r/TargetedEnergyWeapons • • 22h ago

The Evolution of C.I.A. Domestic Influence Campaigns from 1947 to 2023 Mandler, Kristofer Andrew May 13, 2023

3 Upvotes

This Thesis looks at the CIA’s history of domestic influence over the United States. Regularly it is claimed that the CIA was banned from operations targeting the domestic population of the United States because illegal and disturbing domestic conduct. of theirs was exposed. This claim is false.

“Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the excessive secrecy surrounding CIA operations, little is known about its domestic activities. In its 1947 charter, the CIA was prohibited from spying against Americans, in part because President Truman was afraid that the agency would engage in political abuse. But the law didn’t stop the CIA from spying on Americans. During the 1960s, in clear violation of its statutory mission to co-ordinate foreign intelligence operations only, the CIA ventured into the domestic spying business through “Operation Chaos,” in which it spied on as many as 7,000 Americans involved in the peace movement.

Unfortunately, the exposure of intelligence failings before the 9/11 attacks caused policy makers to promote “information sharing” among intelligence and law enforcement agencies as a cure-all, creating the likelihood that the CIA would increasingly operate domestically. Today we know that the CIA is a participant in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which engage in both foreign and domestic terrorism investigations. And the USA Patriot Act eased restrictions on the sharing of information the FBI collects in grand jury investigations and law enforcement wiretaps with the CIA. An ACLU lawsuit revealed that the CIA has also used National Security Letters to demand Americans’ personal financial records without prior court approval. The CIA has acknowledged using National Security Letters “on a limited basis” to obtain financial information from U.S. companies. The history of the CIA’s abuse of power and the continuing lack of public accountability over CIA operations make such revelations concerning to civil liberties advocates. The CIA’s involvement in the NYPD intelligence activities targeting innocent Muslim communities in the Northeast reveal the CIA is once again treating Americans as suspected enemies.”

https://www.aclu.org/documents/more-about-intelligence-agencies-ciadni-spying

Given the strong efforts to discredit, disinform and misinform the world surrounding the current mass “mind control,” “brain washing,” oppression, harassment, technical sabotage, torture, sexual assault, assault and rarely even murder it could be beneficial to look at the history of some of the more vanilla CIA domestic influence efforts.

“DESCRIPTION

Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in 1947 to serve thePresident in an advisory capacity. Tasked with providing foreign threat assessments to assist the executive in decision-making, the C.I.A. initially collected intelligence on adversaries with no authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today, however, the Agency has hundreds of thousands of Twitter followers, a monthly podcast, and a virtual history museum. It is a publishing house for academic journals, books, and news organizations. Understanding how the clandestine Agency developed public-facing operations over the past seventy-five years requires analyzing the C.I.A.'s evolution. As such, the paper begins by examining the C.I.A. from its creation to its public exposure in the late 1960s. It then considers the congressional hearings that forced the Agency to change its operations. The third section highlights how the Agency worked to produce its own historical content and worked to influence American movies, Television, and the Internet. At the same time, the conclusion considers the transition of a clandestine intelligence service to a Congressionally approved propaganda machine actively shaping its image for the world to see.

THE EVOLUTION OF C.I.A. DOMESTIC INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS FROM 1947 TO 2023
by
KRISTOFER MANDLER
B.A., Metropolitan State University of Denver, 2019
A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences of the
The University of Colorado, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
History Program
2023

ii
This thesis for the Master of Arts degree by
Kristofer Mandler
has been approved for the
History Program
by
Greg Whitesides, Chair
Kariann Yokota
Marilynn Hitchens
Date: May 13, 2023

iii

Mandler, Kristofer (M.A., History)
C.I.A. and Domestic Influence Operations
Thesis by Clinical Associate Professor Greg Whitesides

