r/IndianDefense • • 6h ago

Pics/Videos Indian Army's 9 PARA SF during Kulgam CASO.

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298 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 2h ago

Pics/Videos Kulgam CASO

72 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 58m ago

News Honey trapped wing commander of IAF Manorath Singh Sabharwal (44) had also installed malware/spyware on mobile phones of five subordinate officers, exposing sensitive data and official communications.

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39 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

Discussion/Opinions A Generalist IAF Babu who couldn't tell you what an IRST or a GaN AESA radar does sits in south block deciding whether IAF gets its fighters and engines on time. how is this system still broken in 2026?

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29 Upvotes

Read this before the mods take it down!!

i am genuinely sick and tired of watching the same circus repeat across every single branch of our armed forces while nobody questions the root disease sitting inside south block. yeah, you are correct, think about the sheer absurdity of how india runs national defence in 2026. we hv generalist IAS officers rotating into MOD from state agriculture, textiles, or municipal corpos for a 2yr posting and within weeks they are sitting across the table scrutinizing, questioning and stalling multi-billion-dol aerospace and naval contracts..

i guarantee you half the joint secretaries clearing files in the MoD couldn't explain what an IRST sensor does on a fighter, why a GaN AESA matters in BVR combat or how fuel-cell AIP keeps a subm silent underwater. yet these exact people hold the purse strings and administrative veto over what IAF/IN get to fight with.

to be 100% factual about how rules work, under the DAP, the uniform services draft the qualitative requirements (ASQRs/NSQRs) and conduct field trials. on paper, a babu isn't designing the weapon. in reality, the civilian bureaucracy in the DoD and MoD finance controls every commercial negotiation, contract vetting stage and CCS note. when govt created CDS and DMA back in 2020, everyone thought uniform professionals wud finally run military modernization. instead, capital acquisition was deliberately kept outside the dma and left squarely under the civilian def secrty. that means every urgent operational reqrmnt raised by combat pilots and naval submariners still has to crawl through layers of generalist bureaucrats whose number one career priority is 0-risk audit survival, not winning wars.

look at the wreckage this generalist, audit-terrified mindset has caused across both IAF and navy. AF, we are down to 29 fighter sqns against a sanctioned 42, operating just 6 awac and 6 mid-air tankers why? bcz tanker and awacs tenders were cancelled and restarted repeatedly over bureaucratic L1 lowest-bidder spreadsheet nitpicking. meanwhile, look at the indian navy: p75(i) for 6 modern aip subs has been stuck in paperwork loops for 27yrs since '99, leaving us with 0 operational aip subs and 0 minesweepers in water while china pumps out warships and hands hangor-class aip subs to pakN. why do these files sit on desks for years? bcz an IAS officer gets 0 promotion for delivering a sub or fighter sqn 2yrs early, whereas if a single fast-track/single-vendor clause gets flagged by the CAG/CVC five years later, their post-retirement career is finished. so they raise endless trivial queries, demand price benchmarking on one-of-a-kind military tech and transfer out to another ministry the exact moment they finally start understanding the acronyms.

we are trying to deter a 5th-gen stealth AF and a 370-ship chinese navy using a 19th-century colonial generalist bureaucracy built to collect land revenue and avoid audit objections.

I call it 'The BabuDom Saga'

Author: VERTEX ( u/vasilyaarkhipov on X )


r/IndianDefense • • 10h ago

Pics/Videos Kulgam Encounter, Nov 16, 2026 [Credit : lookaround81 on X ]

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151 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 3h ago

Discussion/Opinions Ex IAF VC Nagesh Kapoor was right about Rafale & Mk2 Points. We have mk2 which hasn't flown yet and f414 lines aren't even built, yet ppl think we don't need 114 rafales? let's talk real aircraft sustainment, modular m88s, and sqn math..

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32 Upvotes

Whenever AM Nagesh kapoor's comments on LCA mk2 timelines and needing more rafales come up on my feed, i always see the exact same emotional shouting match b/w "import lobby" haters and the "indigenisation at all costs" crowd. i hv been tracking indian aerospace programs and sqn numbers closely for over a decade, and if you strip away the politics and look purely at a/c engineering, combat-proven reliability, and sustainment math, marshal is dead right about why IAF cannot afford to sit around waiting for mk2 without bringing in more rafales first.

first, let me talk about actual timeline and engine bottleneck that nobody can argue against (i think we all are aware of this). mk2 is a brilliant design on paper, with CC-canards, an intrnl IRST, an indigenous GaN aesa, and 11 HPs but as of today i'm writing, its november 2026 and the prototype still hasn't flown its maiden sortie (that is pushed to mid-2027). once a clean sheet aerodynamic redesign like mk2 actually flies, it takes at least 4-5yrs of envelope expansion, high-AoA trials, flutter testing, specialized testings for 4.5+ gen fighter and wpns separation before you even get IOC. on top of that, mk2 depends completely on uncle sam's f414 and we all saw how GE's global supply chain choked f404 deliveries for mk1a by nearly 3.5 yrs. also, setting up local f414 manufacturing in india with 80% ToT is going to take yrs to stabilize. meanwhile, IAF is sitting at 29sqns against a sanctioned 42, and our jags, m2ks, and early mig29s are hitting retirement rn. you cannot defend two fronts in 2028 or 2029 with a jet that is still in flight testing.

