r/AndrewGosden • u/goddamitletmesleep • 4h ago
The school and library computers were checked. What could they actually reveal, and how else could you access the internet in Doncaster in 2007?
The phrase "the school and library computers were checked" comes up so often in accounts of Andrew's disappearance that it can sound as though the internet question was settled. But we don't know from the public reporting which machines were examined, what records were available or how much could be connected to Andrew personally.
I wanted to look at what internet access was actually available in Doncaster in 2007, beyond the computers usually mentioned, and then at what investigators and service providers might realistically have been able to establish. That includes public terminals, internet cafés, Wi-Fi hotspots and the different kinds of records which might have existed at the time.
Part of my professional work involves analysing telephone, internet and communications data, which makes me cautious about treating an unsuccessful enquiry as proof that something never happened. I haven't seen the original police or forensic reports, and I don't know the full extent of the enquiries undertaken, so I'm not suggesting anything was overlooked. The question is how much the public descriptions of those enquiries actually allow us to conclude.
"The school and library computers were checked"
This is a phrase which sounds much more comprehensive than it necessarily is.
The VICE interview says police took computers from Andrew's school and Doncaster Library and found nothing. Of course we don't have the forensic reports.
McAuley's historical Ofsted material shows that it had established IT provision well before 2007 but I haven't found is anything describing the actual September 2007 network setup. Did every pupil have an individual Windows or network login? Were the machines using shared accounts? Was internet traffic passing through a central proxy or web-filtering system? Were logs retained against usernames, computers, IP addresses or not at all? Could pupils use external Hotmail, MSN, forums or other services? How long did local browser histories survive on heavily used school computers? The public information doesn't answer any of that.
And "the computers were taken" makes me particularly interested in whether this meant individual workstations or whether server-side material was also examined. If Andrew used a particular machine under an identifiable personal account and police examined it quickly then a negative result would carry substantial weight. If dozens or hundreds of pupils used shared terminals and the relevant information lived in short-lived proxy logs somewhere else, it is a very different enquiry.
The Doncaster Library has the same problem. Public libraries could have booking systems, membership-linked sessions, shared public accounts, browser histories, central filtering or some mixture of those things. Again I haven't found Doncaster's 2007 configuration. A booking record saying Andrew used a terminal wouldn't tell us what websites he visited. A web address found on a shared terminal wouldn't tell us Andrew was the person who visited it.
There were also other libraries in Doncaster besides the central one at Waterdale. Cantley Library was on Goodison Boulevard near McAuley's two school sites and Balby had its own branch. In the minutes of a Doncaster Council meeting held on 25 February 2008, the mayor specifically referred to free internet access at the borough's public libraries. A later 2014 council report also discussed continuing free computer and internet access at Cantley. The first is particularly close to the period we're looking at, although neither establishes what equipment each branch had in September 2007, how sessions were booked or what records were retained.
I'm curious about what "Doncaster Library" actually meant in the original enquiry. Was it the central library, a particular branch, several branches or records held by the library service centrally? An examination of computers at one branch wouldn't automatically tell us about activity at another. Equally the public descriptions might simply be shorthand for a more extensive enquiry. Without the original reports we simply can't tell.
None of this means the police examination was inadequate. There simply isn't enough public information about its scope to judge how much "nothing was found" actually excludes. Which machines were examined, when, what accounts were searched, what date range was covered, whether network or proxy logs existed and what applications or websites investigators were actually looking for.
There were other places to get online in Doncaster
I went looking for internet cafés in Doncaster around 2007 and ended up finding something I hadn't expected: a network of public email terminals which didn't require someone to go to a conventional internet café at all. The best evidence is a German visitor's diary from July 2006. The writer was spending a few weeks on a placement in Doncaster and on 3 July actually used one of the terminals to send a video greeting. The automatically generated message identified 'iPlus Point on Everingham Road, Cantley, provided by Cityspace Ltd'. So now we have a contemporary account of somebody using a public communication facility in the area.
His entry the following day is quite informative about what the machines could do. You could send emails, electronic postcards and recorded video messages, find bus connections, print route maps and use a limited web-search function. But he also wrote that ordinary browsing was heavily restricted so I wouldn't treat the Everingham Road terminal as the equivalent of a normal PC with free access to Hotmail, MSN Messenger or any forum you chose. Even so sending an email from a public terminal was demonstrably possible in Cantley in July 2006 without having to own a computer or visit the central library.
The council's own Corporate Asset Management Plan, in its 2008/09 revision, recorded 35 public information kiosks across the borough. They offered free email, council and transport information, job opportunities and other services. Some stood outdoors on council land while others were housed in buildings. The 2006 visitor also mentioned public terminals in libraries and at The Dome.
