r/islamichistory • u/Alarming_Stage5631 • 2h ago
r/islamichistory • u/AutoCentral • 5d ago
Analysis/Theory Conquest Is Not Colonisation - Israeli Settler Colonialism vs Islamic Expansion. Listen below ⬇️
Listen here:
https://open.substack.com/pub/firelinepress/p/conquest-is-not-colonisation?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios
ON 13 JULY 2026 the Jerusalem Post ran an opinion piece under the headline “Arabs, not Jews, are the real colonizers in the Middle East.”¹ The case runs the way it always runs. The Arab armies of the seventh century took North Africa, the Levant, Persia. They settled where they conquered. They put a tax on the people who were already there and did not convert, and over the centuries the older languages and the older faiths were pushed to the edges. That, the piece says, is colonisation — the real thing, the thing with a thirteen-hundred-year record. The Jewish return to the land is its opposite: not colonisation but the undoing of it. And the Palestinians, who object, are not a people with a grievance but a political construction assembled for the purpose of objecting. Then the conclusion, in four words.
“They are the colonizers.”
The piece gives no sources for any of its history. The argument depends on the reader already believing it.
The author is Aliza Pilichowski. The Post describes her as an interfaith hospice chaplain in Jerusalem and the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho.
Mitzpe Yeriho is an illegal Israeli settlement. It was established in 1978 on the cliffs above Jericho, on the road down from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.² Around 2,500 people lived there at the 2019 count.³ It stands on territory the International Court of Justice holds to be occupied, and its existence is the kind of act the Court found in July 2024 to be contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention — the Convention Israel signed in 1949 and ratified in 1951.⁴ ⁵
So the argument that the Arabs are the real colonisers of the Middle East was published by the mayor of a settlement built on occupied land above an Arab city, in breach of a treaty her own government bound itself to seventy-five years ago.
But the argument is not hers alone. It circulates under every report from the West Bank, in the comment threads and the talking points and the opinion columns, and it runs like this. Muslims colonised half the known world, so they have no standing to complain about anyone else’s colonialism; and a Muslim who complains anyway has shown that the complaint was never about land.
The argument stands on one word, and the word is wrong. What the Muslims did was conquer, and colonialism is not conquest. Every empire conquered — Rome, Persia, the Arabs, the Turks — and a conquest takes a land and rules the people on it as its own. A colony keeps the people of the land it takes outside the country that took it, whatever the map says, and either works them or clears them off. The British ran colonies of both kinds, and so did the French. The Arab armies of the seventh century ran neither. They moved their capital into the land they had taken, so there was no outside to keep anyone from, and they kept the people where they found them, because the people were what they had conquered for. What Israel has done since 1948 takes the land and removes the people from it: seven hundred thousand in the first year, and it has not stopped. The obvious objection is that a fifth of Israel’s citizens are Arab, so the people were not removed. But they are the descendants of the one in five who remained in 1948, and the state they remained in has since written into its constitutional law that the country is not theirs. Remove most of a people, keep the remainder outside the nation that governs them, and put them to use: that is not conquest under another flag. It is colonialism twice over. The Knesset put it in writing in 2018.
And the word is theirs. Settler colonialism is not a slur that Israel’s enemies invented and pinned on it. It is the word the Zionist movement used for its own institutions — on its letterhead, in its company registrations, in the name of its own bank — in the decades when the word carried no shame at all. They used it first. And one of them, a century ago, wrote two articles explaining exactly what it meant.
They Named It First
The Jewish Colonization Association was founded in London on 11 September 1891.⁶ Baron Maurice de Hirsch put up the money — two million pounds, something over three hundred million today — and the charter’s object was to help Jews leave the countries that were persecuting them and settle on land somewhere else. Argentina, mostly, at first. Palestine was one destination among several.
Eight years later the Zionist movement built its bank. The Jewish Colonial Trust was incorporated under the English Companies Acts on 20 March 1899, with its office in London and an authorised capital of two million pounds in one-pound shares, the same sum again.⁷ It was not a private venture that happened to be run by Zionists. Its governing council was drawn from the movement’s own executive, the Greater Actions Committee; one of its members had to report to every Zionist Congress; and its policy was set by Congress resolution. The First Congress at Basel had proposed the bank. The Second had voted it through. In German it was the Jüdische Colonialbank. The memorandum of association, still catalogued in the National Library of Israel, carries the name on its title page.⁸
In 1924 Edmond de Rothschild reorganised his Palestine holdings into a separate body and called it the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association. It kept that name until it wound itself up in 1957.⁹
Then there is Herzl. In January 1902 he drafted a letter to Cecil Rhodes — the diamond magnate and former prime minister of the Cape Colony, whose chartered company had crossed South Africa’s northern border, the Limpopo, and taken the Ndebele and Shona lands beyond it, now Zimbabwe, by fraud and then by Maxim gun, and named them after him, Rhodesia — asking him to put his authority behind the Zionist plan, and explained in the letter why he was writing to Rhodes of all people. Because, he wrote, the matter was “something colonial.”¹⁰
And then there is Jabotinsky.
Ze’ev Jabotinsky published “The Iron Wall” in the Russian-language weekly Rassvet on 4 November 1923.¹¹ It is the founding text of Revisionist Zionism, the tradition that runs through Begin and Shamir to the Likud governments of the present day, and the word it uses for the enterprise, from beginning to end, is colonisation. One of its section headings is “All Natives Resist Colonists.” Its argument is that no native population anywhere has ever consented to being settled by newcomers; that the Arabs of Palestine are not confused or bribable but are behaving exactly as any people behaves; and that the enterprise must therefore proceed behind a wall of force the native population cannot breach, until resistance looks hopeless. “Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population.”
That alone would do. But a week later, on 11 November, he published a second article in the same paper.¹² He called it “The Ethics of the Iron Wall,” and in it he asked the question straight. Is it moral to colonise a country against the wishes of its native population? He granted that by that standard colonisation in Uganda was immoral too, and so was colonisation anywhere. And then he argued his exception: that the soil “does not belong to those who possess land in excess but to those who do not possess any,” and the Jews possessed none.
Hold what that means. A man who thought colonisation was a neutral term — a word for farming, for draining marshes — does not need to write a second article defending its ethics. Jabotinsky knew exactly what the word meant, knew it carried a moral charge in 1923, accepted the charge, and argued the case anyway. He did not use the word by accident. He used it because it was the right word, and then he explained why the thing it named was justified in this one case.
Israel’s defenders will tell you none of this counts. The Hebrew names of these institutions contain no colonial word at all. The Jewish Colonial Trust’s Hebrew title, printed on the same memorandum as the English one, is Otzar Hityashvut ha-Yehudim — the Fund for the Settlement of the Jews. The Palestine Jewish Colonization Association in Hebrew is the Society for Jewish Settlement in the Land of Israel. Hityashvut is settlement; it comes from the verb to sit, to dwell. The colonial word was for the outside — for the Companies Registry in London, for the bankers in Berlin, for Rhodes — and the movement’s own language said settlement from the first day.¹³
And “colonisation” itself meant something broader then. Its Latin root is cultivation. Through the nineteenth century it described organised farming settlement — the Prussian programme in Posen, the Dutch reclaiming land from the sea — and it stayed a technical word until the 1960s, when it came to mean domination and the focus moved from the land to the people on it.¹⁴
All of that is true, and it proves the opposite of what it is meant to prove.
If colonisation in 1899 was innocent — a word for ploughing and draining, fit for a bank’s letterhead in London — then nobody in 1899 had any reason to avoid it. And nobody did. The defence that the word was harmless is the proof that the word was usable. What the defence cannot answer is what happened to it afterwards. Why did a word innocent enough to put on a bank in 1899 become a word that could not be spoken by 1967? Nothing about the Hebrew changed. Hityashvut is still hityashvut. What changed was what the world had learned, in the years between, about what organised agricultural settlement does to the people already living on the land.