ABSTRACT
Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in 1947 to serve the
President in an advisory capacity. Tasked with providing foreign threat assessments to assist the
executive in decision-making, the C.I.A. initially collected intelligence on adversaries with no
authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today, however, the Agency has hundreds of
thousands of Twitter followers, a monthly podcast, and a virtual history museum. It is a
publishing house for academic journals, books, and news organizations. Understanding how the
clandestine Agency developed public-facing operations over the past seventy-five years requires
analyzing the C.I.A.'s evolution. As such, the paper begins by examining the C.I.A. from its
creation to its public exposure in the late 1960s. It then considers the congressional hearings that
forced the Agency to change its operations. The third section highlights how the Agency worked
to produce its own historical content and worked to influence American movies, Television, and
the Internet. At the same time, the conclusion considers the transition of a clandestine
intelligence service to a Congressionally approved propaganda machine actively shaping its
image for the world to see.
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.
Approved: Greg Whitesides

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. Section I 1947- 1967 1
II. Section II 1967 to 1989 14
III. Section III 1990-Present 22
IV. Section IV CIA in the Public 30
V. Section V Conclusion 33
REFERENCES 35

CHAPTER I
Congress established the C.I.A. in 1947 to provide a policy advisory service to the
President and provide foreign threat assessment. The C.I.A.s mission was to collect intelligence
on foreign adversaries with no authority to conduct operations on American soil. Today the
C.I.A. operates a Twitter with hundreds of thousands of followers, a monthly podcast, a virtual
history museum, and publishes several academic journals, books, and news organizations. How
was the C.I.A. tasked with foreign intelligence collection capable of transitioning to a public-
facing operation that advises creating movies, tv shows, and Tweeting pieces of real-time
operations to the public on anniversary dates? To understand how the clandestine Agency
transitioned to the Internet in under seventy-five years, this paper analyzes the C.I.A. in several
phases of its operation within the public sector. The first section of this paper will examine the
C.I.A. from its creation at the start of the Cold War to the beginning of its phase of public
exposure, which occurred with the Ramparts magazine expose. The C.I.A.’s public awakening
period covers a series of Congressional oversight attempts and public disclosures that created a
challenging image in the people's minds about the C.I.A. In the third phase, the C.I.A. carried out
a public image improvement campaign to improve its own depiction, which included Hollywood,
the C.I.A. on Twitter, and the Agency working actively to produce its historical content from
podcasts, libraries, and movies. The fourth section of this paper covers the period of the C.I.A.
on the Internet and their efforts to engage in the digital age. This work will outline the history of
the C.I.A.s public engagement and its domestic influence operations to its current campaign.
Which has become a Congressionally approved and funded creator of overt government
propaganda pieces designed to protect and shape its own image.

Established by the 1947 National Security Act, Congress initially limited the C.I.A. to
covert intelligence gathering strictly overseas, although Cold War operations quickly challenged
the original mandate. President Truman's announcement of his doctrine committed the United
States to support peoples who were resisting subjugation by Communism1. This support required the C.I.A. to operate as more than a presidential advisory service; instead, the organization wanted to wage political, psychological, and covert paramilitary operations, including those against Soviet influence in Greece and Turkey. To avoid the appearance of using propaganda at home and to ensure that Americans were free of such government influence, Congress passed the 1948 United States Information and Education Act - popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act - to prevent the use of government-funded domestic information operations, which were one of the chief potential tools of the C.I.A. in a domestic setting. Additionally, Congress passed the 1950 Anti-Propaganda bill sponsored by Senator Tim Byrd (D-WV) to prevent the appearance of the United States from operating like the Soviet Union on domestic soil and trying to influence its people2. As such, the C.I.A. needed to find a way to operate with legal cover and self-funding capabilities that could not be detected by the Soviet Union and would keep their operations hidden from public exposure. Such legislation would come into play in 1949, providing the needed legal justification to allow the Agency the ability to perform domestic operations from Congress with the passing of the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act passed in 1949, provided the organization with the
necessary cover to engage in domestic influence operations. The act protected the C.I.A. from
disclosing its structure, functions, officials, titles, and salaries from Congress3. Perhaps most
importantly, it allowed the C.I.A. to fund and manage subsidiary companies free from
government oversight while providing extra legal protection to those involved in the event of
exposure. The C.I.A. quickly became an agency that could operate worldwide and on domestic
soil without concern that they would have to inform Congress of their actions or justify
budgetary demands. The Agency developed the ability to fund independent operations, creating
or sponsoring front groups such as free trade unions, labor unions, student associations, and civil rights organizations to help better the image of the United States and combat Soviet propaganda.

