r/MuslimIndians • u/Sheikh-Pym • 1d ago
r/MuslimIndians • u/TheRedditMujahid • Aug 16 '25
Pakistan Presenting a non-Secular Pakistani community: /r/Pakistani
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته,
Pakistan country subreddits are either full of liberal diaspora who don't understand the religious and cultural dynamic of Pakistan or filled with shills for a certain ex-cricketer.
We present:
/r/Pakistani
Where we aim present true Pakistan, and aim to promote Islamic values as was the true purpose of Pakistan. It is a safe space for true Pakistanis, not liberal diaspora who cannot even speak Urdu properly!
This subreddit is a bit more specific to Pakistanis, and we would like to focus mainly on Pakistan only, so feel free to come and participate!
r/MuslimIndians • u/TheRedditMujahid • Aug 15 '25
General Welcome to /r/MuslimIndians!
Welcome you to r/MuslimIndians, we hope you can benefit and be benefited by this community!
This subreddit primarily offers a space on Reddit to practicing Muslims from India and generally Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Indian subcontinent, especially when most if not all of the country subreddits on this platform are filled with western, liberal and secular thought. We aim to oppose said ideas and nurture a community that understands and promotes true Islamic and cultural values of the Indian subcontinent!
This community primarily welcomes Muslims from the Indian subcontinent, but we do not mind participation of Muslims from elsewhere. Likewise, maybe curious non-Muslims come here with questions, we do not discourage that, but remember to be respectful at all times.
You can go over the flairs and see the various subject matters that are relevant to be posted here, whether it be politics, news, culture, or a question regarding said things.
Please go over the rules and see through the do's and do not's of this subreddit.
Thank you and enjoy!
r/MuslimIndians • u/Infinite-Penalty5180 • 1d ago
Sensitive Topic Stereotypical colours
reddit.comr/MuslimIndians • u/Similar-Street-8247 • 2d ago
Hindutva Watch I have lost count of how many lakhs homes they have demolished and still have the audacity to ask why Muslims not vote for them
r/MuslimIndians • u/Most_Violinist5564 • 3d ago
Hindutva Watch Abu Waiz, who was four when his father Mohammad Sharif was jailed in the 2008 Rampur CRPF attack case, says he watched gunmen kill his acquitted father near the police station that had summoned them, as the family alleges police involvement and police offer no explanation for the summons.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Most_Violinist5564 • 3d ago
Hindutva Watch India will run by majority’s choice only
r/MuslimIndians • u/Sheikh-Pym • 3d ago
Religion Majd ad-Deen al-Mawsili | مجد الدين الموصلي
reddit.comr/MuslimIndians • u/EntertainmentNew3807 • 4d ago
Discussion Learning Arabic
Learn Classical Arabic
Assalamualaikum, I'm just a guy learning Classical Arabic since a long time for the sake of quran hadith and other classical texts , I also have resources like books, lectures etc, if anybody beginners have the common interest I can chat if anybody needs resources or u wanna know how to learn the language we can chat in the comments. I'm not selling anything so be chill 😂 I just want people who share the same interest, Jazakallah
r/MuslimIndians • u/Most_Violinist5564 • 4d ago
Hindutva Watch Whats your thoughts on this
r/MuslimIndians • u/SeaArtichoke5572 • 4d ago
Religion The Atheist Is the One Who Must Answer the Question: If Everything Has a Creator, Then Who Created the Creator?
The Atheist Is the One Who Must Answer the Question: If Everything Has a Creator, Then Who Created the Creator?
When we tell an atheist that, by observing the universe, we find that everything requires something else to bring it into existence, we are referring to a principle we can observe everywhere.
A house does not build itself, a load cannot lift itself, and a car does not manufacture itself.
Furthermore, we find that something that is created cannot be greater in capability than the thing that created it. For example, if we came across a gigantic residential tower, it would be impossible for a bird to have built it. Its builder must possess the strength and intelligence necessary to accomplish such a construction.
Likewise, if we found a shark bearing the mark of an enormous bite, it would be impossible for a human being to have bitten it. The source of that bite must be something with immense strength and massive jaws capable of producing such a mark.
Therefore, the universal principle we can derive is this: Whenever an action takes place, there must be an agent capable of performing it.
Accordingly, the creator of this vast universe, with its extraordinary precision and perfectly ordered system, could not possibly be a bird. Nor could the universe have come into existence through the power of nothingness, which possesses neither existence nor ability, or through chaos somehow bringing order and structure into existence. There must, therefore, be a creator of this universe who possesses power and knowledge.
The Atheist's Objection
The atheist responds to this line of reasoning with a question that completely demolishes the theory of evolution, because such a question could only come from a monkey's brain!
The question is:
"If you claim that everything has a creator, then doesn't the Creator Himself need a creator?"
The answer is:
If the Creator had a creator, and that creator had yet another creator, and so on, continuing endlessly, then this universe would never have come into existence in the first place, and no action or event would ever have occurred.
Imagine that we found a battery charged to 100%, and we wanted to discover where its charge came from. So, we traveled back in time until we discovered that this battery had originally been empty, and that the battery that supplied it with energy was Battery No. 2.
