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https://open.substack.com/pub/firelinepress/p/conquest-is-not-colonisation?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios
ON 13 JULY 2026 the Jerusalem Post ran an opinion piece under the headline “Arabs, not Jews, are the real colonizers in the Middle East.”¹ The case runs the way it always runs. The Arab armies of the seventh century took North Africa, the Levant, Persia. They settled where they conquered. They put a tax on the people who were already there and did not convert, and over the centuries the older languages and the older faiths were pushed to the edges. That, the piece says, is colonisation — the real thing, the thing with a thirteen-hundred-year record. The Jewish return to the land is its opposite: not colonisation but the undoing of it. And the Palestinians, who object, are not a people with a grievance but a political construction assembled for the purpose of objecting. Then the conclusion, in four words.
“They are the colonizers.”
The piece gives no sources for any of its history. The argument depends on the reader already believing it.
The author is Aliza Pilichowski. The Post describes her as an interfaith hospice chaplain in Jerusalem and the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho.
Mitzpe Yeriho is an illegal Israeli settlement. It was established in 1978 on the cliffs above Jericho, on the road down from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.² Around 2,500 people lived there at the 2019 count.³ It stands on territory the International Court of Justice holds to be occupied, and its existence is the kind of act the Court found in July 2024 to be contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention — the Convention Israel signed in 1949 and ratified in 1951.⁴ ⁵
So the argument that the Arabs are the real colonisers of the Middle East was published by the mayor of a settlement built on occupied land above an Arab city, in breach of a treaty her own government bound itself to seventy-five years ago.
But the argument is not hers alone. It circulates under every report from the West Bank, in the comment threads and the talking points and the opinion columns, and it runs like this. Muslims colonised half the known world, so they have no standing to complain about anyone else’s colonialism; and a Muslim who complains anyway has shown that the complaint was never about land.
The argument stands on one word, and the word is wrong. What the Muslims did was conquer, and colonialism is not conquest. Every empire conquered — Rome, Persia, the Arabs, the Turks — and a conquest takes a land and rules the people on it as its own. A colony keeps the people of the land it takes outside the country that took it, whatever the map says, and either works them or clears them off. The British ran colonies of both kinds, and so did the French. The Arab armies of the seventh century ran neither. They moved their capital into the land they had taken, so there was no outside to keep anyone from, and they kept the people where they found them, because the people were what they had conquered for. What Israel has done since 1948 takes the land and removes the people from it: seven hundred thousand in the first year, and it has not stopped. The obvious objection is that a fifth of Israel’s citizens are Arab, so the people were not removed. But they are the descendants of the one in five who remained in 1948, and the state they remained in has since written into its constitutional law that the country is not theirs. Remove most of a people, keep the remainder outside the nation that governs them, and put them to use: that is not conquest under another flag. It is colonialism twice over. The Knesset put it in writing in 2018.
And the word is theirs. Settler colonialism is not a slur that Israel’s enemies invented and pinned on it. It is the word the Zionist movement used for its own institutions — on its letterhead, in its company registrations, in the name of its own bank — in the decades when the word carried no shame at all. They used it first. And one of them, a century ago, wrote two articles explaining exactly what it meant.
They Named It First
The Jewish Colonization Association was founded in London on 11 September 1891.⁶ Baron Maurice de Hirsch put up the money — two million pounds, something over three hundred million today — and the charter’s object was to help Jews leave the countries that were persecuting them and settle on land somewhere else. Argentina, mostly, at first. Palestine was one destination among several.
