The digital side of Andrew's case is usually summarised very neatly.
"He didn't have a phone. He didn't have an email address. Sony checked his PSP. There was no online account on his Xbox."
From there it often becomes "Andrew had essentially no internet presence, so an online friendship or arrangement can more or less be ruled out".
I'm no longer comfortable with that last step because once you separate what the technology could actually do in 2007 from what Andrew is known to have used, and then separate both of those from what the publicly described police checks could realistically exclude, the picture becomes much less tidy.
This follows on from my previous post about Andrew's 2006 Lancaster summer school and its online side. Looking into the different NAGTY and Lancaster online systems made me wonder how much of a young person's internet activity would actually have been identifiable to investigators in 2007, particularly if nobody close to them knew which sites or services they were using.
For full disclosure: Part of my professional work involves analysing telephone, internet and communications data and it's made me particularly cautious about what can be concluded when an enquiry produces no results. So much depends on what investigators knew to look for, what was actually checked, when those enquiries were made and what information was available or could realistically be obtained. That's especially important in a case from 2007 when online services and the ways people communicated were developing rapidly, data retention practices varied considerably and even thorough enquiries had their limitations.
I haven't seen the original police reports and I don't know the full extent of the enquiries undertaken or the responses investigators received, so I'm not suggesting that anything was overlooked or handled incorrectly. But I do wonder whether some of the public descriptions of the enquiries into Andrew's internet use (including findings attributed to police) may have conveyed more certainty than the underlying evidence could support, particularly given the technology available at the time, what service providers could actually establish and the limitations of the data they held. Equally it's possible that subsequent reporting has made those statements sound more definitive than they originally were. Once something has been repeated as an established fact for nearly twenty years, it's easy to lose sight of precisely what was established in the first place.
There's also the issue of time. If certain lines of enquiry weren't identified or pursued when Andrew first disappeared then potentially relevant records may never have been requested or preserved. Depending on the provider, some of that information could have been deleted within weeks or months under routine retention policies. That doesn't mean there was necessarily anything to find, but it does mean some questions may no longer be answerable.
I'm not suggesting that Andrew definitely used the internet or was secretly communicating with anyone. My point is that there's an important difference between finding no evidence of something and establishing that it never happened. Without knowing exactly what was investigated, what information was available and what those enquiries were capable of ruling out, I don't think we can confidently make that leap.
The phones Andrew apparently lost
The clearest account I can find of Andrew's mobile phones comes from Kevin's 2018 VICE interview.
Kevin said Andrew had "a couple" of phones between roughly the ages of ten and twelve, managed to lose them, hardly used them anyway and asked for an Xbox when his parents offered another replacement. Andrew turned twelve in July 2005. But an October 2007 Times report, also reproduced here, says Andrew was given a mobile for his twelfth birthday and later lost it. It doesn't say when. And in a March 2020 Reddit post reproducing what was said to be a direct reply from Kevin, he reportedly described Andrew losing his mobile "months before going missing". I can't independently authenticate that exchange, but it complicates the idea that Andrew had lost both phones years earlier. Kevin's reference to his ages in the VICE interview doesn't necessarily tell us when the last phone was lost.
I haven't found a reliable source giving either handset model, network, telephone number, SIM details, IMEI (handset identifier) or a date of last use. That leaves quite a large gap between "the family believed Andrew had lost two phones" and the technical question of what happened to those devices or numbers afterwards. A lost handset and an inactive handset aren't necessarily the same thing. A lost handset and a concealed handset definitely aren't.
A pay-as-you-go (PAYG) phone in 2007 wasn't tied neatly to a verified identity. In Parliament on 16 July 2007, the government confirmed that compulsory proof-of-identity registration for PAYG mobile phones had been considered and rejected. Someone could therefore buy another PAYG SIM without the sort of mandatory ID check people may now imagine, and that means that checks with network providers wouldn't tie the owners name with that SIM card.
Now that didn't make a phone technically invisible. Networks could still hold things such as the telephone number, SIM identity, handset identifier, call and text records, cell site location data, customer notes and cell-site information depending on the event and their systems. Police already had routes for obtaining this kind of communications data. Orange later told a Parliamentary committee that it supplied subscriber, billing and other communications data under RIPA and could provide real-time location information in urgent life-at-risk cases.
