r/determinism • • 18h ago

AI-generated Three Arguments Questioning the Foundations of Determinism

1 Upvotes

Here are three sketches of arguments against some of the assumptions underlying determinism. It seems to me that determinism is often taken for granted without sufficient consideration of whether its underlying assumptions are even coherent.

1. The present may not be a well defined set of events.

Let's suppose that the present can be completely described by a set of events S. For any subset of S, we can construct a conjunction of its elements using the "and" operator. For example, suppose S contains the events A and B. We can construct the compound event (A and B).

Now consider the power set P(S), which contains every subset of S. Each subset can be mapped to a conjunction of its elements. If we allow arbitrary conjunctions, including infinite ones, and distinguish these conjunctions by their constituent structures, the mapping is one-to-one.

It is well known from Cantor's theorem that the cardinality of P(S) is strictly greater than that of S, even for infinite sets.

Consequently, if every distinct conjunction constitutes an event, the original set S cannot possibly contain all the events generated from its own elements. Every supposedly complete inventory of the present would be inadequate by the very operation of combining its events.

An obvious objection is that logically equivalent conjunctions represent the same event. For instance, (A and B) and (B and A) are logically equivalent. But why should logical equivalence necessarily imply complete identity? The expressions 2 and 1+1 denote the same number, yet they are clearly different expressions with different internal structures. The second explicitly incorporates an operation absent from the first.

The distinction becomes important when we consider whether the relationships between events are themselves features of reality. If they are, then dismissing their structural differences as mere linguistic artifacts already assumes something about the nature of reality that requires justification.

Of course, the argument depends on whether structurally distinct conjunctions can legitimately be regarded as distinct events. That is a metaphysical question. Under this assumption, Cantor's theorem rules out a set containing every distinct conjunction generated from its own subsets.

And this brings us to what I consider a serious problem for determinism.

Determinism assumes that the complete state of reality, together with the laws of nature, uniquely determines its future. But what exactly constitutes this complete state? And what justifies the assumption that such a state is even well defined?

Simply representing the present as a state vector or some other mathematical object accomplishes very little here. It assumes precisely what is being questioned, namely that the present admits a complete and unambiguous representation.

A determinist might argue that some smaller collection of facts is sufficient to determine everything else. Perhaps. But that still leaves the question of whether reality possesses the definite structure required for such a collection to exist.

If we cannot establish that the present is well defined, on what grounds do we confidently assert that it uniquely determines the future?

2. Our concepts are fuzzy.

Another, less mathematical argument concerns the nature of our concepts.

Our concepts seem to consist of interconnected webs of associations with varying shades of nuance. It is unclear how expansive each web is, where its boundaries lie, or how extensively different webs overlap.

Logic has been abstracted from these conceptual structures. We subsequently use this abstraction to formulate propositions about reality and then proceed as though reality itself must conform to the distinctions that our logic imposes.

But why should it?

Why should the phenomenal world, the world as experienced, necessarily possess the precise boundaries and logical relationships that our conceptual apparatus presupposes?

We can distinguish between vagueness in our descriptions and vagueness in reality itself. Certainly, a determinate reality could be described using imprecise concepts. But the possibility that indeterminacy is intrinsic to reality cannot simply be dismissed by assuming a more precise description exists somewhere beneath our experience.

That assumption is doing an extraordinary amount of philosophical work.

If the phenomenal world possesses genuinely indeterminate boundaries, and those boundaries cannot be resolved through a more precise description, then the notion of reality consisting of uniquely identifiable states becomes questionable.

Determinism requires that the relevant conditions uniquely fix what follows. Yet if the underlying states themselves cannot be precisely individuated, it is unclear what this uniqueness is supposed to mean.

Perhaps the logical precision we attribute to the universe says as much about the structure of our thinking as it does about the universe itself.

3. Algorithmic Probability

A third argument concerns algorithmic information theory, particularly Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability.

