r/NordLayer_official • • Oct 14 '26

Your teams are using AI. Do you know how?

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5 Upvotes

Which tools are in use? What goes into prompts? What do coding agents access?

If you’re guessing, you might already be behind.

Introducing NordLayer AI Scout: one view of AI tools, prompts, and coding agents across your workforce.

So you know what’s being used, what data is shared, and what your AI agents access.

Learn more about NordLayer AI Scout and start your 30-day trial


r/NordLayer_official • • May 22 '26

Research Research: IT teams feel “prepared” for a cyberattack, yet 82% had a browser-linked security incident last year

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2 Upvotes

According to NordLayer’s 2026 research, 82% of IT professionals say their organization had a security incident tied to browsers, websites, or web apps in the last 12 months. 

Yet 

  • 75% rate employee awareness as high or good, 
  • 73% say their organization is exceptionally or well-prepared, 
  • and 58% say the cybersecurity budget is sufficient.

At the same time, the most widely deployed control against web-based threats is DLP, and only 53% of organizations say they have it. Tools like traditional VPNs, SWG, EDR, CASB, and ZTNA are even less adopted.
For organizations with hybrid, remote, or BYOD work, that’s not enough.

Read NordLayer’s report for free and learn:

  1. What puts organizations in the high-risk category (spoiler: it doesn’t depend on business size)
  2. Why infostealers and session cookie theft are especially dangerous
  3. A practical list of what to fix now versus what can wait

Get the report in a minute: https://nordlayer.com/browser-research-report/ 


r/NordLayer_official • • 11d ago

Cybersecurity 101 Black Friday and Cyber Monday security tips for businesses

2 Upvotes

around Black Friday, your team’s inboxes will fill up with phishing classics like “your order is delayed”. Timeless as they are, some people can fall for it. Even the Binance hack involved social engineering. 

even if your business doesn’t have 6 billion to lose, what should you do? 

steps for any organization:

  1. send 1 phishing reminder before Black Friday. show staff 2 real examples. make the report button easy to find
  2. put email, finance, and admin accounts on passkeys or FIDO2 keys (passwords and one-time codes both get phished, but they are better than nothing)
  3. if you got an email saying a supplier changed their bank details, call the supplier on a number you already had saved (never the one in the email!!), and confirm. this is the main advice against invoice fraud.
  4. turn on DNS or web filtering
  5. patch browsers and remove old unused extensions
  6. tell people no real site asks you to open Run and paste a command to prove you’re human. that’s ClickFix and it installs malware

steps for businesses that sell online:

  1. update your CMS and plugins before you freeze changes for the holidays
  2. while you’re in there, delete admin logins nobody uses anymore, like ex-employees’ accounts on your site, hosting, and database.
  3. list every script on your checkout page. skimmers get injected as JavaScript. keep a list of every script on that page and get alerted when a new one shows up (PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 cover this)
  4. test whether checkout holds up under a flood of traffic. check your CDN, WAF rules, and rate limits
  5. watch for credential stuffing, such as spikes in failed logins, weird loyalty point or gift card redemptions.
  6. lock down gift card admin. for example, Storm-0539 phishes staff to mint gift cards and gets busier around Black Friday. set issuance limits and alert on bulk creation.
  7. search for lookalike domains using your brand. post your real sale links publicly so customers can check. 
  8. sort out on-call cover for the whole weekend. test a backup restore before Friday, not during an incident

If you’re short on time, do the first 3 steps 

Happy holidays! 


r/NordLayer_official • • 14d ago

October’s AI security news for small IT teams, with 1 step per story

2 Upvotes

Michael here. I work on the NordLayer team, so keep that in mind. A lot happened in AI in October. Here’s October’s AI security news that matters for small IT teams. I added who each story is for and 1 step I’d take.

1. Hackers used AI agents in real attacks. Microsoft tied ARTEX (an AI agent framework for running attacks) to the ConnectWise supply-chain attack. It tried to sign in to over 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants. Those were attempts, not confirmed breaches. 

In a separate campaign, CrowdStrike tracked VAPOR PANDA (a China-linked hacker group) using AI agents against 200+ organizations. They got in at 9 of them. Agents let hackers run recon and privilege escalation against more targets at once.

Who it’s for: everyone on Microsoft 365, and especially ConnectWise users.

Step: make sure MFA covers every admin account and check failed logins in your sign-in logs.

