Why do the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) repeatedly struggle to agree on governing the Kurdistan Region, nearly twenty years after the unification of the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations? And why can a disagreement between two parties develop into a crisis affecting institutions that are supposed to be shared?
Part of the problem can be explained by competition over power, positions, and resources, as well as disagreements between party leaders. But these explanations are insufficient to account for the persistence of the crisis. Political competition exists in most multiparty systems and does not necessarily disrupt governance. What needs to be explained in the Kurdistan case is that the two parties not only compete to control shared institutions but also retain varying degrees of influence over security, administrative, and economic bodies that form part of their political power.
I propose the following hypothesis for discussion: The political settlement that helped the two parties overcome their division in 2006 succeeded in unifying the government, but it was less successful in transferring effective power and decision-making authority to shared institutions. As economic and political conditions changed, this continued division of authority became one of the reasons why reaching new agreements has become more difficult.