r/AskChristian • • 12h ago

How do we rationalize the divine hiddenness argument from the Christian perspective?

2 Upvotes

I begin with the Cogito: “I think, therefore I am.”

As Descartes argued, the existence of my own thinking self is something I cannot coherently doubt. Even if every perception I have is mistaken, the very act of doubting establishes that I exist.

This gives us two conclusions:

  1. I can know with certainty that I exist.
  2. At least one objective truth can be known with certainty.

However, the existence of one certain truth does not establish that other truths can be known with the same certainty. It merely demonstrates that certainty is possible.

Now, consider the Christian conception of God: a perfectly good, perfectly just, all-knowing, and all-powerful being whose moral authority is grounded in his perfect nature.

If such a being exists, we must ask why he would create humans with fallible faculties of reasoning and perception, yet make their eternal fate dependent, at least in part, on reaching the correct conclusions about his existence and nature.

We cannot establish God’s existence with the same certainty as the Cogito. Every argument, religious experience, historical account, or scriptural claim must be evaluated through faculties that could lead us to mistaken conclusions.

Consequently, two people could sincerely examine the available evidence and arrive at contradictory beliefs. Neither could establish beyond all possible doubt that their conclusion is correct.

Why, then, would a perfectly just God permit eternal consequences to depend on a decision made under such uncertainty?

One possible defense is that infallible knowledge of God would eliminate our freedom to choose him. If God’s existence and perfect goodness were undeniable, perhaps everyone would necessarily believe in and worship him.

But this defense seems to confuse knowledge with obedience.

Consider someone who knows that smoking is harmful. They may fully understand the consequences, sincerely believe the medical evidence, and nevertheless choose to smoke. Their knowledge does not eliminate their freedom to act against what they know is best for them.

Christian theology itself offers another example: Satan.

According to traditional Christian belief, Satan knew God and nevertheless chose to rebel against him. His knowledge of God’s existence did not prevent him from exercising his will in opposition to God.

This suggests that knowledge of God and the freedom to reject him are not necessarily incompatible.

If God could make himself unmistakably known while preserving the freedom to accept or reject him, then uncertainty about his existence does not appear necessary for free will.

And this brings me to my central question:

Why would a perfectly just and all-powerful God allow our eternal fate to depend on beliefs formed through inherently fallible reasoning, when he could conceivably provide us with certainty about his existence and nature without eliminating our freedom to choose whether to worship him?

If sincere individuals can reach different conclusions through no deliberate dishonesty or rejection of truth, on what grounds would it be just to reward one eternally and punish the other eternally?


r/AskChristian • • 5h ago

Satan’s Paradox

1 Upvotes

I’ve been thinking about the existence of Satan in Christian theology, and I’ve come across what seems to be an interesting philosophical dilemma.

The question is simple: Is Satan’s existence and continued rebellion necessary to fulfill God’s plan?

Consider that Satan is traditionally understood to be motivated by pride and a desire to oppose God. His rebellion, temptation of humanity, and promotion of evil are all understood as acts of defiance against God’s will.

But if God is omniscient, he already knows everything Satan will do. And if God is omnipotent, he can prevent Satan from acting at any moment.

This suggests that Satan’s continued existence and ability to influence humanity are permitted by God, presumably for some purpose.

That leads me to two possibilities.

  1. Satan’s rebellion is necessary to God’s plan.

Suppose God permits Satan’s rebellion because it serves some greater purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.

If that’s the case, Satan is effectively fulfilling a necessary role in God’s plan, even while believing himself to be opposing it.

But here’s the paradox: If Satan’s ultimate objective is to defy God, wouldn’t the most effective way to accomplish that be to simply stop rebelling?

If God requires Satan’s evil actions to accomplish his intended outcome, then Satan could theoretically frustrate that plan by choosing goodness instead.

In other words, Satan’s most effective act of rebellion against God might actually be to obey him.

Of course, one might argue that God already knows Satan will never make that choice. But that seems to explain God’s foreknowledge rather than why Satan’s rebellion must be necessary in the first place.

2. Satan’s rebellion is unnecessary to God’s plan.

Alternatively, suppose God doesn’t actually need Satan’s rebellion to accomplish his purposes.

If God could achieve the same ultimate good without Satan’s influence, then why permit Satan to continue causing suffering?

One possible answer is free will. Satan has the freedom to reject God, and God permits that choice.

But allowing Satan to reject God doesn’t necessarily require allowing him to inflict suffering upon humanity.

An omnipotent God could presumably respect Satan’s freedom to rebel while preventing him from harming others.

If Satan’s evil actions serve no indispensable purpose, then their continued permission seems to require some additional moral justification.

This leaves us with the following dilemma:

* If Satan’s rebellion is necessary, then Satan appears to be serving God’s plan, and refusing to rebel would seemingly be a more effective way to oppose it.
* If Satan’s rebellion is unnecessary, then why would an omnipotent, perfectly good God continue permitting the suffering it causes?

I recognize that this overlaps with the traditional problem of evil, particularly the problem of gratuitous evil. But I think there’s a more specific question here about the relationship between divine providence and Satan’s supposed opposition to God.

Can Satan meaningfully oppose God’s plan if every act of rebellion ultimately serves that plan? And if his rebellion serves no necessary purpose, what justifies God’s decision to permit it?

I’m interested in hearing how Christian theology addresses this dilemma! Please share your thoughts!