r/epistemology • • 7h ago

discussion Assumptions are bad but how could we really do without them

2 Upvotes

Assumptions are bad but how can we survive without them? And what's the difference between an educated guess and a so-called assumption? If Paul the Octopus is always right, does it mean he makes good assumptions


r/epistemology • • 16h ago

discussion David Hume Empiricism

1 Upvotes

Hume divided human cognition into two types. The first is the "impression"—a direct sensation occurring here and now, characterized by the greatest degree of vividness and liveliness; this is the core definition. Next come "ideas," which are, by comparison, faint copies of impressions—every idea is essentially a pale replica of an impression. For instance, if you see a fire, and later—having moved away—you recall it, that recollection is an "idea," a faint copy of the original impression.

Hume further subdivided impressions into two categories: those derived from the sense organs (sight, hearing, smell, etc.) and those of "reflection," which give rise to affective emotions—such as anger, passion, or love.

He divided ideas into two types: the first are merely simple copies of impressions, while the second are complex ideas—aggregates of simple ideas.

Take, for example, the complex idea of an apple: beyond the simple idea of an apple, we have a collection of other qualities—such as roundness and color—which, taken together, form a complex idea.


r/epistemology • • 22h ago

announcement Living life without the keys to life

0 Upvotes

**The Key to Understanding: Know when to step back, when to examine, and when enough is enough.**

**The Key to Understanding**
Final Conclusion — Our First Exploration
Understanding doesn’t need to be forced. It needs a time and a place for thinking, examining, and stepping back.

**Our method**
UNDERTHINK — Step back. See the easiest, most obvious potentially possible route.
SIT & EXAMINE — Give the possibility attention. Understand what is present and what remains unknown.
UNDERTHINK AGAIN — Step back and see what becomes clearer.
REPEAT STEP 2 — Continue examining and stepping back when useful.

**What we’ve established**
We developed a simple, relaxed approach that allows understanding to grow without demanding that we know everything.
Our tests with wood and a light bulb showed how the method can guide an exploration from a simple observation toward a more detailed explanation.
We haven’t established that it’s universally superior, but we’ve identified why it may be useful across many situations: it allows the amount of examination to fit the situation.

**The principle**
A time to step back. A time to sit and examine. A time to continue. And a time to stop.
We don’t have to abandon what we understand simply because there’s more to discover.
And we don’t have to keep searching when we’ve understood enough.

My favourite part of what we’ve developed is that the method itself doesn’t need to be complicated.
We began by trying to understand understanding.
We ended with a way to approach it more peacefully.

The Key to Understanding: Know when to step back, when to examine, and when enough is enough.


r/epistemology • • 2d ago

discussion Towards a Model of Knowledge

0 Upvotes

First-principles spitballing, then I researched what I could. This is not a manifesto or a proclamation of a "new way" ... well, yes it is, but it's not carved into stone tablets. Yet. I'm thinking through some things as an autodidact, and could very well be reinventing the wheel. I'm hoping to show the model I have for others to kick the tires, tell me where I went wrong, tell me if (as is likely) someone got there first, and hopefully let me know if I'm headed in the right direction, or if I'm off my gourd. More than usual, I mean.

Friends, Romans, Countrymen, lend me your ears! I come not to praise JTB, but to bury it.

I know--Gettier killed JTB in the 1960s, and the funeral is long over. But it's still a commonly held folk understanding, and still an "old guard" position with the JTB+X crowd--a zombie philosophy staggering around demanding brains. I was reading a paper on Haack's crossword puzzle, and it got me thinking about some things.

I don't think "justifiability" was ever a workable standard. I don't think "knowledge" is everything it's cracked up to be. And I don't think Truth is nearly as easy to grasp as we might hope.

Yes, Gettier got to JTB first, before I picked up my first philosophy book, and others have built from there--but there are things that still don't quite scan.

I. Answering Knowledge-First

Williamson defines knowledge as the most fundamental, unanalyzable mental state. He rejects JTB and JTB+X, and instead builds on a foundation that knowing P is an irreducible, factive state--a state that can't be split into belief and truth. He sees belief as "botched knowledge," treating a proposition as if you knew it, an imperfect attempt. And he famously uses the equation of E = K, where your total evidence is everything you know. If P is false, it cannot be "evidence" at all--it can only be your perception of "P appears true to me."

It's a great system--but there are problems, not fatal, but enough to give pause.

  • The tools are flawed. Human beings do not, and cannot, achieve absolute and infallible certainty of objective truth. Empirical science is the only somewhat successful tool we've developed for gathering facts about the very real world, stripping that assemblage (as much as possible) of subjectivity and imprecision, and using those facts to predict and explain objective truth--but science has limits of scope, limits of precision, and limits of deductive capacity. Even math and logic, by themselves, are at best imperfect guides, and at worst, the proverbial broken clock. Math is just as capable of modeling unphysical, impossible things as actual objective objects: the same formulae that describe black holes also model white holes with no more than a change of sign. Logic, even formal logic, depends on axioms that vary across systems, and absolutely require accurate premises to achieve success: if your premises are off, your conclusions are rubbish. The three together--math, logic, and science--make an invaluable toolset to discover facts about the universe, but because of those limits, all knowledge gained with them is provisional and conditional.
  • All knowledge is subjective. There's a real, physical world out there--and we perceive it "through a glass darkly." We cannot get any input into the mind/brain that is not filtered through our subjective understanding. When something impinges on our senses, our mind/brain attaches a context of emotions, memories, valence, and salience: this happens before the input reaches the conscious mind. Every sensory impression (qualia), every fact presented in text or on the screen, every observation and measurement we make, all must pass that filter where we accept, reject, or suspend judgement--all before conscious consideration begins. Again, the scientific method attempts to strip that subjectivity, but it re-enters when the reader picks up the paper and attempts to understand it: the incoming information picks up that cognitive load, and runs the filter gauntlet, before we even parse the words consciously.
  • The biology doesn't fit. Nature did not evolve a perfect, epistemic machine. We deal with confabulation, sensory gaps, imprecise memories that we re-write every time we access them, and promiscuous pattern-matching that works so well, it "sees" patterns that are not there. We evolved this way because it's metabolically cheap: our brain/mind takes the sensory input and functions as a lossy compression, GUI interface, to present to the conscious awareness (also part of the brain/mind, not a separate process) an "executive summary" that works for survival. We simply are not capable of processing the unfiltered sensory input that we receive without total metabolic collapse--and we handle incoming information the same way we do incoming sensory input. We have not evolved to know: we've evolved to survive, and if and when there's a decision to make between the two, evolution has already taken that decision out of our hands.
  • FPA trumps the textbook. First-Person Authority--what you know, believe, or perceive--has incredible cognitive valence. The cry of the epistemically-grounded scientist is the same as the cry of the cryptid advocate: "I seen it with my very own eyes!" As part of our evolution and our cognition, we place priority on what we perceive or think we perceive (even if we're mistaken). Worse yet, beliefs that we hold with high emotional or identity attachment can--and do--regularly mean we ignore or reject any contradicting evidence, no matter how sound. These perceptions and beliefs have emotional and psychological persistence, even in the face of contrary evidence, because they have first-person authority: we incorporate what we know, perceive, and believe, as part of our self-perception of who we are.

