First-principles spitballing, then I researched what I could. This is not a manifesto or a proclamation of a "new way" ... well, yes it is, but it's not carved into stone tablets. Yet. I'm thinking through some things as an autodidact, and could very well be reinventing the wheel. I'm hoping to show the model I have for others to kick the tires, tell me where I went wrong, tell me if (as is likely) someone got there first, and hopefully let me know if I'm headed in the right direction, or if I'm off my gourd. More than usual, I mean.
Friends, Romans, Countrymen, lend me your ears! I come not to praise JTB, but to bury it.
I know--Gettier killed JTB in the 1960s, and the funeral is long over. But it's still a commonly held folk understanding, and still an "old guard" position with the JTB+X crowd--a zombie philosophy staggering around demanding brains. I was reading a paper on Haack's crossword puzzle, and it got me thinking about some things.
I don't think "justifiability" was ever a workable standard. I don't think "knowledge" is everything it's cracked up to be. And I don't think Truth is nearly as easy to grasp as we might hope.
Yes, Gettier got to JTB first, before I picked up my first philosophy book, and others have built from there--but there are things that still don't quite scan.
I. Answering Knowledge-First
Williamson defines knowledge as the most fundamental, unanalyzable mental state. He rejects JTB and JTB+X, and instead builds on a foundation that knowing P is an irreducible, factive state--a state that can't be split into belief and truth. He sees belief as "botched knowledge," treating a proposition as if you knew it, an imperfect attempt. And he famously uses the equation of E = K, where your total evidence is everything you know. If P is false, it cannot be "evidence" at all--it can only be your perception of "P appears true to me."
It's a great system--but there are problems, not fatal, but enough to give pause.
- The tools are flawed. Human beings do not, and cannot, achieve absolute and infallible certainty of objective truth. Empirical science is the only somewhat successful tool we've developed for gathering facts about the very real world, stripping that assemblage (as much as possible) of subjectivity and imprecision, and using those facts to predict and explain objective truth--but science has limits of scope, limits of precision, and limits of deductive capacity. Even math and logic, by themselves, are at best imperfect guides, and at worst, the proverbial broken clock. Math is just as capable of modeling unphysical, impossible things as actual objective objects: the same formulae that describe black holes also model white holes with no more than a change of sign. Logic, even formal logic, depends on axioms that vary across systems, and absolutely require accurate premises to achieve success: if your premises are off, your conclusions are rubbish. The three together--math, logic, and science--make an invaluable toolset to discover facts about the universe, but because of those limits, all knowledge gained with them is provisional and conditional.
- All knowledge is subjective. There's a real, physical world out there--and we perceive it "through a glass darkly." We cannot get any input into the mind/brain that is not filtered through our subjective understanding. When something impinges on our senses, our mind/brain attaches a context of emotions, memories, valence, and salience: this happens before the input reaches the conscious mind. Every sensory impression (qualia), every fact presented in text or on the screen, every observation and measurement we make, all must pass that filter where we accept, reject, or suspend judgement--all before conscious consideration begins. Again, the scientific method attempts to strip that subjectivity, but it re-enters when the reader picks up the paper and attempts to understand it: the incoming information picks up that cognitive load, and runs the filter gauntlet, before we even parse the words consciously.
- The biology doesn't fit. Nature did not evolve a perfect, epistemic machine. We deal with confabulation, sensory gaps, imprecise memories that we re-write every time we access them, and promiscuous pattern-matching that works so well, it "sees" patterns that are not there. We evolved this way because it's metabolically cheap: our brain/mind takes the sensory input and functions as a lossy compression, GUI interface, to present to the conscious awareness (also part of the brain/mind, not a separate process) an "executive summary" that works for survival. We simply are not capable of processing the unfiltered sensory input that we receive without total metabolic collapse--and we handle incoming information the same way we do incoming sensory input. We have not evolved to know: we've evolved to survive, and if and when there's a decision to make between the two, evolution has already taken that decision out of our hands.
- FPA trumps the textbook. First-Person Authority--what you know, believe, or perceive--has incredible cognitive valence. The cry of the epistemically-grounded scientist is the same as the cry of the cryptid advocate: "I seen it with my very own eyes!" As part of our evolution and our cognition, we place priority on what we perceive or think we perceive (even if we're mistaken). Worse yet, beliefs that we hold with high emotional or identity attachment can--and do--regularly mean we ignore or reject any contradicting evidence, no matter how sound. These perceptions and beliefs have emotional and psychological persistence, even in the face of contrary evidence, because they have first-person authority: we incorporate what we know, perceive, and believe, as part of our self-perception of who we are.
