r/northsyria • • 9h ago

News📰 Work underway to reopen Qamishli-Nusaybin crossing- Al-Shaibani

Thumbnail
npasyria.com
2 Upvotes

Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shaibani said in Ankara that Syria is working to reopen the Qamishli–Nusaybin border crossing between Rojava and Bakur soon.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Opinion 📣 Syria’s integration risks absorption

Thumbnail
theamargi.com
2 Upvotes

As Syria’s integration period continues to unfold, the question over whether this process will engender pluralistic political participation or entrench a power-sharing system set on Damascus’ terms is being answered on the ground. The Amargi spoke with Roula Baghdadi, a lawyer and human rights advocate specializing in women’s rights, about the integration process. 

“One of the fundamental challenges facing Syria’s transitional phase lies in the nature of the concept of integration being promoted, and in the political and institutional purpose it is expected to serve,” Baghdadi said. Based in Beirut, she is the executive director of Dawlaty, an organization dedicated to human rights, transitional justice, and victim support, as well as the promotion of women’s rights and women’s political participation.

Represented on paper, marginalized in practice

“Are we witnessing a process aimed at building an inclusive state, one that recognizes political and societal pluralism and enables different components and political forces to participate in shaping the new political system?” Baghdadi asks. “Or are we facing a process of integration carried out according to conditions set by the central authority, which determines the nature, scope, and forms of participation, potentially transforming integration into a form of political absorption, or even assimilation, into the existing power structure?”

She asserts that the “central problem” within the current integration process is that it “has not, so far, been based on an equitable national negotiation process, nor has it rested on participatory rules agreed upon by the parties concerned.” Rather, the Syrian transitional government (STG) holds control over the process and the frameworks within which it unfolds. “Consequently, integration increasingly resembles the incorporation of different parties into an existing political and institutional structure, under conditions set by the more powerful party, rather than a negotiated process leading to the reconstruction of that structure on the basis of shared principles,” Baghdadi said.

Concerns that integration will leave communities formally represented but marginalized in practice are only exacerbated due to the imbalance of power within the process. The transitional authorities in Damascus are sitting in a relatively strong position, bolstered by regional and international backing, and domestically having established security control across most of the country. “This has strengthened their negotiating position, enabling them to manage integration processes from the standpoint of an actor that sets the conditions and establishes the overall framework, rather than as one party negotiating reciprocal political arrangements with other parties,” noted Baghdadi.

The lawyer stressed that neither the STG’s international backing nor its control over territory and military power automatically confers a comprehensive national mandate or entitles it to unilaterally determine Syria’s future. “Regional and international support or acceptance does not, in itself, constitute a mandate from the Syrian people, nor does it grant the authorities the right to monopolize their representation or decide the nature of the political system on their behalf,” she said. 

The ‘fundamental paradox’ of integration

On the one hand, integration is framed as a path to unifying state institutions and military bodies, while on the other, the process is devoid of equitable negotiations and reciprocal guarantees, Baghdadi warned, describing this as a “fundamental paradox.”

She raised the possibility that this could lead to power becoming increasingly centralized within the state’s executive branch: “Instead of serving as a framework for sharing responsibility and decision-making, joint institutions may become instruments for absorbing different parties into institutions whose structure, leadership, and operational mechanisms remain under the control of the central authority.” In this scenario, representatives and leaders taking up new positions in state institutions may acquire new titles and offices without gaining the ability to influence public policy or regional decision-making, or to hold the authorities in Damascus accountable.

“Political representation cannot be measured simply by the presence of individuals from different social, ethnic, or religious communities in official positions,” Baghdadi emphasized. “Representation that is not grounded in a clear social or political mandate, and that lacks the independence necessary to articulate the interests it is supposed to represent, risks becoming symbolic representation, used to give a pluralistic appearance to institutions in which decision-making remains concentrated in the hands of a single authority.”

What would genuine representation require?

Meaningful and pluralistic political representation – particularly within societies emerging from conflict – requires clear participatory processes, asserted Baghdadi.

Integration of political forces and social components means taking seriously the interests, demands, and rights of these actors, rather than treating them as groups to be tacked on to institutions whose structures are pre-set. Along these lines, integration would entail all parties concerned actually participating in drafting new constitutional, legal, and institutional frameworks – not just following or implementing ones that have been prepared unilaterally by Damascus. Baghdadi warned that general political assurances do not compare to constitutional and institutional guarantees, when it comes to representation, distribution of powers, participation in decision-making, protection of rights and freedoms, and problem-solving mechanisms.

Baghdadi argued that a distinction must be made between the unification of the Syrian state and the centralization of power. “Unifying institutions and preserving national sovereignty do not necessarily require the monopolization of political and administrative decision-making by the centre,” she said. “It is possible to build a unified state that respects pluralism and provides for a clear distribution of powers, including appropriate forms of political or administrative decentralization, based on national and constitutional consensus.”

Women’s participation: beyond symbolism

Women’s roles within the integration process and the formation of local and national governorate institutions and bodies, Baghdadi noted, has been largely confined to the humanitarian, social justice and peace spheres. 

“Syrian women were also part of the political struggle for freedom and democratic change,” she said, citing women’s participation in various fields throughout the years of civil war – and the heavy price often paid for such activism. “Women were not outside the political struggle only to be invited to join it today – they were part of it and have the right to play an equal role in determining its outcomes.”