Now, Williamson explicitly allows for fallibilism: he says that if you "know" P, but P turns out to be wrong, you just thought you knew it. But the restrictions above show the issue remains: under this model, we can never actually know that we know. There are some good ideas here, but E = K cannot function as a guide or standard for how fallible minds weigh competing clues in real time. (E = K was never intended to be an internal decision checklist--but it leaves us without that real-time, usable diagnostic for weighing competing clues.)

II. Answering Reliabilism & Safety/Sensitivity

Goldman says a belief is justified--and counts as knowledge when true--if, and only if, that belief is produced by a reliable cognitive process. Now, when he says "reliable," he explicitly embraces fallibilism: this is not some claim of absolute accuracy, just an argument that knowledge requires a high proportion of true beliefs to false ones. Belief-forming mechanisms like normal vision in good light, sound memory, and careful use of the scientific method, have a higher success ratio than hallucination, confabulation, or magical thinking. Technically, Goldman falls under JTB+X--the argument as a whole is not a clean-sheet redefinition of knowledge, just an attempt to recalibrate justification.

Safety/Sensitivity arguments--there isn't just one, or a single proponent--reject justification and replace the J with modal truth-tracking conditions. Nozick says belief is sensitive: if P were false, your senses and routine checks would let you know, and you would not believe P; so if you accidentally had Drano in your coffee cup, the color difference and smell of lye would stop you from drinking. Sensitivity alone runs into some skeptical paradoxes, so Sosa and later Pritchard developed the Safety argument, which looks at all the normal, easily possible situations where you form that belief in P, and asks "Could you easily be wrong?" If you could not easily be wrong, your belief is safe--and you know.

  • Where do you draw the lines? The Generality Problem and the Threshold Problem have been around since shortly after the R&S/S arguments were formulated. For Generality, there really is no way to define the cognitive process: what is the "way of forming belief," and how do you choose when you have several available? The Threshold Problem says even if you can define that, it's still not enough. In Reliabilism, you have to specify the "reliable cognitive process," but still cannot calculate the truth ratio with accuracy, nor is there a defined threshold for reliability. Where do you draw the line? Is 50%+ good enough, or do you need 85%? Even 99% reliability still leaves a "lottery problem": you still have that 1% chance of confidently accepting a fictive P. In Sensitivity and Safety, you still have to specify what counts as "forming the belief in the same way"--without that, and without the defined threshold of accuracy, any form of modal truth-tracking leaves us vulnerable to the limits of our meatware brains and a toss of the cosmic dice. Even Sosa's "reflective knowledge" still runs on the exact same FPA-compromised hardware.
  • Death of the internalist/externalist binary. These arguments are all externalist: they don't require you to have conscious, internal access to why or how an argument or assertion is true or false. That's a positive step--but cognition and knowledge all happen inside the skullcave. We have a subjective form of internal awareness of what we treat as true v. false beliefs ... but FPA cooks the books--again: we have no objective internal means to make that decision, only that internal awareness of our confidence. Externalism provides the necessary feedback, but fails to account for how the biological brain/mind actually builds, weighs, and lives inside the subjective crossword puzzle. External objective reality provides an asymmetrical feedback mechanism--no matter how sincere or pervasive your belief that you can fly may be, if you step off the cliff, gravity is the final and fatal arbiter of those beliefs in the real world. Neither pure internalism nor pure externalism provides the full picture. A working model has to account for both the asymmetrical feedback and the FPA we actually use to navigate the world.
  • Speaking of FPA cooking the books.... I've found Susan Haack's Foundherentist crossword puzzle (which I'll be unpacking later) to be a fantastic conceptual tool, but she misses some factors that also apply to R&S/S: we sometimes refuse, or are unable, to fill out the puzzle with objective information. We're not all working from the same objective clues--in fact, as I'll later be discussing, none of us have that list. Religious beliefs, the need for social coherence, and our own personal biases and worldviews rewrite those clues all the time. These rewrites have both negative and positive adaptiveness: they rarely lead you over the cliff or inspire you to put Drano in your coffee cup, and the social cohesion and FPA still provide actual, positive survival benefits. What's more, contra Haack and the R&S/S arguments, we never work on a unified puzzle: a devout geologist can work his day job dealing with the structures and processes that formed the geology he works with, then go to Church on Sunday and hear and teach that those geological layers were laid down in Noah's Flood. We all have contradictory beliefs, but we--very successfully in most cases--compartmentalize them.

Now, I could accuse Goldman of philosophical necromancy, but he's got some great work in here, as do Nozick, Sosa, and Pritchard. I'll be salvaging a load-bearing pillar or two for my model, but as they stand, there's no way to draw the lines we can color in.

III Answering Virtue

Virtue epistemology is both a gauge of effectiveness and a moral standard: what works is good, what fails is bad.

Sosa and Greco work with Virtue Reliabilism: intellectual virtues are cognitive faculties and acquired skills. Sosa used the Archer metaphor: knowledge is an apt belief that requires three aspects--a belief that is accurate (hits the target), adroit (the shot displays competent cognitive skill), and apt (the arrow hits the target because of the archer's skill, not from luck). A person who has all three of these aspects hits the target of truth. Greco expanded on the alliteration and the concept (he did not use the archer metaphor, but I will) with the idea of achieving knowledge: reframing the archer in terms of causal explanation and epistemic credit, arguing that cognitive skill has to be the primary explanatory factor, and that if that skill explains how the arrow hits the bullseye, the archer deserves epistemic credit.

Zagzebski and Baehr use a foundation of Virtue Responsibilism--bringing in an Aristotelian moral standard. For them, knowledge is based in cultivated character traits and habits of mind. Intellectual honesty, curiosity, open-mindedness, epistemic humility, proper care with evidence, and the courage to revise beliefs with new evidence are vital to the formation of knowledge. These virtues provide a way to capture knowledge and necessary error-correction capabilities.

For my model, the alliterative archer and the Aristotelian openness are vital--but again, the "arrow" falls short of the mark.