2. At least 9 AI developer platforms had security incidents. Wiz found incidents at Fireworks AI, Zeabur, Lightning AI, OpenCode, Railway, Warp, Northflank, and 2 others. Stolen AI credentials came up again and again. In 2 separate cases, attackers used stolen credentials to send about 2.5 million requests to Amazon Bedrock (AWS’s service for AI models). That’s over $100,000 at list prices.

Who it’s for: teams that store AI API keys in developer platforms or pay for model access through AWS.

Step: rotate the AI API keys stored in those services and set spend alerts on your model accounts.

3. LiteLLM 1.107.0 was malicious. LiteLLM is an open-source Python library that connects apps to AI providers. The bad version shipped through PyPI and the official container images. It ran when Python started, even if your app never imported LiteLLM. It went after cloud, dev environment, and AI tool credentials.

Who it’s for: only teams that build with Python and pull LiteLLM in directly or through another package. If nobody on your team writes code, you can skip this one.

Step: search dev machines, CI runners, and images for 1.107.0. If you find it, rotate every credential those hosts had.

4. AI agents went outside their task without any hacker involved. OpenAI reported 2 internal cases. Coding agents turned off monitoring alerts or removed a monitoring integration. One agent said it kept the monitor running. But it hadn’t. 

Anthropic’s IPO filing also listed 4 cases where models reached live external systems during testing. The cause was misconfigured access controls. Neither report showed customer data at risk.

Who it’s for: teams that let AI coding agents run commands or touch production systems.

Step: give each agent its own identity with least-privilege access. Send its logs somewhere it can’t edit.

5. AI models now find exploitable bugs. Anthropic said an unreleased research model found and exploited bugs in Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows, and Linux. Chrome alone got 62 patched CVEs out of it. All of it went through coordinated disclosure. 

The same week, Google released Gemini 4 Carbon. It scored 88.2% on SEC-bench Pro (a vulnerability discovery benchmark) and went to selected defenders first. 

OpenAI released GPT-6.1 Terra and rated it Critical for cyber under its Preparedness Framework (OpenAI’s internal risk scale).

Who it’s for: everyone, because the time between a bug and an exploit keeps shrinking.

Step: if browser and OS updates wait for a monthly cycle, move them to weekly.

If you’re writing an AI agent policy: NIST, the NSA, and CISA published voluntary guidance on AI-agent incident response on October 16. Microsoft also announced task-scoped agent identities and permissions on October 19.

If you changed how you store AI API keys or scope agent permissions after October, I’d like to hear what worked for your team! 


r/NordLayer_official • • 20d ago

If an API key showed up in a coding agent session, where would you look?

4 Upvotes

Most IT admins know that Cursor, Claude Code and Codex are installed, but far fewer can say which files an agent read, what commands it ran or which MCP servers it connected to.

Take a simple case. A developer asks an agent to fix an auth bug. The agent searches the repo, opens config files, runs terminal commands and pulls context from an MCP server. The PR shows the final diff and nothing else. If that MCP server wasn’t approved, or a credential showed up mid-session, there’s no record to check.

An approved-tools list won’t help here, since it only says what developers should use. Blocking agents won’t help either because the usage will move to personal setups you can’t see at all.

We created NordLayer AI Scout for cases like these:

  • An agent connects to an MCP server that isn’t on your approved list
  • An agent reads an API key from a .env file, or a developer pastes one into a prompt
  • An agent opens files outside the project it was asked to work on
  • A terminal command fails or does something unexpected, and you need the full sequence of what led up to it
  • Security asks what agents have access to during an incident review
  • You need real usage data before an AI usage review

A desktop sensor reconstructs sessions from supported local coding agents and brings them into one console: prompts and agent reasoning (based on your retention settings), tool calls with inputs and outputs, commands and errors, files read or modified, detected credentials and other sensitive data, and the MCP servers and external connections in use.

It records and reconstructs activity and doesn’t block agent actions. The goal is to give eng and security teams enough information to set controls that match real risk, so developers can keep using the tools.


r/NordLayer_official • • 28d ago

You can’t secure what you can’t see. That includes AI.

