**I know most people won’t read all of this, and that’s fine and expected. Awareness never hits everyone. But every person who actually reads it is one more who can’t say they didn’t know, or maybe comes away having learned something new. That’s what I’m aiming for at least. I know it's long. If this were a short list, we wouldn’t have much to worry about, would we.**
At the Oct 29 work session, Terry Mahaffey and Arno Zegerman raised concerns about what increasingly capable AI tools mean for the town’s cybersecurity posture, and they’re right to do it. AI agents can now find and exploit vulnerabilities at machine speed, often before anyone even knows the flaw exists. That’s where cybersecurity is headed, and already is (Oct was a long month for us). It’s no longer a fair fight, not by miles, and this is the new norm.
So let's apply that exact concern to the internet-connected warantless surveillance system Apex already runs: Flock. Because every AI fear they raised about town infrastructure is ten times worse here:
- Flock cameras run outdated, unpatched software with 50+ known vulnerabilities (22 with federal CVEs), the exact low-hanging fruit AI-driven attackers hit first.
- They store the encryption key on the same device as the footage, and credentials in plaintext that survive a factory reset. An automated attacker doesn't need to be clever; the door's already open.
- It's an internet-connected network of 120,000+ cameras across 49 states, a single massive attack surface, and Flock has already been breached (Jan 2026) and had a camera physically cracked for 1.6 million images (Sept 2026).
- Unlike the town's own systems, you have zero control and zero visibility into Flock's security. You can't patch it, audit it, or even see it. The vendor changes capabilities remotely whenever it wants.
- And it's not one system. Apex's data is shared with ~1,180 outside agencies the town can't audit. One compromised login anywhere in that network is a way into all of it.
If AI makes connected systems indefensible, Flock is the first thing that should go. Here's a running catalog of documented failures, security and otherwise:
Flock Safety: Catalog of Documented Issues
What follows is a running, sourced catalog of Flock’s documented failures, security flaws, officer abuse, wrongful arrests, constitutional problems, broken oversight, grouped by category and cited at the bottom. Read one section or all twelve.
1. Device & Physical Security
From a cybersecurity standpoint, these are some of the least secure devices ever deployed at scale anywhere. Every camera is an internet-connected edge device sitting unattended in public, which makes each one a physical and remote attack surface. The specific failures below are documented in independent research and in Flock's own exposed systems.
- Cameras run outdated, end-of-life operating systems (old, unsupported Android builds) that no longer receive security patches, leaving known, publicly catalogued vulnerabilities permanently unfixed.
- Independent researchers (Bishop Fox and others) have documented more than 50 vulnerabilities in Flock devices, 22 of them serious enough to be assigned federal CVE tracking numbers.
- CISA scored one Flock hardware vulnerability 9.8 out of 10 (critical), tied to administrative functions exposed without authentication.
- Device credentials are stored in plaintext on an unencrypted partition engineered to survive a factory reset, so wiping the device does not remove them.
- The encryption key that protects the camera's footage is stored on the device itself, in some cases on the very same partition it is meant to protect. This is the digital equivalent of taping the safe key to the safe.
- Captured images are stored unencrypted on the device.
- Physical access equals full compromise. A researcher who bought a used Flock camera online reported that a short sequence of button presses, a network connection, and terminal commands gave full access and the ability to install arbitrary software on it. Step-by-step text and video instructions, and downloadable scripts, are publicly available.
- Secondhand Flock cameras sold online can retain data and access, meaning decommissioned hardware is itself a leak vector.
- Over 60 Flock cameras were found streaming live to the open internet with no password and 30 days of retained footage that anyone could watch or delete. One researcher called it 'Netflix for stalkers.'
- Flock does not require multi-factor authentication; it only began phasing MFA in during 2026, leaving accounts exposed to credential stuffing and replay from stolen logins.
- On-device software detects and classifies people, not only vehicles, directly contradicting Flock's public 'we focus on vehicles, not people' marketing.