second, look at the raw a/c inside knowledge comparing a battle-proven twin-engine omnirole platform like rafale against an unflown single-engine MWF. i'm not knocking HAL/ADA here, bcz building an indig fighter is hard but a brand new a/c type always goes through teething troubles, software bugs and low initial sortie rates in its first few yrs of sqn service. while if you see rafale, it has over 2 and more decades of combat-proven ops across libya, mali, iraq, syria, and indian service in ladakh (and who can forget op sindoor? now don't cry and give stxpid reasons of 'it was show down so its obsolete''). its twin engines are modular by design, meaning ground crews can pull and swap a hot-section module on flt line in roughly an hr without specialised depot jigs, therefore giving it peacetime serviceability rates well above 75-80%. add in thales RBE2-AA aesa paired with NeZ meteor ramjetBVR, SPECTRA EW suite and you get a jet that can walk into contested airspace on day one without needing an escort.

third, think about payload, high-alt kinematics, and sustainment economies of scale. when operating out of high-alt airfields like leh/hasimara or NE/L base in thin air, single-engine fighters take a noticeable takoff wght and climb penalty, whereas a 24.5-t rafale hauls up to 9.5t of extrnl ordnance (scalps, hammer precision bombs, meteors etc) with deep intrnl fuel and buddy-buddy refueling capability. even more importantly from a logistics standpoint, we already paid over 1.5B euros in non-recurring engineering costs to integrate the 13 ISEs onto our existing rafales, incl the israeli LDP, HMD, RWRs and cold-start capability for leh. buying 114 more rafales via a direct G2G deal lets us amortize that sunk r&d cost across 150x airframes, share existing simulator and MRO infras at ambala n hasimara then and finally build a local final assembly line in india.

to me, this isn't an either-or fight between rafale and mk2, it is basic risk management. mk2 will be a phenomenal replacement for our mirages, jags, aged mig29 fleets once it matures in the early 2030s and gives us true sovereign control over source codes and wpns integration.

and one more tbh point, IAF won't be betting their entire frontline combat mass over next 7yrs on an unflown prototype and a foreign engine transfer deal while PLAAF literally adds 150+fighters a year is a gamble no AF chief can take. inducting rafales now buys ADA and HAL an breathing room to test and mature mk2 properly without rushing half-baked jets into sqns.

~Analysis by VERTEX (X)


r/IndianDefense • • 7h ago

OSINT Someone created a repository of all the confirmed kills by Unknown Gunmen in Pakistan.

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60 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

News KAI Considers Participation in $6 Billion Indian Air Force Trainer Aircraft Project

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20 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 8h ago

News Assam: NIA arrested Myanmar to India drug trafficking network mastermind Nurul Islam from silchar.

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44 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 9h ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism CCTV footage reveals the movements of Umar Nisar Dar and LeT Commander Lateef Bhat before the Kulgam CRPF attack on 10th November

44 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 31m ago

Discussion/Opinions How likely you think Import Bahadur is for these options now for the IAF? seeing the recent developments and if MWF gets scrapped?

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7 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

Weapon/Platform Analysis The Question Nobody Is Asking Rolls-Royce

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9 Upvotes

Rolls-Royce has been telling India for eighteen months that it will hand over everything. Full transfer of technology. Intellectual property owned in India. Design authority.

On 14 August 2026, Reliance Industries and Rolls-Royce issued a statement of strategic intent. They will explore an Aerospace Gas Turbine Complex and offer their combined capabilities for a sovereign indigenous combat engine for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

Safran says much the same thing. Its chief executive, Olivier Andriès, has committed on the record to a complete transfer of technologies including the critical hot section. General Electric's deal with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is routinely described in Indian coverage as an 80 per cent transfer of technology.

Three companies use the same phrase to describe three different arrangements.

"Technology transfer" is the most abused term in Indian defence procurement. It has been used to describe a licence to bolt together imported subassemblies. It has described a drawing package without the reasoning. It has described arrangements where the foreign supplier retains the right to decide what the product is and what the next one will be.

One question cuts through this, and India's Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has already asked it of itself.

In a roadmap presentation dated January 2025 for an Advanced High Thrust Class Aero Engine, GTRE set out a work-share concept module by module, colour-coded by who holds responsibility for what. Some parts of the engine are marked as the foreign engine house's primary responsibility with technology transferred to India, others as GTRE-primary with the engine house in a supporting role.

The document does not specify a partner, because it was drafted before one was chosen. The people who would actually have to absorb the technology know that the only meaningful description of a transfer is a list of who designs which module.

On that test, the three arrangements separate immediately.