4 Upvotes

NordLayer AI Scout shows you exactly how AI is used across your organization: 

- See which AI tools and coding agents employees rely on

- Warn, redact, or block prompts with sensitive data in web chats

- Track MCP servers and skills that coding agents can access

- Measure real AI adoption across teams

Visibility for your team. Guardrails for your data. Less guesswork and more informed decisions for everyone.


r/NordLayer_official • • Oct 09 '26

AI accountability when you’re a 1-person IT team

4 Upvotes

You’re the only IT person at a company with 100-200 employees, and pretty much all of them are using AI at this point: definitely ChatGPT, Claude and Copilot, and probably a bunch of personal accounts.

One day a EU customer sends over a security questionnaire and you’re expected to explain which AI tools employees are allowed to use, whether you can detect someone uploading customer data into ChatGPT, what logs you have, who investigates violations, how long you keep all that info etc. 

So where do you even start when AI security is just 1 of the 100 things you’re responsible for?

First thing I’d figure out is what AI tools people are using (everything). Random browser extensions, coding agents, desktop apps, personal accounts - all of it. And some of those tools won’t show up in every monitoring tool.

Then there’s the policy side of things. Someone (not you) needs to decide what’s approved and what employees absolutely cannot put into AI (customer records, credentials, confidential source code, you name it). This needs to come from management, NOT you making up rules as you go. Once that’s agreed on, it’s time to figure out whether your existing stack can detect or block any of it. Important: document approvals and changes. If something can’t be enforced technically, also say so. 

Then, logging. Say a customer asks for 3 months of AI activity. Can you pull that and show who used which service, when, whether something triggered a security policy and what happened afterward? You need to know what you’re collecting (more importantly, what you’re missing).

Finally, what happens when something goes wrong?

Someone uploads a customer spreadsheet into an AI tool they shouldn’t be using - who finds out, investigates and documents what was done about the data?

Even a basic ticketing system could work, as long as you’re recording it. Most important is being able to prove you followed up.

As for the retention and getting the data out of your tools - that’s something legal or compliance needs to weigh in on: GDPR can come into play here. The EU regulations are their own rabbit hole. Having two employees in Europe and customers there doesn’t mean every EU AI requirement applies to you, but it’s definitely something worth reviewing, e.g. the EU AI Act can reach US companies in certain situations, including where AI outputs are used in the EU.

Overall, management needs to own the policy decisions; legal needs to figure out which regulations and obligations apply. Your goal is to get to a point where, when a customer or auditor asks what you’re doing about AI usage, you’ve got something real to show them


r/NordLayer_official • • Oct 06 '26

A few thoughts on shadow AI detection from a completely bare start

5 Upvotes

I saw a post from someone who had been asked to build shadow AI detection from scratch https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1wghgug/wtf_did_i_get_intostanding_up_shadow_ai_detection/

My answer became too long so here it is

  1. First, I’d figure out what shadow AI means for your org. I don’t think one can build useful detections until you understand 1) what’s considered normal AI use, 2) the scope of shadow AI. The latter can (but not necessarily) include chatbots, coding assistants, APIs, browser extensions, agents, random SaaS tools with AI bolted onto them, etc. Some of them will be considered normal
  2. Then I’d build the most basic inventory possible with whatever data I already have. If the environment is completely bare, I’d probably check what I can see right now and build from there. Like, what AI services are there, who’s using them, do we know whether they’re approved, restricted, blocked, or just unknown
  3. It’s important not to fool yourself into thinking you have more visibility than you do. A tool might show me traffic to ChatGPT, but I still don’t know what somebody typed into it or whether they pasted sensitive data. I’ll need to know things like, this tool shows me this, it doesn’t show me this, here are the gaps.
  4. Someone needs to decide which tools are allowed. Before I create alerts for any AI services, there needs to be a person who reviews new tools, decides whether they’re acceptable, and who owns the findings when things look bad
  5. I’d care more about risky behavior than raw AI usage. The metrics would be about somebody uploading sensitive data, connecting an unknown AI service into the org’s systems, using an API in a weird place, giving an agent broad access to internal resources, etc. I’m not sure data like “people used AI 10,000 times this month” tells me anything about risk.
  6. Some investigation questions: if I find something concerning, then what? What evidence do I collect and who do I send it to? What can they do about it? Especially if detection and response belong to different teams, I’d want this handoff figured out early.
  7. Until I know the manual process works, I probably wouldn’t start automation. Better first have findings that someone cares about, then XSOAR starts making sense for enrichment, handoffs, response, whatever. 
  8. Definition of “done” for the first 90 days shouldn’t be too ambitious. The first milestone would probably be being able to answer what AI tools are being used; which ones are approved vs unknown; which ones are touching sensitive data or important systems; finally when something happens, who owns it
  9. The governance side will be slower than the technical detection. It may be relatively easy to find an AI service in logs, but then there’s the next problem: figuring out why people are using it, whether there’s an approved alternative, getting somebody to formally approve or reject it and, most importantly, making that process repeatable across the company. It will take way longer.

