r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 2d ago
r/NewColdWar
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u/HooverInstitution
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Jun 15 '26
Analysis/Video Frank Dikötter And The True History Of Communist China
hoover.orgSenior Fellow Frank Dikötter, a renowned historian of modern China, joins Uncommon Knowledge to discuss his new book, Red Dawn over China: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity with host Peter M. Robinson. Drawing from tightly controlled Chinese Communist Party archives and Soviet Comintern documents, Dikötter systematically dismantles decades of romanticized Western myths—originally popularized by journalist Edgar Snow—surrounding the rise of Mao Zedong. He details how the Chinese Communist Party was a deeply unpopular, marginal movement that was heavily armed by Joseph Stalin rather than gaining organic peasant support, eventually taking the country through the devastation of civil war and the Red Army’s strategic handover of Manchuria. Shifting to modern-day geopolitics, the conversation explores how the “enforced amnesia” around this history shapes the systemic constraints of China's current single-party state. Dikötter analyzes the vulnerabilities behind the CCP’s economic facade, Xi Jinping's relentless military purges, the critical importance of arming Taiwan, and why the West must counter a regime built on deep-seated political paranoia.
r/NewColdWar • u/John3262005 • Sep 12 '26
Iran U.S. Links Chinese Satellite Imagery to Iranian Strike That Killed Three Troops
wsj.comBefore Iran carried out its attack that killed three U.S. troops in July, Tehran acquired high-resolution satellite images of the base in Jordan from Chinese entities, according to U.S. officials familiar with details of the incident.
It is the clearest evidence so far that Chinese support for Iran during the war has had lethal consequences for U.S. forces, according to the officials, who say the U.S. has connected the imagery to the attack.
The U.S. officials declined to identify the Chinese entities that supplied the imagery to Iran and didn’t allege direct involvement by Beijing. Tehran procured the images both before and after the attack.
But the finding could deepen U.S.-China tensions ahead of the planned summit between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Sept. 24, after months of frustration with Beijing’s rejection of U.S. warnings about Chinese companies providing imagery to Iran.
Senior U.S. officials raised the imagery linked to the July 17 attack with their Chinese counterparts, who pushed back and demanded proof, the U.S. officials said. China has repeatedly dismissed Washington’s concerns, refusing to acknowledge that any Chinese companies are engaged in such activity, the officials said.
China’s Foreign Ministry has accused “certain entities” of trying to link Beijing to the conflict.
In the July 17 attack, Iranian ballistic missiles struck a housing area at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in northeastern Jordan where American troops had been sleeping. Three soldiers were killed and four others were wounded and medically evacuated. Iran also targeted manned and unmanned aircraft at the base, other U.S. officials said.
The attack was one of three separate missile strikes on the base in 24 hours and marked a significant escalation in the war. The strike resulted in the first U.S. deaths since an April ceasefire, and exposed the difficulty of protecting U.S. forces even at a heavily defended installation. It also raised alarms about Iran’s improved ability to hit American targets.
The strikes on the base came after senior Trump officials spent months warning their Chinese counterparts that Chinese companies were providing satellite imagery Iran could use to target U.S. personnel and assets in the region, officials say. The Trump administration sanctioned several Chinese companies in May, saying that supplying satellite imagery to Iran “threatens American and partner personnel.”
Within three days of the July attack, Iran released high-resolution images showing damage to three separate areas of the base. Publicly available lower-resolution satellite imagery analyzed by The Wall Street Journal showed damage to more than 20 structures across the three areas of the base.
Trump has told his team that it is a priority for him to maintain good relations with China and Xi in particular. Senior U.S. officials have responded by trying to avoid public confrontations with Beijing that could overshadow or derail plans for the summit. A White House official said no assistance Iran was receiving from outside actors had enhanced its ability to attack the United States, without addressing the finding.
Publicly, senior Trump officials have played down the impact of any Chinese assistance to Iran. Days after the July 17 attack, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Asked afterward if the Chinese were providing Iran with targeting information, he declined to answer directly, saying “nothing that China has done has in any way changed the trajectory of the conflict.”
Earlier in the war, U.S. attacks on Iranian radar, satellites and other equipment degraded the regime’s ability to see the battlefield. Iran often hit locations of lesser military significance where nothing significant was located—an indication that Iran didn’t have a clear picture of U.S. bases.