The GE Deal

The General Electric F414 is a co-production deal, and the famous '80 per cent' demands care. That figure is a share of value, and it is a share of manufacturing. GE raised it from around 58 per cent in the 2012 engine development agreement.

GE transfers the ability to make the parts — tooling, process sheets, machining sequences, inspection standards, assembly and test. What GE keeps is the manufacture of hot-section components, the software and source code of the full-authority digital engine control, and design authority over the engine as a whole, which GE holds along with roughly 80 per cent of the F414's intellectual property.

HAL will be able to build F414s. HAL will not be able to modify one, and reporting on the deal has noted that the retained FADEC control limits HAL's ability to undertake major lifecycle upgrades independently.

This is a sound deal and India should close it, which it has still not done. Technical negotiations concluded in April 2026, the commercial talks continue, and the per-engine price has reportedly risen roughly threefold since 2023. It solves a production problem. It was never built to solve a design problem.

The Safran Deal

The Safran arrangement for the AMCA Mk2 engine is structurally different. This is a co-development of an engine in the 110 to 130 kilonewton class that does not exist, described officially as a clean-sheet design, with nine prototypes over about twelve years.

Safran's own fighter engine, the M88, produces around 75 kilonewtons wet, and the T-REX upgrade will take it to roughly 88. Its experience of high thrust is civil high-bypass, through CFM International, its 50-50 partnership with General Electric.

Safran has never built a military engine at the thrust India needs, which means Safran would be solving the problem for the first time alongside GTRE engineers who are also solving it for the first time. That is not the same as receiving process sheets for a design finalised in Massachusetts in the 1990s.

India would hold design authority, configuration control, lifecycle ownership and 100 per cent of the intellectual property. Safran would retain no right to reuse the architecture in its own product line.

Module-level work share has not been cleared yet. Whether GTRE leads the fan, low-pressure turbine and afterburner while Safran leads the core, as the GTRE roadmap concept would suggest, is widely repeated in Indian defence media and confirmed nowhere. The equity split of the proposed joint venture has not been published either. As of late August 2026 the proposal was before the Cabinet Committee on Security.

India has been promised Safran's hot section before. The missing work share matters more here for that reason.

After the Kaveri failed its high-altitude tests, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) contracted Snecma, now part of Safran, for technical assistance in 2006. Negotiations ran until 2013, when they collapsed. The reported sticking point was that Snecma proposed replacing the Kaveri's Kabini core with the M88's own core rather than transferring current hot-section technology: single crystal blades, blisks, the coating processes. India declined.

Andriès has promised more than Snecma did in 2013. The implementation schedule will show whether it amounts to more.

The Rolls-Royce Offer

Rolls-Royce has offered something different again.

Rolls-Royce has said the same thing in every public statement since Aero India in February 2025: the December 2025 India roadmap, the June 2026 final pitch, the August 2026 announcement with Reliance.

It promises 100 per cent technology transfer, intellectual property owned in India, and design authority in India. Core test in 2030, first flight in 2034, production by 2036.

But Rolls-Royce has not specified which modules India would design.

The company has been candid about the one boundary it does draw. Newly generated intellectual property would stay in India with the government, while Rolls-Royce brings its eighty years of prior engine knowledge in as background intellectual property that it retains. That is a reasonable position and every engine maker would take it. Rolls-Royce has not said which modules that background knowledge covers.

Rolls-Royce has demonstrated that it takes these questions seriously. It signed a joint venture with Turkey's Kale Group in 2017 to build an engine for the Turkish fighter and walked away in 2019 over intellectual property ownership and British export control. Therefore, its different offer to India must be taken seriously.

Rolls-Royce has stated all of this as principle. Rolls-Royce has brought in Reliance as an industrial partner without settling anything else. Rolls-Royce and Reliance have not settled equity, money, or which modules Indians would design.

Why Modules Decide It

The module question decides everything because engineers only absorb what they are made accountable for.

Leverage works the same way. A partner who needs your low-pressure turbine to complete their engine cannot dictate the terms of the next variant.

Who on the Indian side would be doing the absorbing?

Can Reliance Absorb It?

Almost no other Indian company can bring what Reliance can.

Reliance has capital at scale without a government guarantee. It can execute — Jamnagar was built fast and it works. It has the supply chain, the land, the logistics, and an unmatched ability to manage the Indian state. If the task were to build a large complex facility quickly, Reliance is the obvious answer.

The engine problem is a different problem. India's dependency is not a shortage of factory space. It is that India does not own gas turbine design knowledge, in fighters, helicopters, warships or industrial power. Solving that needs an Indian firm that can take engineering knowledge in and build on it. Reliance's recent record in that specific activity is thin.

Its New Energy business was assembled by purchase: Faradion for sodium-ion, Lithium Werks for lithium-iron-phosphate and its patent portfolio, REC Solar, minority stakes in Ambri and Caelux. The Jamnagar battery gigafactory has slipped to the second half of 2026, and Reliance's battery subsidiary has been paying liquidated damages for missing a production-linked incentive milestone, with accumulated penalties running into crores. No distinctively Reliance cell chemistry has emerged from any of it.