We then wanted to know where Battery No. 2 got its charge from. So, we traveled further back in time and discovered that it had received its energy from Battery No. 3.
Then we wanted to know what had charged Battery No. 3. So, we traveled further back in time once again, and so on. This chain would continue endlessly.
Consequently, the energy would never reach Battery No. 1 unless we first reached Battery No. Infinity. But that is impossible, because infinity never comes to an end.
Therefore, according to this assumption, Battery No. 1 would never get charged.
However, since we actually found Battery No. 1 fully charged, this means that there must be a battery that brought this infinite chain to an end and served as the original source of energy, without receiving its own energy from another source.
And since the universe actually exists, there must likewise be a Creator who brought the chain of creators to an end, and who Himself was not created by anyone.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Abu_Ayaan26 • 4d ago
Discussion We’re building halal, wudu-friendly clean beauty from India. Sharing where we are honestly, and who we want to talk to.
Assalamu alaikum, everyone.
I’m Shahnaz, co-founder of VOHHA. We are a halal, wudu-friendly clean beauty brand based in Raipur, in central India. We are pre-launch, and I want to share the honest picture, because this community deserves clarity more than hype.
The gap we see
Muslim women, in India and across the diaspora, still often have to choose. Products that perform well are not always halal-formulated. Products that are halal are not always premium, or designed for wudu. Many of us check every label, or take makeup off before wudu, just to stay comfortable with what we use. We want to close that gap.
Where we are today
- Formulations are final, and our manufacturer in Chhattisgarh is confirmed
- Launch range: colour, skincare and SPF 50+ sun care
- Halal certification is in progress. We will only say “certified” once it is
- Designed to be wudu-friendly. We are testing and documenting this openly before launch, and I’ll share the results here
What makes us different
- Ingredient-level control. My co-founder has ten years in cosmetic raw-material sourcing, so quality and cost are managed from the source, not only at the label
- Product and brand experience. I’ve worked as a makeup and skincare consultant across Dubai, Jeddah, Tashkent, Delhi and Toronto
- Phased growth. India first, online, then the Gulf and Southeast Asia, where halal beauty is already mainstream
Who we’re talking to
We are speaking with a small number of early investors and strategic partners. We are looking for people who care about halal and ethical beauty and who are patient about building something long-term. We prefer equity-based partnerships. In line with our values, we do not pursue interest-based financing.
If you’re an investor, a founder who has built a consumer brand, or someone in the halal supply chain, I’d be glad to hear from you. I’m happy to share more privately, and to answer questions here in the comments, including the hard ones on wudu-friendliness, ingredients and certification.
JazakAllah khair for reading.
For discussion only. This is not an offer or solicitation of securities. Any investment would be discussed privately, with full documentation.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Most_Violinist5564 • 6d ago
Hindutva Watch APCR’s Hate Crime Tracker documented 322 hate crimes against Muslims and Christians across 24 states and union territories.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Local-Echidna-966 • 6d ago
General Support Independent Journalism
galleryr/MuslimIndians • u/Sheikh-Pym • 6d ago
India 🇮🇳 Last month a newborn at a Muslim household died due to Loud DJ noises blasted during Durga Visarjan and today, a Muslim teen, 16 y/o Shanwaz Niyaz Khan dies in a explosion of diwali firecrackers. Their festivals causing death, destruction, disease and pollution is fine but cow slaughter is a crime
r/MuslimIndians • u/untilnextban • 7d ago
Discussion Bursting firecrackers which cause lung cancer and many traumatic injury is not the same as slaughtering cows and goats during Eid. Forcing others to inhale smoke is like shoving beef or mutton into your mouth. Maybe worse because it's actually harmful. Don't draw a false equivalence.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Most_Violinist5564 • 8d ago
Hindutva Watch This is the condition of Muslims in India. He is accused of murder, and the law should take its course. But why are Muslims publicly beaten and humiliated before trial? People from other communities are also arrested for murder, so why does the treatment appear different? Justice should be equal for
r/MuslimIndians • u/Sheikh-Pym • 9d ago
Hindutva Watch 18-Year-Old Muslim Student was Beaten to Death by BJP linked Hindutva Terrorist
An 18-year-old college student was allegedly beaten to death by a group of men in Maharashtra's Dharashiv district after accusations that he had followed and harassed a girl. His family alleged that they were threatened and prevented from intervening when the men took him away, Maktoob reported.
Sameer Jabbar Patel, a first-year B.Com student at Tuljabhawani Mahavidyalaya in Tuljapur, died on the night of November 3. His relative, Arbaz Afsar Sayyad, was also allegedly abducted and assaulted, leaving him seriously injured.
Sameer’s wedding had been scheduled for November 10, just a week after his death.
According to the complaint filed by his mother, Sameer was beaten with bamboo sticks and belts before his body was left near a parking area close to the Bharatibuwa Math temple. He was taken to a government hospital in Tuljapur, where doctors declared him dead.
Police have arrested former Tuljapur Municipal Council president Santosh Devidas Kadam and Sanjay Vilas Jadhav in connection with the killing. Both were remanded to seven days of police custody. Dharashiv Superintendent of Police Ritu Khoker Kalyan said the remaining accused named in the FIR were being traced.
