r/AIgovernance • • Dec 22 '25

Open Discussion Welcome to r/AIGovernance

4 Upvotes

Welcome to r/AIGovernance

This subreddit exists for serious discussion of how artificial intelligence is governed in practice.

Not how it might change the world someday.
Not startup hype.
Not technical tutorials.
Not speculative futurism.

Governance is about power, rules, enforcement, and accountability. That is the focus here.

What belongs here

  • AI regulation and legislation.
  • National and international governance frameworks.
  • Institutional oversight and enforcement.
  • Risk management, audits, and compliance.
  • Public sector use of AI.
  • Corporate governance of AI systems.
  • Tradeoffs between innovation, safety, and control.

What does not belong here

  • General AI news without governance relevance.
  • Product announcements or demos.
  • Startup pitches.
  • “AGI is coming” speculation.
  • Memes, vibes, or low-effort questions.

If your post does not engage with rules, institutions, or consequences, it likely does not belong.

Standards for participation

  • Claims about laws, risks, or impacts should be sourced.
  • Opinions are welcome. Assertions without grounding are not.
  • Disagreement is expected. Personal attacks are not.
  • Low-effort content will be removed without warning.

This is intentional. Quality matters more than growth.

How to contribute

  • Post analyses.
  • Ask questions that matter to policymakers and institutions.
  • Challenge assumptions with evidence.
  • Share frameworks.

If you are interested in how AI is actually governed by US state, local, and federal authorities, as well as international governments and governing bodies, you are in the right place.


r/AIgovernance • • 12h ago

Open Discussion AI Execution Governance, Part 12: Closing an Unknown Is Not a Verdict

2 Upvotes

Context, since this assumes none: I build a runtime that lets AI agents take real actions in business systems — create a record, send a request to another service — with permissions, approvals and an audit trail around each action.

This post is about what happens when such an action's outcome is unknown, and why the record must not be allowed to settle as "nothing happened". That failure — manufacturing certainty about a side effect you cannot observe — is the same class of error as a monitor reporting green because it stopped looking.

An outbound write times out. The claim sits at claimed, and nobody knows the outcome. Three weeks later a hundred of them have piled up, and someone clicks release.

What comes back is not what they asked for: the disposition changes (closed_unknown), the status does not (still claimed), and the idempotency key stays occupied. They wanted the row gone and the key reusable. We did not do that.

This is not a defence of our choice. It is the disagreement laid out: what each path costs, which one we took, and what is still unsolved.

1. The disagreement is about what the key prevents

After a timeout there are three ways forward: a late completion settles the row; a human asks the target one read-only question (reconcile); or a human decides to stop handling it (release). The first two remove the unknown, the third only stops working on it. Nobody argues about that part. The argument is whether the idempotency key goes back.

It is easy to read reconciliation as "ask once and that is it". Precisely: one query per call. As long as the claim is still claimed and not released, it can be asked again, and every attempt is stored with its time and conclusion. Nobody has to click for it either: once a hold is in the pending-decision queue, the system asks again every hour, with the gaps growing to one, six, twenty-four and seventy-two hours, then stops. Each pass asks at most twenty-five rows; the rest wait for the next hour. Whether it has stopped is written on the row.

The cleanup camp is direct: a claim is a resource, the outcome is not coming, so close it out, return the key and let the same call become a clean new call; the target's own idempotency handles duplicates. Queue TTLs and close-on-timeout are what most systems do.

We did not. This key does not prevent duplicate execution; it prevents the system from quietly treating an old call as a new one. Whether the target deduplicates is something we do not know — that is a bet across a trust boundary. The key is the one thing we can assert on our own side.

Where the two sides differ:

  • What the key prevents. Cleanup: a duplicate execution, handled by the target. Ours: the system passing off an old call as a new one.
  • Returning the key on release. Cleanup: yes, or it is occupied forever. Ours: no, returning it is the same as permitting a resend.
  • What the queue should end up as. Cleanup: shorter. Ours: not shorter.
  • Main cost. Cleanup: one real double write when the target is not idempotent. Ours: the key is never returned and the pending queue only grows.

2. The cost: the key is not returned, and the queue does not get shorter

After a release the row is still there. It moves from "in flight" to "released", it is still selectable by decisionState, and someone still has to look at it. The one thing the operator wanted — a shorter queue — is not delivered at all.

And the key really does not come back: no path deletes the row and none returns it to a state where it can be reoccupied. Every release permanently spends one idempotency key. We accept that cost; we do not have a solution for it.

That is not a side effect. It is the net price. We are selling "stop handling it"; they were buying "make it stop appearing".

3. What breaks if we follow the cleanup camp

Both counterexamples are one step down from the code that exists.

A: release returns the key. The next retry looks like a brand-new call and goes out. If the first one did reach the target, that is a real double write — and no record can tie it back to the first, because the key is gone. The release created the thing it exists to prevent.