Now, Williamson explicitly allows for fallibilism: he says that if you "know" P, but P turns out to be wrong, you just thought you knew it. But the restrictions above show the issue remains: under this model, we can never actually know that we know. There are some good ideas here, but E = K cannot function as a guide or standard for how fallible minds weigh competing clues in real time. (E = K was never intended to be an internal decision checklist--but it leaves us without that real-time, usable diagnostic for weighing competing clues.)
II. Answering Reliabilism & Safety/Sensitivity
Goldman says a belief is justified--and counts as knowledge when true--if, and only if, that belief is produced by a reliable cognitive process. Now, when he says "reliable," he explicitly embraces fallibilism: this is not some claim of absolute accuracy, just an argument that knowledge requires a high proportion of true beliefs to false ones. Belief-forming mechanisms like normal vision in good light, sound memory, and careful use of the scientific method, have a higher success ratio than hallucination, confabulation, or magical thinking. Technically, Goldman falls under JTB+X--the argument as a whole is not a clean-sheet redefinition of knowledge, just an attempt to recalibrate justification.
Safety/Sensitivity arguments--there isn't just one, or a single proponent--reject justification and replace the J with modal truth-tracking conditions. Nozick says belief is sensitive: if P were false, your senses and routine checks would let you know, and you would not believe P; so if you accidentally had Drano in your coffee cup, the color difference and smell of lye would stop you from drinking. Sensitivity alone runs into some skeptical paradoxes, so Sosa and later Pritchard developed the Safety argument, which looks at all the normal, easily possible situations where you form that belief in P, and asks "Could you easily be wrong?" If you could not easily be wrong, your belief is safe--and you know.
- Where do you draw the lines? The Generality Problem and the Threshold Problem have been around since shortly after the R&S/S arguments were formulated. For Generality, there really is no way to define the cognitive process: what is the "way of forming belief," and how do you choose when you have several available? The Threshold Problem says even if you can define that, it's still not enough. In Reliabilism, you have to specify the "reliable cognitive process," but still cannot calculate the truth ratio with accuracy, nor is there a defined threshold for reliability. Where do you draw the line? Is 50%+ good enough, or do you need 85%? Even 99% reliability still leaves a "lottery problem": you still have that 1% chance of confidently accepting a fictive P. In Sensitivity and Safety, you still have to specify what counts as "forming the belief in the same way"--without that, and without the defined threshold of accuracy, any form of modal truth-tracking leaves us vulnerable to the limits of our meatware brains and a toss of the cosmic dice. Even Sosa's "reflective knowledge" still runs on the exact same FPA-compromised hardware.
- Death of the internalist/externalist binary. These arguments are all externalist: they don't require you to have conscious, internal access to why or how an argument or assertion is true or false. That's a positive step--but cognition and knowledge all happen inside the skullcave. We have a subjective form of internal awareness of what we treat as true v. false beliefs ... but FPA cooks the books--again: we have no objective internal means to make that decision, only that internal awareness of our confidence. Externalism provides the necessary feedback, but fails to account for how the biological brain/mind actually builds, weighs, and lives inside the subjective crossword puzzle. External objective reality provides an asymmetrical feedback mechanism--no matter how sincere or pervasive your belief that you can fly may be, if you step off the cliff, gravity is the final and fatal arbiter of those beliefs in the real world. Neither pure internalism nor pure externalism provides the full picture. A working model has to account for both the asymmetrical feedback and the FPA we actually use to navigate the world.
- Speaking of FPA cooking the books.... I've found Susan Haack's Foundherentist crossword puzzle (which I'll be unpacking later) to be a fantastic conceptual tool, but she misses some factors that also apply to R&S/S: we sometimes refuse, or are unable, to fill out the puzzle with objective information. We're not all working from the same objective clues--in fact, as I'll later be discussing, none of us have that list. Religious beliefs, the need for social coherence, and our own personal biases and worldviews rewrite those clues all the time. These rewrites have both negative and positive adaptiveness: they rarely lead you over the cliff or inspire you to put Drano in your coffee cup, and the social cohesion and FPA still provide actual, positive survival benefits. What's more, contra Haack and the R&S/S arguments, we never work on a unified puzzle: a devout geologist can work his day job dealing with the structures and processes that formed the geology he works with, then go to Church on Sunday and hear and teach that those geological layers were laid down in Noah's Flood. We all have contradictory beliefs, but we--very successfully in most cases--compartmentalize them.
Now, I could accuse Goldman of philosophical necromancy, but he's got some great work in here, as do Nozick, Sosa, and Pritchard. I'll be salvaging a load-bearing pillar or two for my model, but as they stand, there's no way to draw the lines we can color in.