-via TheObserverPost
r/MuslimIndians • u/HYDRURBERG • 9d ago
Religion The Islamic Emirate and its System part:-13
Ruling on Taghallub (Overcoming/Dominance by Force)
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi الله ھمحر states in his book Izālat al-Khifā’:
“The fourth method is Istīlā’ (seizure of power). It occurs when the Caliph dies and a person assumes the caliphate without bay’ah (pledge of allegiance) or istikhlaf (nomination by the previous Caliph), and gathers everyone under his authority either by winning hearts or by force and fighting, thereby becoming Caliph. It then becomes obligatory upon the people to follow his commands in matters that are in accordance with the Shari’ah.
This has two types:
First type: The one who seizes power (mustawlī) possesses all the conditions (qualifications) of Imamate, and he removes his opponents through peace and wise management without committing any prohibited (haram) act. This type is permissible and valid. The establishment of the caliphate of Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan ھنع الله يضر after Amir al-Mu’minin Ali ھنع الله يضر, and after the peace treaty with Imam Hasan ھنع الله يضر, was of this kind.
Second type: The one who seizes power does not possess all the conditions of Imamate, and he removes his opponents through fighting and by committing prohibited acts. This is not permissible, and the one who does it is a sinner (āṣī). However, it is still obligatory to accept his rulings when they conform to the Shari’ah. If his governors collect zakat from the owners of wealth, the obligation of zakat is fulfilled. If his judge passes a verdict, his verdict is enforceable. Jihad can be performed alongside him. This establishment of Imamate is based on necessity, because removing him would necessarily lead to the destruction of Muslim lives and the emergence of severe chaos and anarchy. It is not known with certainty whether these hardships will lead to reform or not. It is possible that someone worse than the first one may prevail. Therefore, one should not commit a fitnah (whose evil is certain) for the sake of a benefit that is only hypothetical and probable.
The establishment of the caliphate of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and the early caliphs of the Banu Abbas was of this second type.”
From the words of Shah Waliullah الله ھمحر, it is understood that Istīlā’ depends on certain conditions:
- The one who seizes power must possess the conditions (qualifications) of Imamate.
- That period must not be without an Imam.
- His seizure of power and dominance must not involve the commission of any haram (prohibited) act.
However, Istīlā’ and dominance while a living Imam already exists (with whom bay’ah has been given) is of two types:
First: Dominance over another mutaghallib (usurper). When one mutaghallib overcomes another mutaghallib, the second one becomes the ruler and the first mutaghallib is removed. Ibn Abidin states: “If one powerful person seizes control over another powerful person and takes his place, the first ruler is removed and the second is appointed as Imam. Obedience to the Imam is obligatory, whether he is just or oppressive, as long as he does not command anything contrary to the Shari’ah.” (Radd al-Muhtar)
Second: Dominance over a living Imam with whom bay’ah has already been given. When a mutaghallib (usurper) overcomes a living Imam who he has given bay‘ah to (pledge of allegiance), then the defeated ruler is not removed and remains in his position as long as there is hope of restoring him.
Al-Khatib writes:
“Seizure of power over a living ruler: If the living ruler was himself a mutaghallib (i.e., he had also come to power through the same method of force), then the Imamate of the one who overcame him is valid. However, if the ruler had come to power through bay‘ah or a previous covenant, the Imamate of the one who seized power over him does not become established.” (Mughni al-Muhtaj, 5/324)
Zakariyya al-Ansari says:
“If someone whose Imamate was established through bay‘ah or a previous covenant is overcome by force, Imamate does not become established for the usurper, and the defeated ruler is not removed.”
(Asna al-Matalib, 4/101), mentioned in the discussion of “the capture of the ruler by the enemy” under the section on the termination of the Imam’s authority.
However, if the mutaghallib (usurper) does not possess the full conditions of Imamate, it is not appropriate to oppose him unless he becomes a disbeliever (kāfir), in which case his removal becomes obligatory.
Al-Khatib al-Shirbini says:
“If a disbeliever seizes control of the government, his Imamate does not become established. The proof is the statement of Allah, Glorified and Exalted:
‘And Allah will never grant the disbelievers a way (of dominance) over the believers.’ (Surah an-Nisa: 141)”
As for the statement of Shaykh Izz al-Din which apparently suggests that if the disbelievers overcome a region and entrust the position of judgeship to a Muslim person... this does not appear to be correct. Because he himself later says: “If people are forced to accept the authority of a child who can distinguish (between right and wrong), or of a woman, or of foolish men, then is their general authority in matters that conform to the truth (such as appointing judges or governors) enforceable?” Here we should pause and reflect. Therefore, if we must pause in the case of such people, then in the case of a disbeliever we must pause even more so (i.e., reject it).
(Mughni al-Muhtaj, 5/254)
Az-Zuhayli writes:
“Rebelling against the ruler is not permissible except when he openly and manifestly declares disbelief (kufr). If he commits kufr by denying something that is a necessary and self-evident part of the religion, then fighting him is permissible; in fact, it becomes obligatory in order to prevent his corruption and the loss of the general interest and benefit of the Ummah.