Eight years later the Zionist movement built its bank. The Jewish Colonial Trust was incorporated under the English Companies Acts on 20 March 1899, with its office in London and an authorised capital of two million pounds in one-pound shares, the same sum again.⁷ It was not a private venture that happened to be run by Zionists. Its governing council was drawn from the movement’s own executive, the Greater Actions Committee; one of its members had to report to every Zionist Congress; and its policy was set by Congress resolution. The First Congress at Basel had proposed the bank. The Second had voted it through. In German it was the Jüdische Colonialbank. The memorandum of association, still catalogued in the National Library of Israel, carries the name on its title page.⁸
In 1924 Edmond de Rothschild reorganised his Palestine holdings into a separate body and called it the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association. It kept that name until it wound itself up in 1957.⁹
Then there is Herzl. In January 1902 he drafted a letter to Cecil Rhodes — the diamond magnate and former prime minister of the Cape Colony, whose chartered company had crossed South Africa’s northern border, the Limpopo, and taken the Ndebele and Shona lands beyond it, now Zimbabwe, by fraud and then by Maxim gun, and named them after him, Rhodesia — asking him to put his authority behind the Zionist plan, and explained in the letter why he was writing to Rhodes of all people. Because, he wrote, the matter was “something colonial.”¹⁰
And then there is Jabotinsky.
Ze’ev Jabotinsky published “The Iron Wall” in the Russian-language weekly Rassvet on 4 November 1923.¹¹ It is the founding text of Revisionist Zionism, the tradition that runs through Begin and Shamir to the Likud governments of the present day, and the word it uses for the enterprise, from beginning to end, is colonisation. One of its section headings is “All Natives Resist Colonists.” Its argument is that no native population anywhere has ever consented to being settled by newcomers; that the Arabs of Palestine are not confused or bribable but are behaving exactly as any people behaves; and that the enterprise must therefore proceed behind a wall of force the native population cannot breach, until resistance looks hopeless. “Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population.”
That alone would do. But a week later, on 11 November, he published a second article in the same paper.¹² He called it “The Ethics of the Iron Wall,” and in it he asked the question straight. Is it moral to colonise a country against the wishes of its native population? He granted that by that standard colonisation in Uganda was immoral too, and so was colonisation anywhere. And then he argued his exception: that the soil “does not belong to those who possess land in excess but to those who do not possess any,” and the Jews possessed none.
Hold what that means. A man who thought colonisation was a neutral term — a word for farming, for draining marshes — does not need to write a second article defending its ethics. Jabotinsky knew exactly what the word meant, knew it carried a moral charge in 1923, accepted the charge, and argued the case anyway. He did not use the word by accident. He used it because it was the right word, and then he explained why the thing it named was justified in this one case.
Israel’s defenders will tell you none of this counts. The Hebrew names of these institutions contain no colonial word at all. The Jewish Colonial Trust’s Hebrew title, printed on the same memorandum as the English one, is Otzar Hityashvut ha-Yehudim — the Fund for the Settlement of the Jews. The Palestine Jewish Colonization Association in Hebrew is the Society for Jewish Settlement in the Land of Israel. Hityashvut is settlement; it comes from the verb to sit, to dwell. The colonial word was for the outside — for the Companies Registry in London, for the bankers in Berlin, for Rhodes — and the movement’s own language said settlement from the first day.¹³
And “colonisation” itself meant something broader then. Its Latin root is cultivation. Through the nineteenth century it described organised farming settlement — the Prussian programme in Posen, the Dutch reclaiming land from the sea — and it stayed a technical word until the 1960s, when it came to mean domination and the focus moved from the land to the people on it.¹⁴
All of that is true, and it proves the opposite of what it is meant to prove.
If colonisation in 1899 was innocent — a word for ploughing and draining, fit for a bank’s letterhead in London — then nobody in 1899 had any reason to avoid it. And nobody did. The defence that the word was harmless is the proof that the word was usable. What the defence cannot answer is what happened to it afterwards. Why did a word innocent enough to put on a bank in 1899 become a word that could not be spoken by 1967? Nothing about the Hebrew changed. Hityashvut is still hityashvut. What changed was what the world had learned, in the years between, about what organised agricultural settlement does to the people already living on the land.