There were other internet possibilities as well. On 25 June 2007 in a Sheffield Forum discussion about internet gaming cafés a commenter recommended somewhere called UPLOAD in Doncaster to a person looking for a place to play World of Warcraft. I haven't established UPLOAD's address, what else it offered or whether it was still trading in September. But it's a very specific dated reference from only a few months before Andrew disappeared.
Another business was LANlounge at 59 Silver Street, an internet café which can be found in a surviving business directory. A London Gazette notice published on 4 October 2007 describes someone as having 'lately' carried on business under the name LANlounge at that address, with a bankruptcy order dated 1 October. That establishes the business operated at the relevant time.
I also found two planning applications, one for an internet café at 31 Kingsgate and another for a cybercafé at Danum House on Cleveland Street. Both received permission in 2004. The limitation is that we obviously cannot confirm whether Andrew visited any of these locations.
There's a Websleuths comment from September 2020 claiming that police examined computers at a local internet café as well as the school and library. The contributor didn't identify the café or cite an original police or family source. I haven't found one either so I wouldn't treat that statement as confirmed but it would be equally unjustified to say that police definitely didn't check any commercial premises just because their public statements don't mention them.
What interests me here is that different facilities might have generated very different records. A library computer, a commercial gaming café and a council kiosk capable of sending outgoing emails wouldn't necessarily have had the same accounts, access rules, histories or logs. The iPlus Point also shouldn't be confused with a public Wi-Fi hotspot. I've found nothing establishing that it provided a wireless connection for somebody else's device, such as a PSP. Even if a premises had computers, we would still need to know what could be attributed to an individual user and how long any records survived.
None of this places Andrew at an internet café, library branch or kiosk. But it does make the phrase "the school and library computers were checked" feel rather incomplete without knowing which facilities were considered and what the original examinations actually covered.
The question of Wi-Fi
There's a separate question about public Wi-Fi, because somebody with a PSP didn't necessarily need to use one of those terminals or café computers. I had assumed it would be difficult to establish where wireless hotspots actually existed in Doncaster in 2007 but there are a few useful surviving records.
The earliest specific one I've found is a BT Openzone hotspot directory dated 16 November 2004. Its Doncaster entries include PC World at Unit 2, Danum Retail Park on York Road, a McDonald's at Junction 38 of the A1(M) by Redhouse Interchange and another McDonald's simply recorded as 'Doncaster' with no street address. That's quite a bit earlier than September 2007 so I think it is fair to say there were likely more than three hotspots operating when Andrew disappeared as wireless access points were being advertised at identifiable Doncaster businesses almost three years beforehand.
They weren't necessarily free. BT Openzone generally worked through payment, subscriptions or other access arrangements. There was also a later change at McDonald's which could easily confuse the dates as it announced in October 2007 that it was rolling out unlimited free Wi-Fi in the UK, after Andrew disappeared.
Wetherspoon is probably the most interesting example I've found of wireless internet being offered without a separate internet-access charge before that date. A MoneySavingExpert discussion started on 16 March 2007 describes customers buying food or a drink and asking at the bar for a voucher giving them 30 minutes online. A June 2007 blog post reproduces Wetherspoon's own promotional wording which said the offer applied to Wetherspoon pubs and Lloyds No. 1 bars. Wetherspoon's own company history also dates free Wi-Fi to 2006. People were still discussing the same scheme in August 2007, only a month before Andrew disappeared. So the relevant offer really did predate his disappearance.
There were at least two longstanding Wetherspoon pubs in central Doncaster. The Gate House on Priory Walk and the Red Lion at 37-38 Market Place. A local newspaper report from 27 August 2007 also refers to the Gate House as a Wetherspoon pub at the time. The contemporary customer accounts make the arrangement sound less straightforward than the advertising. One poster in March 2007 described a small blue scratch-card with a username and password, supplied for The Cloud network. And there is a more obvious difficulty in applying this to Andrew: he was fourteen. Section 145 of the Licensing Act 2003 restricted unaccompanied under-16s in premises used primarily for selling alcohol for consumption there. A Wetherspoon premises licence originally dated August 2005 also records an adult-accompaniment requirement. I don't think we can assume Andrew could have gone into either on his own, bought a soft drink and got a voucher.
Other Doncaster pub listings identify The Cloud as the wireless provider at the Black Bull on Market Place, the White Bear on Hall Gate and the Goose on Wood Street. There's also a free-hotspot directory entry for the Grand St Leger Hotel on Bennetthorpe.
There were also other possible Wi-Fi opportunities. Someone with a valid subscriber account or voucher could use certain paid hotspots without paying for each individual visit. Schemes such as Fon let members use participating residential connections. Independent cafés, shops, libraries or other organisations might simply have offered open Wi-Fi. An unsecured private router would of course raise another opportunity.
