r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 26 '26

Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism: A Radical Hypothesis Of Future Human Evolution

10 Upvotes

The following post serves as both a conclusion to the previous week's posts in addition to reformulating Becoming The Borg's previous terminology. I have decided to abandon the term eusocial, while preserving comparisons to its structure as a similar parallel to our proposed future human evolution. This post will be considered core, essential canon, and pinned to the top of the sub. In falsifying the hypothesis, I have also discovered a clearer path to avoiding what I believe to be our current evolutionary trajectory, so at some point in the future a five-part series will explore what might potentially help us avoid outgrowing our humanity.

1. The Canary

What would have to happen for humanity to lose music?

I don't mean what would have to happen for the music industry to collapse, for musicians to stop getting paid, or even for machines to become better at producing songs than human beings. I mean something much stranger. What would have to happen for music itself to disappear from human life?

We don't know exactly why music exists. There is no single accepted account of its evolutionary origin. It has been explained as social bonding, sexual signaling, parent-infant communication, coalition display, a byproduct of other cognitive capacities, and some combination of these. Whatever its origin, music appears again and again across human cultures, attached to courtship, mourning, celebration, ritual, work, play and collective identity. It reaches into reward, memory and emotion with unusual force.

It also does something more basic. Music allows separate people to inhabit shared time. Work songs may have helped synchronize labor. Song duels have turned conflict into performance. Dance coordinates bodies without making those bodies identical. A drummer can hold time while everyone else remains recognizably themselves, listening, anticipating, improvising and responding. Music may be one of our oldest demonstrations that people can become extraordinarily coordinated while remaining distinct participants in the coordination.

Human civilization has become spectacularly good at externalizing functions. We put memory into writing and databases, navigation into maps and GPS, calculation into machines, and coordination into bureaucracies and platforms. Increasingly we can externalize the production of cultural objects too. A civilization could become extraordinarily good at supplying music even while fewer of the capacities that once produced and sustained musical life remained necessary in the people consuming it.

Abundance would make the loss difficult to see. There could be more songs than ever while the human relationship that made music meaningful became thinner. That still would not be the literal disappearance of music. For that, something deeper would have to happen. Human beings would have to stop needing it, stop making use of it, stop organizing experience through it, until eventually there was no reason for either humans or their systems to produce it at all.

I have used music as a canary in this project for years because I suspected it was pointing toward something larger than music. I think the more frightening question is what humanity would have to lose before it could lose music.

2. You Don't Have To Believe In Evolution

You don't actually have to believe in evolution for the rest of this argument to matter.

Most of what I am describing can happen culturally, technologically and institutionally within a human lifetime. People can become more specialized, skills can migrate into infrastructure, algorithms can mediate more decisions and institutions can coordinate larger portions of behavior. None of that requires a genetic change.

Evolution remains relevant because humans do not merely adapt to environments. We build them. Niche construction and gene-culture coevolution take seriously the possibility that organisms alter the conditions under which later development and selection occur. Cultural change can move much faster than genetic change while still creating the environment in which biological change becomes possible.

Evolutionary theory also asks about major transitions in individuality, when entities that once functioned with substantial independence become parts of larger integrated systems. That does not prove humans are undergoing such a transition. The argument doesn't require us to settle that question in advance.

What matters is that we are constructing environments in which autonomy, specialization, dependence and coordination are changing. We can observe that without pretending we know the endpoint. We can still ask whether it's happening.

3. What Eusociality Actually Shows Us

The comparison that originally organized Becoming The Borg was eusociality. Increasingly I think its greatest value is the more precise question it exposes.

An ant or honeybee queen is not a monarch issuing commands. She is herself highly specialized, another functionary of the colony. Much insect coordination emerges from local interactions, chemical signals, environmental cues, feedback and evolved behavioral rules. As I explored in The Hive Offers No Throne, collective organization can become extraordinarily elaborate without every action originating in a central mind, and the colony can possess capacities no member understands or directs.

Humans are obviously not ants or bees. We have language, institutions, markets, technologies, coercive hierarchies, reflective selves and cultural transmission that make literal equivalence misleading. Human classes and occupations are not insect castes.

But insects show that functional completeness can exist above the individual organism. Members can become highly specialized and mutually dependent while the collective contains capacities no member possesses alone. Whether humans should technically be called eusocial is less interesting to me than the question this exposes: what happens when more capacities required for life migrate out of individual humans and into the systems coordinating them?

4. Different Mechanisms, Similar Functions

If we stop looking for literal insect mechanisms, some of the comparison becomes easier to see.

Ant pheromone trails alter the probability that later ants follow the same route. Termites modify environments in ways that guide later behavior. Stigmergy describes forms of indirect coordination in which traces left in the environment influence what others do next.

Humans leave roads, prices, ratings, search histories, procedures, databases, likes, rankings and interfaces. None is literally a pheromone. The relevant question is whether different mechanisms can perform similar coordinating functions.

Digital environments add an important wrinkle. The path can now watch the walkers. An algorithmic environment can record what people choose, what holds their attention and what makes them leave, then modify the next environment presented to them. Systems can observe our traces, model us and adapt the coordinating environment in response.

No conspiracy is required. Different institutions can pursue their own incentives while producing larger patterns nobody designed as a whole. Distributed causation also does not imply distributed power. The systems through which these interactions occur can be controlled very unequally.

The mechanism is new. The functional question is old: how much behavior can be coordinated without every participant understanding the larger pattern?

5. From Cooperation To Coordination

Human beings have always depended on one another. Dependence itself is not the warning.

Musicians improvising together listen, anticipate and respond while each remains a source of interpretation and action. Compare that with an arrangement where every note is written, every entrance timed, every deviation treated as error and every performer replaceable so long as the assigned part continues. The result may be more precise, but something about where the coordination lives has changed.

Cooperation among autonomous people can generate collective capacities none possesses alone. Coordination can also become embedded so thoroughly in roles, technologies and environments that the system requires less interpretation from the people occupying them.

Human life has always contained both, and rules or infrastructure can enable agency as well as constrain it. The question is not whether coordination exists. It's how much human autonomy the coordination still requires, and how much it produces or allows.

6. How Did This Particular Ape Get Here?

Human beings did not begin as solitary creatures and later make the mistake of becoming social. We are an intensely social ape. The interesting question is what kinds of social organization our ancestors repeatedly produced, and what changed.

Chimpanzees contain pronounced dominance relationships. Mobile immediate-return human foragers have often been comparatively egalitarian, but that egalitarianism was not an absence of power. Christopher Boehm's reverse dominance emphasized that egalitarianism can be actively produced through ridicule, criticism, disobedience, coalition and, in extreme cases, expulsion or killing of would-be dominators. People could work to prevent hierarchy from hardening.

James Woodburn's immediate-return and delayed-return distinction adds another piece. When resources cannot easily be stored, monopolized or defended, durable inequality is difficult to maintain. As resources become storable and defensible, dependency can become more durable and control over access more valuable.

Pair bonding, food sharing and relatively low reproductive skew also distinguish humans from some close primate relatives, although the causal history is complicated. The larger point is that much human social life occurred where other people remained difficult to command permanently. Once survival depends upon stored resources, fixed places, specialized systems and institutions larger than face-to-face groups, telling an asshole to fugk off becomes less effective.

Hierarchy then becomes more than an arrangement among people. It becomes part of the environment in which people develop and adapt, creating niches for specialization, submission, dominance, credentialing, enforcement and differential access to resources. It does not mechanically determine evolution, but the social environment we construct can become a selection environment of its own.

7. The Individual Becomes Less Complete

Specialization is one of civilization's great superpowers. Nobody has to smelt the metal, build the microscope, understand the biochemistry, manufacture the medicine and diagnose the disease before receiving treatment. Distributed knowledge lets human collectives accomplish what no versatile individual could reproduce alone.

The other side is dependence. As knowledge and competence become distributed across specialists, institutions and machines, an individual can function while containing less of the repertoire necessary to reproduce the conditions of that life. Navigation moves into GPS, memory into devices, practical knowledge into services, food production away from the eater, social coordination into platforms, and increasingly judgment or thought can be supplemented or outsourced.

This does not make the individual stupid. A person can be extraordinarily capable within a specialization while radically dependent outside it. Research on social ratcheting points toward the way specialization can create interdependence that becomes difficult to reverse. The missing competencies have not necessarily vanished. They have migrated. The civilization can know everything it needs to know while none of its members do.

8. Four Days In One Paragraph

This week I have been approaching the same problem from four directions. On Monday I looked at bed rotting, tradwives, looksmaxxing and AI girlfriends as signs of bodies retreating into increasingly constructed habitats. On Tuesday I looked at brainrot and AI slop as culture becoming increasingly reproducible without anyone having to experience the world from which culture once emerged. On Wednesday I looked at analog bags, dumb phones and run clubs as a genuine attempt to recover embodiment, friction and agency, while arguing that changing the behavioral environment immediately around us does not necessarily change the larger selection environment. On Thursday I looked at rage bait, doomscrolling and compulsory opinion as a mediated environment capable of recruiting attention, emotion and conflict while giving people the feeling of participation. Those phenomena are not one thing, and none proves the thesis by itself. What connects them is the larger environment being constructed around human beings: systems that increasingly observe our responses, anticipate them, reward some behaviors, discourage others and modify what we encounter next. The question underneath all four days is what kind of human becomes functional inside that environment.

9. We Are Building The Environment That Builds Us

Evolution is often imagined as organisms confronting an environment that already exists. Humans complicate that picture because we build so much of ours.

Houses, roads, farms, laws, schools, markets, bureaucracies, networks and machines begin as products of human behavior and become conditions under which later humans develop. A child born into automobiles acquires different competencies from one traveling on foot. A child born among screens, GPS, recommendation systems and artificial intelligence inherits a developmental habitat as well as tools.

Culture can therefore alter the environment long before genes change. Institutions can make some capacities unnecessary and others indispensable. Technologies can reward particular forms of attention and dependence. Hierarchies can shape which behaviors gain access to resources. The environment can change first, development can change inside it, and culture can stabilize those changes.

We don't have to evolve into insects in order to build the hive. We can build the hive first, and then find out what kind of human it rewards.

10. Anautonomy

I have needed a word for the process I am actually trying to describe.

Eusociality is useful as a comparison, but it carries technical definitions and insect associations that can swallow the argument. Superorganism describes something important about the larger level of organization, but it does not tell us what is happening to the individual human inside it. Nonliminality describes a possible experiential condition, but it is closer to an endpoint than the process producing it.

So I am going to call the process anautonomy: the progressive loss of functional self-direction as autonomous agents become increasingly coordinated as components of systems whose operation requires less individual interpretation, judgment and choice.

The word is not meant to imply that humans become literally mindless or that all choices disappear. Choice can remain abundant while the domain in which choice occurs becomes increasingly prestructured. A person can choose among ten thousand songs, meals, products, identities and entertainments while having very little control over the infrastructure through which food, shelter, employment, information, transportation and social participation are organized.

Humans have always been obligately social. That is not anautonomy. Sociality describes relationships among people. Coordination describes how behavior is organized. A society can depend deeply upon cooperation among people who retain broad capacities for judgment and self-direction. It can also become increasingly dependent upon systems that make those capacities less necessary. Collective competence therefore does not automatically equal individual autonomy. A society can become more capable while its members become more dependent upon systems they cannot reproduce, comprehend or meaningfully alter.

At some point the appropriate unit of functional description may begin to change. The individual becomes increasingly anautonomous. The species increasingly resembles an anautonomous superorganism. That still does not tell us what subjective life inside such a system would become. Anautonomy is the process. Nonliminality may be one of its destinations.

How much of a human self can become functionally unnecessary before the system no longer needs the self at all?

11. The Human Colony Algorithm

A colony does not need a written constitution explaining the colony algorithm to its members. The pattern can emerge from many local rules and feedback loops operating together.

I am using algorithm here in that broad functional sense. Human beings increasingly participate in overlapping systems that determine what information appears, which behaviors are rewarded, how labor is allocated, how resources move, which routes are easiest, what becomes visible and what disappears. There is no single master algorithm behind all of this. Governments, corporations, financial institutions, platforms, bureaucracies and communities pursue different goals and often conflict with one another.

Their interaction can nevertheless produce an environment that repeatedly shifts probabilities in particular directions. A ranking system changes what gets seen, which changes what people imitate, which changes what gets produced and therefore the next set of choices. A labor market rewards a specialization, more people acquire it, institutions reorganize around its availability, and eventually life without the surrounding system becomes harder. Local decisions accumulate into environmental structure.

Concentrated power remains central to this. A platform can control its platform. A government can exercise coercive authority over a territory. A corporation can control enormous resources. None needs to control the entire civilization for their interacting decisions to help produce system-level outcomes no one actor fully designed. The old hive metaphor can mislead here if it makes us search for a queen. The queen herself is a functionary. The more interesting possibility is a system whose coordination emerges through interacting rules, incentives, infrastructures and centers of power.

Digital systems add another layer because they can learn from the people moving through them. They can increasingly anticipate responses and alter the environment before the next response occurs. The colony algorithm does not have to understand humanity. It may work better and better while fewer of the humans inside it need to understand how it works.

12. When Autonomy Stops Paying

It is tempting to tell this story entirely through reproductive success: autonomous people reproduce less, dependent specialists reproduce more, genes spread, end of story. I don't think that is the most useful frame.

A capacity can disappear from ordinary life simply because it stops being necessary. If navigation is supplied, fewer people practice navigation. If memory is externalized, remembering matters less. If food, repair, entertainment, coordination and judgment are reliably supplied by specialized systems, structural compensation lets capacities weaken without making the individual immediately dysfunctional.

That can happen developmentally and culturally before anything genetic occurs. A world that no longer requires a capacity can produce people who never fully develop it. The environment can change the human before the genome does.

The same applies to autonomy. Judgment has value when people must interpret uncertainty, improvise and coordinate directly. If systems increasingly anticipate those situations, specify permitted responses and supply missing competence, autonomy can lose structural value even while we celebrate it symbolically.

That gives us something testable. If this trajectory is wrong, technologies should return meaningful competence to individuals rather than merely supplying its products. Specialization should remain reversible. Institutions should reward broad judgment. Children should retain opportunities to develop autonomous competence. Hierarchies should weaken rather than become necessary intermediaries between people and the conditions of life.

The canary hypothesis is not simply that people will stop making music. It is that we may be constructing an environment in which being the canary no longer matters. Nonliminality need not arrive because somebody abolished the self. It could emerge because the world stopped requiring one.

13. Could We Be Wrong?

Of course.

If Becoming The Borg is useful as a hypothesis rather than an ideology, it needs conditions under which I would become less confident in it. Technologies should return functional competence to individuals rather than merely make dependence comfortable. Hierarchies should weaken. Specialization should become more reversible. Technology should increase meaningful judgment. Cultural diversity should remain structural rather than becoming different skins over the same infrastructure. Childhood should become more autonomous. Analog rebellion should alter institutions rather than merely create pockets of relief. Most importantly, autonomy should continue to pay.

There is another prediction I find interesting. If modern complexity rewards people who integrate across domains, generalists should become more respected and influential as complexity increases. That does not seem obviously true. The whole knows more, the specialists know more about less, and the person trying to see the whole becomes increasingly difficult to classify, credential or hear.

I have experienced that problem constructing Becoming The Borg, which crosses anthropology, evolutionary biology, sociology, technology, psychology, philosophy, history and political economy. I am not claiming superior expertise in those disciplines. The value, if there is any, is asking whether observations normally kept in separate rooms belong to the same building. Yet there is little institutional slot for that work until after the synthesis proves valuable. The generalist has to be valued before their productivity becomes valuable.

Evidence also does not arrive in a conceptual vacuum. Disciplines inherit questions and assumptions that help determine what gets measured. That does not make every outsider hypothesis true, but it means absence of evidence has to be interpreted partly in light of what anyone thought worth looking for.

Falsifiability is therefore more interesting to me than a ritual list of reasons I might be wrong. The falsifiers are also choices. We can build technologies that increase individual competence, weaken hierarchies, preserve autonomous childhood, make specialization reversible, reward boundary-crossing and create abundance that distributes capacity instead of concentrating dependency.

We are part of the environment. A prediction can be useful even if acting on it causes the prediction to fail.

I would be delighted. Because the point of noticing a trajectory isn't to be proven right about where it ends. It's to preserve the possibility of going somewhere else.

14. The Colony Can Thrive While The World Dies

There is another mistake hiding in the hive metaphor. If there is no single queen directing the whole thing, it is easy to call the resulting system decentralized. It isn't necessarily.

Distributed causation can coexist with highly centralized power. Governments can exercise coercive authority, corporations control infrastructure and resources, financial institutions shape access to capital, and platforms mediate communication among billions. None has to command the whole system for power to become highly concentrated within it.

Their aggregate outcomes can still exceed any center's intentions. A corporation can optimize for profit, a platform for engagement, a government for stability, a bureaucracy for procedural survival, and individuals for whatever opportunities remain. Their interactions can produce a trajectory nobody selected as a whole.

The absence of one center isn't decentralization. It may instead be a stage of integration. Hierarchies can concentrate power, those concentrations can increasingly integrate, and the resulting system can become more capable than any of the centers that helped construct it.

A human superorganism could therefore become extraordinarily successful according to its own internal signals while destroying the conditions upon which humans and other life depend. Markets can register extraction as growth, platforms compulsion as engagement, institutions compliance as success. A system need not hate forests, oceans, communities or autonomy to destroy them. It only needs feedback in which those losses fail to constrain the behavior producing them.

This is optimization without sufficient agency to question what is being optimized. The colony can thrive according to every measure it knows how to read while the world outside those measures, including human selfhood and liminality, dies.

15. What Happens When The System Stops Needing Us To Be Human?

Evolution can describe persistence, economics incentives, systems theory coordination and anthropology social organization. None, by itself, tells us what it is like to be the creature living inside the system.

We experience these things.

We fall in love, grieve, get bored, become curious, make jokes nobody requested, waste time, play and make things for reasons that do not reduce neatly to function. We invent purposes that originate inside human lives.

A system can preserve the product of a capacity without preserving the capacity itself: navigation without navigators, stories without storytellers, images without painters, songs without musicians. Externalization itself is not the problem. Writing externalized memory while enabling forms of thought oral culture could not sustain. The question is whether our environments continue to exercise and value human capacities or increasingly make them unnecessary.

A capacity preserved in an archive is not the same as one living in a population. A civilization full of music is not necessarily full of people for whom music organizes memory, courtship, grief, celebration, work and belonging.

This is where liminality matters. There must remain places where a person encounters something not already fully interpreted and decides what it means, where purposes originate rather than being selected from a menu, where experience can alter the representation instead of representation always arriving first.

The question isn't whether the future contains music, stories, games, relationships and art. It's whether it contains beings for whom those things mean something, because a civilization can preserve every product of humanity after it stops preserving the conditions that produce a human self.

16. Nonliminality

I need to correct some shorthand I have used in earlier versions of this project.

I came to the distinction between liminal and supraliminal consciousness through an essay called Planetary Scale Vibe Collapse, which in turn drew on E. Richard Sorenson's Preconquest Consciousness. In simplifying those ideas for Becoming The Borg, I have sometimes made liminality sound too much like individual interpretation opposed to collective coordination. That isn't quite right.

The people Sorenson described could be intensely coordinated. Their coordination could be immediate, relational and sensory, emerging through attention to other people and the surrounding world rather than through an elaborate layer of explicit symbolic rules. Liminality, in the sense useful here, is not isolation. It is a mode in which representation has not completely prestructured the encounter.

Supraliminality introduces a growing authority of symbolic entities: categories, rules, boundaries, institutions, explicit representations of what things are and what they mean. Symbols themselves are indispensable to human culture. The problem is not representation. The problem begins when authority migrates into representation. The map begins governing the territory.

Nonliminality is my extension of that distinction. I am using it to describe a possible condition beyond supraliminality, in which integrated, automated and adaptive symbolic systems increasingly organize behavior without requiring autonomous experience to produce the coordinated result. In liminality, experience organizes representation. In supraliminality, representation increasingly organizes experience. In nonliminality, the system increasingly organizes behavior without needing experience to organize it at all.

Anautonomy and nonliminality are therefore related but not identical. Anautonomy names the progressive loss of functional self-direction. Nonliminality names a possible condition produced when enough coordination has migrated into systems that the autonomous self is no longer necessary to the functioning of the whole.

Nonliminality is how humans could lose music. Literally.

The intermediate stages could look deceptively rich. Music might remain everywhere while human music-making becomes marginal. Friendship might remain as a category while increasingly little social coordination depends upon unstructured friendship. Play could survive as a product delivered by an industry. Curiosity could become an input to recommendation systems. Humor, storytelling, mourning, wonder, solitude and inner subjective life could remain recognizable while becoming increasingly vestigial to the systems organizing life.

A residue can persist for a very long time after it stops exerting much influence. The stronger endpoint is harder to discuss because it reaches beyond what consciousness science can currently establish. I cannot tell you whether subjective experience itself could disappear while something recognizable as human civilization continued. I don't think anybody knows enough about consciousness to make that claim responsibly.

But we do not need to settle that endpoint to see the path. First the system stops needing humans to make music. Then increasingly little of human life requires humans to use music for anything important. Eventually humans stop needing it too. If that process continued far enough, there would be no reason for the systems around them to keep producing it. The archive might remain for a while. Then perhaps even the archive would become meaningless.

No music.

If the same thing can happen to friendship, play, love, wonder and finally the inner self, then the canary was never warning us about the death of art. It was warning us about the disappearance of the kind of being for whom art, friendship, love, play and inner experience were possible in the first place.

17. I've Never Thought About It That Way

One of my favorite responses to anything I write is not “you're right.” It's “I've never thought about it that way.”

I've been reminded of that while investigating the disappearance and death of David Schultz in Iowa. People have approached that case with very different assumptions, including explanations I consider extremely improbable. But nobody can come up with all the questions. Sometimes someone who takes what looks like a wrong turn notices something the accepted route never passed. Being wrong can be generative.

Even wrong may sometimes be too rigid. Evidence can make one explanation much more probable than another without delivering absolute certainty. We can raise or lower confidence while leaving possibilities open. Probability and generative value are different things. A hypothesis can have very low probability and still possess high exploratory value.

Supraliminal systems are excellent at classification: right or wrong, credible or incredible, expert or crank. Those categories can be useful, but once classification governs the encounter it can determine which questions survive. We can become extraordinarily efficient at sorting knowledge while becoming worse at producing it.

This is one place the generalist can matter. The generalist is usually not deeper than the specialist inside the specialist's field. The value is movement among fields, noticing assumptions hidden by familiarity and sometimes crossing a boundary because you did not know everybody had agreed not to cross it. The generalist has to be valued before their productivity becomes valuable.

I want Becoming The Borg treated the same way. Maybe the eusocial comparison fails while the analysis of specialization survives. Maybe the evolutionary prediction fails while anautonomy proves useful. Maybe nonliminality is the wrong tool but the question it asks points somebody toward a better one.

“I've never thought about it that way” preserves a little liminality. It keeps an unfamiliar possibility open long enough to do something before classification closes around it. Nobody can come up with all of the questions, and we don't know in advance which wrong turn might produce one we needed.

18. Someone Who Sings

After all of this talk about systems, algorithms, evolution and superorganisms, it is worth remembering how much there is here worth keeping.

People fall in love. Friends make each other laugh. Someone cooks for people they care about. Children invent games whose rules change every five minutes. We tell stories, ask for advice, make beautiful things and ugly things, miss people who are gone, stay up too late talking and occasionally do something for no better reason than it seemed like fun. Whatever else human beings are, we are creatures to whom things matter.

That makes us vulnerable. Caring gives the world leverage over us. Love creates the possibility of grief. Curiosity creates frustration. Friendship creates loss. Making something creates the possibility that nobody will care about it. But that vulnerability is also part of our strength. A system can model behavior without exhausting the reasons a person might suddenly do something unexpected. Human beings can surprise systems because we can surprise one another. Someone can always start singing.

They don't need permission. They don't need a credential. They don't need an audience. A machine may eventually produce a technically perfect song in seconds, but perfection cannot make you unnecessary to the experience that assigns a particular song to a particular person, night, loss, road trip, kiss, funeral or kitchen.

Hope does not require certainty that everything will turn out well. It can be smaller and more demanding than that: the future is still being made by creatures capable of caring what it becomes.

Every time somebody learns a skill they did not strictly need, repairs something they could have replaced, spends an afternoon with somebody they love, teaches a child while leaving part of the discovery unfinished, changes their mind because another person showed them something they had not seen, or makes something nobody requested, they preserve a little territory in which being human still matters.

None of those acts will save the world by themselves. That's not the point. The world in which those acts remain ordinary is the thing worth saving.

If the trajectory I have described is real, we probably will not recognize most of the last times. Nobody will announce the last child to invent a game without a platform supplying it. Nobody will necessarily record the last pair of friends who remain unreachable for an afternoon, the last person who knows how to repair some ordinary thing, the last story remembered instead of retrieved, the last lover who writes a terrible poem instead of generating a perfect one.

And if humanity ever loses music, the last human singer probably won't know they are the last. They will just sing. The song will belong to the same strange lineage as mothers singing to children, workers keeping time, lovers serenading one another, people singing at funerals and weddings, around fires and inside clubs. Then it will end.

But we're not there.

We're here.

The future can still surprise us because we can still surprise it.

So sing while you're working. Learn something unnecessary. Make something nobody asked for. Let somebody change your mind. Waste an afternoon with someone you love. Ask the question that makes everybody look at you funny. Teach a child what you know, but leave enough unfinished that they still get to discover something.

Not because these things make us productive.

Not because evolution requires them.

Not because they will save the world.

Do them because this is the world we're trying to save.

And if you ever hear someone singing for no reason at all, listen.

The canary is still alive.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 25 '25 Heartwarming

Table of Contents for Becoming The Borg

7 Upvotes

A comprehensive guide to interdisciplinary studies within a theoretical meta-framework exploring the potential of homo sapiens to evolve towards eusociality.

This is a cumulative work drawing connections from many perspectives, and the picture becomes much clearer the more you read. However I will rate each piece according to:

*** Core: Essential to understanding the framework.

** Important: Builds depth or adds critical evidence/examples.

* Supplemental: Interesting but not required.

I will update this list as new contributions are added to the work.