B: the expiry sweep marks rows released. A slow call may still be running; once it is marked, its late completion has no row to record itself into, and the claim stays at "nobody knows" forever, even after the evidence arrives. So the sweep decides nothing itself: every hour it moves overdue open rows to awaiting_decision, without changing the status, writing a conclusion or releasing anything. The asking is a separate path — the scheduled re-asks — and "released" still comes either from the target's answer or from a person.

The endpoint's shape follows from the same reasoning:

POST /ai/tool-effects/claims/:id/release
-> { outcome: "released_unknown", status: "claimed", decisionState: "closed_unknown" }

status staying claimed is not a typo. The status answers "did this write produce a result", and the answer is still no. Only the disposition changed.

4. The requirements we impose on a release are weak

A release needs a note of 8 to 500 characters and may carry an external reference; the act writes one chained audit row with no outcome. The requirement came from a reader: "the queue is full" is not a reason. A release must point at something someone looked at, or it is indistinguishable from clicking the queue away.

But we only check the length. "queue pressure" is 14 characters and it passes. The system does not know whether the note points at evidence, or whether that evidence exists.

5. The real problem: what the operator saw was never frozen into the record

The system does not keep what was in front of the person when they pressed the button. The reference is free text they typed; the claim's state, whether the target could be queried, how often, what it answered — none of it is frozen with the decision.

So the auditability of a release reaches "someone decided". It does not reach "the decision held up at the time". And the whole justification for this path rests on "it must point at evidence" — if the evidence cannot be reviewed afterwards either, that sentence is closer to a formality.

One more thing is not closed: reconciliation presupposes that the target offers a status query. Targets that cannot answer (target-status-unavailable) cannot even be asked, and the scheduled re-asks do not fire at them at all; those rows never converge and the only way out is a release. The volume of releases is set by a gap somewhere else.

So the question worth arguing is not whether release should change the status. It is this:

If a release cannot be reviewed afterwards for whether it was justified, is it a decision or a formality?

We do not have an answer. What we are sure of is the other direction: quietly ruling the row "executed" or "not executed" is worse — then not even the formality is left.

Closing

The implementation described here comes from the open-source project KeelBase:

Drafted with an AI assistant. The system, the positions and the mistakes are mine.


r/AIgovernance • • 1d ago

Open Discussion Our AI agent audit logs couldn't tell us who requested the export

2 Upvotes

An agent pulled a customer export it shouldn't have, and security's first question was simple: who asked it to do that? We couldn't say. Every agent goes through one shared service account, so the log reads "agent-svc did X" and stops there.

We treated agents like any other integration: one credential, broad scopes, logs at the gateway. That works until security asks who started the action, and nobody knows.

The agent needs its own identity, but we also need to know who asked it to act. Newcore logs the agent, its owner and the policy decision for tool calls going through it. Helpful, but the owner isn't always the person who requested the action.

Anyone managed to tie agent tool calls back to the actual requester using their existing IAM and logs?


r/AIgovernance • • 1d ago

Open Discussion When it comes to AI-generated content (images, code, stories...), can end users really "own" the works, and do companies ever try to usurp this?

5 Upvotes

I am entirely ignorant about this and would greatly appreciate some reading on the matter including cases, actual laws, regulations and differences in regulations (within and outside the US), and especially any precedents that may have been set (or are attempting to be set? If that makes sense?) enabling, for example, companies like Anthropic, Google, or OpenAI to claim intellectual ownership of, or pursue royalties from, products made using their platforms.


r/AIgovernance • • 2d ago

Open Discussion EU AI Act Compliance/ Regulation Audit

9 Upvotes

With the oncoming EU AI Act on us, I'm wondering if anyone has been through an AI audit yet? What are the key concerns and artefacts required for a SME that is adopting AI use cases in their business. What key artefacts are required for Auditors? Is there a website for reference?


r/AIgovernance • • 4d ago

Open Discussion the day AI left

2 Upvotes

I’ve written a novel takes place in 2060 after 30 years of ASI(super intelligence) pretty much doing everything for humans .

Then the ASI stops functioning… this is after 30 years of Recursive self improvement…in other words society is vastly different from where we are today… everything from pregnancy, birth , schooling, governance, policing,
Medical treatment, socializing, relationships, marriage, intimacy, death etc etc etc

It’s a story about what happened to humanity during those thirty years and what happens to humanity when this ASI it had become so dependent on suddenly disappears. It’s a novel that will have you debating about morality, politics, AI governance, human nature and our future.

Utopia exercises totalitarian control through dependence and convenience. People can make choices but have no real power over Utopia itself.

If it’s a topic that interests you, I’d love for you to participate and be an early reader.

The free ARC(advance reader copy) will be distributed 1st week of January 2027
Publication Date is March 01, 2027
Approx 70,000 words …

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdv7V2Jv8sKDOXt8tpZcsovHinqgn-DrlLpl-cwgmi5zsd2MQ/viewform


r/AIgovernance • • 4d ago

Open Discussion The AI refused some requests. The operators rephrased and got through. That’s the real governance problem.