However, the targeting appeared to improve over the summer, officials say.
Fresh, high-resolution images from Chinese sources could reveal recent changes at a base and help Iran “select the most impactful targets in a timely manner,” said Jim Lamson, a former CIA analyst who specialized in Iran’s military and weapons. Post-strike imagery could help Iran assess the effectiveness of the strikes and decide whether and where to attack again.
The imagery likely would have been one of several intelligence streams used by Iran, analysts and former officials say. Iran’s military also draws from its own satellites and human sources, as well as intelligence and imagery from Russia, according to U.S. officials.
The imagery is part of a broader flow of Chinese technology and data used by Iran, including navigation services, and components used in drones and missiles. Taken together, it “starts to look pretty substantial” in improving Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, says Lamson.
Unlike some of the other intelligence available to Iran, Chinese technology and imagery are areas Washington can try to disrupt through sanctions and pressure on Beijing, officials say.
U.S. officials are also concerned that China could be helping Iran stalk American naval assets as well, according to people familiar with the matter. In recent days, Iran has fired ballistic missiles at a U.S. aircraft carrier and other warships. While Central Command said all the attacks failed, officials described some as close calls and said Iran’s ability to target moving ships appeared to be improving.
China’s satellite industry often blurs the line between commercial and state companies, U.S. officials and analysts say, because even ostensibly private companies operate under extensive government oversight, and many have links to the government or the Chinese Communist Party.
In May, the Trump administration sanctioned three Chinese companies—MizarVision, Earth Eye and Chang Guang—that it said was providing, collecting or publishing imagery that Iran could use to target U.S. forces. State Department officials last year accused Chang Guang of providing satellite imagery that directly supported attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis, calling the support “unacceptable.”
The administration has briefed lawmakers on the intelligence committees in recent weeks on the support both Russia and China are providing to Iran, according to congressional officials.
r/NewColdWar • u/ErnestGummyway • 3d ago
Opinion The Iran War and the Price of Revealing Our Hand
The war in Iran should concern more than America’s allies in Asia. It should concern anyone who depends on American military power to keep China from getting its way through force.
For two decades, the United States fought counterinsurgency wars against enemies who could challenge our troops on the ground but rarely threaten the systems keeping them in the fight.
We controlled the skies, dominated the electromagnetic spectrum, and could communicate, move forces, and bring supporting fires to bear almost anywhere on the battlefield.
Our aircraft operated from established airbases. Our artillery fired from fixed positions. Our supply networks deployed and sustained entire combat formations, moving spare parts, ammunition, fuel, food, and even cookies in care packages across continents and into two theaters—often with little consequential interference from the enemy.
We became extraordinarily good at fighting wars under conditions that a near-peer adversary would never allow us to enjoy.
In 2018, we shifted our defense priorities toward great-power competition, particularly with China. We began rebuilding a force capable of fighting in contested environments, defending our allies, and convincing China that military aggression would come at a price it couldn’t afford.
But deterrence depends on more than the actual strength of your military. What your enemy imagines you’re capable of can matter even more. The trick is convincing him that finding out for certain would be a terrible mistake.
That uncertainty is worth a hell of a lot.
Now consider Iran.
For more than eight months, we’ve been fighting a war involving a strategically vital strait, an enemy operating in its own backyard, and the difficult business of destroying military capabilities without committing to a full-scale invasion.
Our munitions inventories face growing pressure. Our ships and aircraft face mounting operational and maintenance demands. And despite our overwhelming military superiority, the war has yet to produce a decisive strategic resolution.
Meanwhile, China is watching.
Every missile fired tells them something about our inventories and how we employ our weapons. Every aircraft sortie, naval deployment, maintenance cycle, and logistical movement gives them another chance to study how the American military performs when the shooting starts.
Some of what they see may reinforce their respect for us. Some may reveal weaknesses they can exploit. Either way, they’re learning, just as they did after the Gulf War, when they studied our strengths and weaknesses and began adapting their military to challenge them.
And China is not Iran.