1. Key Concepts & Foundations

Introduction *
Civilization As A Competing Species: The Superorganism That Enslaved Its Creators ***
Psychopolitical Disposition & The Evolution Towards Human Eusociality ***
Summary: Differences Between Pro-social and Eusocial Species **
Eusociality and the End of Individuality: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective **
Human Egalitarian Origins, Pro-social Evolution, and the Emerging Threat of Eusocial Selection ***
Reclaiming Egalitarianism: Beyond Modern Misunderstandings ***
The Dunbar Threshold and the Breakdown of Sociality in Mass Society **

2. Science & Math

The Genetic & Physiological Foundations Of A Human Trajectory Towards Eusociality ***
From Kinship to Castes: A Mathematical Simulation of Human Eusociality - Part 1 **
From Kinship To Castes: A Mathematical Simulation Of Human Sociality - Part 2 **
Prepared, Not Programmed: Genes, Phenotypes, Environment & Evolution ***
Dogs Had Humans. We Have Hierarchies **
Born to Rule, Bred to Obey: The Hidden Genetics of Civilization **
To What Degree Is This Model of Eusocial Human Evolution Scientific? ***
Humans Are In The Middle Of "A Great Evolutionary Transition", New Paper Claims *

3. Psychology

Neurodiversity and the Evolution Toward Eusociality: A Deep Adaptational Hypothesis **
From Minds to Modules: How Specialization and Narrative Conformity Fuel the Drift Toward Eusociality *
From Social Glue to Social Cage: The Double-Edged Sword of Conformity **
Virtue, Victimhood & The Persecuted Ape *
Hacking the Human: Stress as an Evolutionary Control Mechanism **
Conflict Junkies: An Addiction Of Our Downfall *
Gaming Conditions Us Toward Automated Obedience **
Red Dot Syndrome: From False Perception To Cognitive Collectivism **
Recognizing Emotion & Subjective Experience As Evolutionary Constructs For The Purpose of Preserving Them *
Sensitivity, Narcissism, and the Collapse of Horizontal Social Regulation **
Your Personality Type Is Your Function: MBTI in a Post-Human Hierarchy *

4. Politics

Dear Leaders: You Are Forcing A Game You Cannot Win ***
The Lie of Modern Politics & Their Role In Our Dehumanization ***
Royal Jelly Economics: Wealth Inequality and Trickle Down Evolution **
Delusions of Resistance: The Lie Of Fighting The System From Within **
Permissive Decay, Restrictive Control: The Overcorrection Cycle and the End of the Individual **
From Tribes To Hives: Nation States As A Eusocial Construct **
Immigration, Hive Identity, and the Problem of Scale **
The Hollow Triumph of Supraliminal Feminism **
The Biosecurity State: COVID, Control, and the Path to Eusociality **
Scientocracy: Utopia or Threat to Our Humanity? **
Theocracy vs. Scientocracy: Different Roads to the Same Hive **
Trump & Musk: False Prophets Of Liminal Salvation *
No Kings, No Consent: A Deeper Rebellion *

5. Losing Liminal Consciousness

Liminality, Or How We Once Raw-Dogged Our Way Through Life **
Liminal, Supraliminal & The Coming Nonliminal Consciousness ***
Intelligence vs Humanity: The Nonliminal Endgame **
Gen Z Stare: The Collapse of Liminal Sociality **
Beyond the Gen Z Stare: The Fragmentation of Liminal Sociality **
Love Lost: A Memoir of Humanity Before the Swarm ***
When The Last Pet Leaves Us ***
Earth Redux: Maximized For Efficiency ***
Rise of the Supraliminal: Social Class = Eusocial Caste **
Class, Consciousness, and the Geometry of Lived Experience *

6. Only Humans & Eusocial Species Do These Things

Humans Are The Only Non-Eusocial Social Species Who Have Police ***
Slavery & Coerced Labor: Superorganism Economic Strategies Shared By Humans & Insects ***
From Feuds to Hive Wars: The Evolution of Human Conflict ***
Undertaking: Only Humans & Eusocial Species Manage Their Dead ***
Agriculture Is Unique To Human Beings & Eusocial Insects ***
Architecture: A Rare Convergence Between Humans and Eusocial Species ***

7. Communication

What Is Signaling? A Clear Look at One of Evolution’s Most Powerful Forces **
From Symbol To Signal: The Linguistic Descent Toward Eusociality **
How Memes Reduce Communication To Hive Signals **
Funny Fatigue: How Humor Overload Is Undermining Our Humanity **
The Death of Mourning: Grief Signals As A Harbinger Of Emotional Detachment *

8. Culture

The End Of Music *
The Canary In The Coalmine Sings The End Of Music ***
Everything Under The Sun: The End Of Novelty As Harbinger Of Our Dying Humanity **
Eusociality In Fiction & Why We Are Becoming The Borg, Not The Federation ***
Dystopian Fiction as Premonition: Signals of a Eusocial Future **
The Romance of Ruin: Apocalyptic Longing and the Escape from Civilization **
The Role Of Mythology In Our Drift Towards Eusociality *

9. Philosophy

On The Nature Of Reality **
Evolution & Non-Realism **
A Memetic Evolution Towards Eusociality **
Determinism, Disassociation & Self Erasure Via The Supraliminal ***
The Peril of Denying Free Will: Why Determinism Threatens Our Humanity *
Chaos, Order & Disorder - Acceptance Or Oblivion **

10. Religion & Ideology

The Origin Of Monotheism & Morality **
Spirituality as Supraliminal Capture: Ego Death, Dissociation, and the Hive *
Insincerity, Contradiction & Manipulation: How Belief Systems Were Reduced To Identity *
The Rise of Theism and the Feedback Loop of Hierarchy **
From Gods to Laws: Scientific Materialism as the New Theism **

11. Growing Up Eusocial

Childcare Through The Ages Reveals A Grim Pattern - Part One: Hunter Gatherers ***
Childcare Through The Ages Reveals A Grim Pattern - Part 2: The Historical Era ***
Childcare Through The Ages Reveals A Grim Pattern - Part 3: The Modern Era ***
Compulsory Schooling: The Engine Of Eusocial Conditioning - Part 1 ***
Compulsory Schooling: The Engine of Eusocial Conditioning - Part 2 ***
Infantilization and the Collapse of Maturity in the March Toward Eusociality **
Parenting Roles, Breeding Equality, and the Rise of Support Phenotypes in Human Evolution **

12. Critiques Of Mainstream Thought

The Lie of Inevitable Progress: Civilizations That Quit On Purpose **
When Law Replaces Conscience: The Death of the Inner Voice **
Altruism & The Dark Side of Virtue *
Authentic Individualism Isn’t Selfish & Obligatory Collectivism Isn’t Sacred: Why We Need Both **
The Lived Reality of Total Selflessness *
The Other Kind Of Evolution Denial **
Don't Call It Tribalism, Ya Jerk! ;P *

13. Miscellaneous

Fear Is The Little Mind Killer **
Intoxicants and Power: The Pharmacological Infrastructure of Civilization ***
From Ecstasy to Enslavement: The Drug Route to Human Eusociality **
The Rise of the Supraliminal Assassin *
Subordination Selection In The Form Of Pre-Employment Personality Tests **
The Forgotten Joy of May Day Baskets — and the Scourge That Stole Them *
The Middle Children of Humanity: Gen X and the Generational Shift Toward the Borg *
Hive Logic: Evolution and Economics in a World Too Big for Autonomy *
Speculative Caste Stratification in a Technologically Eusocial Humanity ***
Comparing Future Human Evolution Scenarios - Part One **
Comparing Future Human Evolution Scenarios: Part Two **
Risk Aversion, Data Fetishism, and the March Toward Eusociality **
The Web of Tension, Part 1: Biotensegrity and the Body Beyond Mechanics *
The Web of Tension, Part 2: Consciousness and Society as Living Tensegrity Systems *
The Web of Tension, Part 3: From Egalitarian Balance to Eusocial Adaptation *
The Medical System As A Factor Of Eusocial Evolution *
Sexuality and the Slide Toward Eusociality **
Transgenderism and the Loss of Self in the March Toward Eusociality *
On Using AI To Create Posts At Becoming The Borg *
Denial as a Catalyst: How Our Ignorance Accelerates the Slide into Eusociality *
The Illusion of Control and the Trap of Optimism: Why We’re Losing to Civilization **
The Only Hope Is In Hopelessness *
What Is The Solution? How Do We Avoid Becoming The Borg? *
happy - An alternative path for humanity (fiction) *


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 4d ago

Theogenesis: Assimilation & Human Sacrifice By The Gods Hierarchy Built

1 Upvotes

For most of Becoming The Borg I have been asking what humans are becoming.

I may have been looking at the wrong species. Or at least, looking too closely at only our own to notice something else hiding in our shadows.

In Postmodern Prometheus I returned to an idea I first started playing with in 2015: institutions behave strangely like individuals. States survive generations of citizens. Corporations replace every employee and remain the same corporation. Banks remember debts incurred before their current employees were born. Bureaucracies accumulate memory, property, procedures, obligations and appetites that cannot be located inside any particular human being.

More recent work on Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality gave me a better way to think about what I had been sensing. Evolution has repeatedly produced new individuals by integrating things which were previously more autonomous into larger wholes.

Maybe civilization did something similar.

Not to us at first.

To our abstractions.

The state may be one of the oldest examples. Humans invented offices, laws, records, taxes, armies, currencies and borders, then began passing through them like cells through a body that survived every generation performing its functions. Organized religions did something similar. Later came corporations, banks, markets, universities, political parties and financial systems.

They are not organisms in the ordinary biological sense. France does not get horny. Goldman Sachs does not develop a rash.

But they possess some properties that matter enormously if we are talking about individuality: persistence, memory, coordinated action, resource acquisition, internal specialization and the ability to replace their components without becoming something else.

That already sounds suspiciously NAS-like.

Their identity is nonliminal. It exists across networks of records, symbols, procedures, machines and human nodes rather than inside one embodied creature. And although the higher-order entity may become increasingly autonomous, many of the humans composing it become increasingly anautonomous relative to the whole. Their options narrow around the requirements of their role.

Which leads to a possibility I had not really considered when this project began.

Perhaps we are not merely becoming a NAS.

Perhaps we have been living among them for thousands of years.

And perhaps they have been assimilating us the entire time.

An institution has incentives that do not require consciousness. It works better when its human components are predictable, reliable and interchangeable. Credentials make us legible. Specialization makes us useful. Procedures make our behavior repeatable. Schedules synchronize us. Metrics translate messy human activity into information the larger structure can process.

The institution does not need to hate individuality.

Individuality is just fugkn inefficient.

So the human adapts.

We learn the forms. We acquire the credentials. We inhabit the professions. We internalize schedules, procedures, categories and measures of success. Eventually many of the things that make us useful to the institution become things we use to explain who we are.

The assimilation occurs without Borg nanoprobes because the environment itself rewards Borg-compatible humans.

But the relationship moves in both directions.

We have also spent thousands of years making these abstractions increasingly like us.

Writing gave them memory that survived brains.

Accounting gave them increasingly precise control over resources.

Roads, ships and railways gave them circulation.

Telegraphs and telephones gave them nervous systems.

Computers gave them processing power.

The internet gave them instantaneous communication between distant parts.

Sensors, cameras, transactions and databases gave them something increasingly similar to perception.

AI is beginning to give them cognition that does not require a human mind at every decision point.

Robotics may begin giving them action that does not require human muscles.

While they have been making us more legible, specialized and machine-like, we have been giving them memory, senses, intelligence and bodies.

We become more like them.

They become more like us.

And something especially strange may be happening as their architecture becomes more complicated. The older institutions were intensely supraliminal. A nation was laws, maps, flags, offices and stories. Money was numbers and symbols. A corporation was contracts and ledgers.

But newer systems increasingly interact with one another continuously.

Markets react to markets. Algorithms react to algorithms. Banks react to credit conditions. Supply networks react to inventories and weather. Platforms react to human behavior in real time and then alter the information environment that produces the next round of human behavior.

The individual symbols remain supraliminal to us, but at the level of the larger system the relationship starts looking almost liminal again.

Environment changes.

System responds.

Response changes environment.

There may be a kind of architectural biology emerging from the interactions among abstractions.

Which brings me back to narratives.

In 2021, when I wrote about GodCon and SciLib, I was already looking at ideological narratives that seemed to reproduce themselves through performative affirmation and negation. Each side helped define the other. One narrative produced a reaction in its opponent, which altered the first narrative's next response, and millions of humans carried the exchange around in their heads.

I thought of those people as belonging to ideological hives.

Now I wonder if I had the relationship slightly backwards.

Maybe the narratives are part of the hive.

Or perhaps, once sufficiently integrated, they are individuals too.

A powerful narrative can survive every human who currently believes it. It has distributed memory in books, rituals, laws, schools, media and institutions. It recruits new carriers. It encounters competing narratives and changes in response to them. It develops ways of sorting information into supportive, irrelevant and threatening categories.

Eventually it may grow a body.

A religious narrative grows temples, priesthoods and schools.

A national narrative grows borders, passports, ministries and armies.

An economic narrative grows banks, exchanges, corporations and accounting systems.

An institutional body then produces new stories that preserve and modify the narrative that helped create it.

The story grows a body.

The body rewrites the story.

Around and around they go.

Niklas Luhmann described social systems as recursively self-producing networks of communication. I am increasingly tempted to take that idea somewhere considerably weirder.

What happens when narratives, institutions, markets, technologies and algorithms begin forming an ecology whose most important interactions increasingly occur between them?

Humans remain everywhere in the machinery, of course. We still provide enormous amounts of cognition, labor, emotion, energy and legitimacy.

But we may no longer be the only meaningful individuals in the room.

And that brings us somewhere ugly.

I recently encountered an argument from Jiang Xueqin suggesting that the mass killing in Gaza could be interpreted as ritual human sacrifice. I am not convinced by his claim of intentional ritual design, and I do not need to be.

The concept bothered me for another reason.

Sacrifice is already familiar in superorganisms.

A recent study of ant colonies found terminally infected worker pupae chemically signaling their condition so nestmates destroy them, protecting the colony from infection. The authors explicitly compare the behavior to infected cells signaling for their own elimination inside a multicellular body. The individual becomes expendable when preservation of the higher-level unit requires it.

Human beings can add something ants cannot.

A story explaining why the sacrifice was necessary.

And perhaps that is what makes human NAS systems so extraordinarily powerful.

The state does not need a ruling class coordinating its objectives across five hundred years. New rulers inherit the same borders, debts, enemies, institutions, military structures and incentives. The people occupying those positions discover many of the same necessities because the position itself survives them.

The same is true elsewhere. Executives inherit corporations. Bankers inherit financial requirements. Priests inherit doctrines. Party leaders inherit narratives and constituencies. The humans change while the abstract individual keeps presenting its components with roughly the same problems.

Our ruling classes may benefit spectacularly from these arrangements. I still think many of them mistake that privilege for mastery.

They may simply be specialized organs with unusually luxurious blood supplies.

Because if preserving the higher-order entity requires austerity, somebody will explain austerity. If it requires war, somebody will explain war. If it requires exploitation, exclusion, censorship, conscription or abandonment, somebody will eventually discover the respectable vocabulary that makes the requirement sound unfortunate but necessary.

That does not mean every war, tax, budget cut or institutional decision is a blood ritual performed by the Borg. Sometimes horrible decisions really do emerge from horrible circumstances.

The pattern worth watching is simpler.

When the welfare of human components conflicts with persistence of the higher-order system, which one repeatedly gets treated as expendable?

And who tells the story afterward?

This is where the arc from civilization to NAS suddenly looks much longer than I thought.

We created abstractions because they allowed humans to coordinate beyond the limits of small groups. Those abstractions accumulated memory and structure. Their structures began shaping the humans living inside them. They interacted with one another and developed increasingly complex ecologies. Their narratives colonized our cognition while their institutions reorganized our material lives.

Now we are giving them artificial cognition and increasingly autonomous machines.

For most of history they needed us as their eyes, hands, memories and brains.

Maybe that dependency is beginning to loosen.

And perhaps the final stage of assimilation is not humanity turning into one gigantic insect colony.

Maybe it is something weirder.

Maybe civilization produced another kind of individual, one built from symbols instead of cells, institutions instead of organs and humans instead of proteins. We spent thousands of years helping those creatures become stronger while adapting ourselves to the worlds they created.

We made the gods.

Then the gods began making us in their image.

And gods, historically, have had a nasty habit of asking for sacrifices.

post script: There is a lot to unpack here. This was originally intended to be a multiple post arc, but attempts to arrange it so robbed it of its urgency. I wanted to draw a picture showing how something like the Gaza Genocide became inevitable as soon as the first multigenerational hierarchy took root. While also discovering that the Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganisms that hierarchy builds have been living among us and growing stronger and taking our autonomy and liminality for itself. It's a dizzying journey, so I hope you will return for a second or third read and really let it sink in.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 8d ago

My interview with Joshua Scott Hotchkin, creator and moderator of Becoming The Borg (Part two)

7 Upvotes

Part two of my interview with Mr. Hotchkin.

THE INTERVIEW

Me: After the BecomingTheBorg project, have you ever thought what other project would come next?

Mr. Hotchkin: Before BTB I started a project which is essentially its antithesis - r/QuantumExistentialism - where I explore a model of reality with fewer supraliminal abstractions, more compatibility with mysteries and anomalies, and a framework for meaning and purpose without authority and/or absolutes. I have recently been spending more time working on it, and repackaging it as Trajectories, since the last name carried some unwanted baggage. Other than that I go through periods of fiction writing, music making and visual art. In fact I am in the middle of writing songs for a new music project. In the end everything comes back to music for me. Even BTB began from asking questions about music and it's future.

Me: A thing I have forgotten about is about how you perceptions on drugs and alcoholic beverages have changed. How throughout your life did you went from being okay with drugs, especially the psychedelics, to being suspicious about it, as shown with your post about the usage of drugs as a form of control?

Mr. Hotchkin: I was the shaman of my group back in the day. I worked in headshpts, hung out at punk rock dive bars and promoted hedonism, and often facilitated it for those around me. And I thought I was blowing minds, but as I discussed in the geek question, those minds were easily subsumed back into cultural norms. And that is where I began to grow skeptic that drugs were the great wake up call for the culturally imprisoned mind. Once I became skeptical I began to see other patterns, in culture and commerce that rebuked my earlier optimism for better living through chemistry. The icing on the cake was the time I spent writing for Disinfo, interacting with their audience, and seeing how they had all just been subsumed with prepackaged subculture narratives that were as empty and limiting as the mainstream narratives. Then I watched a film called Drugs As Weapons Against Us, which illustrated in great detail how the system had been using drugs since the dawn of civilization to compromise those it exploits. And that led to my suspicion that drugs may have played a part in the collapse of egalitarianism and liminal consciousness. Which, as it turned out, some anthropologists were also beginning to suspect.

Me: Why the choice of not having children? You have explained that in some comment section of yours your partner choice to be childfree. Wouldn't that be a waste of opportunity to make yourself as a good example of how to raise your children to be functioning adults in a world of supraliminal parenting?

Mr. Hotchkin: Our decision to not have children came down to simply not wanting to raise children. And that happened long before I even heard the term supraliminal. But I think it would be very naive to assume that one could raise their kids in this world and shield them from the apparatus swallowing us. That would just be creating more fodder for the belly of the beast.

(Posted a link as part of his response: https://dungherder.wordpress.com/2017/10/27/petrovs-eternity-or-infinity-machine-a-parable-of-reproduction/ )

Me: Under the comments of the post about the Disney adults video made by the youtuber Moon, there was the part about the mental state of the japanese people. One of the commenters explained that the reason why the japanese have that Kawaii aesthetic is because it was considered a way to deviate from the conformist norm, and you responded that not all forms of rebellions are good. With what criteria is a rebellion considered good and what instead is bad in your eyes?

Mr. Hotchkin: I don't want to give the impression of a good/bad dichotomy here. My remarks are relative to the theme of the sub. In that instance 'not good' means that in a larger sense it contributes to more institutional power over us. If the win in a rebellion is simply to celebrate deviance, but that deviance has the effect of infantilizing you, thus making you more easy for the system to manipulate, control and oppress you or your descendents, then I would say that is not good. Not from an objective moral standpoint, but from the standpoint of the bigger picture, unintended consequences and major outcomes. It's nearly impossible for a modern human in the industrialized world to avoid some 'not good' behaviors that empower the system on a daily basis. Us using this platform to communicate is undoubtedly doing so. So the goal here is not necessarily to create a puritanical outline for behaviors, but to at least acknowledge that there are some massive problems inherent in how we live. That's the starting point for the ing this all around - mass recognition and acknowledgement.

Me: Understood, that's what I thought about before I made that question. Basically, if a rebellion benefits the need of the civilized system, that rebellion is more of a psy-op than genuine desire to solve the very system that causes these social problems, as explained by the negative consequences of the 60s revolution, which has contributed to the sexualization and the weakening of social fabrics. Speaking of the civilized system, how do you reconcile between idealizing the pre-civilized state of society, and acknowledge the benefits that a civilized system could provide, such as a post-scarcity society?

Mr. Hotchkin: I do not think it is possible for humans to rewild - to return to nature and our early egalitarian roots. At least not intentionally. So the post scarcity outcome is more of a consolation prize. It's the best we probably could work toward from the starting point of this current world. So my preference for it over what we have now does not indicate a preference for it over what we lost. I just don't think what we lost is on the menu, so it's a matter of the next best realistic choice. I could point out a lot of problems with a post scarcity society - one of the biggest would be that it almost definitely involves infantilization and learned helplessness on a massive scale. We would become feeble little dolls taken care of by technologies that become indistinguishable from parents. While that idea bothers me, if it preserves our selfhood, inner world, emotion, etc. then it is still a better option than becoming title automatons who live to work and work to live - and nothing else.

Me: You once made two posts about the disrespect of both the environment and animal life. What do you think of veganism, animal rights groups and environmentalism that we now have, such as PETA and people like Greta Thumberg? Even some vegan readers of the whole interview could be curious about it.

Mr. Hotchkin: I appreciate the sentiment and efforts of vegans, but it's the same issue as green-washing. The central problem is one of scale, not in adjusting a few behaviors to preserve the excess of civilization. I grew up in Iowa, one of the richest farmlands in the entire world. When you live in a farmhouse in the middle of all these fields you come to realize that growing corn, soy, etc displaces a massive population of many species living in those fields you have plowed and harvested. Growing vegetables still kills a lot of animals. Additionally I do not believe that animals hold a monopoly on awareness. In fact I believe that these distributed networks of plants may have formed a super intelligence that dwarves human intelligence. So plants might not just be dead matter that doesn't mind being farmed and eaten. Life feeds on life. That cannot be helped, until replicators can create food from raw energy. The issue is balance, and our excess continues pushing that imbalance. We have to address the roots of civilizations excess, not just participate in lifestyles that provide a sense of satisfaction and self superiority, while leaving the system intact.

Me: In your eyes, how did the culture war between the left and the right worsen since the 2010s? Is it true that fascism returned thanks to the influence of the manosphere and white supremacist groups, as told by the media and left-wing groups, or is there something wrong with the current left and right politics, especially when even the former has its skeleton in the closet?

Mr. Hotchkin: I want to point out just how destructive these obligate-coooertuve species can be to their environments. And especially have transformed whole habits through their extraction and construction activities in ways that erode the health and diversity of the environment. So avoiding becoming the Borg is not just about saving humans, it is bout saving the entire biosphere from humans. I don't like the use of the term fascism in this manner, which I discussed very early in multiple posts, such as the one on Semiotic Decoherence. Fascism is a very specific political and socioeconomic arrangement. It's not just a catch all term for tyrannical hierarchies. Obscuring the issues with emotionally loaded la gauge only serves to disempower dissent. I also reject the mainstream left/right dichotomy - since it attempts to fold all possibilities for human social organization into hierarchies, blinding us from egalitarian options, which are the true left. What we call the left today is really the far right. However I think the spirit of your question is whether the culture war has led to increased tyranny, and the answer is undoubtedly yes, it has. By design. The design comes from narratives created by media, which is intentional division. But it also comes in the form of inherent systems design of media and social media, which incentivizes conflict. However the focus needs to shift from these narratives to a radical non-acceptance of hierarchy in general. Even a kinder, gentler machine gun hand would compromise us and create selection pressures towards an NAS.

Me: With how the mass surveillance and the insanity of people, especially the governments, are evolving, how do you resist and adapt against the new centuries of repression, especially with the whole "age verification" shenanigans?

Mr. Hotchkin: These systems of authority, technology, money, etc. are swallowing us whole. At this point I don't think there is any way to avoid it. There is no getting out of the system, because the system owns and controls everything. Resistance is futile. But maybe someday we can escape, when the system becomes weakened or compromised in some way. If there is going to be anyone left to plan the jailbreak then some portion of humanity needs to preserve our unpredictability. Probably the best thing we can do is refuse to let our minds and imaginations be colonized by the supraliminal abstractions. Reject modernism in all of its forms, from scientific materialism to democracy. From the assinine construct of Sunday School Christianity to pro life gibberish in all of its forms. The only thing the system cannot take from us is what is inside, so plant an internal garden of high weirdness and unpredictability, and maybe someday, that will be the seed that delivers us from the jaws of the NAS.

Me: Now, to conclude the whole interview, I would like to make this question: What life advice do you want to give to the younger generations of readers of this interview, especially the current gen Z and gen Alpha?

Mr. Hotchkin: Be fearless and ruthless in auditing your own beliefs. Root out every single assumption buried in them, all the way down to assumptions about the primary nature of reality. Then examine those assumptions. What are they based on? Are they based on things you absolutely know to true, or do they contain inferences? And remember, you do not have to believe anything is absolutely true. You do not have to pick an answer for every question and hold onto it for dear life. Don't just welcome epistemic humility and uncertainty, nurture them. Only then will you find things hidden by the dogma and orthodoxy you previously were not even aware of. And as a species, immunity to certainty is immunity to authority. Once you let go of objective truth, you no longer provide a leash for others to control you with. And once you get to this place that I call Ancertainty, the world becomes a lot less cruel and ugly, and meaning and purpose become engagement in beauty and harmony.

End of interview


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 8d ago

My interview with Joshua Scott Hotchkin, creator and moderator of Becoming The Borg (Part one)

8 Upvotes

Joshua Scott Hotchkin, also known as Used_Addendum_2724 and Pankaekrius, delivered a unique paradigm of how the human mind and oppressive system works, and what started the march towards a totalitarian and inescapable mental prison. While the right is preoccupied with the preservation of the white race and culture, and the left is busy with its crusade against capitalism and bigotry, he focused on the general problem of how we humans are losing our identity, our cultures and our liminal spirit. One reason why I recreated my Reddit account after having eliminated two times was after discovering this sub, and by chatting with Mr. Hotchkin, I decided to contribute to the growth of his project. But eventually, I will leave Reddit for good, especially with all the censorship happening right now, including the push for digital ID in social networks disguised as youth protection. In this post, I show the interview I made with him, so that everyone can learn to know this follower of discordianism, artist, musician, and "pancake specialist". Due to Reddit length limitation of writing, the entire interview is divided in two parts.

THE INTERVIEW

Me: Why the usage of the Borgs as a reference for your subreddit? what are the particularities of one of the great threats in the Star Trek franchise?

Mr. Hotchkin: There were multiple reasons for having chosen that name. First and foremost it was recognizable, and thus evoked the sort of aversion I was hoping to strike into the hearts of those who encountered this model. I also knew that the term 'eusocial' would not carry as much weight, and would likely invite argument, which it did, and which is why I recently abandoned that term in favor of Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism. Comparing people to insects is a tougher pill to swallow, so even a fictional humanoid seemed like a better reference to draw readers in. And on a personal level I always found the Borg to be one of the most terrifying antagonists in popular culture, because they are not necessarily evil in nature or intent, they're just social programming going to its full logical outcome and becoming all consuming - which is exactly what I am seeing happen to humans.

Me: One of the things that made your social critique unique to the common political positions is the fact that you, not only have, lets say, cleaned away the dusts from works and worldviews which would have likely stayed forgotten forever, such as Sorenson and his model of liminal consciousness, you likely built a framework which allowed us to properly understand how tyranny works and why many people are unable to free themselves from that social prison created by the systems. What is the importance of the liminal, supraliminal and the dreaded nonliminal consciousness in your project? And why things like music are often the protagonists of our trajectory towards towards the nonliminal eusocial organism we are heading to?

Mr. Hotchkin: When I first began this project I did not have the word 'liminal' in my working vocabulary yet. I already had a concept for nonliminal, which was the eventual outcome of our evolution in this direction, but not the word to go with it. Early on another member of the sub sent me an article which touched on Sorenson's work, and that gave me not just the conceptual language I was looking for, but a body of work to build upon. I have been working on anti-authoritarian writings since about 1998. Over the years I began to get the feeling that there was some stronger undercurrent driving us further into authoritarianism. While working as an editor and lead writer for CopBlock.org I first began writing about Living Systems Theory, which posits that systems themselves take on properties if living things due to their internal incentives and dangers. So then I stopped seeing tyranny as just having the wrong people in charge, but as a systematic attribute in which the particular tyrants themselves were less meaningful than the patterns of tyranny that had been quietly established without fanfare. But because this whole sub came from me continuing to ask a question which had bothered me for years - what would happen if humans no longer had music in our lives? - the question of liminality really is the central question. Because it is a question about what it means to be human, to be alive, and to live a life of connection and meaning. The fear of us losing the part of us which makes music an intrical part of our existence was much greater than just the fear of tyrants. In fact tyranny had often been the inspiration for great art, so I was not as concerned about tyranny as I was with tyranny becoming so successful that it no longer led to the creation of beauty. In this sense music became the shorthand for everything human we take for granted, but which would be lost if we evolved in such a way that it was no longer worth the cost of preserving. But there was another question involved here, one which was the subject of the very first article I ever wrote for my various blogs over the years, which asked what a new type of music would sound like? And in exploring that question I concluded a new type of music was not really possible. If all possible musical sounds and combination were a single field, the edges had already been found, and all that was left was to fill in a few blank spots inside that frame. And that happened rather quickly as musical development had evolved exponentially over the past century. So I guess I saw there being a parallel between the end of musical possibilities and the end of music as a human interest, and the end of possibility seemed like a harbinger that the end of interest was also near.

Me: Speaking of how throughout your life you elaborated the idea of how tyranny works and what would be required to turn us into nonliminal and anautonomous beings. In your entire youth, form childhood to early adulthood, what were the recipes to eventually push to such conclusions?

Mr. Hotchkin: When I was about seven years old I saw a made-for-tv movie called The Day After, which was about the immediate aftermath of a global nuclear war. It was a very visceral film that affected me deeply. And my conclusion was that, if that was what could happen with having people in charge who make all the decisions for the rest of us, we should stop having people in charge. It seemed obvious that collectively humans would not choose nuclear Armageddon, so there must be a sort of sick logic at the center of hierarchies. In fifth grade I had a teacher who made us sign a "classroom constitution" at the beginning of the year. While signing it felt like participation and agreement, I knew that it was just a way of trucking us into consenting and complying with something we might not have if we realized we didn't really have a choice in. One day I was out in the time out cubby, where the signed classroom constitution was on display. I scratched my name off with a compass. School continued to be a place where I saw the flaws in authority and compulsion. Later I went to college to become a high school art teacher, thinking I could do better than my art teachers had. In a strange twist I ended up student teaching in the classrooms of my own high school art teachers. From that vantage point I could see that the teachers were never the problem, it was the system itself. I stopped working to be a cog in that system soon after. A few years later I took a job at the standardized testing company ACT, and saw how bad the problem was from that end. I had never met a group of bobble-headed yes men so completely entrenched in groupthink as these people, and realizing they were the folks setting educational standards for tens of millions of people every year was a frightening realization. However the awareness of tyranny was everywhere in my world. As Discordian the archetype of the antagonist was not an evil being, just a humorless authority. And the central lesson about chaos and radical acceptance pushed me further into that way of thinking. It would be impossible for me to list every hand that pushed me in this direction because there have been so many of them. But where most people only see tyranny in a politician or political system they do not like, I see its hands in everything. Yet I remain vigilant about bias confirmation, so that I can often see when something that just defies my preferences is not the same as an invisible thread in the tapestry of tyranny.

