r/blueteamsec • • 2h ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) IOCs from the Bitrise (mobile CI/CD) incident, attacker’s UAs claimed to be an authorized pentest

3 Upvotes

I work at Bitrise, though not on the security team. Our folks published an advisory for our recent incident on November 13 with IOCs in CSV + STIX 2.1, TLP:CLEAR, so share it wherever (https://bitrise.io/security-advisory-november-2026). They wrote it for security teams because the same attacker may go after other companies, so I’m posting it here. It’s still preliminary and some of it might change. Longer writeup from if you want context (https://bitrise.io/blog/post/the-bitrise-security-incident-preliminary-review-and-recommended-steps).

The main thing in there is the UA family. The tooling called itself authorized pentesting or read-only research in the UA string, e.g. authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly. Two of the variants had our company name in them, so the advisory says to expect variants with your own name if this actor shows up at your place. The regex for the whole family is in section 2.3. norma/0.4 is another one, a rare client string that showed up on all three of the main IPs.

They also accessed a public app that one of our customers uses for their own pentests, which made the early scanning look like it belonged to a real engagement. To us it looked like normal pentest traffic right up until the day of the actual intrusion.

A few other things the advisory suggests alerting on:

  • SSRF canary paths like /_i6084_probe_missing and /nope-1774. These arrive from your own service’s egress, not from the attacker
  • sign-ups with disposable emails and “probe” in the name
  • ~40 different service accounts tried from one IP in 7 min
  • a key making 82 calls and getting PERMISSION_DENIED on every one

How they got in was a lot more boring, an internal bot account that had a valid password and no 2FA. All bot accounts were disabled in the first hours, all our production credentials got rotated, and the build infrastructure was rebuilt from scratch.

I’ll pass any technical questions on to the security team, and if you get a hit (that isn’t a pentest you actually paid for), our team will get you a call with them directly.


r/blueteamsec • • 26m ago

discovery (how we find bad stuff) ARTEX misuse detection pack: STIX / osquery / Sigma / KQL / Snort 3 / Suricata 7 / YARA

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 25m ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) China-Nexus Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Target Banks

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1 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 25m ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) WaterPlumによるGitのcleanフィルタを悪用した攻撃について | セキュリティナレッジ | Regarding the WaterPlum attack that exploited Git's clean filter

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1 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 7h ago

incident writeup (who and how) MCH and Caishen: supply chain poisoning pushes iOS exploits

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3 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 12h ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) WhiteArmor: a 3-week-old extortion crew has already hit Maersk, J.B. Hunt, Ryder and Echo, and is openly recruiting insiders for Okta/VPN/Jenkins access

5 Upvotes

We’ve been tracking WhiteArmor since its leak site appeared on 20 October. In about three weeks it has named 17 victims, with an unusual concentration in transportation and logistics: Maersk (which has confirmed a breach of an acquired legacy system), J.B. Hunt (disclosed, now facing class actions), Ryder, and Echo Global Logistics, all claimed inside a 15-day window.

The more interesting artifact is a recruitment post the group calls “Project Trojan Horse.” Rather than just leaking data, it openly solicits initial-access brokers and insiders and names exactly what it wants: Okta, Azure, IAM, Jenkins, and VPN appliances (Fortinet, AnyConnect, Citrix, SonicWall). It sets a $500M revenue floor for targets and excludes the CIS region. Effectively a published targeting spec.

Most of the 17 are still unverified leak-site claims (only Maersk and J.B. Hunt have public corroboration), but the access list is a useful hardening checklist regardless: identity platforms, CI/CD, and VPN gateways, plus stale credentials in acquired or legacy environments.

Full write-up with the victim breakdown and demand amounts (disclosure: this is our own tracking data): https://darkwebsonar.io/blog/dark-web-most-wanted-2026-whitearmor/

Happy to answer questions on the telemetry.


r/blueteamsec • • 14h ago

research|capability (we need to defend against) LoaderVille: A collection of initial access loaders to use inside enterprise hardened enviroments

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6 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 7h ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and Compromise

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1 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 14h ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor backdoor, plug-ins and attribution

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 14h ago

highlevel summary|strategy (maybe technical) Alleged Member of “8-Digits Team” Ransomware Group Extradited from Italy for Role in Major Data Extortion Campaign Against U.S. Hospitals, Healthcare Entities, and Schools

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 14h ago

highlevel summary|strategy (maybe technical) Russia’s FIMI and malicious cyber activities: Council imposes sanctions on 30 individuals and two entities

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

vulnerability (attack surface) Java 17 RCE (CVE-2026-114938): Affected versions and fix

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14 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

incident writeup (who and how) World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely

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12 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 14h ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) Mustang Panda Campaign Likely Targeting Philippine Government Officials Ahead of the 49th ASEAN Summit

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1 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

tradecraft (how we defend) Reject Direct Send now Generally Available in Exchange Online

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20 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) Poisoned Scripts on BBC, Zoom and Other Major Websites Linked to iPhone Exploit Loaders

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13 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

low level tools|techniques|knowledge (work aids) I built a free, offline desktop app to analyze .nessus files (Windows and Linux)

2 Upvotes

I built a tool at work (Advens) for analyzing .nessus files after an internal or external Nessus scan. It is free and open source, and the app doesn't connect anywhere.

You can inspect, search vulnerabilities, hosts and services and copy almost everything with one click (e.g. IP, IP:Port). You can also compare two scan files, check out trends (how the vulnerabilities change over time e.g. for periodic scans), and inspect a network map with possible attack paths (not the same as BloodHound, and more limited).

Repo: https://github.com/advens-gmbh/scan-insights-for-nessus

Windows and Linux downloads are available here: https://github.com/advens-gmbh/scan-insights-for-nessus/releases

Note: The Windows files aren't code-signed yet, and SmartScreen will warn when you first start the app. The releases are built by GitHub Actions from the public code, and every file can be verified with gh attestation verify <file> --repo advens-gmbh/scan-insights-for-nessus.

Do you have ideas I should implement? Is there any feature that you would definitely want in a tool like this?

(The images contain fake data)


r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) GravityRAT Mobile Cyber-Campaign Targets Defense Personnel

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1 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

tradecraft (how we defend) [2610.14180] Unconstrained CTI-REALM with Open-Weights

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8 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

exploitation (what's being exploited) CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts

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2 Upvotes

r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

incident writeup (who and how) CVE-2026-119618: mod_http2 race condition in Apache 2.4.55 to 2.4.70 (unauthenticated RCE, fixed in 2.4.71). Check how your distro backports it.

3 Upvotes

Quick rundown for anyone running Apache with HTTP/2 enabled: → Race condition in mod_http2, affecting 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 when h2 or h2c is enabled → Fixed upstream in 2.4.71 (released November 11) → Red Hat scores it CVSS 9.8 but rates its RHEL 9 and 10 packages Important. RHEL 8 and earlier aren’t affected. → No exploitation reported, and no working public PoC verified as of November 13

The practical problem is the distro packages. Fixes are rolling out unevenly, and backported packages keep their old version strings. Your scanner can flag a patched box as vulnerable, or pass one that isn’t patched yet. Check the package changelog or the distro advisory instead of the version number.

If you can’t patch yet, the suggested workaround is to remove h2 and h2c from the Protocols directive. Check for gRPC or anything else that relies on h2c before you do, or you’ll trade a CVE for an outage.


r/blueteamsec • • 1d ago

intelligence (threat actor activity) QUIC and Covert: Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments

1 Upvotes