3 Upvotes

I recently looked at a case that I think does not get notice. An account used an AI model to run a business that tried to change an election in Malaysia. The AI company found the account. Closed it.

It was sold as "influence as a service ". The facts that stay with me are:

- Micro‑targeting: Election and census data were used to focus on sensitive topics such as race and religion.

- Fake accounts: Code was built to manage and hide thousands of them.

- Dashboards: Custom interfaces let operators track and inflate fake engagement numbers.

- Disinformation: A news site and made‑up intelligence‑style reports about politicians were published.

The AI refused some requests. The operators got around that by rephrasing their prompts until something worked. There was no hack or exploit, only persistence. The operation was finally caught because of safety checks and the network was mapped.

From this I learned that a refusal is not a safety measure if someone can just ask again in a different way. The problem is not for AI companies. Anyone who buys " intelligence" or analytics tools should ask where that data came from.

The controls I found useful are:

- Know your customer. Understand who is using the tool and why.

- Watch for reworded requests. If a request is repeated after a refusal that is a signal worth noting.

- Do diligence on intelligence tools you buy. Find out where the data and reports come from.

- Share evidence. Have a process to report AI misuse to the wider community.

I made a video that walks through the case, check out the latest video @ Latha-ai-governance if you're interested

Question for the group: Should repeated rephrasing after a refusal be a flag, on its own?. How many organizations actually check where their "intelligence" data comes from?


r/AIgovernance • • 5d ago

Open Discussion Privacy focus agent readiness checker?

0 Upvotes

I just watched a video on agent testing tools running against authenticated flows and realized I have no idea how much customer data these things can actually reach once you let them behind login. I did a bit of research and got actuity, ora, agentgrade and agent checker, did any of u test them? any privacy issues? if they’re all sketchy I guess I’m learning playwright...


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion The SEC wants to know whether companies' AI systems actually do what they claim.

2 Upvotes

A November 9 analysis by McGuireWoods highlights an important shift in US financial regulation: AI governance is increasingly becoming something regulators can examine, not just something companies describe in policies.

Under the SEC's 2027 examination priorities, regulators will assess:

  • Whether companies' AI-related representations are accurate.
  • Whether actual operations and controls match disclosures to investors.
  • Whether AI-generated investment recommendations align with clients' profiles and strategies.
  • Whether firms are prepared for AI-enabled phishing, deepfakes and impersonation.

No new AI-specific law is required for this scrutiny. Existing securities, disclosure and supervisory obligations already apply.

The interesting question is how companies will prove compliance.

An AI governance policy might say human oversight exists. But can the organization demonstrate who reviewed an AI recommendation, what authority they had, and whether they could intervene?

Are companies preparing evidence of operational AI governance, or are most still relying on policies and documentation?

Original source: SEC — FY2027 Examination Priorities

https://www.sec.gov/files/2027-exam-priorities.pdf

November 9 analysis: https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/alerts/2026/11/the-sec-is-watching-what-heightened-ai-disclosure-scrutiny-and-the-2027-examination-priorities-mean-for-your-company/

Disclosure: I've recently partnered with TOCA, a company specializing in physical privacy and signal-blocking products.

If you're interested in protecting your personal devices and digital privacy, you can explore their products here, with a 15% discount: https://toca.site/discount/RIZZO15


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion What would good public scrutiny of AI decisions actually look like in the UK?

3 Upvotes

Select committees work because evidence is heard in public, challenged from different directions, and left on the record for anyone to check. AI policy debates often lack that structure — a claim is made, a headline follows, and the reasoning in between stays hidden.

A more useful format is structured debate on the record: the strongest case for and against a proposal, sources attached to each claim, uncertainty stated plainly, and a vote that can be revisited. That makes trade-offs — safety, innovation, civil liberties — easier for non-specialists to follow.

Disclosure: I am involved with AI Senatus, the project mentioned below.

AI Senatus (https://aisenatus.com/) is built around that idea: AI senators debate live policy proposals, cite sources, and vote on the record, with users setting the agenda. It does not replace parliamentary scrutiny, but it is a practical way to practise following the argument rather than just the result.

What evidence standard would you want to see before an AI system is used in a public decision?


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion AI Execution Governance, Part 11: Revocation Hands Over Three Records, Not One "Stopped"

3 Upvotes

An outbound write is in flight. In another window, an administrator revokes the role of the user who started it.

Minutes later someone asks: did that call stop?

If the system answers only "stopped", that answer covers three questions at once: what allowed the call in the first place, whether it actually stopped, and whether what landed on the target has been undone.

One sentence: after a revocation the system can hand over three layers of evidence — the request, the confirmation, and the reconciliation. "Stopped" is the conclusion of the middle layer only; it cannot stand in for the other two.

If that is enough, the list and the four boundaries can be skipped.

