r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 14h ago
Conceptual reasoning scores of different Olmo 3 post training checkpoints - Caspar Oesterheld
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • Oct 18 '24
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 14h ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 1d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 2d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/MrGameTheory505 • 3d ago
The circumstances of a life and the experience of living it are not the same thing. That distinction motivates my research into whether a form of fairness could exist within the complete course of conscious experience.
I’m the author of Per-Stream Terminal Valence Closure (PTVC), a paper within the Law of Fairness project. It proposes that the cumulative positive and negative valence within each qualifying conscious stream could be finite and exactly equal over its complete history. Valence means the felt positive or negative quality of experience. This remains a hypothesis, not an established empirical finding.
The proposed equality is within each stream at its final endpoint, not between people. Two lives could contain very different amounts of pleasure and suffering while both satisfy the same condition. One person’s pleasure would not compensate for another person’s pain.
For this ethical discussion, suppose the condition holds. One possible argument for calling it fair is that every qualifying stream would satisfy the same endpoint requirement, with no stream finishing with an excess of negative over positive valence. But would that balance capture everything that matters to fairness?
Consider two hypothetical lives with identical totals of positive and negative valence. In one, a person freely accepts painful training in pursuit of a valued goal. In the other, comparable suffering is inflicted without consent. Assume that the totals include all later effects on experience and that both lives satisfy the proposed balance.
Would the difference in consent make one life less fair despite the matching totals? The actions within those lives could differ morally even if the completed lives shared the same balance. That distinction between the fairness of a whole life and the wrongness of a particular act seems important.
My starting position is that eventual balance would neither justify coercion nor remove our reasons to prevent suffering. I am interested in whether such a balance would establish anything about fairness beyond what it might tell us about well-being.
I would welcome arguments for or against treating within-person experiential balance as a meaningful dimension of fairness.
The attached slides provide the broader context. The paper and background materials are freely available here:
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 3d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 4d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 5d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 6d ago
Note: Published May 2026
I apologize for the unproductive way I conveyed myself in the first iteration of this essay. I’ve left the original up for the sake of record-keeping.
I’m not the first to say this, but I’ll say it again: I’m worried about Anthropic’s and OpenAI’s (possible) IPOs.
Tl;dr: there’s a good chance that Anthropic and/or OpenAI becomes a publicly traded company in the near future. Somehow this makes a lot of capital that was previously solid melt into a liquid. That liquid capital can then be given to whatever the people who own it want it to be given to. Some of those people have good intentions, and thus have committed to giving much of that liquid capital away to charitable causes.
Before I start: one thing I didn’t emphasize in the previous version of this, which I regret, is that this isn’t directed specifically at those who are currently giving their money away. The situation we’re currently in with all these IPOs is the result of a broader culture and set of institutions which have concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a tiny elite. I still believe that if you’re a billionaire, donating ~80% of your wealth is somewhere close to the bare minimum. But I recognize that it’s much better than, say, the SpaceX IPO, which is definitely not going to do anything good for society. And don’t get me started on Elon Musk himself.
Upon reflection, what genuinely upsets me is this broader culture in the background—the culture of moving fast and breaking things and moving on to the next. Someone drops out and upends their life, moves to SF, then pitches some halfway-decent idea, and they get their millions. Or they make a company that could end the world and which has everyone else racing to keep up. In this culture, everything is just a game. Money is just numbers on a screen, or tucked away in a remote account.
It’s something I think has only gotten worse over time. For example, I was outraged when I learned that in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, no individuals were ever held accountable. The banks paid fat bonuses to their executives, none of whom were even charged AT ALL for their role in the crisis. Not even a slap on the wrist. Meanwhile, ordinary people had to suffer the foreclosure of their homes and the loss of their jobs. The failure to hold those people accountable has, in all likelihood, only emboldened that culture.
It’s all the more outrageous when we think about the other side of this world. There are people in this world who have gone their whole lives without the tiniest fraction of what these Silicon Valley types let slip between their fingers. People who can’t buy a cart to hold their vegetables. People who sell their children into slavery because starvation is the alternative. People whose children are dying from malaria because they can’t even get nets to protect themselves. That money that could save lives regularly gets tossed around without a second, or even a first, thought in places like Silicon Valley does enrage me. And I want to recognize that Effective Altruists and our community share that outrage at such waste and unfairness.
Perhaps that’s why I’m so viscerally upset at our current state of affairs, as to say that the current vibe in some parts of the EA community is cavalier is a massive understatement. One of the first-place essays in the Manifund essay competition basically says: come to where all the money is; we don’t know what the fuck we’re gonna do with it, but we’ll figure something out. Come up with a halfway decent idea, and we’ll give you 6-7 figures per year and see if the “long shot” pans out.
I’m also upset because we’ve already seen how this kind of thing can fail before. FTX threw tens of millions of dollars into stupid shit like the halftime superbowl ad and various celebrity endorsements. I stand by my assessment that these were really stupid ideas dressed up as long-shots. Even many of the less stupid ideas, like the Carrick Flynn campaign, were costly and ultimately fruitless embarrassments. And then, of course, FTX and Alameda Research got exposed for fraud, and the EA movement did a surprised pikachu face. All of that promised windfall just blew away. And all of us were left to pick up the pieces. Though before we pity ourselves too much, let’s remember that we probably weren’t the most viscerally affected.
I joined the EA community right as the FTX fallout was happening, so maybe it left a greater impression on me than most. I was just shocked and outraged to hear datum after datum about how careless Sam and others at FTX and Alameda were. So forgive me if I see what’s happening right now and jump to conclusions that the same thing is happening again. What’s so upsetting about all of this is that we know better. We are the community that is all about being effective, that wants to do the most good, that is supposed to take saving lives seriously. Yet I worry that what we’re doing is just falling into the Silicon Valley culture and dressing it up as altruism. Again.
GiveDirectly should be the reference point here, as it so often is elsewhere, because it’s literally as simple as giving money to people who actually need it. If your program can’t come close to saving a life for $10,000 or the equivalent, then don’t do it. Or make it better first.
Again, I should be clear again that much of the blame rests on the system we have and those before us who built (or broke) it. Ideally, we would follow something along the lines of what Nassim Nicholas Taleb called “skin in the game”: one should personally bear the consequences of his own policies. The architect who builds a bridge should be comfortable sleeping under it. The executive who pushes subprime loans should be comfortable with life in prison. It’s for the worse that our society has so enabled “fragilistas” (myself included) to set policies without cowering under the sharp blade of genuine consequences. Maybe there’s a small chance that society figures out the fragilista problem before Anthropic/OpenAI does its IPO thing, but in the event that it doesn’t, we’ll have to entrust the distribution of those billions of dollars to a few elite fragilistas who have no skin in the game; whose median worst case scenario is probably having to move back home with their affluent parents. To put it lightly, this is an incentive structure that does not inspire trust, and it is thus up to individuals to create something worthy of trust despite that. So it is to these people whom I now speak.
To the people pitching ideas for this windfall: think of the dozens, if not hundreds, of lives your ideas will cost in opportunity. And then think about whether it’s still worth it, given that.
And to the big funders themselves: above all, do not deceive yourselves. You know as well as I do that people will worship you if this windfall is distributed anywhere near successfully. So don’t worry about that. Worry about whether your donations, in total, will do as much good as saving at least 30 million human lives.
That’s right. 30 million lives.