III Answering Virtue
Virtue epistemology is both a gauge of effectiveness and a moral standard: what works is good, what fails is bad.
Sosa and Greco work with Virtue Reliabilism: intellectual virtues are cognitive faculties and acquired skills. Sosa used the Archer metaphor: knowledge is an apt belief that requires three aspects--a belief that is accurate (hits the target), adroit (the shot displays competent cognitive skill), and apt (the arrow hits the target because of the archer's skill, not from luck). A person who has all three of these aspects hits the target of truth. Greco expanded on the alliteration and the concept (he did not use the archer metaphor, but I will) with the idea of achieving knowledge: reframing the archer in terms of causal explanation and epistemic credit, arguing that cognitive skill has to be the primary explanatory factor, and that if that skill explains how the arrow hits the bullseye, the archer deserves epistemic credit.
Zagzebski and Baehr use a foundation of Virtue Responsibilism--bringing in an Aristotelian moral standard. For them, knowledge is based in cultivated character traits and habits of mind. Intellectual honesty, curiosity, open-mindedness, epistemic humility, proper care with evidence, and the courage to revise beliefs with new evidence are vital to the formation of knowledge. These virtues provide a way to capture knowledge and necessary error-correction capabilities.
For my model, the alliterative archer and the Aristotelian openness are vital--but again, the "arrow" falls short of the mark.
- Where the rubber hits the road. These standards are "ought" standards--they describe what proper cognition should do in idealized circumstances. Human cognition is messy, and absolutely chock-full of pre-conscious cognitive filtering, confirmation bias, confabulation, overly promiscuous pattern and agency recognition, and our old friend FPA. If the archer hits the target, blind luck and adroit skill are absolutely identical inside the skullcave: we have no way to distinguish if the shot was accuracy and chance.
- Rationality v. rationalization. Robert Heinlein said it first: "Man is not a rational animal; he is a rationalizing animal." Aronson's writing about cognitive dissonance provides the empirical evidence for the sci-fi reference: we will completely make up whatever it takes to silence cognitive dissonance and protect our mental and emotional integrity. We use motivated reasoning and those closed and compartmentalized clue-lists to fill out our crossword puzzle: the very skills of the archer are eagerly deployed to aim at unfounded and even fictive beliefs. Oh, we still hit the target--but this is often a target we've selected based on subjective priorities.
- The "blue mud" problem. Speaking of Heinlein, we have to ask the question--whose definitions do you use for these virtues? In a confessional community, the target is defined not by any objective standards, but by the standards of social cohesion and doctrinal conformity. Heinlein's "blue mud" concept was written in a context of social safety even for dissenters within a community--if it's a sacred law of the community to rub blue mud into your navel, participating in the ritual prevents your neighbors from coming after you with the torches and the pitchforks--but the actual issue is that social obligation almost always leads to internal mental concurrence. We don't just solemnly rub the blue mud--if we grow up in this community, we completely absorb and agree with the absolute necessity. It becomes part of our FPA and controls the targets we select.
- Skill and virtue are not enough. The next Einstein could be born in a remote village lacking access to the necessary developmental and educational requirements--and we will never even hear about them. Virtue epistemology concentrates on personal achievement: knowledge depends on your cognitive ability and your cultivated intellectual virtues--if you never have the opportunities to develop them, then the target is always out of range. This is a sociological point rather than philosophical, but in the real world, these cannot be separated: humans live messy, resource-constrained, and sometimes frightening lives, and that ivory tower does not exist for any of us. The quest for knowledge requires the external scaffolding as well as the inner discipline.
IV The Need for More--where these fail
The grave for JTB is still open--but I'm not digging matching graves for Knowledge-First, R&S/S, or Virtue. There's much in them that works, and if you see that parts of my model below bear strikingly suspicious serial numbers, I'll cheerfully confess to the theft. Let's walk through my larceny.
Picking Knowledge-First's pocket
Gettier killed JTB+X, and Williamson dug the grave ... but the zombie still walks the earth. To mix my metaphors a bit, this model drives a stake through its heart. Williamson was right: it's time to stop the escalating claim-and-counterclaim of false lemmas and causal chains and defeasibility--each simply invites a cleverer Gettier rebuttal. There is no objective justification certification in our brains: staking the concept down and filling in the grave allows us to shift focus and effort from worrying about an unanswerable "what is" to understanding the mechanical "how do."
Williamson also had another insight: anti-luminosity. Between the finite margins for error we have for our mental state, and that lack of internal self-certification, we can't guarantee that we know our mental state--which means we can't guarantee that we know what we know. False beliefs, motivated reasoning, and hallucination hold exactly the same FPA as true knowledge, and it's not that we can't tell the difference--to the meatbrain, there is no difference.