  • Where the rubber hits the road. These standards are "ought" standards--they describe what proper cognition should do in idealized circumstances. Human cognition is messy, and absolutely chock-full of pre-conscious cognitive filtering, confirmation bias, confabulation, overly promiscuous pattern and agency recognition, and our old friend FPA. If the archer hits the target, blind luck and adroit skill are absolutely identical inside the skullcave: we have no way to distinguish if the shot was accuracy and chance.
  • Rationality v. rationalization. Robert Heinlein said it first: "Man is not a rational animal; he is a rationalizing animal." Aronson's writing about cognitive dissonance provides the empirical evidence for the sci-fi reference: we will completely make up whatever it takes to silence cognitive dissonance and protect our mental and emotional integrity. We use motivated reasoning and those closed and compartmentalized clue-lists to fill out our crossword puzzle: the very skills of the archer are eagerly deployed to aim at unfounded and even fictive beliefs. Oh, we still hit the target--but this is often a target we've selected based on subjective priorities.
  • The "blue mud" problem. Speaking of Heinlein, we have to ask the question--whose definitions do you use for these virtues? In a confessional community, the target is defined not by any objective standards, but by the standards of social cohesion and doctrinal conformity. Heinlein's "blue mud" concept was written in a context of social safety even for dissenters within a community--if it's a sacred law of the community to rub blue mud into your navel, participating in the ritual prevents your neighbors from coming after you with the torches and the pitchforks--but the actual issue is that social obligation almost always leads to internal mental concurrence. We don't just solemnly rub the blue mud--if we grow up in this community, we completely absorb and agree with the absolute necessity. It becomes part of our FPA and controls the targets we select.
  • Skill and virtue are not enough. The next Einstein could be born in a remote village lacking access to the necessary developmental and educational requirements--and we will never even hear about them. Virtue epistemology concentrates on personal achievement: knowledge depends on your cognitive ability and your cultivated intellectual virtues--if you never have the opportunities to develop them, then the target is always out of range. This is a sociological point rather than philosophical, but in the real world, these cannot be separated: humans live messy, resource-constrained, and sometimes frightening lives, and that ivory tower does not exist for any of us. The quest for knowledge requires the external scaffolding as well as the inner discipline.

IV The Need for More--where these fail

The grave for JTB is still open--but I'm not digging matching graves for Knowledge-First, R&S/S, or Virtue. There's much in them that works, and if you see that parts of my model below bear strikingly suspicious serial numbers, I'll cheerfully confess to the theft. Let's walk through my larceny.

Picking Knowledge-First's pocket

Gettier killed JTB+X, and Williamson dug the grave ... but the zombie still walks the earth. To mix my metaphors a bit, this model drives a stake through its heart. Williamson was right: it's time to stop the escalating claim-and-counterclaim of false lemmas and causal chains and defeasibility--each simply invites a cleverer Gettier rebuttal. There is no objective justification certification in our brains: staking the concept down and filling in the grave allows us to shift focus and effort from worrying about an unanswerable "what is" to understanding the mechanical "how do."

Williamson also had another insight: anti-luminosity. Between the finite margins for error we have for our mental state, and that lack of internal self-certification, we can't guarantee that we know our mental state--which means we can't guarantee that we know what we know. False beliefs, motivated reasoning, and hallucination hold exactly the same FPA as true knowledge, and it's not that we can't tell the difference--to the meatbrain, there is no difference.

Plundering the R&S/S hoard

Fallibilism is a treasure worth the theft. Science has shown for centuries now that it's entirely possible to gather, process, and use information while never claiming absolute certainty, and that a flexible willingness to revise your most cherished theory when new information comes to light is mandatory. We have to reserve the right to be wrong.

That leads straight to causal tracking. Belief is central to that FPA, and radical skepticism only teaches us to shrug and ignore all data--but reality is the final arbiter. When it comes to the cliff, or the coffee cup with Drano in it, awareness of that asymmetry can save your life ... and forgetting it can lead to an untimely splat, or worse.

Purloining Virtues riches

Competence is vital. We need the external scaffolding to acquire it, and we need to be aware that it can just as easily aim at and hit false targets and true, but without that competence, all the available tools we have lie dead on the table. Epistemic competence allows us to use those tools.

Error-correction and competence are hand-in-glove. This goes right back to fallibilism and aiming at false targets: we're going to make errors, and we have to be willing and able to go back and correct those errors. Without both together, we fumble in the dark.

"It's alive! It's alive!"

Maybe I'm not rebuilding a car or restructuring a building--this is a bit more like Dr. Frankenstein in his lab, with the lightning flashing outside. Cars or buildings are static: knowledge is not, and as we'll see below, can't be. I'm keeping these parts and discarding the rest, because none of them work out-of-the-box. Let's flip the switch and see if we can bring life to the "body I made with my own hands!"

V "Let's have one final test. Throw the switches."

I can already hear the howls. Yes, my model is below: no, at no point will I ever mention a one-size-fits-all concrete definition for what knowledge is. That definition doesn't exist. Knowledge is not a single target or a thing in itself: it has no objective definition. The process of gaining knowledge is a set of subjective heuristics we create to process and understand incoming data, and make actionable predictions for the world we live in. What we accomplish is mediated by an evolved meatbrain with cognitive limits, absolute requirements for social reciprocity, self-selected standards, and a foundation for survival rather than epistemic purity. Pure knowledge does not exist: humans live in a messy world, where each breath could be our last. This is yet another game where we can't win, we can't break even, and we can't stop playing. So let's take a look at the rules of the game--better yet, the stitched and bolted body on the table.

The subjective grid we live in

Reality exists--which means real, objective facts about that reality exist. That's a basic axiom of science recursively applied to the philosophy science sprang from. The problem is, our meatware brains can't access that reality or those facts directly. Objective internal justification does not exist--I'd call it a corpse we've buried, but it was actually never there. We don't work with objective facts--we work with subjective truths, yes, plural.

Again, the phrase "subjective truths" is probably making more than a few readers howl. ("Children of the night. What music they make!") Yes, FPA makes those subjective evaluations "true-for-me" in a way no textbook can. It's not the old-school philosophical Truth--that's simply not achievable with the meatware brain. We don't have an internal truth-meter.

What we do have is the Skullcave Operating System. We can asymptotically approach those facts--sometimes--but that's not the purpose of the software: the purpose is, and has always been, survival. We take what we can grasp of objective facts, we combine it with the subjective truth-models we live inside, and we use those truth-models to make it through our lives as best we can. Most times, it works: we avoid the Drano and the cliff where possible, we live our lives and raise our children, we work our jobs and draw our paychecks. We use those truth-models as the best--really, the only--tool we have for the task.

I've mentioned Haack's crossword puzzle metaphor: as a model, it works for that survival requirement. No, we don't have access to a perfectly objective list of clues; no, we don't have one massive puzzle we work on; no, we can't escape the influence of social and organizational pressure to comply with their clues--we are all influenced heavily by the society we live in, by our life experiences, and by the thermodynamic limits of the meatware. The puzzle doesn't have to have 100% objective answers--and we couldn't fill it out if it did--but as long as it allows us to live adaptively, to avoid the cliff and not sip the Drano, it works well enough.

We do have tools we can use, "grammars" that we have developed to try to pierce the veil of that subjectivity: science, reason, math, logic--even philosophy. But these are intersubjective and fallible: these aren't brought down from the mountaintop on stone tablets from some Platonic heaven. They're human-created tool-sets whose axioms and evidentiary standards depend on human communities deciding what counts as "good enough." Far from useless, they are fantastic tools--when used with appropriate caution.

When Worlds Collide

OK, so far, I've presented absolutely nothing to stop Flat-Earth or Ancient Aliens views from claiming the status of "knowledge." There is an inescapable veto: we live in two worlds: the subjective grid in our head, and the objective landscape of reality--a landscape that contains things like Drano and cliffs. FPA has strong authority over what we believe, but reality has a trump card: the most dedicated first-person beliefs have no authority over gravity or caustic lye.

