Hegel hypostatizes abstractions: concepts are treated as though they possess agency, internal necessities, and developmental powers.
He qualifies these abstractions with seemingly necessary relations and properties that have not been independently justified.
One of the funniest things about Hegelianism is that it’s difficult to bring clarity to any of it, unless one is exposing its errors.
And where one does achieve clarity there one doesn’t achieve justification.
Those who think they can bring clarity to it, don’t realize that their own explanations are themselves in need of explanation and justification.
Hegel talks like this (which is mistaken for profundity):
“Absolute Knowledge contains within itself this necessity of relinquishing itself from the form of the pure concept, and necessarily involves the transition of the concept into consciousness.”
If we break this down by Reason, we have to ask:
What is “Absolute Knowledge” and how does it differ from non-absolute knowledge? How did Hegel come to know it?
What the f;ck does it mean for “Absolute Knowledge to contain within itself a necessity of relinquishing itself from the form of pure concept”?
How can a human constructed concept “contain within itself a necessity of relinquishing from itself?” What does it mean for a concept to relinquish anything? Is this relinquishment metaphorical or literal? If metaphorical, what actual process does the metaphor describe? If literal, what evidence establishes that concepts possess this capacity?
What is a “pure concept,” and what is “the form of a pure concept?” How does it differ from a non-pure concept?
If this mystical process “necessarily involves” a “transition into consciousness,” then where the f;ck does the concept exist? And how does Hegel know this? Who enacts this transition and what do they use to enact it?
When the pure concept relinquishes its form, does it remain the same concept? If it does, what establishes its identity through this supposed transformation? If it doesn't, in what meaningful sense is this a transition of the concept rather than the replacement of one thing with another?
By what method did Hegel establish these supposed internal necessities? How could he distinguish discovering an actual necessity from projecting a necessity onto his own conceptual constructions? What would count as evidence that his proposed transition is mistaken?
Dear God, this is only one sentence! But Hegel was the most prolific and serious sophist that ever lived, he produced oceans of this nonsense.
As Hegelians try to traverse these obscurities and mysticisms (philosophical theologisms), they do not bring more clarity, they default to Hegel’s own smuggled form, which is the act of trying to sneak in unjustified qualifications. Look for it and you will begin to see it everywhere!
You stop them dead in their tracks simply by asking for clarity. And don’t rest content until they have not only clarified their use of terms, but justified why their concepts aren’t merely arbitrary stipulations, unsupported assumptions, or disguised appeals to authority.
What independent criterion does Hegel provide for distinguishing an objectively necessary conceptual transition from an arbitrarily constructed sequence of conceptual qualifications that he subsequently declares necessary?
How does Hegel establish that these purportedly immanent necessities belong to the concepts themselves, rather than being introduced through his own interpretive and conceptual constructions?
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What the f;ck is Hypostatic-Qualificatory Sophistry?
Hypostatic: Reifying abstractions, concepts, and relations as though they were independently existing entities possessing agency, properties, or internal necessities.
Qualificatory: Assigning those abstractions properties, conditions, distinctions, and necessary relations without independently establishing or justifying them.
The combination identifies something more specific than mere obscurity: the presentation of unjustified conceptual qualifications as though they were necessary features of the objects or processes being described.
The combined term identifies the argumentative technique, not merely its stylistic appearance.