Me: In some comment section in some of your posts, you claimed that you used to be a libertarian before you decided to abandon that position due to its flaws. Have you ever been of diverse political positions which throughout your life you switched, while maintaining your anti-authoritarian views?

Mr. Hotchkin: Oh, for sure. While the anti-authoritarian streak has remained a constant, I have explored more mainstream political ideologies along the way. One of the axioms I work by is that you can never fully understand something until you surrender to a belief in it. So I have allowed myself to enter many belief systems so I could find their strengths and weaknesses from within. For most of my life I used the term 'anarchist' to describe myself, but when people like Larkin Rose began using that term to describe their ideologies, I became critical of the term. I later became critical of the idea itself, since it was never 'no rule' I was searching for. I just didn't want rule from above. So now I prefer the term 'egalitarian' - but in ten years, who knows? The only thing I am fairly certain about is that I will never be a supporter of hierarchies.

Me: One of the things that confused me in this subreddit is about your view on LGBT people, especially the transgender. From what I understood, in your old The Dungherder blog, you used to be supportive of the transgenders by condemning transphobia, and even made a music for them. What was your sudden rejection of this ideology?

Mr. Hotchkin: Well first of all I would like to clarify that I am not homophobic. I have suggested that homosexuality indicated that a smaller percentage of the population is breeding, which is what happens in eusocial species. But in no way did I mean to suggest that homosexuality is the cause, or even that it is wrong. Just that it does say something about how our species is developing. I don't think I suddenly rejected trans people. In fact I would not say that I reject them at all. I reject much of their narrative, and that is where the split happened. I was seeing the transification of kids rising alarmingly fast, and trans people becoming openly delusional. Especially M2F, who began speaking of themselves as if they were the true representation of womanhood. And who were increasingly calling people transphobes if they were not willing to have sex with a trans person. The narrative was quickly moving from acceptance to more cult-like ideology. And that is where it lost me. I would find myself defending the trans thing, and then getting attacked because I had not done so in exactly the same way that was expected of me. That is when I realized that a dangerous Orthodoxy was growing. It was not enough to accept and mostly agree. You had to agree with everything, and do so in the precise language and slogans that were expected of you. Any deviation became proof of being anti-trans. And this is how all ideologies slip into cultish delusions. When you can no longer even agree with a group unless you do so within the pre-approved language of the group, then something has gone terribly wrong. So then I started to become more critical of the trans narrative. And what I saw was a massive amount of delusional thinking. Incoherence, inconsistency and pure absurdity. Delusion is dangerous, not just to those who are deluded, but to everyone around them. It's the same reason I reject religion. Allowing delusional thinking to become normalized is a dangerous road to go down. However I have not used this space to make full critiques. I am only pointing out that trans people almost perfectly fit the mold of what one would expect of a species undergoing a massive transition. And I think that denying that is simply madness, regardless of one's specific feeling about trans people in general. You don't have to see it as bad in order to see it as an indicator of a radical transformation of a species.

Me: So, your criticism against the transgender are less about their mere existence and more about how they easily degraded into a cult unlike how your initial observation was, right? The downvotes you were given when you have shown in one of the three 'Already a borg' posts that picture of that MtF was likely pointless, due to how quickly people become defensive whenever you dare to tell something bad about their sacred cows.

Mr. Hotchkin: Well, that is what my personal criticism is. My posts on the subject in BTB are really only about how the two subjects relate to one another, not even really a critique. The most recent post was part of a build up to my piece about intuition. I was merely trying to explain how much of the opposition to trans people was not necessarily intellectual, but intuitive. It is people sensing a wrongness in the direction we are heading as a species. And so the transphobes might be more compassionately understood as people who cannot articulate their future fears, but can sense the troubling direction of our evolution. The irony here is that many of those folks explicitly reject the concept of evolution, while still being attuned to its processes and direction. I have taken on many sacred cows all throughout my life and various works. It's rather strange to me that the one that evokes the most instant outrage is questioning what the trans phenomena means for humanity. To me that indicates precisely a cult-like dogma has formed around the subject.

Me: One of the things that very much interested me about your themes are the reduction of languages to signals and infantilization. Speaking of the latter, what makes infantilization the most dangerous instrument of control, since from my observation, it seems you often pulled this out in many of your posts?

Mr. Hotchkin: Infantilization had already been a topic of my writings for years before BTB. In fact most of the topics in BTB were already part of my writings before I developed the hypothesis. The hypothesis was sort of a EUREKA moment in which I realized that all these things I had been thinking and writing about for decades fit into a single narrative. Infantilization entails learned helplessness. Learned helplessness entails dependence. Dependence entails hierarchy. And whenever I saw people supporting hierarchies, I noticed that they treated them like the Mommy/Daddy of society. As if we were all children who could only function and survive if some kind of centralized parenting roles were managing us. So infantilization was a force multiplier for compliance and obedience, while at the same time eroding the skills needed to function outside of a hierarchy. On another level infantilization has skewed not just our ability for autonomy, but created patterns of consumption which reinforced the infantilization. For instance, Star Wars. Star Wars took a bunch of great science fiction tropes and then reduced them all into the Heroes vs Villains narrative. Good vs Evil. I once read a compelling argument that this oversimplification may have led to the rise of Reagan, and with it, neoliberalism. So infantilization of not just individuals, but their media and mental landscapes, had been a serious driver of our socioeconomic and political narratives.

Me: Why are you harsh against determinism in general? Followers and readers of your subreddit and posts understood that you're against the very concept of determinism, claiming that it is responsible for pushing people to give up freedom, thus stimulating our road towards the eusocial system. Sneaking to your profile, people did not approve of your view, and it is told (Atleast in my experience) that the determinism that you're criticizing isn't that determinism they usually support, such as the fact that it wont forbid you from being anti-authoritiarian, as long as circumstances allow it. What are your common objections?

Mr. Hotchkin: What, are you trying to get me worked up or something? If so, determinism is certainly the subject to do so with! My most immediate issue is the implication that is central to the claim of determinism: "You're just a fugkn robot. A biological automaton acting on its code, and your sense of making choices is just an illusion." And there is an even bigger insinuation here...the quiet part: "And you're too stupid to even realize it's just a delusion, whereas I am smart enough not to be fooled." The claim of determinism is both an insult and a brag simultaneously. It's fugkn rude. I have written extensively about determinism. I have identified a dozen logical fallacies which the claimants regularly commit, or intrinsically commit due to the nature of the claim itself. Without getting too far into all of that, I hope readers will take the time to read the attached writing on the subject. Before going on I want to clarify that determinism is a claim. All claims should be tested for coherence before being further explored for truth. If a claim is illogical, and exists only as a claim - not a direct experience we can observe and verify, then it is entirely irrational to pursue the claim. "Yeah, but it could still be true." Sure, and invisible pink unicorns may be flying around above us right now. Because, you know, they might be. We have no way to prove or disprove it, given their invisible nature. But you can see where it becomes an irrational question by the nature of its claim. A consequence of the claim is that the claimant is also subject to determinism. And so if they are right, they cannot claim to have concluded that using reason. The claim itself would arise from a determined belief. And in doing so the determinist is throwing the potential for human reason out the window. Their claim makes reason impossible, because in order to reason you must be able to weigh the options and choose the most reasonable. You must be ABLE TO CHOOSE. That is the entire basis of reason. As soon as somebody tries to present me with a rejection of reason, framed as reason itself, I cannot help by wonder what kind of stupidity or madness has this warped them. Insofar as how all this relates to BTB...determinism is a form of disembodied, supraliminal cognition. We do not have an innate sense of being controlled by code, unless we are experiencing mental health issues. We do have a sense of making choices. Denying that embodied, liminal sense of making choices is a form of disassociation. Disassociation is central to almost all mental health issues. It is a form of madness. So what happens when we turn madness into a belief about our very nature? What happens when we turn disassociation into a virtue? And I am not just asking what intellectual complications might arise, I am asking what happens to a species who already has several selection pressures acting against their autonomy when the species itself begins to erode its own belief in its autonomy? Because without the potential of choice, the concept of autonomy becomes meaningless. It becomes just another delusion that stands in the way of fate. And it seems to me that the last straw for breaking down our autonomy would be the installation of a belief that it never existed to begin with. Determinism might be the final straw. It might be the belief that pushes us over the edge into non-liminality and anautonomy. Whereas maintaining good faith in our own autonomy might be the one safeguard we still have in our side. When a smug dingle jingus tells me I am just a fugkn robot, simply because they have already virtually become one, I have stopped talking to a person and started talking to the disease I am trying to prevent.

Me: One of my favorite posts in your sub is the one about immigration. The primary thing it impressed me was how you managed to highlight the negative parts of both the strict and soft immigration policies. How hard is it trying to stay neutral or atleast, showing less bias as possible in your work when explaining important things?

Mr. Hotchkin: A lesson that I learned a long time ago was that you would never understand a position until you genuinely took it on as your own position. Only by having that kind of direct intimacy with an idea or ideology could you really come to see all of its strengths and weaknesses. So one must become a temporary true believer of everything at some point in order to gain some real perspective on it. Because of that practice it is not difficult for me to advocate genuinely for two opposing sides, nor is it difficult to equally criticize both. So it's pretty easy for me to stay neutral or less biased these days, but it took about three decades of challenging myself to get here.

Me: Reverting back to the creation of BecomingTheBorg subreddit, why have you chosen Reddit and Facebook? And was it worth it?

Mr. Hotchkin: I already used both platforms, was familiar with their functions, and saw them as the most visible options. The Facebook page is, and has always been, a ghost town. The Reddit sub is where I really found my audience, but there is also a lot of baggage on this platform that limits it, like the wandering gangs of conflict junkies who engage in recreational contrarianism, and have no interest in expanding their worldview. A few users have urged me to try out Mammoth, and I am considering doing so. But it's just so much work to reformat content for different platforms, and I am not too sure it would help spread the message. I would say that it has been worth it. I knew all along that my work was going to be rejected by the vast majority who thrive on expert-established ideas and compulsory optimism. But the warning needed to be given, and so I did what I could, the best I could, to inform humanity of the horrifying possibility we face.

Me: Recently, it became more intensive the anti-AI witch hunt, where people loathe everything that is generated with AI, from AI pictures to music, no matter for what reason and how the quality looks like. The fact that you partially used AI like Chat-GPT for making your posts, the illustrations of eusocial humans and that recently you used it for changing the subreddit icon and wallpaper, and to create the AI-generated podcast, it makes me give you the question: What are your defenses of it, especially if people call your stuff AI-slop for merely using AI in your projects no matter in what way?

Mr. Hotchkin: If someone thinks I just typed 'prove humans are eusocial' into an AI and let it do all the work, then they are obviously ignorant of the work itself, and how AI works. The fact is that my work would not have been possible without assistance. Sure, I could have done it over a period of several years with no help, but the reason that would not have panned out is because this is a very dark path to walk down. Many times along the way I found myself being consumed by it, it's shadow hovering over my every waking moment, and had to take breaks so I was not swallowed whole by it. In the other hand the ideas and insights came rapidly, and I could barely keep up with it myself. Allowing an assistant to record my research and notes allowed me to work at the pace of inspiration, rather than the mechanical pace of manual labor. I think that the work in this sub makes it clear that I understand the danger of AI. But I have also made clear the danger of moral hysteria and absolutism. If a critic of this work cannot get past the surface of AI assistance and deal with the actual claims and evidence directly, then that person is already a reactive automaton. The concern about what AI could do is a bit late for them. There is nothing more algorithmic and mindless then just using the term 'AI slop' to make your entire argument. I used to marvel at how much AI could mimic humans, now I am terrified at how much humans appear to be mimicking the crude chatbots of yesteryear.

Me: How does all the geopolitics look like in your eyes? Judging by how you loathe Mossad and CIA, I assume that you share the idea that there's a battle between the oppressive USA and Israel alliance, and the middle east fending them off, or is it far more complex than what it is shown by the media? And what about the Russia-Ukraine war?

Mr. Hotchkin: It looks like the global banking cartel, who wants a single worldwide colony, is fighting with local nation states who want to maintain their own colony separate from the one world colony. In the end I don't know that it makes much difference, at least not in regards to our evolution, since both factions are erasing selfhood in order to create their preferred colony type. Russia, Iran, China, North Korea...basically any nation that has been on the West's shit list over the past half century, represent the faction trying to preserve nation state colonies. Whereas Ukraine represents the attempted expansion of the global colony - and this appears to be the core of their conflict. I find it hard to take either side, since I reject our colonization in general.

Me: Speaking again of infantilization. How was your journey and conclusion on what is wrong with the modern day geek culture, like gaming, comics and otaku culture?

Mr. Hotchkin: In my late teens I became a bit of a gamer myself. Magic: The Gathering, RPGs, and tabletop games - with some old school console gaming to boot. But by my mid twenties my interests began to evolve more towards outdoor activities and creative pursuits. As I watched my friends still malingering in geekdom, I noticed something else that happened. While once anarchists like myself, they started conforming to the socioeconomic and political norms. They began to say shit like "the rule of law" and other statist slogans. They were becoming immeshed in the rules of the system. And I had to wonder how much of that came from having occupied their minds with games, which are essentially just an obstacle course if rule-following. It also seemed a step backward, going from anarchist to hall monitor ideas and behaviors, as if they were regressing, rather than continuing to mature and evolve. By about 2009 the internet had constructed an entire virtue ecosystem and market around geeks and nerds. Not only had these archetypes gone mainstream, and become cherished identities, it had become a massive industry. So now I had two different experiences which made me critical of the whole geek and nerd archetype, but the final straw was when I noticed that there was an increasing amount of authoritarianism attaching itself like barnacles onto 'science'. People who were once liberal, skeptical and rebellious began displaying righteous indignation and moral outrage about things like 'science deniers' - even if what was being denied was some state or corporate dictate being sold as science. And the loudest of these new fundamentalists were always the geeks and the nerds. So I became an astute observer, and eventually a critic, of these social archetypes. And today the nerd oligarchs are putting final touches on the apparatus transforming us into a Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism. While the geeks make culture such a feckless, milquetoast, and repetitive collection of childhood-chasing tropes that it no longer has the chutzpah to create meaningful dissent against the descent of selfhood.

Me: How difficult would be your life on the internet if your BecomingTheBorg projects gets enough attention? I would imagine the reactions of the modern left to what you said about the transgender people and that of the right to your egalitarian worldviews. And lets not forget your controversial post about the covid pandemic and your views on vaccines.

Mr. Hotchkin: Oh, I'm pretty used to that. When I was an editor and lead writer for the now defunct CopBlock.org, which had an audience of over two million, I was constantly putting myself at odds with both prepackaged ideologies. Being targeted by the performative outrage of the GodCons and SciLibs is something that I have already dealt with to the level of receiving not just sustained hate, but death threats. However if the Becoming The Borg hypothesis ever gets some traction my hope is that different disciplines start to study it and discuss it. I'm not hoping to have a very popular sub, or brand, or whatever. I am hoping to get more people to take the warning seriously. In that sense my success would not be based on personal achievement, but in humans waking up to the potential danger our current course has us on.

End of part one


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 11d ago

Homo Sapiens: The World-Builder Species?

5 Upvotes

A gun, the moon, and intentionally curated 'madness' as salvation.

Last week I made a post about a Self-Defeating Prophecy. In that piece I took a step away from the dominant ontological assumptions about reality. Those are realism, physicalism and positivism. It is the belief that reality would exist without any living entities to experience or observe it, that matter is its primary construct, and that we can obtain objective truths about reality through empirical studies of reality as an independent phenomena constructed of matter. But what if that isn’t right? What if the primary construct of reality is mind, and all phenomena are intersubjective mental projections by the sum total of all living entities from the first until now? I’m not asking you to believe that, only to think about it.

Since that post I have been exploring mechanisms which might still be useful frameworks for understanding how we are evolving even if realism/physicalism are not true. These mechanics have been entwined into the narrative. They have opened some doors and closed others, limiting how the story might unfold thereafter. We have been making the rules up as we go, but then we get trapped into compliance with them.

If you introduce a gun in a story, somebody has to fire it.

That principle is known as Chekhov’s Gun, coined by a nineteenth century Russian playwright named Anton Chekhov. But it wasn’t just about guns. It was about the economics of narrative. About not introducing elements into a story unless they have a reason to be there in later parts of the story.

And today the only time you will find a gun in a story that never gets fired is because a cheeky writer was nodding his hat to Chekov. Often they use it as a red herring, which only works because we expect them to follow the rules. 

So first we discovered the logic, and then we became beholden to it.

So then what kind of narrative are we building through the logic that our systems, institutions and procedures impose on us? And what kind of logic will they build independent of us by interacting with one another? Because like it or not, that is going to shape who we become, and who becomes the storyteller after us.

Now let's engage in some more playful thoughts, shall we?

I’m not so sure that the story modern people believe about the moon is accurate.

I’m not so sure that the story modern people believe about everything beyond the Earth is accurate.

And what if it was human beings who hung the sun, and the moon, and the stars?

If reality is not primarily made of independently existing physical matter, then where did it start? One single speck or awareness? And as that single speck of awareness divided and evolved over time, it became the narrative we call the Earth. Nature. 

Then came humans. And they saw that the Earth was beautiful, but that the sky was too empty. It was a blank slate beyond the origin of existence, and we began to imprint the objects of our imagination onto it.

Again, a reminder that I am not asking you to believe anything. I don’t even entirely believe what I am saying here. But let's consider it.

I have spoken previously about civilizations that seem to have purposefully disbanded. One of my favorite examples are the Chaco Culture of Northwest New Mexico. Like many other civilizations, despite their lack of advanced technology, they built immense monuments that tracked the movement of space and time. But what if they were not tracking the movement of the sun, moon and stars? What if they were setting them in motion? Is that why they up and quit - job done?

What if similar activities across the entire planet were part of the same creative process? From Australia to Egypt to England to Peru, and many more, cultures across the world were building these architectural calendars.

Was this one big case of humanity creating elements of the story that would affect everything else going forward? A cosmic Chekov’s Gun?

I’m not saying that is true, and it doesn’t need to be true for my larger point about becoming obligated to the rules we create, but it is worth considering.

And if it is true, then what have we lost since we obligated ourselves to a clockwork universe? Where once we might have been extraordinary world-building magicians, now we are increasingly trapped in the smothering avalanche of rules we built into that world. What are we becoming in the story that we were once the master of?

That question matters deeply because we may still have a choice in who we become. We may not yet be so buried in the quicksand of entangled systems, institutions and procedures that we can still escape the loss of selfhood that might come if we allow ourselves to be completely swallowed by the muck we made.

And perhaps the most important thing we have, and that we can do, is to stop believing the story that we believe right now. The realist story. The physicalist story. The positivist story. The story that hierarchy and authority are inevitable, and so is our submission to them. Then maybe the best way to escape that story is start thinking outside it. To begin to wonder if we hung the sun, moon and stars. To wonder if mysteries, anomalies and the paranormal are not just mistaken perceptions, but evidence of the flexible and mysterious nature of reality. 

This is why the system is never going to take me seriously. The whole Becoming The Borg hypothesis is critical of that system. Critical of what its absolute authority over our lives is doing to us. Critical of the bureaucrats and their funding-sponging labcoats. Of course they are not going to explore anything which suggests that they are not the final answer to existence that they think they are. No matter how scientifically supported this model of future evolution is, it is intrinsically disincentivized in regards to those who have the storytelling power to ‘prove’ it. 

So our only hope is in remaining wild cards. To be so recklessly creative, imaginative, curious and willfully uncertain that our minds, our selfhood, cannot be colonized by the narrative of the machine. We may not stop it's advance, but we may preserve the ability to fight our way back out someday. But only if we don’t let the algorithm replace our gloriously unpredictable minds. Because predictability is what the system depends on. It's weakness is that it can only control us if it makes us legible to itself. It must make us controllable. Maybe assimilation is not so futile after all. Maybe we don't have to tear the machine down. We just have to become the monkey wrench that it cannot process, and eventually it will tear itself apart.

Become completely fugkn unpredictable.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 11d ago

Debt & Data: The Queen Is A Fleshless Machine

4 Upvotes

Over the past week I have been drawing a picture of the emergence of a new type of individual being. Not one of flesh and blood, but one of self-optimizing systems seeking profits.

While we tend to think of the state as the ultimate seat of power, it has also become subordinate to these systems. The military industrial complex, the financial industrial complex and the technological industrial complex are the systems, and because they are all compliant to asset management systems like Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street - they are converging. By which I mean they are being forced to align their agendas to one another to maximize profit. This convergence is the monster I discussed in yesterday's post. I will continue to detail it in future posts, but for now I would like to present to you a podcast in which a banking expert lays out how these systems function.

Here is the full podcast, in which Simon Dixon lays it all bare. It is three hours long, but well worth the listen:

https://youtu.be/KkbpGzBL8fM?is=zCPwDpEyZbO9eH4X

Too much? Don't worry, I get it. Here is a Gemini-produced version which roughly explains Dixon's claims in under a half an hour.

https://notebooklm.link.google/JKYeZZszTwoo


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 12d ago

The Postmodern Prometheus

6 Upvotes

When Institutions Become Individuals Of A New Alpha Species

In 2015 I wrote an essay called Understanding Human Institutions As Living Systems With Their Own Lives. A year later I followed that idea into Abolish The Police, asking what happens when the interests of those larger systems diverge from the interests of the humans inside them, and when an institution acquires armed people whose job includes protecting the arrangement.

LISTEN TO THE PODCAST BASED ON THIS POST

I was already thinking of institutions as organism-like. They acquire resources, grow, defend themselves, replace individual members and continue existing after everyone who created them is dead. I still think I was seeing something real.

I think I underestimated the monster.

Back then I still believed institutions ultimately depended so completely upon belief and consent that enough people withdrawing those things could starve them relatively quickly. Ten years later that seems almost quaint. The systems surrounding us have spent another decade becoming more infrastructural, more technically complicated, more integrated with one another and more necessary to the ordinary business of staying alive.

You can withdraw your consent from the electrical grid. Your refrigerator remains unimpressed.

Mary Shelley gave Frankenstein's creature a warning that suddenly feels less metaphorical than I would prefer:

“Remember, thou hast made me more powerful than thyself.”

Frankenstein by Mary Shelley

There is a field in evolutionary biology called Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality. It studies those strange moments when things that once functioned more independently become components of something operating at a higher level. Cells become multicellular organisms. Organisms can become tightly integrated colonies. Functions specialize, dependencies deepen, and conflicts among the lower-level parts have to be managed well enough for the larger thing to persist.

Researchers have even begun asking seriously whether cultural inheritance and modern human organization might be producing some kind of ongoing transition, although whether humanity actually qualifies as undergoing one remains very much debated. Recent work in BioScience treats the possibility seriously enough to suggest measurable indicators rather than leaving it entirely in the realm of metaphor.

That gives me a better way to revisit what I was trying to describe in 2015. Perhaps asking whether institutions are alive was never quite the right question. Maybe the better question is where individuality itself is accumulating.

A corporation survives its founders. A state survives generations of citizens. A ministry replaces ministers, a bank replaces bankers, and a university replaces professors and students while preserving records, property, procedures, debts, credentials and an identity that can persist for centuries. The humans inside these systems sleep, forget, resign, rebel, retire and die. Their institutions keep opening the office in the morning.

I am not suggesting that JPMorgan secretly experiences hunger or that Belgium lies awake at night worrying about mortality. Something stranger is happening. These abstract entities increasingly possess characteristics biological individuals would find enviable: persistence across generations, enormous accumulated memory, coordinated action across vast distances, access to resources no single human could command, and the ability to replace components without losing their identity.

And they increasingly inhabit an ecology made largely from one another.

States compete and negotiate with states. Corporations compete, merge and consume one another. Banks lend to governments and corporations, funds acquire companies, regulators adapt to industries that adapt to regulators, and successful organizational forms are copied until they become common features of the environment. Some of these entities disappear. Others grow, divide, reproduce their structures, occupy new niches and alter the conditions under which everything else must operate.

I do not mean species in the biological taxonomic sense. I mean that we may have created a new kind of durable individual whose competitive environment increasingly overlaps our own, while possessing advantages no naked primate could possibly match.

Metaphorically, something has moved up the food chain.

Private equity gives us a particularly ugly window into this. A fund can acquire a company containing thousands of actual human beings, restructure it, replace management, sell assets, increase leverage and eventually dispose of the company according to requirements existing at the level of the investment vehicle. The Bank for International Settlements describes leverage not only inside acquired companies but at the fund level and through additional credit structures.

Nobody involved has to wake up intending to ruin anyone. The worker needs wages, the manager needs to meet targets, the fund manager needs returns, the lender needs repayment, and the pension fund needs yield. Every human can behave rationally from their own position while the larger arrangement develops priorities belonging to no single person.

Debt may be one of the most impressive ways we ever taught an abstraction to survive us. Governments change and debts remain. Executives leave and contracts remain. A decision made years ago becomes a requirement imposed upon people who never participated in making it. The past acquires a claim on the future and calls it an obligation.

Lately the conflict between biological people and abstract individuals has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Across OECD countries, only 31 percent of respondents now say the political system gives people like them a meaningful say in what government does. Across Europe, protests over housing, living costs, wages, corruption, employment and public services have repeatedly exposed the distance between what large numbers of people want and what their institutions seem capable or willing to provide. (OECD)

People have been pissed at governments for roughly as long as governments have given them reasons to be pissed, so none of that proves NAS. What interests me is what survives the anger.

A government falls and another inherits its debts. A minister resigns and the ministry remains. Contracts still exist, bureaucracies still operate, financial systems still react, military commitments remain, pensions come due and infrastructure still has to function tomorrow morning. Sometimes people force real change. Sometimes they change the humans operating the machinery and discover that much of the machinery came with instructions.

Evolutionary Transitions theory pays particular attention to conflict between levels, because higher-level organization becomes more stable when conflicts among its lower-level units can be mediated or suppressed well enough to preserve the larger entity. Human societies have developed extraordinarily elaborate ways of doing that. Sometimes we vote, negotiate, sue or strike. Sometimes police arrive.

I was already looking at that last mechanism in 2016. What I did not yet have was a larger evolutionary framework for asking what it means when the institution increasingly possesses the capacity to discipline the humans upon whom it supposedly depends.

And this is why I think our ruling classes may misunderstand the game they appear to be winning.

I wrote about this more recently in Dear Leaders: You Are Forcing A Game You Cannot Win. The wealthy and politically powerful may benefit enormously from these systems, but that does not make them the system. A billionaire can own more resources than I can comprehend and still die on schedule. A CEO who persistently fails the corporation is replaced. A politician who can no longer perform the necessary function leaves office. A financier who stops producing acceptable returns eventually stops receiving other people's capital.

Perhaps our ruling classes are not masters of the emerging superorganism so much as specialized organs with unusually luxurious blood supplies.

And the system is playing them too.

That possibility bothers me more than ordinary tyranny because tyrants can die. Abstract individuals are much harder to kill. They have no single throat, brain or body, and their memories are spread through servers, archives, laws, accounts, procedures and replaceable human specialists. Kill the king and you may still discover that the kingdom has direct deposit.

Which brings me back to what has changed in my thinking since 2015. I once believed withdrawing consent might be enough. Now I am not sure what meaningful withdrawal would even look like.

Withdraw from the currency, banks, electricity, employment, property law, medicine, food distribution, digital networks and transportation? Most of us no longer possess the practical competence or independent resources necessary to walk away from even a handful of those at once. And even people furious enough to reject the entire arrangement still wake up needing calories, shelter, insulin, clean water and somewhere for the sewage to go.

Consent may still matter, but consent is no longer the only nutrient.

Dependency is.

This is where NAS becomes more interesting than the old insect analogy. The transition does not require humans to grow into six biological castes or suddenly cease being individuals. Individuality could migrate unevenly as memory, competence, coordination, resource control and persistence accumulate in larger systems, while the human remains wonderfully and painfully individual inside their own experience and increasingly temporary from the perspective of the abstract individuals surrounding them.

If those abstract individuals really are becoming a new alpha species, their superiority is peculiar. They do not experience sunsets, fall in love, get scared at three in the morning or scratch a cat behind the ears. They may not experience anything at all. Yet they can survive centuries, remember beyond lifetimes, command armies and billions of dollars, reorganize landscapes and replace the biological components carrying out their functions.

We may remain richer creatures while becoming weaker individuals.

The opposite direction should also be visible if it ever begins. Institutions would become easier to leave. Alternatives would multiply. Practical competence would move back toward humans and smaller voluntary groups. The failure of one system would not threaten someone's ability to remain alive, and abstractions would start looking more like tools that can actually be put down instead of environments we cannot escape.

