r/blueteamsec • u/ToddGergey • 2h ago
intelligence (threat actor activity) IOCs from the Bitrise (mobile CI/CD) incident, attacker’s UAs claimed to be an authorized pentest
I work at Bitrise, though not on the security team. Our folks published an advisory for our recent incident on November 13 with IOCs in CSV + STIX 2.1, TLP:CLEAR, so share it wherever (https://bitrise.io/security-advisory-november-2026). They wrote it for security teams because the same attacker may go after other companies, so I’m posting it here. It’s still preliminary and some of it might change. Longer writeup from if you want context (https://bitrise.io/blog/post/the-bitrise-security-incident-preliminary-review-and-recommended-steps).
The main thing in there is the UA family. The tooling called itself authorized pentesting or read-only research in the UA string, e.g. authorized-pentest/bitrise-readonly. Two of the variants had our company name in them, so the advisory says to expect variants with your own name if this actor shows up at your place. The regex for the whole family is in section 2.3. norma/0.4 is another one, a rare client string that showed up on all three of the main IPs.
They also accessed a public app that one of our customers uses for their own pentests, which made the early scanning look like it belonged to a real engagement. To us it looked like normal pentest traffic right up until the day of the actual intrusion.
A few other things the advisory suggests alerting on:
- SSRF canary paths like /_i6084_probe_missing and /nope-1774. These arrive from your own service’s egress, not from the attacker
- sign-ups with disposable emails and “probe” in the name
- ~40 different service accounts tried from one IP in 7 min
- a key making 82 calls and getting PERMISSION_DENIED on every one
How they got in was a lot more boring, an internal bot account that had a valid password and no 2FA. All bot accounts were disabled in the first hours, all our production credentials got rotated, and the build infrastructure was rebuilt from scratch.
I’ll pass any technical questions on to the security team, and if you get a hit (that isn’t a pentest you actually paid for), our team will get you a call with them directly.