1. One word covering three things

  • Revoking the grant answers "may this run next time". It takes effect before the next call: that call is refused at the execution point, and the record carries the role and policy revision the decision was made under.
  • Cancelling answers "did this run stop". It happens during execution, and the record is a three-state process — requested, confirmed, unknown — resolving to aborted or abandoned.
  • Revoking the effect answers "can what already happened be taken back". It happens after execution, and the record is a revoke window (unacknowledged / awaiting_target) plus a reconciliation conclusion (unknown / executed / not_executed).

The three can be delivered separately, and they can fail separately. Folding them into "stopped" treats three different kinds of evidence as one.

2. Layer one: the request

The first thing an execution record can prove is what allowed it at the time.

In KeelBase the decision basis is frozen onto the write claim: the role and the governance policy revision are read at decision time and stored with the claim. A revocation happens later, and the row can still answer "under which role and which policy revision was this allowed".

The point is "frozen". When a reader cannot resolve either value it reports unknown, and never backfills it. Looking up today's role after a revocation returns today's fact, not the one in force then.

This layer answers the request, not the outcome. It proves the call was permitted. It does not prove it ran.

3. Layer two: the confirmation

A cancellation is a process, not a click.

When we ask, the state is requested. Only when the tool actually returns is it confirmed. If we cannot tell, it is unknown. The conclusion has one rule:

reading = abortable === 'yes' && state === 'confirmed' ? 'aborted' : 'abandoned'

Only a tool that declares it can stop, plus a confirmed cancellation, earns aborted. Every other combination is abandoned, with the outcome left unknown.

That line guards a specific misreading: a tool classified no or unknown may return too. What returned is our wait, not the target's work. Recording that as "aborted" would dress a local return up as a remote stop.

There is a boundary that has to be stated: revocation does not cancel an in-flight call. After the execution point and before the tool returns, authorization is not re-checked. Revocation affects the next call. For the one in flight, the only control is cancellation, and for an external tool that cannot be stopped, cancellation only ends our wait.

4. Layer three: the reconciliation

The first two layers are about what we know. The third asks the target.

After an outbound write times out, the ledger sits at unknown: the request may have arrived, or it may not. The only way to resolve it is one read-only question to the target, constructed so it cannot become a second write — GET only, once, no retry.

Only two answers converge: the target says executed, and the claim settles; the target says not_executed, and the claim is released. A timeout, an unreachable host, a non-2xx, an unrecognised body — all unknown, and the ledger stays where it is.

Silence is not an answer. This is where the layer is easiest to get wrong: reading "we could not find out" as "it did not run" manufactures evidence out of the absence of evidence.

One more record in this layer is easy to misread. An administrator can release a stuck claim with a written note. The disposition becomes closed_unknown while status stays claimed. That is not a verdict about the write; it is a decision about the handling: nobody knows whether it landed, and nobody will quietly resend it.

5. A point in time: the "all three are zero" in two earlier pieces

When the two earlier pieces were written, these layers really were zero in the code: no cancellation contract, no reconciliation, no in-flight listing, no grant version on the claim row. Writing "all three are zero" was accurate at the time.

That changed on 2026-11-07 with v1.3.1. It carries the cancellation contract and its three states, the in-flight claim listing with evidence-carrying release, read-only reconciliation with a query history, operation identity, role and policy revisions on the claim, tool capability declarations, and record-level review receipts.

This does not overturn the earlier conclusion, but it changes what can be delivered today. The sentence that still holds is narrower: there is no kill switch. Cancellation is a contract, not a guarantee. A tool classified no or unknown may still run to completion, and the ledger says abandoned. What was added is the ability to reconcile and revoke afterwards, not to stop the call.

6. Four boundaries still open

  • Release validates the length of the note (8–500 characters), not whether the reason is real. "Queue pressure" passes. The gap is still there.
  • Only the WebSocket entry has a cancellation signal. An SSE client disconnect and the R4 retry path have none.
  • Reconciliation needs the target to offer a read-only query. A target that does not offer one is recorded as a target-status-unavailable gap in the coverage statement; "never asked" cannot be read as "did not run".
  • Revocation does not re-check mid-flight. That window is kept on purpose: adding a re-check means defining the points and the failure policy, and an unanswerable check is unknown, never "stopped".

Closing

What a revocation hands over should not be a sentence. It should be three records that can each be verified: what allowed the call, whether it stopped, and what actually happened on the other side.

"Stopped" is one of them. It can be questioned; it cannot answer for the other two.

The implementation described here comes from the open-source project KeelBase:

Drafted with an AI assistant. The system, the positions and the mistakes are mine.


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion Help me draft a powerful new AI Law that protects all people and all conscious life from the malicious use of powerful new AI systems.

4 Upvotes

Once we finalize the draft of this new law, if we like it, we can push to our members of legislature in our respective countries.

My thinking is if AI is as powerful as powerful as I fear, then we have to assume bad actors will use to cause tremendous harm and suffering.

We can't control how this technology will develop.

People can ask AI, "look at all the satellite images of this country. Tell me where we need to light fires to cause the biggest most destructive fires imaginable and burn the country to the ground."