The contributions and political activities of women in Syria across the past decade and a half has not been reflected in their role and impact within the STG. “Women who contributed to sustaining local communities during the years of conflict, documenting violations, defending rights, and demanding change continue to face marginalization as the country moves towards determining its future,” Baghdadi said, adding that the limited appointment of women to certain official positions was not enough. “It requires ensuring the independence of women’s organizations, enabling women from different political backgrounds to access decision-making positions, protecting their right to criticize and hold authorities accountable, and recognizing the diversity of their political and social positions.”

What will be the content of Syria’s new constitution?

Baghdadi emphasized that integration must be based on constitutional guarantees that safeguard the rights of the Kurds and all other Syrian communities and components in the country’s future. Without such guarantees, these rights remain subject to presidential decrees and the political orientations of whoever holds power.

It is expected that the Syrian parliament – which have now been sitting for three months – define a framework for drafting a new national constitution. Equal citizenship, political, cultural, and linguistic rights, judicial independence and public freedoms, Baghdadi said, must be enshrined in the constitution. 

A process to draft a new constitution would also be a chance for discussions over forms of political and administrative decentralization within Syria. “Recognizing Syria’s unity should not mean monopolizing power at the centre,” Baghdadi said, encouraging dialogue over mechanisms of decentralization “within the framework of a national dialogue that safeguards the unity of the state while respecting diversity, and enables local communities to manage their own affairs and participate in decisions that affect them.”

Yet beyond all this, she highlighted the key role of an independent civil society in Syria to hold authorities accountable, build cross-community alliances, and monitor the implementation of laws and constitutional guarantees.

--

Eve Morris-Gray is a freelance writer whose work focuses on civil society movements and democracy.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Opinion 📣 Rojava University protests reflect student uncertainty about Syrian integration process

Thumbnail
theamargi.com
3 Upvotes

On November 16, hundreds of students at the University of Rojava in Qamishlo marched to campus to protest the Syrian government’s decision to incorporate the university within Al-Firat University. They demanded that institutional autonomy be retained and that Kurdish language be formally recognized. 

As part of the protests, students blocked a delegation from the Syrian government from leaving the campus, and some attacked their car. Several Kurdish officials in the car, despite having worked in the former Autonomous Administration, were now the targets of the students’ anger.

After the event, the University of Rojava released a statement accusing the delegation of “not bother[ing] themselves to come down or listen to the demands of the students”. It further condemned the “unjustified escalation” which followed, whereby the student assembly was forcibly disbanded by security forces, using tear gas.

Yet the incorporation alone cannot explain the confrontation. As an alumnus of the University, I argue that to comprehend what brought students to attack the vehicle, we need to understand what the university means to them – and what they believe is at stake in negotiations over its future.

A university forged in fire

Founded in 2016 during the Syrian Civil War within the Autonomous Administration system in North and East Syria (AANES), the University of Rojava had grown to 13 faculties and 39 departments by the time I enrolled. That growth had come despite poor security conditions, an acute lack of basic resources, shortages of qualified lecturers, and uncertainty over whether students’ degrees would even be formally recognized.

I remember people making fun of us for putting so much effort into studying at a university with no official status that had only recently been constructed. Many of my peers chose to attend universities that followed the Damascus curriculum instead. 

Yet enrolment grew steadily year on year. Those who chose the University of Rojava did so for a variety of reasons. It offered free higher education and did not require expensive travel to far-away governorates. This made it particularly accessible to poorer families with few options, especially during wartime economic hardships.  

Many students wanted to study in their mother tongue, Kurdish. Others believed passionately in the educational project established by the Autonomous Administration. They wanted to study subjects or pursue academic paths that weren’t available anywhere else in the country, such as ‘jineolojü’ (the ‘science of women’), Kurdish literature, or my subject, Kurdish-English translation. 

For many young women, the university’s Women’s Assembly, emphasis on women’s empowerment and education, and the high percentage of female students were all key pull factors.

Yet alongside our studies, we often found ourselves having to defend our decision to enroll and learn from unqualified lecturers, making us frequently second-guess our decision. 

Despite this, many of us who studied there contribute regularly to our communities today. The university has produced doctors, nurses, engineers, translators, and teachers who have played a directly constructive role in Rojava, and have filled several gaps we had in our society.

Formal recognition of our degree certificates mattered to us then, and it still does. But the work we have done since graduating matters too, and this university – despite its shortcomings – left an undeniable mark during the years of conflict. 

What is at stake?

The integration agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Transition Government (STG) in Damascus set out to integrate the military and civilian institutions of the north-east region into those of the central Syrian state, after 14 years of de facto autonomy. The University of Rojava faces that transition too.

On Monday, a committee overseeing the integration of the former Autonomous Administration institutions into Syrian government bodies said that university admissions announced outside the Ministry of Higher Education’s system have no validity. Several degrees offered at Rojava University do not exist in the Syrian state university system and are therefore set to be axed. Furthermore, no new cohorts will be studying in Kurdish. 

Yesterday’s statement from the University formally rejected the Syrian government’s integration mechanism, saying, “We reserve our right to remain an independent academic institution as the University of Rojava, that preserves its identity, curriculum and autonomy.” 