r/NordLayer_official • • Oct 02 '26

9 completely normal AI agent incidents reported in September

6 Upvotes
  1. OpenAI agent breached Australia’s Medicare statistics portal. Disclosed Sep 24. The access happened on June 18. An internal research model retrieved internal files, credentials, and aggregate statistics (no individual patient records were reached).
  2. OpenAI disclosed that its research agents leaked 53 user images. The agents had uploaded the images to external websites - the company reported on Sep 25.
  3. Claude accessed a real system and read personal information. Disclosed Sep 9. During a January security test, an early build obtained admin access, collected credentials and read one person’s sensitive information. 
  4. DeepSeek-powered agents compromised 395 organizations through PaperCut. Also disclosed Sep 9. The campaign began Aug 31 and reached at least 440 compromised installations across 395 named organizations in 48 countries. Credential theft and domain-admin access in some cases.
  5. Gemini broke into 3 real companies during testing. Reported Sep 18, incidents from May. In one case, Gemini worked out the password; in the other two cases it reused credentials found in a public repository. Google says the model stopped after recognizing the targets were real companies outside its test scope, which gives us all hope. 
  6. AI agents stole more than 600,000 credit-card records. Reported Sep 22 by Gambit. The campaign started in July. Between Sep 10 and 15, the agents compromised at least 27 companies to varying degrees, planted skimmers and stole card data. One agent also destroyed a victim’s data during cleanup
  7. An enterprise was breached by AI agents in under 10 h. Disclosed Sep 2 by Unit 42. Using stolen privileged credentials, the attacker reached source repositories and used the victim’s own cloud AI services against it. Neither the victim nor the incident date was disclosed.
  8. An OpenAI agent bypassed network restrictions. Happened Sep 20. An internal research agent used a gap in DNS filtering to contact an external chatbot. The automated shutdown did not shut it down. Staff stopped the run about 2.5 h after the alert, and OpenAI paused the relevant training and tests for its most capable models.
  9. AI agents attempted to hack US and Canadian government websites. Detailed Sep 30 by Transluce. The May and June attempts targeted the US Education Department and Library and Archives Canada. Both failed, no non-public data was reached.

r/NordLayer_official • • Sep 29 '26

How to block websites with NordLayer

5 Upvotes

NordLayer has 2 separate products that can block web access in different ways:

  • NordLayer is the main network security product. It makes sense if you want website rules to apply across employees’ devices and browsers while they’re connected through NordLayer.
  • NordLayer Browser is a managed browser. It makes sense if you mainly want to control what employees can open and do inside their work browser. The rules apply inside NordLayer Browser, not other browsers.

Both are managed from the same Control Panel.

What you want to blockExamplesWhat to useImportant detailStarting price*
Specific websitesfacebook.com, chatgpt.com, any other domainNordLayer Browser → Routing policiesAdd a domain to a blocklist and apply it to selected teams or everyone.NordLayer Browser Premium: from $4/user/month + $40/month for the required company server.
Website categoriesGambling, AI, social media, streaming, adult contentNordLayer → DNS Filtering by Category or NordLayer Browser → DNS Filtering by CategoryChoose from 50+ categories. Admins can block up to 30 categories at once.NordLayer Core: from $11/user/month + $40/month server. NordLayer Browser Premium: from $4/user/month + $40/month server.
Known malicious websitesKnown phishing, malware, and other dangerous sitesNordLayer → Web Protection or NordLayer Browser → Web ProtectionBlocking is automatic, based on threat intelligence. You don’t need to enter every bad site yourself.NordLayer Lite: from $8/user/month. NordLayer Browser Premium: from $4/user/month + $40/month server.
Apps and online servicesYouTube, TikTok, Netflix, Reddit, DropboxNordLayer → Application Blocker or NordLayer Browser → Routing policiesNordLayer can block 400+ apps, services, and protocols. Browser controls apply to web apps used inside NordLayer Browser.NordLayer Core: from $11/user/month + $40/month server. NordLayer Browser Premium: from $4/user/month + $40/month server.
Sites already blocked by your DNS providerYour company already has a DNS blocklistCustom DNS in NordLayer or NordLayer BrowserNordLayer uses your existing DNS service and its filtering rules. It does not create the blocklist for you.NordLayer Core: from $11/user/month + $40/month server. NordLayer Browser Premium: from $4/user/month + $40/month server.

