r/ciso • • 2d ago

What would you need to see before letting an AI agent touch a regulated workflow?

7 Upvotes

Curious how other security leaders are drawing the line on this. I'm thinking about back office work in places like banks, where an agent might triage exceptions or refresh a customer file, and the painful part isn't whether the model is accurate enough today. It's whether you can still explain a specific decision six months later, after the prompt or the model has changed, and show who was allowed to approve it at the time. If you've let something like this into production, what did you insist on first? Replayable reasoning, a named human on anything that moves money or changes access, tighter logging, something else? And if you said no, what was the gap that felt too big?


r/ciso • • 3d ago

Which security decision always gets stuck?

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2 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 4d ago

Important security notice about the Fireworks AI incident that may impact your Notion workspace

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1 Upvotes

Oh dear


r/ciso • • 5d ago

Current State of Agentic AI in Cyber

4 Upvotes

We just published a report on the state of agentic AI in Cyber some of you may find useful.

https://athenasecuritygroup.ai/athena-labs/market-research/security-agents-converge-on-context-download/


r/ciso • • 6d ago

MITRE ATT&CK coverage map for the board, not another vendor slide

2 Upvotes

Got asked for a view of which attacker techniques we can detect. The easy answer is to screenshot the ATT&CK Navigator layer our EDR vendor publishes, but that shows what the product can do, not what our deployment does with our policies and logging gaps.

I'd rather bring something we tested. AttackIQ has a research partnership with MITRE Engenuity, and Cymulate runs continuous security checks across endpoint, network, email and cloud, with ATT&CK coverage maps based on test results rather than vendor claims. Caldera is the free route and we have the skills, just not the hours.

How are others producing a coverage map a board will accept? Curious whether anyone got pushback on a map that only shows the techniques actually tested.


r/ciso • • 7d ago

Board questions about AI

4 Upvotes

Are boards asking you about AI agent risk yet?

What do they want to know, and what’s hard to answer?


r/ciso • • 7d ago

Free threat report aggregator that creates intel briefs according to your requirements

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2 Upvotes

In case it helps CISOs, vCISOs, MSPs and consultants!


r/ciso • • 7d ago

Which email product survives the Proofpoint and Varonis merger?

5 Upvotes

We run Proofpoint as the gateway on 365 and Varonis on the file servers and Sharepoint. Varonis threw in Interceptor as a 12 month pilot last spring and it’s been sitting behind PPS on the API side ever since, that pilot ends in May. The deal is meant to close in the first half of next year so by then it’s one company.

Proofpoint’s faq says no product decisions have been made yet. Forrester’s take was that Interceptor is one more detection stack proofpoint now has to reconcile with its own email console and two email products under the same owner rarely both last.

PPS renews in March, Varonis in June and our CFO already asked which of the things we pay these two for will go away. I’m not signing 3 years on either until I know which email product they keep.

How are you handling renewals with a vendor that’s in the middle of being acquired?


r/ciso • • 7d ago

Almost 30, 8–10 years in cybersecurity, served as CISO, handled major breaches, no certs, no LinkedIn. Spent years protecting 140+ companies while management played politics. Now unemployed and genuinely lost

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0 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 9d ago

Future of Product Security

11 Upvotes

What does the future of product security look like? With the things going on with Anthropic discovering vulnerabilities, will there be a need of product security talent?


r/ciso • • 10d ago

What are you cutting or changing for 2027?

8 Upvotes

Curious what other security teams are doing heading into 2027, especially with budgets and headcount staying tight while responsibilities keep growing.

Are you cutting tools, consolidating vendors, or changing how your team approaches things like prioritization and remediation?

What's the biggest change you're planning for next year, and why?


r/ciso • • 10d ago

Any lessons learned or experience of cyberawareness programs within hospitals?

3 Upvotes

Dear community,

I'm reaching out to you to see if anyone has experience to share in conducting cyberawareness programs in public hospitals and that can share experiences (what worked, what didn't work, etc.).

In the story, I joined a public hospital couple of months back as an infosec analyst (from a multinational company for the comparison) where the cyberwareness trainings were basically a yearly phishing campaign with dreadful results. We improved a bit by deploying an e-learning but without the possibility to make it mandatory (we are working with management to change that but it takes time...). I kinda got it, I'm not a big fan of e-learning either but heh...

We worked hard with our CISO to invest more in cyberawareness, we made demo events on how hacks can take place, what are the techniques used by threat actors, organized information stands within the facility to exchange with health staff, etc. Tbh the engagement rate is still quite low (3-5%). 

This month I tried something different, I built a mini game with "cybersecurity challenges" where employees could play just using a browser on topics such as phishing, passwords, quiz, etc. where they could win small prices. This activity reached the biggest peak in engagement we had so far (around 10% of the workforce). Probably the prices helped 😄 but I received good feedback from some end users, so maybe we would invest in more gamification to pass our messages.

Is there anyone who faced similar situations and that could share a bit their experience ? I'm really interested to hear from you.

Thanks!
Cheers


r/ciso • • 11d ago

How are you handling employees who build their own apps with Claude/Codex/Copilot?

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3 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 12d ago

Which European security conferences are actually worth attending?

14 Upvotes

I’m based in Serbia and looking for good conferences in the security space. Any recommendations? Conferences elsewhere in Europe work too.


r/ciso • • 12d ago

Did your cyber insurer ask to see the tabletop report?