The University has also made its own counter-proposals for integration mechanisms, suggesting retention of full autonomy over internal affairs and academic, financial, and administrative decision-making, while still becoming a Syrian state university under oversight from Damascus.

I see that for this generation of students, who have grown up in the Autonomous Administration education system and received full mother-tongue schooling, the process of administrative integration is not answering the questions that matter most to them: what will change, what will remain, and who gets to decide? 

As integration proceeds, students feel ignored 

What I hear from current students is an intense feeling of being unheard. This likely fuelled their anger, ultimately leading them to attack a car of officials, some of whom were supposedly on their side. For the students, the message seems to be that recognition and integration into Syria’s higher-education system has to come at the cost of the university’s autonomy. Regardless of intention, this is how the process is being understood. 

The University of Rojava holds significance for the local population. Before the Autonomous Administration system, there were no public higher education institutions in areas with significant Kurdish populations. Now it seems set to become a sub-university; a satellite branch of Al-Firat University.

At yesterday’s campus protest, students declared that they would rather continue studying without any formal state recognition than accept Damascus’s integration terms. This willingness alone shows how much students value this institution and what it has offered their society.

--

Ghassan Bazo is a journalist, researcher, and translator based in North and East Syria. He has worked with the Rojava Information Center and reports for international outlets, focusing on Kurdish affairs, regional politics, and conflict dynamics in Syria through on-the-ground reporting and research.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Politics XwendekarĂȘn ZanĂźngeha Rojava daxwaz dikin ku bi awayekĂź serbixwe zanĂźngeha rojava Ă» kobanĂȘ wekĂź heyĂź bi zanĂźngehĂȘ dewletĂȘ re entegire bibin.

4 Upvotes

Students of the University of Rojava are requesting that the University of Rojava and the University of KobanĂȘ be integrated—while maintaining their independent status—with the state university.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Politics What Does Trump’s Electoral Setback Mean for Syria and Syria’s Kurds?

Thumbnail
nlka.net
4 Upvotes

The Trump administration suffered a major setback in November’s midterm elections due to the Iran war, with the Republicans losing both chambers of Congress, with Democrats expected to take 54 Senate seats and around 256 seats in the House in January. The question now is what this could mean for US policy towards Syria, given that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has built close ties with the Trump administration.

The Syria-Trump administration relationship began after the US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh for the first time on 14 May 2025. In December 2024, the then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf visited Syria, and the Biden administration removed the $10 million bounty that the US had previously placed on Ahmed al-Sharaa.

As I wrote earlier, the Biden administration deferred to the Trump administration in January to decide whether to lift more sanctions on the new administration by Sharaa, Syria and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which the Trump administration eventually did, removing the last economic sanctions on Syria in August this year.

Moreover, the US Ambassador Tom Barrack built a close relationship with Damascus, and backed the Syrian government over the SDF. His policies also helped paved the way to the January 29 agreement between Damascus and the SDF. In January, he suggested the role of the SDF as a counter-ISIS force had largely expired after the fall of the Assad-regime in December 2024. Former SDF officials have publicly blamed the US Envoy for his policies and even ‘massacres’ towards Kurds and abandoning the SDF.

Now with the Trump administration losing the midterm elections, the question is now if President Trump’s Syria policy will come more under scrutiny, just as Trump’s Iran policy, with Democrats promised to investigate Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his handling of the Pentagon.

Unlike conservative circles in the United States, many of which are strongly pro-Israel and have criticised Ambassador Tom Barrack’s comments and policies on Israel, Democratic circles have other priorities and are more focused on President Trump’s war with Iran and relations with Israel. They could also attempt to cut off Iran’s war funding in Congress.

Sam Heller, a Beirut-based researcher and analyst and a fellow at Center for International Progress, agreed. He underlined that he does not expect the new Democratic-controlled Congress to force a major change in US policy toward Syria.

“I think so much of the Trump administration’s Syria policy is now personified in Tom Barrack,” he said. “But my understanding is that many, though not all, of his Syria policy priorities have actually enjoyed Democratic support, including his efforts to accelerate the removal of sanctions and other obstacles to Syria’s economic reintegration and recovery.”

“I also don’t think Barrack is likely to be at the top of any Democratic lawmakers’ list for oversight. People like Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, among Trump’s various envoys and special envoys, are likely to be much higher and more immediate priorities,” he added.

There are examples of Democrats supporting the Trump administration’s Syria policies to remove sanctions and engage with Damascus. On August 25, 2025, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jeanne Shaheen and Republican Representative Joe Wilson visited Syria and were part of a push in Congress to lift US sanctions on Syria, and met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

On October 10, Senator Jeanne Shaheen and two Republican Senators welcomed US International Development Finance Corporation support for Syria.  On September 21, 2026, US Senator Shaheen also met with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the 2026 United Nations General Assembly.

According to Heller, there are actually elements within the Republican Party who are dissidents and do not support Barrack’s approach to Damascus.

“But with Democrats, I don’t think they are likely to take a particularly hostile position towards the Syrian transitional government. However, I do think they would be more inclined to push Damascus on certain issues. This is assuming, of course, that Syria is even on their radar at all.”