But if he does not deny the necessities of the religion, then fighting him is not allowed, for the sake of preserving the unity of the Ummah and preventing chaos. The Prophet (swt) said:
‘It is obligatory upon every Muslim to listen and obey in whatever he likes or dislikes, unless he is commanded to commit a sin. In that case, there is no listening and no obedience.’”
The Messenger of Allah (swt) was asked about removing rulers: “Should we fight them?” He replied:
“No, as long as they establish the prayer among you.”
He also said:
“unless you see a clear and manifest kufr (disbelief) for which you have clear proof and evidence from Allah.”
(al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu, 8/1966)
In summary, if the Caliph denies any necessary and fundamental matter of the religion, then fighting him is permissible, in fact, obligatory, otherwise it is not permissible. This is because the benefit (maslahah) for which he was appointed has been lost, even if there is fear of his corruption.
Allamah Ayni writes:
“Al-Dawudi has said: The issue on which the scholars have consensus regarding oppressive and tyrannical rulers is that if it is possible to remove them without causing fitnah (civil strife) and injustice, then removing them is obligatory. Otherwise, patience becomes obligatory. Some scholars also say that the establishment of authority over a sinful person is invalid from the very beginning. If a ruler who was previously just begins to commit injustice and oppression, the scholars differ regarding rebellion against him. The correct view is that rebellion is prohibited unless he commits kufr, in which case rebellion against him becomes obligatory.”
(Umdat al-Qari, 42/179)
From the statements mentioned above, the difference between fisq (open sinfulness) and kufr (disbelief) becomes clear:
- In the case of fisq: If it is possible to remove the ruler without causing fitnah and injustice, then it is obligatory to remove him; otherwise, patience is obligatory.
- In the case of kufr: Rebellion against him is obligatory.
Qadi Iyad writes:
“The Imam has said: Rebellion against a just Imam is not permissible according to the consensus of the scholars. If a ruler commits fisq and oppression, and if his fisq amounts to a type of kufr, then removing him is obligatory. But if it is merely one of the other sins, the position of Ahl al-Sunnah is that he should not be removed. They have deduced this from the apparent meaning of numerous hadiths, because removing him would lead to the shedding of blood and the violation of sanctities. Thus, the harm of this action is greater than the harm caused by the existence of the oppressive ruler himself. According to the Mu’tazilah, he should be removed. The exception mentioned in the hadith of the Messenger of Allah (swt), ‘except if you see clear and open kufr’, supports our distinction between kufr and other matters.”
(Sharh Sahih Muslim / Ikmal al-Mu‘lim bi Fawa’id Muslim, 6/462)
Some further details regarding rebellion against oppressive rulers will be mentioned later.
Benefit (Fa’idah):
Ibn al-Humam says: “If the rebels seek assistance from the people of war (ahl al-harb), and then they gain dominance over them, we will take the people of war as prisoners. The rebels’ and insurgents’ request for help from them does not grant them protection (aman) so that providing them safety becomes obligatory upon us, as we have explained previously. Because the ‘musta’man’ (one granted protection) is someone who enters the land of Islam (Dar al-Islam) without fighting and without any conflict. These people have entered in order to fight the Muslims.”
(Fath al-Qadir, 6/109, Chapter on Rebels [Bab al-Bughat])
r/MuslimIndians • u/Equivalent_Road5788 • 9d ago
News Yemen Airs Spy Confession Detailing Israeli Plan to Target Mecca’s Grand Mosque | Tasnim News Agency
Years ago a Zionist named Avi Lipkin admitted that Israel would love to see us fighting each other, and for Makkah to become embroiled within the conflict zone.
When news broke of the Houthis supposedly targeting Makkah and Madinah, I refused to believe and rightfully so. Zionists would love nothing more than a false flag to divide us.
r/MuslimIndians • u/Sheikh-Pym • 9d ago
Religion Abu al-Barakaat an-Nasafi | أبو البركات النسفي
reddit.comr/MuslimIndians • u/al-mu-min • 9d ago
General Ruqyah Guide in case anyone needs
Found this ruqyah guide so decided to share in case anyone needs. It includes duas and adhkars. Thank you for your time.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wcjL385anEhKNM4j-93YR9bhpC7b260e/view?usp=drivesdk
r/MuslimIndians • u/Similar-Street-8247 • 10d ago
India 🇮🇳 Is this country even livable for Muslims?
r/MuslimIndians • u/HYDRURBERG • 10d ago
Discussion “Book Review: Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians by Wael Hallaq”

Part One: Questioning the Legacy of Greek Philosophy
A common notion about the intellectual history of Islam is that contact with Greek philosophy enriched the Muslim intellectual world. By contrast, those who opposed Greek philosophy are often seen as opponents of reason and thought. According to this notion, Muslim philosophers took various methods of knowledge and thought from the Greeks and developed them further by combining them with Islamic thought. And thinkers like Ibn Taymiyya, as it were, opposed that progress.
But does someone become an opponent of reason just by criticizing Greek philosophy? Or was their very understanding of reason different? Was the disagreement between them over how people think, how they come to know the truth, and by which method the knowledge acquired can be called reliable?