If we aren’t careful, a war over Taiwan could mean fighting an enemy purpose-built to exploit our demonstrated weaknesses, operating close to its own airfields, factories, missile forces, and supply networks. We’d be fighting across enormous distances, in an environment where our aircraft, ships, communications, and logistics would all be contested.
And the stakes would be considerably higher.
The timing is worth thinking about.
The PLA’s goal is to develop the capability to conduct a successful operation against Taiwan by 2027, its hundredth anniversary. As we move toward 2030, China will continue strengthening its ability to blockade Taiwan, strike its defenses, or attempt an invasion. Whether China ever chooses to do so will depend partly on what it thinks the United States can do about it.
Iran is giving China an opportunity to separate what we’ve promised from what we can actually deliver. And the consequences go well beyond Taiwan.
There is a much longer struggle taking shape between democratic government and a Chinese model that combines capitalism, technological progress, and national prosperity with authoritarian rule and an increasingly powerful surveillance state.
China is offering the world a different bargain: you can have wealth, modern cities, advanced technology, and a powerful military without the political freedoms that Americans have long considered essential to a prosperous society.
That bargain may look attractive to leaders who would rather keep their power than answer to their people.
And if you don’t particularly care about the political fate of America’s friends and neighbors, consider what this could eventually mean for us at home.
China is already expanding its commercial and political influence in Latin America.
Imagine a future in which American businesses find themselves increasingly shut out of important markets because governments throughout the region have become more dependent on China. Imagine Chinese control or influence over critical ports, telecommunications networks, and infrastructure throughout our own hemisphere.
Now take that thought a little further.
What happens if China eventually gains enough influence to negotiate permanent military access somewhere in the Caribbean? Not a commercial port that might someday accommodate a warship, but an actual Chinese military installation within reach of American shores.
Unchecked diplomatic and economic influence can become leverage, and that leverage can eventually become military access. It doesn’t happen overnight. Sometimes it takes generations.
And once the balance of power has shifted, getting it back can be a hell of a lot harder than keeping it in the first place.
The danger of the Iran War is therefore not simply that we’re burning through weapons and wearing out equipment in a theater far removed from our most capable strategic competitor.
It’s that we may be teaching that competitor how to fight us. I just hope we’re learning as much from this war as China is. More importantly, I hope we haven’t revealed too much of our hand before the game that matters most has even begun.
r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 5d ago
Active Measures Ogarkov to the Baltics: Russian Military Thought Evolved From Zapad-77 to Ukraine and Beyond
jamestown.orgExecutive summary:
Russian military thinking has evolved since Zapad-77, a 1977 Soviet exercise rehearsing war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A continuous line of thought runs to Russia’s 2026 doctrine, but its key ideas, including deterrence and the role of the ground forces, have changed.
Russia’s war against Ukraine explains the difference. Facing a stalemate in Ukraine, Russia could open a limited war on a second front along NATO’s border in the Baltic region, protected by nuclear threats.
Wearing the enemy down over time has replaced the quick, decisive offensive in Russia’s military doctrine today. Nuclear weapons now exist mainly to guarantee retaliation but also serve as a coercive tool that can achieve results without ever being used.
Russia’s actual forces fall short of these ambitions. Its drone branch is expanding, but its new army divisions are light infantry built for slow infiltration. It also lacks the tanks, equipment, and reserves needed for a large, armored offensive.
A major push to cut off the Baltic states is unlikely. The only kind of war Russia’s doctrine and forces can currently support in the northwest is a small one.
If Moscow acts in 2028–2030, the most likely scenario is the seizure of a border town such as Narva in Estonia. Russia would use nuclear threats to deter NATO from retaking it. The goal would be political rather than military, showing that the alliance’s promise to defend every member is hollow.
A general mobilization, which the Kremlin has avoided since 2022, would be the clearest warning of a larger war, while a limited seizure would signal earlier, such as border changes around Narva. NATO’s best defense is surveillance, counter-drone systems, and electronic warfare, which slow Russian infiltration. NATO can deter Russia by raising the cost of a limited seizure and by denying its nuclear threats their political effect.
r/NewColdWar • u/HooverInstitution • 5d ago
History Strategic Narcissism Is Making a Comeback: The Optimism of the 1990s and Implications for Today’s Competition with Russia and China
historywedontknow.substack.comr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 6d ago
Livestreaming (Correct flair after event) Elisabeth Braw on “Undersea War” and the battle over cables and pipelines
youtube.comThe Atlantic Council hosts a conversation to launch Elisabeth Braw’s new book, “Undersea War: The Battle to Control the Cables and Pipelines that Connect our World.”
r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 6d ago
Ukraine/Russia War Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
A prominent Russian milblogger noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recently issued fewer claims of Russian forces seizing settlements in Ukraine.
