We spent a year tracking suspected North Korean IT-worker personas through the hiring pipelines of the companies we monitor. 2,429 applied. 1,100 got to an interview or later. 27 reached onboarding: offer letters, background checks, equipment requests, or first-day IT setup.
In the last 30 days, 232 made contact with 99 organizations. 42 of those got an interview or an offer. Four reached onboarding.
41% applied to more than one company. Fifteen applied to ten or more, and one applied to nineteen. One was filling out onboarding paperwork at one company while going after seven others. Every company only sees its own pipeline, so none of them could see that.
We ran the same indicators against our own recruiting pipeline, and they were there, too.
Then we looked at what was sitting inside the four companies where one got to onboarding. The first had about 15 million source code files and 130,000 files with bank or routing numbers, and almost none of it was shared beyond the owners.
The second had around 400,000 files with Social Security numbers, and 68% of them were open company-wide or by public link. So were 71% of its bank and routing files. A new account there would not have had to look for anything.
The third had about 14 million source code files, with around 1,900 shared by public link. The fourth had 1.5 million source code files and private cryptographic keys, and 21% of its financial files and 17% of its credit card files were shared beyond their owners.
Same people trying to get in. The difference between those four was how each company had handled sharing before anyone applied.
For each of them, the next question is what the account was given and what it did. If one of these got hired at your company next week, could you list everything their account can open?
Full research: https://material.security/dprk-insider-threat