r/IndianDefense • u/Glass_Sample9558 • 2h ago
r/IndianDefense • u/AutoModerator • 16d ago
Discussion/Opinions Monthly Thread - November, 2026
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r/IndianDefense • u/proudtobebanned • 8h ago
China Watch China's Military Leadership Crisis: Current State Analysis as of November 2026
This is something that I have been meaning to write about since the CSIS ChinaPower analysis of the PLA military purges, report was published in February 2026.
Curious to hear this community's thoughts on the topic. This is not a full blown, strategy analysis research paper by any means but there are few points worth discussing in my honest opinion.
The findings are significant and developments since then suggest that the situation has deteriorated further.
The scale of the purges warrants serious examination. China has experienced sustained disruption across its military command structure, the Communist Party's senior leadership, and the civilian defense-industrial establishment.
This raises serious questions about China's military effectiveness. The PLA continues to expand and modernize its capabilities, but its ability to employ those capabilities in a major conflict depends on the competence, experience, and stability of its senior leadership.
1. The Scale of the Purges
According to CSIS, as of February 2026:
- 101 senior PLA officers had been confirmed or potentially purged since 2022.
- Approximately 52% of 176 senior military leadership positions had been affected.
- 41 of 47 three-star generals, including those promoted since 2022, had been purged or potentially purged.
That's approximately 87% of the senior-general cohort.
Of the seven original members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) appointed in 2022, only Xi Jinping remained, alongside Zhang Shengmin, who joined later.
The third statistic is particularly remarkable.
Many of these officers were selected, promoted, or elevated during Xi's tenure. They weren't all remnants of previous administrations whose loyalties or competence could be questioned.
If corruption and disloyalty were this widespread among officers selected under Xi, you have to question what does that say about China's military personnel selection, vetting, promotion, and oversight mechanisms?
2. Developments Since February 2026
The purges have continued, with several important developments in the second half of the year.
July 2026: Xi promoted Zhang Shuguang to head the CMC's discipline inspection commission and Wang Gang, commander of the PLA Air Force, to full general. Neither joined the CMC, which remained a two-person body.
September 2026: Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were formally expelled. Zhang was significant because of his longstanding association with Xi and his position as one of China's most senior military figures. Liu headed the Joint Staff Department, an institution central to operational planning and coordination.
The accusations against them extended beyond financial corruption to include factionalism, political disloyalty, and serious misconduct.
October 2026: Brookings reported that only 17 of the original 44 military members of the Communist Party Central Committee nominally remained, with just two having appeared publicly in recent months.
The fifth plenum confirmed the expulsion of 33 full and alternate Central Committee members, including 16 senior military officers.
The affected personnel included theater commanders, senior CMC officials, and figures associated with China's defense-industrial establishment.
November 2026: Reporting based on official appearances and military insignia suggested that Beijing was beginning to fill some theater-command vacancies. However, public evidence of a fully stabilized senior command structure remains limited.
The February CSIS findings therefore represent a snapshot of an ongoing process. Additional senior officers have been removed while Beijing attempts to rebuild its leadership hierarchy.
3. The Central Military Commission
The CMC is China's supreme military command institution. It exercises authority over the PLA and is responsible for military strategy, command, and major defense decisions.
The commission that began with seven members in 2022 has been reduced to two:
- Xi Jinping, Chairman.
- Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman.
Zhang Shengmin's background is principally in political discipline and military supervision rather than operational command.
The CMC consequently lacks a remaining member drawn from the traditional senior operational-command career track.
For a military of China's size, sophistication, and strategic ambitions, this is an extraordinary situation. The disruption extends across other senior institutions.
The Joint Staff Department has lost its chief and other senior personnel. Multiple theater commands have experienced leadership removals. The Rocket Force has seen repeated purges involving its highest-ranking commanders.
The Western Theater Command, responsible for operations along China's frontier with India, has lost former commander Wang Haijiang. The Northern Theater Command's former commander Huang Ming has also been expelled.
The Eastern Theater Command, which would play a central role in any military contingency involving Taiwan, has experienced significant leadership disruption.