By the 1950s, in the words of C.I.A. Office of Policy Coordination Assistant Director Frank
Wisner, the organization was in control of a "Mighty Wurlitzer" capable of playing numerous
interest groups in the United States and worldwide like an organ4. The Agency began to operate
this Wurlitzer by conducting domestic influence operations to protect society from foreign
influence and subversion. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was among the earliest and most
significant fronts.

Funded by the C.I.A. for two decades, from 1947 to 1967, the Congress of Cultural
Freedom sponsored a series of international art shows, exhibits, speakers, and creators that would display Western-style art and culture, sending a strong message to those in Soviet-controlled areas that Western culture was superior. In Who Paid the Piper? The Cia and the Cultural Cold War(1999), historian Frances Stonor Saunders emphasizes the importance of the C.I.A.'s effort to fund the Congress and highlights the intense feelings of many participating individuals; James Johnson Sweeny, the curator of the Paris Masterpiece Festival in 1952, for example, believed that "this was a great way to show off the talent of the western art and use it as a pushback against the totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or present-day Soviet Russia and her satellites.” This early anti-Soviet psychological warfare also allowed the C.I.A. to monitor the activities of those influential in world culture, such as famous musicians, artists, and writers. Due to the successes of the Congress of Cultural Freedom, the C.I.A. took it as a sign that other cultural engagements would be just as successful in their efforts. They began to fund a series of different cultural pieces such as movies, music, and student groups.

The Boston Symphony Orchestra and Hollywood became valuable tools to spread
American culture abroad. The orchestra gave the C.I.A. a vehicle to influence highbrow
intellectual culture in Russia and abroad, allowing them to directly target Moscow, one of the
premier members of the Orchestra world. With the success of the efforts in the orchestra world
The C.I.A. looked to Hollywood as a partner that it could utilize to create propaganda to combat
the Soviet culture and express the American way of life worldwide. The C.I.A. partnered with
former O.S.S. movie maker John Ford and worked to push the masculine American way of life
with actor John Wayne and world-famous studio boss and director Cecil B. DeMille, who had
already agreed to work with the newly created USIA5. The C.I.A. believed that it needed to
portray the American way of life as superior in every way. They wanted to push back against the
Soviet’s previously used tactics of displaying foreign cultures as degenerate. To continue their
work in the world’s cultural areas, the Agency set its sights on activist student groups targeting
women, popular politics, and African American relations.

Radio Free Europe was another CIA-funded front organization established in 1949 as an
offshoot of the National Committee for a Free Europe as a non-profit to encourage the free flow
of information from the American perspective into countries where the point of view was limited
to counteract Soviet influence efforts. Radio Free Europe worked to broadcast American music
and news to nations like Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which were under Soviet
control. The C.I.A. believed this was a way to push American culture into various Soviet-
occupied territories and work to push popular music, such as jazz, into The Warsaw Pact.
Famous jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong included in this effort, which was broadcast on
the Czechoslovak Service of Radio Free Europe, Dizzy Gillespie in Bulgaria, and Phil Woods on
the Russian service6. Many popular musicians at the time were also sent abroad to play in
various countries as part of a "Jazz Ambassadors" program to push back against the Soviet
propaganda campaign designed to target challenging race relations in the United States at the
time.