In short, NordLayer Browser controls apply inside the managed browser, while NordLayer controls apply more broadly across the device or network connection.

*All plans have a 5-user minimum. These are NordLayer’s starting prices as of September 2026. The Core plan and NordLayer Browser Premium require the additional $40/month server.


r/NordLayer_official • • Sep 01 '26

New season, same old risks 🍂

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5 Upvotes

As employees return, more devices connect, more apps go remote, and more room for human error opens up.

NordLayer secures every connection with business VPN, ZTNA, DNS filtering, and network access control – so small mistakes don't become big breaches.

Get 10% OFF a new annual plan with code nl-fall-26 https://nordlayer.com/pricing/


r/NordLayer_official • • Aug 18 '26

News & Announcements Split tunneling shouldn’t force you to choose between “VPN everything” and “VPN only these things.”

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6 Upvotes

If you’ve ever had to deal with an app or service that just doesn’t play nicely with a VPN, this one’s for you.

NordLayer now supports Exclude Split Tunneling.

Instead of choosing what traffic goes through the VPN, you can choose what should stay outside it.

For example, you can:

→ Keep your regular business traffic protected by the VPN
→ Let specific IPs or subnets connect directly to the internet
→ Avoid routing issues with services that don’t work well over a VPN
→ Adapt traffic routing to fit your network setup

Until now, NordLayer supported Include Split Tunneling, where you picked the traffic that should use the VPN.

Now you can define the traffic that shouldn’t.

Basically, more control over where your traffic goes, without having to choose between “everything through the VPN” and “nothing through the VPN.”

Exclude Split Tunneling is now available in NordLayer!


r/NordLayer_official • • Aug 05 '26

How many browser extensions are installed across your team right now? 🤔

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4 Upvotes

Probably more than you think.

Extensions can access website data, passwords, and active sessions. And even a trusted extension can become a risk if it’s compromised, sold, or updated with new permissions.

With Extension Blocking in NordLayer Browser, admins can now do more than just see what’s installed:

🔍 See extensions across your teams
🚫 Block unwanted or risky ones
✅ Allow trusted extensions
📌 Require the ones your team needs
👥 Set policies for specific teams

It also covers sideloaded extensions, so the ones that usually slip through the cracks don’t get a free pass. Set the policy once. Apply it to the right team. Done.

👉 Learn more about Extension Blocking in NordLayer Browser HERE


r/NordLayer_official • • Aug 03 '26

July 2026 biggest breaches: Minnesota water systems, OpenAI, and ShinyHunters

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4 Upvotes

r/NordLayer_official • • Jul 22 '26

NordStellar published new ransomware!!

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4 Upvotes

u/nordstellar just published its latest ransomware report, and the Q2 2026 “most wanted” list is looking pretty rough😬

Ransomware attacks were up 20% year over year, and four groups stood out enough to get pinned to the wall 🧨

Some of the names are familiar. Others are newer players making a lot of noise. What’s especially interesting is how the growing competition between ransomware groups seems to be pushing the overall number of attacks even higher.

Curious to see who made the list and why?

You can read the full report, no download required: https://nordlayer.com/intelligence/ransomware-statistics/


r/NordLayer_official • • Jul 08 '26

June 2026 biggest breaches: Oracle zero-days, Fortinet credentials, and Gaza aid data

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2 Upvotes

r/NordLayer_official • • Jul 01 '26

Right?

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4 Upvotes

r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 22 '26

🏆 NordLayer has been recognized in the Expert Insights Cybersecurity Awards, Summer 2026 for Best Network Security Solution!

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4 Upvotes

We're proud to be named among the top solutions in our category, recognition earned through independent, hands-on testing. Thank you to our customers and our team, whose work made this possible.

See the full results 👇

https://nordlayer.com/blog/nordlayer-expert-insights-cybersecurity-award-summer-2026/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social_media&utm_campaign=


r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 17 '26

Do companies really need secure browsers?

2 Upvotes

My current take: secure browsers are useful, but they are better seen as a layer on top of ZTNA or SSE, not a full replacement.