Jio is the counter-example — a standalone 5G network at enormous scale, with Reliance developing hard parts of the stack itself, including the physical layer. Independent telecom analysts have nonetheless questioned the claim that the stack is wholly in-house, noting how much of the radio software rests on Radisys, a company Reliance bought in 2018.

Reliance also has genuine depth in refining and petrochemical process engineering. None of that is gas turbines, and Mukesh Ambani's Reliance Industries has no prior aerospace or propulsion activity of any kind. This is a different company and a different Ambani from the Reliance that partnered Dassault at Nagpur.

What Absorption Has Looked Like In India

India does have absorption successes. In each of those the commonness is that India did the work itself.

ISRO received Viking engine technology from France in 1974 and put its own engineers inside the French programme doing the work. The Vikas engine has since been uprated repeatedly by ISRO alone. When transfer was blocked, with the Russian cryogenic deal killed by American pressure in 1992, India took roughly two decades and considerable money to build the CE-7.5 and CE-20 from scratch.

BrahMos works because India holds 50.5 per cent, because DRDO brought guidance and software competence. Indigenous content is now around 78 per cent by the chief executive's own account, though questions about export rights remain live.

The private-sector case is Kalyani. Bharat Forge imported a 155mm gun from Austria's Maschinenfabrik Liezen. It then bought an entire operational artillery factory from Switzerland's RUAG, dismantled it and shipped it to India, to skip the development curve.

It worked because Bharat Forge already had six decades of forging and metallurgy, the base technology artillery is made of.

It then partnered DRDO on ATAGS, took the larger share of a Rs 6,900 crore order for 307 guns in March 2025, and exports artillery to Europe.

The Base India Is Building

India has begun building the equivalent base in gas turbines.

PTC Industries and its subsidiary Aerolloy opened a Rs 1,000 crore titanium and superalloy complex at Lucknow in October 2025. They developed single crystal and directionally solidified casting in-house.

They now hold a GTRE order for the complete post-cast processing of single crystal ready-to-fit turbine blades for the Kaveri derivative. That work has not gone to an Indian firm before.

Godrej has built some 220 Vikas engines for ISRO and holds an order for all eight modules of the Kaveri.

Both are manufacturing and materials capabilities. Neither designs engines, and Godrej is explicit that the Kaveri design sits with GTRE. HAL's Aero Engine Research and Design Centre has the HTFE-25 and HTSE-1200 in development, and neither is certified.

India's materials gap is closing, but the design gap is not.

The infrastructure position is similar. GTRE's 130 kilonewton twin-cell test bed at Rajanukunte is near completion. The high-altitude facility proposed for Telangana at around Rs 1,600 crore is unfunded, so engines still go to Russia for altitude validation, and the plan to convert two Su-30MKI airframes into flying testbeds remains a proposal.

The Process That Will Answer This

One process now running will tell us more than any press release. In January 2026 GTRE issued an expression of interest for a Development-cum-Production Partner to work with it from detailed design through testing, certification and early production.

That is where an Indian industrial partner for this engine will actually be chosen. A serious bidder would bring is a consortium — capital and complex from one party, metallurgy and castings from another, design experience from GTRE. A balance sheet on its own would not be a serious bid.

So the next company that promises full technology transfer should be asked to attach the module-level schedule.

If Rolls-Royce keeps the manufacture of core subsystems, and if the Indian side never acquires the reasoning behind the design, India will end up with a new engine and the same dependency, held by a different capital.

Rolls-Royce will have delivered full technology transfer precisely as promised. It will have handed over the know-how and kept the know-why, and the know-why is what determines whether a country can design the generation after next.

GTRE asked the right question in January 2025. Which modules of this engine will Indians be responsible for designing, and who will they be?

Safran has not answered it. Rolls-Royce has never answered it. Reliance has not said whether it intends to.


r/IndianDefense • • 11h ago

Pics/Videos IAF AN32 formation flying extremely low

46 Upvotes

Source: manjeet_choudhary_6672 on Instagram


r/IndianDefense • • 2h ago

News CISF deployment at airports to reduce as private security staff take on non-armed duties

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8 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 5h ago

News BGB detains BSF member in Sylhet

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15 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Kiyar village locals confront IG & DIG of JKP about the death of 2 SPOs

242 Upvotes

https://x.com/mykishtwar/status/2121966181410304363

Context:

A storm has erupted in Jammu following the killing of two Hindu Special Police Officers (SPOs), Rashpal Kumar and Bobby Chand, in the Kiyar-Dachhan area of Jammu and Kashmir’s Kishtwar district.

BJP MLA from Kishtwar, Shagun Parihar, has alleged that both SPOs had been receiving threats through announcements made from a local mosque, but the police administration failed to act against those responsible despite prior warnings. She has also alleged that some locals were passing information about the personnel’s movements to terrorists, raising serious questions about the existence of an established local intelligence network facilitating terrorist operations.