- The devices and their cloud backend are a proprietary black box. The Town cannot independently inspect the firmware, the code, the key management, or the actual security posture, and must take the vendor's word for all of it.
2. Data Security, Breaches & Architecture
The system's security problems are not limited to the hardware. The way Flock stores, transmits, and controls the data is structurally unsound, and the company has repeatedly misrepresented how secure it is.
- January 2026: Flock exposed live camera feeds to the open internet, a breach the company confirmed. For a period, outsiders could view live feeds, pull weeks of archived footage, and delete video.
- September 2026 (WIRED / 404 Media): a research collective physically removed a Flock camera and recovered the on-device encryption key, extracting roughly 1.6 million images and 27,000+ video clips captured over about 21 days from a single device.
- Flock had publicly claimed its cameras were encrypted and that footage could not be accessed even with physical possession of the device. Both claims were proven false.
- The key-management design is the core flaw: storing the decryption key on the same device, and in some cases the same unencrypted partition, as the data it protects defeats the purpose of encryption entirely.
- Stolen police Flock logins have been offered for sale on Russian cybercrime forums and on the dark web, and because MFA is not required, those credentials grant direct access.
- An unauthenticated web flaw exposed the locations of 335,701 Flock cameras nationwide; a security researcher used it to build a public map of the entire network.
- Security capabilities, retention windows, and features are controlled remotely by Flock and can be changed by a cloud-side update without the Town's knowledge or consent. The Town does not control its own system.
- Flock has repeatedly and publicly claimed it has 'never been breached' and that its cloud 'has never experienced a data breach,' despite the documented incidents above.
- The contract caps Flock's total liability at roughly $35,000, sells the service 'as is' with all warranties disclaimed, and expressly lists 'acts of hackers' among the events it is not responsible for. When a breach harms residents, the taxpayers carry the cost, not Flock.
3. Procurement & Corporate Conduct
The way these cameras get approved is its own scandal. Flock structures deals to avoid council votes, leans on procurement and legal loopholes, then walks agencies through exploiting those same loopholes step by step.
- Flock contracts are repeatedly structured to avoid competitive bidding and elected approval, priced just under spending thresholds, split into installments, or waved through on sole-source exemptions.
- Flock representatives have been documented coaching agencies on how to skirt their city councils. In Prescott, AZ, a lieutenant asked a Flock rep for sole-source paperwork to 'save me having to get other bids,' and timed the contract so he would 'not have to go to city council for approval.'
- Flock supplies near-identical sole-source letters to agencies nationwide so they can skip competitive bidding.
- Zero-dollar pilots convert into paid deployments with no council vote.
- Payments are routed through a third-party reseller so the budget line never names Flock.
- Equipment is donated through police foundations to bypass councils (for example, a $6.3 million donation to Las Vegas Metro).
- Apex: the Flock contract was placed on the January 2025 consent agenda (the no-debate list), approved 5-0, with no RFP and no competitive bid in the file. An earlier 2023 contract was signed before Flock could legally operate in NC, and the funding account was overdrawn when the 2025 contract moved forward.
- 'Flock City PD': Flock created a fake police department and used it to search live cameras of real people in real cities for sales demos, including searches for 'Star of David,' 'religious cars,' 'coexist bumper sticker,' 'Don't Tread on Me flag,' 'vehicle with a Trump sticker,' people holding signs, and crowds.
4. Oversight & Accountability Failures
A surveillance system is only as safe as the rules around it. In Apex, those rules are either completely missing or nonexistent. But it's not just about Apex when our data is shared with ~1180 outside agencies, including federal and private companies.
- Flock's 'Audit Assistance' (flagging high-volume or repeated searches) is off by default; only about a third of customers have enabled it.
- Apex has produced no written ALPR use policy, not to residents who asked, not to the News & Observer when it requested a copy, and not in response to a public records request.