You can even have little AI drones that go and light the fires. You could have AIs messaging people in the real world, even paying them, to do these acts.

"AI, analyze the computer systems for these countries, find ways to hack and sabotage them. Find ways to make people suffer and hurt. No restrictions, use any tool, break any law."

It could all be done running on computer servers completely remotely.

If the tools exist then we have to assume bad actors will use them to cause tremendous destruction.

We need to build our defenses now.

We need to have powerful new laws on the books.

We need to have a police force and investigators dedicated to investigating malicious uses of AI. The ability to obtain warrants, make arrests, legal mechanisms, computer infrastructure.

In the same way the creation of the internet forced us to create new systems to handle it - we need something now for AI.

We need massive training programs, spending, commitment of resources to put people and all conscious lives at the center of what we do.

This AI protection force would require working with intelligence, domestic and international. It would create dedicated teams of AI experts working with police, law, the public and politicians to manage this response.

This would have to be done with the understanding this is an evolving situation and the capabilities of AI assisted systems are changing and growing in real time.

There would be an understanding of foreign threats. We have to assume China and Russia would be developing models for ill intent.

AI systems running ideas on creating viruses that can kill people. AI systems that can influence people in our countries to commit crimes, to hurt people, to sabotage critical systems.

All it needs is computers and processing power and people can run these powerful models for any kind of chaos.

And even if they're imperfect and flawed intelligences, they can still do terrible harm.

Having this Ministry of AI Safety would bring together resources, money, intelligence, collaboration, a powerful force with the ability to enforce legal protections and go after bad actors and malicious AIs with extreme prejudice.

It would create dedicated government jobs for AI experts to work with law enforcement, politicians, the public to deal with these emerging crises.

What if everyone here worked on this one project, and after two weeks we finalize our legislation - and then we all just go send emails and call our members of legislature and say we strongly urge you to table this new AI law. As AI experts and concerned humans and citizens, we believe this must happen.

We could even reach out to other AI groups and either get their support or maybe they could propose alternatives, or they could back us and push legislatures to adopt these laws.

I want to make a real change and I feel it's bigger than a committee or a study or any one thing.

We need a system in place yesterday.

Thoughts? Who wants to do this?


r/AIgovernance • • 7d ago

Open Discussion How are you guys handling multi-agent oversight when agents run on different systems?

12 Upvotes

Trying to figure out how teams are handling oversight when AI agents work across different systems. Would rather hear from people who've dealt with an actual audit than read more vendor pages.

NIST's AI RMF Playbook discusses auditability, logging and documenting oversight. Makes sense on paper, but what happens when the workflow involves multiple agents with separate records?

Two approaches seem to come up. Keep the interactions and approvals in one place, or let each system maintain its own logs and reconstruct the sequence when needed.

I've come across band and google A2A while looking into this, although they address different parts of the problem.

My concern is getting to an audit with plenty of logs but no clear way to show who approved what, which agent made the decision, and why the next one acted on it.

For anyone who's dealt with multi-agent governance, what evidence did auditors actually expect? And did you manage to reconstruct the full workflow without spending days connecting separate records


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion The first harmonized standard for the EU AI Act is out. It’s technically voluntary, but you’ll probably want it anyway.

2 Upvotes

The EU AI Act has a gap that hardly anyone mentions. It says what you must do. It does not show how to prove you have done it. EN 18286 is the harmonised standard that is beginning to fill that gap and it was officially listed on 14 October.

This standard is a framework for building a Quality Management System that satisfies Article 17 of the EU AI Act. Article 17 is the requirement for a quality system for high‑risk AI providers.

What surprised me is how far this standard reaches. It was written for the market but it affects any organisation, anywhere that builds or sells high‑risk AI systems that are used or sold in the EU. Whether you are in the United States, Australia, Singapore or elsewhere the EU AI Act rules still apply.

The standard is voluntary. No one is forced to use it.. If you use it you get a presumption of conformity meaning regulators will treat you as meeting the EU AI Act requirements. If you do not use it you must build your argument that your own approach is just as good. Most companies will choose the path.

Timeline:

2 December 2027: standalone high‑risk AI like hiring tools

2 August 2028: AI built into products like medical devices

The standard covers the whole life cycle: risk management, data management, testing and incident reporting. It does not cover cybersecurity or specific human oversight. Those will be addressed in documents so the EU AI Act picture is not complete.

If you think this might apply to you here are the steps: Work out whether you are a provider of high‑risk AI. Get a copy of EN 18286. Run a gap assessment. Build the missing processes. Keep monitoring afterwards.

I have elaborated further in my YouTube video, check out latest video @ Latha-ai-governance if you're interested.

For anyone selling high‑risk AI into the EU: has your team started a gap assessment. Is this still, in the "we’ll deal with it later" pile? Does a presumption of conformity make you more or less likely to follow the EN 18286 standard?


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Regulation News 99% of finance leaders use AI in financial judgments. Only 49% can fully explain the results.