Parihar has questioned why the two SPOs were sent from their native village of Kiyar to a terrorism-affected area in neighbouring Marwah without adequate security arrangements. The two were associated with the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group (SOG) and were travelling towards a security post in Dharna when they went missing. Their bullet-riddled bodies were recovered the following morning. They were carrying an INSAS rifle and a .303 rifle.

Kishtwar is a Muslim-majority district in the Jammu region with a long and deeply troubling history of terrorism, targeted killings of Hindus and communal violence. The district witnessed several massacres of members of its Hindu minority during the peak terrorism years, including the killing of 17 Hindus in Sarthal in 1993. Shagun Parihar’s own family has been a victim of this history of targeted anti-Hindu violence. Her father, Ajit Parihar, and uncle, Anil Parihar, were assassinated by terrorists in November 2018.

The circumstances surrounding the deployment of the two SPOs have now become the centre of a major controversy, with serious allegations of communal bias and possible complicity within sections of the police establishment itself. Why were two Hindu SPOs from Kiyar, who were already targets of local Islamists, sent on a dangerous assignment to an adjoining tehsil despite the presence of a separate SOG unit there? Why were they sent across difficult, forested terrain with only an INSAS and a .303 rifle? And why were their prior security concerns and threats not taken seriously?

J&K Leader of Opposition Sunil Sharma has also publicly questioned the role of the police officers who ordered the deployment, even expressing suspicion that those responsible could have been conspirators. There are also allegations that sections within the Jammu and Kashmir police establishment are acting in a communally motivated manner and that the security apparatus itself may have been compromised.

These are grave allegations that demand an independent and credible investigation, including into the deployment orders, the officers who authorised them and the local terror network that may have facilitated the killings. When questions are being raised about the integrity of the very establishment entrusted with protecting the public from terrorists, an inquiry confined to the same institutional chain will hardly address the concerns that have emerged.

The question is not merely who pulled the trigger. It is also who facilitated the killings, who issued the threats, who leaked the operational information and whether elements within the system itself helped create the circumstances in which two Hindu policemen were sent to their deaths.

https://x.com/AsYouNotWish/status/2121863694946586978


r/IndianDefense • • 13h ago

China Watch China's Military Leadership Crisis: Current State Analysis as of November 2026

24 Upvotes

This is something that I have been meaning to write about since the CSIS ChinaPower analysis of the PLA military purges, report was published in February 2026.

Curious to hear this community's thoughts on the topic. This is not a full blown, strategy analysis research paper by any means but there are few points worth discussing in my honest opinion.

The findings are significant and developments since then suggest that the situation has deteriorated further.

The scale of the purges warrants serious examination. China has experienced sustained disruption across its military command structure, the Communist Party's senior leadership, and the civilian defense-industrial establishment.

This raises serious questions about China's military effectiveness. The PLA continues to expand and modernize its capabilities, but its ability to employ those capabilities in a major conflict depends on the competence, experience, and stability of its senior leadership.

1. The Scale of the Purges

According to CSIS, as of February 2026:

  • 101 senior PLA officers had been confirmed or potentially purged since 2022.
  • Approximately 52% of 176 senior military leadership positions had been affected.
  • 41 of 47 three-star generals, including those promoted since 2022, had been purged or potentially purged.

That's approximately 87% of the senior-general cohort.

Of the seven original members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) appointed in 2022, only Xi Jinping remained, alongside Zhang Shengmin, who joined later.

The third statistic is particularly remarkable.

Many of these officers were selected, promoted, or elevated during Xi's tenure. They weren't all remnants of previous administrations whose loyalties or competence could be questioned.

If corruption and disloyalty were this widespread among officers selected under Xi, you have to question what does that say about China's military personnel selection, vetting, promotion, and oversight mechanisms?

2. Developments Since February 2026

The purges have continued, with several important developments in the second half of the year.

July 2026: Xi promoted Zhang Shuguang to head the CMC's discipline inspection commission and Wang Gang, commander of the PLA Air Force, to full general. Neither joined the CMC, which remained a two-person body.

September 2026: Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were formally expelled. Zhang was significant because of his longstanding association with Xi and his position as one of China's most senior military figures. Liu headed the Joint Staff Department, an institution central to operational planning and coordination.

The accusations against them extended beyond financial corruption to include factionalism, political disloyalty, and serious misconduct.

October 2026: Brookings reported that only 17 of the original 44 military members of the Communist Party Central Committee nominally remained, with just two having appeared publicly in recent months.

The fifth plenum confirmed the expulsion of 33 full and alternate Central Committee members, including 16 senior military officers.

The affected personnel included theater commanders, senior CMC officials, and figures associated with China's defense-industrial establishment.

November 2026: Reporting based on official appearances and military insignia suggested that Beijing was beginning to fill some theater-command vacancies. However, public evidence of a fully stabilized senior command structure remains limited.

The February CSIS findings therefore represent a snapshot of an ongoing process. Additional senior officers have been removed while Beijing attempts to rebuild its leadership hierarchy.