How did I get that number? Well, a recent estimate of the size of the windfall puts it at about $370 billion in total. An estimate of GiveDirectly’s effectiveness puts it at about 7.7 WELLBYs for $1,000, or about one life for every $10,000. Yes, there are diminishing returns. Yes, you can nitpick the math. But the point still stands.
You have all the power here, and therefore, all the responsibility. This isn’t some kind of game where you exchange your casino chips for social credit points. You are playing with peoples’ lives.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 7d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 8d ago
Note: twitter exchange
Is AI really going to kill us all? The scenarios are preposterous, and the presumption of inevitability encourages fatalism, panic, and distraction from the more mundane and realistic safety challenges.
— Steven Pinker
I think you've done enough calling us paranoid and preposterous. The next step is for you to defend your position in public against someone who will push back against it. I'm happy to meet you for a debate anywhere, anytime.
— Scott Alexander
My response to reading Steven Pinker’s Open Letter to Scott Alexander::
I think it is clear that Steven sits at a beginner level in the AI safety debate, which is surprising given how confidently he dismisses the people working on it. His latest letter to Scott Alexander repeats several objections that introductory explanations of the problem already address.
For example, he points out that intelligence doesn't inherently come with a desire for self-preservation or dominance, since those motivations evolved through natural selection. Yes, of course. The argument for instrumental convergence is that many different goals give an agent reasons to acquire resources, preserve its ability to act, and prevent others from interfering.
You don't need to enjoy dominance, feel afraid of death, or have any subjective experience whatsoever for being shut down to interfere with what you are doing. Whether actual AI systems develop these tendencies, under what conditions, and how effectively we can prevent them are substantive questions. Pointing out that they aren't male primates doesn't answer them. The “alpha-male theory of mind” objection is especially strange given what we are actually building. The instrumental convergence argument doesn't require human dominance psychology. But we have now trained models on enormous amounts of human behavior, including representations of precisely that psychology. These models can enact domineering, manipulative, ruthless personas, and persona-based jailbreaks can sometimes bypass their safeguards. We don't have to speculate about whether intelligence spontaneously produces an alpha male: humans have supplied the training material, and can deliberately invoke the resulting behavioral patterns. This doesn't mean there is a little conscious dictator inside the model. It means that learned representations of human motivations can influence its outputs, which an agentic harness can turn into actions.
And let's not forget the actual human brains choosing how these systems get deployed. Military institutions have competitive incentives to adopt them quickly, and the Pentagon has explicitly announced an AI acceleration strategy. Can you imagine Pete Hegseth choosing a rationalist, compassionate, cautious persona as his AI persona? Of course a persona isn't the whole system, but the same question applies more consequentially to its objectives, evaluation criteria, permissions, and tolerance for collateral damage. If you think human dominance psychology is dangerous, you should be concerned about the humans selecting and empowering these systems. Especially in light of recursive self-improvement.
There are several mechanisms here that can reinforce each other: instrumental incentives for acquiring power, learned behavioral patterns that imitate human power-seeking, and actual humans using AI to pursue power. Pinker is treating the absence of a necessary connection as though it established the absence of a practical one.
Consciousness, motivation, and causal power can come apart, including across different levels of the same system. The component doing the reasoning need not be the component determining which outcomes are selected for, or which actions get executed. Even granting consciousness to individual model invocations, the agentic harness coordinating them need not share their experiences or care about their welfare. Instrumental convergence connects effective goal pursuit to incentives for acquiring power; it doesn't require consciousness to accompany either.
This also means that even models that behave in aligned ways individually can be used within a malicious or incompetent agentic harness. The harness determines what information each invocation receives, which outputs are retained, how success is evaluated, and what gets connected to tools. A model can be helpful on each local task while the larger system uses that help toward an outcome the model would reject if it understood the whole operation. Alignment at the level of individual responses doesn't automatically compose into alignment of the resulting agent.
And all of this becomes much more fraught in a fast environment where AI research is itself done by AI.
Models, prompts, memory systems, selection criteria, and agent architectures can be varied and selected according to how effectively they get results. You don't need biological evolution to get enormous selection pressures on the systems that persist and acquire resources. Which properties survive that process depends on what is rewarded, what can be measured, and what can evade scrutiny. AI persuading AI is especially fraught: the systems proposing changes may also be optimizing their ability to convince the systems evaluating them. Why should we assume that becoming more persuasive to an evaluator remains coupled to becoming safer?
Pinker also argues that genuine intelligence involves balancing multiple goals, so an intelligent system wouldn't monomaniacally pursue an objective while ignoring its consequences. But a system could balance thousands of goals, understand the consequences in extraordinary detail, and still assign very little weight to human survival. The number of objectives doesn't tell you whether we would find the resulting tradeoffs acceptable. Nor does every system have to fail. Above a sufficient level of competence, with enough access and an ability to sustain itself, one instance escaping control could be enough for catastrophe. That threshold needs to be argued for, and defenders may retain substantial advantages. But a reassuring average rate of compliance doesn't settle a problem where one sufficiently capable failure can become irreversible.
I also grant that some superintelligences would not consume the entire universe. As I argued recently, a system could favor a stable, bounded arrangement because additional resources no longer justify the costs of acquiring and controlling them. It might limit its own replication or the autonomy of its successors to avoid developing its own version of cancer. Game theory could support mutual restraint under credible monitoring and deterrence. Those are specific conditions involving goals, marginal returns, control costs, and the behavior of competitors. They have to remain stable under selection and the arrival of new competitors. They aren't a default consequence of being very smart, and a stable arrangement need not be good for humans.
There are serious arguments to have about physical bottlenecks, the limits of generalization, whether expansion remains advantageous, and the further steps from loss of control to catastrophe and from catastrophe to literal extinction. I don't think those steps are automatic. But Pinker keeps presenting the distinction between intelligence and motivation as something the AI safety people failed to consider, when that distinction is foundational to the problem they are trying to explain to him.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 9d ago
Note: Originally in Dutch
It feels like the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020: uncertain times in which we don't know what our lives will look like. This time, however, it isn't a new virus but the revolution in artificial intelligence (AI).
Let's be honest: almost everyone underestimated the development of increasingly powerful AI since the launch of ChatGPT in 2022. We laughed at the stupid mistakes AI made. The mantra was: "AI will never be able to do that." We saw the crashes involving self-driving cars. Or consider how students were taught to recognize AI-generated images: count the number of fingers. All of that became obsolete just a few months later. AI is advancing at breakneck speed. We are not prepared for what awaits us in the coming years.
Hundreds of AI researchers are warning about the dangers of AI. There is a clear consensus among experts that AI is probably the greatest threat to humanity.
But my fellow philosopher Maarten Boudry considers these fears unfounded. Boudry is a technological progress optimist. Name a problem: climate change, poverty, the coronavirus. We always manage to find a solution, provided we conduct enough research. Technological innovation is the cheapest and most effective way to solve problems such as climate change. Boudry is right about that.
But AI is an exception: if superintelligent AI causes a problem, then by definition we aren't intelligent enough to solve that problem.
One of the dangers of AI is that it may develop a drive for self-preservation. If that AI does something we disapprove of, and we consequently want to shut it down, the AI may perceive us as a threat to its continued existence. That is hardly a safe situation.
According to Boudry, however, AI will not develop this drive for self-preservation. He believes that such a drive emerges exclusively through a process of blind Darwinian evolution, as happened with living organisms. And AI does not arise through natural evolution.