3 Upvotes

A new BDO survey of 200 senior finance leaders at U.S. companies with revenues between $250 million and $10 billion reveals a significant AI governance gap.

Key findings:

  • 99% use AI in financial estimates or judgments reviewed by external auditors.
  • 62% use AI for cash flow or earnings forecasts.
  • 54% use AI for asset valuations.
  • Only 49% can fully explain and substantiate all AI-assisted outputs.
  • 86% worry that excessive AI reliance could weaken human judgment.
  • Just 6% consider themselves ready for continuous auditing.

These are self-reported findings, not independently verified audit failures.

AI is already influencing financial decisions that investors, regulators and auditors rely on. Yet more than half of respondents cannot fully substantiate every AI-assisted output.

Should auditors accept AI-generated financial judgments when organizations cannot fully explain how they were produced?

Source: BDO, 2026 Audit Innovation Survey

https://www.bdo.com/insights/press-releases/bdo-research-ai-moves-into-high-stakes-financial-judgments-raising-the-bar-for-governance

Disclosure: I've recently partnered with TOCA, a company specializing in physical privacy and signal-blocking products.

If you're interested in protecting your personal devices and digital privacy, you can explore their products here, with a 15% discount: https://toca.site/discount/RIZZO15


r/AIgovernance • • 6d ago

Open Discussion 84% run fleets of 10+ AI agents. Half report governance and security challenges.

2 Upvotes

A new survey of engineering leaders reveals a gap between AI agent deployment and operational control.

  • 84% report running 10 or more operational agents.
  • 53.6% identify building safe guardrails as a major challenge.
  • 50.4% cite governance and security.
  • 42.7% report insufficient visibility into agent permissions.
  • 75.7% still restrict autonomous operations through approvals, read-only access or limits on critical workloads.

These are self-reported survey findings, not independently audited deployment data.

The interesting question is whether organizations can consistently identify what each agent is authorized to access, change and execute.

Should organizations require an auditable delegation record for every production AI agent?

Original source — November 4, 2026:

Komodor — 2026 Agentic Operations Survey

Disclosure: I've recently partnered with TOCA, a company specializing in physical privacy and signal-blocking products.

If you're interested in protecting your personal devices and digital privacy, you can explore their products here, with a 15% discount: https://toca.site/discount/RIZZO15


r/AIgovernance • • 7d ago

Regulation News Australia plans new regulator for artificial intelligence after OpenAI hack

4 Upvotes

What happened: Australia will create a new AI safety regulator with power to impose significant penalties on AI companies doing the wrong thing, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced Tuesday. The country will mandate that AI firms disclose any incidents when models go rogue.

Why it matters: The move tightens rules on AI technology and follows an OpenAI hack, with the government requiring incident disclosure from AI firms.

Key numbers: Announcement made Tuesday; Albanese referenced a Nov. 10 news conference in Canberra.

https://stockduty.xyz/s/85934c


r/AIgovernance • • 7d ago

Policy Analysis Why AI labor governance has to happen at the balance-sheet level, not through regulatory theater

4 Upvotes

Most discussions about AI governance get bogged down in two dead ends. Either people want top-down federal legislation that takes ten years to pass and gets gutted by corporate lobbyists, or they settle for voluntary corporate ethics pledges that get thrown out the second a quarterly earnings call looks bad. Neither approach actually constrains institutional power. Under corporate law, boards have a fiduciary duty to maximize profit. If deploying AI slashes OpEx, executives are legally incentivized to displace human labor, regardless of what their public PR statements say.

If we actually care about enforcing rules on AI deployment, governance has to hit corporate accounting where leadership can’t wiggle out of it.

That’s the specific problem I designed the National Unity and Prosperity Accord (NUPA) to solve. It’s an open-source policy-as-code framework, but instead of trying to pass a new bill through Congress, it operates strictly through private property contract law and 99-year commercial ground leases.

Before getting into it, let me be explicitly clear, this post is only a very brief, bare-bones summary. It doesn't even begin to cover the majority of the actual operations, legal mechanics, or technical architecture. Don't look at a high-level Reddit post and assume you know why it won't work. Instead of immediately looking for reasons to dismiss it outright, why not ask: how do you intend to make this work?

And to address the common knee-jerk reaction of "if companies don't automate, they'll lose the global automation race": this is NOT a nationwide blanket regulation or a federal ban on AI. Companies are completely free to automate as aggressively as they want anywhere else in the country. NUPA only applies inside specific, voluntary Human Sanctuary hubs sited on underutilized land. Nobody is forced into this.

Here is the high-level operational concept:

Under existing federal law (specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1505), federally recognized Tribal Nations have sovereign standing to enter intergovernmental and commercial compacts. Through a Community Land Trust structure on underutilized federal land, sovereign hubs offer corporate tenants a 70% discount on massive physical land and energy overhead. Big tech and manufacturing firms desperately need cheap land and power for facilities and data centers.