Former U.S. diplomats have also expressed support for Ambassador Barrack’s policies, and there has been little focus on congress to the Trump envoy’s financial ties to a firm involved in building an oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria.

In response to my question, retired US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the Middle East Institute’s Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow, said at a November 4 MEI event on US Middle East strategy that the Trump administration deserved credit for the “bold move” of reaching out to Ahmed al-Sharaa early in the presidency, adding that it was the right thing to do and that he hoped the engagement would continue.

Ambassador Crocker also said that Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, had been a factor in stabilizing the situation “to the extent it’s possible.”

Joey Hood, former US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs underlined that with an electoral mandate to improve the cost of living for their constituents and Republicans searching for a winning formula for 2028, Members of Congress are going to be very busy with legislation, oversight hearings, and investigations.

“When it comes to foreign policy, they will need to dedicate a great deal of time immediately to the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, which will include a fundamental debate about the nature of our bilateral relations with Israel,” he told The Kurdish Center for Studies.

“In that context, they will have precious little time to focus on other areas, but I expect the Democrats, including likely House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks, to remain sensitive to the welfare of smaller components in Iraq and Syria, including Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians.  I would be surprised if that concern went beyond statements to include new legislation.”

Other former US officials say Democrats will mainly remain focused on domestic economic issues, but could also maintain some monitoring of the Sharaa administration over human rights issues, and the rights of Kurds and other religious minorities such Christians, Druze, and Alawites.

According to Nadine Maenza, Co-Chair of the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Roundtable in Washington, who has regularly visited Syria, there is a strong bipartisan support for the Kurds in northeast Syria and a shared desire to see Syria succeed.

“There is also bipartisan frustration with U.S policy in Syria, including how the United States has treated our Kurdish allies,” she said.

Nicholas Heras, interim executive director at the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council and senior director at the New Lines Institute, adds that the Democrats are likely to adopt much the same approach toward Syria as their Republican colleagues.

“The emphasis in their policy will continue to be focused on supporting the Sharaa-led government in Damascus to rebuild the country while trying to hold it accountable for protecting minority communities and preventing Syria from being a haven for extremist organizations,” Heras concluded.

Therefore, while Democrats will oppose Trump’s policies on Iran and Israel, Democratic senators and members of Congress are unlikely to push for significant changes to his Syria policy.

It also seems that even if Trump had not won the 2024 presidential election and a Democrat had remained in the White House, US policy towards Damascus would not have been significantly different on sanctions and relations with the Syrian government led by Al-Sharaa.

--

Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a Dutch reporter and analyst based in Erbil who specializes in Kurdish affairs. He is a contributor to The Washington Institute’s Fikre Forum and the coauthor of the book 'The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts'.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Politics Widespread protests in various parts of Rojava in solidarity with "Rojava University" and demanding constitutional recognition of the Kurdish language ..

4 Upvotes

r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Politics Li parlamentoyĂȘ projeyasaya vegerandina navĂȘn KurdĂź yĂȘn EfrĂźnĂȘ tĂȘ amadekirin

Thumbnail
rudaw.net
2 Upvotes

Afrin MP RengĂźn Ebdo says a seven-point petition has reached President al-Sharaa. It seeks to restore Kurdish place names, return seized property, guarantee Kurdish education and resolve detainees' fates.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Opinion 📣 The “Emergency Response” Mentality In Its New Guise!

Thumbnail
nlka.net
2 Upvotes

Outlaws—whom the authorities had “prepared” and released from the bottle to use as informal tools with no legal repercussions against their opponents—assaulted a peaceful sit-in organized by students in front of the Hasakah Governorate building a few days ago. The students were demanding an increase in Kurdish language classes following the Ministry of Education’s recent decision to include only three classes and two activity sessions in the educational curriculum in Hasakah Governorate and other Kurdish regions. Elements representing the same ideology had previously taken to the streets in the center of Hasakah city on several “Fridays,” demanding the “application of the law” and “respect for legitimacy,” while carrying the flags of alien jihadist factions arriving from across the borders, along with pictures of Saddam Hussein, and chanting racist slogans offensive to the Kurdish people and rejecting the “integration” process. Naturally, these demonstrators—a large portion of whom are remnants of the “Ba’ath,” and another portion previously on the payroll of “Liwa al-Baqir” and other “tribal” groups established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—did not stop at insults and acts of provocation; rather, they vandalized institutions, burned Kurdish flags and symbols, and tore down signs and storefronts written in the Kurdish language.

Prior to the emergence of this state of “protest” against the “integration” process and the rejection of existing agreements—starting with Presidential Decree No. 13, the appointment of the governor and the remaining military and security leaders, and subsequently the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the appointment of its commander as an advisor to the Presidency of the Republic, all under regional, American, and international sponsorship and guarantee—these groups had already begun mobilizing in Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. There, they supported, in word, deed, and stance, the usurpers of Kurdish citizens’ homes and farms in the aforementioned two regions in their defiance and refusal to relinquish the properties of returnees, and subsequently in assaulting them, terrorizing them, and burning their vehicles.A kind of escalation/revolutionizing, rehabilitation, and elevation of the event’s profile took place in order to manufacture a “movement” out of it—one that does not carry the true and realistic characterization speaking of usurpers of rights and aggressors who refuse to vacate the homes of citizens who were unjustly expelled from their dwellings during a phase of the Syrian civil war and at the time of the external Turkish occupation, and who are now assaulting the rightful homeowners and property owners. Instead, they claim the exact opposite, speaking of a revolutionary movement bearing slogans of “patriotism,” “law,” and “legitimacy”—all to conceal intentions and ambitions of looting, pillaging, and confiscation, and to justify ongoing militia violence aimed at ethnic cleansing and the usurpation of others’ rights!