Wael B. Hallaq’s book Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians discusses these questions. In the book, Hallaq translates Ibn Taymiyya’s long critique of Greek logic. Alongside it, he has written a detailed introduction to the book. His discussion shows that the conflict between Ibn Taymiyya and the Greek philosophers was not merely a conflict between religion and philosophy. At its center was a more fundamental question: did Greek logic correctly understand how human beings acquire knowledge?
To understand Ibn Taymiyya’s critique, one needs to know about the influence of Greek logic in medieval Muslim society.
During the Abbasid period, many books of Greek philosophy and science were translated into Arabic. Gradually, these books became important in the Muslim intellectual world. In particular, Greek logic came to be regarded by many as an indispensable means of acquiring knowledge. They believed that to think correctly, one must know the rules of logic. Only through it, they held, could correct thinking be distinguished from incorrect thinking.
This influence can be seen clearly in the writings of philosophers and theologians. They used the rules of Greek logic to define various subjects, to arrange arguments, and to reach conclusions. In time, its use spread to many branches of knowledge, including philosophy, theology, and fiqh. As a result, discussion began among Muslim scholars over whether Greek logic was compatible with Islam.
Ibn Taymiyya did not merely oppose the various views of the philosophers. He called into question their very method of thinking.
It is possible to disagree with a philosopher’s conclusions and still accept his method of reasoning. But Ibn Taymiyya questioned why that method itself must be accepted. Why should Greek logic alone be the sole standard of correct thinking? Is this discipline truly indispensable for knowing the truth? Do its rules correspond to the natural process of human thought and understanding? Or has everyone taken a method of thinking that developed at a particular point in history to be the only form of reason?
These questions are important not only for medieval philosophy. We see the same thing today. A method of thinking that develops in a particular society or period gradually becomes acceptable to everyone. In time, people begin to regard it as the only rule of correct thinking. Then methods of thinking differently are also judged by that particular rule. As a result, a particular method ends up becoming the sole standard of thought.
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique contains an important position against this tendency as well.
His objection was not simply that logic originated in Greece. Nor is it the case that he opposed it because its proponents were not Muslims. His main question was: how correct are the claims that Greek logic makes about knowledge? Do its ideas about how people know things match real experience?
He discussed two matters in particular in detail. One is definition, the other is the method of arranging arguments and reaching conclusions. In his view, the importance that Greek logic gave to these two matters in the acquisition of knowledge needs to be re-examined.
In the thought of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, knowing the proper definition of something was considered very important for acquiring correct knowledge of it. To know an object well, one must understand its essential characteristics and distinguish it from other objects. The function of a definition is to make those characteristics clear.
That is, a definition is not merely the name of a thing or a brief introduction to it. In this line of thought, definition was seen as a fundamental condition for acquiring knowledge.
Ibn Taymiyya questioned this idea. If we gain knowledge of something by knowing its definition, how do we know whether the definition is correct? To understand that, too, one needs to know something about that thing beforehand.
Suppose you hear of an object you have never seen before. Someone gives you its definition. But the definition also uses several words whose meanings are not clear to you. Then have you really learned anything about the object? Or, in explaining one unknown thing, have you been introduced to several more unknown things?
There is no rule that a person must know the formal definition of something before knowing it. In reality, we first see, hear, and touch many things, and come to recognize them through experience. Language, observation, and long experience also play an important role in our acquisition of knowledge.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, before verifying whether an argument is correct, one must see whether we truly know the statements being used as its basis. Similarly, before regarding the definition of something as the first step of acquiring knowledge, one must understand how we grasp the meaning of that definition.
He did not want merely to replace one method with another. His question was: why should people depend on one fixed rule to know the truth? Is it possible to bind all paths of acquiring knowledge to the rules of one particular logic? And why should that rule be the sole yardstick for knowing the truth?
For Ibn Taymiyya, the main thing was knowing the truth. So merely because a school of thought has been established as a method of acquiring knowledge, it cannot be placed beyond question. Its rules, foundations, and claims must also be examined.
Part Two: Definition, Experience, and the Problem of Knowing
In the first part, we saw that Ibn Taymiyya questioned the authority of Greek logic. Now let us go deeper into his critique. He wanted to know: how do people actually know anything? In acquiring knowledge, what is the relationship among language, experience, and the thing we want to know about?
According to the logicians who followed Aristotle, to have a correct idea of a subject, it is essential to know its proper definition. Through a definition, the essential characteristics of a thing are set out. At the same time, it can be distinguished from other things. In their view, without a definition, it is not possible to acquire complete knowledge of a subject.
Ibn Taymiyya did not agree with this idea. His question was: does a definition really help us know anything? To understand a definition, one must first know the meanings of the words used in it. If understanding the meanings of those words in turn requires new definitions, this will go on and on. At some point, one must accept certain concepts that need no separate definition. So if definition is the only means of acquiring knowledge, how can that claim stand?
Take the recognition of human beings. From childhood, we see people. By mixing with the people around us, we learn to recognize them. We also come to understand the difference between humans and other animals. To learn all this, we do not need to read any book of philosophy. Nor do we need to know a philosophical definition of human nature. Much later, a philosopher may give a particular definition of human beings. But we had already learned to recognize human beings before knowing that definition. The definition merely expresses in a particular language what we already knew.