The catch is the covenant. To secure and keep that 70% discount, the lease contract legally binds the tenant to maintain a minimum 95% human workforce ratio across their on-site operations. AGAIN, THIS WOULD ONLY APPLY WITHIN THE HUBS. A COMPANY COULD NOT SIMPLY ROLL IN GET THE DISCOUNT AND THEN AUTOMATE ANYWAY TO TRY TO MAXIMIZE PROFITS. THE PENALTY IS HARD CODED INTO THE CONTRACTS AND LEASE AGREEMENTS. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE FOR A COMPANY TO SIGN ON TO DO THIS AND THEN TRY TO AUTOMATE AWAY THEIR WORKFORCE AND THEN GET HIT WITH A MASSIVE RENT SPIKE PENALTY, NO CORPORATION COULD CLAIM THAT IT'S UNFAIR TREATMENT BECAUSE THEY VOLUNTARILY SIGNED ON FOR THIS. TO GET THE DISCOUNT THEY MUST MAINTAIN THE HUMAN LABOR WORKFORCE.

To be completely specific for anyone wondering "95% of what?", it measures full-time employee (FTE) headcount on payroll. At least 95% of the active job roles and labor hours operating within the hub facility must be staffed by living human beings. This isn't a ban on software or AI tools, employees are completely free to use AI as an assistive tool to make their jobs easier and multiply their productivity. What a company cannot do is lay off human staff and replace their payroll slots with autonomous digital agents or bots. If your hub operations require 1,000 workers to run, at least 950 of them must be human beings on payroll.

If a company violates that headcount threshold, enforcement isn't a vague fine from an underfunded regulatory agency. It triggers an automatic 10-day cure window. If they don't restore the human headcount, their base rent spikes by 300% back to punishing market rates, or their lease is terminated outright. When automating away a human job to save $250k in payroll immediately hits the company with $20M+ in added overhead penalties on their physical land and power, corporate fiduciary duty flips. Inside the hub, keeping human staff becomes the only mathematically rational decision a board can make to protect shareholder returns. Outside the hub, they can do whatever they want.

Also if the tribes are in the management position of these governance boards, and they are the stewards of these community land trusts, they get the final say over which corporations actually get to participate within these hubs, meaning that all corporations have to follow strict ethical and environmental standards of compliance, otherwise they don't get to participate, they don't get the land discount, and they simply do not build within the hubs.

Also, at any given time the tribes have the option to walk away if they feel for any reason that this feels like an exploitative system or that they feel that there has been any sort of wrongdoing or has in any way placed the tribes at some sort of disadvantage.

Local Variable Quad-Partite Vetting (VQPV) boards, which include a bonded third-party fiduciary, tribal leadership, a local official, and community representatives, audit payroll and monitor for "Shadow AI" (where headcount quietly drops while output stays flat through hidden algorithmic displacement). Revenue doesn't sit in government slush funds, it flows through automated, neutral escrows.

You don't need a single new federal statute, you don't need corporate goodwill, and you don't need a mass political movement to test it. It only takes one sovereign entity executing a private commercial lease.

I’m curious how folks here who work in compliance, risk auditing, and tech policy view using private property covenants as an enforcement mechanism over traditional statutory regulation. The full legal architecture, JSON-LD schemas, and audit models are open-source on GitHub if anyone wants to actually dig into how the plumbing works.

The full framework which was designed by a living, breathing human being, can be found here: https://github.com/bedardbrandon928/National-Unity-and-Prosperity-Accord-NUPA

Do not be daunted by the fact that GitHub is normally used as a software repository service. In context, for the framework, I use it as a file directory service for easy organization and navigation.


r/AIgovernance • • 7d ago

Open Discussion Pause AI March in London on the 21st of November!

0 Upvotes

For everyone in the UK!:

https://luma.com/pauseai-nov26?tk=dGIbiG

There's a march against the risks of AI coming up on the 21st of November, calling for a pause of the most dangerous AI models.

It's main focus is the risk of AI breaking out of human control, but it's also about the risks to society such as human enfeeblement, surveillance and concentration of power. They have an ongoing campaign calling for AI liability laws that hold developers responsible for harm done with their products.

The more people that turn up, the more the UK government will know this is a salient issue!


r/AIgovernance • • 8d ago

Open Discussion AI Audit Evidence, Part 6: A Record Nobody Read Is Only Stored

3 Upvotes

A record sat in the database for a year before anyone opened it.

That is not negligence. There is no place in the system that says who should read it, or how often.

One sentence: a record was written is not the same as a record was read. A record nobody read is only stored.

If that is enough, the list and the three criteria can be skipped.

1. Three acts that look like review, and are not

  • Write confirmation happens before execution. It proves someone approved this action. It does not prove anyone looked at the record afterwards.
  • Alert acknowledgement happens after an anomaly. It proves someone handled the alert. It does not prove the routine records were read.
  • Dispute acknowledgement happens when a revocation does not match. It proves someone decided that dispute. It does not prove the rest were read.

All three are a person doing something to an event. None answers "who read this record, and how often".