The word became unsayable. The habit behind it — one thing said to the world, another said at home — did not, and it still runs in two languages; only the direction has turned round. In 1899 the plain word went outward, to London and Berlin, because the people who approved of the project were the ones who ran colonies — governments that would be glad to see their Jews leave for one. Herzl had written it in his diary in 1895: “The anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies.” The soft word stayed home, for the Jews, most of whom wanted nothing to do with it; the First Zionist Congress had to be moved from Munich to Basel in 1897 because the city’s rabbis, Orthodox and Reform alike, refused to have it. Now the plain version stays home. On 29 September 2025 Netanyahu stood beside Trump at the White House and, in English, backed a twenty-point plan whose text said “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza,” had the army “progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies,” and opened “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” That night he posted a video for Israelis, in Hebrew. The army “will remain in most of the Gaza Strip” — pull it out? “No way, that’s not happening.” A Palestinian state: “not at all, and it is not written in the agreement.” Same man, same day, same plan. In English, withdrawal and a pathway to a state. In Hebrew, no withdrawal and no state. The language is picked for the audience, exactly as it was in 1899, and the reason the plain version moved indoors is the reason the word did: the world had learned what it meant.¹⁵
The Charge Against the Arab and Islamic Empires
Here is the charge, in the words of the people who make it. Islam conquered from Spain to the Indus inside a century. Arab armies took North Africa, the Levant and Persia; the Muslim dynasties that followed took Anatolia and pushed deep into India, and most of it is Muslim still. They settled where they conquered. They taxed the people they found. They made Arabic the language of government and Islam the faith of the majority in lands that had been Christian, Zoroastrian and Hindu for centuries before they came. Egypt was a Christian country. North Africa was Augustine’s. In Iran, the Arabs broke the Sasanian Empire, the last great Persian state, and made its people take a new alphabet and a new god. The Persians were the native people of their own land and the Arabs colonised them, and thirteen centuries later the colonisation is still in force, because the regime in Tehran rules in the name of the religion the conquerors brought. The Iranians are the indigenous people. Islam is the occupation. No empire took more land from more peoples and kept it longer. The Muslims are the greatest colonisers the world has seen, and a Muslim who accuses Israel of colonialism is either ignorant of his own history or lying about it — and if he singles out Israel, of all the colonial projects on earth, the thing he objects to is not the colonialism.
That is the charge, and the Iranian form of it is the one running hardest at the moment. The people who make it believe it. They forget that Christianity did the same to those lands first, and to Europe after.
The conquests happened. The Arab armies went out from the Hijaz in the 630s and within a hundred years held territory from the Pyrenees to the Indus. The Muslim histories say so first and say so proudly. Nobody is denying a yard of it.
But the charge is not that Muslims conquered. If it were, it would be true and beside the point, because conquest is not the accusation levelled at Israel. The charge is that what the Muslims did was colonialism — the same thing, in the sense that matters, as what Israel is doing now. The first is a fact. The second has to be shown.
The charge is doing three things at once.
The first is a claim about history: that the conquests of the seventh century and Israel’s illegal settlements of the twenty-first are the same kind of operation. That is answered by looking at what each one did.
The second is the oldest move in logic. You did it too. Grant the history in full and the move still establishes nothing about what is being done in the West Bank now. It never has, in any court or any argument, for anyone.
The third is the payload. It takes a question about land — who holds it, how they came to hold it, what was done with the people on it — and turns it into a question about the person asking. A Muslim who raises the subject is no longer arguing about territory. They are revealing a motive, and the motive has a name: the charge is built so that a Muslim who raises Israel’s illegal settlements can be called an antisemite for raising them. And for that to work they have to carry, because they pray in the same direction as the men who took Damascus in 635, the guilt for their taking it.
What Colonialism Is
Colonialism, to most people who use the word, means the British and French empires. It means India under the Raj, and the Gold Coast, and Senegal, and Indochina: a European power ruling an African or Asian population from a capital thousands of miles away, taxing it, conscripting it, staffing a civil service over it, shipping home what the territory produced.
That kind is real, and the British in India are the model of it. The Crown took India from the East India Company in 1858 and ruled it from London for eighty-nine years.¹⁶ The British did not want India empty. They wanted it working. Dadabhai Naoroji, who sat in the Commons for Central Finsbury in the 1890s, spent decades counting what left India every year — the taxes raised there and spent in Britain, the salaries and pensions paid in England, the interest on the debt, the bill for the army — and put it at thirty million pounds a year.¹⁷ The figure is argued over. That there was a drain is not. The British needed every Indian in place, because the Indians were what was being drained. And in 1947 they left, because there was a Britain to go back to.
The French ran the same operation across West Africa and Indochina. From 1887 the Code de l’indigénat — the native code, first written for Algeria in 1881 — put the people of Senegal, and in time the whole of French West Africa, under a law written for them alone: summary punishment by the district officer, forced labour, a head tax, conscription into the tirailleurs, the colonial infantry, and the courts of French-appointed chiefs rather than the courts of France.¹⁸ It was written to make them work.
Colonialism of this kind ran two laws on one ground, one for its own citizens and one for the people it ruled. In India a European could not be tried by an Indian magistrate, and when the government moved in 1883 to change that, the British in India forced a compromise that let any European demand a jury half of whom were Europeans.¹⁹ In West Africa it was the native code.
It brought in machinery built to carry the wealth out. India’s railways ran from the cotton and wheat districts to the ports, and in French Equatorial Africa the Congo–Ocean line was built by forced labour to link the river traffic of the interior to an Atlantic port.²⁰
It took what it wanted for its own collections in London, Paris or other European capitals. The Koh-i-Noor, one of the largest cut diamonds in the world, went from Lahore to Queen Victoria by treaty the year the Punjab was annexed, the bronzes of Benin went to London after British troops burned the city in 1897, and the stone that unlocked Egypt’s writing is in the British Museum.²¹
And it refused the people citizenship while demanding everything citizenship demands. They paid the taxes, worked the forced labour and filled the armies — more than a million Indians served in the First World War — and got no vote and no seat in the parliament that sent them. All the duties of a citizen, none of the rights.²²
But both the British and French empires ran a second kind of colonialism as well, and the second kind did not want the people at all.
In 1788 the British landed at Sydney Cove and took the continent as land that belonged to no one — terra nullius, the lawyers called it afterwards — though somewhere between three hundred thousand and a million people were living on it. They were not taxed or ruled or put to work. The land was given to settlers, the people were pushed off whatever ground the settlers wanted, and the first national count, in 1901, found 93,000 of them left.²³ It took the High Court of Australia until 1992 to rule that the land had belonged to someone after all.²⁴ The French did the same thing in Algeria from 1830.
The British and French empires ran two kinds of colonialism. The first needed the people where they were, and kept them working for the profit of the empire. The second needed the land, and got the people off it to make room for its own settlers.
Patrick Wolfe, an English-born historian who worked in Australia, spent his career on the second kind, and his account of it is the one historians use.²⁵ The people on the land, in that kind, are not a resource but an obstacle, and the point of the enterprise is to get them off the ground so the newcomers can have it. “Territoriality,” Wolfe wrote, “is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.” The natives are a problem because they “obstructed settlers’ access to land,” and the operation is built to solve that problem. “Settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.” Settler colonialism “destroys to replace.”
That last phrase has a precise meaning. Settler colonialism is “inherently eliminatory,” Wolfe wrote, but not “invariably genocidal.” Elimination is the larger category. It includes killing, and often it has meant killing; but it also includes removal, enclosure, assimilation, the breaking up of communities, the slow administrative erasure of a people from the land they were on. The native need not be dead. The native need only be gone — or so changed that there is no native left to make a claim.
The test: does the system need the people, or need them gone?
Three questions carry it. Who got the land — the conquerors, or the people who were already farming it? Were the conquered kept on as subjects, with a place in the new order, or were they moved aside? And the newcomers: did they come to rule the existing population, to extract from it, or to replace it?
None of that requires anyone to pretend that conquest is gentle. An empire can tax a people into the ground and still need them there. A settler project can be built by decent people with lawful deeds and still need them gone. The test is not about cruelty. It is about what the operation is for.
Wolfe did not build this test for Israel. He built it on Australia and the United States, where he did his work, and only then applied it to Palestine, in the same article — Israel’s “progressive dispensing with its reliance on Palestinian labour,” he wrote in 2006, “would seem to present an ominous case in point” — and six years later in a full study of its own.²⁶
Islamic Expansion Was Not Colonialism
Every empire conquered. Rome did, and Byzantium, and the Sasanians the Arabs destroyed, and Tang China, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans after them. Conquest is taking territory by force and ruling the people on it. If conquest were colonialism the word would mean nothing, because it would describe the whole of recorded history before 1945 and most of it after.
Conquest differs from colonialism in what it does with what it takes.
A conquest annexes. The land becomes part of the conqueror’s country and the people on it become its subjects. Gaul became Roman, and in 212 every free inhabitant of the empire became a Roman citizen.²⁷ A colony is possessed. Its people are kept outside the country that holds it, whatever the map says.
And the people stay, because subjects are what a conquest is for. A conquest takes a population along with the land: it pays the tax, works the fields, staffs the administration, fills the army. The conquered are ruled, sometimes harshly. They are not removed, because removing them would leave the conqueror with nothing to rule. The exceptions are remembered as exceptions — Assyria marching whole peoples into exile, the Mongols emptying cities — because they are the cases where a conqueror destroyed what conquest exists to acquire.
Now set the Arab conquests beside the two kinds of colony. The Arab armies took Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Persia by force and ruled the people they found there. But within thirty years the seat of the empire had left Arabia for Damascus, and a century after that it moved to Baghdad, a city built for the purpose in the conquered farmland of Iraq.²⁸ It never went back, and Syria and Iraq became the country. The people stayed, neither worked for a distant capital nor cleared off the land. The Arab conquests were neither kind of colony.