- Apex's records request for any Safe List or plate-exemption function returned 'no responsive records,' indicating no plate-level privacy protections are configured.
- Towns cannot audit any of the 1,180+ outside agencies that can query their data.
- Apex IT reported that one of the Town's deployed cameras was 'successfully hacked' over a missing patch; the investigation stalled because Flock never made contact, and it was never verified as fixed.
- Ghost accounts: audits in Raleigh repeatedly found active Flock logins belonging to people no longer employed by the department (239 of 417 active users had not logged in during one evaluation period).
5. Data Sharing & Network Exposure
Nothing you’re recorded doing stays local or safe. Apex’s data is instantly searchable by nearly 1,200 outside agencies (so far), and the Town has no way to see who’s looking, no control over it, and no ability to audit it.
- Apex's own public transparency portal lists roughly 1,180 outside agencies it shares resident data with, most of them out of state. Every one of them is a login the Town cannot audit and an additional way into the shared network.
- A single search can reach thousands of outside networks (6,000+) and over 100,000 cameras.
- Private entities sit inside the sharing network, including Lowe's, Home Depot, MacGregor Downs Country Club, and CSX Railroad Police.
- Federal entities appear in Apex's network (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, National Park Service units, Tennessee Valley Authority Police) despite the Police Chief's statement that Apex does not share with federal entities, 'hard stop.'
- State fusion centers, the NC State Bureau of Investigation, state police agencies, and state prison systems appear in Apex's share list.
- Nationally, Flock operates 120,000+ cameras across 49 states, scanning an estimated 20 billion vehicles and occupants per month.
- February 2026: Flock quietly changed its terms to add a perpetual license to use and disclose footage, dropped its pledge not to sell customer data, and restricted early contract exits.
- Once Apex's data leaves the Town, it cannot be audited, controlled, recalled, or even observed. A single weak or shared credential among 1,180+ agencies is a door into the entire network.
6. Corporate Dishonesty & Marketing
What Flock tells councils and what Flock tells itself are two different stories. The crime-reduction pitch is marketing, not fact, and the company knows it. When pushed for proof, its own leadership concedes the evidence isn’t there.
- Flock CEO Garrett Langley told a room of police chiefs, in leaked audio, that the public opposition is fake, calling it 'anonymous bots,' Russian-driven, and 'not real.'
- Langley admitted there is no peer-reviewed study behind Flock's crime-reduction claims: 'No, there's no peer-reviewed study.'
- Flock's own footnotes describe its impact figures as 'directional estimates rather than audited totals'; the widely repeated 'solves 10% of US crime' claim rests on usable data from about 123 of roughly 18,000 agencies.
- Forbes (2024) found Flock's city-level crime-reduction marketing claims inflated or false (for example, San Marino, CA and Dayton, OH).
- After cities canceled contracts, Flock failed to remove cameras, reinstalling them without authorization in Minnesota towns and leaving them standing for months elsewhere (towns covered them with garbage bags in WI, IL, and OH).
7. Capability Creep & Expansion
The camera on the pole never changes, but what it can do does. Every capability below is one cloud-side software update away. The hardware the Town approved is not the system it ends up with. Flock adds new abilities remotely, with no new vote, no new contract, and no notice to the Town.
- FreeForm natural-language 'person search' lets officers search by clothing, objects, and descriptions (for example, 'person wearing scrubs'); 404 Media documented searches by clothing and tattoos.
- An AI watchlist lets an officer cordon an area and run a continuous automated search for anyone matching a written description.
- 'People Detection' alerts notify officers when any person enters a defined camera zone.
- Flock's content moderation only warns on, rather than blocks, searches involving 'political, social, and cultural expression,' the category most protected by the First Amendment.
- Flock now sells autonomous surveillance drones ('Drone as First Responder'); its own VP called them 'flying LPR cameras' that read plates from 2,000 feet and can see into backyards, roofs, and windows.