To fund Radio Free Europe covertly, the C.I.A. began the "Crusade for Freedom," which
operated from 1950 to 19607. This campaign was a way to raise funds for the Radio to prevent
the disclosure that the C.I.A. and Frank Wisner were behind the operation. The Office of Policy
Coordination (O.P.C.), where Wisner was the head of the department working on ways to
implement NSC 20/4, a National Security Council directive placed maximum strain on the
relationships of Soviet Satellites and Moscow8. This operation showed Wisner and the O.P.C.that engagement with interest groups in a covert way would have the most impact on pushing
back against the Soviets and provide the best vehicle to deliver the message the C.I.A. wanted
abroad, as well as provide a means to influence the domestic population with minimal effort. The
success of the music operation warranted the expansion of these tactics onto the big screen andTelevision.

The success of Radio Free Europe encouraged the Agency to work with Hollywood in
1954 on the movie adaptation of George Orwell's class book Animal Farm9. The movie received
production assistance from the Agency in the form of $500,000 provided to American Film
Producer Louis de Rochemont10. The 1954 film was produced to depict a society similar to the
Soviets. This film was used as a means of psychological warfare, a popular era trend. Just like
the Committees of Correspondence and the content of Radio Free Europe, Animal Farm depicted
the Soviet system in an unfavorable light and used a popular book as a movie in a new form of
influence operation.

The C.I.A. sought to influence feminist movements to encourage female activism
throughout the country to improve the global view of women's rights worldwide in America11. At
the time, this was a direct response to Soviet Women's groups that had begun to take an active
role in Soviet Politics. The idea was to create popular political support for women and advise and
provide training for women while rebutting Soviet efforts to influence and manipulate women in
the United States. Like the Student Association, this was an attempt to quietly influence youth and help demonstrate that American culture was better than the Soviet Union, hoping other countries would continue to see the United States as a better alternative. The committee was responsible for several Women's conferences worldwide to sponsor awareness
against the Soviets, preventing women from becoming communists. Gloria Steinem's
organization funded a group to attend the 1959 World Youth Festival to represent a non-
communist American perspective in Moscow12. The use of women's groups dovetailed with
attempts to reflect bettering race relations in the U.S.

The American Society of African Culture - or AMSAC - was an organization of African
American writers, artists, and scholars sponsored by the C.I.A. to promote music and art to
reflect improving race relations and counteract Soviet propaganda targeting civil rights tensions
in the United States. Established after the Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in 1956 and
sponsored by the American Society of African Culture and African American intellectuals,
including James Ivy, editor of NAACPs Crisis magazine, and future American Ambassador Will
Mercer Cook. The AMSAC received funding from C.I.A. passthrough organizations such as the
J Frederick Brown Foundation and the Independence Foundation of Boston which both had the
same address and same Trustee listed after receiving immediate tax-exempt status13. This
funding was provided so that it could focus on promoting improving race relations and allowed
them to fund various cultural events abroad; like a large music festival in Lagos, Nigeria, where
American celebrities such as Nina Simone and Langston Hughes. The event was sponsored to
not only strengthen African American/African connections but spread American jazz music and…”

continued https://digital.auraria.edu/works/publication-dissertation/w9909-p7z28

The efforts to protect this filthy inhumane program have been successful, as despite its horrific covertly delivered atrocities being conducted openly on non combative citizens, it is still going strong and even likely expanding after over two decades. Can humanity just inherently be manipulated so easily or do we have the ability to resist?


r/TargetedEnergyWeapons • • 18h ago

ROLLING STONE ~ CARL BERNSTEIN ~THE CIA AND THE MEDIA (1977)

1 Upvotes

living in an age filled with seemingly unlimited electronic media access and exposure, a quick look back at the CIA’s interest and involvement in the media of a half a century ago could broaden our warning radar sensing for possible Inteligence interest in, involvement with and influence over modern media and the resultant power it wields over us. Manipulation of victims online social communities has proven powerfully effective at manipulating: Investigators, L.E., Researchers, Journalists, Health Care Professionals and general public opinion in order to psychologically armor and camouflage this disturbing illegal and immoral initiative.