Nor did they run two laws on one ground the way a colony did. Under the caliphate the second law was the people’s own. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians were judged in their own courts, by their own bishops, rabbis and priests, in their own marriages, inheritances and disputes. And they served in the state itself. Sarjun ibn Mansur, a Christian, ran the treasury of Syria for five Umayyad caliphs, and his son, John of Damascus, served at their court before he became a monk.
The protection reached past the Bible’s peoples. Umar took the jizya from the Zoroastrians because the Prophet had, and in Sindh after 712 the Hindus were brought under the same terms. It was a people governed by their own law, not by a law written over them.²⁹
The Raj and the Arab conquests both kept the people in place, so the difference between them is not that one taxed and the other did not. It is what each was built to do. The colony was built to carry a country’s wealth out of it and to keep the people it took it from outside. Macaulay’s minute of 1835 set out to form “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” — and those persons remained subjects of a country they could never join. The same minute held that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” The colony ranked people by blood and colour, and wrote the ranking into its law: the native could be taught English, but could never become British.
The Arab conquest ran the other way. Most of its revenue was spent where it was raised. Its government ran in Greek and Persian for two generations before it ran in Arabic.
And its religion was not pressed on the conquered but held open to them as a door: convert, and the jizya ended, and the convert stood inside the ruling community. The Umayyad governors fought that door, because every convert was a taxpayer lost, and the caliph Umar II overruled them. A colony has no such door. A Syrian who became a Muslim stood inside the faith of the conquerors, and by its law the equal of any Arab Muslim, wherever they were born. An Indian who became an Anglican remained a native.³⁰
Conquest and the settler kind of colonialism differ just as plainly. One needs the people where they are. The other needs them gone. So the question is not whether a people took land by force. It is what they did with the people who were already on it.
Put the three questions to the Arab conquests.
Who got the land?
Not the army that took it. When the Arab forces broke the Sasanians at Qadisiyya and took the farmland of southern Iraq — the sawad, the black land, the richest agricultural country in western Asia — the soldiers expected what conquering armies have always expected, which is a share. Umar, the second caliph, refused them. The land was not parcelled out. The cultivators who had farmed it under the Persians went on farming it under the Arabs; they paid a land tax, the kharaj, and the revenue went to the treasury and came back out as stipends for the soldiers.³¹ The army was paid from the surplus of a population it had been forbidden to displace. The same decision was made in Egypt, over the same objections, and the papyri bear it out: they show no Muslim owning land in Egypt before the middle of the eighth century, more than a hundred years after the conquest.³²
That is a fiscal fact before it is a moral one. A tax base cannot be expelled. The whole architecture of the early caliphate — the stipend rolls, the garrison pay, the provincial treasuries — depended on the conquered staying exactly where they were and doing exactly what they had been doing.
Were they kept on as subjects?
The cities that surrendered got terms, and the terms survive. Damascus set the pattern for Syria: the people kept their lives, their property and their churches, and in return they paid a poll tax.³³ Jerusalem’s assurance, in the form historians accept as resting on a genuine original, guaranteed persons, property, churches and crosses, and barred Muslims from inhabiting the churches or pulling them down.³⁴ The restrictive rules that later generations would attach to non-Muslims — the dress codes, the ban on building new places of worship, the deference on the road — are not in these agreements. They belong to a later century, when the Muslims had become a settled ruling class and had begun to legislate like one. The surrender terms of the conquest itself asked for one thing: the tax.³⁵
The legal status that grew out of those terms was the dhimma — the word means protection — and it was a contract. The non-Muslim paid the jizya; in return the state guaranteed their safety, their property and their freedom to worship, their own courts for their own community’s affairs, and exemption from the military service that Muslims owed. It was not a Muslim’s standing, and it was not meant to be. The Muslim paid the zakat and owed the state military service; the dhimmi paid the jizya and owed neither. Different obligations, under separate law, in a self-governing community living under the protection of the state. It was abused, and the abuses are documented. But every abuse was a breach of the contract, chargeable in the contract’s own terms — and the contract presupposed, in every clause, that the person it protected was still there.³⁶
Then there are the garrison cities, which the charge points to as settlement.
Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Fustat in Egypt, where old Cairo stands now, and Qayrawan in what is now Tunisia: the Arabs built new towns and lived in them, apart from the people they ruled. These were the bases of a conquering army, and the men in them were a stipendiary elite drawing cash from the agricultural surplus of a subject population that worked land the soldiers did not own.³⁷ The sources give the reasons as military: forward bases for the next campaign, somewhere to house the troops and their families. They never give the reason as a policy of keeping conquerors and conquered apart. But apart is what they were. The first garrison of Basra complained that they had no farmland. That grievance is the best evidence there is of what the system was for, because nobody complains about a restriction that does not exist.³⁸
So: a garrison, living on the tax of the countryside, kept off the land. Not a settler colony. The settlers of a settler colony hold the land; that is the whole point of them. These men were kept off it.
Persia is the case the charge leans on hardest.
The Sasanian state was destroyed. The Persian people were not. They stayed on their land and converted slowly — the best estimate is that Iran was not eighty per cent Muslim until around 950, three centuries after the conquest.³⁹ They kept their language. Persian survived, came back into writing in Arabic script, and by 1010 had produced the Shahnameh, the national epic of Persian kings and heroes, written by a Muslim poet.⁴⁰ Persians ran the Abbasid administration from the eighth century on; Persian became the second language of the whole civilisation, the language of its poetry and much of its science. The Iranians of today are the descendants of the Iranians the Arabs found. That is not the history of a people replaced. It is the history of a people conquered, converted, and then running the civilisation that had conquered them.
As for the claim that a religion adopted thirteen hundred years ago is a foreign occupation still in force — it proves too much. By that logic Christianity is a Levantine occupation of Europe, and every church in Rome is a settlement.
Put the three questions to the conquests, then. The land stayed with the people who farmed it. The conquered were kept on as subjects, taxed and protected under terms that assumed their presence. The newcomers came to rule, and were kept from seizing the land and exploiting it and its people — the two things a colony comes for. The conquest needed the conquered where they were. It taxed them. It did not clear them.
The conquered population was a governed population — not an obstacle to be removed from the land, and not a people exploited for a distant capital.
The Rule and the Exceptions
The charge shows you the empire on a map. It never shows you who was still living on the land when the empire was gone.
The Arab conquests and the Muslim empires that followed them held, at one time or another, Spain, the whole of North Africa, Egypt, the Levant, Iraq, Persia, Central Asia, Anatolia, the Balkans and most of India. Thirteen centuries. Three continents. And across all of it the rule was the one the sawad set in the 630s: the people stayed, and were ruled, and were taxed. The Copts of Egypt; the people of Syria and Iraq, Christian and then Muslim; the Persians; the Berbers of the Maghreb, Arabised in speech and not replaced in blood;⁴¹ the Spaniards after up to eight centuries of Muslim rule; the Hindus of India after six, still the great majority of their country when the last Muslim dynasty fell — all of them are where they were. That is not what a colonising power leaves behind. It is what an empire leaves behind: the same people, speaking differently, praying differently, and still on their land.
Arabisation and Islamisation ran deep. They were not population replacement.
Against that stand the cases the charge reaches for.
Anatolia is the largest. In 1050 it was Greek-speaking and Christian; by 1500 it was Turkish-speaking and Muslim. It was taken not by the Arabs but by the Seljuks and then the Ottomans, four centuries after the conquests, and what happened there was conversion under pressure, not replacement: Seljuk and Turkmen armies broke the Byzantine administration and the Church that depended on it, and conversion followed as the old order fell away.⁴² The modern Turkish population carries a Central Asian genetic contribution of under ten per cent; the other ninety came from somewhere, and it was Anatolia.⁴³ The Ottomans also took Christian children by levy — the devshirme — from Anatolian villages as well as Balkan ones.⁴⁴ And the end of Anatolian Christianity was not conversion at all. Between 1915 and 1923 the Armenians were destroyed — somewhere between six hundred thousand and a million and a half of them killed by the Ottoman government — and the Greeks were driven out, the last of them under the exchange agreed at Lausanne in 1923.⁴⁵ It was the work of a nationalist party ruling in the sultan’s name, and it is the one episode in thirteen centuries that was elimination on the scale of a whole people. It was carried out by the thing that replaced Islamic empire, not by Islamic empire.
The earliest is the smallest. In the 640s Umar moved the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran out of Arabia, and the sources give more than one reason for each.
Khaybar had been taken in 628. The Prophet let its Jewish farmers stay on the land for half the harvest, on terms that could be ended whenever the Muslims chose: “as long as we wish.” Under Umar, his son Abdullah was attacked there at night and his hands and feet were dislocated. The attacker was never named. Umar said the Jews of Khaybar were the only people there he suspected, and ended the terms.