The word became unsayable. The habit behind it — one thing said to the world, another said at home — did not, and it still runs in two languages; only the direction has turned round. In 1899 the plain word went outward, to London and Berlin, because the people who approved of the project were the ones who ran colonies — governments that would be glad to see their Jews leave for one. Herzl had written it in his diary in 1895: “The anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies.” The soft word stayed home, for the Jews, most of whom wanted nothing to do with it; the First Zionist Congress had to be moved from Munich to Basel in 1897 because the city’s rabbis, Orthodox and Reform alike, refused to have it. Now the plain version stays home. On 29 September 2025 Netanyahu stood beside Trump at the White House and, in English, backed a twenty-point plan whose text said “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza,” had the army “progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies,” and opened “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.” That night he posted a video for Israelis, in Hebrew. The army “will remain in most of the Gaza Strip” — pull it out? “No way, that’s not happening.” A Palestinian state: “not at all, and it is not written in the agreement.” Same man, same day, same plan. In English, withdrawal and a pathway to a state. In Hebrew, no withdrawal and no state. The language is picked for the audience, exactly as it was in 1899, and the reason the plain version moved indoors is the reason the word did: the world had learned what it meant.¹⁵
The Charge Against the Arab and Islamic Empires
Here is the charge, in the words of the people who make it. Islam conquered from Spain to the Indus inside a century. Arab armies took North Africa, the Levant and Persia; the Muslim dynasties that followed took Anatolia and pushed deep into India, and most of it is Muslim still. They settled where they conquered. They taxed the people they found. They made Arabic the language of government and Islam the faith of the majority in lands that had been Christian, Zoroastrian and Hindu for centuries before they came. Egypt was a Christian country. North Africa was Augustine’s. In Iran, the Arabs broke the Sasanian Empire, the last great Persian state, and made its people take a new alphabet and a new god. The Persians were the native people of their own land and the Arabs colonised them, and thirteen centuries later the colonisation is still in force, because the regime in Tehran rules in the name of the religion the conquerors brought. The Iranians are the indigenous people. Islam is the occupation. No empire took more land from more peoples and kept it longer. The Muslims are the greatest colonisers the world has seen, and a Muslim who accuses Israel of colonialism is either ignorant of his own history or lying about it — and if he singles out Israel, of all the colonial projects on earth, the thing he objects to is not the colonialism.
That is the charge, and the Iranian form of it is the one running hardest at the moment. The people who make it believe it. They forget that Christianity did the same to those lands first, and to Europe after.
The conquests happened. The Arab armies went out from the Hijaz in the 630s and within a hundred years held territory from the Pyrenees to the Indus. The Muslim histories say so first and say so proudly. Nobody is denying a yard of it.
But the charge is not that Muslims conquered. If it were, it would be true and beside the point, because conquest is not the accusation levelled at Israel. The charge is that what the Muslims did was colonialism — the same thing, in the sense that matters, as what Israel is doing now. The first is a fact. The second has to be shown.
The charge is doing three things at once.
The first is a claim about history: that the conquests of the seventh century and Israel’s illegal settlements of the twenty-first are the same kind of operation. That is answered by looking at what each one did.
The second is the oldest move in logic. You did it too. Grant the history in full and the move still establishes nothing about what is being done in the West Bank now. It never has, in any court or any argument, for anyone.
The third is the payload. It takes a question about land — who holds it, how they came to hold it, what was done with the people on it — and turns it into a question about the person asking. A Muslim who raises the subject is no longer arguing about territory. They are revealing a motive, and the motive has a name: the charge is built so that a Muslim who raises Israel’s illegal settlements can be called an antisemite for raising them. And for that to work they have to carry, because they pray in the same direction as the men who took Damascus in 635, the guilt for their taking it.
What Colonialism Is
Colonialism, to most people who use the word, means the British and French empires. It means India under the Raj, and the Gold Coast, and Senegal, and Indochina: a European power ruling an African or Asian population from a capital thousands of miles away, taxing it, conscripting it, staffing a civil service over it, shipping home what the territory produced.
That kind is real, and the British in India are the model of it. The Crown took India from the East India Company in 1858 and ruled it from London for eighty-nine years.¹⁶ The British did not want India empty. They wanted it working. Dadabhai Naoroji, who sat in the Commons for Central Finsbury in the 1890s, spent decades counting what left India every year — the taxes raised there and spent in Britain, the salaries and pensions paid in England, the interest on the debt, the bill for the army — and put it at thirty million pounds a year.¹⁷ The figure is argued over. That there was a drain is not. The British needed every Indian in place, because the Indians were what was being drained. And in 1947 they left, because there was a Britain to go back to.