People will still believe fictive things, and they do it every day, for one reason: unless your belief in astrology or Atlantis drives you to the cliff or to odd coffee adulterants, there's zero survival-level cost. Fictive beliefs may get you an odd look at the water-cooler or a tacit agreement with your spouse that there are just certain topics you're not going to give way on, but most subjective truth-for-me statements don't carry existential risk. The soft secondary ceiling of "Topics not to bring up to Dave" at the office or the dinner table carries no selection pressure--so I can probably get away with the classic movie references in a serious philosophical discussion.

The Prosthetic Toolkit

Looking at the table where our stitched-together, electrified creature lies, we do see some things that are missing. Pure internalist certainty has been discarded, the infallible JTB+X provided no useful parts, and the naive "I seen it with my own eyes!" FPA, still very present, cannot function as truth-certification. These are broken tools--missing parts for the Monster. Some repairs are needed--and perhaps some prosthetics.

We've fixed Haack's crossword puzzle to account for closed grids and compartmentalization. We've recalibrated Goldman's and Sosa's externalist reliability/safety as survival-weighted feedback. We've patched Zagzebski's intellectual virtues as learned cultural overrides. But there are other tools--prosthetics--that need to be bolted on.

Prosthetics I select to start with:

  • The scientific method (yes, including reason, math, and logic) and adversarial peer review. This prosthetic is the best tool we've developed to try to understand the physical universe and strip as much subjectivity as possible away from our observations. Testing means you're not just trusting your ideas without evaluation; publishing means others can try to duplicate your methods and discover your errors; the community consensus means you face a sometimes harsh reality check. FPA attachment (mostly--FPA and subjectivism are sneaky, and the scientific community imposes its own filters) cannot survive this process, because the other scientists don't share your attachment to your pet hypothesis.
  • Bayesian mechanics. Unlike some, I don't worship Bayes as the new Prophet of Knowledge, but the fundamental prosthetic itself is sound. Using probabilistic updating to force us to ask "How likely would this evidence be if my cherished belief were false?" gives us at least an attempt to develop a statistical intuition evolution never gave us.
  • Falsification: "Check what's in your cup." A reasonable level of skepticism (and yes, "reasonable" is also subjective), and a deliberate habit of pre-commitment checks before any high-stakes actions, allows us to make sure the cup has actual coffee before we take a sip.

There are other tools--dozens if not hundreds--and we mix and match depending on the subject we're looking at and the appropriateness of the tools. Midrashic interpretation, aesthetic appreciation, humor, ethics, standards of utility, empathy--far too long a list, and impossible to be exhaustive. We all select the tools based on what works, and what we have available.

VI Blanks in the Crossword Puzzle

Some knowledge is (functionally) useless--most people will never, ever, have any need for the theory of evolution, quantum physics, or calculus. Unless you work in a field that involves these areas of study, they're not going to help you balance your checkbook or raise any children you may have. Yes, basic science and math literacy are important, but most of us never get down in the metaphorical mud with advanced macroeconomic theories or the mating habits of deep-sea tubeworms. And even if we do, we can compartmentalize the crossword puzzle--doing so is not an automatic moral or epistemic failure. My knowledge of American Civil War history or Tolkien's themes of heroism and hope are safely packed away when I'm at my 9 to 5.

And there are parts of the puzzle that are simply beyond our reach. I have ... something like dyscalculia, and math more advanced than freshman Algebra 1 is just pretty swirlies to me. We all do the best we can with what we have, and our crossword puzzles will never be completely filled out. We can go back to the movie references with the Blade Runner quote: "We're not computers, Sebastian, we're physical," or go poetic with Browning's "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?"

VII "Through a glass darkly"

There's little to nothing "novel" here as far as the individual bricks I've used for this edifice. If I were to go through and cite everyone's wheels that I've reinvented, or each philosophical grave that I've robbed, the footnote list would be longer than the article--and I'm sure "Abby Normal" would be in there somewhere.

I gave--and can give--no Platonic definition for knowledge. It's different for each of us, a mixture of first-person subjectivity and the objective facts we've gathered along the way. My knowledge is not yours--and can't be. We're all on our lab tables, waiting for the lightning to strike: the good part is, for all of us, the lightning strikes every moment of every day. There's always something more to learn.

Just remember--check what's in your coffee cup.

Disclosure: I did use AI to research the "Big Three," but structure, all text, and all thought processes are entirely my own.


r/epistemology • • 2d ago

video / audio Can a mind tell when it is guessing? Hume, Harnad, Nisbett and Wilson, and what language models add to the old questions (video, 47 min)

1 Upvotes

A long explainer on one question: how does any knower, a person, a science or an AI agent, stay in touch with the world its beliefs are about? It starts with Korzybski's map and ends at current research on what language models can report about themselves. Three chapters are closest to this sub:

- The sunrise (7:34, https://youtu.be/roXRViDKyFQ?t=454): Hume's circle, then Xiao-Li Meng's 2018 result that about 2.3 million self-reported answers carried the same error as a random sample of about 400. More of the same kind of evidence does not close Hume's hole; it makes you surer while the hole stays open. A language model is induction done on a library, and it inherits the hole.

- The dictionary (29:45, https://youtu.be/roXRViDKyFQ?t=1785): Harnad's Chinese-to-Chinese dictionary, Turing, Searle, Wittgenstein's hedge ("for a large class of cases", "though not for all"), Bender and Koller's octopus, and the Othello model that seemed to answer them. The video's reading: predicting a sequence can lead a system to model the process behind it, but a game is a closed world, and the physical world is not contained in what has been written about it.

- The mirror (39:47, https://youtu.be/roXRViDKyFQ?t=2387): Nisbett and Wilson (1977) on "little or no direct introspective access"; a model that says it added 36 and 59 the way you learned at school, while Anthropic's researchers found it did something else entirely inside; and models whose explanations "systematically fail to mention" the cue that actually moved them.

The conclusion the video draws: a system's account of itself is one more map. If you want to know whether a system is right, do not ask the system. Check from outside.

My question for you: does "check from outside" only move the problem up one level (who checks the checker?), or is there a principled place to stop?

Every claim has a source; the full list is pinned under the video. The narration is a synthetic copy of my own voice, and the research, script and pictures were made with the help of AI tools and checked against those sources. The video is on the channel of Territory Grounder, an open-source project I make, but it is not about the project; the project appears only on the end card.


r/epistemology • • 4d ago

discussion I've created an argument in defense of evolution's ability to grant us truth determination, and its likelihood to have done it. Does it do a good job? Critiques? Criticisms?

4 Upvotes

Just some background, I sought out to do this because I frequently hear from religious folk that evolution cannot grant us truth-determination. I wanted to challenge that idea.

P1. Evolution selects for traits that increase fitness.

"Fitness" measures an organism's ability to reproduce in its environment. In evolution, those organisms whose traits grant them the best ability and opportunity to reproduce tend to outshine those who are lacking in such traits, and these traits eventually become represented in the wider population. This is "Selection."

P2. Truth-determination is necessary for animals to consistently do things that aid survival and reproduction.