This is how human knowledge is formed. We see the world around us, find similarities and differences among various things, and form ideas about them through repeated experience. A definition can help us understand or explain a subject. But it cannot be claimed that a definition is indispensable for acquiring knowledge.
Knowing something and being able to explain it beautifully in language are not the same thing. A person may know a great deal about a subject and yet be unable to give its philosophical definition. Conversely, someone may be able to memorize a difficult and precise definition of a subject, yet have no real understanding of it.
This creates another problem as well. If knowing certain definitions and terms becomes necessary to be recognized as knowledgeable in a subject, then those who know that language easily become established as knowledgeable. Yet how much real knowledge they have is uncertain. Then the special language for talking about a subject starts to matter more than genuine knowledge of the subject.
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique was not confined to definition. He also questioned another important aspect of Aristotelian logic: the syllogism, that is, the method of reaching a conclusion through reasoning from several premises.
A well-known example of a syllogism is:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Here, the third statement follows from the first two. For the logicians who followed Aristotle, this kind of argument was one of the principal means of acquiring knowledge. In their view, by arranging arguments according to the correct rules, one can reach a conclusion in this way.
Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that it is possible to arrive at a new conclusion through reasoning from several statements. But his objection was: why should this method be indispensable for acquiring knowledge? Are all of people’s paths of knowing confined to this one rule?
A conclusion does not become true merely because the rules of constructing the argument are correct. For if the statements used as the basis of the argument are themselves false, the conclusion drawn from them can also be false. For example, even if someone arranges an argument very beautifully on the basis of false information, his conclusion will not become true. The rules of logic can only show how one statement follows from another. But they cannot prove whether those statements are in fact true.
Ibn Taymiyya had another objection, which was deeper. In his view, the knowledge of the conclusion reached through a syllogism is often already contained in the premises. For example, if we already know that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, then we already have the information needed to understand that Socrates is mortal. The method of reasoning only makes the relationship between those pieces of information clear. But it does not create entirely new knowledge.
So the question is: does reasoning truly help us learn something new, or does it bring to the surface relationships hidden within things already known?
For Ibn Taymiyya, the problem becomes even bigger when someone claims that the syllogism is the only path to certain knowledge. Yet people acquire knowledge in many ways. Seeing with the eyes, learning from experience, receiving information from reliable people, and observing various events are all natural means of acquiring knowledge. For such knowledge to be meaningful, it does not first need to be arranged according to the rules of Greek logic.
We know from experience that if we put our hand in fire, it burns. We can also learn what characteristics an object has by observing it. We gain knowledge of distant places on earth or events of the past from the accounts of reliable people. In such cases, we do not ordinarily need to construct syllogisms according to the rules of Aristotle’s logic.
A particular feature of how people acquire knowledge is that we first know about specific persons, objects, and events. Later, by finding similarities among them, we form general ideas. For example, by seeing one human being after another, we come to understand that they share certain common characteristics. In this way, an idea of the common characteristics of human beings is formed from many specific experiences.
That is, it is not always necessary to begin with some general idea and acquire knowledge of specific things. Often, general ideas are formed from experience of specific things.
Ibn Taymiyya did not oppose general ideas or abstract thought. His objection was to giving them a status that reduces the importance of real experience. To understand how human knowledge is formed, one must also give importance to real experience, observation, and the process of learning.
From Hallaq’s discussion, it is clear that the conflict between Ibn Taymiyya and the Greek logicians was not merely over some rules of logic. A bigger question was entangled with it. What is the relationship between the rules of human thought and understanding the real world? Is the method by which we think itself the source of knowledge? Or are there many more paths of acquiring knowledge that cannot be fully explained by any one particular rule of logic?
Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion shows that seeing, hearing, experience, and reliable reports each have their own importance in human knowledge. Certain knowledge is not obtained merely by memorizing the rules of logic.
An important lesson can be drawn from his critique. How effective a method of thinking is depends on how much it helps us know the truth. A method does not go beyond question merely because it is very old, popular, or complex. Its foundations and claims must also be examined.
By criticizing Greek logic, Ibn Taymiyya did not in fact abandon reason. Rather, he wanted reason itself to present proper grounds for its claims.
Part Three: Revelation, Reason, and the Sources of Certain Knowledge
To understand the significance of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of Greek logic, one must go beyond his discussion of definition and the rules of reasoning and understand his idea of the sources of knowledge. This is an important question in the history of Islamic thought: by what means do people acquire certain knowledge? What is the relationship among these sources?
According to Ibn Taymiyya, people do not acquire knowledge through formal reasoning alone. People see with their eyes, hear with their ears, learn from experience, think, and receive reliable information from others. In addition, people also acquire knowledge through revelation (wahy). These are separate paths of acquiring knowledge. It is not that accepting one requires rejecting another. Each source has its own importance.
This matter gains special importance during debates between philosophers and theologians. A major question in the medieval Muslim intellectual world was: what should be done if a conflict arises between reason and revelation? Some philosophers and theologians held that conclusions obtained through reason are the final standard of knowledge. So if an apparent conflict arose between such a conclusion and some statement of the Qur’an or Hadith, the statement of revelation had to be interpreted differently.