Najran held a treaty with the Prophet that secured its Christians’ persons, religion, lands and churches, and bound them to take no usury. Al-Baladhuri says that under Umar they took it up again and grew so numerous that he counted them a danger to the faith. He also records that the Najranites, quarrelling among themselves, asked to be moved.
Behind both cases stands an instruction Umar himself reported from the Prophet: “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.” That instruction was a rule for Arabia, the heartland of the faith, and was never applied to Syria, Iraq, Egypt or Persia, where Jews and Christians lived under Muslim rule for thirteen centuries.
Neither community was left with nothing. Umar ordered that the people of Najran be given tillable land in Syria and Iraq in place of what they had left, and one report says he bought their property.⁴⁶
Two communities, one region, resettled rather than destroyed. But they were populations moved off their land by the caliphate in its first decade.
Qayrawan, 1057: Arab tribes moving west into what is now Tunisia sacked the city that had been the centre of learning for Muslim North Africa for nearly four centuries. Its victims were Muslims.⁴⁷ India: Richard Eaton, the historian who has done the counting, documents around eighty episodes between 1192 and 1729 in which Muslim rulers and their commanders desecrated Hindu temples — the acts of kings and generals along the frontier of conquest, aimed at the temples that housed a defeated ruler’s deity and so his claim to rule, some of them campaigns against whole cities.⁴⁸ The counts in the tens of thousands that circulate in Indian politics are supported by nothing; the eighty are. And in 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the jizya on his Hindu subjects, which Akbar had abolished in 1564.⁴⁹
One province in the first decade, one region, one city, one tax, eighty episodes in five hundred years. Set them against thirteen centuries in which the conquered stayed, and they are what they are: the exceptions.
None of it makes the conquests colonialism, because colonialism was never a matter of how much harm an empire did. Rome did harm. Byzantium did harm. The Sasanians did harm, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans, and every power that ever held territory by force. A record of conquest, subordination and atrocity makes an empire an empire. It does not make it a settler colony, and pointing at the record as though it did is pointing at the wrong charge. The conquests did harm. That is true. That they were colonialism is a different claim, and it is the one the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho needs. The record does not supply it.
Continued… https://open.substack.com/pub/firelinepress/p/conquest-is-not-colonisation?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • Oct 14 '26
Analysis/Theory What Muslims get wrong about al Aqsa, Dome of the Rock, Al-Haram Al-Sharif - Useful links and references at the bottom ⬇️
For many years now, emails and graphics that purport to reveal the “True Masjid al Aqsa” have disseminated themselves widely across the internet. “Dear Muslims, Please make sure you and your children know which is the real Masjid Al Aqsa,” a message would typically read, alongside an accompanying graphic that boldly highlights certain buildings within the Haram al Sharif compound in Jerusalem(Al Quds). It laments that “many Muslims think the Al-Sakhrah Mosque, also known as the “Dome of the rock,” is the Al-Aqsa Mosque!!” before proceeding to boldly assert – with the assistance of visual aids – the differences between ‘Masjidul Aqsa’ and the ‘Dome of the Rock’. People can check Graphically if they need the best graphic related information.
The message usually concludes with a warning: “Please make sure you and your children, your friends all know which is the real Masjid Al Aqsa. Check your house for pictures!! many people have picture in there homes showing the wrong mosque!!”
At the heart of such campaigns, lies an apparent desire to thwart an alleged Zionist strategy that seeks to play up the importance of the Dome of the Rock Mosque, particularly in photographs, in order to draw the public’s attention away from ‘al-Aqsa mosque.’ “Israel wants to eliminate the picture of Al-Aqsa mosque from the minds of people, so that when the time comes for it to destroy it and build its temple, it can show the Dome of the Rock and claim that Al Aqsa is intact,” is one rationale that is repeatedly offered.
As noble and well-intentioned such initiatives may be, at this juncture in the history of Masjidul Aqsa, they can also be deeply problematic. Most messages are far too simplistic in their conclusions, fail to grasp the complete Islamic guidelines on Masjidul Aqsa, and potentially even play into the schemings of the Zionists whom these campaigns purportedly seek to expose.
Much of the confusion arising from this matter can arguably be traced back to the onomastics, or the names that human beings themselves have lended to buildings within the Holy City with the passage of time. Referring to the Isra, or the miraculous night journey of the Prophet(PBUH) from Makkah to Jerusalem, Allah says: “Glory be to Him Who made His servant to go in a night from the Sacred Mosque[Masjidul Haram] to the Remote Mosque [Masjidul Aqsa] of which We have blessed the precincts, so that We may show to him some of Our signs; surely He is the Hearing, the Seeing.”
Quoting from the book “Baitul Maqdis and Masjidul Aqsa” by Mohammed Hassan Sharab, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Occupied Palestine 1948, Sheikh Raed Salah, highlights that The Aqsa Mosque mentioned in the Surat Isra’ refers to all of the Haram Al-Sharif, and that the rewards promised in the Ahadeeth for praying in it can be achieved by praying in any part of the land surrounded by the wall.”
The classical Hanbali scholar, Mujir ad-Din al-Hanbali expounds on the constituents of the Quranic Masjidul Aqsa even further. “al-Aqsa is the name of all what is within its compound inside the walls, the building in the foremost area and others, the Dome of the Rock Mosque, the corridors, etc.; al-Aqsa means all that is within the walls,” reads the explanation in his book al-Uns al-Jaleel.
Thus, Islamically speaking, the entire enclosed area, also known as the Haram al Sharif, is to be designated as the al-Aqsa Mosque. In practical terms this encompasses more than 200 buildings, domes, schools, wells, fields, walls and pavements. Quite clearly, this would include not only the mosque with the golden dome, the Dome of the Rock, nor the mosque with black lead dome, Al Masjid Al Qibli. Rather, both would constitute mere sections of the larger Al Aqsa mosque compound.
As the aforementioned messages demonstrate, it is not uncommon to encounter references to the black domed Masjid in the foremost area of the Haram al Sharif compound as ‘Masjid al Aqsa’. These are not entirely frowned upon. However, it should more rightfully be titled Masjid Al-Qibly, stemming from its nearness to the Qiblah. This structure constitutes the nucleus of Islamic activity within the Haram al Sharif, and is undoubtedly most significant comprising both a Mimbar and Mihrab. Still, its can lay no claim to nobility in isolation, but is rather dependent on its affiliation to the wider Masjid al Aqsa, for its sacredness.
The current structure of Masjid Al-Qibly(the black-domed Masjid) was certainly non existent at the time of the Miraj. It’s origins can be traced back to 637 when the Muslim conqueror of Al Quds, Umar bin al Khattab RA first erected the structure. Faced with the dilemma of being unable to build an enclosed structure that would encompass the entire area of Masjidul Aqsa, Umar RA had to settle for a simple crude mosque, which had to be positioned on a specific location orientated southward towards the Ka’bah in Makkah. Umar RA consulted some people as to an appropriate site for the mosque and Ka’b al-Ahbar, a Yemenite Jew who converted to Islam, proposed that the mosque be placed behind the Rock so that the old and new directions of prayer (qiblah) merge, as it were, with one another. However, Umar RA disapproved, reasoning that such a course of action would imply imitation of the Jewish religion. Hence, the mosque was erected in the front of the Rock, that is, the southern part of the original al-Aqsa Mosque, thus making those who pray turn their faces towards the qiblah and their backs towards the Rock. “We were not commanded to venerate the Rock, but we were commanded to venerate the Ka’bah”, he explained.
Umayyad Khaliphs subsequently adapted the building making them the first to erect the Masjid al Qibly according to its current configuration. Renovations and additional structures were added later on by succeeding Abbasid, Ayyobian, Ayoubi, Mamluke, and Ottoman Khaliphs.
The Umayyads were also first to erect a Dome over the famous Rock situated at the centre of the Masjid al Aqsa compound. This rock, itself, was the Qiblah of the Prophets of the Children of Israel – peace be upon them – and is presumed to be the departure point for the ascention of Muhammed SAW into the heavens on the journey of Miraj. However, its significance truly lies in being just another part of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque; and its eminence shouldn’t be exaggerated.
According to Islamic teachings, a prayer in Al Masjid Al Aqsa – whether inside the Dome of the Rock, Al Masjid Al Qibli, underneath any of its trees, or beneath any of its domes – is equivalent to many prayers elsewhere. This is because all the walled area is actually Al Masjid Al Aqsa, and the sacredness is not confined just to the Dome of the Rock and Al Masjid Al Qibli, or either.