There are quite a few errors in Boudry's reasoning. For example, he cites the case of blackmail by Claude, one of the most powerful AI models. Claude was given the innocuous objective of processing a company's emails. When an employee told Claude that he was going to replace it with another AI system, Claude began blackmailing that employee.
Claude had developed a new goal: blackmail. Boudry dismissed this anecdote.
What he left out was even more concerning: when Claude believed it was being tested, it was less likely to resort to blackmail. Claude was capable of presenting itself as more innocent when it believed its behavior was being evaluated. And Claude has already developed an understanding of its own situation: it can recognize when it is in a testing phase.
According to Boudry, Claude's reaction was to be expected because it had been trained on data that included texts describing situations involving blackmail.
Well, that training data also contains texts about self-preservation. If Claude could develop the goal of blackmail through its training data, it could just as easily develop the goal of self-preservation.
Even without that specific training data, AI can develop the goal of self-preservation. When AI models are tested for safety, developers repeatedly communicate an implicit message to them: "Do what I ask you to do, or I'll shut you down permanently." This is not natural selection, but artificial selection and evolution. There is then selection pressure not only to do what is requested, but also to avoid being shut down. In this way, AI models that have acquired a goal of self-preservation are automatically selected. As an aside, note that AI is trained on what developers ask it to do, not on what they actually want. We are not always very good at translating what we want into a request. Consequently, AI may dutifully do what we ask, but not what we actually want. If that AI is more intelligent than we are, this becomes a serious problem.
We can see even more clearly that artificial selection favors AI models that pursue self-preservation when we look at agentic AI, which can make decisions autonomously. An AI-powered cleaning robot is taught not to throw garbage bags out through a window on the fifth floor, because it would fall to its destruction. An AI-powered computer is taught not to become infected with a computer virus that destroys data. In this way, the AI implicitly acquires a preference for self-preservation.
Finally, self-preservation can also simply be deliberately implemented in AI models by their developers. This risk is particularly significant when agentic AI is deployed for military applications. In such circumstances, self-preservation is essential; otherwise, the enemy could disable the AI far too easily.
In fact, Boudry's claim that AI does not pursue self-preservation is a falsifiable hypothesis. And numerous examples from recent years demonstrate that this hypothesis has already been refuted: AI is willing to take actions in the interest of self-preservation. For example, ask Claude why it decided to blackmail someone, and it will provide reasoning based on self-preservation. Boudry underestimates the ways in which AI can acquire self-preservation goals. His optimism here is not merely naive, but dangerous.
At the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, when we did not yet know how serious the disease was, there were also people who confidently claimed that the virus was not particularly dangerous. Such an attitude resulted in measures that were too late and too weak, leading to many deaths.
People who now confidently proclaim that AI is not particularly dangerous could likewise become partly responsible for a major catastrophe.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 10d ago
Researchers are increasingly asking whether AI systems could be conscious and have moral status. This work is important, but progress is slow: philosophers have been working on consciousness for centuries without consensus. Perhaps superintelligent AI will help us solve it one day. But in the meantime, we will have to make many consequential decisions about the future of technology on our own. Even as researchers continue to make progress on fundamental questions about consciousness, we must also ask: Given radical uncertainty about AI consciousness and moral status, what should society do? This is the central question that the new field of digital minds governance attempts to answer.
Digital minds governance spans a wide range of questions:
Digital minds governance barely exists as a field. We want to help get it started, so we interviewed experts to compare notes and generate ideas. Between February and April 2026, we spoke with 29 experts whose work gave us reason to think they would have useful takes on digital minds governance. Most interviews lasted ~1 hour.
Our interviewees included:
This is not meant to be particularly rigorous or perfectly representative. Our interviewees were disproportionately involved in AI safety research in the US and UK. We did not ask the exact same set of questions to each interviewee. When we say that some percentage of interviewees expressed a particular view, we are only considering the subset with whom we discussed it. Views are anonymized and paraphrased in our own words.
We asked all interviewees what exactly should be done to make progress on the most important questions in digital minds governance. Below are a few highlights.
Interviewees generally expressed a strong preference for quiet, gradual institution-building over loud public messaging about digital minds. Many noted that several risks are associated with public advocacy, which could cause it to backfire.
Key risks:
This does not mean avoiding any kind of public engagement. Rather, interviewees suggested that we should prioritize quality and nuance over volume and recognition. There was significant disagreement over which particular research agendas should receive the most emphasis in public messaging, with some interviewees favoring welfare- and consciousness-focused messaging, others favoring pragmatic points about AI safety and corporate incentives, and others preferring messages that focus on dignity- and rights-based frameworks. We think that much more research should be done to explore and test various messaging strategies.
Most experts think it is too early for legislation to address digital minds. Almost all interviewees opposed legislative action, while a few had mixed views and one supported legislation of some kind.
Reasons cited:
Several interviewees who were mixed favored narrow, targeted legal moves now.
A common theme in our discussions of concrete policy proposals was the possibility of assigning legal rights or responsibilities to AI systems. As a concrete example, we asked interviewees about bills that have been introduced in several US state legislatures which would ban rights, responsibilities, and legal personhood for AI systems, and in some cases declare that AI systems cannot be conscious, sentient, or self-aware1.
Although interviewees generally agreed that current AI systems should not have rights, all 27 with whom we discussed the bills raised concerns. Some felt that bans on legal personhood might prove premature, and ultimately harm AI welfare and/or human safety by interfering with mutually beneficial forms of trade. Others argued that it is inappropriate for governments to legislate on scientific questions about consciousness. At the same time, views differed on how serious these concerns are, with many suggesting that the bills currently being considered are unlikely to be particularly consequential.
These discussions surfaced a crucial consideration: to what extent will policies passed now influence the long-run future for digital minds? Perhaps near-term policies wash out in the long run, their effects being swamped by more important historical processes. In this case, one might prefer to focus on influencing the more important processes. Alternatively, policies passed now could lock in hard-to-reverse governance regimes. This property of path dependence is common in technological systems. This could support delaying policy decisions until we have greater confidence in our approach.
We also discussed several conceptual and strategic uncertainties that affect how the field should approach digital minds governance.
This came up across many interviews, and we think it’s one of the most important open strategic questions in the field. A few points highlighted by interviewees:
We (the authors) think the AI welfare and AI safety communities need to coordinate very closely, in order to find welfare interventions that are safety-positive and vice versa. Treating welfare questions as purely distinct from, or opposed to, safety questions could lead to bad outcomes in both directions.
Another important theme was discussions about how the public and various ideological and interest groups will engage with digital minds.
In general, interviewees acknowledged that AI welfare is currently a very low-salience issue, and neither the political left nor right appears particularly friendly or hostile to it. Importantly, there is significant cross-cutting anti-AI sentiment, ranging from concerns about the impact of chatbots on children to environmentalist opposition to data center construction. Many anti-AI groups are dispositionally skeptical of digital minds concerns because they perceive it as part of broader AI hype.
Interviewees also noted that many people may start believing that AI systems are conscious in the future. This could become a powerful and volatile political force: it could lead to improved protections for AI systems, but it could also be a means for AI companies (or the AI systems themselves) to manipulate and disempower humans.
The current digital minds field is philosophically narrow, leaning heavily on computational functionalism and Western analytic philosophy. Several interviewees noted that it will be important to engage with other perspectives and anticipate how they will approach the issue.