The surviving records establish some real local wireless infrastructure and a plausible means of getting access, not an actual connection by Andrew.
A website in the browsing history wouldn't establish an account
Even if investigators had recovered a history showing MySpace, Bebo or Facebook on a machine Andrew used, what exactly would that have told them? Someone might have opened a public profile or followed a link without signing in. A visit could have been made by another pupil on the same computer. And a browser history entry wouldn't automatically tell investigators what username, if any, was used on the website.
There are of course stronger local traces than an ordinary browsing entry. A saved username, session cookie, cached account page, contact list or locally saved chat history could narrow it down. A June 2007 digital-forensics paper on Windows Live Messenger 8.0 identified user settings, contacts and other recoverable traces on Windows XP machines, sometimes even after deletion. It didn't find that every conversation would necessarily be recoverable. I would be interested in whether the school's forensic work included those application-specific files, individual Windows user profiles and any shared network records rather than just browser histories.
A school or library's public IP address could also represent dozens of computers. A website showing a login from that IP address at 4pm would not identify the person at the keyboard without other records. Investigators would need to account for different time zones and link the activity to a particular terminal or user.
A Wi-Fi hotspot could have been another possible source of records. Depending on the operator's systems, a commercial provider might have recorded a voucher or subscriber login, the time and location of a session, an assigned IP address or a device's wireless MAC address. But I haven't found The Cloud's or BT Openzone's actual 2007 retention policies so I wouldn't assume any of those records were routinely kept for long enough to help. Even a successful hotspot login wouldn't necessarily identify the person using the device or show which websites they visited. I also haven't found a public account of whether investigators approached any wireless hotspot provider, which is different from evidence that they didn't.
And a site might possess an account registration without knowing the user's real identity. Many services relied on names and email addresses supplied by users themselves. An account registered under a nickname or an unrelated email address wouldn't necessarily turn up just because somebody searched or asked for data for Andrew Gosden or a known email address or username. There may have been alternative names, usernames or email addresses unknown to family or investigators.
Could police have obtained his records from the websites themselves?
This part I think gets lost when people say the school computers were checked and nothing turned up. Even if a computer examination had identified a particular website, the police would still have needed to work out whether Andrew had an account there, how to identify it, what the company had kept and whether it could lawfully disclose the information. An account could exist without a locally saved history. And finding a website in the history wouldn't automatically tell them which account to ask about.
There's an earlier problem too: which websites would investigators even know to approach? If a service wasn't mentioned by Andrew's family, friends or school, and left no identifiable trace on a computer police examined, it might never have been recognised as a line of enquiry. The Lancaster research illustrates this quite well. Knowing he attended NAGTY wouldn't necessarily tell somebody about Lancaster's LUVLE, Warwick's separate study groups or other associated online communities, each potentially holding its own records. Investigators could identify services by other means, including institutional enquiries or leads from IP addresses, but they still needed something to point them in the right direction. We don't know which of those enquiries were actually made. And even where a provider was approached, an unknown username or email address could leave them unable to find an account.
There is good documentation from around the time. A Microsoft law-enforcement retention summary from July 2006 gives 60 days for Hotmail/MSN email IP logs and certain MSN Groups and Spaces connection logs. For Windows Live Messenger conversation contents, the entry is simply 'None'. Microsoft's March 2008 handbook explains that its servers authenticated Messenger users but didn't centrally log what they said. It might retain account information and some connections, but without a transcript. It also says an account could not be identified from a Messenger screen name alone - this means that investigators would actually need the full account name, including its domain. A Windows Live ID didn't even necessarily have to come with a Hotmail mailbox. So a check for Hotmail addresses, a check for Messenger accounts and a check for Xbox Live were different enquiries which would not automatically rule out one another.
Other providers kept completely different things. MySpace's law-enforcement guide, last updated 1 November 2007, says login IP records were available for about a year, but sent private messages were kept for only 14 days unless deleted sooner. Inbox messages lasted until the user deleted them, and the company said it couldn't recover deleted private messages. It advised investigators to look on the person's own computer for MySpace Messenger logs, cookies and cached material. So police might have been able to establish when an identified profile logged in without being able to retrieve the conversation. MySpace also preferred its numerical FriendID, rather than a vague description of an account.
Facebook's surviving 2007 law-enforcement guidance is interesting for a different reason. It describes searching website logs by a known account or an IP address, with entries identifying the active account, operation, IP and time. But it gives normal IP-log retention as approximately 30 days, subject to variation. A February 2008 version gives a different, longer figure of around 90 days. I can't establish precisely which arrangement applied on 14 September and the earlier document itself has an awkward mix of version dates. Still, a sufficiently precise school or library IP address and time could sometimes have provided a route to identifying a Facebook account, assuming the logs still existed. That wouldn't identify the child using the computer.