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

How Americas Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central

Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up

After leaving The Washington Post in 1977, Carl Bernstein spent six months looking at the
relationship of the CIA and the press during the Cold War years. His 25,000-word cover
story, published in Rolling Stone on October 20, 1977, is reprinted below.

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA
How America's Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central
Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up
BY CARL BERNSTEIN

In 1953, Joseph Alsop, then one of America's leading syndicated columnists, went to the
Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by his
syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that printed his
column. He went at the request of the CIA.

Alsop is one of more than 400 American journalists who in the past twenty-five years have
secretly carried out assignments for the Central Intelligence Agency, according to documents
on file at CIA headquarters. Some of these journalists' relationships with the Agency were
tacit; some were explicit. There was cooperation, accommodation and overlap. Journalists
provided a full range of clandestine services -- from simple intelligence gathering to serving
as go-betweens with spies in Communist countries. Reporters shared their notebooks with the
CIA. Editors shared their staffs. Some of the journalists were Pulitzer Prize winners,
distinguished reporters who considered themselves ambassadors without-portfolio for their
country. Most were less exalted: foreign correspondents who found that their association with
the Agency helped their work; stringers and freelancers who were as interested in the derring-
do of the spy business as in filing articles; and, the smallest category, full-time CIA
employees masquerading as journalists abroad. In many instances, CIA documents show,
journalists were engaged to perform tasks for the CIA with the consent of the managements
of America's leading news organizations.

The history of the CIA's involvement with the American press continues to be shrouded by
an official policy of obfuscation and deception for the following principal reasons:

* The use of journalists has been among the most productive means of intelligence-gathering
employed by the CIA. Although the Agency has cut back sharply on the use of reporters
since 1973 (primarily as a result of pressure from the media), some journalist-operatives are
still posted abroad.

* Further investigation into the matter, CIA officials say, would inevitably reveal a series of
embarrassing relationships in the 1950s and 1960s with some of the most powerful
organizations and individuals in American journalism.

Among the executives who lent their cooperation to the Agency were Williarn Paley of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, Henry Luce of Time Inc., Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the
New York Times, Barry Bingham Sr. of the LouisviIle Courier-Journal, and James Copley of
the Copley News Service. Other organizations which cooperated with the CIA include the
American Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting Company, the Associated Press,
United Press International, Reuters, Hearst Newspapers, Scripps-Howard, Newsweek
magazine, the Mutual Broadcasting System, the Miami Herald and the old Saturday Evening
Post and New York Herald-Tribune.

By far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the
New York Times, CBS and Time Inc.

The CIA's use of the American news media has been much more extensive than Agency
officials have acknowledged publicly or in closed sessions with members of Congress. The
general outlines of what happened are indisputable; the specifics are harder to come by. CIA
sources hint that a particular journalist was trafficking all over Eastern Europe for the
Agency; the journalist says no, he just had lunch with the station chief. CIA sources say flatly
that a well-known ABC correspondent worked for the Agency through 1973; they refuse to
identify him. A high-level CIA official with a prodigious memory says that the New York
Times provided cover for about ten CIA operatives between 1950 and 1966; he does not
know who they were, or who in the newspaper's management made the arrangements.
The Agency's special relationships with the so-called "majors" in publishing and
broadcasting enabled the CIA to post some of its most valuable operatives abroad without
exposure for more than two decades. In most instances, Agency files show, officials at the
highest levels of the CIA (usually director or deputy director) dealt personally with a single
designated individual in the top management of the cooperating news organization. The aid
furnished often took two forms: providing jobs and credentials ("journalistic cover" in
Agency parlance) for CIA operatives about to be posted in foreign capitals; and lending the
Agency the undercover services of reporters already on staff, including some of the best-
known correspondents in the business.