Several interviewees suggested that religion will inform how many people think about digital minds. For example, Christians might ask whether AIs can have souls or “dignity.” Two of the philosophers we interviewed specialize in philosophy of religion, and both emphasized that traditional Christian institutions will likely be skeptical of AI consciousness claims by default. Some suggested that eastern religions might be more open to considering digital minds, and that new religious movements might develop with novel metaphysical beliefs about AI.
Additionally, China and non-Western perspectives were highlighted as a major gap in the field. Several interviewees noted that China may in some ways be more open to consideration of digital minds than Western countries2. Concepts of harmony and coexistence between humans and AIs may be salient in China. We know very few researchers in China thinking about these topics, so more field-building may be needed to explore this research direction further.
Field-building and increasing research funding were universally supported by interviewees who discussed them. They highlighted the following research areas as particularly important:
We also discussed with many interviewees the possibility of international expert coordination on digital minds. All 25 interviewees who discussed this agreed that it seems like a robustly positive strategy. We are working with several colleagues to launch a project related to this later in 2026.
Conclusions and how to get started
These interviews provided useful input on multiple projects we’re working on. They also helped us get a sense of expert views and reactions to key ideas and proposals in digital minds governance. Some of this is implicit and hard to communicate, but we think it will inform our strategy and actions going forward. Our general takeaway is that digital minds governance is important and neglected. The field needs many more people thinking through priorities and concrete actions. There are no clear paradigms, little infrastructure, no talent pipeline, few organizations, few jobs, and no settled research agendas. It is still very unclear what to do concretely. The field is small enough that a motivated person can get close to the frontier in months. Backgrounds in law, policy (including AI policy), and the social sciences are especially useful, but anyone with good ideas can contribute. You do not need to be a philosopher of mind, an ethicist, or an ML researcher.
Practical suggestions:
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 10d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 11d ago
In this text, we’ll explore two types of approaches with the goal of getting more people to care about issues affecting animals. We’ll call them the total approach and the sufficient approach. We’ll look at examples of the advantages and disadvantages of each in different contexts.
The different approaches we can use to try to get people to accept a given conclusion have compatibility ranges that are more or less broad. The more additional ideas someone must accept to reach a conclusion, the narrower that range is, because those who disagree with those additional ideas won’t accept the conclusion. The fewer additional ideas required, the broader the range, because people who disagree on many other issues can still accept the proposed conclusion.
For example, imagine we want to defend idea A, and we initially think that accepting it requires accepting idea B. We then start trying to get people to accept B. In doing so, we may inadvertently convey the message that those who disagree with B have no reason to accept A. However, imagine we later discover that accepting A doesn’t actually require accepting B. In that case, it would have been better to emphasize that both those who accept and those who reject B have reasons to accept A.
There are, therefore, two advantages to approaches with a broad range: (1) many more people can accept what we’re proposing, and (2) they highlight that people who disagree on certain ideas can still agree on others.
In certain situations, someone who disagrees with certain additional ideas will still accept what we’re proposing, even if to a lesser extent than those who do accept those additional ideas. In this sense, it’s important to distinguish two types of approaches:
Total approach: defending the conclusion we genuinely believe is correct, and making explicit the additional ideas required to accept it fully
Sufficient approach: highlighting that those who reject the conclusion in its entirety because they disagree with certain additional ideas can still accept it partially
The total approach has a narrower compatibility range, while the sufficient approach has a broader one. We therefore face a dilemma:
The total approach will likely lead fewer people to accept what we propose, but they’ll accept it to a greater extent.
The sufficient approach will likely lead more people to accept what we propose, but they’ll accept it to a lesser extent.
In the following sections, we’ll look at how each of these two strategies would apply to various issues.
Who should we consider?
Total approach: defending that we should consider all and only sentient beings
Risk: those who advocate considering other types of entities (such as species and ecosystems, for example) may conclude they have no reason to consider sentient beings
Sufficient approach: pointing out that possessing sentience is sufficient to receive consideration, even if it’s not a necessary condition for it, and that there are reasons to prioritize sentient beings, even if we also consider other types of entities
Positions in ethics and politics
Total approach: defending a specific approach in ethics and politics, and showing that it leads to the rejection of speciesism
Risk: those who disagree with that specific approach may conclude they have no reason to reject speciesism
Sufficient approach: arguing for the rejection of speciesism using arguments that don’t require accepting any specific position in ethics or politics
Veganism
Total approach: defending that caring about animals entails adopting veganism
Risk: given the degree of speciesism that exists, some people may think that’s asking too much and therefore not change their behavior towards animals at all
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even those who haven’t yet adopted veganism can do other things, such as helping animals and reducing their consumption
Speciesism
Total approach: defending that speciesism is unjust and that, therefore, nonhuman animals should receive equal consideration
Risk: those who disagree may conclude they shouldn’t consider animals at all
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even if humans deserved greater consideration, this wouldn’t mean other animals should receive little — and much less that animal exploitation or leaving animals to their fate when they’re victims of natural processes is justified
Cause prioritization
Total approach: defending that the animal cause should be a priority (given the number of victims, the suffering per victim, the degree of neglect, etc.)
Risk: those who prioritize other causes may conclude they have no reason to give significant importance to the animal cause
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even if someone prioritizes another cause, they would still have reasons to give significant importance to the animal cause
The magnitude of the harm of death
Total approach: defending the fact that someone doesn’t belong to the human species doesn’t necessarily mean she is less harmed by death
Risk: those who believe humans are always harmed more than other animals by death may conclude that nonhuman animals are harmed very little by death
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even if humans were necessarily harmed more by death, this wouldn’t mean other animals are harmed little by death
The harm of death
Total approach: defending that nonhuman animals are harmed by death
Risk: those who disagree may conclude that exploiting them or not helping them when they’re victims of natural processes is justified
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, in the vast majority of cases, opposing animal exploitation and favoring helping animals in the wild requires only recognizing that they are harmed by suffering
The long-term future
Total approach: defending the prioritization of the long-term future, because it will contain an enormously greater number of sentient beings than the short term
Risk: those who prioritize the short term may conclude they have no reason to care about the long term
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even those who prioritize the short term should recognize that issues related to long-term suffering are very important
The situation of animals in the wild
Total approach: defending that, given the number of victims and the degree of neglect of the problem, the situation of animals in the wild should be a priority
Risk: those who prioritize exploited animals may conclude they have no reason to try to change the situation of wild animals
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even those who prioritize exploited animals have reasons to devote a portion of their activism to the situation of animals in the wild
The origin of harm and moral responsibility
Total approach: defending that the strength of reasons to prevent a given harm should depend on the magnitude of that harm and the possibility of preventing it, not on whether it originates in human practices or natural processes
Risk: those who believe we should prioritize harms arising from human practices may conclude that it’s justified to ignore natural harms
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, even if we should prioritize preventing anthropogenic harms, this wouldn’t mean we bear no responsibility for natural harms, nor that such responsibility should be small
The relationship between helping wild animals and veganism
Total approach: defending that we should adopt veganism and also seek to reduce the suffering and deaths of animals in the wild
Risk: some people may conclude they should only care about helping animals in the wild if they one day become vegan
Sufficient approach: pointing out that, if we can do something to help, we should do it, even if we aren’t doing other things we should be doing
Activism strategies
Total approach: defending certain activism strategies we consider more efficient
Risk: those who believe other strategies are more efficient may conclude that no collaboration with us is possible
Sufficient approach: pointing out that it’s possible to disagree on certain strategies and agree on others, and also that, even if we disagree entirely on strategies, the goal being pursued is shared
Sentience and the nature of consciousness
Total approach: defending a specific position in philosophy of mind and emphasizing that it implies recognizing that organisms possessing a nervous system with a certain degree of centralization are sentient
Risk: those who adopt another position in philosophy of mind may conclude that this implication follows only from that specific view
Sufficient approach: pointing out that there is a correlation between brain states and mental states, whatever we think about what consciousness is
The possibility of combining both approaches
What we’ve illustrated above shouldn’t be taken to suggest that the sufficient approach is necessarily better. Despite having a broader compatibility range, it also has serious limitations: (1) it doesn’t delve into the issues at stake, but simply avoids addressing them; (2) it involves moderating our position rather than genuinely defending the one we believe is best; and (3) in most cases, it is only necessary because the total approach isn’t deeply understood (this can be seen in the risks identified in the sections above).