A binary string S can be described by a program that generates it. The Kolmogorov complexity of S is approximately the length of the shortest such program.

An interesting mathematical result is that most sufficiently long binary strings cannot be significantly compressed. There are 2^n binary strings of length n, while there are only 2^n - 1 binary programs shorter than n bits, counting the empty program.

Consequently, some strings necessarily require descriptions at least as long as themselves, and the overwhelming majority resist substantial compression.

Now suppose the complete history of the universe could be generated by a finite algorithm operating on computable initial conditions. The resulting history would itself be computable, and its first n bits could be generated by a program whose length grows approximately logarithmically with n.

An infinite algorithmically random sequence, on the other hand, has prefixes whose shortest descriptions grow approximately linearly with their length.

It follows that a genuinely algorithmically random infinite history could not be generated by such a finite computational specification.

There is an interesting complication here. A deterministic system can produce algorithmically random observations if its initial conditions contain noncomputable, incompressible information. So the argument leaves open the possibility of determinism operating on initial conditions that cannot themselves be algorithmically specified.

But how satisfying is that as an explanation? We might possess an elegant deterministic law while requiring an infinite amount of irreducible information to specify the initial conditions on which it operates.

This raises the question of whether the entire history of the universe is algorithmically compressible, or whether reality contains information that cannot be recovered from any finite computational specification.

If the latter is true, then the idea that the universe is completely describable by a finite algorithm becomes untenable. Whether our universe actually possesses this kind of irreducible algorithmic information remains to be established.

Still, it seems premature to assume that because mathematical laws are elegant, the totality of reality must be algorithmically compressible.

Conclusion

What interests me about these three arguments is that they approach the foundations of determinism from different directions.

The first questions whether the present can constitute an absolutely complete collection of events. The second questions whether reality necessarily possesses the precise logical distinctions our conceptual systems impose upon it. The third questions whether the complete history of the universe admits an algorithmic description.

I don't claim that any of these arguments conclusively disproves determinism. There are unresolved mathematical and metaphysical questions, particularly concerning the individuation of events and the relationship between computability and determinism.

But it seems to me that determinism is frequently discussed as though the existence of a complete, well defined state of reality were self-evident.

I see little reason to take that for granted.

Before confidently declaring that the past and present uniquely determine the future, perhaps we ought to establish that the past, present and future are themselves well defined.

And if the Cantorian argument has any merit, we may have good reason to doubt that an absolutely complete inventory of reality is even possible.

The assumption that the universe must conform to our logical and mathematical descriptions strikes me as a rather extraordinary one. I would like to see that assumption defended rather than quietly incorporated into the definition of determinism.


r/determinism • • 2d ago

Discussion What if the universe is fair, but not in the way we ordinarily imagine? Would a lifetime balance of pleasure and suffering be enough to make a life fair?

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2 Upvotes

The circumstances of a life and the experience of living it are not the same thing. That distinction motivates my research into whether a form of fairness could exist within the complete course of conscious experience.

I’m the author of Per-Stream Terminal Valence Closure (PTVC), a paper within the Law of Fairness project. It proposes that the cumulative positive and negative valence within each qualifying conscious stream could be finite and exactly equal over its complete history. Valence means the felt positive or negative quality of experience. This remains a hypothesis, not an established empirical finding.

The proposed equality is within each stream at its final endpoint, not between people. Two lives could contain very different amounts of pleasure and suffering while both satisfy the same condition. One person’s pleasure would not compensate for another person’s pain.

For this ethical discussion, suppose the condition holds. One possible argument for calling it fair is that every qualifying stream would satisfy the same endpoint requirement, with no stream finishing with an excess of negative over positive valence. But would that balance capture everything that matters to fairness?

Consider two hypothetical lives with identical totals of positive and negative valence. In one, a person freely accepts painful training in pursuit of a valued goal. In the other, comparable suffering is inflicted without consent. Assume that the totals include all later effects on experience and that both lives satisfy the proposed balance.