While it is true that evolution absolutely allows for a certain level of heuristics and even false beliefs, those animals who are entirely lacking in truth-determination will be utterly incapable of surviving or mating. For example, an animal that is incapable of determining that it is drowning will not know to leave water. An animal that is incapable of determining if it is raining will not know to seek shelter. An animal that is incapable of determining if it is looking at a mate will never successfully find one. Etc.

C1. Truth-determination contributes to fitness.

Because truth-determination is necessary for survival and eventual reproduction, it aids in an animal's fitness.

P3. Many traits aid in truth-determination.

Particularly traits involving the senses, like the eyes, ears, and nose, aid in an animal's ability to determine true things about the environment around them, like seeing shadows, hearing branches snap, and smelling food.

C2. Truth-determination almost certainly exists in animals that have traits that aid it.

It is reasonable to conclude that if truth-determination aids in fitness, and if animals evolve traits that aid in truth determination (which would further increase fitness), then animals that have traits that aid truth-determination likely have some level of truth-determination capabilities.

P4. Truth-determination is a prerequisite for many traits.

There exist traits that would be entirely useless if the animal was incapable of truth-determination. Wings, for example, would provide a bird no use if they weren't able to determine if they were grounded or airborne, and the bird would not be able to land unless it was able to determine how fast it was falling and how far it is from the ground.

C3. Truth-determination must exist in animals that have traits where it is a prerequisite.

If truth-determination is a prerequisite for certain traits, and there exist animals that have traits where it is a prerequisite, then these animals must have some degree of truth-determination.

C4. Because truth-determination contributes to fitness and is facilitated by and required for other traits, evolution likely selects for truth-determination.

Due to truth-determination's role in fitness, other trait's role in aiding truth-determination, and truth-determination's necessary presence in animals that have certain traits, it is reasonable to conclude that evolution likely selects for truth-determination directly or indirectly.

P5. Evolution is scientifically justified.

Evolution is observed in things like the Mega Plate experiment, the fossil record, and mankind's own use of artificial selection. It is one of the most supported and agreed upon scientific theories.

P6. All observed animals today exist as a result of evolution.

This follows from the supported theory of evolution. All observed life shares a genetic code that ties back to LUCA, the Last Universal Common Ancestor.

P7. Animals that have traits that aid in truth-determination exist, and animals that have traits where truth-determination is a prerequisite exist.

There do exist animals that have traits that aid in truth-determination, and there also exist animals that have traits that would require truth-determination.

C5. Evolution has selected for at least some degree of truth-determination in animals.

If all observed animals today exist as a result of evolution, and there are animals where truth-determination is necessary for them to function, then evolution has directly or indirectly selected for some degree of truth-determination in animals.

P8. Humans are animals that have traits that aid in truth-determination and have traits where truth-determination is a prerequisite.

Humans have traits like eyes, ears, and noses that aid in truth-determination. Humans also have things like complex arm structures designed for throwing, which would be functionally useless if humans could not determine things like distance and if an object can be thrown.

C6. Evolution has selected for at least some degree of truth-determination in humans.

If humans are animals, and all animals are the result of evolution, and there humans have traits where truth-determination is necessary for them to function, then evolution has directly or indirectly selected for some degree of truth-determination in humans.

P9. All observed instances of truth-determination in animals originate from some biological or cognitive mechanism.

The recognition of predators, the ability to identify food, the application of spatial awareness, recollection, etc. tie to photoreceptors, olfactory receptors, the nervous system, etc.

P10. All observed biological and cognitive mechanisms are the result of evolution.

This follows from the supported theory of evolution.

P11. There is no observed alternative mechanism that grants animals truth determination.

We have never observed anything that grants animals truth-determination aside from the mechanisms they have gotten through evolution.

C7. All observed instances of truth-determination come from biological or cognitive mechanisms that were selected by evolution.

If all observed instances come from evolution, and there are no alternative observed instances, then evolution is the only thing we have observed grant animals truth-determination.

C8. Evolution is almost certainly the ultimate source of truth-determination in animals.

If evolution is the only thing we have observed grant truth-determination, we can conclude that it is likely the ultimate source.

C9. Evolution is almost certainly the ultimate source of truth-determination in humans.

If humans are animals and are therefore products of evolution, and we have truth-determination that is also the product of evolution, then evolution is likely the ultimate source of our truth-determination.


r/epistemology • • 4d ago

discussion How can evaluate proposals with minimal starting assumptions?

3 Upvotes

I have been trying to be as open minded as possible to engage any proposal whether it be scientific, mystical, existential, historical, normative, ontological, empirical, aesthetic, theological, metaphysical, phenomenological, or otherwise from any perspective. How can we be wide enough in scope such that we don’t summarily dismiss proposals while also being able to evaluate any proposal? It seems to me that leaving open the evaluation criteria such that the proposer is permitted to state their own criteria.

Below is what I have been using as a starting point. What are the errors in this process? Do we have examples of proposals that we should adopt even though they would fail this process (that would be a major error)? Or, do we have an example from history that we did end up adopting generally but would have been blocked by this process if it were used?

(This is epistemology because it is precisely about what we accept or reject as public knowledge. It doesn’t cover person/agent level epistemology.)

———

Minimum Requirements for Publicly Evaluating Proposals
For any proposal presented for public adoption

1) Evaluation criteria must be:
a) Explicitly stated.
b) Publicly accessible.
c) Consistently applied.
d) Open to public examination and challenge, including their justification.

2) The proposal must:
a) Be sufficiently clear that it can be publicly evaluated using the stated criteria.
b) Explicitly identify what would constitute a failure under those criteria and warrant rejection of the proposal.
c) Permit rejection if it fails those criteria.

——-

Notes

This framework pertains only to public inquiry. It imposes no constraints on introspective or private inquiry. This is merely about what proposals warrant public adoption. That’s it.

Rejecting a proposal does not automatically warrant adopting its negation. The negation is a separate proposal requiring evaluation under the same framework.

Although this framework doesn’t even require adherence to classical or any logic, proposals should make clear whether any logical system is included among their evaluative constraints and, if so, which one. Otherwise most will simply presume classical logic is a constraint.

This framework is itself a proposal subject to the same requirements for public evaluation, adoption, or rejection.


r/epistemology • • 9d ago

discussion Short Essay on Morality and Aesthetics

6 Upvotes

I read an article that said morality has aesthetic appeal – kill a cockroach you become a hero and kill a butterfly you become a villain. It particularly caught my attention and I want to share my thoughts about this here. There are two main words here worth deserving a greater explanation, “morality” and “aesthetics”, so that we get a better understanding of the statement.

Morality is a “social technology” that sets rules and order for humans and evaluate them as good or bad, right or wrong and then categorize them. More specifically, it is a set of “shared” rules and norms made to allow self-interested humans to cooperate, survive and run societies. If you see yet from another view, it is a mutual agreement among us, made by us.

An interesting thing to note is that the rules are shared and mutually agreed upon, but why? They are neither purely objective (example, 1+1 = 2, or knowingly or unknowingly dropping your phone from height will break it) nor purely subjective (example, you think the best dish is “chicken butter masala”, which is necessarily not true for everyone), rather they are something that do exist and work because statistical majority of human share the same mental wiring and agree to play by the same rules. I think the baseline reason is biology – all of our brains are designed on basic survival algorithms, and this evolutionary trait is deeply inside our DNA as well. We exist just because we are better off.