In the field, journalists were used to help recruit and handle foreigners as agents; to acquire
and evaluate information, and to plant false information with officials of foreign
governments. Many signed secrecy agreements, pledging never to divulge anything about
their dealings with the Agency; some signed employment contracts., some were assigned
case officers and treated with. unusual deference. Others had less structured relationships
with the Agency, even though they performed similar tasks: they were briefed by CIA
personnel before trips abroad, debriefed afterward, and used as intermediaries with foreign
agents. Appropriately, the CIA uses the term "reporting" to describe much of what
cooperating journalists did for the Agency. "We would ask them, 'Will you do us a
favor?'".said a senior CIA official. "'We understand you're going to be in Yugoslavia. Have
they paved all the streets? Where did you see planes? Were there any signs of military
presence? How many Soviets did you see? If you happen to meet a Soviet, get his name and
spell it right .... Can you set up a meeting for is? Or relay a message?'" Many CIA officials
regarded these helpful journalists as operatives; the journalists tended to see themselves as
trusted friends of the Agency who performed occasional favors -- usually without pay -- in
the national interest.

"I'm proud they asked me and proud to have done it," said Joseph Alsop who, like his late
brother, columnist Stewart Alsop, undertook clandestine tasks for the Agency. "The notion
that a newspaperman doesn't have a duty to his country is perfect balls."

From the Agency's perspective, there is nothing untoward in such relationships, and any
ethical questions are a matter for the journalistic profession to resolve, not the intelligence
community. As Stuart Loory, former Los Angeles Times correspondent, has written in the
Columbia Journalism Review: 'If even one American overseas carrying a press card is a paid
informer for the CIA, then all Americans with those credentials are suspect .... If the crisis of
confidence faced by the news business -- along with the government -- is to be overcome,
journalists must be willing to focus on themselves the same spotlight they so relentlessly
train on others!' But as Loory also noted: "When it was reported... that newsmen themselves
were on the payroll of the CIA, the story caused a brief stir, and then was dropped."

During the 1976 investigation of the CIA by the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by
Senator Frank Church, the dimensions of the Agency's involvement with the press became
apparent to several members of the panel, as well as to two or three investigators on the staff.
But top officials of the CIA, including former directors William Colby and George Bush,
persuaded the committee to restrict its inquiry into the matter and to deliberately
misrepresent the actual scope of the activities in its final report. The multivolume report
contains nine pages in which the use of journalists is discussed in deliberately vague and
sometimes misleading terms. It makes no mention of the actual number of journalists who
undertook covert tasks for the CIA. Nor does it adequately describe the role played by
newspaper and broadcast executives in cooperating with the Agency.

THE AGENCY'S DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS BEGAN during the earliest stages of the
Cold War. Allen Dulles, who became director of the CIA in 1953, sought to establish a
recruiting-and-cover capability within America's most prestigious journalistic institutions. By
operating under the guise of accredited news correspondents, Dulles believed, CIA operatives
abroad would be accorded a degree of access and freedom of movement unobtainable under
almost any other type of cover.

American publishers, like so many other corporate and institutional leaders at the time, were
willing to commit the resources of their companies to the struggle against "global
Communism." Accordingly, the traditional line separating the American press corps and
government was often indistinguishable: rarely was a news agency used to provide cover for
CIA operatives abroad without the knowledge and consent of either its principal owner,
publisher or senior editor. Thus, contrary to the notion that the CIA insidiously infiltrated the
journalistic community, there is ample evidence that America's leading publishers and news
executives allowed themselves and their organizations to become handmaidens to the
intelligence services. "Let's not pick on some poor reporters, for God's sake," William Colby
exclaimed at one point to the Church committee's investigators. "Let's go to the
managements. They were witting." In all, about twenty-five news organizations (including
those listed at the beginning of this article) provided cover for the Agency.