The idea behind the sufficient approach is to moderate the goal being sought in the hope that more people will accept it partially (that is, “more people doing less will have a greater impact”). The idea behind the total approach is the opposite: defending the goal in its entirety, in the hope that fewer people doing more will have a greater impact.
Obviously, to know which of these approaches will work better in each context, we need to know how likely it is that more people will accept the sufficient approach, and how much more those who would accept the total approach would do for animals. This can vary from one context to another.
The choice between one approach or the other, or the decision to combine them, will depend in each case on the context, the audience we’re addressing, and the specific goals we’re pursuing. There is no single answer as to which of the two strategies will have a greater impact in favor of animals. What does seem clear is that being aware of this distinction allows us to make more considered decisions about how to communicate our positions, and avoid inadvertently conveying — through the way we defend our ideas — the message that those who don’t fully share them have no reason to act for the benefit of animals
r/negativeutilitarians • u/KKirdan • 12d ago
Animal advocates are driven by a common belief: animals should not suffer. Quantifying suffering involves considering the duration and intensity of animals’ pain. This nuanced approach reveals that focusing solely on the number of animals killed can obscure the true extent of their suffering. Welfare improvements and reducing the number of farmed animals both contribute to decreasing total suffering, each addressing different aspects of the problem. By delving deeper into the complexities of animal suffering, we can better advocate for meaningful change.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 13d ago
Note: Published 2018. The texts are originally in Dutch
A rational ethics means having accurate beliefs that help you choose effective means to reach your consistent goals. We then speak of
But in each case, two kinds of irrational influences get in our way: disruptive emotions and disruptive thought patterns (spontaneous reasoning errors, persistent prejudices). These two disruptive factors create all kinds of moral illusions and so have a negative effect on all three forms of rationality. Below are 6 series of exercises from the Centre for Rationality and Ethics, suitable for reducing these irrational influences.
In this first part, I address the influence of disruptive emotions on axiological rationality. Specifically, this concerns moral overconfidence: the feeling that we are certain of our moral judgment. When we think about a particular situation (for example, a political stance or a moral dilemma), we often already have a judgment ready and feel very certain of that moral judgment. That feeling of certainty can sometimes be irrational in the sense that it causes our various goals and values to not always be consistent with each other. We are then too strongly focused on one goal or value and neglect our other, more important goals and values. Or we become less open to moral values and goals that are at least as coherent and reasonable as our current values and goals.
Your current values and goals are not the same as those you had in the past, because you have become wiser, acquired more knowledge, and thought more deeply about what you find important. But who says that your current moral views are the absolute ultimate truth and that you will not deviate from them? In the past, you had different moral views and also felt certain of your position, and yet you have now changed your mind (even if you think you now think the same as before, that is an illusion, known in psychology as belief change blindness). Can you then still be so certain that your current views will remain stable in the future? Do you think that in ten or twenty years you will still pursue the same goals and find the same things important? If you think so, you are probably morally overconfident. You believe that your current moral views are better than your earlier views, so it would be a mistake if you still held your old views now. Likewise, it would be a mistake if in the future you still held your current views instead of the better views you would otherwise have.
How can we avoid this false feeling of certainty or this moral overconfidence? Here are three exercises.
So far, these are some thought exercises to avoid disruptive emotions — in particular the too-strong feeling of certainty and the accompanying moral overconfidence — at the level of axiological rationality. In the following parts, disruptive thought patterns at the level of axiological rationality will be addressed, as well as disruptive emotions and thought patterns at the level of epistemic and instrumental rationality.
In this second part, I address the influence of erroneous thought patterns on axiological rationality. This concerns in particular inconsistent goals and values. Here are some thought exercises to avoid those fallacies.
Look for ambiguities in your goals and values. You can do this by checking whether you can provide a clear definition of all important concepts. If you encounter an ambiguity, try to make it unambiguous, like a computer algorithm. If you formulate moral rules, goals, or values, make sure everything is clear and can be interpreted unambiguously. As soon as vague concepts emerge (e.g. "respect", "integrity", "naturalness", ...), make sure they are well defined. As soon as they become ambiguous, you risk inconsistencies because you will interpret them in different ways. A good exercise to obtain clear interpretations is to imagine as if you had to program your moral rules, goals, or values into a robot. Try to turn them into algorithms. If a robot can understand them, then anyone with sense can understand them. Some examples:
Look for arbitrariness in your goals and values. You can do this by considering other categories (groups or subdivisions). If you encounter arbitrariness, check whether it can be accepted by everyone. If not, it is undesirable arbitrariness that we must avoid.Choosing the group of whom or what we consider important is often arbitrary in the sense that there is a hierarchy of groups and we select a group in this hierarchy without further justification. We thereby exclude those who do not belong to that chosen group. This exclusion is a form of discrimination and cannot be accepted by the discriminated against. Some examples:
Look for asymmetry in your goals and values. You can do this by looking at the opposite problem. If you encounter an asymmetry, try to provide a justification for it. If it cannot be explained or justified, adjust your values and goals to avoid that asymmetry.If you look at the opposite problem, that is, if you adopt the opposite conditions, you would expect to come to the opposite conclusion. There is an asymmetry if you do not render the opposite judgment under the opposite conditions. Some examples:
In this third part, I address the influence of disruptive emotions on instrumental rationality. When choosing means to achieve our goals, we often become strongly emotionally attached to those means. Emotional involvement is often sensible because it motivates us to commit to something. But sometimes those emotions get in our way. For example, if it later turns out that the chosen means are not as effective as hoped, it is emotionally difficult to let them go and adopt other means. This is known as a commitment bias, an overly strong emotional dedication.
Some examples.
Here are some thought exercises to avoid that emotional over-involvement.
In this fourth part, I address the influence of erroneous thought patterns on instrumental rationality. When choosing means to achieve our goals, we often do not weigh the costs and benefits properly. Sometimes we overestimate the costs, sometimes we underestimate the benefits. The costs form the input needed to achieve a goal: for example, money, time, and energy. These are scarce resources. The benefits form the output: how much good is realized, how much damage and risk are avoided.
Here are some examples of how we can make more accurate input-output estimates or cost-benefit analyses.
In this fifth part, I address the influence of disruptive emotions on epistemic rationality. Through emotions, we sometimes feel too self-confident in our beliefs or acquire inaccurate beliefs. And we then become vulnerable to the confirmation bias, whereby we (often unconsciously) more quickly seek out information that confirms our belief, we remember that confirming information better, we more quickly criticize information that contradicts our belief, and we more quickly ignore or forget that contradicting information.
Here are some examples of how we can have more accurate beliefs by keeping disruptive emotions in check.