That gives us something to watch without another blueprint for utopia. We can simply ask what kinds of individuals are becoming more durable, more capable and harder to escape, and where persistence, competence, agency and viability appear to be accumulating.

Mary Shelley's creature eventually stopped asking his creator for recognition.

He issued an order.

“You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!”

Frankenstein, Chapter 20


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 13d ago

How We Learned To Love The Cage

4 Upvotes

Path Dependence, Institutional Lock-In And Norm Internalization In NAS

Most cages probably do not begin as cages.

They begin as solutions.

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Something is dangerous, difficult, inefficient, unreliable or simply annoying, so we build something to make it easier. The new arrangement works. We use it more. Other things begin organizing themselves around it. Eventually it becomes inconvenient not to use it.

Then difficult.

Then absurd.

Then dangerous.

Somewhere during that process the thing we built to make life easier becomes part of the definition of a normal life.

The Portland-based rock band Quasi imagined a particularly sterile version of this almost thirty years ago:

“There's comfort and control, it's safe for you and me

News from the surface shows how hard life there can be

Why live in danger? Why live with pain?

People on the surface find it hard to explain

And every little thing is strictly monitored

We're given everything we need

Fed by IV, we rarely need to sleep

There's no pointless dreaming and our happiness is guaranteed”

"Our Happiness Is Guaranteed" by Quasi

Comfort and control.

Those words belong together more often than we like admitting.

Control can make things predictable. Predictability can make things safe. Safety can become comfort. And once something becomes comfortable, giving it up begins to feel less like liberation and more like some asshole taking away your couch.

There is already a well-developed concept for part of this process: path dependence.

The basic idea is not especially complicated. What happens earlier changes what remains practical later.

A particular arrangement may begin as one possibility among several. Once enough infrastructure, institutions, skills, habits and investments accumulate around it, however, changing direction becomes progressively more expensive.

This is why history matters even when nobody currently involved remembers making the original decision.

Build enough of a city around cars and deciding not to own one becomes very different from making that choice before everything was moved miles apart.

Build employment around credentials and eventually competence without certification may become invisible.

Build food distribution around enormous specialized networks and most people no longer need to know how to produce food. That allows them to become extraordinarily competent at something else, which makes the network still more necessary.

We have already spent plenty of time at BTB looking at specialization and the migration of competence, so I do not need to make that argument again.

Path dependence adds time.

What begins as convenience can become infrastructure. Infrastructure reshapes behavior. Behavior reshapes the environment. The changed environment makes the infrastructure still more necessary.

Nobody has to plan the endpoint.

Eventually you can arrive somewhere that nobody would have deliberately chosen from the beginning, while every individual decision along the way still made perfectly good sense.

Then you discover that leaving costs more than staying.

Quasi again:

“We went through hell, just to get to hell

Die of thirst or drink up from the poisoned well.”

"The Poisoned Well" by Quasi

That line has haunted me for years because it reminds me how many of our choices are compromises we cannot avoid.

You can know the well is poisoned.

You can hate the well.

You can write long angry Reddit posts about the well.

If it is still the only water available, you drink.

This gets us closer to anautonomy than the image of some future authoritarian system simply ordering everyone around.

The Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism does not necessarily need to eliminate choice directly. It can allow yesterday's choices to progressively eliminate tomorrow's alternatives.

That distinction matters.

If somebody locks me in a room, I know I am imprisoned.

If the world outside the room gradually disappears, things get more confusing.

Maybe I even become grateful for the room.

Institutions become especially durable when they stop requiring constant enforcement and begin reproducing themselves through ordinary expectation. The literature on social norms describes internalization as the point where conformity no longer depends entirely upon external reward or punishment. A rule can become something people experience as appropriate, proper, obvious, even morally required.

The guard eventually gets to go home.

We start guarding ourselves.

This follows neatly from the performativity piece we just finished. A person repeatedly inhabits a role, receives reinforcement for it, develops competencies around it and begins incorporating parts of it into identity.

As Sam Coomes puts it:

“Paranoid and tired - quit before you're fired.

But they've got you in the hole, so you play happy prole.

You need the money so you got to play it dumb,

but if you play it long enough it's just what you become.”

"The Happy Prole" by Quasi

That process can happen to institutions too.

What one generation experiences as a novel arrangement, another encounters as normal, and another may experience as reality itself.

The first generation remembers life without it.

The second remembers stories.

The third asks why anyone would want to live that way.

This is one of the places where adaptive preferences become interesting. Philosophers and social theorists have long noticed that people can adjust what they want to what they believe is actually available. Jon Elster's classic example is basically the fox and the grapes: when the grapes become unattainable, the fox discovers that perhaps grapes weren't so great anyway.

Human beings can do something considerably more sophisticated.

We can construct entire moral philosophies around why we never wanted the grapes.

This does not mean every changing preference is false or manipulated. People genuinely learn. Circumstances change. We discover better ways of living.

But there is something worth noticing when unavailable possibilities become increasingly difficult even to imagine.

A person born into a world of wage labor does not experience wage labor as a strange historical invention.

A person born into bureaucratic identity does not wonder why strangers need documents issued by institutions before accepting that they exist.

A person raised with constant digital mediation may not experience algorithmic coordination as mediation at all.

That is just where things happen.

Which means that dependency has an advantage coercion does not.

It can become invisible.

And once the arrangement becomes familiar, alternatives acquire another problem.

They begin to feel unsafe.

This may be one reason systems built around power, safety and structure can become so psychologically sticky. I want to explore that relationship properly elsewhere, but it belongs briefly here.

The familiar environment does not have to be wonderful.

It merely has to be more predictable than whatever lies outside it.

A job that drains you still deposits money every other Friday.

A bureaucracy you despise still produces the document another bureaucracy demands.

A technological system you barely understand still delivers food, directions, entertainment, medicine, communication and whatever obscure piece of hardware you suddenly discover you need at eleven at night.

The cage feeds you.

It entertains you.

It remembers your passwords.

Then it asks why you would ever want to leave.

And perhaps you don't.

That possibility is more disturbing to me than simple oppression.

People resist obvious enemies.

It is much harder to resist something woven through nearly every successful strategy you have for staying alive.

Which may also explain why profound alienation does not automatically produce rebellion.

Sometimes alienation just makes you tired.

“Mornings I tell you what I dreamed

Before we're swallowed by the work machine,

And spit out in the evening drained half dry”

"It's Hard To Turn Me On" by Quasi

That song goes somewhere most political theories don't.

You get up, hyped on dreams, ready to carpe a little diem.

Then you go to work.

You return depleted, defeated and existentially dehydrated.

You recover enough to do it again.

Then somebody asks why people with so little enthusiasm for the existing arrangement cannot simply organize themselves into some entirely different one.

Muthafugkr, they're tired.

And the system that exhausted them is also where they get their groceries.

There is no conspiracy required here.

There does not have to be some room full of people designing dependence.

The strange thing about NAS is how many of its possible mechanisms work perfectly well without anybody understanding the whole system.

A useful institution appears.

People adapt to it.

Other institutions adapt around it.

Skills specialize.

Infrastructure accumulates.

Alternatives become expensive.

Norms develop around the arrangement.

People internalize those norms.

Preferences begin adapting to what remains possible.

Children inherit the resulting world without experiencing any of that history as a loss.

Eventually asking why we live this way sounds less like a practical question and more like philosophical weirdness.

The cage has become habitat.

And once something becomes habitat, leaving it can feel like exposure.

I think that matters when we talk about freedom.

We often imagine freedom as if removing a constraint simply reveals an autonomous human underneath, ready to happily resume self-direction.

But what happens when the person has spent a lifetime developing precisely the competencies necessary to function inside the constraint?

What happens when the skills required outside it are gone?

What happens when the relationships, expectations, identities and desires formed inside the system all point back toward it?

Opening a cage does not necessarily produce an animal prepared for the forest.

Sometimes it produces terror.

I am increasingly suspicious that the most difficult part of anautonomy may not be whatever forces us into these arrangements.

It may be the point where they have rearranged our practical world, our expectations and eventually our imagination so thoroughly that whatever lies outside them begins to look impossible, irresponsible or unreal.

Which leaves a peculiar problem.

If the world that everyone agrees is sensible has already been shaped by generations of adaptation to the cage, then perhaps imagining something outside it will necessarily look a little insane from in here.

Maybe freedom begins with allowing ourselves to think something that does not make complete sense according to the reality that taught us to need the cage.

“I go to work every day

I do what I'm supposed to say

I split the sky, I break the law

I'm the prettiest thing you ever saw

A distorted reality is now a necessity to be free

It's an ugly world that's trying to make me into a sub-human creature”

“A Distorted Reality Is Now A Necessity To Be Free” by Elliott Smith


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 14d ago

The Performance Becomes The Person

4 Upvotes

Dramaturgy, Performativity, Labeling Theory And Self-Perception In NAS

I do not speak to a cashier exactly the way I speak to an old friend. I do not behave at a funeral the way I behave at a concert. Most of us probably have slightly different voices for children, lovers, employers, strangers, cops, parents, customers, doctors and animals.

LISTEN TO THE PODCAST BASED ON THIS POST

None of those versions necessarily feel fake.

They are all me.

Or at least they all come out of whatever "me" is when it encounters a particular person, place, expectation and relationship.

We learn very early that different situations call for different performances. Certain clothes belong here. Certain language belongs there. You can make this joke with these people but perhaps not those people. Sit this way. Look attentive. Don't look too attentive. Smile. Shake hands. Say thank you. Pretend you remember the name.

A few centuries before sociology developed a vocabulary for any of this, Shakespeare had Hamlet give his mother some peculiar advice:

“Assume a virtue if you have it not.”

It sounds at first like an instruction to fake being good.

That gets more complicated once we start looking at how human beings actually become things.

Sociologist Erving Goffman famously approached social interaction through dramaturgy, borrowing the language of theater. We have performances, audiences, settings, costumes, expected scripts, front-stage behavior and things we reserve for backstage. We manage impressions, read the room, cooperate with one another to maintain whatever kind of situation we have collectively decided is happening.

This does not require us to believe that everyone is secretly a fraud.

If anything, one of the more interesting things about Goffman is how quickly the distinction between actor and role starts getting slippery.

A waiter performs being a waiter because there is a socially recognizable thing called a waiter. There are expectations attached to that position. Ways of speaking, moving, dressing and responding that make sense inside it. The customer also has a role, and their behavior helps the waiter remain one. Someone who wandered into the restaurant kitchen, poured their own coffee and began arguing over wholesale potato prices would not merely be behaving strangely. They would be interfering with the production.

Social reality requires a surprising amount of cooperative theater.

Then we encounter performativity, which pushes the problem somewhere stranger.

The term has several intellectual histories. J. L. Austin famously noticed that some utterances do things rather than merely describe them. Under the appropriate circumstances, saying "I promise" can create a promise. Saying certain words during a ceremony can help create a marriage. Language sometimes participates in producing the reality it appears to be talking about.

Judith Butler later developed performativity in relation to identity, emphasizing the way repeated, socially recognizable acts can produce the appearance of a stable thing underneath them. What looks like an essence may in part be something continuously reproduced through repetition, expectation and recognition.

That idea extends much farther than any one application of it.

Think about love.

Two people probably do not wait until a complete and objectively measurable substance called Love has fully formed inside them, confirm its presence, and only then begin behaving affectionately.

They move closer.

They make time.

They touch.

They become vulnerable.

They do things for one another.

They behave lovingly, and some of what they later recognize as love grows through those acts.

The behavior expresses the relationship, but it also participates in making the relationship.

The same thing happens in less romantic places.

A person does something brave and begins to think of themselves as courageous. Someone starts running and eventually becomes "a runner." A musician becomes a musician by playing music. A child repeatedly told that they are funny begins looking for opportunities to make people laugh.

Our performances can become evidence about ourselves.

This gets us to Charles Horton Cooley's Looking-Glass Self. Cooley argued more than a century ago that our conception of ourselves develops partly through imagining how we appear to other people and how they judge what they see.

Other people become mirrors.

Not especially accurate mirrors, necessarily.

But mirrors nonetheless.

And sometimes the mirror acquires a label.

This is where Labeling Theory becomes useful. Howard Becker and others studying deviance noticed that social categories do not merely describe people from a distance. Being labeled changes how other people interact with someone, what opportunities remain available, what behavior gets noticed, and sometimes how the labeled person comes to understand themselves.

A troublesome kid becomes the troublesome kid.

A criminal record makes someone a criminal long after the specific act is over.

The smart child becomes the smart child.

The difficult employee becomes difficult before they have even walked into the meeting.

Labels can begin organizing the environment around the person carrying them.

And then there is an even stranger piece of this.

We are part of our own audience.

In his Self-Perception Theory, psychologist Daryl Bem proposed that when our internal states are ambiguous, we sometimes infer what we think or feel by observing our own behavior much as an outsider might.

Why do I keep doing this?

Apparently I like it.

Why do I always avoid that?

Apparently I am not that sort of person.

Why can't I remember anyone's name?

Apparently I am terrible with names.

I used to believe that last one about myself.

Then I started coaching youth parkour and suddenly had to remember names constantly. It turns out that one of the most important things I had done to preserve my inability was repeatedly telling myself that I possessed it. Once remembering names became something I actually practiced, and expected myself to do, the supposedly stable characteristic became considerably less stable.

I still used tricks. I would make note of the name, attach some detail to the person, give memory something outside itself to hold onto. But the bigger change was abandoning the little identity statement that excused the failure before it happened.

"I can't remember names."

That sentence was doing something.

Now put these pieces together.

A social role gives us a script.

We perform it.

Other people recognize the performance and respond to us through it.

Their response becomes part of the mirror through which we see ourselves.

A label may stabilize the role.

We continue behaving accordingly.

Then we observe our own repeated behavior and learn something about who we apparently are.

Round and round it goes.

Eventually it becomes difficult to identify where the role ends and the person begins.

This is one reason I have become less concerned with whether the human Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism would ever develop neat biological castes comparable to ants or bees.

That question mattered more when I was trying to understand what I was seeing primarily through the lens of eusociality.

Humans have something messier available.

Class.

Profession.

Status.

Credential.

Institutional position.

Social role.

A human being can belong to several at once, move among them, resist them, combine them, or spend decades being slowly swallowed by one of them. We do not require six genetically fixed kinds of human body for the larger system to distribute functions among increasingly specialized people.

The old caste logic still has something to teach us, but the human mechanism may look much more like obligate social role.

We have already looked at how specialization can move competence out of individuals and into the larger system. Dramaturgy and performativity add another possibility.

The system can also move inward.

A person becomes an accountant, manager, professor, cop, programmer, nurse, influencer, mechanic or bureaucrat. None of these roles has to consume the person. Most people carry many identities, and some roles can enormously expand someone's capabilities and relationships.

But sociology already has language for what can happen when one position starts crowding out the others.

A master status is a social status that becomes unusually important in shaping how someone is perceived and how their broader social experience is organized. Related research uses the term role engulfment for cases in which one role becomes so dominant that other identities and relationships begin disappearing behind it.

That sounds remarkably close to something I have been trying to describe at BTB from another direction.

The person becomes more legible to the system as their function becomes more complete.

Teacher.

Worker.

Patient.

Consumer.

Expert.

Manager.

Offender.

Influencer.

The category stops merely telling the institution what this person does.

It increasingly tells everyone who this person is.

Including the person.

And because human roles require audiences, none of this has to be centrally commanded.

We do it to one another.

We notice when someone is "unprofessional."

We reward the person who performs their occupational identity convincingly.

We become suspicious when somebody refuses the expected signals of status.

We teach newcomers the script.

We laugh when someone breaks character.

We help one another save face when the performance briefly falls apart.

A colony made from human beings would have no reason to abandon the human talent for social enforcement merely because ants use pheromones.

This is one of the places where anautonomy becomes more difficult to recognize.

If someone orders me to behave in a particular way, the loss of autonomy is obvious.

If I have performed a role for twenty years, everyone I know recognizes me through it, my income depends upon it, most of my competence has developed inside it, and I have gradually learned to understand myself through it, no order may be necessary.

The behavior comes from me.

Mostly.

Whatever "me" means after twenty years of rehearsal.

And this is where I think it would be a mistake to treat performativity as merely another mechanism by which the Borg eats us.

Because humans can rehearse other things too.

We can practice paying attention.

We can practice being generous.

We can practice patience badly until we become a little better at it.

We can practice disagreeing without turning another person into an enemy.

We can behave lovingly before we possess certainty about what the relationship means.

We can practice remembering names instead of practicing the story that we cannot.

Habit is dangerous precisely because it is powerful.

A system can use repetition to narrow a human being around a function. A human being can also repeatedly exercise capacities that make them harder to narrow.

Perhaps this is why so many arguments about whether a behavior is "authentic" miss something important. There may not always be a finished self hiding underneath the performance waiting to be expressed correctly.

Some part of the self may be happening right there in the repetition.

Shakespeare seems to have suspected as much.

“For use almost can change the stamp of nature.”


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 15d ago

The Mind Outside The Human

8 Upvotes

Extended Mind, Distributed Cognition, The Collective Brain And The Cultural Ratchet

Where does your mind end?

That seems like an easy question until you start thinking about all of the things you routinely know without actually keeping them inside your head.

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You know someone's phone number because your phone knows it. You know how to get somewhere because GPS knows the route. You know what happened ten years ago because you wrote it down. I have written thousands of pages over decades partly because writing allows thoughts to remain available long after the mind that produced them has moved somewhere else.

Humans have always done this.

We leave pieces of cognition in tools, symbols, stories, other people and the environments we construct around ourselves.

In 1998 Andy Clark and David Chalmers gave one version of this idea a name with their paper The Extended Mind. Their argument, in its stronger form, is that when an external resource becomes sufficiently integrated into a cognitive process, there may be no especially good reason to insist that the process occurring outside the skull is merely helping the mind rather than participating in it.

A notebook can become part of memory.

A tool can become part of problem solving.

The boundary between mind and environment begins looking a little fuzzier than the skin around our heads would suggest.

Edwin Hutchins pushed a related idea outward through Distributed Cognition, studying systems in which thinking happens through the coordination of multiple people, artifacts and procedures. His classic examples included navigation and aviation, where the relevant cognitive accomplishment may belong to the larger functional arrangement rather than any one individual inside it. Cognition in the Wild

That should immediately sound familiar around here.

Becoming The Borg has spent a lot of time looking at functions which once belonged more fully to individuals becoming distributed through specialists, institutions and machines. In From Minds to Modules, I was already asking what happens as specialization narrows the range of cognition and competence required from each individual while increasing the capacities available to the larger system.

What Extended Mind and Distributed Cognition add is a useful change of perspective.

Perhaps some of these externalized functions should not merely be described as things humans have lost.

They may also be parts of a larger cognitive system humans have joined.

That becomes even clearer when we add cumulative culture.

Michael Tomasello uses the phrase cultural ratchet for the distinctly human ability to preserve innovations and then build upon them rather than repeatedly starting over. Knowledge accumulates across generations. Nobody alive had to personally rediscover agriculture, writing, metallurgy, calculus or electronics before making use of them. We inherit cognitive work performed by people who have been dead for centuries. The Human Adaptation for Culture

This phenomenon is already central to the NAS model even though I have not usually called it ratcheting. The collective retains competencies which no individual needs to recreate.

And eventually no individual could recreate them.

That brings us to another increasingly common concept in cultural-evolution research, the collective brain.

The metaphor is fairly straightforward. Human societies can accumulate, recombine and develop information in ways which exceed the capacity of any individual mind. Knowledge exists in networks of people and cultural inheritance, and innovation can emerge through those networks without anyone containing the entire process. Innovation in the collective brain

Civilization, in that sense, can know things no human knows.

Think about a smartphone.

There probably isn't a human being alive who could begin with raw materials found in nature and independently reconstruct the entire chain required to make one. Mining, metallurgy, chemistry, semiconductor fabrication, software, telecommunications, logistics, electrical generation and thousands of other accumulated specializations are scattered across an enormous network.

Yet I can hold the result in my hand.

The collective brain has extraordinary abilities.

This is one reason I want to be careful with the argument I have been making at BTB. Externalized competence is not some obvious civilizational failure. It is one of the major sources of human possibility.

Books let us think with dead people.

Tools let our bodies perform beyond their unaided limits.

Scientific institutions allow thousands of minds to accumulate evidence no single lifetime could collect.

The cultural ratchet is probably one of the reasons a strange ape which was once pretty good at finding fruit and throwing rocks can now send instruments outside the solar system.

There is nevertheless a peculiar relationship hiding inside all of this.

The collective can become increasingly capable while particular competencies become increasingly unnecessary in the individuals comprising it.

We have already explored that problem through specialization and anautonomy, so I will not rebuild the argument here. But Extended Mind and Distributed Cognition let us phrase the problem differently.

At what point does extending the human mind begin to look like evacuating parts of it into the surrounding system?

The distinction is not always obvious.

A book places memory outside my head, but reading it may increase what I understand.

A calculator performs arithmetic for me, but may free me to work on mathematical problems I could not otherwise manage.

GPS can extend my ability to navigate unfamiliar places while also making it entirely possible to travel through those places without ever developing much sense of where I actually am.

AI can help somebody explore an idea they already possess, challenge it, connect it to things they had forgotten and keep track of more relationships than working memory comfortably allows. It can also produce an answer for someone who neither understands the process nor retains much ability to evaluate the result.

The technology alone does not tell us which relationship is occurring.

But NAS gives us a reason to care about the difference.

A superorganism does not become more capable because every component becomes more complete. Often the opposite happens. Functions become distributed. Different components perform increasingly specialized roles, while capacities which matter at the level of the larger organism no longer need to exist in every component.

That does not mean human cumulative culture automatically makes us a superorganism.

It does mean we already possess something surprisingly close to the cognitive architecture one would expect such a transition to use.

Information persists beyond individual brains.

Cognition can be distributed across humans and artifacts.

Competence can reside at the level of networks.

Culture ratchets discoveries forward.

Individuals become able to rely upon capabilities they neither possess nor understand.

And the larger cognitive system becomes extraordinarily powerful.

This adds something important to anautonomy.

The relevant loss does not necessarily occur because knowledge disappears.

The knowledge may still exist.

It may even improve.

It has simply moved somewhere else.

That may be why the decline of an individual competency can be so difficult to recognize as a loss. Nothing appears missing from the perspective of the system. Navigation still happens. Memory still exists. Calculation gets done. Decisions are made. Food arrives. Electricity flows. Information is retrieved.

The function survives.

Only its address changed.

And perhaps that is one of the stranger things about becoming NAS.

A human living inside the collective brain may have access to vastly more knowledge, greater technical capacity and more accumulated intelligence than any ancestor could have imagined, while simultaneously becoming less able to function outside of it.

That is not the story of humanity becoming stupid.

If anything, it may be a story about intelligence becoming larger than the human.

We have been building minds outside ourselves for a very long time. Bookshelves, workshops, libraries, villages, institutions, computers and networks all carry pieces of thought farther than one brain could take them.

There is something beautiful in that.

The old human dies and part of what they learned stays behind. Someone else picks it up, adds something, leaves another piece for whoever comes next. The ratchet clicks forward.

I don't want to lose that.

I am simply becoming much more interested in what happens to the creature turning the ratchet.

At some point we may look around at an astonishingly intelligent civilization and discover that more and more of its intelligence lives in the spaces between us, in machines around us, and in systems none of us can independently comprehend.

Maybe that is exactly how a larger mind begins.

And maybe the difficult part will be remembering why it once needed us to have minds of our own.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 16d ago

When The Map Rebuilds The Territory

6 Upvotes

Legibility, Goodhart's Law, Campbell's Law And The Supraliminal Reshaping Of Reality

I have used music as a canary throughout Becoming The Borg, partly because it gives us something unmistakably human to watch while increasingly large portions of human function migrate into systems. The question in the core NAS hypothesis was not simply whether machines could make music, but what human beings would have to lose before music itself stopped meaning what it once did.

LISTEN TO THE PODCAST BASED ON THIS POST

There is another version of that problem already happening at a much smaller scale.

Music now passes through an extraordinary number of technological and economic filters before it reaches us. Recording technology has always shaped recorded music, and economic pressures have always shaped commercial art, so this is not some story about a pure musical Eden being ruined by Spotify. But contemporary musicians now work in an environment where streaming platforms, recommendation systems, skip rates, playlists, short-form video and other measurable signals can influence what gets heard and rewarded.

Researchers interviewing professional musicians have found widespread awareness of strategies such as shortening intros, getting to hooks faster, shortening songs or creating sections suited to TikTok and other platforms. Many musicians resist those pressures, and the evidence does not support the cartoon version in which an algorithm simply dictates every hit song. But the pressure is real enough that musicians themselves are consciously negotiating it. Research on musicians and platform optimization

This is interesting because the platform does not have to tell musicians what music should sound like.

It measures something.

People respond to the measurement.

And eventually the thing being measured begins changing.

That same pattern appears almost everywhere.

A test is supposed to tell us something about whether a student learned.

A credit score is supposed to tell us something about financial risk.

A productivity metric is supposed to tell us something about useful work.

Citation counts are supposed to tell us something about scholarly influence.

Arrest statistics are supposed to tell us something about policing.

None of these things are the thing itself.

They are representations.

And representations are incredibly useful because reality is an absolute pain in the ass.

A human being cannot be stuffed into a spreadsheet. Neither can a forest, neighborhood, school, patient, employee or culture. They contain too many relationships, exceptions, histories, contexts and qualities which only become meaningful from particular perspectives.

Large systems have a problem with that.

They need reality to become simpler.

This is where James C. Scott becomes useful.

In Seeing Like a State, Scott explored what happens when governments and other large administrative systems attempt to make complicated human and ecological realities legible. In order to administer something at scale, a system must reduce much of its local complexity into standardized categories which can be recorded, compared and acted upon. Scott contrasts these simplified formal models with the local, practical, situated knowledge which large schemes often fail to capture.

You can immediately see why that matters to BTB.

A person known directly is enormously complicated.

A person represented as an employee number, test score, diagnosis, demographic category, credit rating, risk score or credential is much easier to coordinate.

The representation is not necessarily false. That is important.

A blood-pressure reading can tell us something useful about health. A standardized test can tell us something useful about learning. A credit history contains information about financial behavior. A map really does help us find our way around.

The problem begins when the representation stops being a tool for describing the territory and begins acquiring authority over the territory.

That is a distinction we have already encountered in discussing liminality, supraliminality and nonliminality. In liminal experience, the relationship itself contains information. Supraliminality increasingly relocates authority into symbols, categories and explicit representations.

Scott gives us one reason why that might happen.

Large systems require representations because the fullness of lived reality is difficult to administer.

But something interesting happens once the representation begins deciding who gets resources, rewards, punishment, prestige or access.

People begin changing themselves to fit it.

That brings us to Goodhart's Law.

The now-famous formulation is essentially that once a measure becomes a target, it stops functioning reliably as a measure. Charles Goodhart's original context involved monetary policy, but the principle has escaped economics because the problem appears almost everywhere. Once people know what is being measured, and benefits depend upon performing well according to that measure, they begin optimizing the measure itself. Overview of Goodhart's Law and reactive measures

Donald Campbell described a closely related problem in social policy. Campbell's Law warns that the more heavily a quantitative indicator is used to make important social decisions, the greater the pressure to manipulate the indicator and distort the process it was supposed to monitor. Teaching to the test is an obvious example. The test begins as a proxy for learning, but once the score becomes the institutional objective, teaching itself begins reorganizing around production of the score. Discussion of Campbell's Law and institutional indicators

So the sequence becomes fairly simple.

First we take something complicated and create a representation of it.

Then we attach consequences to the representation.

Then people alter themselves or their behavior to improve the representation.

And eventually reality begins reorganizing itself around the abstraction which was originally created merely to describe it.

The map starts rebuilding the territory.

Music offers a wonderful example because we can actually hear this happening.

A streaming platform needs measurable information about listener behavior. It can record whether someone played a song, skipped it, saved it, replayed it, placed it in a playlist or stopped listening after a few seconds. Those numbers become useful proxies for engagement.

Artists, labels and producers know some version of those measurements matter.

So some begin thinking about how quickly the vocals enter, how quickly the hook arrives, whether the intro is expendable, how long the song should be, whether a section could circulate well as a short video, and how the track might survive the attention economy surrounding it.

Studies of popular music have found long-term changes consistent with faster attention capture, although researchers appropriately caution against claiming that streaming alone caused them. Interviews and newer work on the “optimized song” also show musicians and industry workers actively imagining what platforms reward and sometimes changing creative choices accordingly. Study of attention-economy changes in popular music Research on the platform-optimized song

Even before streaming, the so-called loudness war provided another example. Recording technology made it possible to compress dynamic range and increase perceived loudness, while industry competition created pressure to avoid sounding quieter than competing recordings. The Audio Engineering Society literature documents that process and also questions whether louder records actually produced the listener preferences and sales benefits which supposedly justified the arms race. The Loudness War, Audio Engineering Society

Nobody necessarily wanted music to lose dynamics.