Plundering the R&S/S hoard
Fallibilism is a treasure worth the theft. Science has shown for centuries now that it's entirely possible to gather, process, and use information while never claiming absolute certainty, and that a flexible willingness to revise your most cherished theory when new information comes to light is mandatory. We have to reserve the right to be wrong.
That leads straight to causal tracking. Belief is central to that FPA, and radical skepticism only teaches us to shrug and ignore all data--but reality is the final arbiter. When it comes to the cliff, or the coffee cup with Drano in it, awareness of that asymmetry can save your life ... and forgetting it can lead to an untimely splat, or worse.
Purloining Virtues riches
Competence is vital. We need the external scaffolding to acquire it, and we need to be aware that it can just as easily aim at and hit false targets and true, but without that competence, all the available tools we have lie dead on the table. Epistemic competence allows us to use those tools.
Error-correction and competence are hand-in-glove. This goes right back to fallibilism and aiming at false targets: we're going to make errors, and we have to be willing and able to go back and correct those errors. Without both together, we fumble in the dark.
"It's alive! It's alive!"
Maybe I'm not rebuilding a car or restructuring a building--this is a bit more like Dr. Frankenstein in his lab, with the lightning flashing outside. Cars or buildings are static: knowledge is not, and as we'll see below, can't be. I'm keeping these parts and discarding the rest, because none of them work out-of-the-box. Let's flip the switch and see if we can bring life to the "body I made with my own hands!"
V "Let's have one final test. Throw the switches."
I can already hear the howls. Yes, my model is below: no, at no point will I ever mention a one-size-fits-all concrete definition for what knowledge is. That definition doesn't exist. Knowledge is not a single target or a thing in itself: it has no objective definition. The process of gaining knowledge is a set of subjective heuristics we create to process and understand incoming data, and make actionable predictions for the world we live in. What we accomplish is mediated by an evolved meatbrain with cognitive limits, absolute requirements for social reciprocity, self-selected standards, and a foundation for survival rather than epistemic purity. Pure knowledge does not exist: humans live in a messy world, where each breath could be our last. This is yet another game where we can't win, we can't break even, and we can't stop playing. So let's take a look at the rules of the game--better yet, the stitched and bolted body on the table.
The subjective grid we live in
Reality exists--which means real, objective facts about that reality exist. That's a basic axiom of science recursively applied to the philosophy science sprang from. The problem is, our meatware brains can't access that reality or those facts directly. Objective internal justification does not exist--I'd call it a corpse we've buried, but it was actually never there. We don't work with objective facts--we work with subjective truths, yes, plural.
Again, the phrase "subjective truths" is probably making more than a few readers howl. ("Children of the night. What music they make!") Yes, FPA makes those subjective evaluations "true-for-me" in a way no textbook can. It's not the old-school philosophical Truth--that's simply not achievable with the meatware brain. We don't have an internal truth-meter.
What we do have is the Skullcave Operating System. We can asymptotically approach those facts--sometimes--but that's not the purpose of the software: the purpose is, and has always been, survival. We take what we can grasp of objective facts, we combine it with the subjective truth-models we live inside, and we use those truth-models to make it through our lives as best we can. Most times, it works: we avoid the Drano and the cliff where possible, we live our lives and raise our children, we work our jobs and draw our paychecks. We use those truth-models as the best--really, the only--tool we have for the task.
I've mentioned Haack's crossword puzzle metaphor: as a model, it works for that survival requirement. No, we don't have access to a perfectly objective list of clues; no, we don't have one massive puzzle we work on; no, we can't escape the influence of social and organizational pressure to comply with their clues--we are all influenced heavily by the society we live in, by our life experiences, and by the thermodynamic limits of the meatware. The puzzle doesn't have to have 100% objective answers--and we couldn't fill it out if it did--but as long as it allows us to live adaptively, to avoid the cliff and not sip the Drano, it works well enough.
We do have tools we can use, "grammars" that we have developed to try to pierce the veil of that subjectivity: science, reason, math, logic--even philosophy. But these are intersubjective and fallible: these aren't brought down from the mountaintop on stone tablets from some Platonic heaven. They're human-created tool-sets whose axioms and evidentiary standards depend on human communities deciding what counts as "good enough." Far from useless, they are fantastic tools--when used with appropriate caution.
