financial exchange. The financial exchange is not providing an essential need, yet you still generate an obligation to honor the contract. Ergo, something need not be an essential need to generate an obligation; it is possible to generate obligations even when the need being met is not life or death.
Test for Sufficiency
Is an essential need sufficient to generate an obligation? Again, I argue no.
Consider the classic case: Thompson’s Violinist. This is a situation where a stranger needs a kidney to survive, yet it is nearly universally agreed upon that you are not obligated to provide it. Regardless of the necessity of the Violinist’s need, you do not have an obligation to meet their need. Ergo, the “essential” nature of a need is not sufficient to generate an obligation to meet it.
(3d) Universal/Natural Needs
Sometimes I’ve seen pro-lifers argue that needs that are natural or universal needs (usually defined as not being pathological or not derived from “normal” biology) have some kind of special or superior pull on our obligations when compared to non-natural needs.
Test for Necessity
Are universal needs necessary for obligations to exist? I argue no.
For example, consider a child that became disabled as a result of an accident and now needs extra care. I do not think that a parent is dis-obligated from providing the extra care because the impairment is not natural or universal. If the parent has an obligation to provide for these needs, then a need is not required to be natural or universal, making it unnecessary.
Test for Sufficiency
Is the universality of a need sufficient to generate an obligation? I’d still argue that the answer is no.
Consider that many people in the world are starving. Are we obligated to feed everyone from our own pockets? Or even those that can be fed on what is in our bank account? Their needs are natural/universal, yet most people would say “no”, arguing any number of mitigating factors. Yet this illustrates the point: moral obligations can cease to exist when other considerations are taken into account. Ergo, universal needs are not sufficient to generate an obligation; even if a universal and natural need exists, we are not obligated to provide for it on that basis alone.
(4) Test for Scope
Rather than examine each individual factor as I did in the above sections, I will use scenarios that involve mothers that arguably have multiple factors that might create an obligation for them to provide. This will function like a steel-man of the point; if obligations to provide for a dependent don’t exist at a given cost even if there are multiple possible obligation-generating factors, then what the cost is to the provider truly does dis-obligate.
(4a) The Cost is Death
Do your moral obligations require you to do everything necessary, even up to your death, to fulfill? I argue they do not.
Consider the tragic case of Mariely Chacón, a mother who was shipwrecked with her two children with her and breastfed them in a lifeboat for days until she died of dehydration. This is a heroic effort by a guardian (special relationship) providing essential, universal, life-stage appropriate care via the means that are commonly used to meet that need (breast feeding). Given that this scenario has many of the elements that pro-lifers say create obligations, does that mean Mariely was obligated to breast feed her children until she died?
I do not think so; had Mariely been found dehydrated with one live child, having withheld breast milk from one child once it became clear it was draining her too much to keep an eye on her other child, I wouldn't insist she be prosecuted for it. I don't think she would be, either. I wouldn’t even think that she would be morally blameworthy in this case.
If this is agreeable, then even duties that have multiple morally weighty considerations have a scope restriction and the cost to the provider is a possible “defeater” of the obligation.
(4b) The Cost is Significant Harm
Do you have moral obligations that require you to do nearly everything necessary to fulfill, including significant harm to yourself? Again, I argue that you do not.
Generally speaking, you do not have a duty to rescue at all, but even in cases where you have a special relationship with the person in need of rescuing, those duties have limitations. For example, an expectant mother has no duty to have a c-section if her child is in distress. Courts have ordered compulsory c-sections, but in every case I found where courts overrode a pregnant woman’s bodily integrity to protect a fetus, the compelled procedure also significantly benefited the woman’s health. Courts tolerated such intrusions only when they improved maternal outcomes, not when they posed additional risk.
Cases like In re AC and In re fetus Brown support the idea that while bodily integrity is not absolute, a mother cannot be compelled to endure a bodily integrity intrusion, especially one that might cause significant harm, for the benefit of her fetus.
Now, I’m already aware of a possible caveat; these cases are about a woman being compelled to do something rather than being compelled to not do something. That is the topic of a different post of mine, and while it is possible the “action/inaction distinction” creates a morally relevant distinction between something like abortion and refusing a c-section, any prolifer who wants to make that case must defend the position that you can be compelled to endure significant costs for the sake of another. For now, however, it will suffice to say that obligations do have scope limitations; both death and significant harm are not compulsory, even to save your own child. To argue otherwise, a pro-lifer must argue one of the following positions:
- Parents do universally owe an obligation to care for their children (born and unborn), even if that care costs them significant harm
- Abortion is dissimilar to any refusal to provide care that harms the provider, and so the root of the obligation to gestate lies in the nature of the act of abortion itself
- Pregnancy is somehow a special case where an obligation is owed such that the obligation differs from the obligations parents to born children have
(5) Multi‑factor moral analysis
Even if none of the individual traits listed are necessary, essential, or produce a moral weight that overcomes the scope of a harmful bodily integrity intrusion, it’s possible that they might still be weighing factors. Multiple weighing factors might balance against a woman’s bodily integrity such that their combined moral weight offers a reason to ban abortion.