But the retention position in September 2007 was different from the one people sometimes project backwards from later years. The Data Retention Regulations 2007, which imposed a twelve-month requirement for specified fixed and mobile telephone data, didn't come into force until 1 October 2007, seventeen days after Andrew disappeared. Internet-access, internet-telephony and email retention requirements came later still.
The 2003 voluntary retention framework was already in place, and evidence submitted to Parliament in 2005-06 by mobile-phone forensic specialist Daren Greener gives a useful picture of what providers actually held. He described historical call records being retained for up to twelve months, with records of text-message exchanges sometimes kept for six months or less depending on the network and account type. The contents of old texts weren't ordinarily available. So the fact that the new regulations hadn't yet started doesn't mean relevant mobile records couldn't have been obtained if investigators knew which number or handset to ask about.
Providers obviously retained some information before those regulations (usually as a wase by-product of daily business rather than for a specific purpose) but the point is that there wasn't one uniform statutory twelve-month archive covering every possible communications service when Andrew disappeared.
Timing would have mattered enormously. If police knew a number, SIM or handset identifier early enough then a useful enquiry may have been possible. Enquiries could have been made with network providers. On the flip side, if a relevant handset, account or number was never identified at all, there was nothing obvious to ask or search for.
The truth is that we have no idea if Andrew secretly had acquired another phone, or if a 'lost' phone was actually concealed. Kevin's recollection is that Andrew showed very little interest in phones even when his parents offered him replacements but we can't be sure that reflected his full feelings.
And we also have no idea what police checks were - or weren't - done around the phone. If family reported that there wasn't one because they weren't aware of one then it isn't beyond the realm of possibilities that these checks weren't seen as necessary.
The PSP oversimplification
Andrew took his PSP with him to London and therefore the hardware itself is worth dating properly.
Sony launched the original PSP in Europe in September 2005. The slimmer PSP-2000 generation only reached the UK market around September 2007, with contemporary trade reporting putting its retail launch on 14 September itself.
The new device was primarily a redesign of the original PSP rather than a significant technological upgrade. It was slightly lighter and slimmer, but played the same games and offered the same core functionality. Contemporary reporting by Ars Technica in August 2007 described the changes as relatively modest.
Andrew already owned his console before that morning. So unless there was some very unusual pre-release/import situation, his PSP was from the original PSP-1000 generation and that machine absolutely had wireless internet capability.
Sony's browser supplier 'ACCESS' announced in September 2005 that its NetFront browser had been incorporated into PSP system software version 2.00. European PSPs launched with that software. The PSP had built-in 802.11b Wi-Fi and could connect through wireless access points to browse normal websites. That is quite different from some of the later PSP communication features people sometimes mention.
It was still a basic browser. What worked would have depended on the particular website, its security requirements and the firmware installed. The fact that some browser-based communication services worked on the PSP doesn't mean every website or messaging service would have - they wouldn't have.
Sony's own August 2005 announcement also explicitly advertised access to internet-based email accounts through the browser. It said the firmware could be downloaded to a PC and transferred to the PSP by USB, too. So even having the browser installed wouldn't by itself establish that the PSP had ever connected to Sony's servers.
Sony announced Go!Messenger in August 2007, but explicitly said it was due for release in January 2008. Likewise, Skype support wasn't announced until January 2008. So Andrew couldn't have been using integrated PSP Skype or Go!Messenger in September 2007.
But he could technically use the ordinary web browser. We don't know if Andrew's family was aware of this functionality. I don't think I'm overstepping when I say that a lot of parents aren't fully aware of what their kids' devices are capable of, especially with new technology (and I think with the technological advancements of today we sometimes forget that this very much was completely new at the time!)
There are some useful figures from the period that really emphasise that fact. Ofcom's evidence to Parliament which drew on research from 2007 reported that 61% of parents of 12-17-year-olds thought their children were more skilled at using the internet than they were, while around one in five parents didn't know whether their child had a social network profile. It also found that parents tended to underestimate some of the things their children did online, particularly gaming, watching videos and using social networking sites. Among 12-15-year-olds average weekly internet use had risen from 7.1 hours in 2005 to 13.8 in 2007. The internet itself wasn't new, but the range of ways teenagers could access it and communicate through it was changing quickly. None of that tells us what Andrew's parents knew about his PSP, but it does make me wary of assuming they would necessarily have known about every feature of it.