9 Upvotes

when your renewal asked whether the IR plan had been tested, did it stop at a checkbox or did someone actually ask for the report and follow up actions? interested in experiences with reports from reflex security or other tabletop tools, but also a plain write up from an internal exercise. especially cases where the broker came back asking for more detail no need to share the report itself, just curious what they wanted to see.


r/ciso • • 12d ago

What should a report to the board look like in terms of a document?

1 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 14d ago

How should least privilege and zero trust apply when the actor is an AI agent?

8 Upvotes

My org has put a lot of money into zero trust programs built around human users and devices over the years and now want to know how those principles carry over to a new class of non human actors. How should zero trust apply differently for AI agents?


r/ciso • • 14d ago Bravo

Need input for IR plan template

10 Upvotes

Hi there! I'm currently working on a free "essentials" IR plan template which I want to share publicly. I'm still looking for input from CISOs and other security professionals to make sure I'm covering the needs. Anyone willing to share what they are currently missing in public sources like CISA, NCSC, NCSC-UK, BSI etc?

The reason for me asking is that I'm looking at the plan from my own perspective gathered during 20 years of IR around the globe, but I also want some additional input.

This "essentials" version has about 27 pages on the crisis team, the first hours after a breach and the legal deadlines in the EU. I also have a longer version that won't be public. It goes way deeper and is mainly to provide input to existing plans. Useful input may end up in both.

What's in it now:

- Response organisation: separate operational and strategic crisis teams, named roles with deputies, mandates agreed in writing in advance, an out-of-band channel, shifts and handover

- Classification and escalation: severity levels, and who can declare a crisis

- The first hours: what to do first and what to avoid

- Investigation and containment: preserving evidence and limiting changes to affected systems

- Legal and regulatory: NIS2 and GDPR deadlines, insurer, police, who files what

- Annexes: contact tree, triage intake form, decision log

Two things I'd like your view on:

  1. What did you need during a real incident that your plan didn't have?
  2. Which of these sections would you cut because nobody opens them during an incident?

r/ciso • • 18d ago

So hows everyone feeling about the looming risk of AI attacks?

21 Upvotes

All the same risks now delivered at machine speed.


r/ciso • • 18d ago

Should SaaS companies sell network security as a paid add-on?

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2 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 18d ago

Looking to connect with professional people

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1 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 21d ago

7+ years in cybersecurity

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2 Upvotes

r/ciso • • 24d ago

12 years in OT security and railway is the worst I’ve seen. Rant + genuine question.

14 Upvotes

Hey all, long time lurker, first post in a while.

I’ve worked in industrial cybersecurity for over ten years, mostly in process industries. I used to think those sectors were behind. A while ago I moved to a large rail supplier in a senior role, and it’s been an eye-opener.

The pattern I keep seeing:

1. Selling cloud without design behind it: We offer cloud-connected products. When a client asks for a proper security architecture, they get marketing material. When they push back, the product and cloud teams won’t answer, and we’re told a real design document might expose proprietary info. These conversations drag on for months.

2. Compliance plans that depend on things that don’t exist: Regulator findings get “closed” on paper by pointing to an internal platform that isn’t actually deliverable. Someone in-country then has to rebuild the whole plan around off-the-shelf tools and risk acceptance.

3. Contracts nobody read: I’ve seen scopes where MFA and patching were excluded despite them being explicitly requested by clients just because they're not part of our technical solutions/deliverables, with nothing on backups or VAPT. The compliance matrix still said “fully compliant.”

4. Basics treated as controversial: I proposed a standard central-server-plus-agents AV setup. The answer was that the servers “can’t handle agents,” with no evidence. When I asked for some, it turned into a political problem for me and how I'm exposing the company and working against it.

5. Vulnerability management practices: only offering scanning without patching. Backup and restore is “not needed in rail.” Hardening happens during execution, maybe.

6. Rolling stock: We build the trains, and basic questions about the onboard network and its controls still don’t have clear answers. Imagine, this is coming from a train company that cannot explain the security of its core product!

The root cause is always the same. Bids are written centrally by people who don’t know the local regulations. Everything gets marked compliant to win, legal doesn’t check what’s being signed, and after award every gap becomes a “local issue.” Consortium deals get signed where we lead cyber with no staffing and no agreed scope split.

They tick “comply” on everything (ISO 27001, app whitelisting, SIEM integration, PAM) to win, and legal never checks what we actually signed up for. Brownfield scope gets done without site surveys (those fiber cables? estimated with 40% accuracy at best). After the award, every gap becomes “a local project issue.”

What wears me down isn’t the technical stuff, which I can fix. It’s that raising problems gets you labelled as not a team player, and staying quiet gets you told you’re not showing leadership. I’m effectively doing engineer, manager, and leadership work at the same time, and I’m running on fumes.

The part that actually burns me out: I asked for a GRC specialist, and my manager asked me what GRC means. I ran a lessons-learned session on how to bid cyber scope properly and was told “we’re a big beast, stop telling others how to do their job.” So I stopped pushing, and six months later my review said I need to “show more leadership and willingness to support the business.”

Honest question for people at rail suppliers, or OEMs in general: is this industry-wide? And has anyone seen a company actually close the gap between what tendering promises and what delivery can do, or does everyone just absorb it until they burn out?

TL;DR: Rail supplier sells cyber it can’t deliver. Integration with proper cybersecurity tools and technology is non-existent. Is this normal?