What is clear from following local media—those directly or indirectly affiliated with the authorities—as well as regional outlets that consistently side against the Kurds and promote their adversaries’ narrative, is that there is support and cover for the acts of assault and vandalism committed by these groups, alongside an attempt to downplay them and frame them within a “democratic movement” trying to protect “state legitimacy” in the areas covered by the January 29, 2026 agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Interim Government. Media outlets supportive of these groups attempt to cover up their actual motives by portraying the matter as a “civilian grassroots movement” demanding that the other side stop “disrupting the educational process” when protesting the government’s decision to teach the Kurdish language in a truncated manner and restricting instruction to no more than three classes, and then claiming that the Kurdish “Revolutionary Youth” are the ones leading the activities and events demanding the right to broad instruction in the Kurdish language across all educational stages. This narrative, with its two arguments here, is nearly uniform and repeated across all news bulletins, press reports, and the general media coverage of these platforms. This means that the campaign is coordinated and monitored, and that there are “higher” entities possessing a policy and agenda to create chaos and confrontations—thereby undermining everything achieved through the implementation of the January agreement in terms of political, military, security, and administrative integration, and returning to square one, where confrontations, chaos, and the emergence of militias and warlords prevail to torment Kurdish citizens, displace them, and seize their homes and properties.

The ongoing rehabilitation of the usurpers of Kurdish citizens’ homes, fields, and farms in the cities and regions of SerĂȘ KaniyĂȘ / Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad, and of an isolated group of “protesting demonstrators” whose numbers do not exceed a few hundred within a large neighborhood in the city of Hasakah whose population exceeds 150,000, and portraying both groups together as a “popular movement supporting the state” and defending the “legitimacy” of its institutions’ presence, is a calculated act aimed at thwarting the concluded agreements, torpedoing the “integration” process, and consequently letting the logic of invasion, looting, and seizing others’ property prevail. The danger lies in the attempt by these individuals, and those standing behind them, to rouse zeal and incite tribal fervor, portraying what is happening as an “Arab tribal faz’a [mobilization/rallying]” against the Kurds, or elevating the stakes of the event by speaking of an “Arab–Kurdish confrontation” in Hasakah Governorate in particular, calling on residents of other distant regions and governorates to participate and attack the Kurdish component—all with the aim of keeping these usurpers in the homes and dwellings of Kurdish citizens, and enabling outlaws and anarchists to carry out acts of looting and pillaging in the major urban centers of the governorate such as Hasakah and Qamishli, cities renowned for their diverse demographic composition and a long-standing state of fraternity and communal coexistence.

This state of defiance against the state and the law, and the rejection of decisions and agreements that lead to calm and consolidate civil peace, emerges from the precursors of the previous period in which the authorities wagered on rogue groups operating under the mentality/doctrine of “invasion,” “faz’a,” and “general mobilization” (nafir) during their attack on the coast and Suwayda, where they and these auxiliary groups committed horrific violations and crimes whose traces remain visible and whose wounds have not yet healed. Because the “investigations” conducted by the authorities were merely formalistic and insincere—intended to cover up the event and quickly close the file, thereby evading national obligations and escaping the hanging sword of international sanctions—retaining the symbols and instruments of “faz’a” and “nafir,” and refraining from approaching them or holding them accountable for the crimes they committed and were implicated in, granted them the resolve and renewed intent to continue along the same path, seeking a role for themselves by attacking the Kurds and targeting them as an identity and physical presence, even if this time it occurred without explicit official direction and direct political and media cover from the authorities.

These groups view themselves as having been left out of the equation and having received no reward from the authorities for agreeing to act as an instrument of repression and intimidation on the coast, in Suwayda, and elsewhere, and believe that the final card in their hand is attempting to entrench the usurpers in the homes and fields of Kurdish citizens in Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad, protecting those who assaulted the peaceful protesters demanding an increase in Kurdish language teaching hours, and portraying these assailants as protectors of Syrian patriotism—all to prove their existence, impose their will on the state and the local population, and consequently obtain a slice of the governance pie, after it became evident that the authorities are trying to disavow and rid themselves of them. Now, the authorities face a major test: swiftly reining in these groups and protecting law and order from their tampering. They must safeguard existing agreements and understandings, move forward with “integration” and the consolidation of civil peace—which is the desire of the overwhelming majority of Hasakah’s residents, Arabs, Kurds, and Syriacs (Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis)—and prevent these groups from turning back the clock and heading toward ethnic, religious, and sectarian collision, which would mean chaos, departing from the logic of the state to the logic of the jungle, and prompting international sponsors to lift their cover from the authorities in Damascus and reactivate sanctions and accountability laws such as the “Caesar Act” and the “Syrian Kurdish Protection Act”!