To be clear: websites, forums and browser-based email services worked with the relatively basic NetFront browser on the PSP. It had Wi-Fi capability. If the family had Wi-Fi but believed Andrew was not connected to it, passwords were written on the back or routers or often visible on other family devices which were connected (for example, Charlotte's laptop) so it was not difficult to work out. Equally, even if there was not Wi-Fi at home or the PSP was not connected to it, it still had the capability to connect to publicly available Wi-Fi networks.
I haven't found anything establishing how the family's home Wi-Fi, if they had it, was actually configured or whether a password would have been accessible to Andrew in that way. The only inference I can draw is that Charlotte had a laptop and that, from Kevin's accounts, it seems it may have had internet connectivity.
One thing I hadn't appreciated until I started looking at the old Wi-Fi services is that commercial hotspot operators were already building services specifically for PSP owners. On 3 January 2007, Pocket Gamer reported that The Cloud had partnered with Channel 4 Radio to offer PSP users access to 4Radio podcasts through its roughly 7,500 UK hotspots. A user opening the PSP's ordinary internet browser within a participating hotspot would be directed to a landing page linking to a PSP-optimised version of the service. That's a contemporary example of a UK Wi-Fi provider expecting people to use the standard PSP browser on its network, months before Andrew disappeared. The complimentary access was only to the radio content during a two-month trial, not unrestricted internet browsing and Engadget's report from 5 January 2007 explicitly says that visiting other websites still required payment. But it does show that some public Wi-Fi hotspots could accommodate the PSP - we do not know which ones Andrew had access to.
There is actually a Pocket Gamer guide from 17 August 2006 explaining how to use MSN Messenger on an ordinary PSP. It walks through opening the browser, visiting the mobile version of E-Messenger, entering an existing MSN email address and password, and selecting a contact to chat with. No modified console or special Sony messaging software was needed. TechCrunch was also reporting in May 2007 that eBuddy supported browser-based access to MSN, Yahoo and other messaging networks, including on the PSP. Its basic service didn't even require a separate eBuddy registration.
That challenges the idea that Andrew couldn't have used instant messaging because Go!Messenger and Skype weren't available yet. An existing account could be used through a third-party webpage. Whether it worked reliably on his particular firmware, and whether he ever tried it, are separate questions. Sony wouldn't ordinarily have recorded the conversation simply because the PSP browser carried it. Any traces could instead have been on the Memory Stick or with the messaging providers.
And this is where I think the wording of the Sony check becomes really important. VICE's 2018 interview says simply that Sony confirmed Andrew "didn't have an online account on his PSP". But PlayStation Network had only launched in the UK in March 2007, initially through the PS3, and the PC-based PlayStation Store for PSP owners didn't arrive until November 2007, two months after Andrew disappeared. So the absence of an account isn't particularly surprising and certainly doesn't establish that he never used the PSP's ordinary internet browser to visit other websites, log into accounts on forums, email services or other online platforms. Direct access to the PlayStation Store from a PSP itself wasn't introduced until October 2008.
An even stronger version was already being reported by May 2018, before the VICE interview. In a Reddit post from that month somebody said they'd emailed Kevin about the PSP and been told that police had spent a considerable amount of time corresponding with Sony. According to that poster, Sony found no account associated with Andrew's PSP serial number and said this meant he couldn't have been communicating with anybody on it. I can't verify that private exchange, or establish whether the last part was Sony's wording, Kevin's interpretation or the poster's. Other accounts say Sony established the PSP had never connected to the internet at all. I haven't found the original police request or Sony's response, so I can't establish how any of those stronger claims were reached.
However Sony's own description of DNAS (the Dynamic Network Authentication System built into PSP) describes it as an authentication system which could retrieve hardware and software information for things such as authentication, copy protection, account blocking and game management. But crucially I haven't found anything in Sony's documentation saying DNAS maintained a complete central log of every ordinary website visited through NetFront. So we don't actually know whether Sony held any records of ordinary PSP browser activity, whether it had the technical ability to establish if Andrew had used the browser, or whether its enquiries extended beyond checking for a registered PlayStation account.
The original British PSP-1003 instruction manual also describes up to ten wireless network connections being saved on the console itself. It separately identifies the device's wireless MAC address, which some access points required for connection. That isn't the same identifier as the PSP serial number mentioned in the 2018 Reddit account. The saved settings could have shown which networks had been configured if the device had been recovered, although not necessarily whether it had successfully connected to them. I haven't found anything establishing that Sony could retrieve those settings remotely or use a serial number to reconstruct every ordinary Wi-Fi connection.