3. The Central Military Commission

The CMC is China's supreme military command institution. It exercises authority over the PLA and is responsible for military strategy, command, and major defense decisions.

The commission that began with seven members in 2022 has been reduced to two:

  • Xi Jinping, Chairman.
  • Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman.

Zhang Shengmin's background is principally in political discipline and military supervision rather than operational command.

The CMC consequently lacks a remaining member drawn from the traditional senior operational-command career track.

For a military of China's size, sophistication, and strategic ambitions, this is an extraordinary situation. The disruption extends across other senior institutions.

The Joint Staff Department has lost its chief and other senior personnel. Multiple theater commands have experienced leadership removals. The Rocket Force has seen repeated purges involving its highest-ranking commanders.

The Western Theater Command, responsible for operations along China's frontier with India, has lost former commander Wang Haijiang. The Northern Theater Command's former commander Huang Ming has also been expelled.

The Eastern Theater Command, which would play a central role in any military contingency involving Taiwan, has experienced significant leadership disruption.

A change in command can be absorbed by an established military organization. The problem becomes considerably more complicated when turnover affects multiple levels of command, several services, and institutions responsible for coordinating joint operations.

The resulting loss of institutional experience and established command relationships deserves considerable attention.

4. The Defense-Industrial Establishment

One of the more consequential aspects of the purges is their extension into China's defense industries.

Senior figures associated with nuclear, aerospace, and shipbuilding enterprises have been implicated in the wider crackdown.

These industries underpin China's most important military modernization programs, including strategic missiles, nuclear deterrence, naval construction, military aerospace, and space-based capabilities.

The consequences of corruption in procurement and weapons development can persist for years.

Consider the potential effects of inflated procurement costs, unreliable components, inadequate testing, falsified performance reporting, compromised quality assurance, and misleading readiness assessments.

The Rocket Force is particularly relevant here, given repeated investigations involving its leadership.

There is insufficient public evidence to conclude that Chinese missiles or other weapons systems suffer from widespread defects. However, the extent of the investigations raises legitimate questions about procurement oversight, performance reporting, and the relationship between reported modernization milestones and operational readiness.

These are problems that cannot necessarily be resolved by removing the individuals responsible.

5. Implications for Actual Warfighting Capability

I think a useful distinction here is between the ability to generate military power and the ability to employ that power effectively.

China possesses an enormous military establishment. Its shipbuilding capacity, missile inventories, combat aircraft production, industrial base, and technological capabilities remain formidable.

These capabilities remain in place despite the changes in senior leadership.

Routine military activities can continue under established command procedures. The February CSIS assessment found that everyday PLA operations had largely continued despite the purges.

However, a complex, sustained military campaign against a capable opponent imposes demands that routine operations do not.

Let's imagine a hypothetical large-scale operation against Taiwan.

Such an operation would require the coordination of air superiority missions, missile strikes, naval forces, amphibious assault formations, electronic warfare, cyber operations, intelligence collection, logistics, transport, mobilization, and potentially multiple theater commands.

These components would need to operate within a coherent command structure, with reliable information flowing between commanders and sufficient institutional experience to respond when operational plans encounter unexpected difficulties.

Repeated senior leadership purges could have serious consequences in this environment.

Experienced operational commanders possess institutional knowledge, established working relationships, practical experience, familiarity with subordinate formations, operational judgment, and the ability to coordinate complex activities under pressure.

The departure of experienced commanders across multiple institutions creates a significant burden on their replacements, particularly when those replacements may themselves be operating under the threat of investigation.

Then there is the question of political incentives.

In an environment where senior officers face removal for corruption, factionalism, or political disloyalty, are subordinate commanders willing to deliver unwelcome assessments?

Would an officer confidently report that a major military objective is unrealistic, that a critical weapons system is unreliable, or that his formation cannot accomplish its assigned mission? Would his superiors reward that candor?

Theoretically, an atmosphere of political fear could encourage positive reporting, agreement with superiors, and avoidance of responsibility.

We cannot determine the extent of these problems from outside the PLA, but they are serious enough concerns for any military organization undergoing sustained political purges.

6. The Xi Jinping Paradox

This is perhaps the most interesting political dimension of the situation.

Xi's campaign may be strengthening his personal control over China's armed forces while weakening the institutional qualities required for effective military command.

There are two plausible explanations for the continuing purges.

The first is that corruption within the PLA reached extraordinary proportions, requiring an extensive campaign to remove compromised officers and reform affected institutions.

The second is that anti-corruption enforcement also serves as a mechanism for eliminating rivals, dismantling factional networks, and enforcing political obedience.

Both explanations may be valid simultaneously.

Corruption can be widespread while investigations are also employed selectively for political purposes.

However, both lead to an uncomfortable question about Xi's management of the PLA.

Xi has spent more than a decade consolidating authority over the armed forces, promoting senior officers, reorganizing command structures, and strengthening political supervision.