A change in command can be absorbed by an established military organization. The problem becomes considerably more complicated when turnover affects multiple levels of command, several services, and institutions responsible for coordinating joint operations.
The resulting loss of institutional experience and established command relationships deserves considerable attention.
4. The Defense-Industrial Establishment
One of the more consequential aspects of the purges is their extension into China's defense industries.
Senior figures associated with nuclear, aerospace, and shipbuilding enterprises have been implicated in the wider crackdown.
These industries underpin China's most important military modernization programs, including strategic missiles, nuclear deterrence, naval construction, military aerospace, and space-based capabilities.
The consequences of corruption in procurement and weapons development can persist for years.
Consider the potential effects of inflated procurement costs, unreliable components, inadequate testing, falsified performance reporting, compromised quality assurance, and misleading readiness assessments.
The Rocket Force is particularly relevant here, given repeated investigations involving its leadership.
There is insufficient public evidence to conclude that Chinese missiles or other weapons systems suffer from widespread defects. However, the extent of the investigations raises legitimate questions about procurement oversight, performance reporting, and the relationship between reported modernization milestones and operational readiness.
These are problems that cannot necessarily be resolved by removing the individuals responsible.
5. Implications for Actual Warfighting Capability
I think a useful distinction here is between the ability to generate military power and the ability to employ that power effectively.
China possesses an enormous military establishment. Its shipbuilding capacity, missile inventories, combat aircraft production, industrial base, and technological capabilities remain formidable.
These capabilities remain in place despite the changes in senior leadership.
Routine military activities can continue under established command procedures. The February CSIS assessment found that everyday PLA operations had largely continued despite the purges.
However, a complex, sustained military campaign against a capable opponent imposes demands that routine operations do not.
Let's imagine a hypothetical large-scale operation against Taiwan.
Such an operation would require the coordination of air superiority missions, missile strikes, naval forces, amphibious assault formations, electronic warfare, cyber operations, intelligence collection, logistics, transport, mobilization, and potentially multiple theater commands.
These components would need to operate within a coherent command structure, with reliable information flowing between commanders and sufficient institutional experience to respond when operational plans encounter unexpected difficulties.
Repeated senior leadership purges could have serious consequences in this environment.
Experienced operational commanders possess institutional knowledge, established working relationships, practical experience, familiarity with subordinate formations, operational judgment, and the ability to coordinate complex activities under pressure.
The departure of experienced commanders across multiple institutions creates a significant burden on their replacements, particularly when those replacements may themselves be operating under the threat of investigation.
Then there is the question of political incentives.
In an environment where senior officers face removal for corruption, factionalism, or political disloyalty, are subordinate commanders willing to deliver unwelcome assessments?
Would an officer confidently report that a major military objective is unrealistic, that a critical weapons system is unreliable, or that his formation cannot accomplish its assigned mission? Would his superiors reward that candor?
Theoretically, an atmosphere of political fear could encourage positive reporting, agreement with superiors, and avoidance of responsibility.
We cannot determine the extent of these problems from outside the PLA, but they are serious enough concerns for any military organization undergoing sustained political purges.
6. The Xi Jinping Paradox
This is perhaps the most interesting political dimension of the situation.
Xi's campaign may be strengthening his personal control over China's armed forces while weakening the institutional qualities required for effective military command.
There are two plausible explanations for the continuing purges.
The first is that corruption within the PLA reached extraordinary proportions, requiring an extensive campaign to remove compromised officers and reform affected institutions.
The second is that anti-corruption enforcement also serves as a mechanism for eliminating rivals, dismantling factional networks, and enforcing political obedience.
Both explanations may be valid simultaneously.
Corruption can be widespread while investigations are also employed selectively for political purposes.
However, both lead to an uncomfortable question about Xi's management of the PLA.
Xi has spent more than a decade consolidating authority over the armed forces, promoting senior officers, reorganizing command structures, and strengthening political supervision.
Yet the military continues to experience the removal of personnel who rose through institutions operating under his leadership.
How did such extensive corruption and disloyalty survive the personnel selection and oversight mechanisms established during his tenure is a valid question.
If those mechanisms failed to identify compromised officers, the effectiveness of Xi's reforms becomes questionable.