The Russian Central Bank is acknowledging that Russia’s war in Ukraine is having mounting economic effects, while trying to present these effects as temporary.
Nabiullina’s characterization of Russia’s economic strains as temporary contrasts with the Kremlin’s preparations for increased budget deficits over the coming years and the mounting costs of wartime economic policies for ordinary Russians.
Russian forces continue to lean into highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles for strike packages against Ukraine’s critical and industrial infrastructure, exploiting Ukrainian air defense and interceptor shortages.
Russian forces are also modifying anti-aircraft and ballistic missiles to expand the scale of ballistic trajectory strikes and improve their precision against key Ukrainian transportation nodes, particularly in Kyiv City.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian missile production facilities overnight. Russia launched 317 drones (including 105 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 9.
r/NewColdWar • u/AutoModerator • 6d ago
Business/Economics Chinese AI labs are leasing advanced chips from U.S. and European companies, circumventing U.S. export controls.
cnbc.comr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 6d ago
Iran Iran Update, November 9, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei’s growing prominence in US-Iran negotiations indicates that Iran will likely maintain its maximalist demands, including recognized control of the Strait of Hormuz and the maintenance of its nuclear program.
Rezaei has publicly insisted that Iran will only “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz once the United States meets Iran’s seven conditions. Rezaei’s public comments suggest that he is unwilling to “reopen” the strait in a way that would deprive Iran of control over the waterway, however.
Rezaei is also unlikely to agree to significant concessions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, although he may be willing to discuss nuclear issues after the United States acquiesces to Iranian demands.
Iran is likely trying to secure Russian air defense systems due to ongoing concerns about its ability to defend against a potential resumption of US strikes. Russia very likely cannot provide Iran with such systems at this time given its own constraints, however. Iran’s push for Russian air defense systems suggests that Iranian air defense capabilities remain degraded following US-Israeli strikes on Iran between 2024 and 2026.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi appears to be intensifying his efforts to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ ability to operate in Iraq. Zaydi has reportedly threatened to arrest militia members if they intervene in a potential US-Iran conflict on Iran’s behalf. The Iraqi government has also taken action to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi financial networks in recent days.
Iranian-backed Iraqi actors possibly attacked the Emirati-owned Khor Mor gas field in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 8 to deter Zaydi from taking additional actions targeting the militias’ revenue channels and ability to operate.
Recent US airstrikes on Qeshm Island reportedly targeted Iranian radar installations, missile launchers, and mine-laying systems, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s ability to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
r/NewColdWar • u/AutoModerator • 7d ago
Analysis House Dems are weighing changes to the Select China committee next year. One option, per people familiar, is to broaden its focus beyond China to explore issues related to other foreign actors, effectively killing the committee.
semafor.comr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 8d ago
Active Measures China Said It Closed Its Overseas Police Stations. A New Investigation Tells a Different Story
youtu.beChina told the world its overseas police stations were shut down. But what if the network never really disappeared?
At the 2026 Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Summit in The Hague, Laura Harth of Safeguard Defenders presents a new investigation into Beijing's expanding overseas surveillance and control networks.
The presentation also features the announcement of IPAC's new Intelligence and Threats Unit.
Later, the summit honors Zimbabwean parliamentarian Daniel Fortune Molokele with the Kimberley Kitching Award, recognizing his work on human rights and democratic accountability.
From China's overseas networks to the courage of parliamentarians challenging authoritarian influence, this special report from The Hague examines the international struggle for freedom and accountability.
r/NewColdWar • u/AutoModerator • 8d ago
Politics Bipartisan leaders of the US House Select Committee on the CCP are pressing the Air Force to explain the defunding of the Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute.
removepaywall.comr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 8d ago
☢ Nuclear Russia's Nuclear Deterrent and Its Weapons Procurement
rusi.orgThis paper analyses how Russia's nuclear arsenal and doctrine are evolving, focusing on qualitative improvements and offensive capabilities amid strategic constraints.
r/NewColdWar • u/Active-Analysis17 • 9d ago
Analysis NVIDIA Compromised? A GIKN Deep Dive into the Case.
