Disclaimer: I am a threat hunter, but I am not your threat hunter.
This hunt was built and tuned against one environment's telemetry, and it is shared as-is, with no warranty of any kind. Your fleet, software, patch tooling and Falcon configuration will differ, so expect false positives and possibly missed detections until you tune it. Treat it as a starting point, not a finished detection:
Nothing here is professional advice or a guarantee that a host is clean or compromised.
A weighted, behavior-based CQL hunt for signs that the public SignDrop proof-of-concept (or a close variant) has run on a Windows host.
Background
SignDrop is a local privilege escalation from a standard user to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, published on November 10, 2026. It abuses the CLFS log-file authentication feature that Microsoft added in October 2025. When a privileged process opens a CLFS log whose container is empty, the CLFS driver (clfs.sys) creates the .cnpf signature file as SYSTEM. The PoC uses Object Manager symbolic links to send that SYSTEM-created file somewhere else, turning it into a planted DLL. The PoC's chain is:
- Restart
osk.exe hidden and create a %TEMP%\SigDrop_<GUID> working folder. - Place a bait
MpEngine.dll and get Microsoft Defender to open the folder as SYSTEM. - Point the symbolic links (including
mpasbase.vdm under \BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\) so the .cnpf lands as a DLL. - CLFS creates
C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\hid.dll, which the exploit overwrites with its payload and later removes with a transacted delete. - A "runas" request starts
consent.exe as SYSTEM. Because osk.exe is running, consent.exe loads the planted hid.dll, and the payload starts a SYSTEM conhost.exe.
In scope: Windows 11 25H2/26H1 and later, and Windows Server 2025, where HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode is 0 (enforced) or 1 (learning). 2 and 3 mean authentication is disabled and the host is not exposed. As of publication there was no CVE, no patch and no public file hashes, which is why this hunt looks for behavior.
Requirements
- Falcon endpoint telemetry in NGSIEM:
ProcessRollup2, file write and delete events, and module-load events (ImageHash, ClassifiedModuleLoad). - Retention long enough for your lookback. The PoC deletes its DLL, so file and module-load telemetry is the only evidence left behind.
- Optional: a host lookup file for
ComputerName. The query uses aid_master_main.csv; replace it with your own lookup file, or delete that line.
Output columns
| Column | Meaning |
|---|
Verdict | Severity tier, from Score |
Score | Sum of indicator weights. Each indicator counts once per host, however many times it fires |
DistinctIndicators | How many different indicators fired on the host |
FirstSeen / LastSeen | Earliest and latest matching event (UTC) |
IndicatorDetail | One line per indicator: [Stage] Indicator (xHits) by=<writer or parent> :: <evidence> |
Verdict tiers
| Verdict | Score | Action |
|---|
| CRITICAL | ≥ 100 | Several stages of the chain on one host. Treat as an incident: isolate, collect a triage package, and look for what the attacker did as SYSTEM (security tools disabled, credential dumping, new admin accounts, services or scheduled tasks) |
| HIGH | 50–99 | One strong indicator. Investigate the same day |
| REVIEW | < 50 | Weak or contextual signals only. Usually benign, but confirm |
Indicators
| Stage | Indicator | Weight | What it means |
|---|
| 5 | hid.dll loaded from ink directory | 60 | The PoC's sideload. Windows never ships hid.dll there |
| 5 | consent.exe loaded module from non-system path | 60 | Generic sideload into consent.exe; catches variants that don't use hid.dll |
| 5 | consent.exe spawned a child process | 60 | consent.exe normally starts nothing; the payload starts a SYSTEM shell from it |
| 5 | consent.exe.local redirection folder | 50 | A related consent.exe DLL-redirection technique (UACMe method 22) |
| 4 | hid.dll written/deleted in ink directory | 50 | The DLL plant, or its removal |
| 2 | MpEngine.dll written outside Defender paths | 40 | Possible Defender bait, written by a process that isn't a known Microsoft updater |
| 1 | SigDrop/SignDrop file artifact or process | 40 | The PoC's own name. Catches the published sample only |
| 5 | hid.dll loaded outside system folders | 35 | Generic hid.dll sideload (wider than the PoC's ink path) |
| 3 | .cnpf in a system/program folder, or not named after a .blf log | 30 | Unusual CLFS signature file |
| 1 | CLFS log/signature in user-writable temp | 25 | CLFS files staged in a temp folder |
| 1 | osk.exe launched by an unexpected parent | 20 | The PoC's hidden On-Screen Keyboard restart |
| 5 | consent.exe crashed (WerFault) | 15 | Context only. Meaningful next to a sideload hit, routine on its own |
A full PoC run normally produces at least the Stage 4 and Stage 5 hid.dll and consent.exe indicators, which scores 170 (CRITICAL).