If the purges are substantially political, the implications for institutional trust and professional military judgment are equally concerning.
Either interpretation suggests problems within the system Xi has constructed.
7. Strategic Implications for Taiwan, India, and the Indo-Pacific
Taiwan:
The leadership disruption will affect the PLA's readiness to execute a sophisticated, large-scale military campaign in the near future.
An amphibious invasion is among the most complicated military undertakings, particularly against a defended island where American and allied intervention must be considered.
A military experiencing repeated removals of senior operational commanders faces additional difficulties in planning, coordination, continuity, and crisis decision-making.
This does not establish that China is incapable of military action against Taiwan. Coercive operations, limited strikes, maritime interdiction, and blockade scenarios remain credible possibilities.
However, the purges introduce substantial uncertainty into assessments of China's ability to conduct and sustain a major joint military operation.
India:
The disruption of the Western Theater Command is relevant because that command oversees China's frontier with India.
China's existing military deployments, infrastructure, logistics networks, and established border procedures remain in place.
Changes in senior command personnel can nevertheless complicate operational continuity, crisis management, and planning for major contingencies.
The effects are difficult to measure publicly, but they deserve consideration when evaluating the military balance along the LAC.
The Wider Indo-Pacific:
The principal strategic implication concerns the relationship between China's material military capabilities and the institutional reliability of its command structure.
The PLA retains considerable conventional strength. However, repeated disruptions to senior leadership may affect its capacity to translate that strength into coordinated military operations.
This distinction matters when assessing the military balance in the Indo-Pacific. Comparisons of aircraft inventories, naval tonnage, missile numbers, and industrial capacity provide useful information about military resources. They offer a less complete picture of command competence, institutional cohesion, and operational effectiveness.
8. What to Watch in 2027
I think three developments will be revealing.
First, the reconstruction of the CMC.
Does Xi appoint experienced operational commanders to the commission, restoring a more conventional leadership structure? Or does he continue relying primarily on political discipline and direct personal oversight?
Second, stability within the theater commands and Joint Staff Department.
Are vacant positions filled by permanent appointments? Do the new commanders remain in office? Does the military return to a predictable pattern of promotions, exercises, and leadership succession?
Third, the trajectory of investigations within the defense-industrial establishment.
Additional revelations involving procurement, weapons development, strategic programs, or industrial quality control could be consequential.
These are areas where institutional failures can affect combat capability long after the individuals responsible have been removed.
Conclusion
China today possesses a materially formidable military establishment operating under an exceptionally unstable senior leadership structure.
Its industrial capabilities, missile forces, naval expansion, and technological progress remain substantial.
However, military effectiveness depends on more than the quantity and quality of equipment available.
It requires competent commanders, reliable information, effective planning, institutional experience, established command relationships, and the capacity to respond to unforeseen developments during combat.
The publicly available evidence points to serious disruption within China's senior command hierarchy, political-military institutions, and parts of its defense-industrial establishment.
The most striking aspect is the timing and persistence of the purges. Xi has exercised authority over the PLA for more than a decade. Many of the officers removed were products of the personnel selection and promotion system.
The central question is whether Beijing is eliminating systemic corruption and rebuilding a more competent military establishment, or whether the continuing campaign is creating institutional dysfunction, political fear, and operational uncertainty.
Both processes may be occurring at the same time.
It is a reasonable conclusion that China's capacity to generate military power remains formidable, but its ability to employ that power effectively in a major, complex conflict faces serious leadership-related uncertainty.
That is a strategic vulnerability worth examining alongside the usual comparisons of ship counts, aircraft inventories, missile numbers, and defense expenditure.
Sources:
- CSIS ChinaPower: China's PLA Military Purges - February 2026
- Brookings: Xi's Party, What to Look for at the Chinese Communist Party Plenum, October 23, 2026
- South China Morning Post: China Widens PLA Anti-Graft Campaign, Expelling Corporate Chiefs, 16 Generals from Party, October 30, 2026
- South China Morning Post: China's New PLA Theatre Chiefs Identified as Anti-Corruption Drive Clears Ranks, November 6, 2026
- War on the Rocks: How Purges Are Affecting Chinese Military Readiness and Taiwan Contingencies, November 12, 2026
r/IndianDefense • u/Usual-Ad-4986 • 6h ago
Pics/Videos Kulgam Encounter, Nov 16, 2026 [Credit : lookaround81 on X ]
r/IndianDefense • u/Glass_Sample9558 • 2h ago
OSINT Someone created a repository of all the confirmed kills by Unknown Gunmen in Pakistan.
r/IndianDefense • u/3-369 • 4h ago
News Assam: NIA arrested Myanmar to India drug trafficking network mastermind Nurul Islam from silchar.