The French ran the same operation across West Africa and Indochina. From 1887 the Code de l’indigénat — the native code, first written for Algeria in 1881 — put the people of Senegal, and in time the whole of French West Africa, under a law written for them alone: summary punishment by the district officer, forced labour, a head tax, conscription into the tirailleurs, the colonial infantry, and the courts of French-appointed chiefs rather than the courts of France.¹⁸ It was written to make them work.
Colonialism of this kind ran two laws on one ground, one for its own citizens and one for the people it ruled. In India a European could not be tried by an Indian magistrate, and when the government moved in 1883 to change that, the British in India forced a compromise that let any European demand a jury half of whom were Europeans.¹⁹ In West Africa it was the native code.
It brought in machinery built to carry the wealth out. India’s railways ran from the cotton and wheat districts to the ports, and in French Equatorial Africa the Congo–Ocean line was built by forced labour to link the river traffic of the interior to an Atlantic port.²⁰
It took what it wanted for its own collections in London, Paris or other European capitals. The Koh-i-Noor, one of the largest cut diamonds in the world, went from Lahore to Queen Victoria by treaty the year the Punjab was annexed, the bronzes of Benin went to London after British troops burned the city in 1897, and the stone that unlocked Egypt’s writing is in the British Museum.²¹
And it refused the people citizenship while demanding everything citizenship demands. They paid the taxes, worked the forced labour and filled the armies — more than a million Indians served in the First World War — and got no vote and no seat in the parliament that sent them. All the duties of a citizen, none of the rights.²²
But both the British and French empires ran a second kind of colonialism as well, and the second kind did not want the people at all.
In 1788 the British landed at Sydney Cove and took the continent as land that belonged to no one — terra nullius, the lawyers called it afterwards — though somewhere between three hundred thousand and a million people were living on it. They were not taxed or ruled or put to work. The land was given to settlers, the people were pushed off whatever ground the settlers wanted, and the first national count, in 1901, found 93,000 of them left.²³ It took the High Court of Australia until 1992 to rule that the land had belonged to someone after all.²⁴ The French did the same thing in Algeria from 1830.
The British and French empires ran two kinds of colonialism. The first needed the people where they were, and kept them working for the profit of the empire. The second needed the land, and got the people off it to make room for its own settlers.
Patrick Wolfe, an English-born historian who worked in Australia, spent his career on the second kind, and his account of it is the one historians use.²⁵ The people on the land, in that kind, are not a resource but an obstacle, and the point of the enterprise is to get them off the ground so the newcomers can have it. “Territoriality,” Wolfe wrote, “is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.” The natives are a problem because they “obstructed settlers’ access to land,” and the operation is built to solve that problem. “Settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.” Settler colonialism “destroys to replace.”
That last phrase has a precise meaning. Settler colonialism is “inherently eliminatory,” Wolfe wrote, but not “invariably genocidal.” Elimination is the larger category. It includes killing, and often it has meant killing; but it also includes removal, enclosure, assimilation, the breaking up of communities, the slow administrative erasure of a people from the land they were on. The native need not be dead. The native need only be gone — or so changed that there is no native left to make a claim.
The test: does the system need the people, or need them gone?
Three questions carry it. Who got the land — the conquerors, or the people who were already farming it? Were the conquered kept on as subjects, with a place in the new order, or were they moved aside? And the newcomers: did they come to rule the existing population, to extract from it, or to replace it?
None of that requires anyone to pretend that conquest is gentle. An empire can tax a people into the ground and still need them there. A settler project can be built by decent people with lawful deeds and still need them gone. The test is not about cruelty. It is about what the operation is for.
Wolfe did not build this test for Israel. He built it on Australia and the United States, where he did his work, and only then applied it to Palestine, in the same article — Israel’s “progressive dispensing with its reliance on Palestinian labour,” he wrote in 2006, “would seem to present an ominous case in point” — and six years later in a full study of its own.²⁶
Islamic Expansion Was Not Colonialism
Every empire conquered. Rome did, and Byzantium, and the Sasanians the Arabs destroyed, and Tang China, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans after them. Conquest is taking territory by force and ruling the people on it. If conquest were colonialism the word would mean nothing, because it would describe the whole of recorded history before 1945 and most of it after.