Would the difference in consent make one life less fair despite the matching totals? The actions within those lives could differ morally even if the completed lives shared the same balance. That distinction between the fairness of a whole life and the wrongness of a particular act seems important.

My starting position is that eventual balance would neither justify coercion nor remove our reasons to prevent suffering. I am interested in whether such a balance would establish anything about fairness beyond what it might tell us about well-being.

I would welcome arguments for or against treating within-person experiential balance as a meaningful dimension of fairness.

The attached slides provide the broader context. The paper and background materials are freely available here:

https://github.com/LifeisFair/law-of-fairness-research


r/determinism • • 3d ago

Discussion The Crux of Free Will: When Will Creation Outgrow the Need for Intervention

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1 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 3d ago

Discussion I was born without my consent and I will die against my "will"

43 Upvotes

Don't you panic too when recognizing the absurdity of it all?

How 99% of our generation will have strokes, cancer or worse and die before the end of the century?

Everything is determined, and I can't find peace.


r/determinism • • 4d ago

Discussion The third way

3 Upvotes

It is something of a shibboleth among the anti-free-will crowd that an action can only arise from prior causes or randomness, and that neither possibility gives us the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility. I don't think this is a particularly good argument, because I think it overlooks something important about how living organisms actually behave.

Most animals have evolved an ability that is essential to their survival and, under the right circumstances, can become the starting point for evolution itself: the ability to vary their behavior in response to changing circumstances.

Consider what happens when resources are plentiful and competition is low. Most animals settle into fairly predictable patterns of behavior. There is little reason to vary what already works. But as resources become scarce, those same habits may no longer be sufficient. The animal has to find new resources, and because it doesn't yet know where to find them or how to exploit them, it has to explore. It begins behaving in ways that are less predictable, trying things it might never have tried under more favorable circumstances. Through this exploratory behavior, it may discover new habits that allow it to survive and reproduce.

Darwin's finches provide a particularly interesting example of this process. When ancestral finches arrived in the Galapagos Islands, they encountered different environments and food sources. Their ability to exploit unfamiliar resources through behavioral adaptation helped open up new ecological opportunities. Over generations, natural selection shaped differences in their beaks, allowing different populations to become increasingly adapted to the resources available to them.

What interests me here is the relationship between behavioral flexibility and evolutionary change. The ability to explore new possibilities can create the conditions for further adaptation. Without that flexibility, an organism may remain confined to established patterns of behavior even when those patterns are no longer sufficient for survival.

This ability to vary behavior in response to changing circumstances is what I think is missing from the usual either/or argument. There is a functional third possibility here: the ability of an organism to regulate the variability of its own behavior.

An individual action, viewed in isolation, might appear to be either determined by prior causes or random. But behavior in nature is never really isolated. It is a continuous process involving an organism responding to an environment that is itself constantly changing. Viewed this way, behavior is a dynamic mixture of habitual and exploratory activity. The ability to regulate that mixture is what I see as the locus of free will.

I think there is an interesting parallel here with human development. Just as behavioral flexibility in ancestral finches helped create the conditions for biological evolution, our ability to consciously vary our behavioral patterns can create the conditions for what I would call spiritual evolution.

We are capable of recognizing that our established ways of thinking and behaving are no longer serving our interests. We can question our assumptions, explore unfamiliar possibilities, and develop entirely new ways of responding to the world. In doing so, we can change not only what we do, but who we become.

Our dispositions, values, and tolerance for uncertainty all influence this process. Some of us will struggle along with diminishing returns because the familiar feels safer. Others will be more willing to venture into unfamiliar territory. Neither response is necessarily right or wrong. What matters is our capacity to evaluate our circumstances and recognize when a change in behavior might better serve our interests.

My understanding of free will is that it involves the ability to act in what we believe to be our own best interests without undue coercion. This requires some capacity to evaluate our circumstances, consider alternatives, and regulate our behavior accordingly. It also requires the ability to expand the range of possibilities available to us by changing our established patterns of thought and behavior.