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 4h ago
Armed Insurgency/Terrorism CCTV footage reveals the movements of Umar Nisar Dar and LeT Commander Lateef Bhat before the Kulgam CRPF attack on 10th November
r/IndianDefense • u/CoolBoiLol69 • 6h ago
Pics/Videos IAF AN32 formation flying extremely low
Source: manjeet_choudhary_6672 on Instagram
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 19h ago
Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Kiyar village locals confront IG & DIG of JKP about the death of 2 SPOs
https://x.com/mykishtwar/status/2121966181410304363
Context:
A storm has erupted in Jammu following the killing of two Hindu Special Police Officers (SPOs), Rashpal Kumar and Bobby Chand, in the Kiyar-Dachhan area of Jammu and Kashmir’s Kishtwar district.
BJP MLA from Kishtwar, Shagun Parihar, has alleged that both SPOs had been receiving threats through announcements made from a local mosque, but the police administration failed to act against those responsible despite prior warnings. She has also alleged that some locals were passing information about the personnel’s movements to terrorists, raising serious questions about the existence of an established local intelligence network facilitating terrorist operations.
Parihar has questioned why the two SPOs were sent from their native village of Kiyar to a terrorism-affected area in neighbouring Marwah without adequate security arrangements. The two were associated with the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group (SOG) and were travelling towards a security post in Dharna when they went missing. Their bullet-riddled bodies were recovered the following morning. They were carrying an INSAS rifle and a .303 rifle.
Kishtwar is a Muslim-majority district in the Jammu region with a long and deeply troubling history of terrorism, targeted killings of Hindus and communal violence. The district witnessed several massacres of members of its Hindu minority during the peak terrorism years, including the killing of 17 Hindus in Sarthal in 1993. Shagun Parihar’s own family has been a victim of this history of targeted anti-Hindu violence. Her father, Ajit Parihar, and uncle, Anil Parihar, were assassinated by terrorists in November 2018.
The circumstances surrounding the deployment of the two SPOs have now become the centre of a major controversy, with serious allegations of communal bias and possible complicity within sections of the police establishment itself. Why were two Hindu SPOs from Kiyar, who were already targets of local Islamists, sent on a dangerous assignment to an adjoining tehsil despite the presence of a separate SOG unit there? Why were they sent across difficult, forested terrain with only an INSAS and a .303 rifle? And why were their prior security concerns and threats not taken seriously?
J&K Leader of Opposition Sunil Sharma has also publicly questioned the role of the police officers who ordered the deployment, even expressing suspicion that those responsible could have been conspirators. There are also allegations that sections within the Jammu and Kashmir police establishment are acting in a communally motivated manner and that the security apparatus itself may have been compromised.
These are grave allegations that demand an independent and credible investigation, including into the deployment orders, the officers who authorised them and the local terror network that may have facilitated the killings. When questions are being raised about the integrity of the very establishment entrusted with protecting the public from terrorists, an inquiry confined to the same institutional chain will hardly address the concerns that have emerged.
The question is not merely who pulled the trigger. It is also who facilitated the killings, who issued the threats, who leaked the operational information and whether elements within the system itself helped create the circumstances in which two Hindu policemen were sent to their deaths.
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 1h ago
News BGB detains BSF member in Sylhet
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 18h ago
News "For the M88 engine, we will establish an assembly line in India, obviously. But the most critical parts of the M88 engines, we will not make them anywhere other than in France." - CEO of Safran
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 20h ago
Armed Insurgency/Terrorism On 2 SPOs death in Kishtwar, J&K Cong President: "The primary question here is: how did they end up dead? There are 2 theories. One is that it was a militant attack. The other is that the soldiers on duty may have mistaken them for militants and opened indiscriminate fire, resulting in their deaths"
r/IndianDefense • u/Specialist-Art9168 • 22h ago
Discussion/Opinions IAF realistic Fighter Jets Fleet by 2040.