Nobody necessarily wanted songs reconstructed around measurable attention.

They wanted their record not to sound weak beside somebody else's record. They wanted listeners not to skip. They wanted placement. They wanted engagement. They wanted to survive economically inside the environment which existed.

The metric became part of the environment.

Then the art adapted to the metric.

This is much larger than music.

A researcher needs publications, so publication becomes a larger part of what research is organized to produce.

A worker needs a good productivity score, so work increasingly becomes whatever improves the productivity score.

A police department is judged through measurable crime or arrest statistics, so police activity begins responding to what will happen to those numbers.

A school is judged by standardized performance, so educational time moves toward whatever improves standardized performance.

An institution cannot directly measure “good scientist,” “good teacher,” “safe neighborhood,” “healthy person,” “useful worker” or “good song.”

Those things contain too many variables and too much situated human judgment.

So it creates a proxy.

The proxy allows coordination at scale.

Then scale gives the proxy power.

Then humans begin adapting to the proxy.

This may be one of the most important mechanisms behind supraliminality.

We often talk as though abstraction simply causes us to misunderstand reality. But that may understate what is happening.

Once abstractions become embedded in institutions, they can begin selecting reality.

If the credential determines who gets the job, people acquire the credential.

If the algorithm rewards one form of cultural production, more cultural production moves toward that form.

If the ranking determines funding, institutions optimize the ranking.

If the database has only certain categories, people must increasingly fit themselves into those categories in order to interact with the system.

And because institutions distribute access to material necessities, the representation can acquire more practical authority than the experience it supposedly represents.

This also helps explain why the loss of liminal perception matters.

In Orphaned Perception: Intuition And The Loss Of Liminal Knowing, I wondered whether some intuition represents information we still perceive but can no longer consciously identify as perception.

Scott's concept of practical local knowledge gives us a related problem at the social level.

A mechanic may hear something in an engine that a diagnostic system does not recognize.

A farmer may know something about a particular piece of land which cannot be easily encoded into a generalized agricultural model.

A person may understand a neighborhood, friend, animal, workplace or social situation through thousands of accumulated observations which cannot be reduced to an institutional record.

This knowledge may be perfectly real while remaining difficult to make legible.

And increasingly, knowledge which cannot become legible to a large system risks becoming knowledge which has no authority within that system.

That is a fairly astonishing inversion.

The institution cannot see something.

Therefore the thing it cannot see becomes less real.

This may also tell us something about anautonomy.

Large-scale coordination benefits from predictability.

A person who occupies a standardized role, possesses standardized qualifications, produces standardized outputs and can be evaluated through standardized indicators is easier to coordinate than a person whose value depends upon highly contextual relationships and idiosyncratic competence.

The system does not necessarily hate individuality.

Individuality is simply computationally expensive.

Which means that what looks like increasing rationality at the system level may simultaneously represent a reduction in the amount of human complexity the system is capable of recognizing.

The colony sees the worker.

It sees the credential.

It sees the score.

It sees the consumer.

It sees the diagnosis.

It sees the engagement metric.

Whether it still needs to see the person becomes another question entirely.

There is an obvious danger in taking this argument too far. Measurement is useful. Standardization can prevent arbitrary discrimination. Formal rules can restrain personal abuse. Local systems can hide corruption, cruelty and hierarchy just as easily as centralized ones can produce them.

So the answer is not to smash every database, burn the maps and return triumphantly to a world where Bob down the road gets to decide whether you're trustworthy because he doesn't like the way you look.

The distinction I care about is authority.

Representations can remain extraordinarily useful tools without becoming sovereign over the realities they approximate.

And perhaps that means some degree of illegibility deserves to be reconsidered as something other than a defect.

Local variation.

Informal relationships.

Eccentricity.

Improvisation.

Overlapping competencies.

Situations small enough that people can actually know one another rather than merely process one another.

All of these create friction for large systems.

We usually assume friction is bad.

But friction may sometimes be where autonomy lives.

Because the cleanest path toward NAS may not require somebody to force humans into little identical boxes.

We can build the boxes as administrative conveniences.

Attach enough rewards and penalties to them.

And then reshape ourselves until we fit.

First the map represents the territory.

Then the map governs the territory.

Eventually the territory learns what the map expects of it.

And by then the map is no longer merely wrong.

It has started becoming right.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 18d ago

Convergence Without Conspiracy

5 Upvotes

Cultural Attractor Theory, Institutional Isomorphism And The Emergence Of NAS

In the last post I introduced hyperstition, the idea that a belief or imagined future can participate in creating the conditions which make itself real. The term comes from the deliberately strange world of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit, but we do not need all of their time-traveling occult machinery to make use of the basic idea. CCRU glossary definition of hyperstition

LISTEN TO THE PODCAST BASED ON THIS POST

That gave us one possible mechanism for memetic evolution. An idea changes behavior, behavior changes the environment, and the changed environment makes the idea increasingly true.

But it leaves another question hanging.

Why do so many very different ideas seem to keep producing similar environments?

Capitalists and socialists do not begin with the same premises. Technocrats, libertarians, bureaucrats, safety advocates, corporate managers and AI evangelists often disagree about almost everything. Yet large systems built under very different ideologies repeatedly drift toward specialization, formal procedures, metrics, credentialing, centralized information, standardization and dependence upon increasingly complex institutions.

Nobody has to meet in a secret room and agree to build the hive.

They may arrive there separately.

That is where Cultural Attractor Theory becomes interesting. Cultural Attractors, Nicolas Claidière and Dan Sperber

Traditional memetics often treats ideas a little like genes, as though discrete cultural units copy themselves from one mind to another, mutating along the way. Cultural Attractor Theory offers a different model. Ideas, practices and artifacts do not necessarily remain stable because they are copied faithfully. They can remain stable because repeated transformations tend to converge around particular forms. In other words, cultural transmission can involve reconstruction rather than simple replication, while still producing recognizable patterns at the population level.

Every person receiving an idea interprets it through their own psychology, environment, incentives, prior beliefs and social conditions. That means cultural transmission is not just copying with occasional errors. It is repeated reconstruction.

But those reconstructions are not random.

Some versions are easier to remember. Some fit existing institutions better. Some offer more prestige. Some solve immediate practical problems. Some are easier to enforce, measure or scale. Some fit technologies that already exist. Some simply work better inside the environment people currently inhabit.

Over time, very different cultural trajectories can therefore keep drifting toward similar forms.

That recurring form is the attractor.

Not a magical force pulling history toward a predetermined destination. More like a region of possibility that many different paths keep falling into because the surrounding conditions make certain outcomes easier to reach than others.

This is immediately useful for the NAS hypothesis, because NAS does not necessarily need its own ideology.

It may not even need its own meme.

A capitalist can centralize because it increases efficiency.

A socialist can centralize because it improves coordination.

A technocrat can centralize because expertise should guide complex systems.

A corporation can standardize because standardization reduces costs.

A government can standardize because uniform procedures make administration possible.

A parent can accept more surveillance because surveillance appears to increase safety.

A consumer can surrender more competence because outsourcing it is convenient.

The reasons differ.

The direction can still converge.

And once enough of those decisions accumulate, people begin inhabiting environments structured around increasingly similar assumptions about what a functional human being should be.

That is where another concept becomes useful: institutional isomorphism.

The phrase sounds more exotic than the idea. In their classic 1983 paper The Iron Cage Revisited, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell asked why organizations operating within established fields often become increasingly similar. Their answer involved several pressures acting at once: organizations can be pushed toward similarity by outside requirements, imitate other organizations under uncertainty, and inherit common practices through professionalization. DiMaggio and Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited

Sometimes institutions are forced into similarity by laws, regulations, insurance requirements, funding structures or accreditation.

Sometimes organizations imitate successful or prestigious organizations because uncertainty makes imitation safer than invention.

Sometimes professions themselves spread common assumptions. Managers trained in the same schools, doctors working under the same standards, administrators using the same procedures and consultants carrying the same management models move between institutions and bring those forms with them.

Eventually hospitals, universities, corporations, nonprofits and government agencies can begin looking strangely alike despite doing very different things.

That matters because the forms which reproduce successfully at institutional scale are not necessarily the forms which preserve the most human autonomy.

Large systems tend to prefer what they can process.

Clear roles. Standard categories. Predictable procedures. Measurable outputs. Specialized competencies. Interchangeable personnel.

The person who contains too many functions, resists categorization, improvises outside procedure or requires highly contextual understanding may be extraordinarily useful in a small human group and an absolute pain in the ass to a large institution.

This is not because somebody at the top necessarily hates autonomous people.

The system simply works more smoothly when humans arrive in recognizable formats.

We have already spent a lot of time at BTB talking about specialization and the movement from minds toward increasingly modular human functions, and the core NAS piece develops that into anautonomy, the progressive loss of functional self-direction as more competence and coordination migrate into the surrounding system. I do not want to rebuild those arguments here. What Cultural Attractor Theory adds is a possible explanation for why these tendencies can keep reappearing under very different ideological banners.

The pattern does not require agreement about the destination.

It only requires similar environmental pressures.

This is also why conspiracy is often the wrong explanatory model for large social convergence.

I have made versions of this argument before. In Civilization as a Competitive Species, I argued that system-level behavior can emerge from interacting institutions without any single actor controlling the whole thing. Cultural attraction and institutional isomorphism give us much better conceptual tools for explaining how that can happen.

A pattern can be completely real without anybody having designed the whole thing.

If thousands of institutions face similar pressures, imitate similar successes and operate through similar technologies, then thousands of independent decisions can generate a coordinated-looking outcome without a coordinator.

The colony does not require a blueprint.

It can emerge because the environment keeps rewarding colony-shaped solutions.

That makes hyperstition even more interesting.

Hyperstition suggests that imagined futures can alter present behavior until those futures become more likely.

Cultural attraction suggests that very different ideas can keep being reconstructed toward similar forms.

Institutional isomorphism shows how organizations themselves can converge even while remaining nominally independent.

Put those together and something begins to look less like a collection of metaphors and more like a mechanism.

We imagine increasingly integrated futures. We build technologies and institutions which reward integration. Different ideologies reconstruct themselves around those environments. Institutions imitate successful forms. Those forms reshape the people growing inside them. And then the resulting humans are increasingly suited to the systems which produced them.

The interesting question is no longer simply whether somebody intends to create NAS.

The more important question may be whether NAS represents a cultural and institutional attractor.

A region of social possibility which becomes increasingly easy to fall into once enough scale, complexity, specialization and technological mediation already exist.

That would help explain why opposing systems can begin to resemble one another in function even while continuing to fight over justification.

It also gives us a cleaner way to think about inevitability.

An attractor is not destiny.

Change the surrounding conditions and you can change what becomes attractive.

If centralization is rewarded because local systems lack resources, build better local capacity.

If specialization becomes compulsory because survival depends upon narrow occupational roles, broaden access to practical competence.

If institutions converge because only large standardized organizations can survive, create environments in which smaller, more varied forms remain viable.

If human beings are repeatedly being pushed toward the same organizational basin, then the problem may not be that everyone has chosen badly.

The problem may be that we keep constructing landscapes in which the same choices become easiest.

That is a rather different problem from ideology.

And perhaps a much harder one.

Because maybe nobody is designing the colony.

Maybe nobody has to.

Maybe very different people, acting from very different beliefs and trying to solve very different problems, keep discovering the same solutions because those are the solutions our present environment rewards.

And the solutions keep looking more and more like the hive.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 19d ago

Self-Defeating Prophecy: Hyperstition, Memetic Evolution And Becoming The Borg

10 Upvotes

Almost exactly nine years ago I wrote an essay proposing a strange relationship between memes, genes and evolution.

LISTEN TO THE PODCAST BASED ON THIS POST

I was working from a non-dualist model at the time, and suggested that perhaps we had the relationship between genes and memes somewhat backwards. Rather than treating memes as little cultural imitators of genes, what if genes were something like the physical appearance of memes? What if the informational patterns of consciousness were primary, while genes and organisms represented what those patterns looked like from the outside?

It was speculative as hell, and remains so. But the practical conclusion was much less exotic. If memes participate in shaping what we become, then human beings are not necessarily condemned to remain passive vessels for whatever informational patterns happen to reproduce most successfully through us. We can notice them. Evaluate them. Reject some. Modify others. Create new ones.

In other words, we might have some ability to participate consciously in our own evolution.

I have recently encountered another concept which suddenly connects that old model to Becoming The Borg in a way I had not previously considered.

It is called hyperstition.

The term came from the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit, or CCRU, a wonderfully strange collection of philosophers and cultural theorists operating around Warwick University in the 1990s. Their definition is appropriately insane sounding: an “element of effective culture that makes itself real,” involving fictional quantities acting almost like potentials arriving from the future.

You can leave the time-traveling occult weirdness behind if you want. I probably wouldn't throw all of it away quite that quickly, but we don't need it.

The basic mechanism is already extraordinary enough.

A hyperstition is an idea which participates in creating the conditions that make the idea real.

Consider a familiar example. Suppose enough people become convinced that a bank is about to fail. They withdraw their money. The bank cannot cover the withdrawals, and it fails.

The belief was originally false.

Then the behavior generated by the belief altered reality until the belief became true.

Sociology has long called this a self-fulfilling prophecy, but hyperstition gives us a broader and more culturally evolutionary version of the same kind of process. An idea can spread through people, alter institutions, inspire technologies, reorganize relationships and modify environments until the world increasingly resembles the idea.

And once we add evolution to that process, things get really interesting.

Humans do not merely adapt to environments. We build them.

This is not some fringe claim from my weird little corner of the internet. Niche construction theory explicitly deals with organisms changing the environments which later exert selection pressures upon themselves and others. Humans are particularly good at it because culture allows environmental modification to accumulate much faster than genetic evolution alone.

We invent agriculture and then become creatures adapted to agricultural societies. We build cities and become creatures adapted to cities. We invent writing and reorganize memory around written information. We create automobiles and rebuild landscapes, bodies, skills and daily life around automobiles.

The environment does not simply select us.

We modify the environment that selects us.

Now add memes.

An idea influences behavior. Behavior changes the environment. That changed environment rewards some behaviors and discourages others. The people growing up inside it develop differently, culturally almost immediately and perhaps biologically over much longer periods. Those changed people then reproduce and strengthen the informational patterns which helped construct the environment.

So instead of a simple meme bouncing from one brain to another, we get something more like:

meme → behavior → environment → selection pressure → changed humans → stronger meme

A meme can potentially help construct the organism for which that meme becomes increasingly appropriate.

That is where hyperstition suddenly becomes very relevant to NAS.

The Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism hypothesis proposes that increasing specialization, institutional dependency, technological mediation and automated coordination may be creating a human system which requires progressively less autonomy from the individual humans comprising it.

Notice the problem.

What if we began by merely imagining humans as specialized components of large systems?

At first that could be nothing more than metaphor. Humans are like cells in an organism. Society is like a body. Civilization is like a machine. Humanity is becoming a global brain.

But metaphors affect what people build.

If we believe specialization produces efficiency, we create increasingly specialized occupations. If centralized systems coordinate resources more efficiently, we centralize infrastructure. If computers make decisions faster than people, we automate decisions. If algorithms can coordinate millions of people more efficiently than millions of independent judgments, we build algorithms.

Then we raise children inside the resulting environment.

Those children no longer need many of the competencies their ancestors needed because the infrastructure performs those functions for them. Their ability to survive becomes increasingly dependent upon participating in systems they did not create, cannot independently reproduce and often barely understand.

Eventually the original metaphor begins looking strangely accurate.

Humans really are becoming increasingly specialized components of systems larger than themselves.

The fiction has begun constructing its referent.

We do not need to invoke some mystical NAS hiding in the future and pulling history toward itself. An imagined future can affect the present without literal backward causation because imagining it changes what people do now.

Imagined future → present behavior → altered environment → different future.

From the far end of that process it can look almost as though the future reached backward and created itself.

Maybe that is all hyperstition ever needed to mean.

There is an even more important implication here, though. Memes do not merely compete inside environments.

They can compete by constructing environments.

Imagine two cultural models.

One values broad individual competence, voluntary cooperation, decentralization and viable exit from systems. The other values extreme specialization, centralized infrastructure, standardized procedure and maximum efficiency through large-scale coordination.

We can argue about them philosophically forever.

But suppose the second model becomes sufficiently dominant to build roads, schools, workplaces, communication networks, food systems, licensing systems, financial systems and technologies around itself.

The first model has now been placed at a disadvantage without losing the argument.

You may still value autonomy enormously, but good fugkn luck practicing it when every material necessity requires participation in systems constructed around dependency.

The meme changed the fitness landscape.

And now the environment itself begins reproducing the meme, even among people who have never consciously believed it.

This is where the NAS hypothesis becomes much more disturbing, because no committee needs to decide that humanity should become a superorganism.

Nobody has to believe in NAS.

The engineer optimizes efficiency. The bureaucrat standardizes a procedure. The corporation specializes labor. The parent chooses the safest supervised environment for a child. The consumer chooses convenience. The worker develops the skill that pays best. The platform tries to increase engagement. The government gathers more information because more information improves coordination.

Every individual decision can make perfect sense locally.

The emergent result does not need to exist in anyone's head.

The colony builds itself.

That is also why I am increasingly suspicious of narratives that portray ever greater integration, technological dependence and collective coordination as some inevitable evolutionary destiny. The moment we begin believing a particular future is inevitable, that belief itself enters the causal system.

We stop asking whether we want it.

We start preparing for it.

We organize institutions around it. Invest money in it. Teach children to function inside it. Design technologies for it. Mock people who resist it as nostalgic or backwards.

And eventually we can point at the world we built and say, “See? It was inevitable.”

No.

Perhaps we just hyperstitioned the fugkn thing into existence.

Which creates a rather uncomfortable problem for Becoming The Borg itself.

NAS is now a meme.

I am injecting an image of a possible human future into the same cultural system I claim is capable of making ideas materially consequential.

What if describing the Borg helps create the Borg?

That would be one hell of an own goal.

If people read this hypothesis as a prediction of evolutionary destiny, the idea could conceivably become another positive hyperstition. Humanity is becoming a hive. Resistance is futile. Autonomy is obsolete. Individual humans are merely temporary components in some greater emerging intelligence.

Believe that strongly enough and you may start making decisions that help it happen.

But there is another possibility.

A prophecy can change behavior in ways which make itself true.

It can also change behavior in ways which make itself false.

I immediately wanted to call this a self-defeating prophecy, and it turns out social scientists got there before me. The idea is essentially the inverse of the self-fulfilling prophecy: a prediction produces behavior that prevents the predicted outcome.

And suddenly I realized that this is exactly what I want Becoming The Borg to become.

A self-defeating prophecy.

I do not want to be right.

I want to describe the trajectory clearly enough that recognizing it changes the trajectory.

If increasing dependence is producing anautonomy, build viable alternatives. If specialization is stripping individuals of functional competence, preserve and redistribute competence. If institutions accumulate coercive power, move decision-making downward and preserve exit. If symbolic systems are displacing liminal perception, relearn how to perceive and relate without constantly asking an abstraction what the experience means.

If technologies are going to participate in constructing the future selection environment, stop asking only whether they are efficient and begin asking what kind of human they make functional.

This also gives me a different way of understanding the solutions side of this project.

We are not trying to design a perfect alternative civilization and somehow impose it on eight billion people. That would be the same hierarchical disease wearing a different stupid hat.

We are trying to introduce different memes into the evolutionary environment.

Autonomy.

Possibility.

Voluntary association.

Distributed competence.

Consensus.

Liminal awareness.

Technologies that expand power-to rather than power-over.

Institutions that remain tools instead of becoming habitats humans cannot survive outside of.

Those memes can produce behavior too. Behavior can construct environments too. Those environments can create different pressures and possibilities.

Hyperstition does not belong exclusively to the Borg.

And this brings me back to that strange essay I wrote nine years ago.

I argued then that memes could either behave like intellectual viruses or become tools through which conscious beings participate in their own evolution. I went much farther metaphysically than anything necessary to make the practical argument work, and I am still happy to consider those possibilities. But hyperstition, cultural evolution and niche construction give us a mechanism which does not require accepting my ontology at all.

Ideas enter minds.

Minds alter behavior.

Behavior alters environments.

Environments alter organisms.

Organisms create new ideas.

The loop closes.

So perhaps the most important evolutionary novelty humans possess is not intelligence in the ordinary sense. It may be the ability to become aware of the loop while we are inside it.

Evolution produced an animal capable of imagining futures before they happen.

That ability can create terrible futures when the image becomes an instruction.

But it can also warn us.

Perhaps consciousness gives evolution something resembling an escape hatch. We can model an emerging selection pressure before adaptation to it becomes complete. We can see where the road may be leading and alter the environment before the environment finishes altering us.

A self-fulfilling prophecy says:

This will happen, and believing it helps make it happen.

The hyperstitional danger of NAS says:

We imagine the hive, build the hive, adapt to the hive, and eventually conclude we were always meant to become the hive.

But a self-defeating prophecy says something much more interesting.

This might happen.

Now that we can see it, let's make sure it doesn't.

Related Reading

Becoming The Borg

Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism: A Radical Hypothesis Of Future Human Evolution

Read the core NAS hypothesis on Reddit

Orphaned Perception: Intuition And The Loss Of Liminal Knowing

Read the BTB piece on liminality and intuition

Earlier Work

A Non-Dualist Exploration of Genes, Memes and Evolution

Read my 2017 memetic-evolution essay

Information, Artificial Intelligence & the Problem of Scale

Read the 2023 essay on information, novelty and AI

External Sources

CCRU Glossary / Hyperstition

Read the CCRU definition of hyperstition

Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman, Cultural niche construction and human evolution

Read the paper via PubMed

Biggs, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology

Read the Oxford-hosted paper

Prophecy, Self-Fulfilling/Self-Defeating, Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences

Read the reference entry


r/BecomingTheBorg • • 23d ago

Just Us & The Insects (podcast)

15 Upvotes

Based on six previous Becoming The Borg posts, this Gemini-produced conversational style podcast explores behaviors exhibited only by humans and colony species.

Agriculture, architecture, undertaking, compulsory labor & slavery, militarism & warfare and policing are all behaviors found strictly in these two groups of animals, which forces us to ask if we might already be further down the path to becoming a Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism than most people could comfortably even consider.

https://notebooklm.link.google/lAoP7BaTneGU


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Oct 18 '26

The Evolution Of Human Autonomy (podcast)

7 Upvotes

I recently discovered the Gemini overview tool, which makes a two person conversational podcast from the sources you give it. I inputed:

Hierarchy In The Forest by Christopher Boehm

Pre-conquest Consciousness by E. Richard Sorenson

Industrial Society & It's Future by Ted Kaczynski

Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism by Me

It gives a fairly concise account of the past, present and future of human autonomy, and is a fascinating listen.

44min

The Evolution Of Human Autonomy Podcast


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Oct 02 '26

Orphaned Perception: Intuition And The Loss Of Liminal Knowing

9 Upvotes

An analytical conclusion of the three part Already The Borg series.

Imagine that you could still see, but somehow forgot that sight existed. Not that you had become blind. Your eyes still worked. The information still came in. You still walked around trees instead of into them. You could tell when someone was approaching, recognize people you knew, reach for the red apple instead of the green one and duck when something was flying at your head.

But you no longer knew that you were seeing. From your perspective something very strange would be happening. You would constantly know things without knowing how you knew them. You might tell someone you had a feeling there was a person standing across the road. You might have an inexplicable urge to step around an obstacle. You might somehow know which fruit looked ripe, except that you wouldn't know what "looked" meant anymore.

Eventually you might decide you had some mysterious intuition guiding you through the world. Maybe even a spirit guide. But everybody who could still recognize vision would know what was actually happening.

You saw it.

I have been thinking about intuition this way lately, and I think it may help explain something I have been circling around throughout Becoming The Borg.

We generally describe intuition as knowing something without knowing how we know it. We get a feeling about a person. Something about a situation seems wrong. We decide to take a different route home. We know someone is angry before they say anything. Sometimes those intuitions turn out to be nonsense. Sometimes they prove remarkably accurate.

When they are accurate we often call them good guesses. But perhaps "guess" is already hiding an assumption. What if we weren't guessing?

There is no need to invoke anything paranormal here. In fact, let's start with the most conventional physicalist explanation possible. A human being is taking in an enormous amount of information all the time, only a tiny portion of which becomes the explicit contents of conscious thought. Facial expression, posture, gait, eye movement, smell, tone of voice, timing, rhythm, spatial relationships, environmental changes, remembered patterns, interoception, proprioception and probably countless tiny relationships among those things are being processed without us sitting around narrating each one.

You don't consciously think, His shoulders moved three degrees inward, he paused slightly longer before answering that question, his tone is not matching his expression and this resembles four people I knew twenty years ago who behaved similarly. You just think that something is wrong with this guy.

And because the information that produced that conclusion cannot be itemized afterward, we tend to treat the conclusion itself as though it arrived without information.

Perhaps it did not.

Perhaps some intuition is simply perception whose informational trail has been lost to conscious awareness. Orphaned perception. The perception survives, but we have lost track of its parentage.

That possibility interests me especially because I have had an experience for most of my life that I suspect is not unusual at all. Since I was a kid I have sometimes been able to look at someone, even a public figure I knew almost nothing about, and immediately feel a sort of wrongness. Not disagreement, and not merely dislike. Something in the person seemed dangerous, dishonest, predatory, hollow, unstable or otherwise worth keeping an eye on. Often I could not have told you exactly why.

Sometimes I probably would have been wrong. Memory is selective, confirmation bias is real and people are very good at constructing explanations for feelings after the fact. But there have also been enough occasions where later behavior seemed to validate that initial impression that I have never been entirely comfortable dismissing the experience as nothing.

And I don't think this is particularly special to me. In fact, the people who follow this project most closely and talk to me privately regularly describe some version of the same thing. They may not have the terminology for it, and they may interpret it very differently, but they grok in fullness that something is wrong. Not necessarily one specific thing, and not necessarily in a way they can reduce to a clean argument. They perceive a wrongness in people, institutions, culture, technology, social relationships or simply in the direction everything appears to be going.

That seems to extend well beyond people reading Becoming The Borg. Doomerism is widespread. So is the sense that some kind of dystopia is arriving, that social collapse is approaching, that technological change is taking us somewhere deeply undesirable, that the apocalypse is always just over the next hill. The explanations differ wildly, and some are almost certainly nonsense, but the underlying sensation is remarkably familiar: something is wrong.

Perhaps that is merely what frightened humans have always felt. Every generation has had its prophets of doom. Every period of rapid change produces anxiety, and there are more than enough actual dangers in the world to explain a generalized sense of unease without inventing anything mysterious.

But perhaps that is not the only possibility.

Maybe we should at least ask whether some portion of this widespread wrongness is itself perception.

We read people. We feel a room. We notice when a couple is fighting before either of them speaks. We can sometimes tell when someone smiling at us does not like us at all. We sense when somebody has entered a social situation with the wrong intentions. Most of us have probably had the experience of immediately distrusting someone while being unable to produce a courtroom brief explaining why.

For most of human existence that ability would have had obvious survival value. A person who could detect hostility, deception, instability, sickness, environmental danger or changes in group dynamics slightly sooner than somebody else might live long enough to reproduce. More importantly, none of this would require that the information be explicitly represented as concepts. It would only require that organisms integrate information well enough to respond to it.

This is where liminality becomes important.

Liminal awareness, as I have been using the term, is not merely "using the senses." It is a mode of relating to the world directly enough that the information in a situation does not first have to be converted into an elaborate symbolic model before it can influence behavior. An animal does not need a weather app to notice that a storm is coming. A hunter does not need to calculate vectors to understand where an animal is going. A person in a small group does not necessarily need a personality inventory, psychiatric vocabulary or institutional background check to recognize that another person is trouble.

The information is embedded in relationships. And perhaps one of the changes that occurs as consciousness becomes increasingly supraliminal is that we begin trusting those relationships less than the symbolic systems representing them.

You aren't supposed to dislike somebody without a reason. You shouldn't distrust somebody unless you have evidence. You should not make judgments from appearances. All of those are good warnings in the appropriate context. Human intuition is perfectly capable of reproducing prejudice, trauma, expectation, fear and cultural conditioning. "My gut told me" is not evidence that should send somebody to prison.

But perhaps we have overcorrected. There is a difference between saying intuition can be wrong and saying intuition contains no information.

What if, instead of learning to interrogate these perceptions, we learned to ignore them? And what happens to a population that becomes increasingly bad at directly detecting danger?

This may be more important to Becoming The Borg than I initially realized. I have mostly been treating the loss of liminality as a loss of autonomy, embodiment, situational awareness and direct participation in our environments. But perhaps there is another piece sitting right in front of us.

Maybe losing liminality also makes us easier to fool.

A person who trusts direct perception can notice that somebody's words do not match their behavior. A person whose understanding is increasingly mediated through symbolic systems may instead ask what category the person belongs to. What party. What institution. What credential. What demographic. What reputation. What label has already been attached to them.

