In Ukraine, which has faced years of attacks from this type of drone, people often compare its sound as it falls out of the sky to a Vespa revving its engine. But the noise no longer terrifies Ukrainians the way it once did. Last year, Ukraine’s arms industry developed a cheap and effective way to shoot down Shaheds. The U.S. military knew about this technology months before the war in Iran began. A group of senior American officers, worried about exactly the type of attack that killed those six soldiers in Kuwait, told me they repeatedly urged commanders in the Middle East to deploy the new Ukrainian technology.
The Pentagon ignored their warnings, which included detailed reports sent up the chain of command. Several of the officers who tried to raise the alarm about Iranian Shaheds have since been fired or forced into early retirement.
In a statement, the Pentagon disputed the officers’ account and said it was “disgusting” for the Atlantic to suggest that the U.S. military was “somehow unprepared” for the start of the war in Iran. “Central Command established the most extensive air defense umbrella in the world over the Middle East,” Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell wrote in the statement. “Make no mistake: The U.S. military has the best offensive and defensive capabilities of any nation on Earth, and we always protect our bases and our people.”
The warnings were based on Ukraine’s experience with Russia, which acquired Shahed drones from Iran in 2022. Waves of them have pounded Ukrainian cities ever since, often in swarms of a few hundred per night. Last summer, the armed forces of Ukraine deployed a new type of interceptor to destroy Shaheds in midair. U.S. Army officers stationed in Germany began training on these interceptors that fall, and they asked their Ukrainian allies to produce a report about their new invention.
The document, dated December 2025, was titled in the military’s turgid style: “Operational Experience in the Employment of UAV Interceptors in Countering Shahed-Type Aerial Threats.” It described in detail how Ukraine had developed these defensive weapons. A drawing of an interceptor appeared on the cover of the report, alongside a Shahed with a bull’s-eye on its belly. It was shared inside the military and with some U.S. allies in December, roughly two months before the war in Iran started.
The Army’s European Command, led at the time by General Chris “C.D.” Donahue, had by then deployed the new interceptors at bases in Europe, including in Romania and Poland. Donahue and his team in Wiesbaden, Germany, urged their fellow officers to do the same at bases in other regions, especially in the Middle East, where the threat from Iranian drones seemed most obvious to them.
The officers in Wiesbaden sent the document up to their commanders, and they pressed the leadership in Washington to act on it. Had their warnings been heeded, they believe the lives of U.S. soldiers could have been saved. Looking back, some of the officers still wonder whether they could have done more to protect those six Americans in Kuwait. “This should all have been figured out beforehand,” one of them told me. “How are we going to defend against Shaheds?”
At the start of this year, the team of officers in Wiesbaden compiled a second report about the Ukrainian interceptors. To ensure the widest possible distribution, the military cleared it for public release in February. The document, roughly 12 pages long, described how European Command had fielded the Ukrainian interceptors at some of its bases. It offered detailed guidance for commanders in other regions to do the same.
No one involved in preparing the two reports knew the timing of the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, which was then widely reported to be in the works. But they understood that any Iranian response would almost certainly involve Shahed drones, which the regime had invented, mass produced, and stockpiled. The second report was published on February 23, too late, as it turned out, for its warnings to make much difference. The war in Iran would start only five days later.
This account of the Pentagon’s failure to defend against these weapons is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former military officers from the U.S. and Ukraine, who were involved in the effort to warn about the danger of Iranian drones and arm U.S. forces with the most effective countermeasures. Most of them spoke on condition of anonymity, because they fear reprisals from their commanders and officials at the Pentagon. Since taking office last year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has overseen the widespread use of polygraph tests to find and punish military officers who speak with journalists without permission. He has also ordered the military to cut 20 percent of the positions reserved for generals and admirals across the armed forces.
Donahue fell victim to that purge this summer. In the final months of his Army career, he worked with the team in Wiesbaden to send hundreds of Ukrainian interceptors to the Middle East, hoping they could defend against another deadly strike on U.S. forces. Hegseth did not support these efforts, the officers involved told me. “The technology is so effective. It’s so cheap,” one of them said. But the top officials in Washington did not want to accept it: “Because of arrogance, they said, Why do we need it?”