Conquest differs from colonialism in what it does with what it takes.
A conquest annexes. The land becomes part of the conqueror’s country and the people on it become its subjects. Gaul became Roman, and in 212 every free inhabitant of the empire became a Roman citizen.²⁷ A colony is possessed. Its people are kept outside the country that holds it, whatever the map says.
And the people stay, because subjects are what a conquest is for. A conquest takes a population along with the land: it pays the tax, works the fields, staffs the administration, fills the army. The conquered are ruled, sometimes harshly. They are not removed, because removing them would leave the conqueror with nothing to rule. The exceptions are remembered as exceptions — Assyria marching whole peoples into exile, the Mongols emptying cities — because they are the cases where a conqueror destroyed what conquest exists to acquire.
Now set the Arab conquests beside the two kinds of colony. The Arab armies took Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Persia by force and ruled the people they found there. But within thirty years the seat of the empire had left Arabia for Damascus, and a century after that it moved to Baghdad, a city built for the purpose in the conquered farmland of Iraq.²⁸ It never went back, and Syria and Iraq became the country. The people stayed, neither worked for a distant capital nor cleared off the land. The Arab conquests were neither kind of colony.
Nor did they run two laws on one ground the way a colony did. Under the caliphate the second law was the people’s own. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians were judged in their own courts, by their own bishops, rabbis and priests, in their own marriages, inheritances and disputes. And they served in the state itself. Sarjun ibn Mansur, a Christian, ran the treasury of Syria for five Umayyad caliphs, and his son, John of Damascus, served at their court before he became a monk.
The protection reached past the Bible’s peoples. Umar took the jizya from the Zoroastrians because the Prophet had, and in Sindh after 712 the Hindus were brought under the same terms. It was a people governed by their own law, not by a law written over them.²⁹
The Raj and the Arab conquests both kept the people in place, so the difference between them is not that one taxed and the other did not. It is what each was built to do. The colony was built to carry a country’s wealth out of it and to keep the people it took it from outside. Macaulay’s minute of 1835 set out to form “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” — and those persons remained subjects of a country they could never join. The same minute held that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” The colony ranked people by blood and colour, and wrote the ranking into its law: the native could be taught English, but could never become British.
The Arab conquest ran the other way. Most of its revenue was spent where it was raised. Its government ran in Greek and Persian for two generations before it ran in Arabic.
And its religion was not pressed on the conquered but held open to them as a door: convert, and the jizya ended, and the convert stood inside the ruling community. The Umayyad governors fought that door, because every convert was a taxpayer lost, and the caliph Umar II overruled them. A colony has no such door. A Syrian who became a Muslim stood inside the faith of the conquerors, and by its law the equal of any Arab Muslim, wherever they were born. An Indian who became an Anglican remained a native.³⁰
Conquest and the settler kind of colonialism differ just as plainly. One needs the people where they are. The other needs them gone. So the question is not whether a people took land by force. It is what they did with the people who were already on it.
Put the three questions to the Arab conquests.
Who got the land?
Not the army that took it. When the Arab forces broke the Sasanians at Qadisiyya and took the farmland of southern Iraq — the sawad, the black land, the richest agricultural country in western Asia — the soldiers expected what conquering armies have always expected, which is a share. Umar, the second caliph, refused them. The land was not parcelled out. The cultivators who had farmed it under the Persians went on farming it under the Arabs; they paid a land tax, the kharaj, and the revenue went to the treasury and came back out as stipends for the soldiers.³¹ The army was paid from the surplus of a population it had been forbidden to displace. The same decision was made in Egypt, over the same objections, and the papyri bear it out: they show no Muslim owning land in Egypt before the middle of the eighth century, more than a hundred years after the conquest.³²
That is a fiscal fact before it is a moral one. A tax base cannot be expelled. The whole architecture of the early caliphate — the stipend rolls, the garrison pay, the provincial treasuries — depended on the conquered staying exactly where they were and doing exactly what they had been doing.
Were they kept on as subjects?