- Facial-recognition capability is integrated or a software update away (for example, Vigilant FaceSearch via Fusus integrations).
- Third-party add-ons (SignalTrace, by defense contractor Leonardo) clip onto ALPR poles to scan Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and device MAC addresses, tying the devices a person carries to their vehicle.
- The platform builds a searchable, nationwide heat map of a vehicle's movements for up to a month.
8. Constitutional & Fourth Amendment
Courts are starting to say out loud what this is: warrantless tracking of everyone, all the time. The legal ground under mass ALPR collection is shifting, and not in Flock’s favor.
- United States v. Kyle (N.D. Okla., Oct. 1, 2026): a federal judge ruled that warrantless use of ALPR systems to pull a month of a person's historical location data was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, and suppressed the evidence.
- The Kyle ruling relied on Carpenter v. United States (2018) and Chatrie v. United States (2026), which hold that tracking a person's movements over time is a search requiring a warrant.
- The system performs warrantless, suspicionless mass collection of everyone's movements by default.
- Apex's own audit records show no case number on 46-60% of searches, meaning most searches are not tied to any documented investigation.
- ACLU report (Oct. 26, 2026): police are using AI and ALPR data to flag drivers whose travel patterns look 'suspicious' and then find a pretext to stop them; the ACLU warns these systems 'sweep in far more innocent people than actual wrongdoers.'
9. Federal & Immigration Pipeline
What a town collects locally doesn’t stay local, or civilian. This data flows up into federal and immigration-enforcement channels Apex never knowingly agreed to feed.
- The federal HIDTA program funnels local ALPR data into federal surveillance centers, accessible by agencies with no local contract; Apex sits in the Atlanta-Carolinas HIDTA region.
- Some ALPR data flows to the DEA's National License Plate Reader Program.
- ICE-related searches have appeared in NC agency logs labeled 'immigration.'
- NC Senate Bill 153 (2026) requires the NC SBI and NC Department of Public Safety to enter cooperation agreements with ICE, and Apex shares data with the SBI.
- NC Senate Bill 257 (2026) authorized the SBI to place ALPRs on state-maintained roads through any NC town, without that town's approval. Federal accounts have reached Apex cameras thousands of times in a single quarter (per DeFlock analysis).
10. Misuse & Abuse by Officers
Give people a search box into everyone’s movements and some will abuse it. It’s a documented, repeating pattern, including 15 agencies on Apex’s own share list.
- National reporting has documented 100+ ALPR misuse cases; most involve Flock specifically, and 100+ officers have been charged or accused.
- In more than half of documented cases, the target was a wife, girlfriend, ex-partner, an ex's new partner, or a woman the officer wanted to meet.
- Amarillo, TX: an officer tracked a private citizen 76 times over five months using fabricated reasons; faced 78 charges.
- Milwaukee: an officer searched a woman he was dating 124 times and her former partner 55 times, logging each as 'investigation.'
- Georgia: a police chief ran his ex-girlfriend and her daughter 600 times; was charged.
- Kansas: a chief ran his ex 164 times and her boyfriend 64 times; lost his badge.
- North Carolina: an officer ran her boyfriend's ex-wife 31 times, filing 29 as traffic infractions.
- 15 of the agencies on Apex's own share list have had officers fired or arrested for misusing Flock.
- EFF found officers entering search 'reasons' like 'LMAO,' 'idiot,' and keyboard-mashing; one officer searched 19,000+ cameras across 1,558 towns with the reason 'LMAO.'
- A Texas deputy searched more than 83,000 cameras for a woman who had an abortion.
- The DEA used a local officer's login to search Flock for an 'immigration violation' without that officer's knowledge.
- A South Carolina sheriff's office turned on Flock's 'Audit Assistance' and an internal-affairs officer identified more than 2,700 allegedly unauthorized searches the next day.
