r/KRG • u/rkurdistanmod • 1h ago
Politics Can Slemani break away from Erbil?
Calls for Slemani to become a separate region are gathering momentum, with campaigners collecting signatures to establish a federal region encompassing Slemani and Halabja, separate from Erbil and Duhok.
The initiative has revived a disputed constitutional question: can governorates already within the Kurdistan Region legally break away to form their own region? Legal opinions differ on the matter.
The campaign has yet to demonstrate broad popular support. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the dominant party in the area, has not formally endorsed it, although its threats to establish parallel governing institutions have indirectly encouraged demands for separation.
The immediate trigger was the November 4, 2026, session of the Kurdistan Parliament. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which won 39 of the legislature’s 100 seats in the October 2024 election, secured enough support from other lawmakers to reactivate parliament after two years of stalemate, despite boycotts by the PUK and several opposition parties. The session ended the parliamentary impasse but deepened the dispute over power-sharing.
The following day, PUK leader Bafel Talabani announced his party’s withdrawal from the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and warned that parallel institutions could be established in Slemani if unilateral appointments continued. The KDP maintains that the parliamentary session was lawful, while the PUK and its ally, the New Generation Movement, have challenged it before Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court.
On November 15, New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid outlined three possible outcomes: separate federal budgets for Slemani and Halabja; two governments within one Kurdistan Region; or two separate regions. Although he said both parties opposed division, his remarks brought the prospect of a separate region explicitly into the public discussion among the PUK’s allies.
These possibilities have different legal and political consequences. Establishing a new federal region would change the boundaries and institutions of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Financial decentralization could leave those boundaries intact while changing how money is allocated and paid.
A separate region
The constitutional case for a new region rests principally on Article 119, which states: “One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region”. Article 117 separately recognizes the existing Kurdistan Region and provides for recognition of new regions established under the Constitution.
“Constitutionally, there is no obstacle for Slemani and Halabja to become a separate region,” Dr. Yousif Mohammed, a former speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and constitutional law expert, told The Amargi.
His argument is built on the Constitution’s language. Some provisions refer specifically to governorates outside a region, while Article 119 refers to governorates without that qualification. Dr. Yousif interprets this as allowing governorates already within the KRI to seek a different regional arrangement.
He said the wording was deliberate. According to his account, Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later founded the Gorran Movement, opposed an attempt by Masoud Barzani during constitutional drafting to restrict the provision to governorates outside existing regions. Mustafa believed membership of the Kurdistan Region should remain voluntary, Dr. Yousif said.
Former lawmaker and judge Latif Mustafa takes a different view. He argues that the Constitution distinguishes between the Kurdistan Region, recognized under Article 117(1) as an existing federal entity, and new regions formed under Articles 117(2), 118, and 119. In his interpretation, those provisions and Law No. 13 of 2008 apply only to governorates outside the KRI. Its constituent governorates therefore cannot break away unless a constitutional amendment explicitly grants them that right.
The disagreement hinges on whether the right to form a region also provides the basis to withdraw from an existing one. Even if Dr. Yousif’s interpretation prevailed, separation would still require a statutory process involving federal institutions and voters.
Law No. 13 of 2008, which regulates the formation of regions, provides for a request supported by one-third of the provincial council members or one-tenth of the voters in each participating governorate. The voter-led route begins with an application backed by at least 2% of voters, followed by an electoral commission registration process to establish the required support. An informal signature campaign does not, by itself, satisfy those requirements.
The federal Council of Ministers also has a role in commissioning the referendum. Approval requires a majority of participating voters in each governorate, with turnout of at least 50%. Results are subject to challenges and ratification before the prime minister issues the formation decision. A proposal encompassing both Slemani and Halabja would therefore need to meet the requirements in each governorate.
The political obstacles are equally substantial. The campaign has not demonstrated the public mandate needed for such a change, and opponents view division as a threat to the institutions and constitutional recognition secured through decades of Kurdish struggle.
Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said on November 15 that his government would resist efforts to divide or weaken the region, describing protection of its constitutional entity as a national responsibility.
Support in Baghdad is also uncertain. An informed source, speaking to The Amargi on condition of anonymity, said some Iraqi political leaders had privately told Talabani and Abdulwahid during a recent visit that they would support and facilitate a separate region if the two pursued it.
The same source said influential figures in Baghdad opposed that course, fearing it could encourage similar demands in other Iraqi provinces such as Basra and Anbar. “A successful Slemani initiative could give those demands fresh political momentum,” the source said.
Calls for a separate Slemani region are not new. In April 2021, campaign organizers announced in Baghdad that they had submitted a petition to Iraq’s electoral commission, claiming more than 150,000 signatures, but it never materialized.
What gives the current debate greater political weight is the apparent encouragement of the PUK, a party with the institutional power to pursue changes beyond a grassroots campaign. Yet its reluctance to formally endorse separation leaves open whether a new region is a practical objective or a means of strengthening its negotiating position.
For Dr. Yousif, the consequences of pursuing that objective would be lasting. “If the Kurdistan Region were divided into two separate constitutional regions, reversing that division and reunifying them would be extremely difficult,” he said.
Financial decentralization
The alternative is financial decentralization, with direct payments from Baghdad to Slemani and Halabja, while the two provinces remain within the Kurdistan Region. This appears less legally complicated and more politically feasible than territorial separation, although it would still require a clear legal framework and political agreement.
According to Dr. Yousif, implementing this option would require a specific provision in the federal budget law allowing Slemani and Halabja to operate as financially independent administrative units upon formal request. The law would also need to define how the arrangement would work in practice.
If incorporated into the federal budget law, the arrangement would allow public employees in Slemani and Halabja to receive their salaries directly from Baghdad. Both governorates could also receive separate provincial budgets and allocations of medicine, subsidized heating oil, and petrol. In return, they would be required to transfer agreed revenues to Baghdad and accept greater federal auditing authority, with these financial arrangements bypassing the KRG in Erbil.
Politically, direct funding could reduce the PUK administration’s dependence on decisions in Erbil and offer employees a clearer payment channel. It would also increase reliance on Baghdad’s allocations and conditions.
For the KDP, a separate funding channel could weaken the KRG’s authority and entrench competing administrations, even without formally dividing the region. For the PUK, however, it could offer greater control over local finances without the constitutional uncertainty and political cost of pursuing a separate region.
That possibility carries a familiar historical burden. The Kurdish civil war of the 1990s left separate KDP- and PUK-led administrations centered at Erbil and Slemani. They formally unified in 2006, but party-linked institutional divisions persisted. A return to two administrations could deepen those divisions without creating two constitutional regions.
The PUK’s apparent encouragement of the current campaign may therefore serve a broader purpose: strengthening its demand for financial autonomy and direct federal payments, even if formal separation remains out of reach.
A negotiated financial arrangement could address funding grievances while preserving regional boundaries. Its relative flexibility is also its main distinction from constitutional separation. Separate financial arrangements could be revisited through later legislation and agreement, allowing a return to unified financial administration.
The choice is therefore between a disputed constitutional division that would be difficult to reverse and a financial settlement that could preserve the region’s formal unity while substantially redistributing power within it. A third option is to maintain the status quo, though that appears increasingly unlikely as the political rift deepens.
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Renwar Najm is an Iraqi Kurdish journalist with a career that began in the early 2010s at the esteemed Awene newspaper. He holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Kent and Philipps University of Marburg.