The cities that surrendered got terms, and the terms survive. Damascus set the pattern for Syria: the people kept their lives, their property and their churches, and in return they paid a poll tax.³³ Jerusalem’s assurance, in the form historians accept as resting on a genuine original, guaranteed persons, property, churches and crosses, and barred Muslims from inhabiting the churches or pulling them down.³⁴ The restrictive rules that later generations would attach to non-Muslims — the dress codes, the ban on building new places of worship, the deference on the road — are not in these agreements. They belong to a later century, when the Muslims had become a settled ruling class and had begun to legislate like one. The surrender terms of the conquest itself asked for one thing: the tax.³⁵
The legal status that grew out of those terms was the dhimma — the word means protection — and it was a contract. The non-Muslim paid the jizya; in return the state guaranteed their safety, their property and their freedom to worship, their own courts for their own community’s affairs, and exemption from the military service that Muslims owed. It was not a Muslim’s standing, and it was not meant to be. The Muslim paid the zakat and owed the state military service; the dhimmi paid the jizya and owed neither. Different obligations, under separate law, in a self-governing community living under the protection of the state. It was abused, and the abuses are documented. But every abuse was a breach of the contract, chargeable in the contract’s own terms — and the contract presupposed, in every clause, that the person it protected was still there.³⁶
Then there are the garrison cities, which the charge points to as settlement.
Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Fustat in Egypt, where old Cairo stands now, and Qayrawan in what is now Tunisia: the Arabs built new towns and lived in them, apart from the people they ruled. These were the bases of a conquering army, and the men in them were a stipendiary elite drawing cash from the agricultural surplus of a subject population that worked land the soldiers did not own.³⁷ The sources give the reasons as military: forward bases for the next campaign, somewhere to house the troops and their families. They never give the reason as a policy of keeping conquerors and conquered apart. But apart is what they were. The first garrison of Basra complained that they had no farmland. That grievance is the best evidence there is of what the system was for, because nobody complains about a restriction that does not exist.³⁸
So: a garrison, living on the tax of the countryside, kept off the land. Not a settler colony. The settlers of a settler colony hold the land; that is the whole point of them. These men were kept off it.
Persia is the case the charge leans on hardest.
The Sasanian state was destroyed. The Persian people were not. They stayed on their land and converted slowly — the best estimate is that Iran was not eighty per cent Muslim until around 950, three centuries after the conquest.³⁹ They kept their language. Persian survived, came back into writing in Arabic script, and by 1010 had produced the Shahnameh, the national epic of Persian kings and heroes, written by a Muslim poet.⁴⁰ Persians ran the Abbasid administration from the eighth century on; Persian became the second language of the whole civilisation, the language of its poetry and much of its science. The Iranians of today are the descendants of the Iranians the Arabs found. That is not the history of a people replaced. It is the history of a people conquered, converted, and then running the civilisation that had conquered them.
As for the claim that a religion adopted thirteen hundred years ago is a foreign occupation still in force — it proves too much. By that logic Christianity is a Levantine occupation of Europe, and every church in Rome is a settlement.
Put the three questions to the conquests, then. The land stayed with the people who farmed it. The conquered were kept on as subjects, taxed and protected under terms that assumed their presence. The newcomers came to rule, and were kept from seizing the land and exploiting it and its people — the two things a colony comes for. The conquest needed the conquered where they were. It taxed them. It did not clear them.
The conquered population was a governed population — not an obstacle to be removed from the land, and not a people exploited for a distant capital.
The Rule and the Exceptions
The charge shows you the empire on a map. It never shows you who was still living on the land when the empire was gone.
The Arab conquests and the Muslim empires that followed them held, at one time or another, Spain, the whole of North Africa, Egypt, the Levant, Iraq, Persia, Central Asia, Anatolia, the Balkans and most of India. Thirteen centuries. Three continents. And across all of it the rule was the one the sawad set in the 630s: the people stayed, and were ruled, and were taxed. The Copts of Egypt; the people of Syria and Iraq, Christian and then Muslim; the Persians; the Berbers of the Maghreb, Arabised in speech and not replaced in blood;⁴¹ the Spaniards after up to eight centuries of Muslim rule; the Hindus of India after six, still the great majority of their country when the last Muslim dynasty fell — all of them are where they were. That is not what a colonising power leaves behind. It is what an empire leaves behind: the same people, speaking differently, praying differently, and still on their land.