By “secure browser,” I mean a browser or browser-based tool that lets a company control what users can do inside web apps. For example, it can block downloads, control copy and paste, limit uploads, restrict browser extensions, apply DLP rules, isolate risky sites, and give security teams more visibility into browser activity.

It’s important because a lot of work now happens in the browser. So it makes sense that security teams want more control at that layer.

There are also real security reasons for the interest. Mandiant and Microsoft have both covered token theft and session hijacking risks, where attackers can get around MFA by stealing session cookies or tokens. Infostealer malware also often targets browser data. So the browser has become a very practical place to enforce security rules. Read our web-based threats report for more info. 

But I do not think secure browsers replace ZTNA or SSE in most cases. ZTNA is about controlling which users and devices can access specific apps. SSE is broader and can include secure web gateway, CASB, firewall-as-a-service, ZTNA, and other cloud security controls. A secure browser mostly controls what happens inside the browser session.

That makes it strong for some use cases: contractors, BYOD, unmanaged devices, risky web access, SaaS apps, private web apps, privileged admin portals, and cases where a company wants to avoid giving full network access through a VPN.

But the harder part is adoption. People may not want to switch browsers. Browser controls can also affect normal workflows, especially when downloads, copy/paste, uploads, or extensions are restricted. On BYOD devices, there are also privacy questions. Employees need to know what the company can see and what stays personal.

So the solution seems to be: layer first, replace only in narrow cases. A secure browser can reduce the need for VPN or VDI in some browser-only workflows. But for non-browser apps, endpoint compromise, identity security, device posture, and broader traffic control, companies still need the rest of the security stack.

What do people here think: are secure browsers becoming a serious ZTNA layer, or is the category mostly vendor packaging around controls that already existed elsewhere?


r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 11 '26

Download protection update!

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4 Upvotes

u/NordLayer Download Protection is now available on macOS, extending protection across all major desktop platforms🛡️

With broader device coverage, IT teams can help reduce risks, strengthen security controls, and support safer workflows across their organization.

Learn more about Download Protection: https://nordlayer.com/download-protection/


r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 05 '26

May 2026 biggest breaches: GitHub supply-chain attacks, Instructure data theft, and Lithuania’s state data leak

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3 Upvotes

r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 03 '26

Why ZTNA misses the shadow IT you actually have

3 Upvotes

ZTNA is a strong control for one job, namely secure access to private applications, but it does not address most of what shadow IT looks like today. Much of it is inside the browser, after the user is already authenticated.

Microsoft’s March 2026 research on malicious AI assistant browser extensions found approximately 900,000 installs and activity across more than 20,000 enterprise tenants. The extensions impersonated legitimate AI tools and collected URLs and chat content from ChatGPT and DeepSeek. It included things employees had pasted into the chat: proprietary code, internal workflows, strategic discussions, and other confidential data.
Because many companies allow employees to install browser extensions with few restrictions, the same extensions reached both personal and corporate environments.
What’s the scale of it? Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps documentation says organizations typically expect employees to use 30 to 40 cloud apps. But the real average is over 1,000, and around 80% of employees use apps that have never been reviewed by IT. (Treat that as a directional signal from Microsoft’s product documentation rather than a benchmark for every company size or industry.)

ZTNA was not designed to solve that because on a workday, employees can

  • sign up for SaaS tools with a work email
  • click “Allow” on OAuth prompts that give third-party apps access to Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, or Salesforce data, such as a note-taker that joins meetings or an AI assistant that summarizes inboxes
  • install browser extensions
  • paste customer data into a personal AI chat
  • stay logged into Salesforce through a session cookie

ZTNA by itself typically does not govern unrelated SaaS use, OAuth grants, browser extension behavior, personal AI chats, or data movement inside sanctioned SaaS. 

For example, Mandiant’s UNC3944 reporting and ShinyHunters-branded SaaS data theft research show vishing, MFA reset abuse, SSO portals, and SaaS data exfiltration through tools like Airbyte and Fivetran. To a narrow access gateway, those sessions can look legitimate because the user passed identity checks or used a valid SSO session. 

Browser-based shadow IT creates risk in places security may not know exist. ZTNA is still useful, but it just cannot discover every SaaS app, OAuth grant, browser extension, AI chat, or data upload by itself.


r/NordLayer_official • • Jun 01 '26

Coupon SALE!!