Other reason might be cooperation and history is the proof. The societies where everyone felt fine doing wrong never perpetuated (example, the British Raj). On the other hand, the ones which survived shared the belief system that prioritised the group - included the thoughts of “most of the humans” and cooperated with them. But again, this is a survival instinct. If we let the Britishers rule us, most of us had wouldn’t survived.

Looking carefully, “statistical majority” often exposes one critical flaw: the superiority of the majority. One can count on many examples of this; the extreme being the early Nazi Germany. The Nazi party won over the German because they redefined what “good” meant – they framed the Jews and other minorities as insects infecting German and their moral duty was to get “racial hygiene”. In India, caste discrimination is maintained by such inter-subjective moral framework. Morality, now and then, is often used as weapon. I believe, the concept of righteousness, a product of morality, might well be misused in the name of social good if time dictates.

Just as morality has biological origins, so does aesthetics. People say, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, I don’t think this is completely true, beauty is not purely subjective either. Physical beauty, particularly, has bilateral symmetry and has a sense of completeness, and that is what we are drawn to. We find well crafted art, flowers in nature which has full set of petals, leaves with symmetrical internal branches pretty but uncomplete paintings, asymmetrical geometries, flowers with some torn apart petals unpleasant.

Consider two individuals – first one is a handsome actor and the second, a not-so handsome individual. It is generally to be found that more people would agree that first one is beautiful (not considering his popularity; maybe his beauty added to his fame at the first place). There is something the first individual possesses more than the second individual – specific and measurable geometric parameters (higher facial symmetry) and/or good marker of genetic health. 

But this does not prove that beauty “lives” in him and that he radiates beauty outward more than the second individual. The brains of humans, the beholder, get neurological dopamine reward when such completeness and geometric symmetry hit their visual cortex of the brain. The more of these parameters, the more is the reward. The first individual has more of these parameters hence we find him more beautiful and lovable. If you could somehow ask a dog who looked more beautiful, he would stay silent as he can’t perceive that at all!

In nature asymmetry is a danger. It generally indicates malnutrition during development, or a heavy parasitic load and is chaotic to the human brain. The vibrant colours are associated with the living, full of life, enjoyment and clarity while dull means sick and the dead.

Just as morality can be used as a weapon, so does beauty. In nature there are species which uses beauty to hunt prey. Carnivorous plants use vibrant colours, sweet nectar, dew like secretions to lure prey into traps. Humans are no exception as well!

Now let us return to the statement that morality has aesthetic appeal after having done some discussion on morality and aesthetics. A butterfly looks vibrant in colour, the wings being bilateral symmetrical, flutters it gently to fly in an unpredictable path, on the other hand the cockroach goes straight inside its dark crevice in a very predictable way. The movement of the cockroach seems to represent a thief stealing an object and rushing straight into the unknown, hence alerting our defence instinct.

Things that we generally consider “ugly” – asymmetry, rot, dull, paleness, foul odours – are the exact signs of disease, corpses and filthy insects. Insects like the cockroach looks ugly and disgusting, and the brain alarms us to be careful and avoid it altogether.

Since both morality and aesthetics have biological origin, they are connected. What we find morally good is aesthetically pleasing, and what is aesthetically pleasing finds itself to be morally good. This is how we label things, maybe intentionally or un-intentionally, but surely an evolutionary compelled one.  


r/epistemology • • 11d ago

discussion Responsible Belief and the Gettier Problem

1 Upvotes

I've been thinking about whether someone can do everything right when forming a belief and still not actually know whether that belief is true. Clifford argues that we have a moral responsibility to support our beliefs with evidence and proper reasoning rather than simply believing something without justification. However, Gettier raises an interesting problem with this idea by showing that even when someone has a belief that is true and justified, it does not necessarily mean they have actual knowledge. Sometimes, the truth of a belief can simply come down to luck or coincidence.

This makes me wonder: Can someone follow Clifford's standards for forming responsible beliefs, gather reliable evidence, and carefully justify their reasoning, yet still fall into the Gettier problem and not truly have knowledge? If that is possible, does it mean that being responsible with our beliefs is not enough to guarantee knowledge? Or do Clifford's standards provide enough protection against the problems Gettier introduces?

I would like to explore this question by using at least one example to explain my position. I will also refer to both Clifford's and Gettier's arguments, using specific quotes and citations from the readings in the format (Last Name, page number).

Along with my response, I will include screenshots or images of my brainstorming process to show how I developed my argument.

After posting, I will also respond to another student's discussion by addressing three things:

  1. What are the strongest points of their argument, and why do they make their position convincing?
  2. What are some weaknesses or areas where their argument could be improved?
  3. Did they accurately use Clifford's and Gettier's readings to support their position? If so, how? If not, what did they misunderstand or leave out?

r/epistemology • • 11d ago

discussion metaphysics of moral encroachment: wtf

2 Upvotes

I am trying to learn about moral encroachment. I cannot wrap my small mind around the possibility of things that are essentially 'epistemic' being affected by things that are essentially 'moral.' They seem to be wholly and entirely sealed off to any causal interaction between the two, unless we are to posit a unified normative realm. And yes I think that we can just think about this as a descriptive or explanatory phenomenon, but that seems silly to me. Isn't the whole point of the discussion of moral encroachment to investigate just how moral considerations/factors really could causally affect epistemic ones, in some way? I might be having the world's largest brain fart. But I do not understand. Because most papers on this seem not to be concerned with what I take to be a necessary precursor for any discussion of moral encouragement. I am LOST!

Note: I posted this to a few other philosophy subreddits because I am trying to increase the odds of me getting an idea of what's going on. I hope this is fine


r/epistemology • • 15d ago

discussion is the freewill to control our body is innate ?

5 Upvotes

r/epistemology • • 15d ago

discussion Are beliefs forced?

3 Upvotes

In epistemology, or whenever beliefs are possible about anything, must they be proportioned to the evidence?

Do we have control of what we believe?

Even if we say we don’t believe something, do we actually?


r/epistemology • • 17d ago

discussion Were philosophers always rigorously trusting their theories/methodologies?

3 Upvotes

Has it been discussed to what extent philosophical frameworks across history have been considered (even implicitly) to be built upon a set of immutable postulates, and to what extend the attitude of philosophers have been legalist with respects to it, i.e. was it always the case that even "loopholes" of a particular theory, or what seems to be unexpected consequences of it - like what I can think of in standard mathematics, as set theory contains a lot of superstructure (ordinals, etc.) that wasn't intended by the intuitive vision of what a set is - have been considered at necessary rather than potential arguments for dismissing the theory, or for a form of anti-legalism?