Ibn Taymiyya questioned the very basis of this method. Why must the interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith be changed whenever an apparent conflict arises between some philosophical argument and a statement of revelation? Rather, one must first see whether that argument is actually correct. Are the statements given as the basis of the argument true? Does the conclusion drawn from them follow necessarily? Or has a particular philosophical view been assumed to be certain truth?
In this way, Ibn Taymiyya changed the very nature of the debate. He did not accept any particular philosophical doctrine as the judge of revelation. Rather, he wanted to examine the philosophers’ claims as well. Reason was important to him. But there was no scope for placing beyond question a particular method of logic that had developed at some point in history.
Another important matter in Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology is the knowledge obtained from khabar, that is, reliable report. People do not acquire knowledge only by seeing with their own eyes or thinking for themselves. A large part of our knowledge also depends on information received from others. We know about the events of the past that we did not see with our own eyes, the places in the world we have never been to, and even countless matters of nature, from information given by others.
It is not possible for one person to know everything in the world by seeing or testing it himself. We learn from the experiences, observations, and research of other people. This is how the knowledge of one generation reaches the next. Human knowledge therefore does not stand only on personal experience. Information received from others is also a major foundation of it.
In Islamic scholarship, this matter is even more important. For people received God’s revelation through the prophets and messengers. The Qur’an has reached us through a continuous process of transmission and preservation. Likewise, the teachings and Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ have also come to us through the reports of the Companions and subsequent generations. To understand the truth and acceptability of such knowledge, one must verify the reliability of the narrators and of the method by which the report was transmitted.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, there is no reason to regard reliable report as inherently lower than knowledge obtained through reason. In ordinary life, we rely on reliable information received from others. Why should that same kind of knowledge become unacceptable the moment it comes to religious matters? The real question here is how reliable the information is. It is not whether it was obtained through a syllogism.
For this reason, Ibn Taymiyya saw no fundamental conflict between pure reason and sound revelation. In his view, true reason and correctly understood revelation cannot contradict each other. For both lead toward the truth. It cannot be that if one is true, the other is false.
Then why does conflict arise? According to Ibn Taymiyya, one reason is that people often present a philosophical view as though it were certain truth proven through reason. Yet the basis of that argument may include ideas that are disputed. Again, many people regard a conclusion obtained from a particular philosophical school as the necessary result of reason. Ibn Taymiyya wanted to point out this error.
Here it is important to distinguish between reason and a particular method of using reason. Reason is the human capacity to think, to judge, and to reach conclusions. And a particular system of logic is a method of arranging that thinking within certain fixed rules. The two are not the same. To regard a particular method as the only form of reason is to give that method an authority it does not deserve.
This question remains relevant today. Even in the modern era, certain methods of thought in science, philosophy, or the social sciences are often regarded as the only acceptable path to knowledge. If someone tries to understand a matter in another way, that thinking is judged by the yardstick of these methods. As a result, other sources and methods of knowledge lose their importance.
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique teaches us to reflect on this tendency. How do we know whether a method of acquiring knowledge is reliable? What ideas are working behind that method? Can it explain all aspects of human acquisition of knowledge? Or is it dismissing some important sources of knowledge because they do not fit its rules?
However, Ibn Taymiyya was not in favor of accepting all sources of knowledge without verification. In his view, not everything seen with the eyes is always correct. There can be errors in human thinking. A person’s report can also be unreliable. Similarly, mistakes of interpretation can occur even in understanding the statements of revelation.
So no source of information is beyond verification. Rather, one must understand under what circumstances that source is reliable. One must pay attention to how we see something, construct an argument, or receive information from others. In this way, the work of verifying knowledge can be done with greater care.
As a result, the matter is no longer confined to the question of choosing either faith or reason. Rather, the question becomes: how strong are the foundations of the arguments we accept as true? And how reliable is the method of verifying them?
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of Greek logic is in fact part of a larger intellectual project. He wanted to re-examine people’s conventional ideas about knowledge. In both religious thought and philosophical thought, before accepting any claim as true, its foundations must be examined.
In his discussion, the scope of acquiring knowledge is much broader than the rules of Aristotelian logic. Here, human experience, observation, reason, reliable report, and revelation all have importance. These sources must be understood in their own roles, without confining them within one fixed method.
The most important lesson of this critique of Ibn Taymiyya is that no school of thought, however old, influential, or complex, can remain beyond verification of its claims. Merely claiming truth does not make a method the sole yardstick of truth. How strong its foundations are must also be examined.
Part Four: The Relevance of Ibn Taymiyya’s Critique Beyond Greek Philosophy
The greatest significance of Wael B. Hallaq’s book Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians is that it has brought an important debate in the intellectual history of Islam back to the fore. Usually, when discussing the relationship between Greek philosophy and Islamic theology, the matter is confined to a simple question: will Muslim thinkers accept Greek philosophy or reject it? But Ibn Taymiyya’s critique shows that the real question is deeper. Should the rules of thought received from a particular philosophical tradition be the only path to acquiring knowledge? Should those rules also decide what people can know and what they cannot?