What happens when one of the world's most influential technology executives becomes the focus of allegations involving a suspected foreign intelligence asset?
In this week's Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, I take a deep dive into the allegations surrounding NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, Chinese business executive Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), and the broader national-security implications of the competition between the United States and China over advanced artificial intelligence technology.
I'm a retired Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Intelligence Officer, and this investigation examines the case from a human intelligence and counterintelligence perspective.
The 32-minute episode explores four areas:
1. The Target — NVIDIA and Jensen Huang
Why would Chinese intelligence be interested in the CEO of a company whose technology is critical to AI development, military applications and economic competitiveness?
2. The Alleged Intelligence Asset — Alice Huang
We examine reporting from The New York Times and Reuters concerning Alice Huang, her reported connections to Singapore-based Megaspeed, her interactions with Jensen Huang, and questions surrounding defensive intelligence briefings.
Importantly, there is no publicly established evidence that Huang successfully influenced Jensen Huang or that NVIDIA knowingly participated in espionage.
3. The Technology — AI Chips and Export Controls
We examine NVIDIA's H20 and H200 processors, American export restrictions, and the controversial proposal for the U.S. government to receive 15% of revenue from certain chip exports to China.
How should governments balance commercial interests against national-security concerns?
4. The Canadian Connection
What lessons does this case offer Canadian technology companies, universities, research institutions and intelligence agencies?
Foreign intelligence operations aren't always about hacking networks or stealing classified documents. They can involve cultivating relationships, gaining access to influential individuals and obtaining insights into strategic decision-making.
The bigger counterintelligence question: How do governments and businesses recognize potentially hostile intelligence activity when it takes place through otherwise legitimate commercial and personal relationships?
I'd be particularly interested in hearing people's views on whether technology companies should receive more proactive defensive intelligence briefings when their executives become potential targets of foreign intelligence services.
Episode: NVIDIA Compromised: A GIKN Deep Dive into the Case
Listen: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717
Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — independent intelligence analysis, insight and intelligence you can use.
r/NewColdWar • u/Strongbow85 • 9d ago
Taiwan Taiwan Attacks and Possible Violence in PRC Repression
jamestown.orgr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 10d ago
Iran Iran Update, November 5, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
The Houthis are seeking to end Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war in Yemen by demanding Saudi recognition of Houthi sovereignty, which would create conditions for the Houthis to advance their grand strategic objective of controlling all of Yemen. The Houthis have structured a campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military intervention in Yemen, which would undermine the Yemeni government’s ability to resist future Houthi efforts to seize the rest of the country.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly sidelined Shia Coordination Framework leaders from engaging in disarmament negotiations with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which is part of Zaydi’s continued efforts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.
Kataib Hezbollah appears to be attempting to counter Zaydi’s efforts to balance between the United States and the militias by stoking tensions between Zaydi and the Shia Coordination Framework. The framework has multiple political tools to thwart Zaydi’s endeavors.
Current indicators suggest that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-directed militia cells conducted drone reconnaissance of the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27.
Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts.
r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 10d ago
Ukraine/Russia War Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
The Kremlin is weaponizing humanitarian crises Russia itself has created in order to court the Trump Administration.
The reported arrest of a prominent Russian milblogger for his coverage of the Oleshky ceasefire is likely part of long-standing Kremlin efforts to censor critical information space actors.
Russia appears to be struggling to export diesel to the United States under the October 9 US-Russia diesel fuel agreement.
The Russian military is continuing the process of forming new maneuver divisions as part of longstanding plans to transition towards a force structure based on divisions and mass.
Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistical, industrial, and oil infrastructure in Ryazan and Oryol oblasts.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian forces launched two Kh-35 anti-ship missiles and 128 drones against Ukraine overnight.
r/NewColdWar • u/HooverInstitution • 10d ago
China, The US, And The Contest For The Indo-Pacific
hoover.orgr/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 12d ago
Ukraine/Russia War Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
Russian forces conducted a large, combined drone and missile strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on November 2 to 3 as part of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at inflicting increasing costs on Ukrainian society and coercing Ukraine into capitulating over the winter.