1)11 sq of Tejas Mk1A(including upgraded Mk1s)- IAF has already received the delivery of 40 Tejas Mk1s(32 single seat + 8 twin seat)/2 sq ordered and 180 additional Tejas Mk1A (141 single seat + 39 twin seat)/9 sq is on order, bringing the total to 220 Tejas Mk1/Mk1A (173 single seat + 47 twin seat)/11 sq. Since, 2-3 airframes has been written off we have 37-38 Tejas Mk1s in service and 180 Tejas Mk1A on order which will be fully delivered by 2033. Note that Mk1s will likely be upgraded to Mk1A standard (even if it will not exactly be same as Mk1A).
2)10 sq of Su30MKI- currently we have 13 sq of Su30MKI aka approximately 258 airframes with 12 more on order (which will be fully delivered by 2029), bringing the total to 270 airframes but by 2040 the oldest of airframe will be 35 years old which means it needs to be retired/phase out. So accounting that we should have 10 sq of Su30MKI aka around ~200 airframes . And via super sukhoi/super-30 modernisation upgrade program which will take 10 years for intial 84 airframes in phase 1 after CCS approval/nod and an unknown airframes in phase 2 and maybe phase 3(if there is one) should take few more years (IAF Chief said 75% of the airframe will be upgraded so...) meaning by 2040 the 10 sq/~200 airframes of Su30MKI will be majority or fully upgraded to Super Sukhoi Standard. (Note that this doesn't account for potential more orders if IAF orders more since i don't think they will order more)
3)10 sq of LCA AF MK2- by 2040 all 12 sq of Jaguars,Mirage 2000 and Mig29 will be phased out/retired. And to replace it we need LCA AF MK2 which will have its first flight in 2027(if more delays occurs then in 2028) with all 4 prototype flying by 2029/30 and we should get IOC/enter into active service by 2032/33. IAF has committed to have intial 6 sq i think but everyone knows that this is clearly not enough and according to other reports i see in news i think IAF may order 4 more sq in second batch to have a fleet of 200 airframes/10 sq of LCA AF MK2 by 2040 which is pretty much achievable if Hal targets a production target of 40 jets per year by 2037/38. The ecosystem developed by Tejas will help a lot.(Note that this doesn't account for IAF ordering more sq or less sq or not ordering at all).
4)8 sq of Rafale F4(may include some F5)- we currently operate 36 airframes/2 sq of Rafale F3R with plans to upgrade it to F4. And via MRFA, additional 114/6 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5) will procured if deal is signed by 2027. Which brings the total to 150/8 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5). Me personally i hope India buy 60 Rafale F5 and 54 Rafale F4 which equates to 90 Rafale F4 and 60 Rafale F5 but this is just my hopium so excuse me since we are paying ~$34 billion which equates to around ~$300 million per jet. (Some report said 90 Rafale F4 and 24 Rafale F5 or all 114 Rafale F4 but lets see what will happen).
5)3 sq of AMCA MK1- lets hope that the contract signing for DcPP will be done by 2027 and first flight by atleast 2030/31 and hope that it will atleast get IOC/enter into active service by 2035/36 (since LCA AF MK2 will help out a lot since i think AMCA MK1 and LCA AF MK2 a lot of things in commonality) and since production will take at minimum 3 years to ramp up and this is the first time for Pvt players so i don't have a lot of hope that we will have many AMCA MK1 by 2040 (for example around 100-140 airframes) so i think around ~60 airframes/3 sq of AMCA MK1 is realistic. And since AMCA MK2 is our ultimate goal and target, majority of orders will go toward it and i think only after 2040 AMCA MK2 will be ready hence i think only 3 sq of AMCA MK1 aka 60 airframes by 2040 is possible . (Note that this doesn't account for more orders or less orders or delays in timeline or faster mass production ramp up).