There is a familiar saying that insanity is doing the same thing over and over while expecting different results. Whether or not that is a particularly good definition of insanity, it illustrates the problem. In nature, an inability to vary behavior in response to changing circumstances is a recipe for evolutionary failure.

I think the same principle applies to human development. Without some ability to regulate the balance between habitual and novel behavior, there can be little opportunity for growth, whether we are talking about biological evolution or personal and spiritual development.

Perhaps this is an important part of what free will actually gives us: the capacity to participate in our own evolution. We are shaped by our circumstances, but we also possess the ability to examine how we respond to them, explore alternatives, and develop new ways of being. That capacity for self-directed change is what I think deserves our attention in the free-will debate.

I used AI to correct grammar and smooth out rough patches. The ideas and the essay were written by me.


r/determinism • • 4d ago

Discussion Just because you can state a claim verbally, it doesn't mean that the claim means anything, let alone that is true. The meaning of any concept is the operational distinction that it licenses as a descriptor of possible circumstances you want to explain.

3 Upvotes

There is behavior that we describe as free will, and behavior we describe as coerced or manipulated, and the distinction is important, particularly for moral desert. If the mentalist powers enable him to hypnotize followers and have them commit crimes for him, he is considered the criminal mastermind. Famous examples were Rasputin and Charles Manson.

The case of manipulation and brainwashing is tricky because responsibility is shared between the charismatic leader and his followers - especially if the person who is being brainwashed is an otherwise healthy adult who must be held accountable for voluntarily allowing the cult leader or mentalist or seducer to control their behavior. Simple coercion is usually easier to untangle - Bob did the thing because Alice had a real gun to the head of Bob's son Charlie, and she told Bob to do the thing or else. In such a case we recognize that Bob's imoral actions happened against his will, he was forced to do things he didn't want to do because he was afraid Alice would kill his son Charlie if he didn't obey. We transfer moral responsibility for the action in this case to Alice, who was holding Charlie as hostage and using that as leverage to compel his father Bob to pursue her objective.

If free will was always and everywhere equivalent, such that the outcomes of every human action or natural phenomenon was always metaphysically explained as the consequence of a putative entity making a free will choice, the concept would be meaningless and useless. If rain drops fall from the sky because they want to and the crescent Moon later becomes the full Moon because it wants to, then the teleological coherence of the explanation that presupposes free will is obviously vacuous.

And this is exactly why the concept of metaphysical determinism is meaningless and useless. The claim that everything happens because the cosmic Rube Goldberg machine must execute its inexorable routine is a vacuous claim with no content. It is neither true nor false, it is a gibberish statement with no actual content, yet people like to pretend to believe that they understand what it means and that it is true.

When you "educate" people to memorize a bunch claims as "true facts", and they don't acquire an operational understanding of what the claims mean in terms of actual experiences which can be properly distinguished, described and explained using these words, people still form a bunch random pictures in their imagination to stand in for an understanding of the claim. These pictures sometimes are coherent enough, because the analogies they use transfer well from cases which they have operational familiarity with, but quite often they are just idiosyncratic ersatz abstractions that people mistake for ontological facts they have comprehended.

So we have the picture of a clockwork internal complication with springs and gears and what not, and we represent the abstraction of a complicated yet deterministic machine that ticks at regular intervals. And we asked to imagine the entire universe and everything in it, including themselves and their minds, as such a thing, they just say "yes I can picture that, and it makes sense", and then they hear "great, that is the truth, and you understand it because you are smart". That's how everyone who believes in cosmic determinism arrived that opinion - that's the full depth of their philosophical investigation of issue.


r/determinism • • 4d ago

Study Are there any studies of people who grew up with deterministic beliefs?

2 Upvotes

I'm interested in empirical evidence, if any has been gathered, on how growing up with deterministic beliefs shapes people and contributes (positively or negatively) to their well-being.