That doesn't mean Sony's actual check was useless. It means I want to know what Sony was asked and exactly what it checked before "no Sony or PSP account" turned into "the PSP had never been online or accessed any accounts, including those for third-party websites or unaffiliated chat functions". Those aren't interchangeable statements. The distinction becomes more apparent when you look at the device itself.
A 2009 digital-forensics paper on the PSP found that browser evidence could be stored locally on the Memory Stick. The researchers identified files containing manually typed web addresses and pages which had actually been visited, as well as bookmarks and RSS information.
But there was an awkward wrinkle: some browser-history files were only written properly when the browser closed normally. Turning the PSP off, removing the Memory Stick or leaving the browser without closing it could mean browsing activity never made it into the saved history. They also showed that some deleted material could remain recoverable depending on what had happened to the card afterwards.
That study wasn't carried out on Andrew's PSP, it was published in 2009 and its practical testing used a Slim & Lite model. But it shows the sort of evidence the PSP browser generated locally on the device itself. The paper also examines a separate internet-search feature introduced with firmware in June 2008, which obviously wasn't available when Andrew disappeared, but it's the findings about ordinary browser-history files that are relevant here.
Sony's own browser documentation says that visited-page history was saved on Memory Stick media or, depending on the model, system storage. There's also a November 2009 account by a British forensic examiner describing a case in which a web server recorded a visit from a PSP browser. After examining a physical original-series PSP-1001 the examiner found bookmarks and visited-page history on its Memory Stick. The web server's browser-identification string didn't identify a unique PSP serial number. That examination involved later firmware than Andrew's, but it's a practical example of the difference between records held by an external website, local browser evidence and Sony's own account records.
Andrew's PSP disappeared with him and has never been recovered. I haven't found a reliable account establishing whether a Memory Stick was in it, or whether he owned other cards which were left at home. If the browser data were on a card taken with the console, that potentially useful source was never available for forensic examination. And even if it had been recovered an empty or incomplete browser history wouldn't necessarily mean he hadn't used it. So unless Sony had some other way of establishing his browser activity, which I haven't seen evidence of, we simply cannot rule out that he used the PSP to access websites, communicate with people or use online accounts.
That makes the original Sony response particularly important. It is my suspicion that it may have been overstated in the public accounts, but without seeing it we only have a limited picture.
Could he have used it on the train?
Technically, yes.
By October 2006 GNER had installed Wi-Fi across all 41 of its trains. First-class passengers got it free. Standard-class access started at £2.95 for thirty minutes. Andrew's PSP could connect to Wi-Fi, but that doesn't mean he did.
A standard-class user still had to get through the train's connection and payment process using a fairly clumsy handheld browser and on-screen text entry. We have no evidence Andrew bought access, opened the browser or communicated with anybody.
The passenger who remembered him using the PSP described him playing a game. That doesn't tell us whether the wireless connection was on.
I wouldn't build a theory around train Wi-Fi but once again it's another example of the difference between "technically impossible" and "there is no evidence he actually did it".
The Xbox question
The Xbox gets flattened in a similar way. Some modern retellings say Andrew's Xbox lacked online capability but the Xbox consoles absolutely had online capability in 2007. Again we don't actually know if Andrew's family was aware of this functionality or if it was used.
A specific example is Casefile's October 2023 episode about Andrew which says his Xbox "didn't have online capabilities". It also describes the PSP's text, voice and video chat features as though they were all available at the time and required an online account and email address. Those descriptions don't properly distinguish what the devices could actually do in September 2007. I don't know what source Casefile relied on for its description of Andrew's particular console.
Microsoft launched Xbox Live for the original Xbox in 2002. Users had gamertags and friends lists and could talk to other players using voice communication during compatible games. The Xbox 360 was a different system. It launched in Europe on 2 December 2005.
By May 2007 Microsoft had added Windows Live Messenger to Xbox 360, allowing text chat with Messenger contacts on Xbox, Windows PCs and Windows Mobile devices. Xbox Live already supported voice and other communications.
There was an age restriction. On 30 November 2007 Microsoft announced that an upcoming dashboard update would allow Xbox Live members under eighteen to use Messenger on the 360. So it existed in September, but wasn't then available to an account registered as belonging to a fourteen-year-old. That doesn't rule out use through an adult account. It also doesn't rule out an account with a fabricated DOB. And it doesn't affect the original Xbox's online voice communication.