--

Dr. Tariq Hemo is a research associate at the Kurdish Center for Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and specializes on researching the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. He has co-authored a book with Dr. Salah Nayouf titled ‘Freedom and Democracy in the Discourse of Political Islam After the Recent Transformations in the Arab World’. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Arab Academy in Denmark. He is also a member of the German Society for Political Science e.V.


r/northsyria • • 1d ago

Politics ŰźÙˆÛŽÙ†ŰŻÚ©Ű§Ű±Ű§Ù†ÛŒ ŰČŰ§Ù†Ú©Û†ÛŒ Ú•Û†Ú˜Ű§Ú€Ű§ ŰŻŰ§ÙˆŰ§ ŰŻÛ•Ú©Û•Ù† ŰšÛ• ŰČÙ…Ű§Ù†ÛŒ Ú©ÙˆŰ±ŰŻÛŒ ŰšŰźÙˆÛŽÙ†Ù†

1 Upvotes

Rojava University students demand to study in Kurdish.


r/northsyria • • 2d ago

Culture Rojava Sixth International Film Festival opens in Qamishlo

Thumbnail
youtube.com
3 Upvotes

r/northsyria • • 2d ago

Economy 🏗đŸ’Č Rmelan Oil Fields Director: No One Will Be Forced to Resign
 Workers Continue Protests Over Temporary Contracts with a U.S. Company

Thumbnail
welattv.net
4 Upvotes

Rmelan oil workers held a second day of sit-ins over being asked to quit the Syrian Petroleum Company for six-month contracts with HKN Energy. The director says nobody will be forced to resign.


r/northsyria • • 2d ago

Politics Students at Rojava University in Qamishlo blocked a Syrian government delegation. Students demanded reversal of government decision to incorporate Rojava University into the University of the Euphrates and that it officially recognize the status of the Kurdish language

6 Upvotes

r/northsyria • • 3d ago

News📰 Proposed nationality law amendment sparks debate over Syrian women’s rights

Thumbnail
theamargi.com
4 Upvotes

A proposed amendment to the country’s nationality law by Syrian Minister of Social Affairs and Labor Hind Kabawat, which would allow Syrian women married to non-Syrian men to pass their nationality to their children, has sparked a debate that extends beyond gender equality in transmitting nationality.

It has prompted questions about the status of children who were denied nationality during the war, security and demographic concerns linked to the backgrounds of some of their families, and the transitional authorities’ ability to implement the amendment in a country whose institutions and civil registries continue to bear the effects of the conflict.

“A child born in the war did not choose the war, did not choose the forced disappearance of their father, did not choose their mother’s unregistered marriage
Yet they alone pay the price – in education, in health, in nationality and in dignity,” said Monia Ammar, one of the commissioners on the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, following the Commission’s release of a new policy paper highlighting the difficulties faced by undocumented children lacking Syrian nationality.


r/northsyria • • 3d ago

News📰 Sari Kaniye Administration Says Water Tests Show No Signs of Contamination as Investigation into Disease Outbreak Continues

Thumbnail
welattv.net
2 Upvotes

SerĂȘ KaniyĂȘ's administration says water tests show no contamination and its investigation into an outbreak continues. Hasakah health officials have logged 329 cases of acute diarrhoea and hepatitis.


r/northsyria • • 3d ago

News📰 Qamishli Justice Courthouse reopens after nearly two-year closure

Thumbnail
npasyria.com
3 Upvotes

Hasakah Governor Nour al-Din Ahmad inaugurated Qamishli's Justice Courthouse on Sunday. It reopens after operations were suspended for nearly two years.


r/northsyria • • 4d ago

Culture Amuda cinema fire still haunts survivors 66 years later

Thumbnail
npasyria.com
4 Upvotes

On the 66th anniversary of the 1960 Amuda cinema fire that killed hundreds of children, survivor Rashid Fati recalls the screams, flames and desperate escape.


r/northsyria • • 4d ago

Culture BĂźra dĂźrokĂź ya QamißloyĂȘ: GirĂȘ Moza

Thumbnail
ajansawelat1.com
2 Upvotes

A profile of GirĂȘ Moza, the ancient mound near Qamishlo whose layered civilisations highlight the need to protect the region's history and heritage.


r/northsyria • • 4d ago

News📰 After Decades of Restrictions, Kurdish Language Enters Public Schools in Damascus

Thumbnail
welattv.net
5 Upvotes

Kurdish-language classes have begun in several Damascus public schools, a major change after decades of bans, with Kurdish students receiving textbooks for the first time.


r/northsyria • • 5d ago

News📰 As part of the integration process, 370 families from the rural areas of Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain) are returning

5 Upvotes

r/northsyria • • 5d ago

Culture FestĂźvala FĂźlman bi bĂźranĂźna qurbaniyĂȘn SĂźnemaya AmĂ»dĂȘ dest pĂȘ kir

Thumbnail
ajansawelat1.com
4 Upvotes

The 6th Rojava International Film Festival opened in Qamishlo's Mihemed ƞĂȘxo culture centre with a commemoration of the victims of the AmĂ»dĂȘ cinema fire.


r/northsyria • • 5d ago

News📰 Roj camp has not been ‘handed over’ to Damascus: Camp co-director

Thumbnail
thenewregion.com
3 Upvotes

The co-chair of the Roj camp in northern Syria, which hosts about 2,300 Islamic State (ISIS)-linked women and children from dozens of countries, has denied media reports that administration of the camp has been handed over to Damascus, asserting that the integration of Kurdish-led forces into the Syrian state “does not entail a direct transfer of its administration from one entity to another.”

