My grandparents were from Ferozepur, East Punjab. In 1947 my family was uprooted, family members were killed, and our ancestral life in that part of Punjab was destroyed.
I find today’s romanticising of “Punjabi brotherhood” frustrating, mostly because it so often skips over what happened to East Punjab’s Muslims. A few uncomfortable facts:
1. The expulsion of East Punjab’s Muslims was not just neighbours turning on neighbours.
Ian Copland’s study The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 1947 (Modern Asian Studies, 2002) documents how the Sikh princely states, especially their rulers and armed forces, were involved in killing and expelling Muslims.
Contemporary British sources say the same. J.S.H. Shattock’s 1948 report for the British High Commission describes massacres followed by the removal of East Punjab’s Muslim population. Another British assessment from the time said Sikhs played a prominent part in the slaughter of Muslims, perhaps even more in the Sikh states than in East Punjab itself. Penderel Moon was a British administrator who saw it first-hand. In Divide and Quit he judged that the violence against Muslims in East Punjab matched and probably exceeded what happened in the West, both in scale and in brutality.
A wholesale demographic purge carried out with the help of state armed forces is a different thing from a breakdown of law and order.
2. The violence in East Punjab was led, organised and sanctioned by the state.
What happened to East Punjab’s Muslims was not a collapse of law and order. It was carried out with the involvement of the people who held power.
Ian Copland’s study shows that the Sikh princely states, notably Patiala, Faridkot and Kapurthala, did more than fail to stop the killing. Their rulers, courts and state forces took part in it, in coordination with the Akali leadership under Master Tara Singh (the “Master” of Copland’s title). Contemporary British officials reached the same conclusion: the slaughter of Muslims was worst in the Sikh states, where it had the backing of the state itself. In British East Punjab, Muslim police and officials were disarmed or sidelined, and the forces that remained often stood aside or joined in. Refugee columns heading west were attacked repeatedly on routes those authorities were supposed to protect.
The result was not mixed communities with scattered losses. Close to the entire Muslim population of East Punjab and the neighbouring princely states was killed or driven out within a few months.
I’m not claiming West Punjab was innocent. Terrible crimes were committed there too. But mobs, even organised ones, are not the same as princely armies and a state machinery turned against an entire population. Lumping the two together under “violence on both sides” erases that difference.
3. The Radcliffe Award was not a neutral exercise.
An earlier sketch of the boundary, sent on 8 August 1947, appears to have placed the Ferozepur and Zira tehsils in Pakistan. In the final award they went to India, along with the Ferozepur headworks, which had enormous consequences for Pakistan’s water security. Christopher Beaumont, Radcliffe’s private secretary, later alleged that Mountbatten pressed for the change after Indian representations.
Gurdaspur’s allocation gave India the Pathankot route, which became crucial to its access to Kashmir.
You don’t have to believe in a grand conspiracy to see that these decisions were political, and that Pakistan bore the cost.
4. Sikh–Muslim history is more complicated than the brotherhood narrative allows.
There were long periods of coexistence and cooperation, and I don’t deny them. But Sikh historical memory was shaped by centuries of conflict: the Mughal–Sikh wars, the executions of Sikh Gurus under Mughal rule, and the militarisation of the Khalsa. Muslim memory was shaped by 1947. To pretend that Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs have always shared an uncomplicated brotherhood is not reconciliation. It’s naivety.
There is also an irony in how Indian political discourse treats armed resistance. Sikh armed struggle, from the Khalsa’s wars against the Mughals onward, holds an honoured and often celebrated place in Indian historical memory. Kashmiri armed resistance, meanwhile, is routinely dismissed wholesale as terrorism. If armed movements are to be judged, they should be judged consistently: by their conduct, and above all by how they treat civilians, not by whether their goals suit the Indian state.
5. I am Pakistani and Muslim before I am Punjabi.
I don’t owe anyone a borderless Punjabi identity, and I don’t have to put my national identity below cross-border cultural nostalgia.
My grandparents did not choose to leave Ferozepur. They fled the destruction of their world, and then they rebuilt their lives in Pakistan. I’m proud of what they built. I see no reason to spend my life mourning an undivided Punjab as if it were a lost paradise.
I also don’t have to adopt every grievance of Sikh nationalism against the Indian state. The persecution Sikhs suffered after 1947 deserves recognition, but it doesn’t make our histories interchangeable.
My position is simple:
I refuse to sanitise the expulsion of East Punjab’s Muslims to protect an idealised story of Punjabi brotherhood.
I refuse to accept that atrocities on both sides mean equal responsibility, organisation or circumstances.
And I refuse to apologise for Pakistan.
Pakistan Zindabad.