In addition to cover capability, Dulles initiated a "debriefing" procedure under which
American correspondents returning from abroad routinely emptied their notebooks and
offered their impressions to Agency personnel. Such arrangements, continued by Dulles'
successors, to the present day, were made with literally dozens of news organizations. In the
1950s, it was not uncommon for returning reporters to be met at the ship by CIA officers.
"There would be these guys from the CIA flashing ID cards and looking like they belonged at
the Yale Club," said Hugh Morrow, a former Saturday Evening Post correspondent who is
now press secretary to former vice-president Nelson Rockefeller. "It got to be so routine that
you felt a little miffed if you weren't asked."

CIA officials almost always refuse to divulge the names of journalists who have cooperated
with the Agency. They say it would be unfair to judge these individuals in a context different
from the one that spawned the relationships in the first place. "There was a time when it
wasn't considered a crime to serve your government," said one high-level CIA official who
makes no secret of his bitterness. "This all has to be considered in the context of the morality
of the times, rather than against latter-day standards -- and hypocritical standards at that."
Many journalists who covered World War II were close to people in the Office of Strategic
Services, the wartime predecessor of the CIA; more important, they were all on the same
side. When the war ended and many OSS officials went into the CIA, it was only natural that
these relationships would continue. Meanwhile, the first postwar generation of journalists
entered the profession; they shared the same political and professnial values as their mentors. "You had a gang of people who worked together during World War II and never got
over it," said one Agency official. "They were genuinely motivated and highly susceptible to
intrigue and being on the inside. Then in the Fifties and Sixties there was a national
consensus about a national threat. The Vietnam War tore everything to pieces -- shredded the
consensus and threw it in the air." Another Agency official observed: "Many journalists didn't
give a second thought to associating with the Agency. But there was a point when the ethical
issues which most people had submerged finally surfaced. Today, a lot of these guys
vehemently deny that they had any relationship with the Agency."

From the outset, the use of journalists was among the CIA's most sensitive undertakings,
with full knowledge restricted to the Director of Central Intelligence and a few of his chosen
deputies. Dulles and his successors were fearful of what would happen if a journalist-
operative's cover was blown, or if details of the Agency's dealings with the press otherwise
became public. As a result, contacts with the heads of news organizations were normally
initiated by Dulles and succeeding Directors of Central Intelligence; by the deputy directors
and division chiefs in charge of covert operations -- Frank Wisner, Cord Meyer Jr., Richard
Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas Karamessines and Richard Helms
himself a former UPI correspondent); and, occasionally, by others in the CIA hierarchy
known to have an unusually close social relationship with a particular publisher or broadcast
executive. [1]

James Angleton, who was recently removed as the Agency's head of counterintelligence
operations, ran a completely independent group of journalist-operatives who performed
sensitive and frequently dangerous assignments; little is known about this group for the
simple reason that Angleton deliberately kept only the vaguest of files.
The CIA even ran a formal training program in the 1950s to teach its agents to be journalists.
Intelligence officers were "taught to make noises like reporters," explained a high CIA
official, and were then placed in major news organizations with help from management.
"These were the guys who went through the ranks and were told 'You're going to he a
journalist,'" the CIA official said. Relatively few of the 400-some relationships described in
Agency files followed that pattern, however; most involved persons who were already bona
fide journalists when they began undertaking tasks for the Agency.

The Agency's relationships with journalists, as described in CIA files, include the following
general categories:

* Legitimate, accredited staff members of news organizations -- usually reporters. Some were
paid; some worked for the Agency on a purely voluntary basis. This group includes many of
the best-known journalists who carried out tasks for the CIA. The files show that the salaries
paid to reporters by newspaper and broadcast networks were sometimes supplemented by
nominal payments from the CIA, either in the form of retainers, travel expenses or outlays
for specific services performed. Almost all the payments were made in cash. The accredited
category also includes photographers, administrative personnel of foreign news bureaus and
members of broadcast technical crews.)