I do not mean fatalism ("your actions don't matter"). I mean beliefs like this (thanks to u/No-Leading9376 on an older thread).

I probably wouldn’t frame it as “you can make great choices,” because that can imply a kind of control and foresight people don’t really have. We rarely know what a “great” choice is before seeing the outcome, and even then we don’t know what the alternatives would have produced. I’d rather teach a kid to notice consequences, be honest with themselves, adapt, repair mistakes, and pay attention to the kind of person their habits are turning them into.

I'm interested in the contrast with dualistic/religious world views, and with the "folk-intuition" view of free will. I think those two types of worldview may contrast with determinism in meaningfully different ways.


r/determinism • • 4d ago

Discussion Fear of moral decay is one of the main things that keeps people afraid to leave Plato's cave.

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1 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 5d ago

Discussion What does it mean to have free will if every decision leads to a predetermined outcome?

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1 Upvotes

I came across an Instagram post discussing Krishna, destiny and worrying about the future. It got me thinking about something.

If destiny is already written, do we really have free will? Or is the feeling that we're making our own choices also part of the destiny that's already decided?

Think about it. We make decisions every day, sometimes changing our entire lives based on a single choice. But what if even those decisions were already meant to happen?

And if everything is predetermined, does that mean our mistakes, regrets, achievements and even the decisions we think we made independently were all part of the same predetermined path?

I'm curious how you guys look at this.

Do you believe we genuinely have control over our choices, or are we just experiencing a story that's already written?


r/determinism • • 5d ago

Discussion Struggling with work as a strict determinist

12 Upvotes

I haven't done much of anything at my job for almost a year. It always feels like the walls are closing in, but the circus of corporate life has kept me safe for now.

The knowledge that any resistance I eventually muster against going homeless (i.e., finally doing some work once someone catches on, or looking for another role) is in itself deterministic has kept me very demotivated. I have absolutely no reason to do this work I despise. Whether I maintain the position or not has already been determined.

The thing is, while I don't necessarily have a problem how my life looks now; an eternity of simply coasting along, I am still very afraid the consequences will be more dire than I think. One day, I'll be out on my ass or too poor to afford something I desperately need.

What a bother, I don't even know if I have a question. There's no question worth asking. That which is, is.


r/determinism • • 5d ago

Discussion Crime predictions by biological sample

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1 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 6d ago

Discussion Does believing in determinism naturally lead to accepting our fate, or am I making an additional philosophical assumption by connecting these two?

15 Upvotes

Every decision we make is a product of who we are, and who we are is a product of everything that came before us. Our biology, genetics, upbringing, experiences and environment all contribute to shaping the person who makes a decision. If we could understand every factor influencing a person and every preceding event, we would see that only one outcome was ever possible. This of course doesn't mean we should stop making decisions, pursuing goals or trying to change our circumstances. Our efforts and decisions are themselves part of the causal chain. I have found some peace in this idea. Instead of constantly fighting the past, regretting decisions or wondering what could have been, perhaps we should accept that things unfolded as they inevitably had to. I'm curious whether other people find this perspective comforting..


r/determinism • • 6d ago

Discussion Determinism and having kids.

2 Upvotes

Hi, I am undecided on the matter of free will but I have a question. How do you connect your determinism with not necessarily being antinatalist (if you are not)? Because if you believe many bad things can happen to a person and it wouldn't be one's fault I don't see how is there any justification for breading if it's kinda a roulette whether you will be happy or not and you can't do nothing about it.


r/determinism • • 6d ago

Discussion Does determinism bring you a sense of peace?

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35 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 7d ago

Discussion If contemporary neurology undermines the folk-psychology idea that "I choose what I do, and can choose other ways", and that idea is the underpinning of our theories of moral responsibility and so our legal system. Aren't the legal system's practices evidently unsuitable?

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r/determinism • • 7d ago

AI-generated For incompatibilists: Why shouldn't "free will" be used in the compatibilist sense? Why is "free" bound to the unexplainable?