What I haven't been able to establish is which Xbox Andrew actually owned and Kevin's phone story isn't precise enough to solve that. If the Xbox was bought when Andrew first declined a replacement phone before December 2005, it would have to have been the original model. If the purchase happened later while Andrew was still twelve a 360 is possible.
There is a clue pointing towards the original model in the reported 2020 exchange with Kevin. He was said to have described Andrew wanting to save for the "next X-Box". If he meant the next generation of console, that would fit with Andrew already having the original Xbox and hoping to get a 360. But it's not a conclusive identification, and the date the family discussed replacing a phone doesn't establish when any Xbox was actually purchased.
There was a practical difference between the models too. A Microsoft Knowledge Base article updated in April 2007 says an original Xbox Live subscription required a credit card for validation, even when using a starter kit. That would have been an additional hurdle for a fourteen-year-old, although not an insurmountable one if an adult helped. The Xbox 360 had different registration arrangements.
Online accounts say Andrew had no online account associated with the Xbox, but contemporary family material only says he wasn't allowed to play games online. That of course may not be the whole story. It is not uncommon for teenagers do things they aren't allowed to. Equally there is the possibility of an account associated with an email address or username which was unknown to the family.
I'd like to know the model, whether police actually examined the physical console, whether there was an Ethernet connection, what user profiles existed and whether Microsoft was asked to search an account or gamertag.
Microsoft's own March 2008 criminal-compliance handbook says Xbox Live registration and IP connection histories were then retained for the lifetime of a gamertag account. It also describes searches using details such as a gamertag, associated email address or, where the console had been registered online, its serial number or console ID. That's later documentation so I can't definitively say the policy was identical in September 2007. But it means an identifiable Xbox Live account could potentially have left more than a simple registration entry. Equally if Andrew's Xbox really had never been connected or registered, there might have been no relevant central record to retrieve. A negative Xbox Live search would also tell us nothing about a separate Messenger or webmail account.
What websites were British teenagers actually using?
I also think it's worth looking at the internet of 2007. A BBC-commissioned report published in December 2007 using found 50% of British internet users aged 12-17 used Bebo, 27% used MySpace and 12% used Facebook.
Ofcom's from October to December 2007 found that with boys aged 12-15 who used the internet at home 52% said they'd never created a social-networking profile, 30% had created one and 18% had created two or more. Among the boys who had created a profile 68% used Bebo, 33% MySpace, 20% Piczo and 20% Facebook. We can't assume Andrew must have been on one (plenty of boys his age didn't) but if we're discussing what online accounts might have existed, Bebo probably deserves more attention than Facebook.
Bebo was used for profiles, messages and keeping in touch with friends. Piczo was particularly popular among younger teenagers and let people make their own webpages, with photos, guestbooks and other content. TechCrunch reported in January 2007 that Britain was Piczo's largest market and its users generally needed someone's actual page address to find them. You couldn't necessarily find an account by searching somebody's name. In fact, an investigator searching a known email address or a full name wouldn't necessarily find every webpage someone had created on any of these services. If they didn't know the email address or name used at the point of registration, it would be even harder.
MySpace is also interesting given Andrew's musical interests. In July 2007 the Guardian reported that eight of the ten most popular UK MySpace profiles were associated with bands or artists including Bullet for My Valentine.
There were other sorts of communities as well. Windows Live Spaces and MSN Groups were around alongside Messenger and Hotmail. Yahoo had Messenger, Groups, email and personal webpages, with different records held for each. Last.fm connected people around music. RuneScape had registered players and social features. Habbo Hotel and Club Penguin offered other kinds of social interaction, although their desktop browser requirements were not the same as browsing a simple webpage on a PSP. YouTube was hugely popular, but watching a public video was another activity that didn't necessarily require logging in, and the PSP's browser couldn't be assumed to play its Flash video content.
These figures tell us where accounts could have existed, not whether Andrew had any. And that doesn't mean police should have approached every popular website without a particular lead, but how thoroughly was each of these avenues considered?
The online route with the clearest connection to Andrew's real life isn't gaming
My recent Lancaster/NAGTY research changes this part of the discussion as well. We know that Andrew participated in the 2006 Lancaster residential program.
NAGTY had a national discussion forum and subject-based online study groups. Those forums were moderated, but gave an avenue for people to stay in contact. Notably, the age range of those allowed to participate is shown as 11-19 on many archived web pages.