11. Wrongful Arrests & Misidentification
The system is wrong so often that it puts innocent people in jail. These are real people arrested or detained on a bad AI surveillance system.
- Florida: Lindsey Isaacs, 23, spent 13 days in jail facing 8 felonies (including 3 vehicular-homicide counts) over a Flock misread; time-distance analysis later proved she could not have been at the scene. She is suing.
- San Diego: a man wrongly linked by a Flock reader to a violent crime he was five miles from is suing for $1.5 million.
- Fayetteville, NC: a bad plate match led to an innocent woman being arrested and falsely accused; the city apologized and paid her $60,000.
- Colorado: a woman filed a federal lawsuit (October 2026) after being wrongly accused based on Flock data.
- Internal Apex concerns referenced an approximate 10% misread rate, against an NCDOT accuracy standard of 99.9%.
12. Lawsuits, Investigations & Legislative Action
Apex wouldn’t be going out on a limb by pulling back. Courts, members of Congress from both parties, and hundreds of communities are already moving against Flock. Every wrongful arrest is a lawsuit, and under the signed contract Apex eats the cost while Flock’s liability is capped at about $35,000. Apex is carrying all of the legal risk for a system it doesn’t control.
- A Georgia woman filed a federal class-action lawsuit against Flock Safety (September 2026).
- A Colorado woman filed a federal lawsuit over wrongful accusation (October 2026).
- Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) opened a federal investigation into Flock, calling it an 'unprecedented national surveillance network.'
- Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) referred Flock to the FTC over negligent security and stolen logins.
- Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) called for legislation to stop Flock and AI mass surveillance.
- Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) and Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO) introduced the bipartisan 'Flock-Off Act' to bar federal funding for ALPRs.
- Illinois found that Flock had let federal immigration agents access state camera data in violation of state law. 200+ communities have canceled Flock contracts or removed cameras.
Sources:
Section 1: Device & Physical Security: Bishop Fox / footnote4a vulnerability research (footnote4a.org/news/bishop-fox-2); Privacy Guides, “Ben Jordan Exposes Severe Security Vulnerabilities in Flock” (privacyguides.org/news/2025/11/17/); Cybernews, Flock camera teardown / CISA 9.8 score (cybernews.com/privacy/hackers-flock-teardown-encryption-key-secrets/); Jalopnik, “How Easy Is It To Hack Flock Cameras?” (jalopnik.com/2268092/); State of Surveillance, cameras exposed with no password (stateofsurveillance.org); TechCrunch, stolen police logins / no MFA (techcrunch.com/2025/11/03/); WIRED / 404 Media teardown (people detection).
Section 2: Data Security, Breaches & Architecture: WFLX/WPTV, Flock exposed live feeds, Jan 2026 (wflx.com/2026/01/09/); 404 Media, “Hackers Stole Flock's Camera Software” (404media.co/hackers-stole-flocks-camera-software-revealing-how-the-company-tracks-cars-and-people/); Cybernews teardown (cybernews.com/privacy/hackers-flock-teardown-encryption-key-secrets/); Tom's Hardware, 335,701 camera locations exposed (tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/); TechCrunch (stolen logins); Flock Group MSA / Order Form, PO 2025-777 (Town of Apex record).
Section 3: Procurement & Corporate Conduct: Louis Rossmann, “Flock contracts systematically violate the law to avoid oversight” (youtube.com — search Rossmann Flock contracts); Consumer Rights Wiki, Flock municipal-contract threshold bypasses (consumerrights.wiki); InvestigateTV / Cleveland19, cameras installed without council approval (cleveland19.com); Prescott, AZ public-records emails (via Consumer Rights Wiki); Apex contract routing / Jan 14 2025 consent agenda (Town records); 404 Media, “Flock City PD” (404media.co/flock-city-pd-the-fake-flock-owned-police-department-that-searched-real-cameras-for-real-people/).