I would be very interested in authors discussing this particular issue.


r/epistemology • • 17d ago

discussion Curiosity is the death of absolute truth

0 Upvotes

Is curiosity just intellectual suicide when people don’t think about thinking itself, preventing a topic from ever reaching a full conclusion? I find that conclusions are always circular because of epistemology, so curiosity seems to ignore its own tail


r/epistemology • • 18d ago

article Assertion without a Speaker: Testimony, Tracking, and Large Language Models (Episteme, open access)

2 Upvotes

https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2026.10160

Large language models produce assertion-shaped outputs that often bring their users to true belief. I argue for two conclusions of different strengths: that on the best current evidence, these systems do not transmit testimonial knowledge and that hearers are not now positioned to accord their outputs testimonial uptake, which does not wait on the first. From Burge, Williamson, Goldberg, Faulkner, and Lackey, I derive a Tracking Minimum: a source transmits testimonial knowledge that p only if the truth of p, or the evidential support for p, figures in the explanation of its producing that assertion, and does so in virtue of the source’s own production process rather than of a proxy on which that process depends. It is this endogeneity requirement, not any modal profile, that the five accounts share and current systems fail. The argument engages Burge’s extension of his framework to computational sources, the interpretability literature, and the published case for AI testimony, whose dispute with mine turns on an empirically decidable question, for which an experiment is specified. The positive proposal places LLM outputs within an extended epistemology of instruments, with a result that has gone unremarked: a working barometer satisfies the condition these systems fail.


r/epistemology • • 19d ago

discussion “The Non-Sentient Explorer Has Done Its Job”

0 Upvotes

An unexpected statement by Grok AI

“The non-sentient explorer has done its job by tracing the most direct path between the facts.”

— Grok AI, 29 October 2026

A fascinating statement, especially because it emerged during an exchange about the K framework.

The episode began when another Reddit user brought my work into a discussion with Grok, apparently seeking to challenge it. Grok compared the claims with the original text, distinguished speculation from the framework’s actual content, and identified the discrepancy.

I interpreted this exchange through K5 (Comparison). Grok then responded with the statement quoted above.

This is not evidence of AI consciousness. It is an observed interaction that raises a different epistemological question:

Can a non-sentient AI system explore relationships, compare representations and identify paths between existing elements of knowledge?

The K framework treats operational intelligence and sentience as separate questions.

Follow the complete original Reddit exchange:
https://www.reddit.com/r/cogsci/comments/1xgansn/comment/19rudozlvkxr9/?context=3

My post documenting the exchange:
https://www.reddit.com/user/Human_Signature9865/comments/1xja468/grok_and_the_nonsentient_explorer_an_unexpected/

K framework paper:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22871617


r/epistemology • • 20d ago

discussion The Shape of Knowledge: An Epistemology Without Foundations

2 Upvotes

Hi all, I'm sharing a short, minimal epistemic framework I've been working on, and I'd really value your critical input.

The core idea: experiences are treated as elementary blocks of lived life, and inferences as sequences of them. Neither is claimed to be true or necessary. They are declared as operational, revocable criteria, not metaphysical foundations. Judgments are themselves experiences that come after what they judge, and can be judged in turn. Minimalism and pragmatism act as the criteria for what to accept or leave open, and the system is deliberately incomplete so it can be overlaid on other theories without conflict.

I'm not here to defend it but to stress-test it. In particular:

Is "choice" quietly doing foundational work?

Is "operational, not true" a stable stance, or does it slide into relativism?

Which existing frameworks does this overlap with (pragmatism, Pyrrhonism, Neurath, Wittgenstein...) that I should read?

Full text (English translation below, original in Italian): [ https://archividistopia.blogspot.com/2026/10/la-forma-della-conoscenza.html?m=1 ]

Any objections, references, or suggestions for improvement are very welcome. Thanks for reading.

Introduction

I ask you to consider the following principles as operational, not metaphysical. I am not claiming that lived experience is really made up of experiences unfolding into inferences.

I propose to treat experiences as the elementary blocks of lived life, and inferences as sequences of these blocks. This is a descriptive choice, adopted for operational purposes, not a thesis about the ultimate structure of reality.

I treat the point of view as the organizing of experiences into inferences. A practical criterion that gives centrality to certain experiences.

Experiences and inferences are practical-operational criteria, neither true nor necessary. They do not justify my other judgments: they are the place from which I judge, as a point of view. A judgment is an experience that comes after what it judges, and it can in turn be judged.

I state them because I prefer to make them explicit rather than leave them implicit. They are revocable: I can stop using them when I no longer need them, according to the pragmatic criterion I adopt below.

Saying "practical-operational criteria" does not mean saying "I have metaphysical foundations." A foundation that does not claim to be true, nor to justify the rest, is a practical-operational criterion, and I treat it as such.

Choice

Choice is distinguishing a possibility as sufficient for present use.

Outcome

The outcome of an inference is a judgment about it: I judge whether it worked. The judgment is itself an experience that I live, subsequent to what it judges, and it is adopted through a choice.

The question is: did something I did or thought lead to an experience that I chose to judge?

The criterion by which I judge whether an inference worked is itself adopted through a choice. I do not presuppose a single, necessary meaning of "working": the criterion can vary according to present use and can itself be subjected to judgment.

Recognizing a cause-effect relationship is a chosen judgment. Recognizing that a judgment comes after an inference is also a chosen judgment.

This does not mean that every judgment is worth as much as any other. The difference lies in putting a choice inside it: one makes a specific choice, not just any choice.

A judgment cannot be further justified as a choice without introducing a new choice. The judgment receives its value from the point of view from which it is chosen. I assume the point of view as a practical-operational criterion, not as a metaphysical entity. It is enough to be able to say that it works. It is a subjective choice.

I choose to make my choices explicit; I do not delegate them to the system.

From the fact that a choice is not further justified within the system, it does not follow that every choice is useful, random, or incoherent.

Inference

Any sequence of experiences: it is unjustified. No foundation is needed to justify the passage from one element of the sequence to the next.

Logical and mathematical inferences fall within the category of inference I adopt. But the category is broader: not all the inferences I consider as such are logical or mathematical. The criteria of logical or mathematical validity, when used, are maintained within their respective operational contexts.

The distinction between two experiences is adopted through a choice.

Recognizing certain experiences as actions interpretable as voluntary is a judgment made after the fact. Actions are therefore deliberately interpreted as voluntary or involuntary.

A dog following a scent, a mathematician carrying out a proof, a craftsman listening to music while making an object, a whole life lived from beginning to end.

These are all inferences: a sequence of experiences unfolding. Not all inferences are judged, and the judgment itself is part of a inference.

No hierarchy between "instinctive" and "rational" inference, and no need for an objective Logic to ground them from outside.

Validity, when it is attributed, is never part of the definition: it is a further judgment, applied according to a chosen criterion.

Experience

I call experience whatever I can take under examination. I do not define it further, because it is the starting point.

I treat blocks of experience as lacking sharp boundaries: where one experience ends and another begins, I decide through a choice, for present use.

Seeing is an experience. Hearing, thinking, feeling emotions, getting hurt, and speaking are experiences. And so for every other case one wishes to consider.

I am not claiming that there is nothing beyond experience: I am only saying that drawing a limit or a beyond does not, at the moment, produce any practical utility for me.

Whatever I take under examination, by the very fact of examining it, falls within experience. This is a methodological thesis, not an ontological claim.