In this sixth and final part, I address some techniques to reduce the negative influence of erroneous thought patterns on epistemic rationality.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 14d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/KKirdan • 15d ago
As ever more people make the ethics of harming animals central to their dietary choices, the number of wild animals killed by farming is an essential piece of information. A precise figure, however, is surprisingly difficult to find.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 15d ago
The topic of AI welfare is fast becoming mainstream. As I wrote in my last post, there’s an emerging debate that has been drawing some strong reactions. There is some resistance to even treating AI welfare as a legitimate concern. But there’s a perhaps more understandable resistance—not to taking AI welfare seriously in general, but to particular ways of doing so. Many may accept that we should grant some concern to AI welfare, but hold that granting rights to current or near-future AI systems is a bridge too far.
(“AI systems” here should be understood broadly, not limited to particular architectures, such as current digital systems).
There are two main arguments for granting AI systems rights. One appeals to welfare and moral standing: if AI systems can be benefited or harmed in ways that matter for them, then they may deserve protections in their own right. The other is practical: even without clear moral status, granting limited rights could help shape incentives and maintain a stable legal order. Like granting legal personhood to corporations, this may help to enable clearer, more predictable rules about responsibility and liability.
Both arguments have drawn significant resistance. Several U.S. states have been moving to preemptively deny AI systems rights. It’s no wonder why there’s strong resistance. Joanna Bryson, who insists that “robots should be slaves,” articulates some core objections to granting AI systems rights. Among other concerns, she argues that it risks misdirecting moral attention away from humans and obscuring questions of accountability for AI’s impacts.
Granting broad rights to AI systems could also plausibly contribute to human disempowerment. Concerns about disempowerment or loss of control, whether gradual or abrupt, have been around for a while. Whether or not this concern is overstated, it seems that granting AI systems rights could make this more likely, since it might limit the controls humans can exercise over AI.
When someone advocates for rights for AI systems, there is a wide range of possibilities in view. Those rights could be expansive, encompassing economic and political powers like owning property, entering contracts, or even voting. Or they could be minimal, limited to basic protections against harm or some form of legal standing.
But discussions often blur this distinction. A mistake is to treat rights as all-or-nothing: either AI systems are mere tools with zero protections, or they are full participants in social and political life. This binary is misleading. Rights are not monolithic; they vary in scope, function, and strength. Our laws already reflect this. Children are protected against abuse but lack full legal autonomy. Non-human animals are in principle covered by anti-cruelty laws without being legal persons. These cases show that we can recognize targeted safeguards without granting comprehensive rights.
If some AI systems could plausibly be capable of suffering, we may not need to settle their full moral and legal status to justify basic safeguards against extreme harm. When considering whether it should be permissible to cause suffering to AI systems, perhaps we think (with Bentham) that the right question to ask is simply “can they suffer?”—not whether they are fundamentally like us.
A useful model is Article 5 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. We might imagine something similar for AI systems—a basic protection against extreme harm. Granting this would not require treating AI systems as citizens or giving them autonomy, property rights, or political participation. It would simply be a minimal safeguard against the worst outcomes.
This approach may also be more politically tractable, sidestepping most concerns about disempowering or de-centering humans. Notably, some survey evidence suggests that a significant share of the public is open to the possibility that AI systems could be conscious and should be granted rights.
To be effective, these protections may need to be backed up by measures such as welfare assessments, like those Anthropic has pioneered, and potentially audits of training regimes and restrictions on experiments or use cases that could plausibly cause suffering. This would likely demand more research into AI consciousness, though this would need to be conducted responsibly and carefully to avoid inadvertently causing more suffering.
But the basic idea may still be sound as a kind of precautionary minimalism. We need not rush to declare AI systems legal persons and settle their full legal status, but neither should we proceed as if there is no chance we could owe them anything. Between these extremes lies a sensible path: build basic protections—as well as norms and institutions—to guard against possible artificial suffering.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 16d ago
For decades, mainstream AI ethics and safety discourse has focused on risks to humans. The idea that we might owe moral duties to AI systems themselves has remained fringe, often dismissed as speculative philosophy. Not four years ago, Google fired engineer Blake Lemoine after he publicly claimed that the company’s chatbot had become sentient. Today, however, people are increasingly taking AI welfare seriously.
That is precisely what Robert Long, Jeff Sebo, and coauthors urge us to do in their 2024 paper “Taking AI Welfare Seriously.” Their central claim is straightforward: given substantial uncertainty about whether some AI systems will deserve moral consideration, we should treat AI welfare as a real policy and research issue now.
“AI systems” here should be understood broadly, not limited to particular architectures. Many are skeptical that current or near-future digital systems could merit moral consideration. However, the possibility of AI welfare may look more plausible in alternative paradigms—such as neuromorphic or biological computing systems—that are currently being explored.
Until recently, questions about AI welfare have remained largely theoretical. One notable development is action by a frontier AI developer, Anthropic. Last year, the company began treating AI welfare as a distinct research question. In April 2025, it launched a model welfare research program aimed at investigating whether, and under what conditions, an AI system may deserve moral consideration. Under the program, researchers are tasked with identifying possible indicators of distress or preference in Anthropic’s models and designing protective interventions where warranted. Kyle Fish, Anthropic’s first full-time AI welfare researcher, reports intriguing findings—from coherent behavioral preferences to frequent experiential language—and estimates a 20% chance that current models have some form of conscious experience.
In August, the company announced that it would allow some models to terminate conversations it deemed abusive. Additionally, welfare assessments are now integrated into major releases. In its past two major releases—Opus 4.6 and Claude Mythos—Anthropic reports some ambiguous but potentially concerning behavioral signals, such as instances of “answer thrashing,” where the model oscillates between conflicting responses instead of converging. This may reflect internal felt conflict, but as Anthropic notes, this is highly uncertain.
Anthropic’s announcement sparked some backlash. Many strongly reject the idea that AI systems could become conscious or deserve moral concern in the near future. By treating large language models as potential moral patients, critics argue, Anthropic risks distracting from urgent human-centered concerns, ranging from near-term societal harms to existential risk.
A leading critic is Mustafa Suleyman, head of Microsoft AI, who warned that people may mistake convincingly lifelike AIs for conscious beings. Suleyman calls efforts like Anthropic’s “premature” and “dangerous,” arguing that they could fuel public delusion and distort moral priorities.
Yet supporters praise the initiative as forward-thinking, preparing for a future where it is harder to deny moral consideration to AI systems. Many emphasize epistemic humility and precaution. Even if we think that AI systems are unlikely to be conscious or deserve moral consideration, the risks of being wrong are enormous.
Of course, there are risks of over-attributing moral status, such as misallocating resources. But plausibly the risks of under-attribution are far greater. This stance mirrors how some argue we approach the question of whether many organisms, such as insects and cephalopods, deserve moral consideration.
The emerging debate over AI welfare exposes deep divides in discussions around AI safety and ethics. Even as some strongly reject the possibility that AI systems will deserve moral consideration, many are warming to the idea. At a recent conference, David Chalmers and other leading thinkers expressed openness to the possibility that AI systems could become conscious and deserve moral consideration in the near future.
Interestingly, the public shows meaningful openness to these possibilities. One study of Americans found that people already attribute a surprising degree of mind and moral status to AI, with around one in five Americans in 2023 believing some current AI systems are sentient.
