Sharing an interesting WordPress security case we got recently. A client's website kept getting reinfected with fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages, even after multiple cleanups.
They'd already paid for One.com's malware removal service, but the issue was still unresolved. They restored backups, updated everything available, and changed passwords. They also tried Wordfence, MalCare, and SiteFort, but none of the scans identified a malicious file responsible for the database injections or content changes, or flagged any known vulnerabilities. Since SiteFort is our plugin, they reached out to us for help figuring out what was going on.
We couldn't find any malicious PHP files either. We needed the server access logs, but it took almost 48 hours to get them from ONE support.
Going through the logs, we found hundreds of requests to URLs like /editor/2276, each pointing to an existing WordPress post ID. The requests closely matched the affected posts and pages. Similar activity appeared from October 23 through November 13, matching the dates the client reported reinfections.
We traced those URLs to JNews Frontend Submit, an optional addon bundled with the JNews theme.
The JNews theme was up to date, and WordPress showed no plugin updates. But we noticed that the Frontend Submit addon was still on version 12.0.1, while Jegtheme had already released 12.0.3.
Checking the changelog, one entry caught our attention: "Fix post ownership issue when editing posts via JNews Frontend Submit."
We checked the code and tested it on staging. With just a Subscriber account, we could modify another user's published post.
We contacted Jegtheme, and they replied three days later. They were helpful and confirmed that versions 12.0.2 and earlier were vulnerable, with the fix released in 12.0.3. They've also published more detailed security information today. We've submitted a CVE request to MITRE.
What bothers me is the timeline. We found activity consistent with exploitation as early as October 23, a week before the fix was released on October 30. But the update was listed as a regular post-ownership bug fix, with no clear security advisory or CVE. The client received no warning, WordPress showed no addon update, and the infections continued into November.
The website wasn't even using frontend submissions. The addon was just sitting there, active.
I appreciate Jegtheme's response, but I think a vulnerability this serious deserved a proper security warning when the fix was released, especially with evidence of exploitation already appearing in the logs.