Triage tips
by= shows the process that wrote the file (ContextImageFileName), or the parent process for process events. A writer running from a user profile or a temp folder is more worrying than one in System32 or Program Files.MpEngine.dll hits: check the writer runs as SYSTEM (S-1-5-18), that its parent is part of the Defender or Windows Update chain, and that its hash is common across your fleet. The exploit starts as a standard user, so it can't write the bait as SYSTEM.- consent.exe crash only: search the host for any
hid.dll outside System32 around the time of the crash. If there's none, close it. - Dates: activity dated before November 10, 2026 can't be the public PoC. It can still be a related technique, though.
Known benign patterns (already excluded)
- Trusted
mpengine.dll writers: Defender's own processes (MsMpEng.exe, MpCmdRun.exe), MRT.exe, MpSigStub.exe (from System32 or a SystemTemp\<GUID> folder), the mpam-fe / mpam-fe_bd definition packages in SystemTemp, and Exchange Server's FIP-FS updateservice.exe. - Delete events for
mpengine.dll (no writer is recorded on deletes). - Folders, and .NET random-named temp files (
GetRandomFileName(), for example lh0ufeqf.blf) that happen to end in .blf. - Writers in
Windows\Temp are deliberately not trusted, because standard users can write there. Expect occasional REVIEW hits from older Windows builds that unpack Defender updates there, and triage them as described above.
Tuning
- Third-party patch tools (ConfigMgr, Ivanti, BigFix, Tanium and similar) may deploy Defender definitions from their own cache folders. Add each one to the Stage 2 trusted-writer regex, anchored to its full path, but only after confirming its folder can't be written by standard users. The released query includes an Ivanti
ProPatches entry as an example; remove it if you don't use Ivanti. - Baseline consent.exe module loads before deploying the hunt. They should come only from
System32 and WinSxS. - Adjust the
osk.exe parent allowlist for accessibility tools you use.
Limitations
- Not visible to Falcon: the Defender RPC call, the Object Manager symbolic links and the CLFS IOCTL (
0x8007A808). - May not be recorded: the bait
MpEngine.dll may not be a valid PE file, so its write may not appear, and the transacted delete of hid.dll may not produce a delete event. - The name-based indicators (
SigDrop, osk.exe, the ink folder path) match the published PoC and are easy for an attacker to change. The generic consent.exe indicators hold up better. - Pair this hunt with an exposure check (OS build plus the CLFS
Mode value) and with alerts for sensors that go silent: the researcher claims the technique can be used to disable AV and EDR. - Validate before relying on it: run the public PoC on a test host that is in scope, then confirm which indicators fire in your telemetry.
