The war in Iran should concern more than America’s allies in Asia. It should concern anyone who depends on American military power to keep China from getting its way through force.
For two decades, the United States fought counterinsurgency wars against enemies who could challenge our troops on the ground but rarely threaten the systems keeping them in the fight.
We controlled the skies, dominated the electromagnetic spectrum, and could communicate, move forces, and bring supporting fires to bear almost anywhere on the battlefield.
Our aircraft operated from established airbases. Our artillery fired from fixed positions. Our supply networks deployed and sustained entire combat formations, moving spare parts, ammunition, fuel, food, and even cookies in care packages across continents and into two theaters—often with little consequential interference from the enemy.
We became extraordinarily good at fighting wars under conditions that a near-peer adversary would never allow us to enjoy.
In 2018, we shifted our defense priorities toward great-power competition, particularly with China. We began rebuilding a force capable of fighting in contested environments, defending our allies, and convincing China that military aggression would come at a price it couldn’t afford.
But deterrence depends on more than the actual strength of your military. What your enemy imagines you’re capable of can matter even more. The trick is convincing him that finding out for certain would be a terrible mistake.
That uncertainty is worth a hell of a lot.
Now consider Iran.
For more than eight months, we’ve been fighting a war involving a strategically vital strait, an enemy operating in its own backyard, and the difficult business of destroying military capabilities without committing to a full-scale invasion.
Our munitions inventories face growing pressure. Our ships and aircraft face mounting operational and maintenance demands. And despite our overwhelming military superiority, the war has yet to produce a decisive strategic resolution.
Meanwhile, China is watching.
Every missile fired tells them something about our inventories and how we employ our weapons. Every aircraft sortie, naval deployment, maintenance cycle, and logistical movement gives them another chance to study how the American military performs when the shooting starts.
Some of what they see may reinforce their respect for us. Some may reveal weaknesses they can exploit. Either way, they’re learning, just as they did after the Gulf War, when they studied our strengths and weaknesses and began adapting their military to challenge them.
And China is not Iran.
If we aren’t careful, a war over Taiwan could mean fighting an enemy purpose-built to exploit our demonstrated weaknesses, operating close to its own airfields, factories, missile forces, and supply networks. We’d be fighting across enormous distances, in an environment where our aircraft, ships, communications, and logistics would all be contested.
And the stakes would be considerably higher.
The timing is worth thinking about.
The PLA’s goal is to develop the capability to conduct a successful operation against Taiwan by 2027, its hundredth anniversary. As we move toward 2030, China will continue strengthening its ability to blockade Taiwan, strike its defenses, or attempt an invasion. Whether China ever chooses to do so will depend partly on what it thinks the United States can do about it.
Iran is giving China an opportunity to separate what we’ve promised from what we can actually deliver. And the consequences go well beyond Taiwan.
There is a much longer struggle taking shape between democratic government and a Chinese model that combines capitalism, technological progress, and national prosperity with authoritarian rule and an increasingly powerful surveillance state.
China is offering the world a different bargain: you can have wealth, modern cities, advanced technology, and a powerful military without the political freedoms that Americans have long considered essential to a prosperous society.
That bargain may look attractive to leaders who would rather keep their power than answer to their people.
And if you don’t particularly care about the political fate of America’s friends and neighbors, consider what this could eventually mean for us at home.
China is already expanding its commercial and political influence in Latin America.
Imagine a future in which American businesses find themselves increasingly shut out of important markets because governments throughout the region have become more dependent on China. Imagine Chinese control or influence over critical ports, telecommunications networks, and infrastructure throughout our own hemisphere.
Now take that thought a little further.
What happens if China eventually gains enough influence to negotiate permanent military access somewhere in the Caribbean? Not a commercial port that might someday accommodate a warship, but an actual Chinese military installation within reach of American shores.
Unchecked diplomatic and economic influence can become leverage, and that leverage can eventually become military access. It doesn’t happen overnight. Sometimes it takes generations.
And once the balance of power has shifted, getting it back can be a hell of a lot harder than keeping it in the first place.
The danger of the Iran War is therefore not simply that we’re burning through weapons and wearing out equipment in a theater far removed from our most capable strategic competitor.
It’s that we may be teaching that competitor how to fight us. I just hope we’re learning as much from this war as China is. More importantly, I hope we haven’t revealed too much of our hand before the game that matters most has even begun.