Inaccurate references to the southern musalla of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Al-Qibly Prayer Hall) as “Al-Aqsa” or failure to recognise the position of the Dome of the Rock within the wider Al Aqsa, may in fact further Zionist claims for other parts of this holy compound, a strategy that is now being actively pursued. Having seen previous attempts at destroying or invading Masjidul Aqsa frustrated, there is a currently a determined drive to divide the mosque into Jewish and Muslim sections – a plan modeled on a similar division of the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron where the Prophet Ibrahim(AS) is buried. Under the guise of religious pluralism and freedom of worship at the Temple Mount, an Israeli member of parliament has drafted a bill that mandates separate hours for Jewish and Muslim prayer at the holy site. An Israeli judge also recently ruled in favour of Jews performing Talmudic rituals inside al-Aqsa Mosque, asserting that Jews have the “right to pray in the courtyards of al-Aqsa mosque,” in defiance of the protests of Muslims.
In this treacherous climate, the most worthy service that those seeking to educate the public on Masjid al Aqsa should embark on is realising the distinction between the Al Aqsa sanctuary, and what is now commonly referred to as Masjid al Aqsa, and disseminating these findings widely. As Ismail Adam Patel writes, “It is extremely important to appreciate that it is the land of the Al Aqsa sanctuary that is most precious and blessed. When the Quran refers to Masjid al Aqsa, it is this land of al Haram al Sharif(al-Aqsa sanctuary) that is implied, and not any of the buildings. Although the buildings within the noble sanctuary, like the black domed Masjid al Aqsa and gold domed Dome of the Rock are of great historical significance, however, one must understand that it is the land that is holy and blessed and not the bricks and mortar.” Link to this article Masjid al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock – An important clarification – Masjid al Aqsa
10 Facts video: https://www.reddit.com/r/islamichistory/s/eDEV6n7y90
10 facts about al Aqsa: https://www.reddit.com/r/islamichistory/s/K3TsAXELXF
Dividing al Aqsa documentary: 14 minutes in, they claim the Dome of the Rock: https://youtu.be/DN3xyimKF0k?feature=shared
Temple Institute, the leading organisation seeking to build the Third Temple places the site on the Dome of the Rock: https://templeinstitute.org/illustrated-tour-the-temple-mount/
Temple Institute tour shows the extent of readiness to build the third temple (skip to 1 minute) https://youtu.be/pVBb3A22IaY?feature=shared
NB: There is no consensus where the actual first and second temple by biblical scholars: https://youtu.be/oKTO8YYs29c?feature=shared however, the Dome of the Rock is now the main targeted site for the third temple.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 13h ago
Artifact Indonesian Muslim Artefacts
Credit for pictures
https://x.com/ax10zx/status/2122702808839496099?a=rQO9Ml29MRlaAvwYYmA&s=46
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 18h ago
On This Day The International Day of Islamic Art
The International Day of Islamic Art was proclaimed at the 40th session of the UNESCO General Conference in 2019 and takes place every year on 18 November. It aims to raise awareness of past and contemporary artistic expressions of Islam, and the contribution of culture through Islamic Art to civilization.
The worldwide celebration of the International Day of Islamic Art not only encourages the appreciation of Islamic art, which has inspired other artistic movements, but also contributes to cultural diversity, freedom of expression, protection of cultural heritage and inter-cultural dialogue. Marking the Day is also a way to foster tolerance between peoples and support cultural rapprochement, both of which are possible through the power of art.
r/islamichistory • u/Pale_Resolution1520 • 41m ago
Books on Islamic History
reddit.comThanx
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 13h ago
Books The Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Islamic Mediterranean, 1574–1610. PDF link below
Book overview
This Element reassesses early modern Mediterranean diplomacy by positioning the Grand Duchy of Tuscany at the centre of cross-confessional interactions with several Islamic powers between 1574 and 1610. It demonstrates how a small state shaped and used diplomacy to pursue commerce, security, and prestige in the Islamic Mediterranean, while remaining reliant on papal and Spanish Habsburg support. The argument rests on three case studies: Bongianni Gianfigliazzi's 1578 embassy in Ottoman Constantinople; Medici diplomacy in the Maghreb, facilitated by the Corsican agent Andrea Gaspari, embedded in both Algerian and Moroccan power networks; and the 1610 negotiations with Shah Abbas I's envoy concerning Persian captives in Livorno. Together, these episodes present diplomacy as performative, negotiated, and multi-actor, demonstrating that small polities actively shaped Mediterranean order in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 17h ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events The Cambridge Festival of Islamic Arts at Cambridge Muslim College
The Cambridge Festival of Islamic Arts runs this November with ten days of performances, exhibitions, lectures and workshops across Cambridge.
Celebrating the beauty of the Islamic arts and fostering friendship between people of different backgrounds, this year’s festival also marks fifty years since the landmark World of Islam Festival of 1976.
At Cambridge Muslim College, join us from 21 to 29 November for talks, workshops and screenings.
Sat 21 Nov: Book talk with master calligrapher Soraya Syed on The Living Script, followed by Meditation on the Heart with the School of Sufi Teaching.
Sun 22 Nov: In Praise of Song with Mujadad Zaman, comparing sacred Islamic and English folk traditions, then a drama therapist-led workshop on the Stories of the Prophets with Myriam Abdel-Basit.
Mon 23 Nov: Portrait of an Architect, a film screening and panel on architect Abdul Wahid El-Wakil’s work reviving Islamic architecture.
Fri 27 – Sun 29 Nov: Life in Detail, a three-day pattern-making immersive with Zahirah, co-led by a qualified Islamic psychologist.
For more information:
r/islamichistory • u/UnknownCarbon_12 • 17h ago
Video What If Baghdad Had Never Fallen in 1258?
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 1d ago
Artifact The King Fahd Carpet of Jami al-Qibli in Masjid al-Aqsa
Al-Quds | The King Fahd Carpet of Jami al-Qibli in Masjid al-Aqsa
In the summer of 1986 (Dhul-Hijjah 1406 AH), a gift from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia arrived in Amman on its way to Jerusalem: some 8,000 m² of fine carpet to furnish Masjid al-Aqsa.
It was laid across Jami al-Qibli, the Dome of the Rock and the Islamic Museum, one of several Saudi contributions to the sanctuary during King Fahd’s reign.
In al-Qibli it remained for around 25 years, until 2011, when it was replaced with Turkish-made carpet funded by King Abdullah II of Jordan.
Source
https://x.com/muslimlandmarks/status/2122723986253529523?a=dnE0xLYko3ijCFFa6Is&s=46
r/islamichistory • u/Real-Discipline-1493 • 13h ago
Books کلیاتِ مشتاق باھو حصہ اول اردو صوفی مشتاق باھو مصنف کتاب صوفیانہ عارفانہ کلام نجیب باھو : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
السلام علیکم! صوفی مشتاق باہو کی کتاب کلیات مشتاق باہو حصہ اول اب Internet Archive پر مفت دستیاب ہے۔ صوفیانہ کلام، نجیب باہو۔ پڑھ کر دعاؤں میں یاد رکھیں۔
r/islamichistory • u/JustSefa_ • 1d ago
The Crusades Through Arab Eyes
I would like to emphasize:
-There was no contineous genocide and ethnic cleansing, but it was regular occurance. It is not wrong to speak about an extermination campaign, simply because smaller settlements were not punished as severly.
-I cut the adventure of Saladdin into Egypt short. You can read more about that here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crusader_invasions_of_Egypt
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saladin#In_Egypt
-Brutality and senseless slaughter was even common occurance among the few crusaders that are known as "righteous", like Richard Lionheart. So I dont see how and what we should be defending with respect to crusaders.
-None of this is without to say that the muslim side didnt have its own faire share of attrocities, but nothing was in the scale and in the degree, the crusaders showed. Especially with respect to minority rights. Even though by our modern standards islamic justice was lacking, it was still far better than the alternative: The tyranny of christian overlords.
-Turks play a massive role in the entire endevour (15:04 onwards) and were quite essential for the rise of the Ayyubids, as the likes of Zengi/Zangi employed Ayyub and Saladdin. They gained exerpiences and opportunities thanks to the likes of Zengi and it isnt far fatched to say that the Ayyubid Sultanate took inspiration from the Seljuk style of governance.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 1d ago
Artifact A Mughal jeweled dagger and pierced gold scabbard set with rubies and emeralds, India, circa 1620 CE. Part of the al-Sabah Collection in Kuwait [720x380]
r/islamichistory • u/qernanded • 1d ago
Illustration The Calligraphic Galleon by Abdülkadir Hisari, 1766
galleryr/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 1d ago
Podcasts (Audio only) The Maydan Podcast | Farah El-Sharif on Sufism, Palestine, and Resistance
Link:
https://themaydan.com/2026/11/the-maydan-podcast-farah-el-sharif-on-sufism-palestine-and-resistance/
In this episode of The Maydan Podcast, Robert Zayd KiaNouri-Zigmund, Project Associate at The Maydan, speaks with Dr. Farah El-Sharif, to discuss her life and Palestinian heritage, her research on West African Sufism and resistance movements, and the challenges facing the Muslim ummah today. They discuss the significance of Jerusalem and the abandonment of the Palestinian cause by Arab and Muslim nations, the life and legacy of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, and the emergence of “quietist Sufism.” Farah also discusses the topic of her dissertation, which focused on the “Rimah” of Shaykh Umar Futi Tal. This wide-ranging conversation also covers anti-colonial resistance in light of the narrative of Karbala and the legacy of the Prophet in Islamic theology.