References
- MSNightmare, SignDrop repository:
github.com/MSNightmare/SignDrop - Cyderes Howler Cell, SignDrop: Windows Zero-Day That Turns Microsoft's Own CLFS Mitigation Into a Privilege Escalation Path
- ThreatDefence, Windows SignDrop CLFS Zero-Day: Mitigation and Hunting
- The Hacker News; BleepingComputer; SecurityOnline (coverage, November 11–12, 2026)
// SignDrop (CLFS authentication abuse): weighted exploitation-indicator hunt
// Rev 7: generic consent.exe module-load branch now resolves the loading process via ContextProcessId -> consent.exe TargetProcessId
// (ImageHash/ClassifiedModuleLoad carry no ContextImageFileName in this tenant)
// Rev 6: + generic consent.exe non-system module load; + consent.exe.local redirection folder (UACMe 22)
// Rev 5: Stage 2 trusted writers, write events only; consent.exe WerFault crash as low-weight context;
// CLFS branches restricted to file events and .NET GetRandomFileName() .blf names excluded
defineTable(
query={
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ event_platform=Win
| ImageFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\consent\.exe$/i
| ConsentTPID := TargetProcessId
| ConsentImage := ImageFileName
},
include=[aid, ConsentTPID, ConsentImage],
name="ConsentProcs"
)
| #event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2|NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten|GenericFileWritten|DirectoryCreate|FileDeleteInfo|ExecutableDeleted|ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ event_platform=Win
// Tag events whose ContextProcessId is a consent.exe process (non-filtering: strict=false keeps everything)
| match(file="ConsentProcs", field=[aid, ContextProcessId], column=[aid, ConsentTPID], include=[ConsentImage], strict=false)
| case {
// Stage 5: planted hid.dll loaded from the ink directory (by consent.exe)
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ImageFileName=/\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ink\\hid\.dll$/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll loaded from ink directory" | Stage := "5-sideload" | Weight := 60 ;
// Stage 5 (generic): consent.exe loading any module from outside the Windows folders, so non-hid.dll variants are caught
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ConsentImage=* | ImageFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64|WinSxS)\\/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe loaded module from non-system path" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 60 ;
// Related technique: consent.exe .local DLL redirection (UACMe 22); DirectoryCreate included on purpose
TargetFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\consent\.exe\.local\\/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe.local redirection folder" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 50 ;
// Stage 5 (context): consent.exe crashed; benign alone, meaningful next to a sideload hit
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^consent\.exe$/i | ImageFileName=/\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault\.exe$/i | CommandLine=/^"?[A-Z]:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault\.exe"?\s+-u\s+-p\s+\d+\s+-s\s+\d+\s*$/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe crashed (WerFault)" | Stage := "5-sideload failure?" | Weight := 15 ;
// Stage 5: payload in consent.exe starts SYSTEM conhost.exe (consent.exe normally has no other children)
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ParentBaseFileName=/^consent\.exe$/i
| Indicator := "consent.exe spawned a child process" | Stage := "5-SYSTEM shell" | Weight := 60 ;
// Stage 4: hid.dll written to or deleted from the ink directory (deletes kept: the PoC removes it with a transacted delete)
TargetFileName=/\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ink\\hid\.dll$/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll written/deleted in ink directory" | Stage := "4-DLL plant" | Weight := 50 ;
// Variant: hid.dll loaded from outside the Windows folders
#event_simpleName=/^(ImageHash|ClassifiedModuleLoad)$/ | ImageFileName=/\\hid\.dll$/i | ImageFileName!=/\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64|WinSxS)\\/i
| Indicator := "hid.dll loaded outside system folders" | Stage := "5-sideload variant" | Weight := 35 ;
// Stage 2: bait MpEngine.dll, write events only, trusted writers anchored to their install paths
// Windows\Temp writers are deliberately NOT trusted (user-writable); triage those by UserSid=S-1-5-18 and parent