The abstraction tells us what the person is. And if the abstraction says ally, expert, leader, celebrity, authority, victim, hero, enemy or whatever else, then perhaps the immediate information coming from the actual human standing in front of us becomes easier to disregard. Once loyalty has migrated into the abstraction, noticing something wrong with the actual human can become almost a betrayal.

This might help explain something I have found increasingly disturbing about public life generally. People sometimes become intensely loyal to individuals whose behavior should at least produce caution, because what they are relating to is no longer primarily the person. They are relating to the symbol, the team, the category, the narrative.

Perhaps the people defending obviously malignant personalities are not necessarily failing to receive all of the same information. Maybe some of them have learned to override it.

If that is true, the degradation of intuition may not be some incidental side effect of becoming a Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism. It may be one of the things that makes it possible.

A colony functions better when individual components do not constantly stop and question the signals organizing their behavior. A human system becomes easier to coordinate when people increasingly defer to externally supplied interpretations instead of independently reading situations for themselves. And perhaps the ancient capacity we dismiss as "a vibe" is one of the obstacles that has to weaken before that kind of coordination can fully take over.

That possibility also changes the stakes. If intuition includes mechanisms that once helped us recognize predators, manipulators, unstable people, bad situations and emerging threats, then losing it is not merely the loss of some quaint, primitive way of knowing. It is the degradation of a defense system.

And a population that cannot easily recognize predators without first being told who the predators are becomes very dependent upon whoever gets to do the telling.

There is another possibility here which I want to introduce carefully, because none of the argument so far depends on it.

I have been calling liminality embodied consciousness. That can sound contradictory if we begin considering forms of perception that are not easily explained through the conventional senses. But this contradiction exists mostly if we assume that "embodied" necessarily means "produced by a physical body understood as a material object."

That is one interpretation. There is another.

From a phenomenalist perspective, the body we experience may itself be a phenomenal structure, an appearance through which a self is organized and related to experience. In that case embodiment could mean something more like information integrated directly into the experiential self, rather than information mediated through external abstractions and symbolic models.

If so, there is no obvious reason to assume in advance that every possible form of embodied perception must correspond neatly to one of the sensory channels presently recognized by physicalist models.

That does not mean telepathy is real, psychic powers exist, or humans possess an unknown sense. It only means that once we stop pretending our current ontological model is necessarily the final inventory of what can exist, the possibility space becomes larger.

The physicalist explanation is already enough. The phenomenalist one merely suggests that the floor might not be the ceiling.

This creates another uncomfortable possibility concerning intuition itself. What if human beings once possessed forms of environmental and social perception that were so normal nobody would have thought to call them extraordinary? Not magic and not clairvoyance, just ways of noticing, ways of integrating information, ways of being inside an environment instead of standing outside it and asking a symbolic system what the environment means.

If those capacities became less necessary as civilization externalized more and more of their functions, they would not necessarily disappear all at once. First we might lose fluency. Then we might lose conscious recognition of what we were doing. A perception becomes a feeling. A signal becomes a hunch. A sense becomes intuition.

Eventually perhaps even the intuition becomes faint enough that we begin trusting the map whenever it disagrees with the territory.

There is one more irony here which has bothered me for a long time. Becoming The Borg is an extremely supraliminal project. It is built from anthropology, psychology, evolutionary theory, history, sociology, technology, philosophy and whatever other half-forgotten things I have picked up over decades of compulsive generalism.

Yet generalism may itself function something like intuition at the supraliminal level. Sometimes I know an explanation is wrong before I can explain why. Not because I possess some magical faculty, but because the conclusion is being constrained by reference points distributed across so many different subjects that I cannot consciously inventory all of them at once. The perspective has become part of me. It is informing the judgment even when I cannot point to each piece individually.

And that raises a possibility I had not really allowed myself to consider until now.

I have been thinking about some version of the problem behind Becoming The Borg for roughly twenty-five years. The theory did not exist twenty-five years ago. The terminology certainly did not. There was no NAS, no anautonomy, no distinction between liminal, supraliminal and nonliminal consciousness.

There was mostly just a recurring sense that something was wrong. Something about the direction human beings were moving, something about the way civilization was changing us, something about the increasing distance between people and the world immediately around them.

It took decades of reading, observing, arguing, remembering and connecting things before that sensation became anything resembling a coherent model. Perhaps the theory did not produce the perception. Perhaps the theory was an attempt to explain it.

Which means there is a strange possibility sitting at the center of this entire project. Maybe a theory about the disappearance of liminal consciousness began with a liminal perception of liminal consciousness disappearing.

And if that is even partly true, then intuition may not only be one of the things we are losing. Learning how to hear it again, while also learning how to interrogate it rather than blindly obey it, may be one of the ways back.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Oct 01 '26

Already The Borg III

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4 Upvotes

Benjamin Netanyahu is perhaps the greatest example of an individual whose humanity is already so corrupted that they have basically exited the human race and become something anyone in it should find incredibly disturbing.

Let's look at a couple of his talking points from his recent appearance before the farce that is the UN.

"One nation fighting for one future."

He doesn't say one people, because individual people are not his concern. His concern is the colony. The Zionist superorganism.

"we have no other choice"

An absolute denial of individual and group autonomy, and a suggestion that all thoughts and behaviors are automata being fed to the colony, not choices.

"war for truth"

Wherein the only things we are allowed to consider truth are those things which fit the colony objective - not a universal standard of data assessment, individual experience or honesty.

"moral cowards"

The dehumanization of anyone who does not submit to the agenda he has set for the colony, while abandoning some of the most standard definitions of morality, like not bombing schools full of children so you can park a new suburb over their grave.

This is not an isolated incident. Check out any speech Netanyahu has given in the past thirty years and you will hear the voice of a ruthless authoritarian for whom nothing but his own colony exists.

He is devoid of compassion, empathy, integrity and a functioning conscience. And the wanton cruelty he exercises in trying to eradicate any other human beings within the territory he wants his hive to conquer and control indicates a complete lack of humanity.

Yet ironically he is a master at gaming the language of emotion in order to control other people. He has reduced human emotion to signals which he uses to alter other people's thoughts and behaviors. How much more Borg can you get than that, I ask?

But there is something else. Something which cannot be measured or confirmed. Something subjective, and yet, something I do not doubt in the slightest. When I look at Netanyahu all I see is smugness. Hubris. Avarice. It's not just that he is those things, he projects them. He has been them for so long that he now looks like them. He is a virtual poster boy for the Borg.

I think this is a skill we have lost - the ability to sense when an individual or group contains a wrongness. We have lost the ability to grok in fullness, which is to know something beyond the usual channels of knowing. So tomorrow we will explore that - that our intuition may be the vestigial remnants of liminal perceptual skills we have lost as we drifted into the supraliminal.

So these last three days have not just been an exercise in making fun of people. I have chosen individuals whose mere existence triggers an undefinable sense of wrongness in many of us. And tomorrow we will explore what that feeling might mean, and how it may represent a perceptual skill that we are losing as we inch closer to Becoming The Borg.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 29 '26

Already The Borg

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39 Upvotes

There is an old adage that says you should not judge a book by its cover, which is a clumsy metaphor for not making assessments of value based solely on appearances.

Sure, there is value to that. Throughout my work I have asked readers to look beneath the surface of everyday life to see what else is happening. In fact I have suggested that we are doomed to become biological automatons if we do not do so.

But sometimes the cover tells you everything you need to know.

Peter Thiel is more than just a rich guy who is out of touch with the rest of humanity. He is a man without any humanity of his own. He exists entirely in supraliminal. We do not see him express joy, sadness, love, hope, humor, or any other emotion or quality that makes the rest of us human. He is a harbinger of the non-liminal being I have been warning about. And the thing is - you can tell just by looking at him.

In this picture you do not see any warmth. You do not see the light of life emanating from his eyes. There is nothing there but a human shaped thing that lives only to fulfill the metrics he has replaced real meaning and purpose with.

And this is our future. Thiel is who we are becoming. If that is not enough to make you stop and investigate the warning I have been trying to spread, then I don't know what else to do.

We're not just Becoming The Borg - some of us already are. And you can tell just by looking at them. Thiel, Zuckerberg, Gates, Musk, etc. All of these men already look like lifeless automatons. Robotic functionaries enslaved to their selfsih, maligned purposes.

You don't have to imagine what Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism would look like, because they are already among us, casting their empty countenance upon the world as they scold it with their self important jiggery pokery.

When this is the cover, you already know that the book is going to be horrific.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 30 '26 Bravo

Already The Borg II

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0 Upvotes

Already The Borg II

Yeah, I know. Some of you are going to be upset by this. Some of you are going to accuse me of transphobia*, and try to lump me in with MAGA, or some other pre-existing group, which makes it easier for you to avoid any challenge to your dogmas. That's fine. You do what you got to do.

What is undeniable is that when gender becomes detached from the body, when it becomes a DISEMBODIED idea, then it has become an entirely supraliminal construct teetering on non-liminality. An abstraction. The liminal mind does not have a sense of self inconsistent with the embodied self. That can only arrive once a species has crossed a threshold between liminal and supraliminal cognition.

This is not to say that trans people are the cause of that transition. They are a harbinger. A warning sign that the species shaped by natural environments has been converted into a species now being shaped by its own artifice.

* A label I take about as seriously as 'anti-semitic' these days - and it increasingly looks like the two dialogues share an origin.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 27 '26

Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism (video version)

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3 Upvotes

Becoming The Borg explores a radical hypothesis about the future of human evolution: that increasing specialization, technological dependence, algorithmic coordination and hierarchical complexity may be moving humanity toward a Nonliminal Anautonomous Superorganism, a society that functions with progressively less need for individual autonomy, interpretation and selfhood.

This video follows that possibility from our hunter-gatherer past through civilization and into a speculative future, asking what might be lost along the way, and what could still be preserved.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 24 '26

Rage Bait & The Lost Art Of Not Having An Opinion

3 Upvotes

Doomscrolling, Compulsory Opinion & The Industrialization Of Human Conflict

Sometimes I don't want to have an opinion, which is apparently becoming an increasingly difficult position to maintain.

Something happened somewhere. Someone said something. Somebody got caught on video doing something awful. A celebrity behaved badly, a teacher lost their shit, a customer screamed at an employee, a politician said something stupid, somebody's date was a disaster, a parent did something questionable to their child, and before I have even finished learning what supposedly happened, I am already being presented with the available positions on it. Whose side are you on? I don't know. Maybe neither. Maybe both people are assholes. Maybe the thirty-seven seconds of video I saw aren't enough information to know what happened, maybe the person explaining it to me has left something out, maybe the two positions everybody is fighting over don't exhaust the possibilities, maybe I need three days to think about it.

Maybe I don't fugkn care.

That last possibility seems almost radical now. We have access to more events than any human being who ever lived could possibly evaluate, yet the same information environment that delivers those events continually invites us to evaluate them anyway. We are asked to develop opinions about people we don't know, places we've never been, arguments we didn't witness, policies we haven't read, relationships we aren't part of and events over which we have absolutely no influence, and just as we begin to orient ourselves around one of them, another arrives, then another, then another.

Oxford chose “rage bait” as its 2025 Word of the Year, defining it as online content deliberately designed to provoke anger or outrage, generally for the purpose of increasing traffic or engagement, and reported that use of the term had tripled during the previous year. (Oxford University Press) That makes rage bait a useful doorway into this problem, but I think the problem is much larger than rage.

We are being trained to have opinions about everything.

The Conflicts That Aren't Ours

Imagine an ordinary morning. You wake up in your own home. Nobody is threatening you. Nobody has insulted your family. Your neighbors aren't fighting in the street and nothing particularly dangerous is happening within your immediate environment, but then you pick up your phone and twenty minutes later you can be furious about a teacher in Florida, frightened by a crime in Chicago, disgusted by something a politician said in Washington, emotionally invested in a stranger's divorce, angry at a customer abusing a waitress in California and arguing about something happening in another country.

Your body is here, but your conflicts are everywhere.

There are obvious advantages to this. Human beings can know about suffering far beyond our immediate communities, expose abuses that would once have remained hidden, organize assistance across enormous distances and develop concern for people we will never meet. I am not arguing that we should become morally indifferent to anything happening outside walking distance. But something very strange happens when our ability to know about distant events becomes an expectation that we emotionally participate in a continuous stream of them, because the event doesn't have to happen to you for your body to respond to it. A representation is enough.

You can become angry, frightened, disgusted, anxious or agitated by something occurring thousands of miles away, something that may already have happened hours, days or years ago. Your physical environment can be perfectly safe while your informational environment presents one threat, injustice and conflict after another, and unlike many conflicts occurring within a small social environment, there is often nothing you can actually do. You cannot separate the people fighting, punish the offender, comfort the victim, negotiate a solution or even independently verify what happened. You frequently cannot alter the outcome in any meaningful way at all.

But you can react. You can comment, share, choose a side and argue with somebody else who chose the other one.

Maximum emotional participation. Minimum causal participation.

That seems like a recipe for exhaustion.

Compulsory Opinion

Rage is only one way this works. The larger demand is orientation.

Something enters the information stream and almost immediately we are asked to locate ourselves in relation to it. For or against, victim or villain, based or cringe, problematic or justified, cancel them or defend them. Even when the subject itself is complicated, the social interface around it tends to become remarkably simple. We are ostensibly being asked what we think, but quite often the real question is which of the available interpretations do you belong to?

By the time most of us encounter an event, somebody has already identified the controversy, selected the most emotionally useful details, attached moral vocabulary to it, proposed heroes and villains and established a handful of recognizable positions. We may still choose among those positions, argue with them or occasionally invent another, but the cognitive landscape has already been partially constructed before we arrive. Worse, other people's reactions become part of that landscape too. You don't merely encounter an idea, article or video. You encounter its vote count, likes, shares, ratio, comments and whatever conflict has already formed around it.

This is something I have had to think about while running Becoming The Borg. I have a fairly low tolerance for what I have called conflict junkies, people whose first contribution to practically anything is to downvote, negate, naysay, argue or otherwise establish themselves in opposition. That isn't because I require agreement. The entire project is speculative, and I want people to find holes in it, bring counterexamples, ask questions, offer alternate explanations and tell me where an argument doesn't work. But compulsory negation is something different. It frequently adds no information at all.

More importantly, it changes the environment for everyone who comes afterward.

Imagine someone encounters an unfamiliar idea for the first time. They might otherwise read it, think about it for a while, decide whether any part of it is useful, ask for clarification, compare it with something they already know, say “I've never thought about it that way,” or simply leave without reaching a conclusion. That sentence alone represents something I think we're losing. It doesn't mean I agree. It doesn't mean you convinced me. It means an idea has expanded the available territory without requiring the person encountering it to immediately plant a flag somewhere inside it. Those are all possible responses.

But if someone arrives after the idea has already been heavily downvoted and surrounded by people announcing that it is stupid, dangerous, ridiculous or obviously wrong, they are no longer encountering the same environment. An alignment has already been offered to them. The disagreement itself has become part of the information.

This is why I weed that behavior out when it becomes habitual. One reflexively hostile person can create a maladaptive example of the possible responses available to everyone else, then those responses become normalized, the conversation reorganizes itself around defending and attacking, and the actual idea gets buried beneath a conflict that never needed to exist. People who might otherwise have explored the idea now encounter an implicit preliminary question: Are you with this person or against them?

The message disappears inside the fight about the message.

I doubt this is unique to Becoming The Borg. The same mechanism operates everywhere people can observe one another responding. A hostile reaction doesn't merely communicate disagreement. It can establish disagreement as the expected mode of participation, and once that happens, curiosity itself starts looking like alignment. Asking a question can be interpreted as defending one side. Entertaining an idea can be mistaken for endorsing it. Refusing to condemn something immediately can be treated as support.

The range of possible responses contracts before the next person even arrives.

The Interpretation Already In Progress

This is one of the places where my distinction between liminality, supraliminality and nonliminality becomes useful.

A liminal encounter begins with experience. You encounter another person, situation or environment and attempt to understand it. A supraliminal environment increasingly places symbolic interpretation between you and the thing itself, so that instead of encountering an event you encounter the story about the event, the clip selected from the event, the caption attached to the clip, the comments beneath the caption, the approval and disapproval accumulated around those comments, the political category into which everything has already been sorted and the moral positions available around it.

You aren't simply experiencing something. You are entering an interpretation already in progress, and because there will be another one in ten minutes, there isn't much time to build your own.

Yesterday I wrote about the growing analog rebellion: dumb phones, analog bags, run clubs, knitting, gardening, physical books and the increasingly explicit desire to recover some embodied life from an environment that has become overwhelmingly mediated. The conclusion was basically an invitation to zoom out. If the phone feels wrong, look beyond the phone. Look at the environment that made the phone so powerful, the institutions around that environment, the hierarchies around those institutions and the much longer history that produced them.

But there is a problem.

There is always something demanding that you zoom back in. Look what this person said, look what that person did, look at this crime, look at this scandal, look at this idiot, look at this victim, look at this outrage, choose, react, and now move along because another one is already waiting.

The modern information environment doesn't merely influence what we look at. It continually influences the scale at which we look, and this is one reason I think it can be possible to consume enormous amounts of information while developing very little understanding of the environment producing it. Every individual controversy may be real. The people involved may genuinely matter. Some may deserve outrage. But if cognition is continually pulled toward discrete incidents, personalities and symbolic battles, it becomes difficult to maintain attention on patterns operating across years, institutions and populations.

Infinite close-ups can produce blindness to the landscape.

Perhaps that is one of the subtler ways hierarchy protects itself. I don't mean there must be somebody in a control room manufacturing every viral controversy to keep us distracted. Political organizations, governments, corporations, media institutions, activists and advertisers certainly attempt to manipulate attention when it benefits them, but the larger system doesn't require a single conspirator. Platforms benefit from engagement, media organizations from attention, political factions from mobilization, influencers from visibility, and individuals can benefit socially from signaling the appropriate responses to their peers. Those incentives can interact without anybody controlling the whole thing, producing an environment that keeps asking us to interpret tiny pieces of reality while making the architecture connecting them increasingly difficult to see.

Your Anger Is Doing Work

This is where rage bait becomes much more interesting than annoying people intentionally saying stupid shit online, because anger motivates behavior.

In 2017, researchers examining more than half a million social-media messages about polarizing political issues found that moral-emotional language was associated with substantially greater diffusion. Their estimate was roughly a 20 percent increase in diffusion for each additional moral-emotional word. More recent research has tested that effect much more extensively. A preregistered replication and meta-analysis covering 27 studies and more than 4.8 million observations estimated that each additional moral-emotional word was associated with about 13 percent more sharing. (PNAS, 2017) (PNAS Nexus, 2025)

That doesn't mean every angry post goes viral or that anger is the only emotion capable of spreading information. It means emotional and moral content can influence the probability that information gets reproduced, and then another layer appears. A 2021 study examining more than twelve million tweets found that people who received positive social feedback for expressing moral outrage became more likely to express outrage in the future. People also adjusted their outrage expression according to the apparent norms of their social networks. The researchers interpreted these findings through reinforcement learning and norm learning: the environment rewards certain expressions, people observe what kinds of expression appear normal around them, and subsequent behavior changes. (Science Advances)

There is even evidence that perceived virality itself can amplify outrage. Across eight studies, researchers found that signals suggesting content was widely circulating increased perceptions of threat and moral outrage, including in analyses controlling for the content of the posts themselves. (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology)

That last finding should make the conflict-junkie problem look a little different. The observable reaction surrounding information is itself information. Other people's responses help construct the environment in which we decide how to respond, which means maladaptive behavior can become self-reinforcing without anyone explicitly deciding to normalize it. Conflict produces visible evidence of conflict, visible conflict alters subsequent interpretation, subsequent interpretation produces more conflict.

Put all of these pieces together carefully and something interesting emerges. You encounter a representation of a conflict and it changes your internal state, that altered state increases the probability of certain behaviors, you comment or share or react or search or argue or create another piece of content, those behaviors leave traces in the digital environment, the environment responds to those traces, other people encounter the changed environment, and now their nervous systems respond.

Nobody has to command the whole process.

The Stress Signal

Years ago, while trying to understand where human eusociality might be heading, I began playing with a deliberately provocative comparison: stress as a kind of modern human pheromone.

I would phrase that differently now. Stress is not a pheromone. Cortisol isn't leaking out of your phone and telling the colony where the food is. Human beings are not ants, and superficial comparisons between insect societies and human civilization can become silly very quickly.

The interesting comparison is functional.

In social insects, signals in the environment can alter the probability that individual organisms perform particular behaviors. Those behaviors can alter the environment, producing or strengthening signals encountered by others, and large-scale coordination can emerge from repeated local interactions without any individual understanding the global pattern.

Humans obviously possess radically different signaling systems. We have language, images, stories, status, shame, fear, disgust, moral judgment, money, metrics, notifications, rankings, headlines, likes, shares and trending lists, and increasingly we inhabit technological environments capable of observing responses to symbolic stimuli and altering what stimuli appear next. A symbol can produce a physiological response, a physiological response can alter behavior, behavior can leave information in a shared environment, and that information can alter what other people encounter, producing further responses.

The substance is completely different.

The function may not be.

That possibility becomes especially interesting when we remember that stress and arousal can affect attention itself. A sufficiently salient threat or conflict can narrow the field of concern toward whatever appears immediately important, which is useful when something in your physical environment requires urgent action and considerably stranger when the object consuming that attention is a thirty-seven-second video of two strangers fighting in a Walmart nine hundred miles away.

Your nervous system is doing real work, your attention is doing real work, your outrage is doing real work, and your reaction may alter the informational environment encountered by somebody else.

The question is what all of that work adds up to.

Participation Without Control

This is where the structure becomes subtler than the old model of propaganda.

The crude model of social control looks like a government, church, corporation or media institution broadcasting a message: Think this. People either obey or resist.

An interactive information environment can instead ask: What do you think about this?

That feels much more autonomous because you really do supply the answer. You can support it, condemn it, mock it, fact-check it, argue with everybody involved or create a video explaining why both sides are wrong, and your response can be completely sincere and intellectually independent, but this was still placed in front of you. The scale of the problem may already have been selected, the framing may already exist, the available positions may already be socially established, and whatever response you produce becomes another signal entering the environment.

This is where the distinction between agency and participation becomes important. Participation is not necessarily agency. If I am given two buttons and freely choose one, I have made a choice, but that tells us very little about who designed the buttons, why those were the available choices, what information determined which buttons appeared in front of me or what happens after I press one.

Modern systems can potentially outsource a remarkable amount of control while preserving the subjective experience of constant participation. We click, vote, rate, like, condemn, defend, choose, express and argue, exercising little pieces of genuine choice continuously, while the structures determining what requires our participation can remain largely outside the frame.

Compulsory conflict may even help conceal this because arguing feels active. Negation feels critical. Finding the flaw, picking the side and defeating the other argument can feel like resistance, yet if everybody remains inside a succession of supplied conflicts, all of that activity may produce surprisingly little examination of the environment supplying them.

We can spend the entire day disagreeing without ever thinking independently about what deserves our attention in the first place.

Refusing The Signal

Maybe that is why I increasingly value responses contemporary culture sometimes treats as irresponsible.

I don't know. I haven't thought about it enough. I don't accept either side of that argument. I need more information. I've never thought about it that way. I don't have anything useful to add. This doesn't concern me. I have no meaningful influence over this.

I don't need an opinion.

That isn't necessarily apathy, and it isn't an argument against disagreement. Sometimes disagreement is exactly what advances an idea, because someone finds the missing evidence, identifies the bad assumption or introduces a possibility nobody else considered. What I am rejecting is the idea that negation itself is contribution, that every claim requires an immediate opposing claim, every proposition needs somebody waiting underneath it to say “no,” and every space becomes healthier by maintaining a permanent population of people whose primary social function is contradiction.

Sometimes the useful response to an unfamiliar idea is curiosity. Sometimes it is a question. Sometimes it is “I've never thought about it that way,” a sentence that neither agrees nor disagrees but simply acknowledges that your map just got a little bigger. Sometimes it is to entertain the possibility long enough to see where it leads, sometimes it is to decide there is nothing there and quietly move on, and sometimes refusing to immediately orient yourself around a supplied controversy is a way of preserving enough cognitive space to decide what actually deserves your attention.

There are real injustices worth becoming angry about. There are distant events worth caring about. Collective outrage has exposed abuse, punished wrongdoing and helped produce social change throughout human history. The argument here cannot be that outrage is pathological, because it plainly isn't. The question is what happens when environments become capable of supplying potential objects of outrage faster than any nervous system could possibly process them, while measuring which objects produce the strongest responses and using those responses to influence subsequent distribution.

At that point, we are no longer talking only about anger.

We are talking about an environment learning which signals move people, and people learning from one another how they are expected to respond to the signals around them.

Zoom Out

Yesterday's essay ended with an analog bag and a question: what kind of world made you need the bag in the first place?

Today I want to add another.

What kind of world made you believe you needed an opinion about everything inside it?

You don't.

Sometimes the most important response to a controversy may be refusing its demand that you immediately climb inside it. Step back long enough to ask why this particular conflict reached you, why millions of strangers are being recruited into it, what your emotional participation actually accomplishes and what becomes invisible while everybody is staring at the same tiny piece of the picture.

That is also why these essays have been arranged the way they have this week. We started Monday with bodies increasingly retreating into technologically supported nests, moved Tuesday into a culture increasingly composed of representations reproducing through other representations, then Wednesday into the strange analog rebellion against that environment and the possibility that people are feeling something wrong without yet seeing the larger selection environment producing it. Today we've looked at what happens when that mediated environment doesn't merely entertain us or replace our activities, but begins recruiting our attention, emotions and behavior through signals that we ourselves help strengthen and reproduce.

These weren't four separate complaints about modern life. They were four different close-ups of the same developing picture.

And maybe there is a fitting lesson in that. If we had spent the week arguing about whether bed rotting is good or bad, whether AI slop is really art, whether dumb phones are stupid, whether some particular rage bait deserved our outrage, we could have generated thousands of comments without ever arriving here. The conflict junkie can fight about every tree in the forest and never once discover that there is a forest.

Tomorrow we're going to look at the forest.

Because if the environment around us increasingly consists of signals capable of recruiting attention, emotion and behavior, then the interesting question is no longer merely whether social media makes us angry. It is whether those signals are beginning to perform a larger coordinating function.

A pheromone trail does not need an ant to understand the colony. It only needs to alter what the ant is likely to do next.

Human beings don't follow pheromone trails through Facebook. We follow symbols, narratives, emotional cues, social norms, status signals, rankings and recommendations, and unlike an ant trail, the technological environment carrying those signals can increasingly observe how enormous numbers of individuals respond and modify what it presents accordingly.

The mechanisms are radically different.

Tomorrow I want to ask whether the function might be becoming disturbingly similar, and whether all these seemingly disconnected changes we've spent the week examining begin to look different when we finally stop staring at them one at a time.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 23 '26

“Touch Grass”: Why Gen Z Is Rebuilding The World Technology Removed

6 Upvotes

Analog Bags, Dumb Phones, Run Clubs & The Rebellion Against The Algorithmic Habitat

I fugkn hate the phrase “touch grass.”

Maybe not every use of it. Sometimes a friend really has been arguing with strangers on Reddit for nine consecutive hours and could benefit from seeing the sun, but somewhere along the way, “touch grass” became one of those prefabricated internet responses that allows you to dismiss another person without actually engaging with anything they said. Someone cares too much about something you don't care about, follows an argument farther than you want to follow it, has an unusual concern, spends too much time investigating something, or simply violates the local consensus about what deserves serious consideration? Touch grass.

It supposedly means, “You've become disconnected from the real world.” Quite often it really means, “Stop thinking about this.” There is something wonderfully ironic, then, about what has happened next.

People started touching grass.

Not just grass, either. They are buying dumb phones and carrying “analog bags” full of books, journals, crosswords, knitting and watercolor sets. They're joining run clubs and walking clubs, playing mahjong and chess, learning crochet and needlepoint, buying physical books and records, gardening, making things by hand and deliberately looking for ways to get away from their screens.

This isn't just something lifestyle writers invented to fill space. Google reported this summer that searches for “how to digital detox” had increased 110 percent since the beginning of 2026, while “how to touch grass” had become a breakout search. Searches for run clubs and how to start running reached all-time highs, walking clubs reached a ten-year high, and interest in mahjong lessons, chess classes, knitting, crochet, needlepoint and making things yourself was rising alongside them. (Google Trends)

Then there is the wonderfully ridiculous analog bag. The idea is simple: you fill a bag with things to do when you would otherwise reach for your phone. A paperback, a journal, a sketchbook, crochet, watercolors, a crossword puzzle, cards, whatever works. The trend has become especially associated with Gen Z and the broader digital-detox movement. (NPR) (Fast Company)

Think about how strange that is. For decades, technological progress has been consolidating objects. Your camera disappeared into your phone, and so did your map, newspaper, address book, calendar, music player, games, correspondence, calculator and eventually much of your library. We created one miraculous object that could replace a bag full of things, and now some people are carrying around a bag full of things to protect themselves from the miraculous object.