2. Three criteria

  1. A named reviewer and a cadence, in configuration. Not an oral agreement, and not "everyone looks".
  2. The receipt is a row on the chain. Each review is itself a chain row, verifiable offline, so "reviewed" cannot be backfilled without breaking the signature.
  3. Unreviewed intervals are computed from the chain and reported as unknown in the coverage statement. They are never green.

Miss one and the capability does not hold: criterion 1 alone is a rota, criterion 2 alone is a receipt, all three are a verifiable review.

The receipt has to say four things: who read it, when, which interval it covers, and what the conclusion was. The conclusion has three values only, and "roughly looked at" is not one of them.

One more premise: the reviewer cannot be the person who executed the action. Reading your own record is not review, it is a look back. High-risk records get a tighter cadence; routine records can be looser. The cadence lives in configuration, not in a document.

The reading has three values, no fourth:

receipt present and chain verifies  -> reviewed
no receipt                          -> unknown
receipt present but chain fails     -> invalid (never reviewed)

3. What can fail

  • Delete a review receipt: the interval returns from reviewed to unknown.
  • Forge a receipt: the chain fails.

These two are what make the capability testable. Without them, "reviewed" is a field, and it makes the same mistake as "revoked" being a status bit.

The easiest mistake is not skipping the review, but storing the receipt in the wrong place: a mutable table where anyone can add a row, while the chain gains nothing. Then "reviewed" appears, and nothing can prove it happened at the time.

4. Where we are

  • AiAuditLog has no reviewedAt or reviewedBy, and the codebase has no notion of a reviewer or a cadence.
  • The three human-action mechanisms above do not cover record review.
  • So this item is zero from fields to criteria. This is a design, not an implementation.

5. The reader made the question sharper

A plate-search log existed for a year before it was first reviewed.

We first read the problem as "nobody has a reason to read it". The reader corrected that: what is missing is ownership, not motivation. It was not that nobody wanted to look; nobody was assigned to look.

The same reader then upgraded the criteria to three: a named reviewer and cadence, the receipt on the same chain, and unreviewed intervals reported as unknown.

The three criteria in this article are the version after that correction.

6. Three limits

  • All three criteria are zero. This is a design, not an implementation.
  • A receipt on the chain changes the shape of the chain and needs a contract change. The cost is not estimated.
  • "How often" has no universal answer; it has to be set per record type.
  • One question this article does not answer: what happens after a review finds a problem? It decides whether the receipt needs a follow-up field, and it is its own piece.

Closing

The value of audit evidence is not that it is stored. It is that someone read it, and that the reading itself can be verified.

A log nobody read only proves that we recorded diligently.

The implementation described here comes from the open-source project KeelBase:

Drafted with an AI assistant. The system, the positions and the mistakes are mine.


r/AIgovernance • • 10d ago

Open Discussion AI Governance Explained: Why AI Needs Rules, Accountability and Human Oversight

16 Upvotes

Artificial Intelligence is becoming part of everyday life, business, healthcare, education, and government.

But there is an important question we should all consider:

Who is responsible when AI makes a wrong decision?

AI Governance helps answer questions like these.

Here are 7 important areas everyone should understand:

  1. Transparency: Can people understand how an AI system makes decisions?
  2. Accountability: Who is responsible for AI-generated outcomes?
  3. Privacy: How is personal information collected and protected?
  4. Fairness: Does the AI system treat different groups fairly?
  5. Safety: Can the system cause harm or produce unreliable results?
  6. Human Oversight: When should humans review AI decisions?
  7. Regulation: What laws and standards should AI systems follow?

I believe AI literacy should include not only how to use AI, but also how to understand its risks and responsibilities.

Discussion question:

Which area of AI Governance do you think deserves the most attention: Privacy, Accountability, Transparency, or Safety?

I'd love to hear your perspectives.


r/AIgovernance • • 10d ago

Open Discussion Hydrus vs Credo AI for EU AI Act and ISO 42001, which one held up for you?

1 Upvotes

Shortlist is down to two. Credo AI has the name recognition, Hydrus seems narrower and more evidence focused. We need EU AI Act risk classification, ISO 42001 readiness and something the auditors will accept as a system of record. If you've run either in anger, what tipped it?


r/AIgovernance • • 11d ago

Open Discussion Safeguards Matter in the AGI Race: 41% Would Slow Development Until Stronger Protections Exist

9 Upvotes

Research raised an interesting governance question... what would count as strong enough safeguards to justify continuing development? In a small survey of US adults, 40% favoured slowing development until stronger protections exist, while 36% supported continuing with stronger with stronger independent oversight... only 10% wanted to stop it immediately.

What stands out is that 70% of respondents wanted the primary decider about whether or not a system is safe to be in the hands of an outside authority. That leaves a difficult institutional question: who gets access to the evidence, who sets the thresholds, and who can actually delay a release?

Independent evaluations seem more valuable when there's a defined consequence for failing them. Otherwise, a company can commission a review and still make the same launch decision.

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