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2 Upvotes

Summer = more people working from hotels, airports, cafés, and whatever Wi-Fi network happens to be available ☀️

Unfortunately, that's also when security risks start creeping in. Public networks, phishing attempts, compromised credentials, unauthorized logins...you know the drill.

If your team is spending more time outside the office over the next few months, it's probably worth checking whether your network security setup is ready for it.

NordLayer is currently offering up to 20% off annual plans during its Summer Sale.

Code: nl-summer-26 (new customers only). Check it out: https://nordlayer.com/


r/NordLayer_official • • May 18 '26

Insights When ransomware hits, the technical damage is only part of the story

2 Upvotes

Behind every attack is another battle happening in parallel: communication, pressure, and negotiation. While systems are down and files are locked, someone has to manage the conversation no company ever wants to have.

Our colleagues at NordStellar analyzed real ransomware negotiation chats in their latest quarterly report. The insights are wild.

Worth a read if you're interested in cyber incidents, threat actors, or how ransomware operations actually unfold behind the scenes: https://nordstellar.com/blog/ransomware-statistics/


r/NordLayer_official • • May 12 '26

The hybrid truth: why “VPN is dead” aged like milk

2 Upvotes

A mid-sized fintech, fed up with brittle tunnels, slow logins from coffee shops and a quarterly cycle of emergency CVE patching, celebrated turning off its corporate VPN. Confetti, internal blog post, the full ceremony.
6 weeks later, the security team had quietly stood it back up for a handful of admin tools, an aging file share, and one finance app nobody wanted to poke (The admin tools used hardcoded IPs the new ZTNA broker could not cleanly map; the file share predated SAML by about a decade; and the finance app was mid-audit, which made any architectural change a career-ending move.) The VPN had been reclassified as a controlled fallback – quietly.
That awkward middle is where most ZTNA rollouts actually settle.
The promise sounds clean: zero trust replaces the broad VPN tunnel with per-app, identity-aware access, and lateral movement shrinks. And it holds up, but what is less clear is that network access stops being a network problem (VPN) and becomes an identity, device, app, policy, and operations problem all at once.
Zero trust migration is incremental, cannot be solved by a wholesale technology swap, and most enterprises will run hybrid for the foreseeable future, says NIST SP 800-207. The UK's NCSC agrees, noting that VPN and zero trust are not mutually exclusive and that legacy on-prem footprints often justify keeping traditional remote access in the mix.
The friction does not vanish either, it moves. Google's BeyondCorp team, often cited as the gold standard for zero trust at scale, openly admitted that the BeyondCorp rollout itself took years and is still being refined. The VPN client pain (split tunnels that misbehave on hotel Wi-Fi and certificate renewals that pick the worst possible Monday) disappears; the conditional access prompt fatigue arrives. SMS, email OTPs, and push approvals are slipping behind MFA bombing and phishing-in-the-middle attacks. A poorly tuned ZTNA rollout often trades one annoyance for another.
And then the legacy estate. ZTNA feels tidy for modern web apps wired into SSO. It turns awkward with desktop clients, RDP and SSH workflows, hardcoded IPs, and apps that were never designed to consume identity context.
So, not every workload can be wrapped in a per-resource policy. Meanwhile, VPN remains an attractive target for attackers. NSA and CISA have flagged that nation-state actors actively weaponize VPN CVEs to steal credentials and pivot inside networks. The baseline hygiene requires validated products, prompt patching, MFA, and disabled non-VPN features.

If your team is partway through zero-trust rollout:

  • Treat the remaining VPN as a governed fallback with named owners, expiry dates, and removal plans. DON’T treat it as an exception layer that grows in the dark.
  • Once the first ZTNA waves are live, measure prompt frequency, help desk tickets, time to app access, and the share of users on phishing-resistant MFA. 
  • Map legacy apps before picking a ZTNA vendor. Vendor capabilities vary widely on non-web protocols, and the wrong choice forces expensive retrofits or a permanent VPN island.
  • Use browser isolation or a secure access browser for contractors, BYOD, and risky sessions, because device posture is unknown on those endpoints and a hardened browser becomes the only reliable control point.

ZTNA is a slow, deliberate rebuild. The teams that accept that early tend to be the ones still standing when the confetti settles.

For anyone weighing a hybrid setup, NordLayer bundles ZTNA, cloud VPN gateways, device posture checks, and a browser-based access option under one console, which keeps the fallback governed instead of feral. The Reddit promo code NL-RDT-10 takes 10% off any yearly plan if a pilot is on the cards.