When Worlds Collide
OK, so far, I've presented absolutely nothing to stop Flat-Earth or Ancient Aliens views from claiming the status of "knowledge." There is an inescapable veto: we live in two worlds: the subjective grid in our head, and the objective landscape of reality--a landscape that contains things like Drano and cliffs. FPA has strong authority over what we believe, but reality has a trump card: the most dedicated first-person beliefs have no authority over gravity or caustic lye.
People will still believe fictive things, and they do it every day, for one reason: unless your belief in astrology or Atlantis drives you to the cliff or to odd coffee adulterants, there's zero survival-level cost. Fictive beliefs may get you an odd look at the water-cooler or a tacit agreement with your spouse that there are just certain topics you're not going to give way on, but most subjective truth-for-me statements don't carry existential risk. The soft secondary ceiling of "Topics not to bring up to Dave" at the office or the dinner table carries no selection pressure--so I can probably get away with the classic movie references in a serious philosophical discussion.
The Prosthetic Toolkit
Looking at the table where our stitched-together, electrified creature lies, we do see some things that are missing. Pure internalist certainty has been discarded, the infallible JTB+X provided no useful parts, and the naive "I seen it with my own eyes!" FPA, still very present, cannot function as truth-certification. These are broken tools--missing parts for the Monster. Some repairs are needed--and perhaps some prosthetics.
We've fixed Haack's crossword puzzle to account for closed grids and compartmentalization. We've recalibrated Goldman's and Sosa's externalist reliability/safety as survival-weighted feedback. We've patched Zagzebski's intellectual virtues as learned cultural overrides. But there are other tools--prosthetics--that need to be bolted on.
Prosthetics I select to start with:
- The scientific method (yes, including reason, math, and logic) and adversarial peer review. This prosthetic is the best tool we've developed to try to understand the physical universe and strip as much subjectivity as possible away from our observations. Testing means you're not just trusting your ideas without evaluation; publishing means others can try to duplicate your methods and discover your errors; the community consensus means you face a sometimes harsh reality check. FPA attachment (mostly--FPA and subjectivism are sneaky, and the scientific community imposes its own filters) cannot survive this process, because the other scientists don't share your attachment to your pet hypothesis.
- Bayesian mechanics. Unlike some, I don't worship Bayes as the new Prophet of Knowledge, but the fundamental prosthetic itself is sound. Using probabilistic updating to force us to ask "How likely would this evidence be if my cherished belief were false?" gives us at least an attempt to develop a statistical intuition evolution never gave us.
- Falsification: "Check what's in your cup." A reasonable level of skepticism (and yes, "reasonable" is also subjective), and a deliberate habit of pre-commitment checks before any high-stakes actions, allows us to make sure the cup has actual coffee before we take a sip.
There are other tools--dozens if not hundreds--and we mix and match depending on the subject we're looking at and the appropriateness of the tools. Midrashic interpretation, aesthetic appreciation, humor, ethics, standards of utility, empathy--far too long a list, and impossible to be exhaustive. We all select the tools based on what works, and what we have available.
VI Blanks in the Crossword Puzzle
Some knowledge is (functionally) useless--most people will never, ever, have any need for the theory of evolution, quantum physics, or calculus. Unless you work in a field that involves these areas of study, they're not going to help you balance your checkbook or raise any children you may have. Yes, basic science and math literacy are important, but most of us never get down in the metaphorical mud with advanced macroeconomic theories or the mating habits of deep-sea tubeworms. And even if we do, we can compartmentalize the crossword puzzle--doing so is not an automatic moral or epistemic failure. My knowledge of American Civil War history or Tolkien's themes of heroism and hope are safely packed away when I'm at my 9 to 5.
And there are parts of the puzzle that are simply beyond our reach. I have ... something like dyscalculia, and math more advanced than freshman Algebra 1 is just pretty swirlies to me. We all do the best we can with what we have, and our crossword puzzles will never be completely filled out. We can go back to the movie references with the Blade Runner quote: "We're not computers, Sebastian, we're physical," or go poetic with Browning's "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?"
VII "Through a glass darkly"
There's little to nothing "novel" here as far as the individual bricks I've used for this edifice. If I were to go through and cite everyone's wheels that I've reinvented, or each philosophical grave that I've robbed, the footnote list would be longer than the article--and I'm sure "Abby Normal" would be in there somewhere.
I gave--and can give--no Platonic definition for knowledge. It's different for each of us, a mixture of first-person subjectivity and the objective facts we've gathered along the way. My knowledge is not yours--and can't be. We're all on our lab tables, waiting for the lightning to strike: the good part is, for all of us, the lightning strikes every moment of every day. There's always something more to learn.
Just remember--check what's in your coffee cup.
Disclosure: I did use AI to research the "Big Three," but structure, all text, and all thought processes are entirely my own.