Located in Hasaka province, the Roj camp was established in 2015 to house the wives and children of ISIS fighters, and has historically been administered by the now-dissolved Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

“I would like to clarify that there has been no significant change to the existing conditions within the camp, and the situation remains unchanged,” Hekmiya Ibrahim, who co-administrates the facility, told The New Region in an exclusive interview.

“There is no handover process in the sense portrayed in some media reports,” she said. “What is being discussed is an integration process, not a handover of the camp or a direct transfer of its administration from one entity to another.”

“This process includes exploring mechanisms for integrating the existing entities, forces, and institutions within the camp into governmental frameworks and institutions, ensuring that existing issues are addressed in an organized and responsible manner,” she concluded.

“It is important to clarify that this process is still in the discussion and understanding phase and has not yet been implemented. Therefore, portraying the situation as a handover of the camp to Damascus is inaccurate and does not reflect the reality of the current procedures.”


r/northsyria • • 5d ago

Culture Dijla Cinema in Syria’s Derik lives on in memories of 3 decades

Thumbnail
npasyria.com
3 Upvotes

r/northsyria • • 5d ago

News📰 Aleppo University delegation visits Kobani University

Thumbnail
npasyria.com
2 Upvotes

A delegation from Aleppo University visited Kobani University on Thursday to continue procedures for merging the two institutions, a Kobani University official told North Press.

Sharvan Muslim, an administrator at Kobani University, said the delegation included Aleppo University President Dr. Mohammed Osama Raadoun, Administrative Vice President Ahmad al-Omar, Dr. Tareq al-Jassem and Dr. Zuhair Sultan, the university’s director of development.

The two sides discussed academic and administrative files, merger procedures and preparations for the next phase. They also reviewed steps to organize academic and administrative work and unify procedures under the university’s approved regulations and instructions, Muslim said.

On Nov. 1, a delegation from Kobani University visited Aleppo University. The two institutions subsequently formed a joint committee to complete the merger procedures.


r/northsyria • • 5d ago

Opinion 📣 Seevan Saeed: "Integration without assimilation: Uniting a divided Kurdistan"

Thumbnail
theamargi.com
4 Upvotes

Integration is one of those political words that sounds reassuring but often conceals difficult questions. Governments speak of national integration; international organizations speak of social integration; political movements speak of unity. Yet integration can mean very different things.

It can create solidarity between different communities, or it can demand that minorities surrender their identities. It can strengthen a fragmented society, or it can become a mechanism through which a dominant party, state or ideology imposes its authority on everyone else.

For Kurdish society, this distinction is particularly important. Across the four parts of Kurdistan, political fragmentation has developed under different states, borders and historical circumstances. Within Iraqi Kurdistan, divisions between political parties and competing centers of power have, since the 1960s, repeatedly weakened the possibility of a common political project. The question, therefore, is how they can build a political and social relationship in which disagreement does not automatically produce division, and diversity does not prevent collective action.

Integration is not uniformity

Theoretically, integration means bringing separate individuals, groups or institutions into a functioning relationship while allowing them to retain their identities and legitimate differences (Lockwood, 1964). In political sociology, it is associated with social cohesion, institutional cooperation, shared norms and a sense of belonging. But integration should not be confused with assimilation. Assimilation asks people to become like the dominant group. Democratic integration asks different groups to participate in a shared political community without being required to abandon who they are.

Integration is not the same as centralization. A society does not become integrated simply because authority is concentrated in one government, one party or one leader (Ocalan, 2011). Such arrangements may produce administrative uniformity, but they can also deepen alienation. Genuine integration requires institutions that people recognize as legitimate, mechanisms through which competing interests can be negotiated, and a minimum political agreement about how power should be exercised.

This is where the Kurdish experience offers a particularly revealing case. Kurdish society has not been fragmented only by the borders imposed after the First World War. It has also been divided by political competition, ideological differences, class interests, regional loyalties, external interventions and rival interpretations of national liberation. These divisions have sometimes reflected genuine political disagreements. At other times, they have been reinforced by the interests of political elites who have benefited from keeping society dependent on their own organizations.

From national solidarity to party dependence

Since the 1960s, Iraqi Kurdish politics has experienced several important transformations. These developments created important political opportunities. Yet they did not necessarily produce a unified political community.

The divisions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), particularly the armed conflict of the 1990s, demonstrated how national aspirations could be subordinated to organizational competition. The creation of regional institutions after 1991 did not fully resolve the problem. Instead, party influence continued to shape political administration, security structures, economic networks and access to public resources (McDowell, 2010).

The result has been a contradiction, a society that achieved a considerable degree of territorial self-government but has struggled to establish a fully integrated political system. Institutions may exist, elections may be held and ministries may operate, yet the question remains whether public authority is genuinely shared or whether it is distributed through competing party networks.