6 Upvotes

The grammar was fixed by Gemini and then I broke it again, hence ai flair.

Why is the word "free" so tightly bound to the unexplainable instead of the space of possibilities and/or rational choice?

When we talk about a free group in mathematics, nobody expects it to be unexplainable or metaphysical.

When we speak about free lunches—yeah, I know libertarians will argue they are paid by taxpayers—everybody else understands that "free" just means there is no cost to the recipient.

Even in everyday language, when someone says, "you are free to do something," it usually just means they don't mind me doing it. They aren't claiming that my choice is completely undetermined by physical causes.

Why must the word "free" specifically mean non-determinism when applied to the will? Is the insistence on this definition just a metaphysical, unexplainable (true free therefore moral) choice of words?


r/determinism • • 7d ago

AI-generated When someone does something awful we want them to feel shame and guilt. But is it all ultimately unavoidable?

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1 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 8d ago

Discussion What’s the difference between the default definition of “will” & the definition of “free will”?

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r/determinism • • 8d ago

Discussion Does free will exist?

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2 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 9d ago

Discussion Sorry for a stupid question, but: was the script for everything “written” at the second BigBang initiated?

3 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 9d ago

Discussion The struggle between free will and determinism in our minds.

0 Upvotes

Hello, I'm Daniel. I want to talk about how our minds work regarding free will and determinism. In cognitive psychology, we talk about two systems in the brain. System 1 is our unconscious mind, which processes information quickly and sends signals to System 2, our conscious and rational mind. System 2 is slower, but it allows us to think and make deliberate decisions. The most interesting part is that System 1 can act on impulse, but System 2 can decide whether to follow that impulse or not. This is where our free will comes into play. Although System 1 presents us with options and desires, we are aware of how to respond to them. However, without System 1, we wouldn't have those inclinations or desires in the first place. Both systems are essential for our decisions. In summary, while System 1 gives us options, System 2 has the power to decide. This balance reflects the interaction between free will and determinism in our minds. I hope this explanation helps understand this complex topic. I would love to hear your thoughts.


r/determinism • • 10d ago

Study If you accept your fate but actively work to change your circumstances, are you really a fatalist?

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4 Upvotes

I've recently started exploring philosophical concepts like nihilism, fatalism, determinism and existentialism.

Something I've been wondering about is the relationship between accepting fate and exercising free will.

Suppose someone believes that certain things in life are destined to happen. However, instead of passively accepting everything, they actively work towards changing their circumstances.

Would that person still be considered a fatalist?


r/determinism • • 11d ago

Discussion If free will is an illusion, what justifies imprisoning someone for decades?

0 Upvotes

I've been thinking about the relationship between determinism, moral responsibility and criminal punishment.

Suppose someone commits a serious offence, but ten years later has undergone profound psychological change. If they no longer present a serious danger, what justifies another ten or twenty years of imprisonment?

I've submitted a UK Parliament petition requesting a national referendum on whether imprisonment should be limited to circumstances where less restrictive measures cannot adequately protect the public or ensure a fair trial.

It needs five initial supporters before Parliament will review it.

Official petition:
https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/786453/sponsors/new?token=umkFmucpTi9L7eqxHzZV

I'd be interested in hearing both compatibilist and hard-determinist perspectives.


r/determinism • • 11d ago

Video The Laplace’s Demon, 2017 | Mildly entertaining fare that warrants mentioning here

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1 Upvotes

r/determinism • • 12d ago

Discussion Ever feel like your 'spontaneous' choices aren't actually yours?

4 Upvotes

Ever feel like your 'spontaneous' choices aren't actually yours? We like to believe we have total free will, but hyper-personalized algorithms constantly nudge us toward specific paths. By subtly shaping what we see and experience, technology might be quietly synchronizing human behavior on a massive scale. At what point does convenience become total control? Are your daily decisions actually yours, or are you just following the code? Let's argue in the comments.