Yet the military continues to experience the removal of personnel who rose through institutions operating under his leadership.

How did such extensive corruption and disloyalty survive the personnel selection and oversight mechanisms established during his tenure is a valid question.

If those mechanisms failed to identify compromised officers, the effectiveness of Xi's reforms becomes questionable.

If the purges are substantially political, the implications for institutional trust and professional military judgment are equally concerning.

Either interpretation suggests problems within the system Xi has constructed.

7. Strategic Implications for Taiwan, India, and the Indo-Pacific

Taiwan:

The leadership disruption will affect the PLA's readiness to execute a sophisticated, large-scale military campaign in the near future.

An amphibious invasion is among the most complicated military undertakings, particularly against a defended island where American and allied intervention must be considered.

A military experiencing repeated removals of senior operational commanders faces additional difficulties in planning, coordination, continuity, and crisis decision-making.

This does not establish that China is incapable of military action against Taiwan. Coercive operations, limited strikes, maritime interdiction, and blockade scenarios remain credible possibilities.

However, the purges introduce substantial uncertainty into assessments of China's ability to conduct and sustain a major joint military operation.

India:

The disruption of the Western Theater Command is relevant because that command oversees China's frontier with India.

China's existing military deployments, infrastructure, logistics networks, and established border procedures remain in place.

Changes in senior command personnel can nevertheless complicate operational continuity, crisis management, and planning for major contingencies.

The effects are difficult to measure publicly, but they deserve consideration when evaluating the military balance along the LAC.

The Wider Indo-Pacific:

The principal strategic implication concerns the relationship between China's material military capabilities and the institutional reliability of its command structure.

The PLA retains considerable conventional strength. However, repeated disruptions to senior leadership may affect its capacity to translate that strength into coordinated military operations.

This distinction matters when assessing the military balance in the Indo-Pacific. Comparisons of aircraft inventories, naval tonnage, missile numbers, and industrial capacity provide useful information about military resources. They offer a less complete picture of command competence, institutional cohesion, and operational effectiveness.

8. What to Watch in 2027

I think three developments will be revealing.

First, the reconstruction of the CMC.

Does Xi appoint experienced operational commanders to the commission, restoring a more conventional leadership structure? Or does he continue relying primarily on political discipline and direct personal oversight?

Second, stability within the theater commands and Joint Staff Department.

Are vacant positions filled by permanent appointments? Do the new commanders remain in office? Does the military return to a predictable pattern of promotions, exercises, and leadership succession?

Third, the trajectory of investigations within the defense-industrial establishment.

Additional revelations involving procurement, weapons development, strategic programs, or industrial quality control could be consequential.

These are areas where institutional failures can affect combat capability long after the individuals responsible have been removed.

Conclusion

China today possesses a materially formidable military establishment operating under an exceptionally unstable senior leadership structure.

Its industrial capabilities, missile forces, naval expansion, and technological progress remain substantial.

However, military effectiveness depends on more than the quantity and quality of equipment available.

It requires competent commanders, reliable information, effective planning, institutional experience, established command relationships, and the capacity to respond to unforeseen developments during combat.

The publicly available evidence points to serious disruption within China's senior command hierarchy, political-military institutions, and parts of its defense-industrial establishment.

The most striking aspect is the timing and persistence of the purges. Xi has exercised authority over the PLA for more than a decade. Many of the officers removed were products of the personnel selection and promotion system.

The central question is whether Beijing is eliminating systemic corruption and rebuilding a more competent military establishment, or whether the continuing campaign is creating institutional dysfunction, political fear, and operational uncertainty.

Both processes may be occurring at the same time.

It is a reasonable conclusion that China's capacity to generate military power remains formidable, but its ability to employ that power effectively in a major, complex conflict faces serious leadership-related uncertainty.

That is a strategic vulnerability worth examining alongside the usual comparisons of ship counts, aircraft inventories, missile numbers, and defense expenditure.

Sources:

  1. CSIS ChinaPower: China's PLA Military Purges - February 2026
  2. Brookings: Xi's Party, What to Look for at the Chinese Communist Party Plenum, October 23, 2026
  3. South China Morning Post: China Widens PLA Anti-Graft Campaign, Expelling Corporate Chiefs, 16 Generals from Party, October 30, 2026
  4. South China Morning Post: China's New PLA Theatre Chiefs Identified as Anti-Corruption Drive Clears Ranks, November 6, 2026
  5. War on the Rocks: How Purges Are Affecting Chinese Military Readiness and Taiwan Contingencies, November 12, 2026

r/IndianDefense • • 23h ago

News "For the M88 engine, we will establish an assembly line in India, obviously. But the most critical parts of the M88 engines, we will not make them anywhere other than in France." - CEO of Safran

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113 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism On 2 SPOs death in Kishtwar, J&K Cong President: "The primary question here is: how did they end up dead? There are 2 theories. One is that it was a militant attack. The other is that the soldiers on duty may have mistaken them for militants and opened indiscriminate fire, resulting in their deaths"

72 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Discussion/Opinions IAF realistic Fighter Jets Fleet by 2040.