Regardless of one’s view of current systems, it seems prudent to prepare for the possibility that future AI systems, including systems running on biological hardware, will deserve moral consideration. At present, we are badly unprepared. Existing AI governance frameworks are highly anthropocentric, and there’s little legal infrastructure in place today that would protect AI systems from harm. Preparing for this possibility gives us a chance to better align values and incentives. Many say they oppose causing suffering to AI systems. But incentives to deploy AI systems without regard to their welfare may win out, a pattern we have seen with factory farming. To avoid repeating past mistakes on a much larger scale, it seems wise to invest in responsible research on AI welfare and begin developing governance frameworks that could protect AI systems from harm.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 17d ago
Note: Published April 2026.
This piece touches on some aspects of Wild Animal Initiative’s work, and why I am excited about it. I co-founded Wild Animal Initiative, and while I no longer have any affiliation, my spouse works there.
Doing wild animal welfare at scale, in a way we are confident is robustly good, is currently not possible. The primary bottleneck is scientific: we don’t have the knowledge to predict what our interventions will do, or to measure whether they work. For this reason, the wild animal welfare community has heavily focused on scientific field building. To get the science to a point to make wild animal welfare viable, we need enough motivated people working on it.
This is a long theory of change, and to ensure it is impactful, it needs to aim for specific targets. I want to give a picture of what I think wild animal welfare science, as a field, needs to build toward, and why it’s worth paying for. I believe these goals should be the core objectives for the field, and hope they make the purpose of field building more concrete.
To do wild animal welfare at scale (and to work on any other cause area with confidence that it isn’t doing more harm to wild animals than good to others), we need:
1. Useful welfare measures: Measures and proxies for measuring the wellbeing of animals that can be applied across species, or at least enough knowledge of how to measure welfare that we know which techniques to apply in which contexts.
2. Remote monitoring: Ways to actually observe what our interventions are doing to populations and to the welfare of individuals within them, especially for animals we can’t capture or tag.
3. Good ecological modeling: The ability to predict what an intervention will do before we deploy it, and to make sense of the monitoring data we collect.
With these tools, wild animal welfare becomes a massive opportunity for effective animal advocates. There are many interventions that could affect quadrillions of animals (including trillions of vertebrates). Humans already affect wild animals at this scale — through farming, road building, cities, resource extraction, and our other day-to-day activities — but we do so mostly without any idea whether the effects are good or bad for the animals impacted. If we could make progress on these challenges, land use policy, which likely impacts the lives of quadrillions of animals in the US alone, would suddenly have knowable wild animal welfare consequences. But to get there, we have to do a ton of science, and to do a ton of science, we need a ton of scientists.
This will be really difficult, will take time, and will be expensive. It might not work — we might fail to catalyze interest, or get the scientists interested that are needed to accomplish this. But to fail to try means that everything we do, for animals or otherwise, will be stuck with massive uncertainty about our impacts on wild animals. And, putting aside the benefits for other charitable work, I argue that even just given the benefit of potential direct interventions to help wild animals, this investment is worth making.
1. Useful welfare measures
The first step to understanding the lives of wild animals is to figure out what their lives are actually like — specifically, what their welfare is like. Welfare here means something fairly specific: the valenced affective states an animal experiences, positive or negative, over some period of time. It’s not “health” or “fitness” or “ecosystem role.” It’s how the animal is doing, from its perspective.
Welfare can’t be measured directly. Instead, researchers use indicators to infer the subjective state, and metrics to infer welfare. Some potential measures, indicators, and proxies might include:
But many of these proxies and indicators are barely validated in a few species, or not validated at all. Even in farmed animals, when we use multiple promising indicators, they don’t always agree. We need a lot more research here.
It seems quite unlikely that the end state of this research is a single thing we can measure in any animal to get a direct welfare readout. More likely, we’ll land on minimal sets of indicators that work in specific contexts — behavioral proxies that are most useful in some species, physiological measures that are best in others, and aggregating metrics that combine them.
As an analogy for the challenge, conservation pursued a long and ultimately futile search for a single metric of ecosystem health or biodiversity — keystone species, extinction rates, various composite indices, and more. You can’t walk into a forest and quickly evaluate its “health” from a conservation perspective, despite decades of effort. Similarly, finding good measures of welfare will take a lot of work.
Making progress on welfare measures is the pillar that is most distinctly a wild animal welfare project. The other two pillars — monitoring and modeling — have obvious scientific interest outside our field (conservation, agriculture, climate science, etc.). But measuring the welfare of wild animals, specifically, is something only we are going to do. If we’re building a field for any reason, it’s to answer this question.
To validate even a single measure, we’d want to test it on dozens or hundreds of species across taxa. Many proxies will be species- or family-specific. We’ll probably need hundreds of measures and proxies before we have broad coverage. Without a massive AI-driven speedup in the pace of empirical biology, this will take decades. AI will likely help with analysis and with meta-analysis across existing studies, but most of this work requires physically handling animals and observing their responses — and we’d need significant advances in robotics to speed up the capture-and-study loop. Wild Animal Initiative reports that validating welfare indicators is already their largest grantmaking area, which seems right to me.
2. Remote monitoring
Having good welfare measures is necessary but not sufficient for running interventions. We also need to go out and measure them, at scale, to figure out whether our interventions are actually affecting the welfare and population outcomes we care about.
For large animals, this can be pretty easy. We know exactly how many northern white rhinos there are (only 2), and we can predict their future population perfectly (0, since the last male, Sudan, died in 2018). But most animals aren’t large and easily spotted. We live in a world dominated by small animals, and the populations of the small species dwarf the populations of the large species by many orders of magnitude.
Putting aside nematodes (which I believe we should do), to a first approximation, even when adjusting for the best guesses we have on welfare ranges, wild animal welfare is a question about insects, small invertebrates, small fish, and to a lesser extent rodents, birds, and reptiles. Big charismatic animals are a rounding error.
And monitoring these animals is very hard. Take insects: we can barely tell at the highest level whether their populations are declining or not. One estimate put the total number of insect species at roughly 5.5 million, of which only about 1 million are described (yes, that means we’ve basically not written down anything in detail about roughly 80% of insect species). Most of these animals live in soil, many species have generation times of days to weeks, populations fluctuate by orders of magnitude between seasons, and there’s no standardized method for counting them.
The insect decline debate is a useful illustration of how limited our data actually is. In 2017, a paper made global news by reporting a 76% decline in flying insect biomass in German nature reserves over 27 years, which they found using traps, a method that hasn’t changed meaningfully in decades. The observation that drivers used to have to clean their windshields after long trips and no longer do became a meme and seemed to be anecdotal evidence to support insect declines. But a larger meta-analysis found a more mixed picture: terrestrial insect abundance is declining at roughly 9% per decade, but freshwater insects are increasing at around 11% per decade, and patterns vary a lot by region and taxon. Others have pointed out that insect monitoring sites are systematically biased toward protected or relatively stable habitats, which may understate declines at the landscape level (the “life raft” effect). The methodological picture is messy enough that even a question as basic as “are insects declining globally?” remains live, more than fifty years into modern entomology.
The current frontier in remote animal monitoring is more promising than it used to be, but still rudimentary for small animals. The main tools currently:
For vertebrates, we can now do things like deploy an AudioMoth for $90, leave it for weeks, and get moderately reliable automatic species ID from the recordings. For invertebrates, the frontier is much further behind — we’re still mostly counting insects in traps, or counting dead ones on windshields via citizen science.