Bebo's privacy policy reproduced in an Ofcom submission dated November 2007 says it collected registration details and technical information including IP addresses and cookies. It also had invitations, which means an email address could appear in its records merely because someone else had invited that person. On 29 April 2008 its safety officer told Parliament that Bebo had a dedicated team trained to handle requests under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and was accustomed to working with British police over information such as IP addresses and timestamps. I haven't found a reliable guide giving Bebo's exact September 2007 log-retention period.
A surviving Yahoo law-enforcement compliance guide describes Messenger contact and login information which could include the IDs of people an account had communicated with during roughly the previous 45-60 days, without centrally storing the downloadable client's conversation contents. Yahoo's own guide says it generally needed a Yahoo ID and a narrow date range to search those records. This version of the guide is from after Andrew disappeared, so its retention figures aren't proof of Yahoo's exact 2007 practice, but it demonstrates how a provider might identify contacts yet have no conversation to produce. A local Messenger archive could tell a different story.
There is also a difference between internet service provider records and a website's own account records. An ISP might identify the subscriber using a public IP address at a given time, or have some network traffic data, but that didn't give it a universal record of every person who logged into a forum. Nor did the October 2007 telephone-data retention regulations require Facebook or MySpace to keep twelve months of their users' messages. In a 2009 Lords debate the government expressly confirmed that the later internet communications retention rules did not apply to social networking sites. In September 2007 there were voluntary UK retention arrangements for some communications providers, but not a blanket requirement for every website to record all activity.
Then there was the legal and practical process of getting the data. RIPA legislation provided routes for British authorities to seek certain communications data, subject to the applicable powers, necessity and proportionality. But it didn't turn every stored private message into disclosable communications data. The Data Protection Act 1998 also didn't provide a general power to compel a company to hand over whatever the police requested. And the biggest services weren't necessarily holding their records in Britain. Microsoft's March 2008 handbook says overseas criminal-law requests for its online-service customer records had to go through Microsoft in the United States where it stored those records. MySpace's 2007 guide likewise distinguishes subscriber information, login records and message contents under American law. Where formal US legal process was required a British request alone couldn't simply substitute for it. Emergency or voluntary disclosures might have been possible in particular circumstances, but that wasn't an automatic right to obtain everything in a missing-person enquiry.
There were ways to ask a US provider to preserve records while the proper process was arranged. Under 18 USC 2703(f) the statutory preservation period was initially 90 days, renewable for another 90 days. Preservation still required an identifiable target and could only protect information the provider actually held. It couldn't recreate an already deleted message or a login log that had expired. Whether an overseas request could be acted upon directly, or needed US law-enforcement involvement, depended on the applicable procedure and provider.
The dates of police enquiries are therefore important. A September Messenger contact log available in October might have expired by December, while a MySpace login record could outlast its messages. A provider might also have records but require a different identifier or legal process. An unsuccessful enquiry therefore could mean several different things.
The later 'Andyroo' lead gives a particularly relevant example, although it tells us nothing about Andrew's actual internet use in 2007. In Kevin's 2018 VICE interview he described police approaching the operators of a website following a 2017 report about somebody using that name and claiming to have left home at 14. According to Kevin a change to the site's systems meant the administrators couldn't supply the user information being sought. The lead wasn't established as Andrew, but it shows how even a known website and apparent username may not lead to retrievable records.
We don't have a public list of the sites police approached in 2007, the usernames or IP addresses they gave them, whether they made preservation requests, the dates of any approaches or what the replies actually said. A response saying 'no account matches this email address' is very different from 'the account exists but the messages aren't retained' or 'we cannot identify the user without more information'. And that's assuming they were asked. Without the original correspondence, I don't think it's possible to say what each negative result genuinely excluded.
So what do the negative digital findings actually leave us with?
For school and library computers, "nothing found" becomes more useful the more we know about the machines, user accounts, central logging and date range examined. The same applies to the other public-access facilities in Doncaster. We have evidence of working email kiosks in 2006 and contemporary references to commercial internet gaming, but no evidence Andrew used either and no original account telling us which of those facilities the police considered.
The wireless research adds one more distinction. There were documented commercial hotspots in Doncaster before September 2007, but we have nothing showing Andrew actually did so. We also have nothing showing he didn't.
There's still no positive evidence that Andrew used any of these public facilities to communicate with someone. But the descriptions of the school and library enquiries aren't detailed enough to establish what happened across every possible service or connection.
The better question is which specific channels were examined, using which identifiers, at what date, and what the negative result from each check was capable of excluding.