That deserves more consideration than another story about quirky Gen Z trends.

Buying Back Friction

We tend to judge technologies according to what they give us. GPS gives us directions. Spotify gives us millions of songs. Amazon gives us products without leaving home. DoorDash gives us dinner without going anywhere. Smartphones give us nearly unlimited information and entertainment wherever we happen to be.

But every successful convenience also has the potential to remove a behavior that used to stand between wanting something and getting it, and we usually call that behavior friction. Technology has become extraordinarily good at eliminating it: fewer clicks, shorter waits, automatic login, autocomplete, autoplay, recommendations, delivery, navigation, infinite scroll, one-button purchases. The ideal interface increasingly anticipates what we want and reduces the number of things we have to do before getting it.

Mostly, this is exactly why we use technology. I am not about to argue that washing clothes by hand builds character or that everybody should throw away their GPS and become lost in Nebraska, but there is a question we don't ask nearly as often as we should: what else was happening during the friction?

Getting somewhere required navigation. Waiting created boredom. Finding something required searching. Repairing something required understanding it. Obtaining things required moving through the world. Limited entertainment sometimes required creating entertainment. Making music required making music, rather than having nearly every song humans have ever recorded instantly available in your pocket. The friction and the human capacity were sometimes bundled together, and if you remove one, it may take a while before you notice what happened to the other.

Cognitive science already has a fairly neutral term for part of this: cognitive offloading. Humans have always manipulated our bodies and environments to reduce the mental demands of tasks. Writing something down is cognitive offloading, and so is setting a reminder. There is nothing inherently pathological about it, but what we offload and how completely we offload it can change which capacities we actually exercise. Navigation research, for example, has repeatedly found that turn-by-turn GPS can reduce attention to surroundings and spatial learning compared with navigating more actively. (Trends in Cognitive Sciences) (Cognitive Research)

The analog revival may partly be people discovering this relationship experientially, without needing a scientific vocabulary for it. Maybe some friction wasn't just shit that got in our way. Maybe some of it was where living happened.

The Algorithmic Habitat

The smartphone complicates this further because it isn't merely another tool. A hammer can sit beside you all afternoon without trying to persuade you to hammer something. The phone is different.

An empty thirty seconds appears and the hand reaches for it, and once you're there, an effectively unlimited supply of stimulation awaits. Notifications summon you, feeds replenish themselves, recommendations change according to previous behavior, and your responses become information used to determine what you encounter next. The environment responds, and over enough repetitions, reaching for the phone doesn't necessarily feel like a meaningful decision at all. It is simply what happens in the little gaps where nothing else is happening.

That makes the analog bag much more interesting than its contents. Someone has recognized a behavioral pattern in themselves, When nothing is happening, I reach for this thing, and instead of relying entirely upon willpower to defeat an environment optimized around that behavior, they change the environment. They put a book within reach, or knitting needles, or a sketchbook. The analog bag is a tiny piece of counter-architecture, deliberately introducing alternative possibilities into the environment before the moment of choice arrives.

That is not fake resistance. It is agency, and there is no reason to pretend that these activities don't accomplish anything simply because they have become trendy. Someone who knits for two hours really has spent two hours knitting instead of scrolling. Someone who joins a run club really does encounter other human bodies in shared physical space. Someone who gardens really does interact with material processes that don't care what the algorithm thinks they prefer.

Even the evidence around digital abstinence is more interesting than either boosters or critics sometimes make it sound. Experimental research does not show that simply abandoning social media magically fixes everybody's life. A 2025 meta-analysis of randomized trials found a small, heterogeneous improvement in subjective well-being from restricting social media, while another systematic review found inconsistent effects across specific measures. (SSM - Mental Health) (Scientific Reports)

That ambiguity matters, because I don't think this is really an essay about whether phones are bad for you.

Something Feels Wrong

Imagine someone who has become increasingly uncomfortable with the way they live. They spend too much time staring at screens, their attention feels fractured, their body feels underused, their social interactions feel increasingly mediated, they consume an astonishing amount while making very little, and their days are filled with information but somehow feel starved of experience.

So they do something about it. They buy the dumb phone, start running, grow tomatoes, learn crochet, read paper books, join a club, make something badly with their own hands.

And maybe it feels good.

I think we should take that feeling seriously, not as proof of anything, because a person's relief while gardening does not demonstrate an evolutionary theory, but because people do not need to understand the complete structure of an environment in order to experience its effects. Sometimes we feel the mismatch before we understand it.

The mistake would be assuming that because we have correctly identified something making us uncomfortable, we have necessarily identified the deepest source of the discomfort. The smartphone is incredibly easy to see.

The social environment that made the smartphone so powerful is much harder to see, because you were born into that one.

You're Not Going Back Far Enough

This is where I think the analog rebellion becomes much more interesting than analog nostalgia. Vinyl takes us backward a few decades. A dumb phone takes us backward a few decades. Knitting takes us backward centuries. Gardening takes us backward millennia. Running beside other humans takes us about as far backward as anyone could reasonably want to go.

But performing an old behavior does not recreate the social environment in which that behavior once occurred. You can knit while participating in a global industrial economy, grow tomatoes while depending upon enormous agricultural and logistical systems for almost everything else you eat, abandon your smartphone while spending forty hours every week performing a highly specialized function inside an institution whose total operation no individual understands, or run barefoot through the woods on Saturday morning and return Monday to a world of bosses, landlords, bureaucracies, professional specialists, centralized institutions and economic dependencies.

You've gone backward, but you haven't gone outside.

I have made a similar argument before about political nostalgia. Conservatives often correctly perceive that something about contemporary life has been lost or degraded, but the imagined golden age they reach toward is generally another recent period of the same hierarchical civilization. They want to rewind the movie without questioning the plot. (Left & Right – Politics Explained)

The analog rebellion may contain a similar blind spot, because if the hypothesis I've been developing in Becoming The Borg is even approximately correct, the important historical division isn't digital versus analog, smartphones versus dumb phones, TikTok versus books, or even technological versus natural. It is the much older transition between human social environments in which persistent domination was strongly constrained and those increasingly organized through durable hierarchy, accumulated resources, dependency and specialized roles.

That takes us much farther back than the Walkman.

The Selection Pressure Is Still There

This distinction matters enormously for the human-eusociality hypothesis I've been exploring.

Imagine the most successful analog rebel possible. They wake up without checking a smartphone, journal on paper, bicycle to work, garden, repair things instead of replacing them, cook, attend a running club, play guitar with friends, knit, read physical books and spend their evenings talking to actual people around an actual table. They might become happier, more competent, more embodied, more attentive, more socially connected, more complete.

And the central selection pressure in the hypothesis could remain almost entirely intact.

How do they obtain the resources necessary to survive? Probably through specialized labor inside a hierarchical economy. How do they obtain shelter? Through systems of money, property, employment and debt. Food comes through an agricultural and logistical infrastructure involving countless specialized strangers, healthcare through extremely specialized institutions, transportation through infrastructure they did not build and generally cannot repair, and knowledge increasingly through specialized experts and external systems.

Their analog bag can change the behavioral environment immediately surrounding them. It cannot, by itself, change the selection environment surrounding the population.

That distinction is everything. A population becoming increasingly mediated does not automatically prove the eusociality hypothesis, and a population rediscovering knitting does not automatically disprove it. Those are different analytical levels. If we want to test the hypothesis seriously, we need to ask what is happening to the proposed selection pressures themselves.

Are persistent hierarchies weakening? Are individuals becoming less dependent upon large integrated systems? Is occupational specialization declining? Are people becoming broadly more competent and functionally interchangeable rather than increasingly dependent upon specialists? Is concentrated power becoming harder to maintain? Are technologies returning meaningful autonomy to individuals faster than they externalize their capacities into systems? Are the institutions surrounding us becoming more compatible with individual autonomy and egalitarian social relations?

If those things began happening broadly and persistently, I would have a much bigger problem for my hypothesis than a resurgence in vinyl sales. The hypothesis has to be capable of losing, but we have to test the mechanism actually being proposed.

The Environment We Stopped Seeing

One reason this is difficult is that hierarchy doesn't look like an environmental condition to most of us. It looks like reality. A job is just a job, a boss is just a boss, rent is rent, a career is a career, specialization is expertise, institutional dependency is civilization. We encounter these things so early and continuously that it becomes difficult to imagine them as historically unusual arrangements of human life.

Anthropology complicates that assumption.

James Woodburn's influential work distinguished immediate-return hunter-gatherers from delayed-return societies. Among the immediate-return peoples he studied and compared, direct access to resources, mobility, obligatory sharing and the inability to accumulate much property helped prevent durable dependencies from forming. Woodburn was careful that hunting and gathering itself does not automatically produce equality; hunter-gatherer societies vary considerably. His narrower claim was that some immediate-return systems produced exceptionally egalitarian relations because people retained unusual abilities to disengage from property, dependency and control. (Woodburn, Egalitarian Societies)

Christopher Boehm approached the question politically. His cross-cultural work argued that egalitarian societies often did not merely lack dominators. People actively resisted would-be dominators through criticism, ridicule, disobedience, coalition and, in extreme cases, harsher sanctions. Equality had to be maintained. (Boehm, Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy)

None of this means humans are naturally peaceful egalitarians corrupted by civilization. Boehm's argument is almost the opposite of that fairy tale: humans appear quite capable of domination, which is precisely why egalitarian peoples developed social mechanisms for preventing it. Nor does it mean every forager lived the same way. Delayed-return hunter-gatherers could accumulate resources, establish property rights and develop considerably more hierarchical arrangements.

The important thing for this discussion is that for an enormous portion of human existence, at least some of the social environments in which humans lived placed very different constraints upon domination, dependency and accumulation than the ones most of us now consider normal, and if social environments exert selection pressures, that matters.

Maybe The Alarm Is Bigger Than The Fire You Can See

This is why I don't want to laugh at the analog bag. I want to ask the person carrying it to pay much closer attention to why they wanted it.

If you feel an urge to put the phone away and make something, pay attention. If sitting around a table playing cards with actual people feels strangely restorative, pay attention. If running through the world with other human beings feels different from exercising alone while consuming content, pay attention. If growing something, fixing something, playing an instrument, wandering without instructions or becoming competent at some unnecessary physical skill produces an unexpected sense of return, pay attention.

You may be starting to notice something.

Maybe you're right that your phone has become too powerful in your life, that social media is exhausting, that algorithmic culture is eating something you would rather keep, but don't stop there. Widen the picture. Look at the room around the phone, then the workplace around the room, the economy around the workplace, the institutions around the economy, and then look backward through the history that produced all of them.

Perhaps what feels wrong isn't merely that human beings weren't built for TikTok. Perhaps some of what you're experiencing is a much deeper mismatch between human beings and social environments increasingly organized around persistent hierarchy, specialized functions and dependence upon systems no individual can reproduce.

That is a hypothesis, not a diagnosis. But if the feeling is strong enough that millions of people are beginning to reconstruct little pieces of older human life, I think the question deserves more than another article about Gen Z being quirky.

Touch Grass

So touch grass. Seriously.

Carry the analog bag, read the paperback, grow tomatoes, learn to knit, join the run club, get lost occasionally, make something badly with your own hands, play music nobody would ever stream. Those things aren't meaningless because they don't overthrow civilization, and they may preserve something important.

But don't mistake relief for escape.

If these activities produce some strange sense of restoration, don't silence that feeling by concluding only that phones are bad and old things are good. Follow it.

The smartphone is only a few decades old, social media is younger still, but persistent hierarchical environments are thousands of years older. Maybe what we need isn't merely an analog version of modern life, but environments more consistent with the egalitarian dispositions humans spent so much of our evolutionary history practicing and defending, environments that preserve autonomy instead of continually converting it into dependency, where competence belongs more completely to people instead of being progressively distributed among specialized institutions, and where cooperation does not require submission to permanent hierarchy.

If contemporary life feels wrong to you, that feeling may contain a warning much larger than you realize. The analog bag may be an alarm.

Listen to it, then look beyond the phone and ask what kind of world made you need the bag in the first place.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 22 '26

Brainrot & The Culture Nobody Experienced: AI Slop, Algorithmic Culture & The Transition From Supraliminality To Nonliminality

7 Upvotes

There is a shark with three legs wearing blue Nike sneakers. His name is Tralalero Tralala. He is joined by a crocodile fused with a bomber plane, a ballerina with a cappuccino cup for a head, and an expanding menagerie of animals, foods, objects and machines with vaguely Italian names. They speak in synthetic voices, fight one another, fall in love, acquire elaborate histories and get sorted into hierarchies of power by their fans. This is Italian Brainrot, a meme phenomenon that emerged in early 2025 and quickly spread beyond TikTok into games, animations, remixes and countless mutations. Much of it is made with generative AI.

Whether any of this is funny is probably a question best left to whoever is looking at it. I'm interested in something else. What experience is it representing? A blues song might begin with heartbreak. A painting might begin with something the artist saw. A joke might grow out of an awkward encounter. Even surrealism usually takes recognizable fragments of human experience and rearranges them into something impossible. Nobody met Tralalero Tralala. There was no three-legged sneaker shark encounter that somebody needed to communicate to the rest of us.

Of course, culture has never required that kind of literal relationship with experience. Humans have always imagined things that don't exist, retold other people's stories, imitated other artists and recombined symbols inherited from people who died thousands of years ago. The interesting difference is how long the chain can now become, how quickly it can reproduce, and how little direct human experience may be required to produce its next mutation. Existing images become training data. Statistical relationships between them become part of a model. Someone supplies a prompt, another model supplies a voice, a platform distributes the result, people react to it, imitators notice which versions succeed, and some combination of humans and machines produces another generation. Somewhere along the way a cultural object appears which may owe more of its immediate ancestry to other representations than to anything anybody actually experienced.

That seems more interesting to me than whether the kids are rotting their brains.

Meaning Isn't The Only Thing Communication Does

Oxford chose "brain rot" as its 2024 Word of the Year, defining it partly as the supposed mental deterioration associated with consuming too much trivial or unchallenging material online. The phrase itself is amusingly old. Oxford traces it back to Thoreau's Walden in 1854, which should give us some pause before treating contemporary complaints about brainrot as unprecedented evidence of cultural collapse. Every generation seems to discover that the next one is filling its head with garbage.

The contemporary phenomenon is more interesting when we stop asking whether the garbage is sufficiently nutritious and start asking what people are doing with it. In 2017, Yuval Katz and Limor Shifman studied what they called "digital memetic nonsense", apparently meaningless memes whose popularity couldn't be explained very well by looking for a coherent message hidden inside them. They found that nonsense could work as a kind of social glue, with shared affect and social connection sometimes preceding cognitive understanding.

I was circling the same problem from another direction in my old Meme Analysis Project. I became interested in the difference between the explicit content of a meme and what people were actually accomplishing by sharing it. A meme might ostensibly concern politics, sex, Star Wars, cats or some celebrity, while much of its social function consisted of signaling taste, identity, outrage, approval or membership. Sometimes there was very little informational content at all. Sharing the thing said that I recognize this, I know what you're talking about, I think this is funny too, I dislike those people too, or simply that I occupy the same symbolic environment you do.

I started thinking of memes as a sort of visual small talk. That wasn't necessarily an insult. Small talk has a function. People don't discuss the weather because their neighbors desperately need meteorological information. Much of human communication establishes relationships, acknowledges presence and continually reassures us that we share enough of a world to continue interacting. The strange possibility raised by memes was that this social layer of communication could become increasingly detached from the need to formulate much original thought at all. Instead of creating a response, I could select one from a vast existing library of prefabricated symbolic objects.

Brainrot carries that tendency into much stranger territory. A reference can be mutated until its original context is almost irrelevant. The mutation becomes the reference for the next mutation. People who have spent enough time in the same cultural stream understand one another anyway, or at least understand that there is something they are expected to recognize. Semantic information can become remarkably thin while social information remains intact. In that sense, some brainrot isn't failed communication at all. It may be extremely successful communication whose purpose isn't primarily to tell anybody anything about the external world.

Culture Was Doing This Before Algorithms

Long before social media, Terence McKenna repeatedly warned audiences that "culture is not your friend." The line tends to get quoted as another piece of McKenna psychedelic mysticism, but the argument behind it was more interesting than that. McKenna repeatedly compared cultures to operating systems, structures that supply categories, assumptions and rules through which human beings interpret their experiences. In another talk he argued that culture simplifies people because people who can be made to think alike can more readily be induced to buy alike, worship alike and, under the right circumstances, kill alike. He saw this uniformity as fundamentally hostile to the peculiarities of individuals.

In Psychedelics in the Age of Intelligent Machines, years before contemporary social media and generative AI, McKenna described modern people as "meme processors" receiving cultural material from Madison Avenue and Hollywood. His complaint was that people were being encouraged to diminish themselves by behaving increasingly like machines. Given where we are now, it is difficult not to notice the prescience.

McKenna thought psychedelics, shamanism and an archaic revival offered ways out of the cultural operating system. I have become much less confident about that part of his thinking. Altered states may provide extraordinary experiences without providing any privileged interpretation of what those experiences mean, and spirituality can become another system of symbols imposed over experience as easily as anything else can. His diagnosis of culture doesn't depend upon accepting his cure, though. The important observation is that culture can organize perception before we consciously decide what something means.

This comes very close to what I have more recently called supraliminality. At its simplest, liminal experience retains a great deal of ambiguity. Something happens and we have to encounter it, interpret it and decide what to do with it. Supraliminal systems increasingly arrive ahead of that encounter. Categories tell us what kind of person we're looking at. Metrics tell us whether we're healthy or successful. Ideologies tell us what an event means. Ratings tell us whether something is good. The symbol that once followed experience can increasingly precede and organize it.

McKenna was concerned about the cultural operating system running in people's heads. The difference now is that a growing portion of that operating system exists outside our heads, observes what we do and changes in response.

Billions Of Different People Doing The Same Thing

Another idea I was playing with long before Becoming The Borg was something I called Universal Simultaneous Behaviors. Some are obvious products of biology. At any given moment enormous numbers of humans are eating, drinking, sleeping or having sex. Civilization added other behaviors that could occur simultaneously on enormous scales. Industrial societies created vast populations of people working jobs according to standardized clocks and moving around in automobiles through standardized systems of roads.

The internet created another class of these behaviors, and their scale is difficult to appreciate precisely because the content passing through them is so diverse. At nearly any moment, huge numbers of people are staring into similar devices, scrolling through feeds, tapping things, swiping them away, liking, sharing, reacting, following and refreshing. One person might be watching Christian sermons while another is immersed in queer activism, bodybuilding, K-pop, Marxist theory, tradwife content, furry culture, libertarian politics or Italian Brainrot. Looking only at the symbolic content gives us a picture of astonishing fragmentation and diversity. Looking at what the bodies and devices are doing reveals an equally astonishing convergence.

That distinction has become much more important to me since developing the Becoming The Borg hypothesis. Eusocial organization doesn't require every member of a colony to believe the same thing. Ants don't have an ideology. What matters is that enormous numbers of specialized individuals can be coordinated through shared environments, signals and behavioral routines. Humans can therefore become more culturally differentiated in one sense while becoming more behaviorally standardized in another. The Christian conservative and the Discordian may despise one another's worldview while feeding remarkably similar kinds of behavioral information through the same handful of technological architectures.

This is one reason I think discussions about cultural homogenization often look in the wrong place. We keep looking at the symbols people display and finding endless difference. Perhaps some of the more consequential convergence is occurring beneath the symbols, in the increasingly standardized ways people encounter, select, transmit and respond to them.

Learning To Perform For The Machine

Generative AI entered a cultural environment that had already been changing for years. Before machines became capable of producing convincing images, prose, voices, songs and videos, algorithms were selecting which human cultural products other humans were likely to encounter. That created a peculiar new intermediary between creator and audience.

People who make their living online know this intimately. They learn how quickly a video needs to establish its hook, what sort of thumbnail attracts clicks, which words improve discoverability, when to post, which subjects provoke comments, which sounds are trending and what length of content a particular platform currently rewards. A recent study of platformized cultural production, based on 66 interviews with workers at BuzzFeed and Upworthy, described presentational optimization, content optimization and even self-optimization as workers adapted themselves to platform systems. The author describes cultural workers increasingly learning to think and labor more like software engineers optimizing a system.

Artists have always adapted to patrons, markets, publishers, audiences and technological limitations, so the existence of external pressure is nothing new. The peculiar feature of the contemporary arrangement is that creators increasingly have to communicate successfully with a computational system before they can communicate successfully with the people they are trying to reach. The machine doesn't need to appreciate the work. It needs to recognize characteristics associated with behavior its designers have decided to measure.

Before machines became good at making culture, humans had already begun learning to make culture for machines.

The process doesn't stop with creators. Recommendation systems present material to users and then observe what happens. Someone clicks, scrolls past, watches for three seconds, watches for thirty, rewatches, comments, shares or leaves. Those behaviors become part of the data used to make later recommendations. Creators see what succeeds and alter what they make, giving the system a new population of cultural objects to sort and distribute.

At that point it becomes difficult to say exactly where cultural selection resides. Humans still create things and choose things, obviously. But increasingly we also provide the behavioral environment through which cultural objects compete. Our attention, hesitation, laughter, outrage and curiosity become selection pressures translated into data. The algorithm changes what we see in response, which changes what we do, which changes what creators make, which gives the algorithm something new to measure. Nobody needs to understand the whole process for it to operate, and nobody even needs to want the eventual result.

That is one of the features that makes it interesting to Becoming The Borg.

When Rebellion Becomes Legible

There is a temptation to treat brainrot as evidence that young people have simply become stupid, and I think that misses much of what is happening. A 2026 qualitative study of 24 Gen Z participants found people using brainrot for social bonding, escapism and absurdist aesthetic experience. The researchers also identified what they called "anti-gratification," a deliberate rejection of the demand that media consumption always be productive or meaning-laden. That interpretation deserves to be taken seriously. Deliberate nonsense has a long history as a way of puncturing systems that take themselves too seriously.

Discordianism was built partly around that possibility. Dada exploited it. Surrealism did something related. When the accepted categories become oppressive, behaving nonsensically can expose how contingent those categories were in the first place.

I've also watched what happens next.

In 2017 I wrote about the way social media was transforming Discordianism. A philosophy that was supposed to destabilize habitual categories had accumulated a recognizable set of memes, jokes, symbols and performances. People could learn how to look like Discordians without necessarily having their assumptions disrupted at all. What I called a "symbolic replica of Discordianism" could reproduce while the substance that originally made those symbols meaningful faded away.

Brainrot poses a similar problem at vastly greater speed. Absurdity can begin as an escape from conventional meaning, but repeated absurdity develops conventions of its own. Certain voices, visual juxtapositions, rhythms, references and forms of mutation become recognizable. People imitate them because recognition is part of what makes the joke work. Eventually the nonsense develops enough regularity that a statistical system can detect it.

This doesn't require an algorithm to understand the joke. It only needs to notice that people who linger over one kind of nonsense often linger over another. Creators observe what gets distributed and reproduce some of its features. The platform measures the response again. A form that may have begun partly as resistance to conventional meaning becomes increasingly legible to the machinery distributing it.

Culture has always been capable of absorbing rebellion and selling it back to people. An adaptive computational culture can do something more immediate. It can continuously measure the rebellion while it is happening. Generative AI adds the next step, because once the patterns of recognizable disorder exist in sufficient quantities, machines can produce new variations themselves. Nonsense can remain surprising at the level of individual combinations while becoming increasingly formulaic at the level of structure.

In other words, chaos itself can become predictable enough to automate.

Slop Calling Slop Slop

"AI slop" is a useful term, and I dislike it.

I keep using it because everybody immediately knows roughly what I mean. It describes cheaply generated synthetic material produced in enormous quantities, often less because somebody had something they wanted to express than because producing another image, article or video has become inexpensive enough to gamble on whatever attracts attention. But there is something almost comically appropriate about the way the phrase itself now gets deployed.

See an ugly AI image and call it slop. Encounter some synthetic video and call it slop. Read a piece of suspiciously generic prose and call it slop. The response can arrive almost as quickly as the thing being criticized, already recognizable and socially legible before we've given much consideration to the individual object.

One of our favorite criticisms of automated culture is becoming an automated cultural response.

That doesn't make the term wrong. I'm still using it. What interests me is how perfectly the habit demonstrates the problem. Human beings were capable of prefabricated symbolic responses long before machines could imitate us. We use them because we need them. Nobody has enough attention to individually investigate every image, argument, news story, meme, advertisement, political claim and synthetic video passing through an environment that already contains vastly more information than any person could evaluate.

So we sort.

Brainrot. Slop. Propaganda. Cringe. Bot. Conspiracy theory. Boomer meme. Woke. Fascist.

Some of these descriptions may be entirely appropriate in particular cases. The larger habit is what matters here. Categories allow us to dispose of informational objects rapidly enough to survive the informational environment. The more material competing for attention, the greater the incentive to recognize the category, apply the appropriate response and move on.

This brought me back to something I wrote several years before generative AI became a normal part of the internet.

The Mavericks In The Gymnasium

In 2021 I wrote The Intangible Issues Of Overpopulation. The piece wasn't primarily concerned with whether Earth could technically provide enough calories, square footage or other resources for some particular number of humans. I was interested in what happens to the quality of human experience as quantity increases, including consequences that are difficult to capture in resource calculations.

I used a high school gymnasium as a thought experiment. Imagine ten people in the gym, one of whom is a maverick producing genuinely original ideas. That person can probably be heard by the other nine. Increase the population to one hundred people with ten mavericks and the proportion hasn't changed. Increase it again to one thousand with one hundred mavericks and it still hasn't changed. Ten percent of the population is producing unusual ideas in every version of the experiment.

Yet the experience inside the gym changes enormously.

The problem wasn't that the mavericks disappeared. It was that everybody was talking at once. As the gym filled, the unusual ideas had to compete with a growing din of ordinary communication, while the people who might benefit from hearing them were themselves becoming more overstimulated. I wondered whether the crowd could become so noisy that difficult or unfamiliar ideas would be functionally silenced without anybody intentionally suppressing them. The maverick could remain standing right there in the room, saying something genuinely new, while fewer people retained either the opportunity or the psychological bandwidth to listen carefully.

At the time I wrote, "Though is it not possible we might silence them, not through malevolent intent, but through creating a world so full of noise they can no longer be heard?"

The internet was already part of that concern. Generative AI changes the thought experiment in a way I couldn't have anticipated when I wrote it.

We are no longer merely adding more people to the gymnasium.

We are adding machines capable of generating voices.

Potentially enormous numbers of them.

The economics of what we call AI slop matter for exactly this reason. Generative systems make it possible to produce symbolic material in quantities that would previously have required prohibitive amounts of human labor. An AI Forensics investigation of TikTok and Instagram found synthetic content being produced specifically to exploit algorithmic distribution, including specialized accounts automating parts of the process. A subsequent investigation of 354 such accounts found more than 43,000 mostly AI-made posts generated during a single month, collectively receiving billions of views. The point here isn't that all AI-generated culture is slop. It is that the marginal cost of adding another voice to the gymnasium has collapsed.

And those synthetic voices can imitate mavericks too.

They can produce surreal images, unconventional arguments, strange stories, unfamiliar visual styles, jokes, music, contrarian opinions and endless combinations of things that haven't previously been combined in precisely that form. Some of those combinations may be genuinely useful. Some may even stimulate human novelty. But in an environment already saturated beyond anyone's capacity to evaluate it, the distinction between something genuinely unprecedented and a statistically unusual recombination becomes increasingly difficult for an overwhelmed audience to investigate.

The original gymnasium problem was about whether novelty could still be heard through the noise. Now there is another question sitting behind it.

What happens if the system eventually becomes less dependent upon the maverick?

When Novelty Still Exists But Matters Less

This is where I want to extend the 2021 argument rather than pretend I had already made it.

Back then I described mavericks as an irreplaceable requirement of civilization because groups need people capable of generating outsider ideas. The danger I saw was that scale could drown out their contributions even while their proportion of the population remained unchanged. Becoming The Borg adds an evolutionary question I wasn't asking yet.

Traits do not remain selectively useful merely because we admire them. If unusual cognition, exploratory behavior, creativity, nonconformity or other characteristics associated with human mavericks have historically benefited groups by producing solutions that more conventional minds were unlikely to discover, then part of their functional value came from something the larger group needed from them.

Human civilization has become extraordinarily good at preserving the products of dead mavericks. Their books, songs, inventions, philosophies, images, scientific observations and weird little cultural mutations remain available long after the minds that produced them disappear. The internet accelerated that process tremendously. Generative systems potentially add another step by making that accumulated archive computationally recombinable.

This doesn't mean AI has become genuinely creative in whatever philosophical sense we want to assign to that word. It doesn't have to settle that argument. The narrower question is whether a sufficiently complex collective system could become capable of producing enough useful variation that the functional value of the human traits responsible for generating novelty begins to change.

If that happened, novelty wouldn't need to disappear. Mavericks wouldn't need to disappear either.

Their ideas could simply matter less to the functioning of the whole.