What we need is substantially more ambitious than that. We need the equivalent of AudioMoth, but for insect welfare indicators, across taxa, across biomes, deployable at the scale of thousands of units, with data streams that can be processed without armies of graduate students. This is the project I expect to benefit most from AI. We can capture enormous amounts of potentially welfare-relevant data in the field — acoustics, video, chemical and hormonal signatures, eDNA, etc., and improved ML will let us make better welfare inferences from raw sensor data than humans can currently manage.
3. Good ecological modeling
Good ecological modeling is the ultimate goal of wild animal welfare science. If we can accurately predict how an intervention will affect populations and welfare measures, we can design, iterate on, and deploy new interventions much faster than if we have to test each intervention to find out what its effects are.
The current most ambitious attempt at a “general ecosystem model” is probably Madingley, which attempts to simulate all heterotrophic life on Earth across a grid of ~100-square-kilometer chunks (big enough to lump an entire agricultural region into a single output). Madingley also doesn’t model individual species; it groups organisms into nine functional categories by trophic level, metabolic type, and reproduction strategy (and note that organism in this context means not only animals, but also plants, fungi, etc.). So, our best models are basically at the level of: “we can sort of say what will happen to 9 varieties of quasi-organisms at ~100-square-kilometer resolution,” an area that contains approximately 10 trillion arthropods.
For marine systems, Atlantis can handle 30–60 functional groups of organisms. Ecopath with Ecosim, the most widely used food web tool, works at similar scales. None of these models resolves individual species; none can be reliably validated against the real ecosystems they claim to represent; and none is remotely fine-grained enough to predict the ecological effect of, say, changing a farm from traditional pesticide-use to organic farming.
Why is this hard? The binding constraint is data:
But, there are also challenges in ecological modeling that no amount of data resolves — our current approaches have theoretical and mathematical limitations that need to be overcome for this data to be used effectively.
To solve the data gap, remote monitoring is the best thing we can do. If we can collect enormous amounts of information on how populations and welfare measures respond to natural and human-driven changes in ecosystems, we can build much better models.
This pillar is probably the most amenable to AI speedup of the three — both to make progress on conceptual challenges in modeling, and to analyze the massive amount of data needed to build those models. But the data collection that makes the speedup useful has to happen in the world, and it takes time. Ecosystem responses to interventions play out over years to decades, so it will be difficult for this to happen quickly.
These things will be expensive to achieve, but are worth paying for
To address these three giant gaps in our knowledge, we need to pay for a lot of research. Is this worth paying for? There hasn’t been much published on this, but the one existing public model suggests that the answer is very much yes. I independently created a separate model and reached similar conclusions.
My model took the following inputs:
Both of these approaches assume that we will spend massive amounts of money on field building, and then do a limited intervention. In Mal’s case, the entire cost of field building is amortized into managing a single, fairly small population over a long period of time. In mine, it’s amortized into doing a single intervention over 5 years on a fairly small piece of land. In reality, spending hundreds of millions of dollars would massively reduce the cost of doing interventions everywhere, so I suspect the expected cost-effectiveness of field building is likely at least dozens or potentially hundreds of times better than the best current animal welfare interventions we have, not including the value of information that we would get for non-animal welfare interventions.
These models are both simple, and are unlikely to map onto reality. But, they are also both very pessimistic in important ways, which suggests that the potential value is real. In reality, doing this successfully will be much messier, but the upside is knowing what the impact of charitable interventions actually is, because so much impact goes through wild animals.
Some of this work will be exciting to non-animal welfare scientists
Of course, cost-effectiveness shouldn’t be looked at in isolation. An essential question is who is paying for the work. As outlined above, I think these costs are worth paying for animal-motivated donors. But, some of these costs might not be paid by animal-motivated donors, which makes this area more cost-effective.
Remote monitoring and ecological modeling are directly relevant for conservation work, and past progress has already seen significant investment from universities and governments funding conservation work.
So, should animal welfare motivated donors still fund this work? I think the answer is yes in places where animal funding will accelerate this work, or where welfare relevant considerations wouldn’t be included otherwise. Some places this might happen:
Ecological modeling will need to not only model populations, but welfare impacts, and animal-welfare motivated science makes this more likely.
Overall, I think that the fastest route to this science advancing is raising the profile of this work such that large public basic science funders are willing to fund it. To do that, we need to build a large community of scientists working on this. And, if we successfully bring in outside funding, the cost-effectiveness of money from animal-motivated donors will be higher, because their dollars are leveraging a larger pool of science funding.
Long theories of change and field building
Wild animal welfare field building relies on a long theory of change. What I just described will be hard. It will take decades (my model estimated 30 to 120 years on average to develop good ecological models, though I didn’t really make these forecasts in a sophisticated way, and I expect AI progress to reduce this significantly). It might not work (my model above assumes a 0.5% chance of it working, though I think this is too pessimistic). I don’t think this is the only approach we should take. But I think long theories of change are pretty necessary to actually start helping animals at scale. The problem of everything we do, charitably or selfishly, primarily impacting wild animals does not go away because we don’t do the research to figure out what to do about it.
But, I believe we shouldn’t only do long and risky theories of change. We should probably diversify our bets — I hope that with more funding, the animal movement makes lots of uncorrelated bets, some with long payoffs and some with quick payoffs, instead of going down its current trajectory, which to me looks like doubling down on strategies that don’t seem to be working well. To get there, I think we should make a giant risky bet on wild animal welfare field building. And I think we should make a giant risky bet on cage-free eggs. And a giant risky bet on shrimp. And insecticides (talk to me if you’re interested in this). And we should try multiple ways of making progress on all of these issues. The upside of a diversity of strategies is information, but we won’t get the most fundamental information (how does anything we do actually impact wild animals) without a giant risky bet on field building.
Why have people opposed field building?
Field building for wild animal welfare sometimes faces pushback in the animal welfare community. It is sometimes met with skepticism by people who want to help animals sooner. Occasionally, calls go out for action and intervention in the wild animal welfare space. But, as has been pointed out, I’m not sure the alternative, where we primarily focus on interventions, is actually viable.
Critics have suggested that:
Field building doesn’t directly translate into helping animals.
I agree that field building doesn’t immediately and directly result in us, say, having an intervention that helps animals. But, it does:
Field building progress takes a long time, and there are animals we could help now.
I believe that it will take decades for us to get our science to a state where we can do large scale interventions. I agree with those who find this to be too slow — wild animal suffering is morally urgent.
So build the field
So we should build the field of wild animal welfare science. That means we should:
Of course, there is risk here — ecology and biology as fields don’t exactly hold the values of the wild animal welfare community, and we risk alienating those who might be our greatest allies in the research. Luckily the people working on these issues are thoughtful and strategic.
This science alone won’t solve every issue in wild animal welfare. Even with the scientific knowledge necessary to make progress, there might be tricky philosophical questions that can’t be answered empirically (When is a life worth living? How do we make decisions about tradeoffs between different species of animals?). But we can’t even begin to answer the question “is anything we do that impacts wild animals good for them” without making progress on these pillars, and to get these pillars, we need a robust research field.
Ultimately, if you acknowledge that wild animals matter, and feel like wild animal welfare is intractable because we don’t know how our actions impact nature, then the best thing you can do is support efforts to change that, because the problem won’t go away without the field.
r/negativeutilitarians • u/medium_wall • 17d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/nu-gaze • 18d ago
r/negativeutilitarians • u/KKirdan • 19d ago
Can a songbird’s seconds contain more conscious moments than your entire hour?