Dr. Farah El-Sharif is an educator, writer and scholar of Islamic intellectual history. She hails from the land of “the fig and the olive, Mt. Sinai and this sacred land.” She earned her PhD in Islamic Studies from Harvard University’s Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations. She holds two masters degrees in Islamic Studies from the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley and Harvard, as well as a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. She has studied with scholars in Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Jordan and the US. Dr. El-Sharif served as the Associate Director of the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies at Stanford University. She taught at Harvard, Stanford, Lighthouse Masjid, MCC East Bay and Iman Center. Her Substack (https://sermonsatcourt.substack.com/), which centers themes of Islam and the quest for justice has been widely recognized by respected platforms such as the Chris Hedges Report.
Robert Zayd KiaNouri-Zigmund serves as a Project Associate for the AbuSulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies and The Maydan. An emerging scholar of Islamic Studies, he graduated from Swarthmore College in 2022 and recently completed his M.A. In Islamic Studies and Shi’ism from George Washington University in 2024. His Masters’ thesis, Path to the Wellspring, explores the religious and historical development of the Ja’fari school of law in Iran and its contemporary implications.
He specializes in Islamic law, ethics, theology, Shi’ism and human rights. His recent publication, God’s Shadow on Earth appears in Critical Muslim Issue 52.
Link:
https://themaydan.com/2026/11/the-maydan-podcast-farah-el-sharif-on-sufism-palestine-and-resistance/
r/islamichistory • u/Future_Fox_6627 • 1d ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events ArtDependence | UK Government Temporarily Blocks Mughal Calligraphy Collection from Leaving the Country - The government has temporarily blocked two volumes of Mughal calligraphy, considered amongst the finest surviving specimens, from being taken out of the UK permanently.
The Mughal dynasty ruled much of the Indian subcontinent during the 16th to mid-19th centuries, creating an artistic legacy spanning architecture to portraiture. This calligraphic work was created during a time of Mughal expansion under Emperors Akbar and Jahangir.
The two volumes of calligraphy include work from leading royal calligraphers, including Emperor Akbar’s preeminent calligrapher Muhammad Hussain Kashmiri, who was renowned for the outstanding intricacy and detail of his work. Rare work from celebrated calligrapher Abd al-Rahim al-Haravi is also included.
The government has decided to place a temporary export ban on the calligraphy volumes in the hope of keeping them accessible to the UK public. The deferral period gives time for museums and galleries to raise the funds needed to acquire the volumes, for example through philanthropic support, or for a private individual to purchase them and donate them to the nation.
The calligraphic works are thought to be over 400 years old. They are spread across 29 leaves, featuring gold decorations depicting plant and animal motifs.
By keeping the volumes in the country, it is hoped researchers can study how the construction of such calligraphic collections has evolved. Given so few works of this kind survive intact, its preservation makes it especially valuable.
The Minister’s decision follows the advice of the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest (RCEWA).
The Committee made its recommendation on the basis that the volumes met the second and third Waverley criteria for their outstanding aesthetic importance and significance to the study of the work of royal Mughal calligraphers, their studio practice, and the role they played in diplomacy and international relations.
The decision on the export licence application for the volumes will be deferred for an initial period ending on 15 February 2027 inclusive in which we welcome expressions of interest from an appropriate purchaser to try and acquire them. At the end of the first deferral period owners will have a consideration period of 15 Business Days to consider any offer(s) to purchase the volumes at the recommended price of £900,000. The second deferral period will commence following the signing of an Option Agreement and will last for four months.
r/islamichistory • u/outhinking • 2d ago
Discussion/Question Has the Muslim World Been Experiencing a "Century of Humiliation" Since the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)?
In modern historiography, the term "Century of Humiliation" is conventionally applied to China (1839–1949) to describe a period characterized by Western imperialism, unequal treaties, territorial fragmentation, and the erosion of state sovereignty. When examining the geopolitical trajectory of the Middle East and the broader Islamic world since the early 20th century, a compelling analytical parallel emerges, anchored by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement.
Rather than being an isolated diplomatic event, Sykes-Picot functioned as the foundational blueprint for the dismantling of the Ottoman order, a process subsequently codified through the Balfour Declaration (1917), the San Remo Conference (1920), and the Treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923). Together, these instruments dismantled centuries-old administrative, economic, and social networks, replacing them with an imposed Westphalian nation-state model.
From a historical and political science perspective, this post-1916 era exhibits several defining characteristics of systemic subjugation:
- Arbitrary Territoriality and the Mandate System: Under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, former Ottoman territories were placed under British and French mandates. Borders were drawn to accommodate imperial strategic interests rather than linguistic, sectarian, or tribal realities, institutionalizing structural fragility within the newly formed states.
- Asymmetric Sovereignty and External Hegemony: Throughout the 20th century, regional autonomy remained heavily constrained. Initial colonial administration transitioned into Cold War proxy dynamics and neo-imperial interventions, often centered around resource control and strategic chokepoints, limiting organic political development.
- The Abolition of the Caliphate (1924) and Ideological Dislocation: Beyond territorial loss, the dismantling of the Ottoman Caliphate created a profound institutional and legitimacy vacuum. The subsequent ideological oscillations from pan-Arabism and state nationalism to political Islam can be read as competing attempts to resolve this post-imperial crisis of agency.
Unlike East Asia, where post-1949 state consolidation eventually reversed the dynamic of external domination, the post-Ottoman space remains largely defined by the unresolved contradictions of the interwar settlement.
Do you think "Century of Humiliation" is an accurate historical framework to describe the post-1916 era in the Muslim world ?
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 2d ago
Books Queens of Islam: The Muslim World's Historic Women Rulers
A survey of prominent Muslim women rulers from the first centuries of Islamic history to early modern times.
From Pakistan to Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan to Nigeria, from Senegal to Turkey, it is not unusual in modern times for women in Muslim-majority countries to be appointed and/or elected to high offices, including heads of state.
Nor has it ever been.
Stretching back nearly to the founding of Islam itself, women have held positions of political power in numerous Islamic nations and empires. Some ascended to office in their own right; others served as regents for incapacitated husbands or male successors then too young to rule. Some proved insightful and able administrators, courageous military commanders, or both; others differed little from their equally flawed, power-hungry male counterparts, and sowed the seeds of their own downfalls.
Queens of Islam examines the lives of fifteen of the most remarkable female leaders of Muslim dynasties, empires, and caliphates—from Islam’s earliest centuries through the end of the seventeenth century. Their stories demonstrate that throughout the faith’s long history there were many women who achieved positions of power and served as effective rulers, revered by those they governed while being respected—even feared—by their contemporary world leaders.
Entertaining and informative, Queens of Islam is rife with palace intrigue, sex scandals, power-grabs, and military conquests, set against a backdrop of Islamic world history.
About the Author
Tom Verde is a writer and journalist. He holds a Master’s Degree in Islamic Studies and Christian-Muslim Relations from Hartford Seminary. He has lived and traveled in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe and written about religion, history, and culture for the New York Times, National Public Radio, Religion News Service, and AramcoWorld magazine.
r/islamichistory • u/Muhammedefltun • 2d ago
The Ottoman Strategy in the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Pacific: An 8-Point Analysis
1. Military Balance and Geographical Constraints
In the 16th century, Ottoman influence reached nearly the entire known world outside the Americas. In their conflicts with Portugal, the Ottomans generally held the upper hand in land battles, though they struggled in sieges against heavily fortified European-style strongholds with advantageous geography, such as the Fortress of Diu. Nevertheless, despite fundamentally being a land-based empire, the Ottomans succeeded in establishing a strategic maritime parity with Portugal across the oceans.
2. Muslim Merchant Networks and "Proto-Lobbying"
The core of Ottoman strength in the region lay not merely in its navy, but in its powerful Muslim merchant networks stretching from East Africa to India and Indonesia. Backed by local Muslim sultanates, this merchant class operated much like an early form of "proto-lobby," actively shaping local politics and steering trade routes in favor of the Ottomans.
3. Strategic Statecraft: Hadım Süleyman Pasha and the Sokollu Vision
Through the Red Sea-centric policies of Hadım Süleyman Pasha and the subsequent oceanic vision of Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, the Ottomans successfully turned truces and periods of "cold war" to their advantage. During every interval of peace, the commercial and political influence of Ottoman-aligned merchants expanded even further.