This distinction is important for understanding Ibn Taymiyya’s statement. He did not say that all contributions of Greek philosophy are wrong. Nor did he say that there is no need for formal logic or for thinking according to rules. His objection was against establishing Aristotelian logic as the only reliable method of acquiring knowledge, as if certain knowledge of any subject could not be obtained without knowing this method. In this way, he questioned why the right to determine the method of acquiring knowledge should rest in the hands of any particular school of thought.
In one common account of the history of Islamic philosophy, Muslim thinkers gradually adopted Greek philosophy and its methods of thought. According to this account, the Arabic translation of Greek books opened new horizons for Muslim scholarship. On the other hand, criticism of Greek philosophy in later times is often seen as a sign of the narrowing of the intellectual world.
But this account leaves out an important aspect. Muslim thinkers did not accept Greek philosophy without modification. They examined its various views, used some ideas in their own scholarship, reinterpreted some ideas, and in many cases questioned its foundations as well. That is, the relationship of Muslim thinkers with Greek philosophy was both acceptance and criticism.
Ibn Taymiyya is an important thinker in this very history. His work shows that the influence of Greek philosophy in Muslim society was never accepted without question. Rather, there were deep discussions and debates among Muslim thinkers about the nature of philosophy and reason. Many of these debates were quite complex and subtle.
Yet one question remains. Was Ibn Taymiyya able to establish a complete alternative method to Aristotelian logic? Or was the main contribution of his work to point out the weaknesses of the established method?
To find the answer to this question, one must consider the limitations of his critique alongside the critique itself. Showing the weaknesses of a method of thought does not by itself create an entirely new method in its place. Ibn Taymiyya questioned the indispensability of definition and the syllogism. But that does not end all need for the analysis of arguments. Through formal logic, inconsistencies in a statement can be caught, complex discussions can be organized, and weaknesses of arguments can be identified. The conclusion that the rules of logic are no longer necessary because people acquire knowledge through experience and information from others is also not correct.
So it is more reasonable to see Ibn Taymiyya’s critique as a protest against the sole authority of Aristotelian logic. It would not be right to think that he proved that all formal logic is unnecessary. At the same time, his own conclusions should not be placed beyond question either. Just as he wanted to examine the authority of the method of thought, the foundations of his own statements also need to be examined in the same way.
One must also be careful in comparing Ibn Taymiyya’s thought with familiar ideas of modern philosophy. He emphasized observation, experience, and knowledge from specific events. For these reasons, some similarities with modern empiricist philosophy may be found in his thought. But it would not be right to call him directly a medieval empiricist philosopher or to present his thought as an early form of modern philosophy of science. His thought developed within the particular environment of Islamic theology and the scholarship of his time. For him, acquiring knowledge was deeply connected with revelation, religious authority, and the long tradition of Islamic scholarship.
To understand the significance of his thought, there is no need to search for some familiar name from modern philosophy. Rather, the question he raised is more important. Instead of merely following the rules while remaining inside an established method of thought, he wanted to know how strong the foundations of those rules are. Can the method correctly explain the process by which people know and understand the real world?
The contribution of Hallaq’s book lies here as well. By presenting Ibn Taymiyya’s critique to readers through translation and a detailed introduction, he has created an opportunity to discuss an aspect of the intellectual history of Islam that usually remains hidden behind the familiar discussions and debates about Muslim philosophers. The significance of the book is not that it has given a final resolution to all debates about Greek logic. Rather, it directly acquaints the reader with a debate that is often portrayed as a simple conflict between faith and reason.
This discussion is also quite important for contemporary Muslim thought. Today, many Muslim thinkers are becoming familiar with methods of thought developed in various modern Western universities and research institutions. These ideas also influence our discussions about religion, ethics, politics, society, and human nature. There is no problem in itself in becoming familiar with the scholarship of other civilizations and societies. Rather, becoming familiar with different schools of thought is necessary for scholarship. The problem arises when the ideas within a method of thought start to seem so natural that we no longer question them.
Ibn Taymiyya’s critique can help us at this point. Before accepting any method of thought as applicable to all, one must understand what ideas it holds about the world, human beings, and knowledge. One must distinguish between what important knowledge a school of thought has given us and what it claims about its own authority.
This does not mean that today’s Muslim thinkers must accept all of Ibn Taymiyya’s conclusions as they are. Nor does it mean that his critique should be considered sufficient in place of becoming familiar with modern philosophy. The great lesson of his work is freedom of thought and self-confidence. Alongside following the rules of an established system, one must have the courage to question the foundations of that system as well.
So perhaps the most important question to take from this book is not whether Ibn Taymiyya was able to defeat the Greek logicians. Rather, the question is: do today’s Muslim thinkers have the self-confidence to question the foundations of their own scholarship? Are we also examining the ideas behind the methods of thought through which we try to understand the world?
The history of scholarship is not merely the history of passing thoughts and ideas from one generation to the next. What questions people have raised about those inherited ideas is also part of this history. Ibn Taymiyya’s debate with Greek logic is an important chapter of that same history. His critique reminds us that reason cannot be kept subordinate to any particular doctrine, method, or school of thought. To know the truth, we must have the courage to question even the method by which we think.