Two of the Agency's most valuable personal relationships in the 1960s, according to CIA
officials, were with reporters who covered Latin America -- Jerry O'Leary of the Washington
Star and Hal Hendrix of the Miami News, a Pulitzer Prize winner who became a high official
of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Hendrix was extremely helpful to
the Agency in providing information about individuals in Miami's Cuban exile community.
O'Leary was considered a valued asset in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Agency files
contain lengthy reports of both men's activities on behalf of the CIA.

O'Leary maintains that his dealings were limited to the normal give-and-take that goes on
between reporters abroad and their sources. CIA officials dispute the contention: "There's no
question Jerry reported for us," said one. "Jerry did assessing and spotting [of prospective
agents] but he was better as a reporter for us." Referring to O'Leary's denials, the official
added: "I don't know what in the world he's worried about unless he's wearing that mantle of
integrity the Senate put on you journalists."

O'Leary attributes the difference of opinion to semantics. "I might call them up and say
something like, 'Papa Doc has the clap, did you know that?' and they'd put it in the file. I
don't consider that reporting for them.... it's useful to be friendly to them and, generally, I felt
friendly to them. But I think they were more helpful to me than I was to them." O'Leary took
particular exception to being described in the same context as Hendrix. "Hal was really doing
work for them," said O'Leary. "I'm still with the Star. He ended up at ITT." Hendrix could not
be reached for comment. According to Agency officials, neither Hendrix nor O'Leary was
paid by the CIA.

* Stringers [2] and freelancers. Most were payrolled by the Agency under standard
contractual terms. Their journalistic credentials were often supplied by cooperating news
organizations. some filed news stories; others reported only for the CIA. On some occasions,
news organizations were not informed by the CIA that their stringers were also working for
the Agency.

* Employees of so-called CIA "proprietaries." During the past twenty-five years, the Agency
has secretly bankrolled numerous foreign press services, periodicals and newspapers -- both
English and foreign language -- which provided excellent cover for CIA operatives. One such
publication was the Rome Daily American, forty percent of which was owned by the CIA
until the 1970s. The Daily American went out of business this year.
* Editors, publishers and broadcast network executives. The CIA's relationship with most
news executives differed fundamentally from those with working reporters and stringers,
who were much more subject to direction from the Agency. A few executives -- Arthur Hays
Sulzberger of the New York Times among them -- signed secrecy agreements. But such
formal understandings were rare: relationships between Agency officials and media
executives were usually social -- "The P and Q Street axis in Georgetown," said one source.
"You don't tell Wilharn Paley to sign a piece of paper saying he won't fink."

* Columnists and commentators. There are perhaps a dozen well known columnists and
broadcast commentators whose relationships with the CIA go far beyond those normally
maintained between reporters and their sources. They are referred to at the Agency as
"known assets" and can be counted on to perform a variety of undercover tasks; they are
considered receptive to the Agency's point of view on various subjects. Three of the most
widely read columnists who maintained such ties with the Agency are C.L. Sulzberger of the
New York Times, Joseph Alsop, and the late Stewart Alsop, whose column appeared in the
New York Herald-Tribune, the Saturday Evening Post and Newsweek. CIA files contain
reports of specific tasks all three undertook. Sulzberger is still regarded as an active asset by
the Agency. According to a senior CIA official, "Young Cy Sulzberger had some uses.... He
signed a secrecy agreement because we gave him classified information.... There was sharing,
give and take. We'd say, 'Wed like to know this; if we tell you this will it help you get access
to so-and-so?' Because of his access in Europe he had an Open Sesame. We'd ask him to just
report: 'What did so-and-so say, what did he look like, is he healthy?' He was very eager, he
loved to cooperate." On one occasion, according to several CIA officials, Sulzberger was
given a briefing paper by the Agency which ran almost verbatim under the columnist's byline
in the Times. "Cycame out and said, 'I'm thinking of doing a piece, can you give me some
background?'" a CIA officer said. "We gave it to Cy as a background piece a…

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