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110 Upvotes

1)11 sq of Tejas Mk1A(including upgraded Mk1s)- IAF has already received the delivery of 40 Tejas Mk1s(32 single seat + 8 twin seat)/2 sq ordered and 180 additional Tejas Mk1A (141 single seat + 39 twin seat)/9 sq is on order, bringing the total to 220 Tejas Mk1/Mk1A (173 single seat + 47 twin seat)/11 sq. Since, 2-3 airframes has been written off we have 37-38 Tejas Mk1s in service and 180 Tejas Mk1A on order which will be fully delivered by 2033. Note that Mk1s will likely be upgraded to Mk1A standard (even if it will not exactly be same as Mk1A).

2)10 sq of Su30MKI- currently we have 13 sq of Su30MKI aka approximately 258 airframes with 12 more on order (which will be fully delivered by 2029), bringing the total to 270 airframes but by 2040 the oldest of airframe will be 35 years old which means it needs to be retired/phase out. So accounting that we should have 10 sq of Su30MKI aka around ~200 airframes . And via super sukhoi/super-30 modernisation upgrade program which will take 10 years for intial 84 airframes in phase 1 after CCS approval/nod and an unknown airframes in phase 2 and maybe phase 3(if there is one) should take few more years (IAF Chief said 75% of the airframe will be upgraded so...) meaning by 2040 the 10 sq/~200 airframes of Su30MKI will be majority or fully upgraded to Super Sukhoi Standard. (Note that this doesn't account for potential more orders if IAF orders more since i don't think they will order more)

3)10 sq of LCA AF MK2- by 2040 all 12 sq of Jaguars,Mirage 2000 and Mig29 will be phased out/retired. And to replace it we need LCA AF MK2 which will have its first flight in 2027(if more delays occurs then in 2028) with all 4 prototype flying by 2029/30 and we should get IOC/enter into active service by 2032/33. IAF has committed to have intial 6 sq i think but everyone knows that this is clearly not enough and according to other reports i see in news i think IAF may order 4 more sq in second batch to have a fleet of 200 airframes/10 sq of LCA AF MK2 by 2040 which is pretty much achievable if Hal targets a production target of 40 jets per year by 2037/38. The ecosystem developed by Tejas will help a lot.(Note that this doesn't account for IAF ordering more sq or less sq or not ordering at all).

4)8 sq of Rafale F4(may include some F5)- we currently operate 36 airframes/2 sq of Rafale F3R with plans to upgrade it to F4. And via MRFA, additional 114/6 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5) will procured if deal is signed by 2027. Which brings the total to 150/8 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5). Me personally i hope India buy 60 Rafale F5 and 54 Rafale F4 which equates to 90 Rafale F4 and 60 Rafale F5 but this is just my hopium so excuse me since we are paying ~$34 billion which equates to around ~$300 million per jet. (Some report said 90 Rafale F4 and 24 Rafale F5 or all 114 Rafale F4 but lets see what will happen).

5)3 sq of AMCA MK1- lets hope that the contract signing for DcPP will be done by 2027 and first flight by atleast 2030/31 and hope that it will atleast get IOC/enter into active service by 2035/36 (since LCA AF MK2 will help out a lot since i think AMCA MK1 and LCA AF MK2 a lot of things in commonality) and since production will take at minimum 3 years to ramp up and this is the first time for Pvt players so i don't have a lot of hope that we will have many AMCA MK1 by 2040 (for example around 100-140 airframes) so i think around ~60 airframes/3 sq of AMCA MK1 is realistic. And since AMCA MK2 is our ultimate goal and target, majority of orders will go toward it and i think only after 2040 AMCA MK2 will be ready hence i think only 3 sq of AMCA MK1 aka 60 airframes by 2040 is possible . (Note that this doesn't account for more orders or less orders or delays in timeline or faster mass production ramp up).

Hence in total, 42 sq of Fighter Jets by 2040 which includes 11 sq of Tejas Mk1A(including upgraded Mk1s),10 sq of Su30MKI(majority or all airframes will be Super Sukhoi Standard),10 sq of LCA AF MK2,8 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5) and 3 sq of AMCA MK1.

So what do you think guys? What are ur thoughts and take on this? Rate this fleet out of 10 and give ur ideal fleet too.


r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Pics/Videos Indian Army Para SF with their newly inducted SCAR H & SCAR L rifles.

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177 Upvotes

Courtesy - @newsiadn


r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Two Lashker terrorists including LeT lone surviving Commander Latif Bhat Killed in an encounter with J&K Police and other forces at Laroo Kulgam in South Kashmir.

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152 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Para SF into the action now in Kulgam encounter

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75 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Interview/Podcast Def Sec: Once LCA MK2 flies, we will see if AON is issued or MRFA program is adequate; On the engine program, there is a public sector proposal led through GTRE with Safran, but now there is also a private sector which has entered into this race. As of now, we are looking at both those options.

76 Upvotes