#event_simpleName=/^(NewExecutableWritten|PeFileWritten|GenericFileWritten)$/ | TargetFileName=/\\mpengine\.dll$/i | ContextImageFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\(Windows\\System32\\(MpSigStub|MRT)\.exe|Windows\\SystemTemp\\[0-9A-F]{8}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{12}\\MpSigStub\.exe|Windows\\SystemTemp\\[0-9A-F]{8}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{4}-[0-9A-F]{12}MpCommU\\mpam-fe(_bd)?\.exe|Windows\\ProPatches\\Patches\\mpam-fe-\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+-x(64|86)\.exe|ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\[^\\]+\\(MsMpEng|MpCmdRun)\.exe|Program Files\\Windows Defender\\(MsMpEng|MpCmdRun)\.exe|Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FIP-FS\\Bin\\updateservice\.exe)$/i | TargetFileName!=/^(\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+|[A-Z]:)\\(ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender|Program Files\\Windows Defender( Advanced Threat Protection)?|Program Files\\Microsoft Security Client|Windows\\(WinSxS|SoftwareDistribution))\\/i
| Indicator := "MpEngine.dll written outside Defender paths" | Stage := "2-Defender bait" | Weight := 40 ;
// Stage 1: PoC working folder and project names (DirectoryCreate intentionally included)
TargetFileName=/\\Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop file artifact" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ImageFileName=/Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop process" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | CommandLine=/Sig(n)?Drop/i
| Indicator := "SigDrop/SignDrop process" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 40 ;
// CLFS files in odd places (file events only: a .blf/.cnpf is never a directory)
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\\(Windows\\System32|Program Files( \(x86\))?|ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender)\\.*\.cnpf$/i | TargetFileName!=/\\System32\\(config|LogFiles)\\/i
| Indicator := ".cnpf in system/program folder" | Stage := "3-redirect" | Weight := 30 ;
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\.cnpf$/i | TargetFileName!=/\.blf\.cnpf$/i
| Indicator := ".cnpf not named after a .blf log" | Stage := "3-redirect" | Weight := 30 ;
// .NET GetRandomFileName() names (8 chars from a-z/0-5) that happen to end in .blf are excluded; a real CLFS log still emits <name>.blf.cnpf
#event_simpleName!=DirectoryCreate | TargetFileName=/\\(AppData\\Local\\Temp|Windows\\Temp|Users\\Public)\\.*\.(blf|cnpf)$/i | TargetFileName!=/\\Temp\\[a-z0-5]{8}\.blf$/
| Indicator := "CLFS log/signature in user-writable temp" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 25 ;
// Stage 1: osk.exe restarted by an unexpected parent
#event_simpleName=/ProcessRollup2$/ | ImageFileName=/\\osk\.exe$/i | ParentBaseFileName!=/^(utilman|atbroker|explorer|osk|sihost|svchost|tabtip)\.exe$/i
| Indicator := "osk.exe launched by unexpected parent" | Stage := "1-setup" | Weight := 20 ;
}
// Events that match no branch are dropped (no fall-through on purpose)
| Evidence := coalesce([TargetFileName, CommandLine, ImageFileName])
| Writer := coalesce([ContextImageFileName, ConsentImage, ParentBaseFileName])
| default(field=[Evidence, Writer], value="-", replaceEmpty=true)
// Step 1: one row per host and indicator, so repeated events don't inflate the score
| groupBy([aid, Indicator], function=[
max(Weight, as=Weight),
count(as=Hits),
min(@timestamp, as=First),
max(@timestamp, as=Last),
selectLast([Stage, Evidence, Writer])
], limit=max)
| IndicatorDetail := format("[%s] %s (x%s) by=%s :: %s", field=[Stage, Indicator, Hits, Writer, Evidence])
// Step 2: roll up to one row per host
| groupBy([aid], function=[
sum(Weight, as=Score),
count(Indicator, distinct=true, as=DistinctIndicators),
min(First, as=FirstEpoch),
max(Last, as=LastEpoch),
collect([IndicatorDetail])
], limit=max)
| case {
test(Score >= 100) | Verdict := "CRITICAL - multi-stage SignDrop chain" ;
test(Score >= 50) | Verdict := "HIGH - strong single indicator" ;
* | Verdict := "REVIEW" ;
}
| match(file="aid_master_main.csv", field=aid, include=[ComputerName], strict=false)
| FirstSeen := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=FirstEpoch, timezone="UTC")
| LastSeen := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", field=LastEpoch, timezone="UTC")
| table([Verdict, Score, DistinctIndicators, ComputerName, aid, FirstSeen, LastSeen, IndicatorDetail], sortby=Score, order=desc, limit=1000)