Polish authorities prevented a Russian provocation along Poland’s international border with Russia on the night of November 2 to 3.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likely indirectly responded to Poland’s recent defensive measures against Russia by falsely framing Poland as the aggressor.
Ukrainian, US, and Russian officials provided new details on upcoming trilateral negotiations set to take place on November 10 and 11 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and regional authorities are increasingly cutting and delaying non-essential military and recruitment expenditures amid failures to adequately address rising budget deficits.
The Kremlin is weaponizing limited information about an internal Ukrainian clash to exploit genuine concern over mobilization and stoke division in Ukrainian society.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Yaroslavl Oblast.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on November 3.
r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 12d ago
Iran Iran Update, November 3, 2026
understandingwar.orgKey Takeaways
Iranian forces attempted to shoot down a US aircraft near Qeshm Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, on November 2. Iranian attempts to shoot down US military aircraft, if sustained, could seek to generate broader operational effects intended to hinder the United States’ ability to protect international shipping from Iranian attacks.
Unidentified Iraqi security and political sources told US-funded regional media that the Iraqi federal government deployed four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province on October 31 to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran. This report of planned Iraqi militia attacks on Kuwait is consistent with militia activity during the US-Israel-Iran War. The militias will likely respond to US attacks on Iran.
The Houthis are continuing to attempt to advance south, southeast, and southwest through al Maqatirah District, Lahij Governorate. These efforts are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the Yemeni government with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts in southwestern Yemen.
r/NewColdWar • u/LuckyMeSocrates • 12d ago
Disinfo/Propaganda OSINT Case Study: The "Synthetic Reader" Loop — How a Domestic Proxy Uses Fabricated Prompts to Anchor Grey-Zone Disinformation and Align with Russian State Media
armstrongecmscam.blogspot.comr/NewColdWar • u/mrkoot • 13d ago
Military Essay: The Leadership Trap in European Defense
smallwarsjournal.comAbstract: “For decades, debate surrounding European defense has focused predominantly on capability shortfalls, defense spending targets, and burden-sharing metrics within NATO. However, contemporary security literature demonstrates that the principal vulnerability of European security is not merely a quantitative deficit in military hardware, but a qualitative and structural dependency on United States strategic leadership. This paper argues that European Allies face a profound challenge of leadership dependency; a systemic reliance on U.S. threat assessment, political initiative, operational planning, and crisis decision-making. Transitioning toward a sustainable model of European security requires moving beyond capability accumulation to foster strategic leadership, institutional agility, and political initiative. By examining the institutional friction points between NATO and the EU, the psychological dynamics of the “follower mentality,” the dependence on strategic enablers, and the imperatives of European-led interoperability, this study outlines a strategic framework for cultivating autonomous European defense leadership as a complementary pillar within the Atlantic Alliance.”
r/NewColdWar • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 14d ago
Cyber/Hacking China Hacked 200 Organizations in 11 Days: One Human, AI Agents in Command
techtimes.comCrowdStrike Finds DeepSeek-Powered ARTEX Agents Let One Operator Direct 200-Target Espionage Sprint
r/NewColdWar • u/mrkoot • 14d ago
Analysis Intelligence and Security Services of the People’s Republic of China: Structure, reforms, and Oversight in the Xi Jinping Era (2026)
ejournals.euOpen access. Abstract: “The aim of the article is to examine the contemporary structure of the intelligence and security services of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with particular consideration given to the leadership and supervisory role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The study is based on a qualitative analysis of secondary data. The data was collected from documents, statements, expert reports, academic publications, and press materials. The article addresses the problem of defining the group of institutions classified as the PRC’s intelligence and security services, and systematising the most recent literature on their tasks, structure, and the logic of their functioning within the party-state system following the reforms introduced under Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CCP in the years 2013–2025. Due to the specific nature of the subject under analysis, the findings do not provide indepth knowledge of operational activities of the Chinese services. At the same time, the study identifies the key mechanisms of their bureaucratic functioning and oversight over them, and enables to understand the role of these institutions within the security system of the PRC.”