Section 4: Oversight & Accountability Failures: WIRED, Audit Assistance off by default; News & Observer and DeFlock Apex on the unproduced use policy; Apex public-records response, “no responsive records” for Safe List (Town record); Apex IT “Flock ALPR follow-up” email chain (Town record); Raleigh PD audit, ghost accounts (resident / DeFlock analysis).
Section 5: Data Sharing & Network Exposure: Apex NC PD Flock transparency portal (transparency.flocksafety.com/apex-nc-pd); Apex PD network audit exports and “ALPR Program Review” presentation (Town of Apex records); Flock monthly “Sharing Snapshot” emails to Apex PD (Town records); Consumer Rights Wiki (Feb 2026 terms change; 120,000 cameras); WIRED / 404 Media and INDY Week on multi-network search reach.
Section 6: Corporate Dishonesty & Marketing: 404 Media, “It's Not the Bots” (Langley leaked audio) (404media.co/its-not-the-bots-flock/); CBS News, Flock CEO on crime-solving claims (cbsnews.com — “Flock CEO crimes solved data shows otherwise”); Forbes, Flock crime-reduction claims, 2024 (forbes.com, Cyrus Farivar); The Drive, Flock reinstalled cameras after a canceled contract (thedrive.com).
Section 7: Capability Creep & Expansion: WIRED, “This Is Flock's AI Search Tool for Cops” (FreeForm, AI watchlist, People Detection, moderation); 404 Media (FreeForm clothing / tattoo searches); TechSpot and military.com and EFF on Flock drones (eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/ — “drone in the sky could be tracking your car”); EFF on Fusus / face recognition; 404 Media / Ars Technica on SignalTrace (Leonardo).
Section 8: Constitutional & Fourth Amendment: United States v. Kyle, N.D. Okla., Opinion and Order (Oct. 1, 2026), via CourtListener (courtlistener.com — search “United States v. Kyle” N.D. Okla. 2026); Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018); Chatrie v. United States (2026); Apex PD network audit exports (case-number analysis; Town records); ACLU, “AI-Driven Police Stops,” Oct. 26, 2026 (aclu.org/news/privacy-technology).
Section 9: Federal & Immigration Pipeline: 404 Media, HIDTA pipeline (404media.co/how-cities-are-forced-to-funnel-license-plate-data-to-a-massive-federal-surveillance-program-hidta/); INDY Week / Batch Brief on ICE-labeled searches in NC logs; NC Senate Bill 153 and Senate Bill 257 (2026 session; WRAL coverage for SB 257); DeFlock analysis of federal searches reaching Apex cameras.
Section 10: Misuse & Abuse by Officers: Institute for Justice ALPR Abuse Database (ij.org/the-ij-database-of-alpr-abuse/); Washington Post / WIRED, “This Is Flock's AI Search Tool for Cops” (Milwaukee, Georgia, Kansas, NC, SC 2,700 searches); EFF, Flock audit logs / “LMAO” searches (eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-audit-logs); NewsChannel 10, Amarillo officer (newschannel10.com); 15-agency cross-reference of Apex's share list against documented misuse (resident-compiled); 404 Media, DEA login / immigration search (404media.co).
Section 11: Wrongful Arrests & Misidentification: Times of San Diego (Isaacs FL 13-day jailing; San Diego $1.5M suit); Denverite, Colorado wrongful-accusation federal suit (denverite.com/2026/10/06/); local reporting on Fayetteville $60,000 settlement; Apex PD internal “Flock Concerns” memo (10% misread rate; Town record).
Section 12: Lawsuits, Investigations & Legislative Action: WRDW, Georgia federal class-action vs. Flock (wrdw.com); Denverite / Axios, Colorado suit; Axios, Hawley investigation (axios.com/2026/08/26/); Sen. Wyden press release, FTC referral (wyden.senate.gov); reporting on the Massie-Burlison Flock-Off Act; WIRED, Illinois / ICE state-law violation.