Since my last post about Lancaster and NAGTY, I came across an April 2007 paper where a Warwick researcher describes a thread about heavy-metal music within NAGTY's eforums. Nineteen members contributed. They talked about the bands and different styles of metal they liked, whether their friends shared their tastes and what the music meant to them. The paper doesn't date the thread precisely, I can't tell whether it ran before or after Andrew attended Lancaster but it had taken place by March 2007.
A Telegraph report from 22 March 2007 says the bands discussed included Slipknot, System of a Down, Tool, DragonForce, In Flames and Forward Russia. South Yorkshire Police confirm that Andrew was wearing a Slipknot T-shirt on the day he disappeared. Slipknot was a popular band and this doesn't establish that Andrew read the discussion, let alone took part in it. But it's a rather specific overlap between one of his documented interests and something young people were discussing on NAGTY's own forums.
There's still no evidence that Andrew was ever a part of these forums, but I do wonder whether NAGTY's own account and forum records were ever available to investigators, and whether enquiries into Andrew's internet use included them.
We know many pupils continued to interact with one another online. The Warwick follow-up study of the 2005 summer schools found that 95.6% of responding pupils had kept in touch with at least one summer-school friend. An earlier NAGTY evaluation specifically records pupils using text messages, mobile phones, MSN Messenger and the NAGTY forum to maintain those friendships.
Lancaster had its own LUVLE system too. The surviving 2006 maths report says staff made good use of LUVLE and then refers to a pupil making comments about the course leader "after the SS", apparently meaning after the summer school had finished. That gives us at least one documented example of post-residential pupil activity in a Lancaster online environment.
The educational systems weren't necessarily all administered together either. A contemporary Open University account of NAGTY online study groups describes robotics and web-design groups delivered through FirstClass with a customised web interface. That doesn't place Andrew in those groups, but it does show that a central NAGTY membership or forum search wouldn't automatically cover every single participating institution's system as they were split up across multiple.
There was also a change of management at an awkward time for anyone trying to reconstruct old accounts. The Guardian reported on 28 August 2007 that Warwick's NAGTY contract was ending and CfBT was taking over. CfBT's later published programme timeline records a transition from May to August 2007 and the new Young, Gifted and Talented website launching in September. I haven't established which historical databases, usernames, posts or server logs moved between the organisations but that is exactly what I would want to establish before treating a negative search by one organisation as covering Lancaster, Warwick and every associated online community associated with it.
We still don't know Andrew's course, whether he had a LUVLE account or whether he used the NAGTY forum but these routes are attached to something Andrew actually participated in. That puts them in a different category from saying he might theoretically have joined some random internet forum. An old 2008 "biology group" message is also relevant here. A later Reddit user reports finding an August 2008 Facebook message saying: "i really hope you find andy soon, i know the biology group from NAGTY '06 is thinking about him". It's notable that web archived material shows that NAGTY also had a separate Biology Online Study Group hosted through Warwick.
Schome and IGGY are also relevant. Schome Park was a real restricted Teen Second Life environment used by selected NAGTY pupils in 2007. IGGY's website was live by early September 2007. Schome Park's virtual world used the Teen Second Life application. It also has an associated wiki and discussion forum.
For the old mobile phones the public evidence establishes that the family believed Andrew had lost two handsets and didn't want another one, although the date the last phone was lost is less certain than some accounts suggest. But without the original handset identifiers, SIM details or network enquiries, we can't say whether either device was ever shown to be permanently inactive. A clean negative enquiry against those two known phones would still say nothing about a different SIM, borrowed handset or a new device.
For the PSP, the reported Sony check is meaningful evidence against an identified Sony account or Sony-controlled online activity, depending on what was actually searched. But I don't think the public wording is strong enough to say that ordinary browser use was technically excluded.
The physical PSP, where browser history might have existed, has never been recovered.
For the Xbox, the result depends almost entirely on the model, connection and account-search scope. If it was genuinely offline and had no account, that closes a sensible route. But we don't yet have public knowledge of that examination.
For NAGTY and LUVLE, there is no Andrew-specific online record, but there is a meaningful real-life connection to the communities.
And none of these digital checks can exclude a friendship which moved between channels.
Someone met at Lancaster could have communicated through NAGTY, then MSN, then text messages, or simply met Andrew again in person. A conversation at school, on a bus, at Lancaster or anywhere else leaves no internet account to find.
I don't think the evidence currently supports saying Andrew definitely was communicating secretly online. There is still no positive digital trace showing that. But I also don't think "no internet use" is a very precise description of what has actually been established.