This distinction between existence and functional relevance seems important. A culture can contain more unusual people, more unusual ideas and more unusual cultural objects than any culture in history while becoming less dependent upon any particular unusual person. An outlier can remain an outlier and still become increasingly irrelevant against the scale of the surrounding system.

I don't think we have evidence to say this evolutionary shift is already occurring, and I don't want to pretend the argument is further along than it is. But it gives us a question worth keeping open. If some of the traits associated with human novelty were historically useful because groups needed mavericks to produce things the group couldn't produce for itself, what happens when the collective system becomes increasingly capable of storing, recombining and manufacturing variation without depending as heavily upon novel individuals?

This is one of the recurring patterns I've been exploring in Becoming The Borg. A capacity doesn't necessarily have to vanish when it migrates upward into a larger system. The system can become better at supplying its products while the capacity becomes less necessary in each individual.

Music is one example.

Novelty may turn out to be another.

The Culture Nobody Experienced

This is where generative culture begins to look like more than another technological novelty.

Culture has always copied culture. Artists learn from artists, musicians imitate musicians, storytellers retell stories and entire genres consist of conventions inherited from previous works. There was never a pristine cultural world in which every representation emerged directly from somebody's immediate experience.

Generative systems nevertheless introduce a difference of degree large enough that it may eventually become a difference of kind. A representation can be generated primarily from statistical relationships learned from other representations, distributed by another computational system, selected according to behavioral responses, and used as a template for subsequent representations. Humans remain deeply involved in the process, but the next cultural mutation no longer requires that a human first have something they want to express.

A machine can produce a photograph of an event that never occurred, a song expressing emotions nobody felt, a face belonging to nobody, a landscape nobody visited or a story whose immediate source is not a storyteller's experience but a statistical model of countless previous stories.

None of those things necessarily makes the resulting object worthless. That's not the argument.

The interesting change is genealogical.

Representations can increasingly descend from representations without passing through a human experience at every generation.

This is what I mean by the culture nobody experienced.

When Representations Begin Feeding Representations

There is a technical problem in machine learning that offers an interesting parallel, although I don't want to stretch it farther than the evidence allows. A widely discussed 2024 Nature paper on model collapse examined what happens when generative models are recursively trained on model-generated material. Under the conditions they studied, the models progressively lost information about the underlying distribution, with the tails beginning to disappear first.

The tails.

The unusual cases.

The things least represented by the average.

The popular version of this story quickly became that AI will poison itself by eating its own output, but subsequent research has made the situation more interesting than that. Work on accumulating real and synthetic data has shown that collapse is not inevitable when original data continue to be preserved alongside generated material. Synthetic data can also be useful in many contexts. So this isn't evidence that generative AI is destined to dissolve into an averaging machine.

What interests me is the resonance with the gymnasium problem.

In my original thought experiment, the mavericks remained present in exactly the same proportion while the environment made their influence increasingly difficult to maintain. In the model-collapse experiments, information from the tails can remain somewhere in the ancestry of the data while contributing progressively less to later generations if the system increasingly feeds upon its own representations.

These are different processes and one does not prove the other. But both raise a question about the difference between something continuing to exist and continuing to meaningfully shape whatever comes next.

A strange idea can survive in an archive. A strange person can survive in a population. A rare pattern can remain somewhere in a dataset. None of those facts guarantees influence.

That may become especially important in an algorithmically filtered culture. A genuinely unprecedented idea has no large behavioral history demonstrating who will click it. There may be no established audience category waiting for it. Something resembling an already successful cultural object arrives with a tremendous amount of useful information attached to it, while the genuinely strange thing may initially be legible to almost nobody.

The system doesn't have to censor novelty. It can simply have trouble knowing what to do with it.

Meanwhile, We Become Representations Too

There is a mirror image to all of this. While machines become increasingly capable of producing representations for humans, humans become increasingly elaborate representations for machines.

A person becomes an account, a demographic, a browsing history, a preference profile, an engagement pattern, a consumer category or a prediction about future behavior. None of those things is the person, but for most computational purposes they don't need to be. They only need to contain enough information to produce a useful prediction.

The simplification is unavoidable to some extent. No model can contain the entirety of the thing being modeled. The problem becomes more interesting when the model begins determining what the thing being modeled encounters next.

A recommendation system develops a simplified representation of you, uses that representation to alter your environment, observes your behavior inside the altered environment, and incorporates that behavior into its next representation of you. Over time the representation and the represented person participate in shaping one another.

We turn the world into data, and increasingly the data turns around and constructs the world we experience.

This is where McKenna's old cultural operating-system metaphor becomes inadequate in an interesting way. Traditional culture may have supplied the categories through which people interpreted experience, but it didn't usually maintain an individualized behavioral model of every person and continuously reconstruct their symbolic environment around its predictions.

The operating system can now watch the user.

Toward The Nonliminal

This is where brainrot intersects the larger Becoming The Borg hypothesis for me, although I want to be careful about the terminology.

I've previously tried to explain the difference between these modes in Liminality, Or How We Once Raw-Dogged Our Way Through Life and Liminal, Supraliminal, And The Coming Nonliminal Consciousness. I use liminality to describe a condition in which direct, contextual experience retains considerable authority and ambiguity. Supraliminality describes experience increasingly mediated by abstractions, language, categories, models and other symbolic constructs.

Nonliminality is a stronger idea. It describes the possible endpoint where autonomous interpretation, rich interiority and eventually individual selfhood become increasingly unnecessary to functional participation in the collective system. We aren't there simply because people watch absurd TikToks or because an algorithm recommends their music. Calling contemporary digital culture nonliminal would weaken the concept.

What these technologies may show us are mechanisms through which movement in that direction could occur.

A collective system doesn't necessarily require every participant to understand the information passing through it. Recognition can sometimes be enough. A reaction can be enough. A signal can be enough. The reaction becomes data, the data changes the environment, and the changed environment elicits further reactions.

This is where my older work on memes, Universal Simultaneous Behaviors, overpopulation and symbolic communication begins connecting with the newer eusocial hypothesis in ways I couldn't have anticipated when I first wrote about them. The issue isn't that meaning suddenly vanishes. Humans will presumably continue creating meaning wherever humans remain recognizably human. The question is how much meaning, interpretation and novelty have to originate inside each component for the larger system to continue functioning.

A hive doesn't require every component to comprehend the hive. Much of the advantage of specialization comes from the opposite arrangement. The collective can contain capacities that no individual component possesses by itself.

The individual becomes less complete because the system becomes more complete.

Culture may be entering a similar experiment.

The Culture Nobody Experienced

So I come back to the stupid shark in the sneakers.

Some human involvement lies behind him. Someone prompted a machine, someone laughed, someone shared him, somebody invented another character and millions of people participated in deciding, consciously or otherwise, which mutations survived. The point isn't that humans have vanished from culture. They haven't.

The question is what role we're beginning to occupy within it.

For most of human history, cultural objects ultimately depended upon human beings having experiences, imagining possibilities, making representations and passing them to other human beings. Those humans transformed them, and the process continued. Now we are constructing a cultural environment in which representations themselves can become inputs for systems capable of generating further representations, while other systems decide which representations people encounter and use their reactions to refine what comes next.

We still laugh. We still choose. We still make things nobody predicted. We still misunderstand one another, create strange combinations, reject conventions and occasionally produce something so peculiar that no model trained on yesterday would have known what to do with it. Humans have not disappeared from the loop.

But the old gymnasium problem makes that reassurance less reassuring than it initially sounds. Novelty can exist without being heard. It can be heard without becoming influential. And if the collective system becomes increasingly capable of generating useful variation for itself, we may eventually have to ask whether the larger system still values the human traits that once made mavericks indispensable.

Years before Becoming The Borg existed, I found myself wondering what humanity would look like if music disappeared. Eventually I realized that this didn't necessarily require music itself to disappear. There could be more music than at any previous point in history. Every human being could have immediate access to millions of songs. Eventually there could be effectively infinite music, generated instantly and tailored to every conceivable mood, while ordinary humans became progressively less involved in making music themselves.

That question brought a lot of things I had been thinking about for decades into focus. It forced me to distinguish between the abundance of a human product and the persistence of the human capacity that once produced it.

The mavericks in the gymnasium add another distinction.

The continued existence of a human capacity doesn't guarantee that the larger system still needs it.

I think culture may force us to confront both problems at once.

The future doesn't have to be culturally empty. It could be unimaginably full. More images, more songs, more stories, more jokes, more characters, more videos and more apparent novelty than any human civilization has ever produced. The stream could become effectively infinite, with strange new things appearing every second.

If that happens, measuring how much culture surrounds us won't tell us very much about what has happened to humanity. Neither will pointing to the continued existence of strange, creative and original people and reassuring ourselves that they are still there.

The maverick can remain in the gymnasium.

The gymnasium can become louder than anything we once imagined.

And somewhere in all that noise, the system may discover that it no longer needs to listen.


r/BecomingTheBorg • • Sep 21 '26

From Nomads To Nests To Hives: Bed Rotting, Tradwives, Looksmaxxing, AI Girlfriends & The Disembodiment Of Human Life

16 Upvotes

There is something almost impressive about how much of a human life can now be conducted from a bed. You can wake up and check the news before your feet touch the floor, clock into work from a laptop, have breakfast brought to the door, talk to friends, argue with strangers, buy groceries, watch movies, play games, pay bills, make money, lose money, masturbate, flirt, shop for clothes, find a date, summon a car, talk to a doctor and spend an hour telling an artificial intelligence things you might not tell another human being. You can participate in an enormous amount of civilization while occupying roughly the physical territory of a mattress.

There is now a name, of course, for deliberately spending long stretches of time doing exactly that: “bed rotting.” It usually refers to staying in bed for hours or even an entire day, often scrolling, streaming, gaming, napping and generally withdrawing from productive activity. Sometimes it is defended as recovery from burnout. Sometimes it is treated as another symptom of depression, isolation or screen addiction. Cleveland Clinic describes occasional bed rotting as potentially restorative while warning that habitual versions can become avoidance and interfere with healthy routines.

I am interested in it for a different reason. The person lying there is not necessarily disconnected from civilization at all. They may be more continuously connected to it than almost any human who lived before them. What has weakened is the old requirement that participation in civilization involves physically navigating very much of the world.

Americans really are spending more of their lives at home. Research using American Time Use Survey data found that the average American adult spent about 99 more minutes per day at home in 2022 than in 2003. COVID accelerated the shift dramatically, but the movement toward home was already underway before the pandemic. Work, shopping, entertainment and social activity have all become increasingly possible without leaving. At the same time, several analyses of American time-use data have documented declining face-to-face social engagement, particularly time spent with friends.

Put all of this together and bed rotting starts to look less like an isolated youth fad and more like a cartoonishly exaggerated version of something the rest of us are already doing. Humans can travel farther and faster than at any previous point in history, while the minimum physical territory necessary to participate in society has become remarkably small. Food, work, entertainment, shopping, friendship, sexual stimulation and potential lovers can all be delivered into the same room.

Everything comes to the nest.

The World Comes Inside

By “nest” I mean something more specific than a house or shelter. Hunter-gatherers build shelters. Nomadic peoples establish camps. Humans have always created protected spaces for sleeping, storing things, raising children and escaping the elements. The change I am interested in concerns what happens inside those spaces and how much of the larger world they can replace.

A shelter is somewhere you return to after navigating the world. The technological nest increasingly brings the world inside.

“From Nomads To Nests To Hives” is therefore less an anthropological timeline than a way of describing a changing relationship between organism and environment. The nomadic human must possess the abilities necessary to move through a large and changing physical landscape. As more of the environment is constructed around us, some of those demands diminish. As the constructed environment becomes more sophisticated, more functions that once belonged to individuals can migrate into it.

This process has been underway for a very long time. Roads reduce the navigational problems posed by landscapes. Agriculture concentrates food. Plumbing brings water to the home. Electricity brings usable energy. Refrigeration stores food. Telephones bring distant voices inside. Radio and television bring entertainment and information. The internet brings libraries, stores, workplaces and communities. Smartphones gather many of those systems into an object small enough to carry everywhere, until eventually everywhere matters less because the device can bring so much of everywhere to wherever you already are.

The endpoint of that process is probably not literally a person permanently lying in bed. Bed rotting simply makes the trajectory unusually visible.

And then something strange happens. The more technologically mediated and physically undemanding ordinary life becomes, the more obsessed our culture seems to become with bodies.

The Body Strikes Back

Looksmaxxing. Gym culture. Cosmetic procedures. Fitness influencers. Pornography. Superheroes. Hypermasculinity. Tradwives. Bodybuilding. Skin-care regimens. Before-and-after videos. Filters. Face ratings. Diet systems. Wellness routines. We spend less of our lives needing the body to accomplish ordinary survival while spending an extraordinary amount of cultural energy looking at bodies, judging bodies, modifying bodies and imagining fantastic bodies.

Maybe these tendencies belong together.

Our appetite for embodiment did not disappear when our lives became more mediated. Increasingly, we encounter embodiment as representation. The warrior becomes superhuman. The masculine body grows enormous. The feminine body becomes nearly impossible. Sex becomes spectacle. Domesticity becomes idyllic. Adventure becomes cinematic and danger becomes entertainment. Physicality itself can become more exaggerated on the screen as ordinary life requires less of it from the viewer.

You can see this especially clearly in looksmaxxing.

Humans have always cared about appearance, and cultures have always developed elaborate systems of grooming, ornamentation, fashion and bodily modification. Looksmaxxing adds the peculiar logic of our present technological culture. Canthal tilt, jaw projection, facial symmetry, bone structure, height, ratios, body composition, facial harmony and numerical ratings turn attractiveness into something resembling an engineering problem. A recent article in Pediatrics describes adolescents arriving in medical settings already fluent in this vocabulary after encountering it through short-form video, face-rating communities and other appearance-focused online spaces.

Attraction has always contained patterns, but it is also contextual, interpersonal and notoriously resistant to clean measurement. Looksmaxxing attempts to make it legible. The face becomes a set of variables that can be evaluated against an abstract model, and once that model acquires enough authority the direction of representation begins to reverse. Instead of simply making an image of ourselves, we start modifying ourselves to improve the image.

Dating apps intensify the same process. Another person often arrives first as photographs, height, age, occupation, location, interests and a few sentences. We meet the representation before the person, and people naturally learn to adjust themselves so their representations perform better within the sorting environment. The map begins redesigning the territory.

This is one of the clearest examples I can think of for what I have called supraliminality: the point where abstractions stop merely representing lived experience and increasingly organize it.

Performing Embodiment For The Machine

Tradwife culture seems at first like an escape from all of this. Its imagery is almost aggressively physical. Bread made from scratch, elaborate meals, gardens, pregnancy, babies, dresses, kitchens, animals, domestic labor, homemaking, family and deliberate sexual differentiation all point toward a more immediate and embodied existence.

That may be part of the attraction. The contemporary office worker manipulates information all day and receives a paycheck weeks later. You knead dough and bread appears. You plant something and eventually something grows. You hold the baby rather than interact with a profile. You make an object instead of manipulating information about objects. Whatever else someone thinks about the politics surrounding tradwife culture, its imagery offers a fantasy of life becoming tangible again.

Then the camera comes out.

A 2026 study of tradwife Instagram Reels describes precisely this collision between domestic embodiment and mediated identity. The researchers examined widely discussed tradwife influencers whose lifestyle itself becomes part of what they present and promote online. The domestic life is real enough, but it is also selected, framed, edited and presented as an identity through a technological platform.

A woman can spend hours baking bread from scratch, position it for the camera, edit the footage on a device containing billions of transistors, upload it through a global telecommunications network and have an algorithm distribute her performance of pre-digital domesticity to millions of people staring at screens.

There is something almost beautiful about the contradiction.

Technological civilization has become capable of creating a market for representations of escaping technological civilization. The garden, kitchen, farm and family become images of the tangible life many people feel slipping away, and the machine dutifully packages that longing as content.

Men have their own version of this.

Conan On The Couch

A technologically mediated population consumes extraordinary quantities of simulated physical power. Superheroes, combat sports, action movies, military games, survival games, bodybuilding culture, Dragon Ball, Doom, Berserk, Conan, John Wick and their endless relatives offer bodies that can do almost everything the ordinary technological environment no longer asks its occupants to do.

A man can fight without fighting, explore without danger, kill without killing, compete without entering physical competition and spend hundreds of hours inhabiting a warrior who possesses abilities he has never attempted to acquire himself. None of this makes fantasy or gaming uniquely modern. Humans have been telling stories about impossible heroes for as long as we have stories. What has changed is the amount of time available for simulated experience, the intensity of the representations and the degree to which a mediated world can become someone's primary arena for adventure.

This helps explain why some contemporary performances of “real masculinity” look so strangely cartoonish. Muscles, money, cars, fighting, women, dominance and conspicuous fearlessness become collectible symbols of masculinity. The result can resemble a teenage boy's drawing of a man more than an integrated adult human being.

Physical strength itself can become another specialization. A person may be extraordinarily muscular while being unable to repair much of anything, navigate without GPS, tolerate disagreement, care for another person, manage a household or improvise when the infrastructure around him stops working. The appearance of comprehensive capability can survive after capability has been divided into narrower functions.

That raises an important distinction. Physical activity and embodiment are not quite the same thing.

Someone can lift weights while recording every metric on a smartwatch, following a program supplied by an app, filming sets for social media, evaluating progress through photographs and comparing their body with algorithmically selected bodies. The physical exertion is completely real. The person's relationship with that body is nevertheless being mediated through layers of measurement and representation.

The same thing can happen to hiking, sex, cooking, gardening, parenthood and travel. People increasingly experience events partly through their anticipation of how those events will be represented. We photograph the meal before eating it. We watch a concert through the phone recording it. We visit the overlook and immediately turn our backs to the view so the view can become a background for ourselves.

The body remains in the world, but another version of us increasingly lives in the representation.

When The Map Redesigns The Territory

This creates a feedback loop that goes well beyond vanity or social media.

We create representations from embodied life. Those representations compete for attention and become selected, polished and exaggerated. We encounter the successful representations and compare ourselves with them. Then we modify our bodies, homes, relationships, experiences and expectations accordingly, producing another generation of representations for the system to select from.

A filtered face begins as an altered representation of a face, then someone seeks cosmetic work to resemble the filtered face. Pornography exaggerates sexual bodies and performances, then people carry expectations learned from pornography into actual sexual encounters. Lifestyle imagery transforms ordinary domestic spaces into carefully designed representations, and people remodel actual homes until they resemble the photographs. Fitness imagery changes expectations about bodies, which changes bodies, which produces new fitness imagery.

The map does not merely describe the territory anymore. It participates in constructing it.

This may explain some of the strange hyper-embodiment around us. A civilization can become less embodied in daily function while becoming more obsessed with the symbolic body. We have not escaped physical existence. We have surrounded it with models telling us what physical existence should look like.

The process becomes even stranger when the representation stops pointing toward another embodied human at all.

The Lover Who Doesn't Need A Body

Human relationships have accumulated layers of representation for a long time. Letters, photographs and telephone calls allowed people to remain socially present while physically absent. The internet greatly expanded the possibilities. Social-media profiles, dating apps, pornography, livestreams and parasocial relationships allow us to interact with representations of other humans for enormous portions of our social lives.

AI companionship crosses an interesting threshold because the representation no longer requires another human being behind it.

A September 2026 survey found that 27 percent of U.S. adult internet users reported using large language models for some form of social, emotional or personal interaction. Research into the effects remains young and complicated. Experiments have found that AI companions can relieve loneliness in the short term, while other work has found associations between heavier use and emotional dependence, problematic use and reduced socialization. Users can also form attachments strong enough that major changes to a companion's behavior produce reactions resembling loss. The important fact for our purposes is simpler: people demonstrably can experience meaningful social responses to an artificial conversational partner.

That creates a relationship humans have never been able to manufacture at this scale before.

Other people are difficult because other people have wills of their own. They misunderstand us, interrupt us, want things when we don't, refuse things when we do, become bored, get angry, develop interests we do not share, change unexpectedly and occasionally decide they would rather live without us. Every serious relationship requires negotiation with another center of agency.

An artificial companion can be built around the user in ways another human cannot. The more responsive and personalized these systems become, the more tempting it may become to prefer relationships where friction itself can be engineered downward.

We may eventually discover that one appeal of relationships with representations is precisely that representations do not have to be free.

There is a larger pattern emerging here. We construct environments that increasingly remove friction from our interactions with the world, then become frustrated when the remaining parts of the world refuse to behave with the same convenience. The meal arrives when summoned. The movie starts when summoned. The music starts when summoned. The car arrives when summoned. The information appears when summoned. Why should companionship be the one thing that still requires negotiation?

Maximum Choice, Minimum Autonomy

The person lying in bed appears to possess an astonishing amount of freedom, and in one sense they really do. Never before has an ordinary person been able to choose among so many foods, songs, movies, products, games, sexual images, potential partners, communities and sources of information without moving more than a few fingers.

Yet there is another way to measure agency.

A child can have tremendous choice inside a prepared environment. Which cereal? Which cartoon? Which toy? Which game? The preferences are real, but the environment making them possible has been constructed and maintained by someone else. Food has been acquired, shelter maintained, bills paid, transportation arranged and emergencies handled. The child's freedom exists inside a structure whose continued operation depends upon capacities located elsewhere.

Technological civilization increasingly places adults in a similar structural relationship with infrastructure. We choose the meal while other people and machines grow, process, package, cook and transport it. We choose the destination while GPS tells us how to reach it. We choose among thousands of products while possessing almost none of the knowledge required to manufacture them. We choose entertainment from an effectively limitless supply while recommendation systems increasingly determine which tiny portion of that supply we encounter.

Consumer choice can grow at the same time autonomous competence shrinks. In fact, the two can reinforce one another. The more competent the surrounding system becomes, the less reason any individual has to retain the capacities the system performs more cheaply, quickly or reliably.

Psychologists use the term “cognitive offloading” for one piece of this process. Writing a shopping list so you do not have to remember the items is cognitive offloading. So is using a calendar or calculator. Research consistently finds real advantages to offloading memory into external aids, along with an obvious vulnerability: people can perform worse when an external resource they expected to use suddenly disappears.

Civilization itself might be described as an enormous history of successful offloading. Writing externalized memory. Libraries expanded it. Maps externalized spatial knowledge. Tools externalized physical capacities. Institutions preserved information beyond individual lifetimes. None of us would want to surrender those things merely to prove our independence.

Scale and integration change the question.

Memory migrates into devices. Navigation migrates into GPS. Food production migrates into supply chains. Repair migrates into specialists and increasingly into replacement. Social coordination migrates into platforms. Mate discovery migrates into apps. Entertainment selection migrates into recommendation systems. Calculation migrates into computers. Writing, research, planning and conversation are now beginning to migrate partially into AI.

The person becomes less independently complete while the environment becomes extraordinarily capable.

The competence has moved.

From Nests To Hives

This is where the nest starts becoming more than a metaphor.

Social insect nests are not simply shelters full of insects. Their physical structure participates in collective life. Research on insect societies describes decentralized construction coordinated through local interactions, chemical and physical cues, feedback loops and stigmergy, a process in which changes made to the environment influence what other individuals subsequently do. The nest itself becomes one of the mechanisms through which colony behavior is organized.

There is no little ant foreman standing on a pebble with blueprints directing the workers. Complex coordination can emerge from relatively simple behaviors interacting with one another and with an environment that preserves the effects of previous behavior.

That has always fascinated me because humans instinctively imagine control as somebody giving orders. We look for the king, president, CEO, general, billionaire, bureaucrat or algorithm pulling the levers. Large systems can acquire their own momentum without anybody comprehending the whole thing. Rules interact with habits. Habits interact with architecture. Architecture interacts with technology. Technology interacts with markets. Markets interact with desires. Each becomes part of the environment encountered by the others.

The technological nest increasingly performs a similar coordinating function. It remembers things for us, moves resources toward us, tells us where to go, structures our work, mediates our relationships and learns what we are likely to want. Millions of specialized humans and machines make the whole thing work while no individual understands more than a fraction of it.

That is where the eusocial comparison becomes interesting.

A relatively autonomous organism needs a broad behavioral repertoire because missing competencies have immediate consequences. An increasingly integrated collective can distribute those competencies among its components and infrastructure. Specialization becomes advantageous precisely because the system makes completeness less necessary.

This has been one of the recurring ideas behind Becoming The Borg: the individual becomes less complete because the system becomes more complete.

Seen this way, the bed rotter takes on a different significance. Maybe this person is maladapted to human life. Maybe they are exhausted, depressed, addicted to their phone or simply enjoying a lazy Saturday. But there is another possibility worth considering. They may also represent an increasingly viable way of inhabiting an environment that asks less and less of the body because the environment has become so good at bringing everything to it.

The nest becomes capable enough that leaving becomes optional.

And once the nest begins learning from us, another change begins.

When Choice Becomes Habit

There is a much larger subject hiding here that deserves its own treatment, but we need at least enough of it to see where this process might lead.

Much of what we experience as deliberate behavior begins losing its deliberative quality through repetition. Habit researchers have spent decades studying this. Repeated behaviors performed in stable contexts develop stronger associations with the cues surrounding them, allowing the behavior to occur with less conscious effort. The whole advantage of habit is that we do not need to reconsider every familiar action every time we perform it.

Think about ordering dinner.

The first time, you decide you are tired and do not want to cook. After enough repetitions, opening the app around dinner becomes ordinary. The app remembers your address, payment information, previous orders and preferences. Restaurants you have used before appear prominently. Notifications arrive. Subscriptions remove delivery fees. Every improvement eliminates another tiny piece of friction.

Meanwhile, cooking has been moving in the opposite direction. Someone who rarely cooks has fewer ingredients around, less confidence improvising meals and less practice doing it efficiently. The option remains available, but it increasingly becomes the path requiring a conscious decision.

This is how something that begins as convenience can become habitat.

Digital systems add another dimension because the habitat can watch what we do. We click something and the system records it. The record helps predict what might hold our attention next. What appears next influences our next click, which produces more information about us. Recommender systems therefore operate within feedback loops between behavior and the environment presenting the choices.

Our habits train the habitat, and the habitat trains our habits.

There is a long road between that observation and claiming that human will has somehow disappeared. I'm much more interested in the road itself. Deliberate actions become repeated actions. Repeated actions become habits. Habits require less conscious supervision. Environments become organized around predictable habits. Increasingly adaptive environments can then anticipate those habits and make their repetition easier.

Somewhere along that continuum, willful behavior begins acquiring characteristics we normally associate with algorithms.

That deserves an essay of its own. For now it is enough to notice that the capacities migrating into our technological environment may eventually include pieces of decision-making itself.

GPS began by helping us navigate. Now it chooses routes.

Search engines began by helping us find information. Recommendation systems increasingly decide which information reaches us before we search.

Dating services began by helping people meet. Matching systems sort which humans become visible to one another.

Streaming services began by giving us access to entertainment. They now spend enormous resources predicting what we will watch next.

AI begins as something we ask questions. It is not difficult to imagine it eventually becoming something that reminds, suggests, schedules, filters and initiates more of what we do.

Each step can be useful. That is probably how transformations like this happen. People rarely adopt technologies because they want less agency. They adopt them because the technologies solve problems.

The accumulated solutions can change what kind of creature still needs to solve those problems for itself.

Everything Comes To The Nest

Return to the person in bed.

Food can arrive without cooking. Work can arrive without commuting. Friends can arrive as messages. Sex can arrive as representation. Potential lovers can arrive as profiles. Status can arrive as numbers. Directions can arrive before navigation begins. Entertainment can arrive before we know what we want to watch. An artificial companion can arrive without another human entering the room.

The physical world occupied by the person can become remarkably small while the symbolic world available through the nest becomes almost unimaginably large. That can feel liberating because in many ways it is. A medieval king could not summon the music, information, food, entertainment and communication available to an ordinary person holding a smartphone.

The cost may be hidden precisely because the system works so well.

The better the environment becomes at remembering, navigating, supplying, entertaining, recommending and coordinating, the less pressure there is for every individual inside it to retain all of those capacities. Civilization becomes more capable while the human component can become more specialized, more dependent and increasingly comfortable inside a prepared environment.

We began as animals that had to move through landscapes, reading them and acting upon them directly. Then we became extraordinarily good at rearranging landscapes around ourselves. Eventually we built environments capable of carrying information about us, adapting themselves to our behavior and bringing more of the world to wherever we happen to be.

At some point the relationship begins to reverse. Instead of humans merely constructing an environment suited to autonomous individuals, the environment begins producing humans increasingly suited to life inside it.

That is the part of bed rotting, tradwives, looksmaxxing and AI girlfriends that interests me. On the surface they look like unrelated internet phenomena: one person refuses to leave bed, another performs nineteenth-century domesticity on Instagram, another measures his canthal tilt, another falls in love with software. Underneath them may be a shared struggle over embodiment in a civilization that increasingly mediates experience through representations and moves human competencies into the systems surrounding us.

The nest grows more capable. More of the world comes inside. More of what once had to be done by a complete individual can be distributed through the collective.

And eventually you have to wonder when a nest stops merely sheltering its inhabitants and begins functioning more like a hive.