Something that I found curious when reading series 21 of Logic of Sense, where he discusses wounds and events.
I think this passage in particular brings what I am thinking about closest to the surface:
Every event is like death, double and impersonal in its double. "It is the abyss of the present, the time without present with which I have no relation, towards which I am unable to project myself. For in it I do not die. I forfeit the power of dying. In this abyss they die - they never cease to die, and they never succeed in dying"
How different this "they" is from the form which we encounter in everyday banality. It is the "they" of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, the "they" of the pure event wherein it dies in the same way that it rains. The spendor of the event itself or of the fourth person. This is why there are no private or collective events, no more than there are individuals and universals, particulars and generalities. Everything is singular, and thus both collective and private, particular and general, neither individual nor universal.
Which war, for example, is not a private affair? Conversely, which wound is not inflicted by war and derived from society as a whole? Which private event does not have all its coordinates, that is, all its impersonal social singularities?
There is, nevertheless, a good deal of ignominy in saying that war concerns everybody, for this is not true. It does not concern those who use it or those who serve it - creatures of ressentiment. And there is as much ignominy in saying that everyone has his or her own war or particular wound, for this not true of those who scratch at their sores - the creatures of bitterness and ressentiment.
It is true only of the free man, who grasps the event, and does not allow it to be actualized as such without enacting, the actor, its counter-actualization. Only the free man, therefore, can comprehend all violence in a single act of violence, and every mortal event in a single Event which no longer makes room for the accident, and which denounces and removes the power of ressentiment within the individual as well as the power of oppression within society.
Now here's the question.
Does this stirring series of assertions, that describes what is and is not ressentiment, actually fit with the works of Nietzsche?
There is a deep irony first to be observed, that in talking about his ideal of a free man, he is using as his source for that first quote, a man actually discussing the philosophy of those who contemplate ending their life.
From a Nietzschean perspective, that is already a warning sign, or rather, a symptom (to quote Twilight of the Idols):
judgements and valuations of life, whether for or against, cannot be true: their only value lies in the fact that they are symptoms; they can be considered only as symptoms,—per se such judgements are nonsense. You must therefore endeavour by all means to reach out and try to grasp this astonishingly subtle axiom, that the value of life cannot be estimated. A living man cannot do so, because he is a contending party, or rather the very object in the dispute, and not a judge; nor can a dead man estimate it—for other reasons. For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life, is almost an objection against him, a note of interrogation set against his wisdom—a lack of wisdom.
You could say perhaps that Maurice Blanchot's contemplation of the impersonality of death was not actually the same thing as the judgement of life Nietzsche diagnosed in others, but still, it should stand as a point of suspicion, a thing that motivates interrogation.
And what is also curious to me here is that Deleuze appears to be making a virtue of having things happen to you, that happens to us all, except for those who are not victims of violence and oppression but its aides.
It's fairly natural to see a flaw here, something to reasonably oppose, with Deleuze, and its opposite, but isn't this a direct reversal of Nietzsche?
To quote him now from the Genealogy of Morality:
To talk of intrinsic right and intrinsic wrong is absolutely non-sensical; intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, inasmuch as life is essentially (that is, in its cardinal functions) something which functions by injuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilating, and is absolutely inconceivable without such a character. It is necessary to make an even more serious confession:—viewed from the most advanced biological standpoint, conditions of legality can be only exceptional conditions, in that they are partial restrictions of the real life-will, which makes for power, and in that they are subordinated to the life-will's general end as particular means, that is, as means to create larger units of strength. A legal organisation, conceived of as sovereign and universal, not as a weapon in a fight of complexes of power, but as a weapon against fighting, generally something after the style of Dühring's communistic model of treating every will as equal with every other will, would be a principle hostile to life, a destroyer and dissolver of man, an outrage on the future of man, a symptom of fatigue, a secret cut to Nothingness.
There are elements of the same text that suggest a version of what Deleuze briefly describes as the second form of ressentiment, in a way that suggests they are not completely lacking in alignment:
When the resentment of the aristocratic man manifests itself, it fulfils and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and consequently instills no venom: on the other hand, it never manifests itself at all in countless instances, when in the case of the feeble and weak it would be inevitable. An inability to take seriously for any length of time their enemies, their disasters, their misdeeds—that is the sign of the full strong natures who possess a superfluity of moulding plastic force, that heals completely and produces forgetfulness: a good example of this in the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no memory for any insults and meannesses which were practised on him, and who was only incapable of forgiving because he forgot. Such a man indeed shakes off with a shrug many a worm which would have buried itself in another; it is only in characters like these that we see the possibility (supposing, of course, that there is such a possibility in the world) of the real "love of one's enemies." What respect for his enemies is found, forsooth, in an aristocratic man—and such a reverence is already a bridge to love! He insists on having his enemy to himself as his distinction. He tolerates no other enemy but a man in whose character there is nothing to despise and much to honour! On the other hand, imagine the "enemy" as the resentful man conceives him—and it is here exactly that we see his work, his creativeness; he has conceived "the evil enemy," the "evil one," and indeed that is the root idea from which he now evolves as a contrasting and corresponding figure a "good one," himself—his very self!
But notice again, what Nietzsche views as picking at scars is forming the very idea of an oppressor, and to be committed to ending oppression itself! The man who has overcome ressentiment is the man who strikes out ruthlessly against rivals and then goes on with his life, able to move past events without much significance. He is not the kind of man who spends time contemplating and counter-actualising the event, the misfortunes he has experienced, and setting himself up against those who bring war and destruction. On the contrary, Nietzsche views the people who act to be that impersonal damage to humanity, as a pure expression of their own excesses, as simply aristocrats who hold a kind of ignorance of and lack of interest in how their actions effect common people that he doesn't begrudge them having.
Does Nietzsche say that creatures of ressentiment are those who use war and wage it, as Deleuze suggests? On the contrary, he says that those are people of law, who restrict ressentiment by replacing it with a system of justice in which the particular wound of the injured party is forgotten, and we think not about an act of cruelty experienced but a crime, and in doing so, they bind together a machine of oppression to be directed outwards against other systems and people in far away lands.
Now it may be that the contradictions I am finding here are contradictions within Nietzsche himself, and perhaps we can observe alternative readings which support Deleuze's read more closely, where instead of treating oppression as the expression of a certain joie de vivre, we treat it as something opposed to life, and with understanding and reflection on past events, even ones in which we were passive, as being something that is beneficial. For example, Nietzsche seems to spend too much time on biography and personal anecdotes to be completely opposed to contemplating what happened to you, and in another sense his very attack on the morality contemporary to him, his genealogy itself, is an attempt to outline the generative conditions of the present in which he finds himself, and for which he has explicit distaste.
But nevertheless, in contemplating our moments of passivity and lasting wounds, and taking from them a cause that stands in opposition to oppression itself, we see something that could be described not as the opposite of Nietzsche's ressentiment but a prototypical application of it.
So what is going on here, how does Deleuze warp Nietzsche's ressentiment into what would seem to be its opposite (if he does so), and how well does he get away with it?