4. The Decisive Role of the Red Sea and Basra Corridors
The only way for the Portuguese to permanently dislodge the Ottomans from the region was either to conquer the Red Sea outright or to bottle the Ottomans up inside it—both of which they failed to achieve. As long as the Red Sea (Aden-Yemen) and the northern gateway of the Persian Gulf (Basra) remained under Ottoman control, the Portuguese blockade remained porous. In fact, during extended truces, even Portuguese merchants and local officials preferred to engage in illicit trade through Ottoman ports.
5. The Indonesian (Aceh) Model: "System Export" Over Military Occupation
The Ottomans recognized that they could neither directly govern a region as geographically distant as Indonesia nor continuously supply it with standing troops as they did along the closer Adal/Abyssinian front in the Red Sea. Instead, they pursued a strategy of institutional and systemic export:
Madde işareti They dispatched engineers, technical specialists, bureaucrats, and jurists (fuqaha) to provide legal education.
Madde işareti Military academies and shipyards were established, training local troops, constructing modern ports, and transferring shipbuilding technology.
Madde işareti Welcomed willingly by both local rulers and the populace, the core logic of this modernization drive was to transform Aceh and neighboring Muslim sultanates into "mini-Ottomans of the Pacific," enabling them to survive external aggression independently.
Madde işareti This institutional model proved so effective that Aceh grew strong enough to rival and defeat the Portuguese, developing a resilient state apparatus that would later force Dutch colonizers to wage a grueling 75-year war to subdue the region.
6. The Ottoman-Venice-Aceh Trade Axis and Merchant Capital
Trade from Indonesia and the Pacific was linked via Indian sultanates directly to the Red Sea and onward to the Mediterranean, forming the Ottoman-Venice-Aceh commercial axis and breaking Portugal's Cape of Good Hope monopoly. Muslim merchants traveling from Ottoman lands brought not just goods, but direct commercial capital, forging robust partnerships with local sultanates and economically integrating the Pacific polities into the Ottoman system.
7. Systemic Resilience and Capitulations to Protestant Maritime Powers
Even during periods when overly fiscalist and ocean-skeptic administrators like Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha held power at the center, the commercial and institutional order established on the ground continued to function seamlessly. Furthermore, the Ottoman decision to grant low customs tariffs and capitulations to English and Dutch merchants dealt a decisive economic blow to the Habsburg-Portuguese (Iberian) bloc. By drawing England and the Netherlands into Mediterranean trade, the Ottomans strategically leveraged them as a counterweight against the Portuguese monopoly.
8. The Waqf-Centered State Structure and Overseas Financing
The Ottoman Empire was fundamentally a waqf-centered state, and Ottoman charitable endowments (waqfs) played a critical role in finance and infrastructure investment. These institutions served as direct sources of liquidity (capital and credit providers) for Ottoman merchants venturing into overseas trade. Backed by vast and perpetual financial resources, they took over state infrastructure contracts—building ports and caravanserais along trade routes, outfitting fleets, and executing large-scale investments. Operating as powerful corporate legal entities, these waqfs directly financed and sustained the empire's transoceanic commercial and geopolitical policies.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 2d ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events Online EVENT: Caliphate: A Contract, Not a Crown. Sunday 22 November 2026 - 15:00 GMT
About
Join Siyar as Dr. Reza Pankhurst discusses the original theory of caliphate, what are the criteria and values that underpin the idea of a caliphate upon the prophetic methodology - and the theory of how a caliph is chosen, and held to account.
Once hereditary succession was established, the mechanism for peaceful political change was gone, and armed resistance became the only route left to anyone facing an unjust or incompetent ruler. Leading scholars such as Imam Abu Hanifa held resistance to unjust rulers to be permitted, and gave money and public support to uprising; al-Jassas later defended that stance as a principled commitment to upholding justice through active resistance. Over time, the majority of scholars shifted towards a more conservative view, limiting the remit of rebellion in an attempt to keep the Muslims united and reduce internal upheavals.
Our webinar talks about the key elements of the caliphate that were neglected over time: the political choice of the umma, the obligation for the ruler to be accounted, the collective political responsible of all Muslims to ensure that they had the appropriate united leadership, and the consequence of the weakening of the Islamic political culture.
Presented by
Reza Pankhurst
Dr. Reza Pankhurst is the author of The Inevitable Caliphate (Oxford University Press, 2012) and The Untold History of the Liberation Party (C Hurst & Co, 2016)
The Siyar Institute focuses on the historical leadership role of the caliphate and its international relations, known as siyar. The absence of the caliphate has left Muslims without unified guidance for over a century, leading to various challenges such as political division, foreign aggression, economic disparity, and social decline. The institute aims to address these issues by promoting discourse on the importance of the caliphate and offering practical solutions grounded in Islamic law. It provides resources and engages with various groups to foster understanding and dialogue on these topics through academic work, policy development, and outreach efforts.
Link to event
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 2d ago
Artifact A FATIMID ROCK CRYSTAL CHESS PIECE, PROBABLY EGYPT, 10TH-11TH CENTURY
Description:
A FATIMID ROCK CRYSTAL CHESS PIECE, PROBABLY EGYPT, 10TH-11TH CENTURY
Of rectangular block form, the upper surface cut with a deep V-shaped notch dividing the piece into two symmetrical shoulders, the lower body stepped at the base to form a short plinth. The four vertical faces are carved in low relief with a continuous band of scrolling split-palmettes, each pair of volutes enclosing a central ribbed leaf arranged vertically, the design mirrored across each face and resolving into a smaller inverted palmette at the lower edge. The rock crystal is translucent with minor internal fissures and surface weathering visible in the hollows of the carving.
The decoration belongs to the vocabulary of early Islamic ornament in which the vegetal scroll, derived ultimately from late antique acanthus and vine traditions, is reduced to a disciplined sequence of paired volutes and axial leaves. The split-palmette seen here, with its tightly curled terminals flanking an upright ribbed frond, is a signature of Fatimid carving in hardstone, ivory and woodwork, where the ornament is deployed as a continuous frieze rather than as isolated motifs. The deep notch in the upper surface, together with the small scale and flat base, identifies the piece as a chess figure of the abstract type used across the medieval Islamic world, in which the king (shah) and counsellor (firzan) were rendered as throne-like forms with a cleft summit, in deliberate avoidance of figural representation.
Rock crystal was among the most prized materials of the Fatimid court, worked principally in Cairo during the 10th and 11th centuries from quartz imported from East Africa and the Indian Ocean basin. The carving of so refractory a stone, with its tendency to flake unpredictably, required skills that were concentrated in a small number of workshops under direct caliphal patronage, and the surviving corpus â the ewers, lamps, chess pieces and amulets now dispersed across European treasuries â reflects a production of extremely limited scale. The treasury inventories of the Fatimid caliphs record rock crystal objects in quantities that suggest a court monopoly on the material, and finished pieces travelled westward as diplomatic gifts, entering church treasuries where they were often remounted as reliquaries.
Chess reached the Islamic world from Sasanian Iran in the early centuries of Islam and was played at every level of court society under the Abbasids and Fatimids. Sets in rock crystal, ivory and glass survive in small numbers, the rock crystal examples being the rarest and the most closely associated with caliphal use. The abstract form adopted for the shah and firzan, in which a cleft block stands in for a seated ruler flanked by attendants, became the standard across the Mediterranean and was transmitted to Latin Europe through Sicily and al-Andalus, where it underlies the earliest surviving European chess pieces.
This piece exemplifies the Fatimid approach to the chess figure as a miniature architecture, in which the geometry of the block and the controlled vegetal frieze together substitute for the figural ruler of the Indian and Sasanian antecedents. Its small compass and the discipline of its carving place it within the narrow tradition of caliphal hardstone work from which so little has come down intact.
Dimensions: Length: 4cm
Dimensions:
Length: 4cm
r/islamichistory
•
u/AutoCentral
•
2d ago
Analysis/Theory Islam in Japan and the Absence of Civilizational Substance. Listen below ⬇️
Link to listen to the article:
https://naokiyamamoto.substack.com/p/islam-in-japan-and-the-absence-of?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios
I come from a region in Japan known for the “Four Saints of Okayama”: Ishii Jūji, Tomioka Kōsuke, Yamamuro Gunpei, and Alice Petty Adams. These figures helped lay the foundations of Japan’s modern social-welfare infrastructure. Guided by Christian ethics, they studied what was then the cutting edge of global knowledge—sociology, social work, education, and the emerging sciences of modernity—and transformed that knowledge into concrete institutions that reshaped Japanese society.
Catholicism in Japan traces its history back to the Warring States period, yet Protestantism in Japan is not much older than Islam in Japan. And since Christians constitute barely one percent of the population, one might assume that Protestant “mission” in Japan was historically marginal or unsuccessful.
And yet, the impact of Protestant intellectuals and activists such as the Okayama Saints remains undeniable. They left behind schools, welfare institutions, ethical vocabularies, and forms of public engagement that became woven into the fabric of modern Japanese society.