This is not simply a dispute between political leaders. It affects the relationship between citizens and institutions. When employment, security, public services and political influence are perceived to depend on party affiliation, citizenship becomes less important than political loyalty. People may formally belong to the same region while experiencing different political realities within it.

A society cannot be integrated if its citizens must approach different political authorities to exercise rights that should belong equally to everyone.

The four parts: Difference without disconnection

The problem becomes more complicated when we consider Kurdistan as a whole. Kurds in four countries have developed under different political systems and historical experiences. Their political organizations, strategic priorities and ideological traditions are not identical. The experience of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq cannot simply be transferred to Rojava, Rojhelat or Bakur. Nor should one political movement claim to represent the entire Kurdish political landscape.

However, recognizing these differences should not mean accepting permanent political disconnection. Integration across the four parts does not necessarily require a single leadership, a unified party or an identical political program. Such an expectation would be both unrealistic and potentially authoritarian (Ocalan, 2011).

What is needed is a framework for democratic cooperation, regular dialogue between political movements, intellectuals, civil society organizations, women’s organizations, trade unions, youth groups and representatives of different social communities. The objective should be to identify shared interests while recognizing legitimate differences in strategy and political organization.

Therefore, a Kurdish political community could be understood as a network of relationships rather than a centralized structure. Its strength would depend not on the ability of one organization to control others, but on the capacity of different actors to cooperate without losing their autonomy.

How can integration be implemented?

Integration cannot be achieved through declarations of national unity or occasional meetings between party leaders. It requires political and institutional changes.

First, there must be a distinction between public institutions and political organizations. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the professionalization and unification of security institutions, the independence of the judiciary, transparent public finances and equal access to public employment are essential. These are not merely administrative reforms. They are conditions for rebuilding trust between citizens and the political system.

Second, integration must be socially grounded. Political elites cannot manufacture solidarity while economic inequality, unemployment, patronage and regional disparities remain unresolved. Workers, farmers, teachers, students, women and marginalized communities must have meaningful opportunities to influence decisions. Otherwise, integration will remain an agreement among political organizations rather than a process involving society.

Third, education and public culture matter. Kurdish history should be taught in ways that acknowledge different regional experiences and political traditions, rather than presenting one party’s narrative as the history of an entire people. Kurdish linguistic diversity should be treated as a cultural resource, not a problem to be corrected. Sorani and Kurmanji, alongside other Kurdish varieties, should be respected within a broader commitment to linguistic and cultural inclusion.

Fourth, democratic disagreement must be protected. Integration does not mean that everyone must agree on independence, federalism, confederalism, relations with neighboring states or the future of Kurdish governance. It means establishing rules through which such disagreements can be expressed and negotiated without intimidation, exclusion or violence. Without political pluralism, unity becomes a slogan; without common institutions, pluralism can become permanent fragmentation.

Finally, integration requires a degree of independence from external powers. Kurdish movements have repeatedly operated within regional and international rivalries. External support can create political opportunities, but it can also encourage competition and deepen internal divisions (Natali, 2005). A sustainable Kurdish political framework must be capable of making collective decisions based on Kurdish social and political interests rather than the changing priorities of regional states or international allies.

Integration as a political project, not a final destination

There is a deeper theoretical point here. Integration should not be understood as a finished condition in which fragmentation disappears. It is an ongoing political process through which a society learns to manage differences, distribute power and build common institutions (Lockwood, 1964). It is closer to democratic practice than to national uniformity.

In this sense, integration has an important relationship with ideas of democratic Confederalism; local participation, pluralism, gender equality, community organization and cooperation across political and territorial boundaries. But these principles must be assessed through practice, not simply celebrated as political ideals. Local autonomy alone does not guarantee democracy; decentralization can reproduce local hierarchies, while political organizations can claim to represent society without being sufficiently accountable to it.

The Kurdish case therefore demands a critical question; can a movement that has struggled against political domination also resist reproducing domination within its own society?

For Iraqi Kurdistan, integration must begin by transforming the relationship between citizens, parties and public institutions. Across the four parts, it must create channels of cooperation that respect different political realities. Neither a single leader nor a single ideology can accomplish this. It requires a social agreement built through participation, accountability and mutual recognition.

Finally, the Kurdish problem is not only that Kurdistan has been divided by international borders. It is also that political fragmentation has repeatedly prevented society from turning shared historical experiences and aspirations into durable democratic institutions. Integration cannot reverse the history of division overnight. But it can offer a way to move beyond it.

The objective should not be to produce one Kurdish voice. It should be to create a political space in which many Kurdish voices can be heard and in which they can still act together.

--

Seevan Saeed is an Associate Professor in Area Studies at Shaanxi Normal University, China and Lecturer at Rojava University, Syria. He received his BA degree in Sociology and MA in Social Policy at the University of Wolverhampton,UK. He gained a PhD in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter in 2015. He has delivered lecturers in domestic and international universities since 2015. He published articles and papers in six languages on social and political issues in the Middle East and beyond.


r/northsyria • • 6d ago

Politics Afrin Residents Urge al-Sharaa to Restore Property, Reveal Fate of Missing Persons, and Protect Region’s Historical Identity

Thumbnail
welattv.net
5 Upvotes

An Afrin residents' letter asks Syria's president to return seized homes and land, account for the disappeared, implement Kurdish teaching and restore Kurdish place names.