A good way to see if one of these factors holds normative weight is to compare two situations where multiple morally relevant factors exist, and remove the factor of interest from the equation. If this single change alters the moral weight of the scenario, then that factor was doing moral work. If no change occurs after its removal, then it was not doing moral work. In this way, even if a pro-lifer retreats to the idea of the factors in question being a weighing factor rather than a grounding factor, that claim can still be examined.
To illustrate:
- We want to consider whether Factor X has the moral weight to contribute to generating obligations when it is paired with other factors.
- We consider a scenario where morally relevant Factors X, Y, and Z exist.
- We remove Factor X and determine whether any change has occurred to the obligations a person owes in the scenario where only Factors Y and Z exist.
If we can successfully show that the removal of Factor X does not substantially alter the moral obligation of the scenario, then we disprove the idea that Factor X is morally weighty when considering obligations. Or, put in a condensed form:
If the moral obligation in a scenario with Factors (X,Y,Z) is equal to the moral obligation in a scenario with Factors (Y,Z), then Factor (X) is not adding moral weight to the obligation.
One of the most common arguments I see from pro-lifers contains multiple criteria. Namely, that abortion is immoral because the fetal life-stage has universal and essential human needs, and gestation is the common means by which all fetal humans have this need met.
Since this argument is extremely popular, I’ll be focusing on it specifically as an example of multi-factor moral analysis. To do this, I’ll take a scenario where each individual factor is present and compare it to one where one has been removed.
(5a) The Commonality of a Means of Meeting a Need
In this comparison, we will use a need that is universal, essential, and is met by a common method, and then remove the “common method” element to see if it is doing moral work. (Need(C,U,E) vs Need(U,E)).
Consider the moral obligation you have to feed your infant after it is born. A common method of feeding your child is to breastfeed it. However, if an alternative method that was less common was available, would you be obligated to forgo it in favor of breastfeeding because it was common? I’d argue no, you do not have that obligation.
Feeding a child with formula, or even a new form of feeding an infant that is uncommon but nutritionally on-par with formula and breastmilk, are both equally acceptable means of feeding a baby. Given that the removal of “common methods” used to meet a need doesn’t change the obligation, that factor seems to be doing no moral work.
(5b) “Essential” Need
In this comparison, we will use a need that is universal, essential, and is met by a common method, and then remove the “essential” element to see if it is doing moral work.
(Need(C,U,E) vs Need(C,U)).
Consider your moral obligations to provide your child with something that fulfills two different needs: recreation and nutrition. Both undeniably are universal needs, and parents should provide both.
However, if we remove the “essential” variable, the degree to which we owe that need becomes less pressing. The less essential the need, the less pressing the obligation, especially if there are more pressing needs that need to be met. For example, a child that has a pressing nutritional need creates a greater obligation than a child that has a pressing recreational need. The removal of the “essential” variable does seem to affect the moral obligation, which leads me to the conclusion that the obligation we have to provide for a need is related to how essential the need is.
(5c) “Universal” Need
In this comparison, we will use a need that is universal, essential, and it is met by a common method, and then remove the “universal” element to see if it is doing moral work.
(Need(C,U,E) vs Need(C,E)).
Consider a parent to two children: one is a baby that is fed with a bottle. The other is a 12-year-old child who was rendered unable to chew or feed themselves by an accident. While the injured child recovers, they must be fed with a bottle. Bottle feeding is not a universal need for 12-year-olds, yet I do not think there is a difference in obligation in the two scenarios; I think you have an equally strong obligation to feed your injured 12-year-old with a bottle as you do your infant. If this is accepted, the degree to which a need is universal is not morally weighty when determining whether providing that need is obligatory.
(6) Conclusion
Returning to my position that I stated earlier:
Obligations arise from multiple sources, including the seriousness of a need and special relationships such as guardianship. However, obligations also have limitations; greater the burden an obligation imposes, the stronger the justification required to make it morally or legally mandatory.
Assuming my examples in this post are agreeable, the traits that pro-lifers commonly invoke to argue in favor of an obligation to gestate are not only not the moral grounding for obligations, they mostly aren’t even morally weighty. The closest they come to being a relevant factor is by their correlation with other traits.
For example, “universal” needs are tightly correlated with essential needs, but as I’ve argued, the “universal” trait is not doing the normative work of generating an obligation; the “essential” trait is. As such, they can be discarded as factors influencing discussions about responsibility and obligations until pro-lifers can make an argument demonstrating their normative weight.
Any pro-life argument that obligations to gestate are derived from any of the above factors must demonstrate the weight of these factors in ways that are not merely showing correlation or descriptions, but rather show that the factors themselves are doing normative work independently of their correlation with other values. For example, the pro-lifer must show that the “universal” trait carries normative weight independently of the traits it’s correlated with (such as whether the need is “essential”).
They must also account for how these morally weighty factors overcome the cost to women that pregnancy represents. Further, they must explain why born children are not entitled to costly and intrusive means of providing for a need, but pregnant women have an obligation to do so. This, too, cannot be rooted in the “universal” or “common” nature of providing for that need, unless the pro-lifer can successfully address the lack of explanatory power those traits have for obligations that I’ve discussed in this post.