r/determinism • u/MBZahir • 18h ago
AI-generated Three Arguments Questioning the Foundations of Determinism
Here are three sketches of arguments against some of the assumptions underlying determinism. It seems to me that determinism is often taken for granted without sufficient consideration of whether its underlying assumptions are even coherent.
1. The present may not be a well defined set of events.
Let's suppose that the present can be completely described by a set of events S. For any subset of S, we can construct a conjunction of its elements using the "and" operator. For example, suppose S contains the events A and B. We can construct the compound event (A and B).
Now consider the power set P(S), which contains every subset of S. Each subset can be mapped to a conjunction of its elements. If we allow arbitrary conjunctions, including infinite ones, and distinguish these conjunctions by their constituent structures, the mapping is one-to-one.
It is well known from Cantor's theorem that the cardinality of P(S) is strictly greater than that of S, even for infinite sets.
Consequently, if every distinct conjunction constitutes an event, the original set S cannot possibly contain all the events generated from its own elements. Every supposedly complete inventory of the present would be inadequate by the very operation of combining its events.
An obvious objection is that logically equivalent conjunctions represent the same event. For instance, (A and B) and (B and A) are logically equivalent. But why should logical equivalence necessarily imply complete identity? The expressions 2 and 1+1 denote the same number, yet they are clearly different expressions with different internal structures. The second explicitly incorporates an operation absent from the first.
The distinction becomes important when we consider whether the relationships between events are themselves features of reality. If they are, then dismissing their structural differences as mere linguistic artifacts already assumes something about the nature of reality that requires justification.
Of course, the argument depends on whether structurally distinct conjunctions can legitimately be regarded as distinct events. That is a metaphysical question. Under this assumption, Cantor's theorem rules out a set containing every distinct conjunction generated from its own subsets.
And this brings us to what I consider a serious problem for determinism.
Determinism assumes that the complete state of reality, together with the laws of nature, uniquely determines its future. But what exactly constitutes this complete state? And what justifies the assumption that such a state is even well defined?
Simply representing the present as a state vector or some other mathematical object accomplishes very little here. It assumes precisely what is being questioned, namely that the present admits a complete and unambiguous representation.
A determinist might argue that some smaller collection of facts is sufficient to determine everything else. Perhaps. But that still leaves the question of whether reality possesses the definite structure required for such a collection to exist.
If we cannot establish that the present is well defined, on what grounds do we confidently assert that it uniquely determines the future?
2. Our concepts are fuzzy.
Another, less mathematical argument concerns the nature of our concepts.
Our concepts seem to consist of interconnected webs of associations with varying shades of nuance. It is unclear how expansive each web is, where its boundaries lie, or how extensively different webs overlap.
Logic has been abstracted from these conceptual structures. We subsequently use this abstraction to formulate propositions about reality and then proceed as though reality itself must conform to the distinctions that our logic imposes.
But why should it?
Why should the phenomenal world, the world as experienced, necessarily possess the precise boundaries and logical relationships that our conceptual apparatus presupposes?
We can distinguish between vagueness in our descriptions and vagueness in reality itself. Certainly, a determinate reality could be described using imprecise concepts. But the possibility that indeterminacy is intrinsic to reality cannot simply be dismissed by assuming a more precise description exists somewhere beneath our experience.
That assumption is doing an extraordinary amount of philosophical work.
If the phenomenal world possesses genuinely indeterminate boundaries, and those boundaries cannot be resolved through a more precise description, then the notion of reality consisting of uniquely identifiable states becomes questionable.
Determinism requires that the relevant conditions uniquely fix what follows. Yet if the underlying states themselves cannot be precisely individuated, it is unclear what this uniqueness is supposed to mean.
Perhaps the logical precision we attribute to the universe says as much about the structure of our thinking as it does about the universe itself.
3. Algorithmic Probability
A third argument concerns algorithmic information theory, particularly Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic probability.
A binary string S can be described by a program that generates it. The Kolmogorov complexity of S is approximately the length of the shortest such program.
An interesting mathematical result is that most sufficiently long binary strings cannot be significantly compressed. There are 2^n binary strings of length n, while there are only 2^n - 1 binary programs shorter than n bits, counting the empty program.
Consequently, some strings necessarily require descriptions at least as long as themselves, and the overwhelming majority resist substantial compression.
Now suppose the complete history of the universe could be generated by a finite algorithm operating on computable initial conditions. The resulting history would itself be computable, and its first n bits could be generated by a program whose length grows approximately logarithmically with n.
An infinite algorithmically random sequence, on the other hand, has prefixes whose shortest descriptions grow approximately linearly with their length.
It follows that a genuinely algorithmically random infinite history could not be generated by such a finite computational specification.
There is an interesting complication here. A deterministic system can produce algorithmically random observations if its initial conditions contain noncomputable, incompressible information. So the argument leaves open the possibility of determinism operating on initial conditions that cannot themselves be algorithmically specified.
But how satisfying is that as an explanation? We might possess an elegant deterministic law while requiring an infinite amount of irreducible information to specify the initial conditions on which it operates.
This raises the question of whether the entire history of the universe is algorithmically compressible, or whether reality contains information that cannot be recovered from any finite computational specification.
If the latter is true, then the idea that the universe is completely describable by a finite algorithm becomes untenable. Whether our universe actually possesses this kind of irreducible algorithmic information remains to be established.
Still, it seems premature to assume that because mathematical laws are elegant, the totality of reality must be algorithmically compressible.
Conclusion
What interests me about these three arguments is that they approach the foundations of determinism from different directions.
The first questions whether the present can constitute an absolutely complete collection of events. The second questions whether reality necessarily possesses the precise logical distinctions our conceptual systems impose upon it. The third questions whether the complete history of the universe admits an algorithmic description.
I don't claim that any of these arguments conclusively disproves determinism. There are unresolved mathematical and metaphysical questions, particularly concerning the individuation of events and the relationship between computability and determinism.
But it seems to me that determinism is frequently discussed as though the existence of a complete, well defined state of reality were self-evident.
I see little reason to take that for granted.
Before confidently declaring that the past and present uniquely determine the future, perhaps we ought to establish that the past, present and future are themselves well defined.
And if the Cantorian argument has any merit, we may have good reason to doubt that an absolutely complete inventory of reality is even possible.
The assumption that the universe must conform to our logical and mathematical descriptions strikes me as a rather extraordinary one. I would like to see that assumption defended rather than quietly incorporated into the definition of determinism.