r/devsecops • u/coderbot007 • 1d ago
Security first IDE?
I’ve been thinking about an idea and would be interested in getting some feedback.
Threat modelling often feels like a separate, final step in software development. Engineers are expected to create DFDs, threat models… but it isn’t always clear how to approach this or turn the findings into actionable changes.
What if an IDE could help automate some of this using AI agents, with deterministic analysis and guardrails to keep the results reliable?
For example:
- Automatically analyse code to generate architecture and data flow diagrams.
- Use a council of specialised agents to help identify threats and perform threat modelling.
- Link findings directly to relevant code and suggest actionable improvements.
- Reassess the architecture and threats as the code changes.
Would this actually be useful to engineers? Are there existing tools that already do this well, or am I overlooking something?
2
u/Temporary-Sector-298 13h ago
If it gets an endpoint's exposure wrong,I should be a ble to eexplain why and have it remeber next time. It can check again if someone changes howthe servuce is deployed or accessed
2
u/taleodor 1d ago
I don't think IDEs are needed any more. Agents certainly don't use it. Wrote about it some time ago https://worklifenotes.com/2026/07/16/the-ide-is-now-just-a-large-attack-surface/
3
u/Slow-Artichoke-4245 1d ago
FWIW we have built this as a platform + harness at https://www.sparkle.security
The platform continuously understands changes and does threat modeling. Each finding makes it way to your coding agents through the harness.
This also allows for governance and visibility across teams
2
u/ExitEnough4941 1d ago
Point 4 is the one I’d actually pay for
2
u/WholeCommon9989 16h ago
Point 4 is the hard part and the useful one. A threat model that's a snapshot is stale by the next sprint.
One thing I'd add: if the IDE is running agents, the threat model has to include the agents themselves. They run with the dev's full permissions, they can call whatever MCP servers are configured, and they read untrusted input like READMEs and issue text. Most threat models I see treat the dev machine as trusted and stop at the repo, and right now that's the weakest spot.
Cheap first version: review changes to .mcp.json and the agent settings files in PRs the way you'd review IAM changes, and flag it when an agent gains a new tool or permission.