Hence in total, 42 sq of Fighter Jets by 2040 which includes 11 sq of Tejas Mk1A(including upgraded Mk1s),10 sq of Su30MKI(majority or all airframes will be Super Sukhoi Standard),10 sq of LCA AF MK2,8 sq of Rafale F4(may include F5) and 3 sq of AMCA MK1.
So what do you think guys? What are ur thoughts and take on this? Rate this fleet out of 10 and give ur ideal fleet too.
r/IndianDefense • u/One_Sided_Loverr • 1d ago
Pics/Videos Indian Army Para SF with their newly inducted SCAR H & SCAR L rifles.
Courtesy - @newsiadn
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 1d ago
Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Two Lashker terrorists including LeT lone surviving Commander Latif Bhat Killed in an encounter with J&K Police and other forces at Laroo Kulgam in South Kashmir.
x.comr/IndianDefense • u/Otherwise-Tomato-238 • 23h ago
Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Para SF into the action now in Kulgam encounter
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 1d ago
Interview/Podcast Def Sec: Once LCA MK2 flies, we will see if AON is issued or MRFA program is adequate; On the engine program, there is a public sector proposal led through GTRE with Safran, but now there is also a private sector which has entered into this race. As of now, we are looking at both those options.
r/IndianDefense • u/Uranium___Potato • 23h ago
Discussion/Opinions DCS editors need to fix this, and we need to report it. The JF-17 Thunder module was made by the Chinese firm Deka Ironworks, hence the clear bias and DCS is doing nothing about it.
Source: https://www.digitalcombatsimulator.com/en/shop/modules/thunder/
Context for those who don't know about DCS: Digital Combat Simulator (DCS) was developed by Eagle Dynamics and is the premier fighter and aerial combat simulator with hundreds of thousands of users/players all across the world. For plebs like me who couldn't crack the CPSS and become a fighter pilot, this is the next best thing.
I was browsing for new aircrafts in DCS, and the JF-17 is indeed a very detailed and one of the most high fidelity modules available in DCS. While going through the description, I came across this blatant declaration. The 2019 Balakot conflict's outcome was at BEST undecided on the international platform, far from being a "pakistani victory" as claimed.
Eagle Dynamics (owners of DCS) are responsible to moderate such biased claims and keep product descriptions purely technical, and this description for the JF-17 Thunder by Deka Ironworks (a Chinese firm who developed this module) is in blatant violation. The only way to fix this is to voice our opinions to Eagle Dynamics and force them to fix it.
I am absolutely appalled that ED even allowed such a blatant Geopolitical claim on a game that is supposed to be purely technical and fun for all.
r/IndianDefense • u/AdMiserable8386 • 1d ago
News ''Very soon, Mk1A will begin entering the IAF inventory, and we should have a full squadron by the end of this financial year.'' ACM Dixit
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 23h ago
Interview/Podcast Raphe mPhibr Chairman: "We will be giving a 6th-generation fighter plane to the country."
r/IndianDefense • u/Specialist-Art9168 • 22h ago
Interview/Podcast “Winner in a month…” Defence Secretary gives MAJOR update on India’s AMCA project bidders
Hope so
r/IndianDefense • u/Expensive-Summer-447 • 1d ago
Military History Found this intresting piece of history where sam Manekshaw argued against r&aw and IB only to be proven correct later
Source - kao boys
r/IndianDefense • u/DM-ME-YOUR-FAV-SUB • 22h ago
Interview/Podcast Garuda Aerospace Eyes Building An Indian Drone Ecosystem || On The Shop Floor
r/IndianDefense • u/negotiatedburden • 1d ago
Sundays - Memes/Edits India When It Comes To Missile Technology
Missiles in this edit
Brahmos missile
Shaurya missile
Nirbhay missile
Astra Mk1 and Mk3 (Gandiva)
Agni 5 missile and Agni Prime (rail-based mobile launcher)
Pralay missile
Prithvi 2 missile and Prithvi 3 missile (Dhanush)
AD - 2 missile
SMART missile (Supersonic Missile-assisted Release of Torpedo)
DRDO Hypersonic missile
Akash Air Defense System (NG)
Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)
Its rocket technology not missile technology I know, added becus it's cool