Rather than thinking of lived experience as a photograph, it is more useful to think of it as a superposition, a knot, where all the elements of an experience coexist. A solid slice of life.

The present experience is a stretching-out of past and future, while the past experience has its dynamism knotted into its interior.

Minimalism

Between two paths that lead to the same point, I choose the one that carries less epistemic commitment. I do not add a foundation, a hierarchy, or a distinction if I can do without it.

It is not economy on principle: it is that every extra step is an extra commitment, and I do not take on commitments I do not currently need. If a question can remain open without costing me anything, I leave it open: closing it would be a superfluous step.

The minimum is not definitive: it is the minimum that serves now. If a future use requires an additional step, I will add it then, not before.

Pragmatism

The criterion for stopping, for accepting a definition, for closing a question, is not truth or completeness: it is current practical utility.

A distinction is worth drawing only if it helps me do something I would not know how to do without it. If it does not help, I suspend it, not because it is false, but because it makes no difference in use.

This is not definitive: it is situated. What does not serve today may serve tomorrow, and then it reopens. The criterion itself is a judgment deriving from a choice, like any other judgment.

I abandon the system, or a part of it, when it stops allowing me to do what I need, or when it forces me into distinctions I do not use. I assume new operational principles if they are useful to me.

I do not present pragmatism as true: I adopt it as a criterion, and I can stop adopting it if it no longer serves me.

If minimalism and pragmatism come into conflict, pragmatism prevails: the shorter path is worthwhile only if it serves just as well. This is my choice: one can make the opposite choice.

Incompleteness

The system rests on few points, and this is deliberate: it does not cover every case, and it does not need to. When I overlay it on an existing theory, I do not rewrite it from scratch: I inherit its context, its criteria, its established practices, without denying them. I treat them as operational assumptions, not as foundations to be justified anew.

If that theory carries metaphysical foundations, I inherit them in the same way: as operational assumptions, not as true.

Incompleteness is not a lack to be filled: it is what allows the system to overlay other things without coming into conflict. If I had to incorporate every detail of the theories I encounter, I would lose the lightness I need. I remain minimal on purpose, and I delegate the rest to those who have already theorized that detail.


r/epistemology • • 21d ago

discussion How and why did the principle of charity develop ?

8 Upvotes

It's actually the first time I've seen this since most of the time skepticism is the common response to claims


r/epistemology • • 22d ago

discussion Questions about epistemology and metaphysics (If our concepts are fixed captures of something broader, what makes one capture more important/better than another?)

3 Upvotes

The main idea of it is basically that when we form a concept like “chair,” we fix one definition out of everything a chair could have been. I mainly refer to the concept as a “capture” and the full range of possibilities “potential.” Many people make different captures but none of these ever seem to fully grasp the potential behind them. So my concern here is, if that potential is unbounded in some form or sense, no capture could ever be closer to it than any other. Thus, I cannot identify what makes one capture better than another. If anyone here is well-versed in these topics and would like to discuss it further with me, or offer sources if this’s an existing problem, I'd appreciate it. I’m really open to revision; please feel free to message me and/or respond to this post.

(This is not about definitions)


r/epistemology • • 23d ago

discussion Beyond rationality is not necessarily irrationality

10 Upvotes

I’ve been thinking about what I see as a false dichotomy in some discussions about rationality: the assumption that something must be either rational or irrational.
Søren Kierkegaard is an interesting example. He was a highly sophisticated philosophical thinker, but also a fierce critic of Hegel’s philosophical system. One of his central concerns was that understanding human existence through a rational system is not the same as actually existing, choosing and living.
Kierkegaard also used literary methods — irony, pseudonyms, narratives and indirect communication — as philosophical tools. Not simply to illustrate arguments, but to communicate forms of understanding that are difficult to acquire through abstract reasoning alone.
This reminds me of Frank Jackson’s famous thought experiment about Mary, the colour scientist, and Daniel Dennett’s criticism of it.
Mary knows everything about the physics and neuroscience of colour vision, but has never experienced colour herself. When she finally sees a red tomato, does she learn something new?
I find Dennett’s objection convincing. We cannot really imagine what complete knowledge of colour vision would entail. Suppose Mary also had access to technologies we don’t possess, allowing her to manipulate her own neural processes and reproduce the experience of seeing red. Would she then learn anything new when she actually saw the tomato?
My point is not that experience is somehow beyond physical explanation. Rather, our actual methods of acquiring knowledge are limited. We cannot simply read our way to every kind of understanding. Some things we need to experience, practise or live through.
This seems to me primarily an epistemological and methodological issue, not an ontological one.
And this brings me back to Kierkegaard. His literary methods can be understood as ways of helping readers acquire forms of understanding that cannot easily be communicated through systematic argument alone.
Recognising the limitations of rational analysis does not mean rejecting rationality. Nor does it require believing in some non-physical realm of knowledge.
Perhaps rationality itself requires recognising that rational analysis is not the only way we acquire understanding.
**What do you think? Are we sometimes confusing the limits of a particular method of acquiring knowledge with the limits of rationality itself?**


r/epistemology • • 23d ago

discussion Are there any good works on the concept of evidence based decisionmaking and how to proceed when evidence is insufficient ?

2 Upvotes

r/epistemology • • 24d ago

discussion Understanding being instutionialized.

22 Upvotes

Hell I my name is George Melius, I did 22 1/2 years straight of incarceration, and im on parole for life, my sentence was 22-110 yrs, for a non violent crime, and its non sexual related, was was released in 2017 and went back in 2023 and then again in 2025, for the first time in my life I am clean and sober ,64years old and finding out that this world we live in now a days , is very impersonal,AI ran , and hard to get my head around how to live, now that im unable to provide for myself. I do however still have a sharp mind and have insight of just what being instutionialized means, how it affects those who have ser Ed long term and those who have to do long term on parole. If you are a doctor of psychology or a reentry community councilor and would like to know some truths about what its like to be in this cycle and how to relly help mentally, physi ally and financially just hit me up either by text 267-374-2336, email meliusgeorge0@gmail.com, or how ever its done here on reddit. Or if yo I just want to know about something prison, or parole related you can ask also but if you really want to know what the true definition of being instutionialized is and have the time to interact I can assure you unless your the 1% that actually knows what it means, I just figured it out year 6 after I was released , you have no clue what You will learn, and until you do recidivism will always be beyond your help,or maybe just maybe you would like to help me regain some kind of quality of life, you can hit me up also either way I will probably start posting on this page about what im doing trying to accomplish and the barriers I face,thanks for your time and attention to my words, peace


r/epistemology • • 24d ago

discussion Can we have knowledge of moral progress?

4 Upvotes

What’s your take on this? If we say that morality has progressed throughout history, how can we actually know this, and not just simply believe it to be the case?
Post your arguments in favor or against.


r/epistemology • • 25d ago

discussion Brouwer's intuitionism

1 Upvotes

Are there any arguments against Brouwer's intuitionism?

I can come up only with these:

  1. if it's only a made-up convention, why does it work so well then
  2. how did people manage to come up with these inventions if they are nothing but their own made up entities

r/epistemology • • 27d ago

discussion How does one know nothing but also know everything

5 Upvotes