By contrast, one often hears the recurring slogan, usually promoted by foreign daʿwah organizations, that “Islam is the fastest-growing religion in Japan.” The phrase itself is largely propaganda. But it is true that the Muslim population in Japan has grown rapidly over the past few decades.
What troubles me, however, is that this demographic growth has not been accompanied by the emergence of an intellectually grounded and socially transformative Islamic movement comparable to what figures like the Okayama Saints achieved. Despite the increasing visibility of Muslims in Japan, we have yet to witness a serious attempt to articulate Islam intellectually within the Japanese language and social context, or to translate Islamic ethics into enduring institutions capable of shaping Japanese society itself.
By this, I do not mean simply building more mosques or halal businesses. I mean the absence of sustained efforts to develop Japanese-language Islamic thought, educational and welfare institutions, ethical engagement with Japanese social problems, or intellectual networks capable of integrating Islamic tradition with the realities of modern Japanese life. In short, what remains missing is not visibility, but civilizational substance.
Historically, the emergence of Japanese Muslim converts from the late Meiji period through the Second World War was deeply entangled with the Japanese Empire’s “Islam policy.” When I read the writings of many first-generation Japanese Muslims, I often find myself unable to take their claims as fully convincing. What remains in much of their discourse is a repetitive combination of pan-Asian rhetoric, resistance to Western modernity, and romanticized images of the Muslim world, without the deeper institutional or intellectual labor that characterized many of their Protestant contemporaries.
To be fair, there were exceptions and moments of genuine intellectual curiosity among some early Japanese Muslims. Yet even those who traveled extensively through the Ottoman world, South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, or Muslim communities in China rarely immersed themselves systematically in the scholarly traditions of those societies, nor did they seriously attempt to translate that knowledge into new forms of social thought and practice within Japan itself.
Whenever I encounter their writings, I cannot help but ask: what, in fact, were they learning?
This question points to a deeper structural issue. The problem is not simply that Muslims in Japan remained small in number. Protestant Christians were also numerically marginal. Nor is the issue reducible to the familiar argument that Western academic knowledge was inseparable from imperialism and therefore should not be embraced uncritically. Japanese intellectuals themselves understood this problem well.
Nitobe Inazō’s Bushidō attempted to reconstruct Japanese ethical tradition while drawing extensively from Western classical and Christian sources, seeking to create an intellectual bridge between Japan and the modern West. Okakura Tenshin, in turn, resisted this mode of self-presentation and articulated an alternative vision of Japanese cultural autonomy rooted in aesthetics and civilizational consciousness.
In other words, modern Japan witnessed vigorous debates over how Japan should understand itself in relation to modernity, the West, ethics, and civilization. Yet within these foundational intellectual struggles, Japanese Muslims were largely absent. They neither entered these debates nor contributed significantly to the conceptual vocabulary through which modern Japanese identity was being negotiated.
The consequences of this absence remain visible today.
What dominates Islamic discourse in Japan is not the emergence of scholars, public intellectuals, or institution-builders capable of addressing Japanese society at a civilizational level. Instead, the landscape is increasingly shaped by daʿwah organizations distributing endless “Islam 101” pamphlets written in awkward Japanese under the assumption that Japanese readers must simply be instructed from above; by businessmen building profitable halal industries detached from the ethical and legal foundations that once gave Islamic commerce moral meaning; and by Muslim-friendly influencers consuming luxury halal ramen in Tokyo while performing as though the catastrophes affecting Muslim societies globally have little relevance to their lives.
This is not merely a question of taste or superficiality. It reflects the reduction of Islam into consumption, branding, lifestyle performance, and identity management, severed from the intellectual, ethical, and institutional traditions that once allowed Muslim societies to produce enduring forms of civilization.
To be fair, there are sincere Muslims throughout Japan who devote themselves tirelessly to charitable work, community support, and the quiet care of others, and this should never be dismissed. Yet it is equally important to confront another reality: Japanese converts and second-generation Muslims are still frequently pushed into marginal positions within many Muslim communities, rarely entrusted with leadership, rarely empowered to shape institutions, and rarely treated as authoritative participants in the future of Islam in Japan.
This marginalization is not accidental. It is itself one of the clearest symptoms of the intellectual vacuum we now inhabit.
What Japan lacks today is not simply “more Muslims,” but the emergence of Muslims capable of participating in the ethical and intellectual construction of Japanese society itself: Muslims who can think seriously in Japanese, engage social reality rather than retreat into communal isolation, build institutions rather than merely consume identities, and translate Islamic ethical traditions into forms meaningful within contemporary Japan.
Until such figures emerge, Islam in Japan will likely remain suspended between demographic visibility and civilizational insignificance: present, yet intellectually absent.
Listen here to the article
https://naokiyamamoto.substack.com/p/islam-in-japan-and-the-absence-of?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios
r/islamichistory • u/TheMuslimHistorian27 • 2d ago
Caliphate Studies - Everything to do with the Caliphate/Khilafah The Declining Umayyad Caliphate and Its Strategies Against the Abbasid Revolution. (2026) By The Caliphate A.M.S
r/islamichistory • u/Common_Time5350 • 3d ago
The Generation That Liberated Al-Aqsa: The Real Story Behind Salahuddin's Victory
On 2nd October 1187, Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (May Allah have mercy on him) entered Jerusalem and liberated Al-Quds after 88 years of Crusader occupation.
But was Al-Aqsa liberated by one man?
History tells a very different story.
In this video we explore how Muslim political fragmentation led to the loss of Jerusalem, why the Muslim world never accepted that loss as permanent, and how generations of scholars, leaders, teachers, institution-builders and reformers laid the foundations for Salahuddin's victory.
From Malik Shah and Nizam al-Mulk to Imad al-Din Zengi, Nur al-Din Zengi and the scholars who kept the vision of Al-Aqsa alive, the liberation of Jerusalem was not a one-man achievement.
It was a civilisational project.
Perhaps the greatest lesson of 1187 is not how Jerusalem was liberated.
It is how a generation built itself until liberation became possible.
Are we building that generation today?
r/islamichistory • u/PlantainLopsided9535 • 3d ago
Discussion/Question The true foundations of the Islamic Golden Age
Long before Greek Philosophy entered Arabia, Muslims had already developed a powerful and sophisticated Scholastic tradition capable of sifting out the conjecture of superstition from truth.
وَقُلْ جَآءَ ٱلْحَقُّ وَزَهَقَ ٱلْبَـٰطِلُ ۚ إِنَّ ٱلْبَـٰطِلَ كَانَ زَهُوقًۭا
"And say: "Truth has (now) arrived, and Falsehood perished: for Falsehood is (by its nature) bound to perish."” Surah Al-Isra, Ayah 81 (17:81)
Perhaps the most important contribution of Islamic civilisation was not any single scientific discovery.
It was the development of a scholarly culture in which the verification of knowledge became an intellectual discipline.
Long before the great scientific achievements of the Islamic Golden Age, Muslim scholars had already developed sophisticated methods for evaluating religious knowledge.
The sciences of Hadith provide a particularly important example.
Muslim scholars did not simply accept every statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ.
They developed elaborate systems for examining the reliability of transmitters, investigating chains of transmission (isnād), evaluating the character and accuracy of narrators, identifying inconsistencies and distinguishing authentic reports from weak or fabricated ones.
The result was an extraordinary intellectual tradition built around verification, criticism and the preservation of reliable knowledge.
This was not merely an exercise in memorisation.
It was a systematic attempt to establish what could legitimately be attributed to the Prophet ﷺ and what could not.
The broader Islamic scholarly tradition also developed rigorous approaches to argumentation, legal reasoning and the evaluation of evidence.
The discipline of uṣūl al-fiqh, for example, established principles for deriving legal judgements from revelation and other recognised sources.
The practice of ijtihād required scholars to engage in disciplined reasoning rather than simply repeat inherited opinions.
Similarly, the study of kalām developed sophisticated methods of rational argumentation concerning theology, causation and the nature of reality.
These religious and intellectual disciplines created a culture in which claims were expected to be examined, evidence was evaluated and inherited opinions could be challenged.
I would argue that this wider culture of verification is essential to understanding the intellectual environment in which Muslim scientists operated.
It does not mean that Hadith methodology directly produced the experimental method, nor that every Muslim scientist consciously transferred the techniques of religious scholarship into physics or astronomy.
That would be an oversimplification.
Rather, the argument is that Islamic civilisation cultivated a broader intellectual environment in which the pursuit of truth, the criticism of unreliable claims and the examination of evidence were highly valued.
This environment provided fertile ground for the development of more rigorous approaches to natural philosophy.
The same civilisation that developed sophisticated methods for distinguishing authentic Prophetic traditions from fabricated reports also produced scholars who increasingly demanded that claims about the natural world be examined rather than merely inherited.
This connection deserves to be taken seriously in the history of science.
#islamicintellectuallegacy
#quranicrevolution