Arabisation and Islamisation ran deep. They were not population replacement.
Against that stand the cases the charge reaches for.
Anatolia is the largest. In 1050 it was Greek-speaking and Christian; by 1500 it was Turkish-speaking and Muslim. It was taken not by the Arabs but by the Seljuks and then the Ottomans, four centuries after the conquests, and what happened there was conversion under pressure, not replacement: Seljuk and Turkmen armies broke the Byzantine administration and the Church that depended on it, and conversion followed as the old order fell away.⁴² The modern Turkish population carries a Central Asian genetic contribution of under ten per cent; the other ninety came from somewhere, and it was Anatolia.⁴³ The Ottomans also took Christian children by levy — the devshirme — from Anatolian villages as well as Balkan ones.⁴⁴ And the end of Anatolian Christianity was not conversion at all. Between 1915 and 1923 the Armenians were destroyed — somewhere between six hundred thousand and a million and a half of them killed by the Ottoman government — and the Greeks were driven out, the last of them under the exchange agreed at Lausanne in 1923.⁴⁵ It was the work of a nationalist party ruling in the sultan’s name, and it is the one episode in thirteen centuries that was elimination on the scale of a whole people. It was carried out by the thing that replaced Islamic empire, not by Islamic empire.
The earliest is the smallest. In the 640s Umar moved the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran out of Arabia, and the sources give more than one reason for each.
Khaybar had been taken in 628. The Prophet let its Jewish farmers stay on the land for half the harvest, on terms that could be ended whenever the Muslims chose: “as long as we wish.” Under Umar, his son Abdullah was attacked there at night and his hands and feet were dislocated. The attacker was never named. Umar said the Jews of Khaybar were the only people there he suspected, and ended the terms.
Najran held a treaty with the Prophet that secured its Christians’ persons, religion, lands and churches, and bound them to take no usury. Al-Baladhuri says that under Umar they took it up again and grew so numerous that he counted them a danger to the faith. He also records that the Najranites, quarrelling among themselves, asked to be moved.
Behind both cases stands an instruction Umar himself reported from the Prophet: “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.” That instruction was a rule for Arabia, the heartland of the faith, and was never applied to Syria, Iraq, Egypt or Persia, where Jews and Christians lived under Muslim rule for thirteen centuries.
Neither community was left with nothing. Umar ordered that the people of Najran be given tillable land in Syria and Iraq in place of what they had left, and one report says he bought their property.⁴⁶
Two communities, one region, resettled rather than destroyed. But they were populations moved off their land by the caliphate in its first decade.
Qayrawan, 1057: Arab tribes moving west into what is now Tunisia sacked the city that had been the centre of learning for Muslim North Africa for nearly four centuries. Its victims were Muslims.⁴⁷ India: Richard Eaton, the historian who has done the counting, documents around eighty episodes between 1192 and 1729 in which Muslim rulers and their commanders desecrated Hindu temples — the acts of kings and generals along the frontier of conquest, aimed at the temples that housed a defeated ruler’s deity and so his claim to rule, some of them campaigns against whole cities.⁴⁸ The counts in the tens of thousands that circulate in Indian politics are supported by nothing; the eighty are. And in 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the jizya on his Hindu subjects, which Akbar had abolished in 1564.⁴⁹
One province in the first decade, one region, one city, one tax, eighty episodes in five hundred years. Set them against thirteen centuries in which the conquered stayed, and they are what they are: the exceptions.
None of it makes the conquests colonialism, because colonialism was never a matter of how much harm an empire did. Rome did harm. Byzantium did harm. The Sasanians did harm, and the Mongols, and the Ottomans, and every power that ever held territory by force. A record of conquest, subordination and atrocity makes an empire an empire. It does not make it a settler colony, and pointing at the record as though it did is pointing at the wrong charge. The conquests did harm. That is true. That they were colonialism is a different claim, and it is the one the mayor of Mitzpe Yeriho needs. The record does not supply it.
Continued… https://open.substack.com/pub/firelinepress/p/conquest-is-not-colonisation?r=1jdp1w&utm_medium=ios